

Outcome Report from the Workshop on

Strengthening the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture
- Transforming commitments into action

9-10 December 2024, Greentree Estate, Manhasset, NY

The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) presents an important opportunity to advance the UN's role in building and sustaining peace. With the primary objective of examining what is required to translate the commitments made in the *Pact for the Future* into actionable measures within the framework of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) and to advance recommendations of previous PBARs, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Life & Peace Institute, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) convened a dedicated workshop on 9–10 December 2024 at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset, New York. This workshop was organised with the support of the Global Challenges Foundation and with co-sponsorship of the Permanent Missions of Australia, Colombia, Norway, and the Republic of Korea.

This report presents an overview of the key outcomes from the workshop. During the 1.5-day event, representatives from permanent missions at both high-level and expert level, UN staff, CSO and research experts shared suggestions and jointly crafted proposals for concrete next steps to strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission. It summarises the discussions, findings, and actionable recommendations generated for the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) to enhance the Peacebuilding Commission including specific proposals, in line with Action 44 of the *Pact for the Future*.

With the workshop having been held under Chatham House rule, the report presents analysis and recommendations synthesized without attribution and framed with the intention to stimulate further discussion and exploration during the 2025 PBAR process. It was produced by the DHF (Sigrid Gruener and Henrik Hammargren) and GPPAC (Marina Kumskova) based on the input of workshop participants.

The report is structured into three main sections: 1) Introduction and Workshop Coverage; 2) Workshop observations and identified recommendations; and 3) Conclusion and Way Forward. Additional information about the workshop is provided in the following annexes: Annex A – *Workshop Agenda*; Annex B – *List of Participants*; and Annex C – *Documentation and Resources on PBAR Recommendations (attached separately)*.

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1. Introduction and workshop coverage

The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) is mandated by the 2020 twin resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace as a ‘comprehensive’ review with a focus on impact¹. Strengthening the role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is one of the central 2025 PBAR discussions.

The PBC's mandate is primarily focused on providing political accompaniment to countries in transition, while also playing a crucial bridging, convening, and advisory role within the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.² This mandate highlights the PBC's essential function in supporting countries emerging from conflict.

The 2025 PBAR is the fourth review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, and its process is divided into two phases: an *informal phase* and a *formal phase*, with the workshop having been held at the end of the informal phase.³ The informal phase generated two types of analysis, based on outputs from various consultations, processes, and official documents: 1) statements and observations of challenges and areas of concern needing further attention, and 2) specific recommendations that require further development into concrete actions, including the identification of responsible actors, timelines, and implementation mechanisms.

During the formal phase of the review, the focus should shift from statements to actionable steps, aiming to clarify plans for implementation. Recommendations, many of which are general or abstract, must now be transformed into concrete actions that will drive change. The emphasis should be on identifying actionable strategies and ensuring that these actions align with the broader development agenda and the commitments made by Member States.

The recommendations discussed at the workshop were derived from multiple sources, including previous reviews of the Peacebuilding Architecture, resolutions related to peacebuilding financing, and outcome documents developed by the UN and its Member States, including the *Pact for the Future*. Participants also considered relevant analysis and ideas as presented in the SG's policy brief *the New Agenda for Peace*. Additionally, there is other important input produced during the informal phase, as outlined in the terms of reference for Member States to consider as part of the 2025 PBAR.⁴ This includes:

- The 2024 UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace ([A/79/552-S/2024/767](#));
- A letter the group of independent eminent persons ([A/79/634-S/2024/869](#));
- [Summaries of the 2025 PBAR meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission](#); and
- Findings from [regional and thematic consultations and written submissions](#).

It should be noted that the Secretary-General's 2024 annual report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace was not available at the time of the workshop. The report highlights significant aspects related to the work

¹ A/RES/75/201-S/RES/2558, OP5

² [A/RES/60/180-S/RES/1645](#)

³ See details in the Terms of Reference for the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review ([A/78/870-S/2024/339](#)).

⁴ A document was produced by DHF in advance of the workshop to serve as a resource for participants summarizing key UN documents (see Annex 3). It outlines key UN documents relevant to the PBC and its mandate, including high-level agreements. The document is organised into two sections: one lists essential documents and resources, while the other compiles thematic recommendations. Additionally, it includes a reference list of written inputs from the PBAR's informal phase.

of the PBC and reinforces many of the themes and recommendations raised at the workshop. More specifically, the 2024 SG's report underscores the PBC's essential role in promoting national ownership of peacebuilding processes, facilitating inclusive approaches to conflict prevention, and fostering collaboration among diverse stakeholders. It highlights the need for sustained support to the PBC, including enhanced Secretariat capacity, strengthened partnerships with international financial institutions, and increased voluntary and assessed contributions to address growing demands for peacebuilding assistance. The report proposes several key recommendations to strengthen the PBC's role. These include encouraging Member States to develop nationally led prevention and peacebuilding strategies, with an emphasis on human rights and inclusive governance; convening an annual peacebuilding event to promote international cooperation and awareness; and enhancing the PBC's advisory capacity to the Security Council, particularly in UN mission transition settings. The report also recommends establishing an independent expert group to support the PBC, exploring synergies with the Human Rights Council, and increasing contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund to ensure adequate resources for advancing peacebuilding priorities.

The workshop opened with a high-level opening session providing an overview of the challenges and opportunities within the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture. Distinguished speakers included ASG Elizabeth Spehar; H.E. Mohamed Edrees from the Independent Eminent Persons Group for the PBAR, and A. A. Mohamed of Save Somali Women and Children. Senior diplomats, including H.E. A. Løvold (Norway), H.E. I. Šimonović (Croatia), H.E. T. Mikanagi (Japan), H.E. T. Zahneisen (Germany), and H.E. Bahia Tahzib-Lie (Netherlands), shared insights on key themes such as the PBC's advisory role, national ownership, aligning PBAR with broader peacebuilding efforts, and strategic stakeholder engagement. Discussions focused on the PBAR outcome document and the translation of Pact for the Future commitments into action. Additional remarks were made by H.E. R. Bryant (Australia) and H.E. H. Cho (Republic of Korea).

The second part of the workshop focused on strengthening the PBC's advisory role, promoting coherence, and enhancing financing and partnerships for peacebuilding. Cedric de Coning (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs) and Erica Gaston (UNU Centre for Policy Research) presented new research on the PBC's potential to offer more timely, high-quality advice to the UNSC and GA. Diloru Kadirova of the Development Coordination Office (DCO) shared reflections on engagement with UN actors at the country level. During a working lunch discussion Céline Monnier and Sophie Rutenbar of the Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) shared best practices for developing National Prevention Strategies. Beatrice Nzovu of the Life & Peace Institute provided insights from the recent review of Kenya's national peacebuilding architecture and the support provided by the UN and civil society in that process. Discussions during the workshop emphasised national ownership, cross-country collaboration, and the PBC's role in developing knowledge-sharing and supporting tailored peacebuilding efforts. They underscored the PBC's potential to serve as a platform for exchange and collaboration, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts remain responsive to specific national contexts and needs.

The following section presents an overview of the key outcomes from the workshop, summarising the discussions, findings, and actionable recommendations generated for the 2025 PBAR process.

