



NATIONS UNIES  
République centrafricaine

# CADRE DE RÉSULTATS STRATÉGIQUES 2025-2028

## Fonds pour la Consolidation de la Paix

République centrafricaine



FONDS POUR LA  
CONSOLIDATION DE  
LA PAIX

## Background

1. After almost three years of political transition, the election of President Faustin Archange Touadéra and the holding of legislative elections in 2016 marked the return to constitutional order in the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>1</sup> This transition was extensively supported by the international community, most visibly with the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). In October 2016, the CAR Government approved a recovery and peacebuilding plan (RCPCA), supported by the African Development Bank, the European Union, the World Bank Group and the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> The RCPCA was presented at an international donor conference in Brussels on November 17, 2016, and raised \$2.1 billion.<sup>3</sup> In 2021, due to the impact of COVID, the RCPCA was extended for two years.
2. Since 2017 the Government of CAR, with support of its international partners, has delivered significant results across governance, security, social, economic and environmental domains, notably marked by the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR) in 2019 and the Luanda roadmap in 2021. With the end of the RCPCA in December 2023, the Government of CAR announced a new phase of the stabilization and reconstruction process of the country through the development of an ambitious National Development Plan (PND) 2024-2028.
3. The launch of the PND in September 2024 is an opportunity for the renewal of the partnership between CAR and its international partners in support of peace and development. The PND, capitalizing on the completed projects of the RCPCA and the APPR, sets out the framework for cooperation and dialogue between the Government of CAR and its development partners for the coming five years. The PND is explicit that despite significant progress “challenges remain for stabilization, peacebuilding, and socio-economic development in CAR”<sup>4</sup> and presents the priorities for a new phase of the country's stabilization and reconstruction process moving from emergency response to development.
4. In his February 2024 report, the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed “the support of partners for the Central African Republic and called for greater and more sustained support for the country and its population.” The President of the CAR Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission emphasized this further in his report to the Security Council of December 2023 advising of the need for a “concerted and unified approach between the partners of the Central African Republic...”<sup>6</sup> identifying shared priorities for peacebuilding, and a mapping of projects and instruments.
5. In 2023 the United Nations launched the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2023-2027, as a partnership agreement with the government for the development, execution, monitoring and evaluation of UN support to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in CAR. The UNSDCF emphasizes sustaining peace both as an outcome of specific investment and as a cross-cutting objective across development objectives.
6. Recognizing the need for continued and scaled up support to peacebuilding, and the importance of inclusive, targeted, and sustained approaches, the UN has committed to work with partners to strengthen strategic alignment on key results for peacebuilding over the course of the PND. This alignment is intended to ensure that the funds of UN and partners are focused

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<sup>1</sup>On July 23, 2014, the belligerents signed an agreement to cease hostilities in Brazzaville. In 2016, the country hosted a national dialogue, the Bangui Forum, followed by elections, opening a window of opportunity to lay the foundations for lasting peace, recovery and accountability in CAR.

<sup>2</sup>The recovery and peacebuilding needs assessments are based on a mutual international commitment on the part of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union to align their partnership and approaches to post-conflict recovery to support the Government's efforts. This commitment was formalized in a declaration signed in 2008, relating to the joint conduct of “Post-Conflict Needs Assessments”, recently renamed “Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessments”.

<sup>3</sup>An evaluation of the United Nations response found that “recovery and peacebuilding needs assessments are based on mutual international commitment on the part of the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union to align their partnership and their approaches to post-conflict recovery in order to support the Government's efforts.” UNSDCF Evaluation

<sup>4</sup> GoCAR (2024). *National Development Plan of the Central African Republic PND-RCA 2024-2028*, pp 3.

<sup>5</sup>At the same time, the Security Council, within the framework of resolution S/RES/2709 (2043), requested the Secretary General to “conduct and provide to the Security Council, no later than August 15, 2024, an independent strategic review of MINUSCA... [assessing] the challenges to peace and security in the CAR, and providing detailed recommendations regarding the possible reconfiguration of the mandate of MINUSCA, on the effectiveness of the mission, the adequacy of resources and the options for gradually adapting its civilian, police and military components, where appropriate, as well as recommendations for a possible transition plan and possible withdrawal of MINUSCA when conditions are met.”

<sup>6</sup> Letter dated 19 December 2023 from the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2023/1013

on shared priorities and facilitate a multi-sectoral, impact-driven approach to peace and development, while maintaining a dedicated focus on the most marginalised groups, in particular women and youth.

7. Developed with support from the UN-WB partnership under the Peacebuilding Fund's Humanitarian, Development, Peacebuilding & Partnerships (HDPP) facility, this note presents strategic results for peacebuilding that have been developed under full government leadership and ownership, as well as the outline of the context, lessons, and management arrangements of this exercise, as well as a draft of the accompanying strategic results framework (annex 1).

