

**Working Group on Lessons Learned**  
**Resource Mobilization and Mapping of Relevant Actors**  
**DRAFT Background Paper for the meeting on 3 July**

**Introduction**

The Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) will convene a meeting on 3 July 2012 on “Resource Mobilization and Mapping of Relevant Actors”. Taking Guinea as an example, it will seek to draw lessons in the field of efficient resource mobilization by mapping out relevant actors, identifying overlap and gaps in funding, and by trying to understand the linkages with the political accompaniment process undertaken by the PBC. The role of non-governmental actors in the area of peacebuilding and their comparative advantages in filling some of the gaps that arise was addressed in the informal information session which took place on 13 June 2012.

**Background**

**1. Marshalling resources for PBC countries**

The founding resolution of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) lists marshalling resources and improving coordination among all relevant actors among the key functions of the PBC. Marshalling resources is a multi-faceted task, which will only grow in importance and urgency as more countries are placed on the agenda of the PBC.

The PBC has sought to fulfil this role by developing partnerships with international and regional financial institutions; by mobilizing financial support from UN Member States and the larger international community for countries on its agenda; and by convening policy discussions to highlight good practices and lessons relevant to its work.

Despite these efforts, there is much recognition that more needs to be done in this key aspect of the PBC’s mandate, which should not be seen as limited to the mobilisation of financial resources only. Measuring the PBC’s success in this area should include efforts to mobilise technical assistance and expertise, to provide training and to share lessons, as well as to provide political advice to the government to help unblock resource flows, to name a few.

**2. Why is the mapping of aid important?**

In most post-conflict countries, there is insufficient government capacity to establish and manage effective mechanisms for aid coordination, collect aid information, verify aid data, report on aid data and utilize aid information in planning and budgeting processes. Consequently, the absence of effective aid coordination, monitoring, and reporting

complicates efforts to align aid with national priorities and prevents national governments from effectively communicating their needs and financing gaps to donors.

Donors also suffer from the absence of effective aid coordination, monitoring and reporting. Most donors and recipient countries have committed themselves to the principles outlined in the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. However, adherence to these principles requires a satisfactory level of verified aid information in order to base the dialogue around ownership, mutual accountability, harmonisation and results. More importantly, aid delivered without a satisfactory level of coordination and dialogue also tends to be less effective in achieving development and peacebuilding results due to duplication, lack of prioritisation, and missed opportunities for complementarities.

In short, efforts to marshal resources by and for post-conflict countries are more likely to succeed if prospective donors are presented with a clear picture of existing aid flows and gaps. In turn, this increased clarity has the potential to help ease the lack of reliable and predictable funding, which has profoundly challenged the ability of post-conflict governments to engage in the kind of long-term planning and programming necessary to build sustainable peace.

(see ANNEX II for the aids mapping system the PBSO is undertaking)

### **The Case of Guinea – mapping aid and peacebuilding assistance**

#### (a) Overview

The financial flows to the PBC countries as a group, calculated as the average net disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) per capita, has been consistently higher than the average flow to all countries in the group of Least Developed Countries (LDC), excluding PBC countries between 2000 and 2010. In other words, the six PBC countries are, as a group, not worse off than the collective group of the world’s most impoverished nations and are also slightly better off than a group of countries defined by the OECD as aid orphans. However, Guinea<sup>1</sup> remains an exception to this and stands out as an aid orphan even among the world’s poorest countries.

ODA per Capita	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Guinea	27.17	52.33	43.41	37.47	37.21	25.18	20.75	25.34	33.78	21.96	21.84

Table 1 - ODA per Capita to Guinea

Furthermore, aid to Guinea has fluctuated wildly as can be seen from table 2 below. The OECD-DAC considers fluctuations of over 15% from one year to the next as undesirable and

<sup>1</sup> Christian Lotz. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 6 No.2, 2011.

volatile. However, such radical fluctuations have been the norm for Guinea in the past decade, both in upwards and downwards directions.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Guinea	92.60%	-17.05%	-13.67%	-0.71%	-32.32%	-17.59%	22.12%	33.29%	-35.00%	-0.55%

Table 2 - Fluctuation in ODA per Capita

(b) Mapping exercise

The ongoing mapping exercise for Guinea seeks to provide an up-to-date picture of the investments made by development partners towards achieving the peacebuilding objectives agreed upon in the PBC’s Statement of Mutual Commitments (SMC). The manual nature of the mapping exercise reveals that existing data sources are inadequate in determining flows to peacebuilding-related sectors. For example, the “Conflict prevention, peace and security” category of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD-DAC does not explicitly include many of the activities that are normally considered to be part of peacebuilding, such as rule of law, governance and economic revitalisation. In addition, the CRS captures historic data (the latest data now is from 2010), rather than current and prospective data.