2. Workshop observations, identified recommendations and proposed actions

This section provides an overview of the key recommendations emerging from the workshop, focusing on actionable steps to enhance the Peacebuilding Commission's (PBC). The discussions were structured around three main themes: 1) strengthening the PBC's advisory role, 2) promoting coherence and enhancing capacity, and 3) improving peacebuilding financing and partnerships. Each theme was addressed through plenary presentations and roundtable discussions, resulting in concrete recommendations for enhancing the PBC's impact. The observations provide a framing of current challenges and give context for identified recommendations and proposed actions. As Member States move ahead with the 2025 PBAR, it is important to consider which issues and recommendations may require new or revised mandates, and which issues can be addressed through changes in practice or working methods. This distinction – and follow up action on both - will be crucial in ensuring that the PBC adapts effectively to evolving peacebuilding needs.

2.1 Strengthening the PBC's Advisory Role

Discussions explored how expert input could be systematically integrated into the PBC's work and how *the impact of its advice and interactions with the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (GA)* could be assessed. Participants also considered the PBC's role *in mission transitions and drawdowns in peacekeeping operations*.⁵ Japan, having served as Informal Coordinator between the UNSC and the PBC in 2024, shared reflections and recommendations drawing on their recent experience and highlighting the outcome of informal consultations on this topic held in September 2024.⁶ The identified recommendations and actions are presented below:

2.1.1 PBC advisory role and interactions with the Security Council

The PBC's advisory role to the Security Council is often limited in its impact, as its advice 'rarely introduces new information, analysis, or insights' and frequently relies on pre-agreed language. This is largely due to the PBC's consensus-based operating structure and insufficient planning ahead of PBC meetings that are held to generate and agree on advice to the UNSC. Consequently, the PBC's advice tends to reflect the 'lowest common denominator' rather than the strategic, politically informed counsel that it is mandated to provide. Furthermore, the PBC has not been able to generate country-specific analysis that can be directly and meaningfully utilised by other intergovernmental bodies, including the UNSC, ECOSOC, and the Human Rights Council. The lack of institutional support, the absence of follow-up on the Commission's advice, and the insufficient integration of diverse expertise further limits its capacity to provide timely and actionable recommendations.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. **Strengthen institutional support for quality advice:**

- The PBC should enhance its capacity to generate political and informed advice by leveraging existing resources, such as the UN Secretary-General's reports and Common Country Analyses

⁵ For more detailed information turn to the report presented by Cedric de Coning (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs) [here](#) and a blog post produced by Erica Gaston (UNU Centre for Policy Research) [here](#).

⁶ The written summary of the informal consultations was shared with workshop participants to inform discussions and is available at <https://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/files/100767106.pdf>.

(CCAs). The PBC should not merely replicate these documents but instead use them to bolster its own recommendations.

- The PBC Branch of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), serving as the Secretariat for the PBC (hereafter referred to as the PBC Secretariat), must be strengthened to support the Commission in producing more political advice, informed by diverse stakeholders. The PBC should use its advisory role to inter-governmental bodies including the UNSC to elaborate on the meaning of key peacebuilding terms, such as ‘restoration and extension of state authority’, a phrase frequently used by UNSC.

2. *Establish a framework for following up on PBC advice:*

- To better understand and strengthen the impact of its advice, the PBC should develop a framework to measure the outcomes of its recommendations, particularly regarding their influence on both global policy and field-level implementation. This framework should include mechanisms for engaging with national stakeholders to assess the impact and relevance of the advice over time and build on the PBSO’s ongoing development of a [Peacebuilding Impact Hub](#).

3. *Reinforce the quality of the Commission’s advice:*

- The PBC could establish a ‘*Knowledge Hub*’ or ‘*Advisory Group*’ that draws on diverse technical experts to assist Member States in obtaining relevant, actionable information. This can enhance the Commission’s role by ensuring its advice is targeted, comprehensive and rooted in diverse expertise.
- The PBC should update its working methods to prioritise quality over quantity in the advice it provides. This involves being more selective and strategic, focusing on areas where the Commission has a comparative advantage, such as advising on countries in transition. This will increase the potential for the Commission’s recommendations to be impactful and aligned with the core objectives of peacebuilding. On the other side, the UNSC should prioritise requests for advice from the PBC on themes and in contexts where the PBC can add the most value.

4. *The PBC should align its annual work plan with the UNSC’s programme of work:*

- The PBC could better align its annual work plan with the UNSC’s Programme of Work, including countries where it has expertise, particularly those in transition, contingent upon the country in question showing an interest to be discussed at the PBC. This approach rests on the foundational principle of national ownership, which underpins all work of the PBC.
- The Vice-Chairs and Chair of the PBC should work together to ensure a more effective and coordinated approach to annual planning, ensuring that the PBC advice is formally considered in the UNSC’s mandate renewal processes.

5. *Re-activate the use of ‘Informal Interactive Dialogues’ (IIDs) between the UNSC and PBC:*

- The PBC could advocate for the reactivation of Informal Interactive Dialogues (IIDs) between the UNSC and the Commission.⁷ These dialogues can provide a format for addressing overlaps in the work of various intergovernmental bodies and promote greater coordination and coherence. The

⁷ The Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) of the UNSC has no official definition. [Note 507](#), which is a compendium of the methods and practices of the UNSC’s working methods, refers to the Council utilising informal dialogues, when appropriate, to “seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties”. Key characteristics of an IID, which distinguish it from Arria-formula meetings, are that they are presided over by the Council President, are considered proceedings of the Council and are attended by all members.

PBC should investigate the reasons behind the decline of interest in IIDs and explore ways to reinvigorate this modality which can enhance the flow of information and decision-making between the two bodies.

- Further inquiry can be also made as to what the UNSC can do to support the work of the Commission. Similar space available within the ECOSOC could present an opportunity to discuss how to better leverage the UN Development System for peacebuilding.

6. Increase the PBC Chair's engagement with UNSC and other intergovernmental bodies:

- Building on the increased engagement of the PBC Chair with the UNSC in 2024, it is important to continue and expand this practice.
- The PBC Chair should be invited to brief other intergovernmental bodies, such as ECOSOC, more frequently to ensure that the PBC's perspective is consistently represented and integrated into broader UN discussions on peacebuilding.

2.1.2 PBC advice and interactions with the General Assembly

The PBC's advisory role to the General Assembly (GA) has significant potential to advance peacebuilding priorities and foster greater coherence across the UN system. While the GA holds a broad peace and security mandate under the UN Charter, its scope encompasses a wider range of peacebuilding and prevention contexts that the PBC could support. In the past, the GA has mandated peace operations or other mechanisms that have contributed to critical transition moments – from overseeing elections to monitoring ceasefires and withdrawals - supporting key peacebuilding priorities such as monitoring human rights, strengthening justice and police functions, and facilitating inclusive peace negotiations and transitional justice. It has appointed special envoys, fact-finding missions, accountability mechanisms and otherwise used its good offices roles to promote human rights, sustainable development mechanisms and other issues crucial for peacebuilding. It has also lent its weight in moments of crisis response and management, using its global voice and wide membership body to condemn unconstitutional transitions of power and create pressure for peaceful elections and other key components for sustaining peace.