## **Context**

8. Since 2016, CAR has undergone transformations at all levels to regain peace and stability. On February 6, 2019, the Central African government signed a peace agreement with 14 armed groups, which was facilitated by the African Union, the Sudanese government, the United Nations and the Russian government. The Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR) was signed by most armed groups and brought together all international actors around a single document.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently a government comprising 13 representatives of 9 armed groups was set up as well as a joint security committee.
9. However, progress towards stabilization and sustainable development is never linear.<sup>8</sup> On January 13, 2021, the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) launched two simultaneous attacks on Bangui before being repelled by MINUSCA, the Central African Armed Forces; (FACA) and reinforcements from Russia and Rwanda. On October 15, 2021, President Touadéra unilaterally decreed a ceasefire, in accordance with the road map adopted on September 16 by the States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). This was welcomed by armed groups. In April 2023, five armed groups decided to dissolve their rebel movements.<sup>9</sup> These dissolutions are part of the DDR process initiated in September 2022 by the meeting with representatives of the 14 armed groups signatories of the APPR-RCA.
10. The RCPCA identified several structural causes of fragility and conflict that should be addressed for the CAR to move forward on a path to sustainable peace. These included scarce resources and the concentration of political power in the hands of elites, and imbalances between Bangui and the rest of the country, as well as the marginalization of certain extremely poor regions, particularly in the northeast. These underlying causes contributed to a cyclical nature of conflict exacerbated by weak institutions, which have historically struggled to maintain social and national cohesion, which with the lack of prosecution for human rights violations, notably extremely high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and "victors' justice", had created an environment of widespread impunity and a lack of confidence among the population in formal justice.<sup>10</sup> In addition, regional instability, arms trafficking and the illegal trade in diamonds and gold fuel insecurity in the country.
11. The efforts and profile of UN agency, funds and programmes are overwhelmingly humanitarian, reflecting large-scale and long-standing humanitarian needs and food insecurity. The current humanitarian appeal stands at \$368m targeting some 1.9 million Central Africans. The current appeal is down from \$533m in 2023 reflecting a slight reduction in humanitarian needs, although some 2.8 million people are assessed in 2024 as extremely vulnerable to the extent that humanitarian assistance alone is not sufficient for their well-being. Despite persistent humanitarian needs and pockets of continued displacement, the context is shifting positively with improving access and security conditions and a clear focus from the Government to a scaling up development investments and outcomes in line with the Sustainable Development Goals.
12. Today CAR remains an environment where respect for human rights, development and peace and security are intrinsically linked. The structural causes of fragility continue to require sustained attention and the partnership between CAR and its international partners remains of existential importance to sustainable peace and development for the country.

## **Objective**

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<sup>7</sup>United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2454 (2019). S/2019/608. July 30, 2019

<sup>8</sup>For example, during the first years of the RCPCA, "the country did not experience a decline but rather an upsurge in violence. Massive investments and promising reforms have had a much faster impact on Bangui than in remote areas, where armed groups continue to operate. As a result, despite development progress, CAR's overall fragility outlook in 2018 was not significantly different from 2016."

<sup>9</sup>These are (i) Séléka renovated for peace and justice; (ii) Revolution and Justice, Belanga wing ; (iii) Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic, Abdoulaye Issene wing ; (iv) Democratic Front of the Central African People, wing of the dissident Jean Rock SOBI; (v) Patriotic Movement for the Central African Republic, wing of the dissident Hassan Adramane .

<sup>10</sup> According to the perception study on peace, justice and security carried out in 2021, 50% of Central Africans have confidence in formal justice while 71% of them have confidence in alternative justice mechanisms Report 6 of survey on peace-justice-security, June 2021, PBF

13. In accordance with PND and the spirit of the *Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning* (2008), the objective of the strategic alignment exercise is to support the government and international partners of CAR (UN, World Bank, AfDB, and EU) in ensuring that investments contribute to sustaining peace through shared context analysis, joint monitoring of shared indicators, milestones and activities and agreed principles for the mainstreaming of peace through development programming, reforms, and policy,
14. The expected outcome is better alignment of flagship investments and instruments, collaboration on high-level joint monitoring of impact and improved strategic dialogue between partners and government on the joint promotion, priorities and support needs for sustaining peace.

### **Lessons learned**

15. Recognising the complex ecosystem of local and international actors engaged in CAR, this exercise is based on six key lessons to which all partners commit in implementing.
  - *Conflict Analysis*: Efforts to support peace in CAR, should draw on a shared analysis of the dynamics of the conflict, including its root causes, actors involved and affected communities, as a basis for the design, targeting and implementation of projects with a clear and direct impact and theory of change for contributing to peace.
  - *Inclusive National ownership*: Progress on building a sustainable peace in CAR depends on government leadership and ownership of coordination, programming and reforms. Government leadership will be ensured throughout the design, targeting and monitoring of interventions, and through the reinforcement of robust platforms for policy dialogue on peacebuilding priorities, milestones, and objectives with partners. Furthermore, this ownership should be inclusive, both in terms of the definition of priorities and in the monitoring of results, with local authorities and civil society integrated throughout the process.
  - *Humanitarian, Development, Peace Nexus*: Peacebuilding in CAR should move progressively from a focus on stand-alone projects to a mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and peace positive investments into development policy, planning, and programming across the country. This will require ensuring that conflict sensitive criteria and analysis are available over the long-term to development programs to maximize positive contributions to peace, and ensuring, wherever possible, that development activities are designed to actively build peace and social cohesion.
  - *Institutional reform*: Many studies, including the Pathways for Peace report by the World Bank/United Nations in 2018, demonstrated that countries that find ways to achieve lasting peace undertook complicated and contested processes of institutional reform. This requires ensuring that peacebuilding activities balance addressing proximate threats to stability with ensuring alignment on institutional reform goals that is conflict sensitive in both design and approach.
  - *Conflict prevention*: Sustainable peace requires addressing structural causes of conflict but must also ensure early warning and dialogue between partners on investments in conflict prevention mechanisms in emerging areas of risk. By addressing potential sources of tension before they escalate into violence, development efforts can be mobilized to help prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflicts.
  - *Monitoring and Evaluation*: Mainstreaming of peace into development programming cannot be achieved without dedicated, robust monitoring, evaluation and reporting of impact. Through the development of a basket of conflict-sensitive indicators, partners will be able to jointly track progress and results, communicate clearly with stakeholders what is working/ what is not, and make necessary adjustments to ensure that development efforts effectively contribute to peacebuilding goals.