The current map indicates that:

- Guinea suffers from a limited bilateral donor base (EU, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Russia, Spain, UK) in general and particularly in the field of peacebuilding (See Annex I for overall donor situation in Guinea). There may be a correlation between the relatively low level of donor engagement with the political turmoil in Guinea over the last few years, at the same time when the discussion on aid and development cooperation effectiveness was taking place globally.
- Overall, SSR received the highest amount of assistance among the three peacebuilding priorities with 70.67 million USD (out of which 54.3 million USD is projected), while Youth and Women Employment came in second with 64.4 million USD (out of which 10.4 million USD is projected) and national reconciliation third with 13.06 million USD; Once we take away the PBF funds the figure becomes 61.4 million (out of which 54.3 million USD is projected) for SSR, 60.78 million USD for Youth and Women Employment (out of which 10.4 million USD is projected), and approximately 7.16 million for national reconciliation.
- Significant attention to SSR sector can be seen as the results of shared recognition by the stakeholders, including the government, the donors, as well as UN, on the enormity of the impact SSR can create in the Guinean political context. However, it is also worth noting that although SSR has significant amount of projected funds by the European Union, the

- From a project/program-level perspective, certain commitments, such as advocating for international support for quick-win projects in SSR (SSR/PBC(b)) as well as assisting in the mobilization of resources to support public works and peace dividend programs for Youth and Women Employment (Empl/PBC(a)), attract many projects, partly due to the wider-nature of the commitment. The tendency of the donors to invest in the latter also relate to the tendency of the donor countries to favour lower risk development projects as opposed to the peacebuilding projects that are thought to have a higher level of risk.
- The peacebuilding priority of national reconciliation and unity has so far attracted less financing, arguably due in part to the less resource-intensive nature of the activities involved. Some have noted the difficulty of investing in this field due to lack of political condition conducive for national dialogue to take place, which remains one of the main challenges of both national reconciliation as well as the holding and completion of free and fair elections.
- In short, the case of Guinea reveals the need to develop a wider donor base as well the need for political support to overcome some of the obstacles that are hindering potential donors from becoming actively engaged in critical areas of peacebuilding. PBC, as the only United Nations entity with a political mandate to support peacebuilding in Guinea, has a role to play not only in terms of marshalling resources but in highlighting obstacles to peacebuilding and possible solutions to them, thus assuming its responsibility for political accompaniment.

### **Coordination mechanisms in Guinea**

As Guinea is the first country on the PBC agenda which has no special political or peacekeeping mission of the UN, a reinforced coordination mechanism was established for Guinea at Headquarters (HQ) with a view to strengthening support at the field level. Coordination mechanisms serve multiple purposes, including the avoidance of overlap and fragmentation in financial and technical support to critical peacebuilding priorities.

The following is a list of existing coordination mechanisms in Conakry and at HQ focused on development and peacebuilding issues:

(1) At the field level (Conakry):

- Development Partners coordination group (GCPP)
- Peacebuilding Joint Steering Committee (JSC), including national and international partners (in charge of the oversight of PBF's Peacebuilding Priority Plan)
- Group of friends of Guinea (GAG)
- SSR task force, including national and international partners (in charge of oversight of the SSR process)

(2) At HQ level:

- UN-wide IATF ( Inter-Agency Task Force ), co-chaired by DPA and UNDP (provides a framework for regular exchanges of information with Conakry on ongoing programmes and challenges in the area of development and peacebuilding)
- Inter-agency SSR Task Force, co-chaired by BCPR/UNDP and DPKO (includes PBSO, DPA and UNOWA):
- PBC Country-Specific Configuration (46 Member states and 7 international organisations)

So far, the different coordination mechanisms have proved valuable in supporting the initial steps of the renewed engagement of the PBC in Guinea through the SMC and the PBF Priority Plan, respectively. In particular, the SSR Inter-Agency Task force has produced concrete results in overseeing highly risky political undertakings (biometrical census of the armed forces and military retirement).

In terms of coordination for peacebuilding projects, the presence of a strong SSR taskforce and experts, as well as strong commitment on the side of the Guinean government, have helped to promote information sharing among relevant donors through periodic gathering with the SSR taskforce lead by the UNDP. However, similar active mechanisms are missing for the other two priorities of national reconciliation and youth and women employment, making it more difficult for the donors to exchange frequent information.

Existing coordination mechanisms for Guinea will need to be further strengthened and refined, especially with respect to the establishment of the appropriate linkages between the political and programmatic levels. The JSC offers an important avenue for linking the implementation of the PBF Priority Plan and the SMC, providing linkages between the PBC and the PBF funded projects. Group of Friends of Guinea might also provide a good platform where the PBC's political and bilateral donor's programmatic linkages maybe sought. At the

Headquarters level, a connection between the programmatic (e.g. the IATF members, the Inter-agency SSR task-force) and the political (e.g. PBC country-configuration) support could be further strengthened through regular exchange of information and dedicated and thematic discussions at the expert level.