Despite this, the PBC has not fully leveraged this relationship in advancing the UN's peacebuilding efforts, and its advisory role to the GA remains underdeveloped. There has been increased interest from Member States that have been discussed at the PBC to further strengthen this engagement, in part with the intention of using the Commission's advice to gain support for GA resolutions. While GA resolutions are non-binding, their 'soft power' is particularly effective in peacebuilding situations, where mandatory or coercive authority could be counterproductive or unnecessary. To fully realise this potential, it is crucial to strengthen the relationship between the PBC and the General Assembly.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Strengthen the PBC's advisory role to the General Assembly:

- The PBC should explore avenues to expand its advisory role to the GA. In the 2025 PBAR outcome document, Member States should, in follow-up of the Pact for the Future, consider including language that explicitly supports fully activating the PBC advisory capacity to the GA, with such engagements initiated upon request by either body. This could build on actions by and experiences of the PBC members who have served as Informal Coordinator between the PBC and the GA.

2. *Develop regular modalities for interaction between the PBC and the GA:*

- The GA should begin identifying regular and institutionalised pathways for interaction with the PBC. This will create a more formalised and consistent framework for dialogue and collaboration, allowing the PBC to channel its expertise and advice on peacebuilding issues to the GA.
- Enhancing the PBC's engagement with the GA might require identifying a dedicated recurring agenda item for consultations with the Commission or simply ensuring that the existing annual review item offers a more robust space for dialogue, advice and collaboration. This year, the PBC Chair informally briefed the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), and similar informal engagements and consultations with other relevant committees could be taken forward.

3. *Pursuing new avenues for consultation and dialogue should not detract from other engagements:*

- Strengthening the advisory role of the PBC to the GA should be viewed as an additional avenue to enhance the PBC's impact, not as a replacement for its work with other UN bodies, such as the UNSC, ECOSOC, or the Human Rights Council. Maintaining and enhancing these existing relationships should remain a priority, with the GA advisory role complementing and broadening the PBC engagement within the UN system.

2.1.3 PBC advice and interactions related to mission transitions and drawdowns in peacekeeping operations:

The PBC plays a critical role, particularly in transition settings and mission drawdowns, where its expertise can provide valuable political accompaniment, convening power, and advisory support. The 2022 Secretary-General's report on transitions in peace operations (S/2022/522) emphasises the importance of a comprehensive political strategy that engages multiple stakeholders around a shared vision for the post-mission phase. Such a strategy must align with national development plans and include a long-term financing approach. The PBC's mandate can offer substantial value in these contexts, as seen in Liberia and Burkina Faso. However, there is a need for a more consistent and integrated peacebuilding orientation within UN peace operations, particularly regarding planning, financing, and the involvement of the PBC itself. Strengthening peacebuilding in these settings requires early and continuous engagement, as transition should not be viewed as a fixed stage but rather a mindset that can evolve at any point. Without this integration, peacebuilding priorities may be overlooked, and transition processes risk losing momentum.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. *Strengthen peacebuilding orientation in UN peace operations:*

- The 2025 PBAR resolutions could include language that emphasises the need to strengthen the peacebuilding orientation within UN peace operations. For example, the resolutions could encourage the integration of peacebuilding into the planning and financing of peace operations, ensuring that peacebuilding priorities are addressed early and continuously throughout the mission cycle. There could also be consideration of involving the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in the task forces mandated to plan the mandates of peace operations.

2. *Synchronise the PBAR with other key UN processes:*

- The 2025 PBAR's formal phase should consider the ongoing discussions regarding peace operations, including the review of peace operations, the upcoming UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting, and follow up on the outcomes of the 2024 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review ([A/RES/79/226](#)). This alignment can help to foster a triple nexus approach, connecting peace, development, and humanitarian efforts, and leverage the broader UN development system to support peacebuilding.

3. *Encourage the UNSC to seek the PBC's advice on peace operation mandates:*

- Member States could encourage the UNSC to consult the PBC on new peace operation mandates and mandate renewals, as prescribed by several resolutions and Security Council Presidential Statements (PRSTs). Rather than creating a parallel process, the PBC should channel its expertise into UNSC and GA discussions, reinforcing its advisory and bridging roles. This will ensure that peacebuilding expertise is embedded in the early stages of mission design and planning, aligning peace operations with long-term peacebuilding goals.

4. *Strengthen peacebuilding capacities within UN peace operations:*

- Peacebuilding capacities within peace operations should be reinforced, including the integration of peacebuilding advisors or peace and development advisors who can offer a comprehensive package of expertise to support the peacebuilding and prevention needs of countries in transition. These advisors should be embedded within the operational structure to ensure peacebuilding is considered throughout the mission.

5. *Increase engagement with national and local stakeholders:*

- The PBC should leverage its convening power to engage more with national and local stakeholders, including governments, youth groups, and women's organizations, to gather input on transition processes. This engagement will help ensure local ownership and buy-in for the transition process. Additionally, these consultations can inform the plans of development partners and promote joint discussions on how to integrate transition planning into development cooperation efforts.

6. *Encourage UNSC engagement with the PBC for countries in transition:*

- The UNSC should encourage governments of countries undergoing transition to engage with the PBC, especially those that have not yet sought PBC support. For example, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not yet been discussed within the Commission, there is potential for the PBC to contribute valuable insights. The UNSC could recommend to transitional governments to approach the PBC to benefit from its expertise and guidance.

2.2 Promoting coherence, enhancing capacity and leveraging convening power

The second theme of the workshop focused on improving coherence across the UN system and enhancing the PBC's capacity to coordinate peacebuilding efforts. Discussions emphasised the need to align peacebuilding objectives, avoid fragmentation, and strengthen the PBC's ability to enhance national ownership of peacebuilding processes. The Workshop identified three key areas for action: 1) *promoting coherence*; 2) *enhancing capacity*; and 3) *leveraging convening power*. The identified recommendations and actions are presented below:

2.2.1 PBC's role in promoting coherence across the UN system:

The PBC has and can play a critical role in advancing coherence within the UN's peacebuilding efforts, yet there is significant potential to improve the integration and coordination of its activities. Currently, the PBC's role in promoting coherence across both operational and policy dimensions is underutilised. The Commission could more effectively integrate diverse issues and stakeholders into its work, ensuring alignment with broader UN peacebuilding efforts, including those of UN Country Teams and peace operations. Furthermore, while the PBC convenes experts from key stakeholders, its approach to inviting participants remains inconsistent and a systematic and strategic process is often missing. Additionally, while the PBC could serve as a central hub for generating knowledge and promoting learning in peacebuilding, its capacity to do so is not fully harnessed. There is also a lack of systematic engagement with Resident Coordinators. To enhance its impact and contribution to the coherence of peacebuilding efforts across the UN system, the Commission must strengthen its internal processes, expand its engagement with stakeholders, and improve coordination across intergovernmental bodies and Member States.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. *Adopt a comprehensive approach to integrate diverse stakeholders:*

- The PBC should adopt a more comprehensive and intentional approach to including a broader range of stakeholders in its discussions. By convening experts from across the UN system, (local) civil society, international financial institutions (IFIs), and other relevant actors, the PBC can foster greater synergy and coherence in its work. A more systematic approach to determining who is invited to PBC meetings would improve the effectiveness of these dialogues and ensure that all relevant voices are included in shaping peacebuilding efforts.

2. *Increase engagement with Resident Coordinators (RCs):*

- The PBC should engage more frequently with RCs, who play a crucial role at the country level in bringing together various UN entities and supporting national priorities. Regular engagement with RCs will promote peacebuilding discussions at the country level and ensure better alignment between global and national peacebuilding priorities. The PBSO in collaboration with DCO should facilitate follow-up after PBC meetings with RCs, recognizing the challenges posed by shrinking capacities within RC offices. Support for RCs should be prioritised, including ensuring adequate resources for peacebuilding tasks within their mandates.