### **Strategic Priorities**

16. Based on the recommendations of the Bangui Forum of May 2015, the priorities of the Government Political Program of 2021, the five retrospective studies and on the aspirations and perceptions of the grassroots population expressed during the 2023 consultations, carried out as part of the process of formulating the RCA Vision 2050, the PND 2024-2028 aims to make the CAR “ *a country prosperous, with quality human capital and resilient and sustainable infrastructure, based on a more inclusive rule of law focused on the principles of good governance.*”
17. The strategic axes of the PND are:
  - **Strategic axis 1** : Strengthening security, promoting governance and the rule of law
  - **Strategic axis 2**: Development of human capital and equitable access to quality basic social services

- **Strategic axis 3:** Development of resilient and sustainable infrastructure
- **Strategic axis 4 :** Acceleration of production and value chains in productive sectors for strong, inclusive and sustainable economic growth
- **Strategic axis 5 :** Environmental sustainability and resilience to crises and the effects of climate change

18. the strategic results framework draws on these results of the PND, as well as on the priorities presented in the UNSDCF, the MINUSCA political strategy 2023-2028, and other documents, including the World Bank's Turn Around Allocation monitoring framework, to propose four objectives.

- **Strategic Priority 1:** *D'ici 2028, la confiance de la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, dans une gouvernance démocratique, tant au niveau national que local, est renforcé*

Achieving strengthened trust in governance institutions in the Central African Republic (CAR) is essential for promoting long-term stability and development by 2028. The CAR has faced years of political instability, conflict, and weak institutional frameworks, which have eroded public confidence in public institutions governance. Alongside the strengthening of core governance functions and institutional capacity, investments in rebuilding state presence and trust alongside investments in establishing democratic governance is critical for CAR's progress toward sustainable peace. As of 1 June 2024, 147 prefectural and sub-prefectural authorities out of 174 (84 per cent) are present at their posts, and 18 of the 25 courts outside of Bangui were operational.<sup>11</sup> By focusing on state presence, reinforcing democratic processes, inclusive governance reforms, and ensuring citizen participation in decision-making processes, at both national and local levels, the government can rebuild trust in its institutions.

- **Strategic Priority 2:** *D'ici à 2028, les institutions de l'État, tant au niveau national que local, sont améliorées pour fournir de services clés liés à la justice, la sécurité et les droits humains.*

The security situation in CAR remains volatile, especially along the borders, which are subject to periodic armed clashes, at the same time, armed groups continue to seek control over mining resources and transhumance corridors, attacking civilians as well as national defence and security forces' positions. In response, the Government, with MINUSCA support, continues to implement a multidimensional approach combining increased Force presence with tailored DDR and rule of law. These include support for the deployment of internal security forces through the national territory, the national disarmament and demobilisation programme, strengthening the presence and effectiveness of the formal rule of law, and strengthening transitional justice processes.

- **Strategic Priority 3:** *D'ici 2028, la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, accède de manière inclusive aux opportunités économique résilient et durable*

As of 2023, two thirds of the population lived in extreme poverty<sup>12</sup>, furthermore, modelling the variance in household consumption shows that 88.6 percent of Central Africans have at least a 50 percent chance of being below the national poverty line in the next two years.<sup>9</sup> Notwithstanding the complex causal links between conflict, livelihoods, and poverty, conflict has hampered inclusive growth and poverty reduction in CAR which would in turn reduce the opportunity cost of participating in armed groups. With economic growth estimated to have reached 0.9 percent in 2023, compared to 0.5 percent in 2022, beyond a focus on growth, this requires a dedicated focus on the inclusion of the population in economic revitalisation. With more than three-quarters of CAR's population aged less than 30 years and with only 1% of Central Africans benefitting from government social safety nets, investing in human capital alone will not be enough: young people will need commensurate livelihood opportunities for CAR to take advantage of its demographic dividend. With a dedicated focus on the expansion of economic activity and presence, as well as the creation of temporary jobs and permanent income generating activities, Young people without productive livelihoods have been drawn into armed groups, further fuelling conflict and violence.<sup>13</sup>

- **Strategic Priority 4:** *D'ici 2028, les tensions et les conflits violents entre les communautés, y compris entre les personnes retournées et les communautés d'accueil, sont réduits et la cohésion sociale est renforcée*

Forced displacement is currently impacting some 20% of the population of 6.1 million in Central African Republic. There are over 511,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 22% of whom are in dedicated IDP sites with the balance in family and community hosting arrangements. There remain 751,000 Central African Refugees outside the country. Recent

<sup>11</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic, S/2024/473, [https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s\\_2024\\_473\\_en.pdf](https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2024_473_en.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Macro Poverty Outlook for Central African Republic : April 2024 (English). Macro Poverty Outlook (MPO) Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099235204052498520/IDU1e2029cea1a400146081b276102d05b85022b>

<sup>13</sup> World Bank. Central African Republic Poverty Assessment - A Road Map Towards Poverty Reduction in the Central African Republic (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099111323121515851/P17739108d680e074088b608a00615bcb3a>

improvements in security have been evidenced in increased IDP returns to areas of origin, and with the support of the humanitarian community a modest but promising reduction in displacement.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, these returns, in addition to existing inter and intra communal tensions, in particular population movements related to transhumant livelihoods, have created tensions with risks of secondary and tertiary conflicts breaking out. On top of large-scale and long-standing humanitarian support, IDP solutions and government capacity to tackle such significant levels of displacement will require a greater complement of longer-term financing and programmatic support with a close attention to the conflict risks presented by these returns. Protracted internal displacement is the result of decades long, continuous internal armed, intercommunity and political conflict which continue to impede development amidst high rates of poverty and concerning levels of food insecurity. Fostering social cohesion through dialogue and reconciliation efforts among various ethnic and social groups, including returnees, transhumant and residents, will be key to reducing tensions and preventing future conflicts. Strengthening these foundations is critical for CAR's progress toward sustainable peace and democratic governance.