### **Focus of the discussion**

#### **(a)mapping**

- What are some of the dilemmas faced by the agenda countries in mobilizing resources? How should we define the role of PBC in marshalling resources and how can the mapping exercise help?
- How can the PBC help unblock some of the political impasse that prevents resources from flowing into critical peacebuilding needs? How can the PBC combine its role of political accompaniment and marshalling of resources?
- What is the potential role of aid mapping in facilitating resource mobilisation that addresses critical peacebuilding priorities? How can the mapping tool be further optimized for this purpose? How can the PBC support the governments of the countries on its agenda to build national aid monitoring systems and processes?
- How should the government of the agenda country use tools like mapping to approach potential donors-including foundations, private sector, NGOs?

#### **(b)coordination**

- What are the key factors for ensuring successful coordination mechanisms which could help unblock resource flows? What have been the lessons learned of past coordination mechanisms that have worked/failed?
- How has the catalytic nature of the PBF helped in unblocking some of the resources? What role can the PBC play in ensuring catalytic nature of the PBF and help coordinate other aid?
- What are the challenges in aligning bilateral aid to SMC priorities? What are the challenges in coordinating multilateral and bilateral donors? What platform can be used to align bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental aid to the SMC priority areas?


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## ANNEX I

Guinea donors in 2010 in CRS	
EU Institutions	75,482,247
France	50,711,474
United States	21,522,891
AfDF	19,775,544
Global Fund	15,424,579
<b>Top 5</b>	<b>182,916,735</b>
Germany	13,866,238
Japan	10,336,444
UNICEF	7,180,881
AfDB	5,631,888
UNPBF	5,329,170
<b>Next 5</b>	<b>42,344,621</b>
UNDP	5,294,683
UNFPA	4,294,603
GAVI	3,762,820
Kuwait	2,171,406
Spain	2,170,729
WFP	2,042,704
Canada	1,949,506
Switzerland	1,432,915
Belgium	1,084,567
Sweden	930,412
OFID	623,170
UNAIDS	550,619
Italy	385,425
Luxembourg	364,860
GEF	197,026
Austria	157,291
Korea	139,096
IDA	59,901
Ireland	57,172
Portugal	43,850
Denmark	8,125
<b>The rest</b>	<b>27,720,880</b>
<b>Total ODA</b>	<b>252,982,236</b>

The table to the left lists the donors by ODA to Guinea according to size. The numbers are from 2010 and from the OECD's Creditor reporting System.

As captured in the pie chart below, a few donors provide the vast majority of ODA to Guinea. The five largest donor account for 72% of ODA and if the 5 next on the list are included, close to 90% of ODA is captured.



## **ANNEX II**

### **PBSO's project on Aid Information Management for Peacebuilding**

PBSO is currently implementing a project designed to address the often challenging task of aid coordination, monitoring, and reporting in post-conflict countries. With funding from the European Union, Liberia has been chosen as the pilot country and PBSO is currently trying to raise funds to expand the project to another PBC country.

The AIMS for Peacebuilding project is a response to the demand for more reliable and accurate information. In addition to providing the data needed by the PBC to support its fundraising efforts, it will also be of great value to the donor community, including the European Union, and national governments.

The project consists of two work streams, focusing on:

1. **The provision of aid data**

One part of the project seeks to enhance the reliability, quality and frequency of aid reporting. Consequently, the first aspect of the AIMS for Peacebuilding project focuses on improving aid information collection, verification and reporting. To do this, the project will assist the donor community, the government and the United Nations Country Team in improving existing processes or establishing more effective mechanisms for aid information collection, verification and reporting. The aim of this part of the project is not to introduce a new system but simply to improve the quality of the data being captured in existing system(s). As UNDP is principally responsible for AIMS support to recipient countries, this work stream has been planned and will be implemented in close collaboration with UNDP.

2. **Reporting on peacebuilding data**

Building on the improved data reported into the existing AIMS, the project will, as its second objective, introduce a reporting tool for aid information related to peacebuilding. Establishing an effective reporting tool for peacebuilding support will improve the capacity of the Peacebuilding Commission and the government in marshaling financial resources to meet critical peacebuilding needs. The working title for this reporting tool is the 'Peacebuilding Dashboard'. The data should be drawn from existing AIMS systems – in the case of Liberia, it would be the Aid Management Platform - within pre-defined peacebuilding sectors and areas of activity. The dashboard will be able to display the data in a number of different 'views' – per sector, over time, per donor, per region (if GIS enabled), per recipient government agency, etc. This will, however, require that each project is equipped with additional, peacebuilding-



relevant data before being entered into the Aid Management Platform. This data must be agreed upon by the government, donors and the UN.