3. *Make the PBC a hub for knowledge production, learning, and adaptation:*

- The PBC should strengthen its focus on knowledge generation and sharing good practices in peacebuilding. One of the Vice-Chairs could be assigned specific responsibility for knowledge, learning, and adaptation. The PBC could also convene an annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference to take stock of the latest research on peacebuilding and sustain dialogue with the global peacebuilding research community. This could align with the Secretary-General's call for an annual peacebuilding conference, enhancing the Commission's role as a central hub for knowledge on peacebuilding.⁸

⁸ ([A/79/552-S/2024/767](#), para 67).

4. ***Encourage Member States to Integrate Peacebuilding Expertise Across the UN System:***

- Member States should be encouraged to integrate the peacebuilding expertise gained through their work with the PBC into their engagements with other intergovernmental bodies. This includes, for example in the work of the GA's Fifth Committee, in ensuring that Peacebuilding Advisors (PDAs) remain financed and that peacebuilding tasks are not removed from the terms of reference when Member States leave the PBC. These experts should be tasked with carrying forward the peacebuilding agenda within other intergovernmental bodies.

5. ***Raise awareness of the PBC's work and improve information flow within the UN System:***

- Member States on the PBC should actively promote the work of the PBC to countries who have not previously utilized its platform in support of their peacebuilding efforts. Many countries undergoing transitions are not fully aware of the support the PBC can offer and modalities for engagement. By raising awareness of the PBC's role and offer, Member States can generate greater interest and understanding, encouraging non-member countries to engage with the PBC.

6. ***Map existing peacebuilding efforts to promote coherence:***

- The PBC should leverage its convening capacity to map existing efforts in support of countries' peacebuilding priorities, particularly to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, in its engagement with São Tomé and Príncipe, the Commission conducted a mapping exercise of existing financial support, which helped stakeholders identify gaps and areas where further support was needed. Such mapping exercises should be expanded to enhance coordination and ensure that all stakeholders are working towards common peacebuilding goals.
- The PBSO should improve the flow of information between the PBC and Member States, particularly regarding important events and dialogues. For instance, information on the CSO-UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding, which took place during the same week as the Greentree workshop, was not available to all Member States, limiting opportunities for connection with local peacebuilders. The PBSO should facilitate better coordination and coherence by ensuring that all relevant parties are informed early and can thus contribute to system-wide peacebuilding efforts. The PBSO can also support broader coordination across the UN system, helping to align peacebuilding efforts with other development and humanitarian initiatives.

2.2.2 Enhancing the capacity of the PBC

The PBC is facing increasing demand for its work at a time when its capacity to respond effectively and strategically remains limited. Many Member States, particularly those undergoing transition, do not fully grasp the value proposition of the PBC. This calls for efforts to enhance communication of the PBC's work and impact, investing resources to raise awareness of its role within the broader UN system. Moreover, increasing the visibility of the PBC and reinforcing its operational capabilities are essential steps to ensure that it can meet the growing demands for peacebuilding support, and channel this support with the most impact.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. ***Strengthen the PBC Secretariat:***

- The PBC Secretariat should be reinforced as a foundational component of the PBC. This enhancement will help the PBC assess and communicate its value proposition to Member States

and stakeholders more effectively. The PBC Secretariat could also take a more systematic approach to gathering and analysing information, strengthening the PBC's strategic direction and increasing its impact on peacebuilding efforts. The ongoing efforts to develop the Peacebuilding Impact Hub is a welcomed step in this direction and should be reinforced.

2. *Ensure dedicated space and interpretation for PBC meetings:*

- The PBC should secure dedicated meeting space, such as the Trusteeship Council, and ensure that interpretation services are available for all meetings. The lack of interpretation services has led to the cancellation of PBC meetings in the past, hindering its ability to convene and engage effectively. Providing dedicated space and interpretation will ensure the PBC work proceeds without disruption, enabling it to carry out its functions more efficiently.

3. *Clarify and strengthen the role of Vice-Chairs:*

- The introduction of four Vice-Chairs to the Commission is a positive development, and their roles should be clarified in order to fully utilize their potential complementarity alongside the work of the Chair. Potential roles for Vice-Chairs include: engaging with countries to prepare for PBC meetings; overseeing follow-up actions on the PBC meetings; focus on thematic issues such as financing (link to PBF), partnerships, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), climate security and Artificial Intelligence. This division of responsibilities can help to ensure that key areas receive focused attention, and that the Commission's work is more systematic and strategic.

4. *Enhance awareness among Member States of the PBC's mandate and capacity:*

- Member States on the PBC should take active steps to raise awareness of the PBC's role within the broader UN system. A practice like that of ECOSOC, where members circulate concept notes within their regional and negotiating groups, could be adapted to help other Member States better understand the PBC work and generate interest in engaging with it. This will increase the PBC visibility and ensure that its expertise is utilized by a wider range of UN bodies and Member States.

5. *Improve follow-up on the PBC's recommendations:*

- The PBC must enhance its follow-up mechanisms to ensure that recommendations are acted upon. For instance, after Somalia presented to the PBC in December 2020, a recommendation was made for the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to increase support for civil society actors, but no follow-up action was taken. Establishing a clear follow-up function, perhaps assigned to one of the Vice-Chairs, supported by the PBC Secretariat, will ensure that recommendations lead to tangible outcomes and maximize the impact of the PBC work.

6. *Develop a system for evaluating and documenting impact:*

- There is a lack of documented evidence regarding the impact of the PBC work, which hinders its ability to demonstrate its effectiveness and prioritize its activities. To address this, the PBC should invest in impact evaluation efforts, including annual assessments and could build on the development of the Peacebuilding Impact Hub (mentioned above on p 6). This Hub should support the collection of reports, studies, and impact assessments from diverse stakeholders. Strengthening the Secretariat's capacity to document and evaluate the PBC's impact will provide valuable insights and improve the PBC's ability to adapt and prioritise its work.

7. Engage More with UN Field Presences:

- The PBC should increase its engagement with UN field presences, including peace and development advisors, to enhance awareness and understanding of the PBC's work at the country level. Peace and development advisors should act as representatives of the PBC, ensuring that its priorities and strategies are integrated into national-level peacebuilding efforts. This will help promote the PBC's value and facilitate closer coordination with national stakeholders and development partners.

8. Document good practices for future PBC Chairs:

- The PBC Secretariat should document 'good practices' and key precedents in the PBC's operations, such as decisions regarding the inclusion of civil society speakers. This will help ensure knowledge transfer as the PBC membership changes and enable new Chairs to build on previous successes. By capturing and institutionalising best practices, the PBC can ensure continuity and effectiveness in its work, even as leadership transitions.

2.2.3 Leveraging PBC's convening power across the UN system

The PBC holds significant potential in developing inclusive engagement across a range of countries, regions, and thematic areas on its agenda. However, its approach to engagement has often been ad-hoc, without a clear commitment to long-term partnerships or a systematic approach. Furthermore, Member States who seek support from and engagement with the PBC have demonstrated and articulated different views and expectations of what they aim to receive from the Commission's work (from PBF eligibility to sharing of experience and promoting accountability for advancing peacebuilding priorities).