19. These priorities have been the subject of broad consultations with CSOs, the United Nations and technical and financial partners. Analysis of existing strategic plans was undertaken in consultation with all partners, and a workshop engaging all partners, government and civil society was held on the 9<sup>th</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> October 2024. The strategic alignment exercise was presented and validated by the CAR Government at this workshop. In addition, these results will also serve as tools for assessment and resource mobilization related to Peacebuilding Objectives.
20. Recognising that efforts to sustain peace will take place across all of the strategic axes of the PND, the alignment exercise will bring together key partners to coordinate priority activities and programs under these objectives. Partners engaged in the strategic alignment exercise will identify specific initiatives within the framework of these Strategic Axes as key contributions to peace building and align on key results and indicators. Additionally, partners in the strategic alignment exercise will maintain a policy dialogue with government on key reform priorities, aligning milestones and targets across instruments. These key results can be updated and reviewed at request based on a shared or updated context analysis.
21. In identifying specific activities under these strategic axes, careful attention will be paid to ensuring alignment with existing plans, eg. the PND, the MINUSCA political strategy 2023-2028, and the UNSDCF, with particular attention to ensuring that investments bridge the gap between Bangui and the prefectures.

### **Prioritisation Criteria**

22. CAR faces considerable needs, not all of which can be met immediately and simultaneously. Considering the above lessons learned, the different actors of the peacebuilding ecosystem will benefit from agreeing on common prioritization criteria for the identification and delivery of specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound results for peacebuilding, and with these shared indicators.
23. The RCPCA had prioritization and sequencing criteria based on four variables: (1) time; (2) sectors, (3) geographic areas and (4) population groups. The partners reinforced the need to maintain these prioritization criteria, and to move forward with geographic targeting based on government criteria.
24. Based on these, revised criteria for the prioritization of projects under the strategic results framework are:
  - That the planned activity will have a visible impact on peacebuilding and/or on the reduction of critical risks and factors of fragility.
  - That the activity will directly target the most vulnerable population groups, with a particular focus to gender and youth, and/or the most disadvantaged regions of the country, with particular attention paid to bridging the gap between Bangui and the prefectures of historically marginalized areas
  - That the activity can be realistically implemented within the time frame provided, i.e. by 2028, considering existing implementation (national/international) and absorption capacities and available resources
  - That the activity will have catalytic effect by removing barriers that block longer-term/sustained peacebuilding support, establish essential systems necessary to rebuild the legitimacy of the State or mobilise additional stakeholders in existing peacebuilding efforts.

### **Implementation Arrangements**

25. Alignment of strategic results requires clear governance and management arrangements in line with the PND. To support the SRF, it is proposed to set up a dedicated Steering Committee (eg. Peacebuilding Steering Committee) with the task of providing

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<sup>14</sup> United Nations Secretary General Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement, Mission Report, Central African Republic February 23 – March 1, 2024.

strategic guidance and oversight on peacebuilding activities at country level. This committee will be co-chaired by the Minister of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Co-Chairs will convene meetings as required, and will be tasked with

- Sharing of context analysis, data, and programming, as relevant, related to peacebuilding.
- Reviewing and approving the ToR of Sustaining Peace Steering Committee, the Technical Committee and updating and / or modifying them, as necessary.
- Providing strategic guidance for the prioritization of peacebuilding interventions and geographical areas to be considered.
- Supervise the implementation of the PBF portfolio and its progress, and decide on strategic reorientations if necessary.
- Conduct joint monitoring and evaluation missions in the field in cooperation with implementing partners.
- Ensuring project proposals and funding requests are in line with the approved Strategic Results Framework, including:
  - Approving, overseeing and reviewing the Strategic Results Framework for sustaining peace in CAR
  - Ensuring there are monitoring mechanisms in place to track progress against the Strategic Results Framework.
  - Reconsidering periodically the peacebuilding vision and strategy contained in the Strategic Results Framework and determining if it is still valid or needs amendment.

26. Representation at the Steering Committee will include

- 2 Government representatives:
  - Ministre chargé du désarmement, de la Démobilisation, de la Réintégration, du Rapatriement et du Suivi de l'Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation ;
  - Ministre chargé de la justice, de la promotion des droits de l'Homme et de la bonne gouvernance, Garde des Sceaux ;
  - Ministre de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité publique ;
  - Ministre chargé de l'Action humanitaire et de la Solidarité ;
  - Ministre chargé de la Promotion de la Jeunesse, des Sports et de l'Éducation civique ;
  - Ministre chargé de l'Administration du territoire, de la Décentralisation et du Développement local ;
  - Ministre chargé de la Promotion du genre, de la Protection de la femme, de la Famille et de l'Enfant.
- 3 Multilateral Partners
  - World Bank Group
  - European Union
  - African Development Bank
- Représentatives of the United Nations agences, fonds et programmes des Nations Unies (eg. Representat du PMT)
- Representatives of Bilateral Partners
  - Eg. France, Morocco, Switzerland
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- 2 Representatives of Civil Society
  - Représentant de l'organisation des femmes;
  - Représentant de l'organisation des jeunes.