While the PBC's convening power is one of its key strengths, it has not been fully utilised in a way that promotes sustained dialogue, inclusivity, and effective collaboration. The PBC's meetings sometime lack a clear purpose or framework, and the involvement of key stakeholders—such as local peacebuilders, academia, and civil society—has been limited. Additionally, the current structure of convenings and decision-making processes can limit the PBC's ability to create meaningful partnerships and facilitate strategic peacebuilding initiatives. To maximise the potential of its convening power, the PBC should adopt a more systematic, inclusive, and transparent approach to its engagements and strengthen its ability to drive positive, long-term peacebuilding outcomes.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Clarify the purpose and goals of the PBC's convening role:

- The PBC should clearly define the goals and purpose of its convenings, ensuring that each meeting has a well-established objective. The PBC could develop a framework that outlines the roles and expectations of various stakeholders, including Member States, civil society, local peacebuilders, and international financial institutions (IFIs). This framework can increase clarity on the types of information that are most valuable to share during meetings; help IFIs and others to better understand what is expected of them; and provide more guidance for the Commission's work and thereby its ability to be impactful and purposeful.

2. Formalise and structure the PBC's convenings:

- The PBC should implement a more structured approach to its convenings by providing clear and timely information to stakeholders. Concept notes and agendas should be made available at least

one month in advance to allow all participants—including Member States, civil society, and other partners—adequate time to prepare. This will encourage greater participation and ensure that all relevant voices are heard. The PBC should not allow meetings to proceed without proper preparation, and the Chair should take a more active role in ensuring that meetings are well-organized and meaningful.

3. *Enhance inclusion of local peacebuilders, academia, and civil society:*

- The PBC should prioritize the involvement of local peacebuilders, academia, and think tanks in its meetings. These stakeholders bring valuable, country-level perspectives and can contribute to more inclusive and holistic discussions. Member States should be encouraged to propose briefers, and the Chair should ensure that the input by independent civil society is included in every relevant session. To facilitate this, the PBC could establish a systematic mechanism for selecting diverse civil society representatives, including women and youth, to ensure that different perspectives are consistently represented.
- In situations where there is an absence of civil society participation, the Chair has the prerogative (following precedent and if deemed appropriate) to decide not to proceed with the meeting.

4. *Rethink consensus principle for more effective decision-making:*

- The PBC should reconsider the application of the consensus principle across all of its work, which often prevents meaningful civil society engagement and hinders decision-making. Instead, the PBC could adopt a voting mechanism on relevant questions to ensure that the views of all stakeholders are considered and that decisions are made in a timely and effective manner. This shift will allow for more inclusive, transparent, and accountable decision-making processes within the PBC.

5. *Establish annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference:*

- The PBC should organise an annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference, coordinated by the PBSO with guidance from a global research advisory panel. This conference would bring together researchers, peacebuilders, and stakeholders to discuss the latest developments in peacebuilding and share best practices. It could also serve as a platform for the PBC to collaborate with academic institutions and think tanks on the development of national prevention strategies, thus strengthening the knowledge base of the PBC and enhancing its strategic capacity.

6. *Facilitate pre-meeting engagement with local peacebuilders:*

- To ensure meaningful local participation, the PBC should work with civil society to organise meetings with local peacebuilders ahead of its formal sessions. This will allow for a more inclusive and preparatory process, giving local stakeholders an opportunity to provide input and align their priorities with the broader peacebuilding agenda. These engagements should be scheduled with adequate notice, ensuring that local peacebuilders have enough time to contribute effectively.

7. *Revise PBCs working methods to ensure diverse civil society engagement:*

- The PBC should revise its working methods to ensure that a diversity of civil society representatives, including those from marginalized communities, are meaningfully engaged

during its meetings. This could include setting aside specific time slots for civil society input and ensuring that diverse perspectives are reflected in discussions. Furthermore, the PBC could develop specific guidelines for the inclusion of women and youth, ensuring that their voices are integral to the peacebuilding process.

2.3 Enhancing Peacebuilding Financing and Partnerships

The third theme of the workshop explored the PBC's role in mobilising resources for peacebuilding and establishing strategic partnerships with international financial institutions (IFIs), regional development banks, and the private sector. Starting with the acknowledgment that budgets for peacebuilding are being decreased at a time when conflict and fragility are on the rise, the discussions focused on identifying actions to ensure sustainable financing for peacebuilding initiatives and strengthening the PBC's ability to support national peacebuilding and prevention strategies. Concerted action on part of the international community in this regard is considered particularly pertinent in the context of the 2025 PBAR and the 2025 International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), as well as in follow-up on the 2022 General Assembly resolution on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/RES/76/305).

Key recommendations focused on: 1) *Engagement with IFIs and regional development banks*; 2) *Mobilising resources for peacebuilding*; and 3) *Supporting national strategies*: Ensuring that financing is responsive to the specific needs of national prevention and peacebuilding strategies is critical for achieving sustainable outcomes. Presentations by Bushra Hassan (UN Peacebuilding Support Office) and Mariska Van Beijnum (former chair of the PBF advisory group) highlighted the importance of strategic resource mobilisation and collaboration to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts.

2.3.1 PBC's engagement with IFIs and Regional Development Banks

The PBC has significant potential to engage International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs) in peacebuilding processes. Yet there remains a noticeable lack of interest and active engagement from these institutions. While the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is a key resource, it cannot provide comprehensive support for peacebuilding in countries on its own. PBF funding, while small, can help to attract investments by IFIs and RDBs. These institutions are well-positioned to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, as their involvement enhances development objectives and help reduce the risks associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected countries. However, to unlock this potential, the PBC must help to bridge the gap between the UN's peacebuilding architecture and the operational language and priorities of IFIs and RDBs. More frequent, structured engagement, alignment of language, and better understanding of expectations will be key to fostering stronger partnerships that can deliver impactful peacebuilding outcomes.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Explore the expectations of IFIs and RDBs for effective engagement:

- The PBC should deepen conversations with IFIs and RDBs to better understand their expectations from peacebuilding discussions. This will help to build synergies and identify areas where collaboration could be most effective. The PBC Secretariat should systematically investigate the specific needs and priorities of these institutions, ensuring that the PBC's engagement with them is relevant and mutually beneficial.

2. *Align Language Between the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and IFIs/RDBs:*

- To enhance communication and understanding, the PBC should work towards aligning the language used within the UN peacebuilding architecture with the terminology and frameworks employed by IFIs and RDBs. This alignment will improve clarity and ensure that both parties are speaking the same language, facilitating better collaboration and understanding of each other's roles and contributions.

3. *Encourage joint peacebuilding assessments:*

- The PBC should encourage joint peacebuilding assessments between the UN and IFIs, ensuring that both entities are working from a shared understanding of the peacebuilding context and needs. These assessments should include input from both the UN system and IFIs to ensure that the most relevant and comprehensive data informs peacebuilding strategies.

4. *Improve internal coordination among bilateral donors:*

- Bilateral donors, particularly those represented on the advisory boards and governing bodies of IFIs, should improve internal coordination within and across their ministries. This will ensure that IFIs better understand the value of engaging with the PBC and can align their funding and peacebuilding efforts with the broader goals of the PBC.