27. In addition, the steering committee can invite, with agreement of the co-chairs, as participants/observers, eg. Représentatives of the Bureau du DSRSG/RC/HC, Représentant de la MINUSCA, and other UN agencies Fund and programmes.

28. The Steering Committee will meet when convened as requested by the co-chairs at least once a year. Ad hoc meetings may be organized when convened by the co-chairs. The meeting notices and agenda as well as all working documents are prepared by the PBF Secretariat and sent to members at least seven (07) days before the meeting date.

29. The agenda is determined by the co-chairs of the Steering Committee. Committee members may request that other items be included on the agenda, but rejection or acceptance remains at the discretion of the Co-chairs.

30. The quorum of the Committee is made up of more than 50% of the members, including at least one co-chair present.

31. The decisions of the Committee are taken by a simple majority of the members present. In the event of a tie, the co-chairs have the casting vote.

32. In the event of a conflict of interest, the members concerned do not participate in the votes.
33. At the end of the meeting, a detailed report is drawn up and sent to the co-presidents. The co-presidents jointly sign all decisions.
34. This committee will be supported by a Technical Committee (eg. 'conflict sensitivity hub'), which will rely on the PBF Secretariat and contributions from partners, composed of representatives of the United Nations, members of partner institutions and representatives of Government Institutions. Recognizing that the ambition is to monitor broader peacebuilding outcomes, this working group will play a broader service function across issues related to peacebuilding in CAR, as well as supporting the design, allocation and monitoring of resources for the Secretary-Genera's PBF.
35. This working group will be responsible for:
  - Preparation of the Steering Committee including formulation of recommendations and guidance.
  - Sharing of information on ongoing interventions related to peacebuilding, including the review of the mapping of projects.
  - Sharing of knowledge, best practice and lessons on peacebuilding interventions and methodologies in CAR
  - Suggesting revision of the Strategic Results Framework to the Steering Committee - by identifying key Peacebuilding results and indicators under the PND.
  - Coordinating proposed programmatic responses to risks between partners under each of the Strategic Result Framework outcomes.
  - Proposing to the Steering Committee joint missions, joint campaigns, joint communications and joint initiatives,
  - Ensuring visibility and communication of results of investments in peacebuilding
  - Coordinating the geographic and programmatic prioritization of peacebuilding activities
36. It will also be important that this coordination at the central level reinforces coordination at the decentralized level aligned with the strategy of the PND and the law of centralization.
37. The Technical Committee meets as needed upon convocation by the Co-Chairs of prior to the meeting of the Steering Committee, at least twice a year. On an ad hoc basis, any persons or organizations may be invited to participate, based on their expertise on the issues on the agenda, to take part in the work of the Technical Committee, with an advisory vote.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

38. The SRF is not a new planning framework. All projects aligned with the SRF, will be approved based on the partners existing country plans and frameworks aligned with the National Development Plan ( PND) 2024-2028, which takes into account the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR signed in 2019) as well as the Road Map for Peace known as the Luanda Road Map signed in 2021. It is articulated around the strategic axes of the PND.
39. The SRF monitoring framework will be targeted and light, in order to be both strategic and sustainable. It will provide a snapshot of progress and obstacles in order to foster strategic dialogue, inform decision making and communicate results to national authorities, technical and financial partners and communities.
40. It is recommended that the framework capture three types of monitoring:
  - (1) results and achievements over the course of the SRF,
  - (2) a set of milestones articulating concrete actions that will serve as stepping stones for achieving the objectives,
  - (3) transparent tracking of aid flows and indicators focused on peacebuilding.
41. The indicators of SRF are selected from already existing plans, namely the PND and UNSDCF. Each partner engaged in the Strategic Results Framework will maintain their respective separate reporting, monitoring, and evaluation accountabilities, contributing data to the Strategic Result matrix based on their existing plans. To complement existing indicators each strategic result includes perception indicator(s). The Steering Committee can commission a perception survey (e.g. HHI), with support from participating partners.
42. The indicators under each strategic priority should be measured regularly over the course of implementation to demonstrate trends over time (see M&E framework in annexes). Lessons from other transition situations suggest that indicators must provide a basis for high-level political dialogue over technical reporting. The SRF can be evaluated at the request of the Steering Committee (e.g. Mid-term evaluation and final evaluation). The SRF and the M&E framework can be modified/ updated at the request of the Steering Committee.
43. Monitoring is essential for tracking progress, but it serves little purpose if the findings are not properly shared and used to inform decision making. Results need to be communicated to different stakeholders to ensure monitoring processes are meaningful and support better development outcomes. As such, each partner to the SRF will contribute to communications

through their existing strategies, however, principles for joint communication over joint activities (eg. Joint missions, joint results) should be developed to accompany the framework.

## **Funding**

44. The alignment of strategic results does not provide for the creation of new financing instruments; it is expected that all partners commit their instrument to contribute to the results. The UN Peacebuilding Fund started its investments in CAR in 2008, and as a country on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), CAR is automatically eligible for PBF funding. The monitoring framework will help projects through the strategic axes of the PND, to integrate monitoring of impact on peacebuilding, through the indicators identified in the strategic results framework ( Annex 1).
45. The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund is the United Nations' instrument of first resort to respond and prevent violent conflict. The PBF is designed to be a timely, catalytic and risk-tolerant investor, uniquely placed to incentivize coherent work across institutional mandates, based on national leadership. Under this alignment exercise, the PBF will maintain its core peacebuilding focus areas mandated in its terms of reference while scaling up its support to cross-border and regional approaches, transition contexts, prevention and inclusion.

## CADRE DES RESULTATS STRATEGIQUES 2025-2028

### Résultat Stratégique 1: D'ici 2028, la confiance de la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, dans une gouvernance démocratique, tant au niveau national que local, est renforcé

**Reflète les priorités suivantes :**

**Plans et Strategies Nationale:**

Plan National de Developpement

**Plans et Strategies Internationale**

Agenda 2063 de l'Union Africaine

Objectifs de développement durable

Objectif 16 : Paix, justice et institutions efficaces – Cibles 2, 3, 5, 7, 9

Objectif 17 : Partenariat – Cibles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

**Théorie du Changement**

**Hypothèses fondamentales**

Ce résultat stratégique ne peut qu'obtenir si et seulement si les climats aux aspects de la gouvernance notamment : la Stabilité politique et sécuritaire, l'Existence d'un cadre institutionnel fort, l'Engagement des bailleurs de fonds, la Volonté politique nationale, le Cadre d'intervention humanitaire sécurisé et la Formation spécialisée des institutions en charge de la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS) soient favorables.

Possibles Indicateurs des résultats	Baseline/ Cible	Moyens de vérification	Comment
<p><b>Indicateur 1.a</b> : Pourcentage de fonctionnaires et agents de l'État (personnel civil) effectivement en poste hors de Bangui <i>Approche Programmatique: RESA, décentralisation ,</i></p>	Baseline: 70% Cible: 90%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND - Rapport Haute Autorité de la Bonne gouvernance</li> <li>MINUSCA</li> <li>UNSDCF</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateur 1. b:</b> Services d'enregistrement civique fournis par les autorités locales <i>Approche Programmatique: Décentralisation, documentation civile,</i></p>	Baseline: 0 (WB) Cible: 30 (WB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank - LGRP Project,</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateur 1.c:</b> Proportion de femmes et jeunes élus (présidentielle, législative, locale) <i>Approche Programmatique: espace civique, sensibilisation et education civile;</i></p>	Baseline: 12,85% Femmes et jeunes (2020) Cible: 20%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND – ANE, Rapport du verdict de la CC , UNSDCF, MINUSA</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateur 1.d:</b> Taux de participation aux élections présidentielles et locale <i>Approche Programmatique : appui aux campagnes électorales, médiation et dialogue, violences électorales, hate speech, espace civile, droits politiques, education civile</i></p>	Baseline: 35,25% (nationale)/ 0 (locale) Cible: 66% (2026) ; ? (locale)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND – ANE, Rapport du verdict de la CC , MINUSCA</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateurs 1.e:</b> % de la population déclarant avoir confiance aux institutions étatiques centrales, déconcentrées et décentralisées <i>Approche Programmatique: Access aux service de base, transparence et redevabilité,</i></p>	Baseline: 10% Cible: 80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Rapport de HHI</li> </ul>	

## Résultat Stratégique 2: D'ici à 2028, les institutions de l'État, tant au niveau national que local, sont améliorées pour fournir de services clés liés à la justice, la sécurité et les droits humains.

### Reflète les priorités suivantes :

#### Plans et Stratégies National

Plan National de Développement

#### Plans et Stratégies International

Agenda 2063 de l'Union Africaine

Objectifs de développement durable

Objectif 16 : Paix, justice et institutions efficaces – Cibles 2, 3, 5, 7

Objectif 17 : Partenariat – Cibles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9

### Théorie du Changement

### Hypothèses fondamentales

Ce résultat stratégique ne peut qu'obtenir si et seulement si les climats aux aspects de la gouvernance notamment : la Stabilité politique et sécuritaire, l'Existence d'un cadre institutionnel fort, l'Engagement des bailleurs de fonds, la Volonté politique nationale, le Cadre d'intervention humanitaire sécurisé et la Formation spécialisée des institutions en charge de la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS) soient favorables.

Possibles Indicateurs des résultats	Baseline/ Cible	Moyens de vérification	Comments
<b>Indicateur 2.a :</b> Nombres de FDS forme et déployés sur le territoire national <i>Approche Programmatique : SSR, droits humains, VBG,</i>	Baseline: 22189 FACA, XXXX Gendarmes, 1073 Policiers Cible: 27120 FACA, XXXX Gendarmes, 1573 Policiers	PND - Rapport de formation des MDN/ Ministère de la Sécurité Publique/ MEF/MFB, MINUSCA,	
<b>Indicateur 2.b:</b> Nombre de cours et tribunaux opérationnels <i>Approche Programmatique : Access a la justice</i>	Baseline: 24(PND) 23 (UNSDCF) Cible: 38 (PND) 30 (UNSDCF)	PND - Rapport du MJDHBG, MINUSCA, UNSDCF, EU	
<b>Indicateur 2.c:</b> Nombre d'éléments des groupes armés désarmés, démobilisés et ayant reçu un soutien socio-économique pour se réinsérer dans leurs communautés <i>Approches Programmatique : DDR</i>	Baseline: 4314 (5,6% de femmes) (2022) Cible: 2000 (WB)	PND, MINUSCA, UNSDCF, WB	Baseline and targets, need to be consolidated across donor partners
<b>Indicateur 2.d :</b> Nombre de dossiers de victimes traités par la Commission vérité justice réparation et réconciliation (CVJRR) <i>Approche Programmatique : Justice transitionnelle, Accès a la justice, MHPSS, VBG</i>	Baseline: 0 Cible: 40	UNSDCF, MINUSCA,	
<b>Indicateur 2. e:</b> Pourcentage de la population qui indique avoir confiance dans la justice ordinaire <i>Approche Programmatique : CVR, GBV, police de proximités, justice transitionnelle, sécurité communautaire</i>	Baseline: 47,35% (2020) Cible: 60%	HHI	
<b>Indicateur 2.f:</b> Pourcentage des personnes qui perçoivent que la sécurité s'est améliorée sur les 12 derniers mois <i>Approche Programmatique : CVR, GBV, police de proximités, sécurité communautaire</i>	Baseline: 70,54% (2020) Cible: 90%	UNSDCF, PND, HHI	