5. *Encourage documentation and sharing of lessons learned:*

- The PBC should encourage IFIs and RDBs that are already engaged in peacebuilding, such as the African Development Bank, to document and share their lessons learned with other IFIs and RDBs. This exchange of experiences and best practices will help other institutions improve their own peacebuilding efforts and ensure that the most effective strategies are being implemented across regions.

6. *Explore additional international fora for engagement with IFIs and RDBs:*

- Members of the PBC should explore other international forums, such as the G20, to engage IFIs and RDBs. While peacebuilding is rarely the focus of these discussions, forums like the G20 have a significant impact on IFIs. By raising peacebuilding issues in these spaces, the PBC can help bring greater attention to the importance of peacebuilding and encourage IFIs to incorporate it into their broader agendas.

2.3.2 Enhancing PBC's role in mobilising resources

The PBC plays a vital role in mobilising resources for peacebuilding efforts, yet its current capacity to do so effectively is underdeveloped. Despite the growing need for peacebuilding funding, especially in post-conflict countries, the PBC lacks the mechanisms to fully align its efforts with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), mobilise domestic resources, and engage the private sector. Additionally, there is limited focus on creating sustainable national peacebuilding funds or ensuring that peacekeeping missions allocate appropriate resources for peacebuilding activities. The reliance on intermediary models for financing, while necessary, often limits the direct impact of funding on local actors. To enhance the PBC's role in resource mobilisation, there needs to be a more strategic, coordinated approach to funding and resource allocation that includes exploring innovative funding models, and better engaging national and private sector stakeholders.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Empower the PBF with increased funding and enhanced working methods:

- The PBC should advocate for increased resources for the PBF to ensure that it can meet the growing demands for peacebuilding support. This includes exploring new funding sources and ensuring that the PBF's working methods are streamlined to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The PBC should work closely with all Member States and other stakeholders to secure the necessary resources and refine the operational processes of the PBF, ensuring that it remains flexible yet accountable in its support for peacebuilding initiatives.

2. Align the PBC and the PBF's work for greater accountability and flexibility:

- The PBC should strengthen the alignment between its activities and those of the PBF, while maintaining the PBF's flexibility to respond to dynamic and context-specific peacebuilding needs. This could include more regular briefings to the PBC on progress of PBF-funded projects; an annual exchange between the full membership of the PBC and the full PBF Advisory Group; and a standing invitation for a PBC member to join field visits by the Advisory Group to PBF project sites.
- The PBC can play a critical role in ensuring that resources are used effectively and in a manner that reflects the priorities identified in peacebuilding strategies supported by the PBC.

3. Encourage domestic resource mobilisation and private sector engagement:

- The PBC should actively encourage domestic resource mobilisation, particularly in countries undergoing transition, to ensure that peacebuilding efforts are more sustainable. In addition, the PBC should work to foster greater engagement from the private sector in supporting peacebuilding initiatives. By involving private sector actors, the PBC can help distinguish between bilateral donor support and national capacities, ensuring that both domestic and international resources are mobilised effectively for long-term peacebuilding.

4. Explore the Creation of National Peacebuilding Funds:

- The PBC should explore the creation of national peacebuilding funds to complement the work of the PBF. While the PBF cannot sustainably support all peacebuilding activities in a given country, national peacebuilding funds can provide a more sustainable source of financing, drawing in resources from domestic governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), and regional development banks (RDBs). The PBC could look to models like Liberia's peacebuilding fund as a potential model for other countries, ensuring that funds are tailored to the specific needs and context of each country.

5. Ensure peacekeeping missions allocate resources for peacebuilding:

- The PBC should advocate for peacekeeping missions to allocate a set percentage of their budgets for peacebuilding activities. In many cases, more resources are available within peace operations' budgets than in the PBF. The PBC should work with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) to ensure that peacekeeping budgets are used strategically to support peacebuilding objectives, and that unspent peacekeeping funds are transferred to peacebuilding efforts where appropriate.

This approach will help to ensure that peacekeeping missions contribute to long-term peacebuilding goals, rather than just addressing immediate security concerns.

6. *Review and Enhance Intermediary Financing Models:*

- The PBC should support the review of existing intermediary financing models to improve the quality and accessibility of funds for peacebuilding. Bilateral donors often rely on the UN, international NGOs, and other networks as intermediaries to distribute funds. The PBC should explore how these models can be improved to ensure that local actors have better access to resources and that funding reaches those who can most effectively drive peacebuilding efforts. By identifying the intermediary models that result in greater impact, the PBC can help refine the ways in which funds are distributed and utilised at the local level.

2.3.3 *The PBC's role in Financing national prevention strategies*

The Pact for the Future (Article 17) encourages Member States to adopt national prevention strategies and approaches to sustain peace 'on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national priorities'. As any other mechanisms, such strategies and approaches to be effective need to be adequately financed. The UN General Assembly Resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding (A/RES/76/305) provides guidance on the national and multilateral pathways to funding such prevention strategies. The rationale is that properly funded national prevention strategies and approaches could serve as a foundation of the interest of more donors to invest into the country's stabilization and development.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. **Activate the PBC's convening role:**
The PBC could play a role, particularly through its convening function, in making the case to various donors for financing national prevention strategies, including from national funding, bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and other IFIs. Specifically, the PBC could strive to mobilize funding from the World Bank's Prevention and Resilience Allocation Facility (PRA), which requires the existence of a national prevention strategy as one criterion for funding. Beyond financial resources, the PBC can mobilize required support in the development of strong policies by bringing relevant stakeholders together. Through the convening power of the PBC, countries can identify and/or communicate gaps that need to be filled.
2. **Explore linkages at the country level:**
In certain contexts, engagement with IFIs can also be pursued at the country level under the leadership of the RC. For example, in Papua New Guinea (PNG), following the development of a national prevention strategy that was supported by the PBF, World Bank funding was secured for its implementation.
3. **Increase cooperation between the PBC and the PBF:**
Cooperation between the PBC and PBF could be strengthened, including by allowing countries that present their national prevention strategies to the PBC to receive special consideration for PBF funding and organizing an annual meeting on PBF financing for such strategies. The PBF can share good practices in supporting national prevention strategies and communicate them to the PBC through the format of annual thematic review.
4. **Take action to unlock private finance:**

The PBC needs to develop a clear strategy for engagement with the private sector which currently does not exist. Such an effort could start with a mapping or exploration of where the private sector is willing to engage and connect these efforts to national prevention strategies. Lessons could be learned from efforts in recent years to strengthen financing for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the use of blended financing and public-private partnerships.

2.4 Other issues and observations

2.4.1 Strengthening Engagement with Regional Organisations for country-level peacebuilding

The PBC has a critical role to play in building strong prevention and peacebuilding architectures, but its current engagement with regional organisations remains underdeveloped. Regional organisations, particularly those in conflict affected and fragile areas, have a deeper understanding of local contexts, greater acceptance among local populations, and are often better positioned to influence peacebuilding outcomes. The PBC can enhance its impact by systematically strengthening its collaboration with these organisations. By better aligning the PBC's efforts with regional development plans, such as Africa's Agenda 2063 and the African Union's Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), the PBC can provide more coordinated, holistic peacebuilding support that integrates local and regional priorities.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Formalise and Strengthen Partnerships with Regional Organisations:

- The PBC could establish formal partnerships with key regional organisations, including the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and ASEAN, to support country-level peacebuilding and prevention efforts. This could involve regular consultations and joint initiatives that align the PBC's work with regional priorities and strategies, ensuring a more contextually relevant and coordinated approach to peacebuilding.