## Résultat Stratégique 3: D'ici 2028, la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, accède de manière inclusive aux opportunités économique résilient et durable

<p><b>Reflète les priorités suivantes :</b>  <b>Plans et Stratégies Nationale:</b>          Plan National de Développement  <b>Plans et Stratégies International</b>          Agenda 2063 de l'Union Africaine          Objectifs de développement durable          Objectif 1 : Éliminer la pauvreté sous toutes ses formes et partout dans le monde – Cibles 4, 5,          Objectif 2 : Éliminer la faim, assurer la sécurité alimentaire, améliorer la nutrition et promouvoir de l'agriculture durable - Cibles 4          Objectif 9 : Bâtir une infrastructure résiliente, promouvoir une industrialisation durable qui profite à tous et encourager l'innovation – Cibles 1,          Objectif 17 : Partenariat –</p>			
<p><b>Théorie du Changement</b></p>			
<p><b>Hypothèses fondamentales</b>          Environnement politique et sécuritaire apaisé ; Volonté politique affirmé ; Engagement des bailleurs de fonds.</p>			
Possibles Indicateurs des résultats	Baseline/Cible	Moyens de vérification	Comments
<p><b>Indicateurs.3. a :</b> Linéaire des routes nationales et des pistes rurales construites/réhabilitées  <i>Approche Programmatique: Infrastructure, transport,</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 1455 km (2023)             Cible: 1900/ an</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND, UNSDCF, MINUSCA, BAD, World Bank</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateur 3. b:</b> Nombres de bénéficiaires directs avec un meilleur accès aux infrastructures résilientes au changement climatique  <i>Approche Programmatique : décentralisation, développement locale, stabilisation, RESA</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 0 (2024)            Cible: 68000 (2028)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank - Local Governance and Community Resilience Project, MINUSCA, EU</li> </ul>	Multiple donors and partners are investing in infrastructure
<p><b>Indicateur 3. c :</b> Nombres de femmes et jeunes qui participent dans les travaux de réhabilitation des infrastructures  <i>Approche Programmatique : TIMO, infrastructure,</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 0 (2022)            Cible: 28500 (2028)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND, UNSDCF, MINUSCA, World Bank, BAD,</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateurs.3. d :</b> Emplois créés dans les chaînes de valeurs pour les jeunes et les femmes (H/F).  <i>Approche Programmatique : AGR, agriculture.</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 0            Cible: 2500 emplois permanents (1000 femmes, 1500 jeunes) 5000 temporaires (2000 jeunes et 3000 femmes)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BAD, UNSDCF</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Indicateurs.3. e:</b> Nombre de communes disposant d'un PDL, y compris agricole, sensible au genre et au conflits  <i>Approches Programmatique : décentralisation, co-production des services, élaboration des PDL.</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 22 (PND), 0 (BAD)            Cible: 42 (PND), 40 (BAD)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND - Rapport du MATDD/ ICACESS, BAD, World Bank LGCR, AFD, UNSDCF</li> </ul>	Multiple donors and partners are investing in infrastructure
<p><b>Indicateurs.3. f:</b> Proportion de la population qui considère que les tensions autour de l'accès aux ressources naturelles ont diminué.  <i>Approches Programmatique :</i></p>	<p>Baseline: 0%            Cible: 60%</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HHI</li> </ul>	

## Résultat Stratégique 4: D'ici 2028, les tensions et les conflits violents entre les communautés, y compris entre les personnes retournées et les communautés d'accueil, sont réduits et la cohésion sociale est renforcée

Reflète les priorités suivantes :

### Plans et Stratégies Nationale

Stratégie Nationale des Solutions Durables pour les Déplacés Internes et les Rapatriés en République Centrafricaine

### Plans et Stratégies Internationale

Agenda 2063 de l'Union Africaine

### Objectifs de développement durable

**Objectif 11** : Villes et communautés durables – Cibles 1, 3, 5

**Objectif 16** : Paix, justice et institutions efficaces – Cibles 2, 3, 5, 7

**Objectif 17** : Partenariat – Cibles 14, 15

### Théorie du Changement

### Hypothèses fondamentales

Environnement politique et sécuritaire apaisé ; Volonté politique affirmé ; Engagement des bailleurs de fonds.