2. Integrate Regional Development Plans into PBC's Work:

- The PBC could incorporate regional development plans, such as Africa's Agenda 2063 and the AU's Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, into its peacebuilding framework. This will ensure that the PBC advice and support align with long-term regional development goals, enhancing the sustainability and effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives at the field level.

3. Enhance Knowledge Exchange Between the PBC and Regional Organisations:

- The PBC could facilitate regular knowledge exchange between its members and regional organisations, sharing best practices, lessons learned, and challenges faced in peacebuilding. This could be achieved through joint workshops, conferences, and collaborative research initiatives, enhancing mutual understanding and strengthening the collective impact of peacebuilding efforts.

4. Increase Local Stakeholder Participation in Regional Dialogues:

- The PBC could work with regional organisations to create more inclusive peacebuilding processes by involving local stakeholders, including civil society, youth, and women’s groups. This approach will ensure that regional peacebuilding efforts are not only locally driven but also reflect the needs and aspirations of the populations most affected by conflict.

2.4.2 Supervising ‘Light Footprint Missions’

The Group of Independent Eminent Persons has recommended the use of light footprint missions as a more flexible and sustainable alternative to traditional large-scale peacekeeping operations, reiterating an idea presented by the 2023 PBC Chair. These missions are designed to operate with minimal presence while focusing on providing political support, coordination, and targeted capacity-building. However, the PBC’s role in supervising these light footprint missions is not yet clearly defined. By taking on a supervisory role for such missions, the PBC could help ensure their success and integration into broader peacebuilding strategies, while ensuring that they remain responsive to evolving country needs.

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Develop a clear terminology and framework for ‘Light Footprint Missions’:

- The PBC could work with relevant stakeholders to develop a clear framework for light footprint missions that outlines their objectives, mandates, and the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. This framework should focus on flexibility, responsiveness, and the ability to adapt to changing political and security dynamics, while ensuring that missions remain focused on building sustainable peace.

2. Ensure Alignment of Light Footprint Missions with National Peacebuilding Priorities:

- Light footprint missions should be closely aligned with the peacebuilding priorities of the host country, ensuring that they address the root causes of conflict and support long-term development. The PBC should facilitate coordination between light footprint missions and national peacebuilding and prevention strategies, ensuring that the missions complement and enhance existing efforts by national governments and local stakeholders.

3. Provide Adequate Resources and Support for Light Footprint Missions:

- While light footprint missions are designed to operate with minimal presence, they still require sufficient resources, including funding, expertise, and capacity-building support. The PBC should work with Member States and relevant UN bodies to secure the necessary resources for these missions, ensuring that they have the capacity to deliver effective support and create lasting impact.

2.4.3 PBCs role regarding National Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies

Over the past two years, interest in and attention to national prevention strategies has gained momentum. Countries from different regions and income levels have presented their national prevention strategies and efforts at the PBC. These meetings have demonstrated the universality of prevention. In the [Pact for the Future](#) (Action 17), Member States recognize the PBC’s important role in supporting national prevention strategies and efforts, including through facilitating exchanges of good practices and mobilizing political and financial support. As Member States’ interest in making use of the platform offered by the PBC to share

*their priorities and experiences increases, questions arise as to how the PBC can most effectively support such strategies.*⁹

Recommendations and Actions:

1. Explore modalities and forms for PBC support on national prevention strategies:

- Member States of the PBC could discuss options within its mandate and working methods to support national prevention strategies with support from think tanks and civil society. To enhance clarity on expectations and to increase comparability and exchange in learning the PBC, with input from experts, could consider outlining a list of basic elements or factors that are considered essential for any successful national prevention strategy.

2. Consider creating a window within the PBF for financing national prevention strategies:

- A window within the PBF could be opened to provide support for the development, implementation or evaluation of national prevention strategies. This could be catalytic in unlocking funding from the World Bank. In line with this, the PBC Secretariat could continue working closely with IFIs to ensure their strategic engagement/participation in PBC meetings around national prevention strategies. Continuing the discussions on this issue would help understand what Member States need from IFIs, how IFIs envision such engagement and support, and how the PBC can assist.

2.4.4 Other observations

The workshop also recognised the importance of distinguishing whether the recommendations outlined in various documents, agreements, or reports will require formal amendments or elaboration in new resolutions (SC/GA), or if they can be implemented through existing processes, including through decisions made by the Chairs of the PBC to amend the PBC's working methods or operationalise existing policies.

A careful examination of proposed recommendations and agreed actions is necessary to determine procedural implications. Recommendations that propose changes to the established mandates or structure of the PBC or PBSO and the PBF may necessitate formal revisions, thereby also requiring broader consensus and approval. Recommendations that fall within the operational scope of the PBC should be made actionable through the Chairs' discretion and subject to PBSO's internal processes and practices. This distinction is essential to avoid overloading the negotiations for the 2025 PBAR outcome document, likely to undergo challenges reaching consensus, and still adhere to procedural processes.

⁹ For further reading on how the PBC can support national prevention strategies please consult <https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/What-Can-the-Peacebuilding-Commission-Do-to-Support-National-Prevention-Strategies-November-2024.pdf>

4. Conclusions and the way forward

4.1 Conclusions

The conclusions of the workshop highlight the need for a cohesive and action-oriented approach for maximising the usefulness of the 2025 PBAR. Strengthening the PBC's role in global peacebuilding efforts requires translating insights and recommendations into tangible, measurable actions. The outcomes from the workshop can effectively be taken forward and made actionable during the 2025 PBAR by systematically addressing the three key areas for future action, focusing on concrete and practical implementation, capacity enhancement, and strategic partnerships to ensure inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

1. Strengthening the PBC's Advisory Role

A core priority moving forward is enhancing the PBC's ability to provide high-quality, timely advice to all intergovernmental bodies, including the Security Council and the General Assembly. To achieve this, the 2025PBAR should consider integrating the following:

- Establish inclusive mechanisms to ensure its recommendations are strategic, demand-driven and responsive to the evolving needs of Member States and UN entities.
- Develop systems to assess the impact of its advice, ensuring continuous improvement in its advisory functions.
- Identify measures to establish a distinct role for the PBC in mission transitions and peacekeeping drawdowns, ensuring that transitions are strategically guided and supported by coordinated peacebuilding efforts.

These actions will strengthen the PBC's position as a trusted and influential advisory body within the UN system, capable of bridging policy discussions and operational realities.

2. Promoting Coherence and Enhancing Capacity

To support national ownership and enhance the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts, it is imperative to promote greater coherence across the UN system and reinforce the PBC's capacity to support Member States. Key actions include:

- Strengthening coordination between the PBC, the UN Secretariat, UN Country Teams, and across the UN System to align peacebuilding objectives and avoid duplication of efforts.
- Enhancing the capacity of the PBC to act as a central platform for convening diverse stakeholders, including Member States, regional actors, and civil society organisations to foster inclusive engagement.
- Supporting national ownership by providing tailored assistance to countries emerging from conflict, with an emphasis on aligning peacebuilding efforts with local priorities and contexts.