Possibles Indicateurs des résultats	Baseline/Cible	Moyens de vérification	Comments
<b>Indicateur 4.a</b> : Nombre de personnes retournées par sexe ayant bénéficié des opportunités économiques <i>Approche Programmatique: Appui aux solutions durables entre personnes déplacées et communautés hôtes, appui à l'accès aux logements, à la terre et aux biens;</i>	Baseline: 0 Cible: 3000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND - Rapport du MAHSN</li> </ul>	
<b>Indicateur 4.b</b> : Nombre de conflits communautaires résolus par les mécanismes de résolution des conflits (CLPR, comité de paix etc.) <i>Approche Programmatique: Appui aux infrastructures de paix, dialogue communautaire/médiation, gestion des conflits autour des ressources naturelles (eau, terres..), participation jeunes et femmes dans la prévention des conflits, projets transhumance</i>	Baseline: 0 (2023)  Cible: 165	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND, UNSDCF, MINUSCA</li> </ul>	
<b>Indicateur 4.c</b> Proportion de la population victime de violence physique, psychologique ou sexuel au cours des 12 derniers mois <i>Approche Programmatique: Appui en MHPSS, Lutte/prise en charge des Violences basées sur le genre, accès à la justice pour les victimes</i>	Baseline: 25%  Cible: 0%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND, UNSDCF, UE</li> </ul>	
<b>Indicateur 4.d</b> : Proportion de la population estimant vivre en paix dans leur localité <i>Approche Programmatique: Culture de paix, cohésion sociale</i>	Baseline: 16% (2020) Cible: 76%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PND - Rapport Sondage Paix Justice MJDHBG</li> </ul>	

**Annex 2: Matrice de Référence des cadres existants**

Cette matrice donne l'aperçu des éléments clés des cadres stratégiques existants et de leurs liens avec les résultats de consolidation de la paix proposés.

Plan Stratégies Nationales	UNSDCF (2023-2027)	MINUSCA Political Strategy (2023-2028) (MINUSCA/OSRSG/076/2023)	IDA 19 Turn Around Allocation Monitoring Framework	Résultat du Cadre de Résultats Peacebuilding
<p><b><u>Plan Nationale de Développement (2024-2028)</u></b>  <b>Axe stratégique 1 : Renforcement de la sécurité, de la promotion de la Gouvernance et de l'État de droit</b></p> <p><b>Effet 1.2. :</b> D'ici à 2028, les populations vivent dans un environnement apaisé où les mécanismes de consolidation de la paix et la gouvernance sont effectifs</p>	<p><b>PAIX : Promotion de la paix, de la sécurité, des droits humains et de l'État de droit</b></p> <p>Effet 1 : D'ici à 2027, les populations en RCA vivent dans un environnement où les mécanismes de consolidation de la paix, de réconciliation nationale, et de gouvernance sont inclusifs, redevables et efficaces</p>	<p>a) Revitalise the peace process in an integrated approach  b) Build Trust and create space for continued political dialogue and support for democratic institutions  d) support sustainable restoration of state authority including through concrete offer of support to FACA and ISF in compliance with the HRDDP</p>	<p>Achieving full democratic governance and restoring climate of trust and respect for human rights</p>	<p><b>Résultat Stratégique 1.</b>  D'ici 2028, la confiance de la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, dans une gouvernance démocratique, tant au niveau national que local, est renforcé</p>
<p><b><u>Plan Nationale de Développement (2024-2028)</u></b>  <b>Axe stratégique 1 : Renforcement de la sécurité, de la promotion de la Gouvernance et de l'État de droit</b></p> <p><b>Effet 1.1. :</b> D'ici à 2028, les Institutions nationales disposent des capacités leur permettant d'assurer l'accès à la justice, la sécurité et la promotion de la bonne gouvernance</p>	<p><b>PAIX : Promotion de la paix, de la sécurité, des droits humains et de l'État de droit</b></p> <p>Effet 2 : D'ici à 2027, les populations en RCA vivent dans un État de droit et accèdent à la justice, à la sécurité, et leurs droits humains sont promus et protégés</p>	<p>c) create a secure environment to advance the peace process and protect civilians and their human rights</p>	<p>.Improving the security situation for greater stability, state presence and management of resources</p>	<p><b>Résultat Stratégique 2.</b>  D'ici à 2028, les institutions de l'État, tant au niveau national que local, sont améliorées pour fournir de services clés liés à la justice, la sécurité et les droits humains.</p>

<p><b><u>Plan Nationale de Développement (2024-2028)</u></b>  <b>Axe Stratégique 4 : Accélération de la production et des chaînes de valeurs dans les filières productives pour une croissance économique forte, inclusive et durable</b></p> <p><b>Resultat Stratégique 5 : Durabilité environnementale et résilience face aux crises et aux effets du changement climatique</b></p>	<p><b>PROSPERITE : Développement des compétences et croissance économique accélérée, inclusive et durable</b></p> <p>Effet 1 D'ici à 2027, les populations en RCA, en particulier celles vivant dans les zones rurales, accèdent de manière équitable à des infrastructures de qualité, durables et résilientes qui favorisent la relance économique, le bien-être, et l'intégration régionale</p>		<p>3. Building a more stable and resilient socio-economic environment</p>	<p><b>Résultat Stratégique 3.</b>  D'ici 2028, la population, notamment les femmes et les jeunes, accède de manière inclusive aux opportunités économique résilient et durable</p>
<p><b><u>Plan Nationale de Développement (2024-2028)</u></b>  <b>Axe stratégique 2 : Accès équitable à des services sociaux de base de qualité et développement du capital humain</b></p> <p><b><u>Stratégie Nationale des Solutions Durables pour les Déplacés Internes et les Rapatriés en République Centrafricaine</u></b>  <b>Renforcer ou/et mettre en place les mécanismes de prévention/gestion</b></p>				<p><b>Résultat Stratégique 4:</b>  D'ici 2028, les tensions et les conflits violents entre les communautés, y compris entre les personnes retournées et les communautés d'accueil, sont réduits et la cohésion sociale est renforcée</p>

<b>des conflits par le dialogue, de consolidation de la paix, de réconciliation et de cohésion sociale dans les zones de retour, de relocalisation et d'intégration locale</b>				
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