3. Enhancing Peacebuilding Financing and Partnerships

Sustainable peacebuilding requires robust and innovative financing mechanisms, as well as strategic partnerships with key stakeholders. To address these needs, the PBC should:

- Strengthen partnerships with international financial institutions (IFIs), regional development banks, and the private sector to mobilise resources for peacebuilding efforts.
- Advocate for an increase in assessed contributions for the PBF, better alignment between the work of the PBF and the PBC and more voluntary funding for peacebuilding activities, exploring innovative financing approaches to address funding gaps (including use of unspent mission budgets).
- Ensure that financing strategies are responsive to the specific needs of national prevention and peacebuilding plans, aligning resources with local priorities to achieve maximum impact.

4.2 Way forward - the formal phase of the PBAR

The formal phase of the 2025 PBAR kicked off in January 2025, following the conclusion of the informal phase with the publication of the SG's report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.¹⁰ The General Assembly has appointed two co-facilitators, the PRs of Egypt (H.E. Osama Abdel Khalek) and Slovenia (H.E. Samuel Žbogar), to lead the intergovernmental consultations and negotiations on the outcome document that will conclude the formal phase of the PBAR.

This process aims to consolidate inputs from the informal phase into a comprehensive and actionable outcome. The review seeks to assess the UN's peacebuilding efforts and propose improvements to the architecture. The negotiation process will be crucial in shaping the future direction of UN peacebuilding initiatives. While specific dates for the conclusion of the formal phase are yet to be announced, the PBAR is expected to align with other key UN processes in 2025.

Aligning the PBAR with ongoing UN Processes

The 2025 review should be aligned with other key ongoing processes within the UN system to ensure coherence and synergy across the broader peacebuilding and security agenda. Several important processes in 2025 will offer opportunities for alignment, allowing the PBAR to complement and strengthen these efforts. Some of the processes deemed particularly relevant include:

1. Annual Open Debate on the UNSC's Working Methods
2. 69th Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) Beijing +30 (10-21 March 2025 | New York, USA)
3. The 2025 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting (May 13–14, 2025 | Berlin, Germany)
4. The 2025 International Conference on Financing for Development (30 June – 3 July, 2025 | Seville, Spain)
5. Secretary-General's review of the future of all forms of UN peace operations
6. The 25th Anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (October 2025 | New York, USA)
7. The 10th Anniversary of the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda (December 2025 | New York, USA)
8. Ongoing efforts to implement the Pact for the Future ([A/RES/79/1](#)) and the 2022 Resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding ([A/RES/76/305](#))
9. Second World Summit for Social Development (4-6 Nov 2025 | Doha, Qatar)

This list highlights some of the other UN processes deemed most relevant to link with peacebuilding but is not presumed to be comprehensive. Participants at the workshop strongly encouraged Member States to seek broader linkages with a broad range of ongoing policy processes. By drawing connections with parallel efforts, the 2025 PBAR can enhance its impact, promote greater coherence in UN peacebuilding efforts, and ensure that the work of the PBC remains responsive and relevant.

¹⁰ For details see Terms of Reference for the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review ([A/78/870-S/2024/339](#)).

Annex A. Workshop Agenda

Workshop on Strengthening the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture - Transforming Commitments into Action

December 9 - Day one

16:30—18:00 Opening session - 'Delivering Change through the 2025 PBAR'

Welcome by Co-sponsors

Introduction: Sigrid Gruener, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF)

Speakers:

- Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, *Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding*
- Mr. Mohamed Edrees, *Independent Eminent Persons Group for the 2025 PBAR*
- Mr. Ahmed Abdinahir Mohamed, *Deputy Director and Head of Programs, Save Somali Women and Children.*
 - *On ways of strengthening the role of the Peacebuilding Architecture at the country level and PBC's convening role regarding CSO inclusivity*

Open dialogue with initial remarks by:

H.E. Andreas Løvold, Deputy Permanent Representative, Norway

H.E. Ivan Šimonović, Permanent Representative, Croatia

H.E. Tomohiro Mikanagi, Deputy Permanent Representative, Japan

H.E. Thomas Zahneisen, Deputy Permanent Representative, Germany

H.E. Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Deputy Permanent Representative, the Netherlands

Framing questions:

- *What is needed by member states to identify and agree on priorities for the formal phase of the PBAR process and to ensure the implementation of commitments made? What is your vision for the 2025 PBAR Outcome Document? What can the PBAR realistically accomplish?*
- *How can the recommendations and commitments from the Pact for the Future be taken forward in the formal phase of the review? What changes must be anchored in new UN resolutions, and what actions can be taken independently within the existing mandate of the PBA?*
- *What are three concrete changes that could be done to strengthen the capacity of the PBC to deliver more impact at the country level? What does it take to operationalise these changes?*

19:30 - 21:00 Working Dinner: Shaping the Future of Peacebuilding

Moderated discussions continuing dialogue from the opening session

Henrik Hammargren, Director Emeritus and Senior Advisor, DHF

Initial Remarks by:

H.E. Rebecca Bryant, Deputy Permanent Representative, Australia

H.E. Hyunwoo Cho, Deputy Permanent Representative, Republic of Korea

Tuesday, 10 December - Day two

9:00-9:30 *Workshop Framing*

Moderated by: DHF and GPPAC

Messages from the PBC Chair – Ms. Érika Helena Campos, Second-Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations

Recap and reflections on day 1 – Marina Kumskova, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)

Setting the Scene: Introduction to the workshop methodology: Sigrid Gruener, DHF

9:30-12:00 *Interactive workshop sessions 1 and 2:*

Session 1: *Strengthening the PBC’s Advisory Role*

The focus of Session 1 is on enhancing the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an advisory body. The roundtable will explore key topics, including the PBC's interactions with the General Assembly and its advisory role with the Security Council. It will also address how to more systematically integrate expert input into the PBC's work to improve its overall effectiveness. The session will also discuss the provision of quality and timely advice—both on demand and proactively—and explore ways to assess the impact of the PBC's recommendations. It will examine recommendations regarding the PBC's role in the evolving context of UN peacekeeping, particularly concerning mission transitions and drawdowns

Plenary Presentations:

- **Cedric de Coning**, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI).
- **Erica Gaston**, Senior Advisor & Head of the Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace Pillar UNU Centre for Policy Research.

Roundtables:

1. ***PBC interaction with the UNSC***, ensuring quality, timely advice – on demand and by demand. Including measuring impact (Facilitator: Cedric de Coning; Rapporteur: MS)
2. ***PBC’s advisory role to the General Assembly*** including measuring impact (Facilitator: Erica Gaston; Rapporteur: MS)
3. ***The PBC’s role in transition settings/mission drawdowns*** (Facilitator: Céline Monnier, Rapporteur: MS)

Guiding questions:

- *How can the PBC strengthen its advisory role vis-a-vis the Security Council and how can the impact of its advice be assessed?*
- *How can the systematic input of expert advice be better integrated into the PBC’s work?*
- *What steps should be taken to enhance the capacity of the PBC, the UN Secretariat, and UN Country Teams to support the implementation of the Sustaining Peace Resolutions?*

Session 2: *Promoting coherence, enhancing capacity and strengthening the convening role of the PBC*

The session will focus on the specific actions PBC should take to promote coherence among UN entities, avoid fragmentation, and promote common peacebuilding objectives and priorities. It will explore how the PBC, through its convening role, can increase support for national ownership through inclusive engagement

with and beyond national governments, assisting countries in building resilient institutions (SDG 16) while addressing the root causes of conflict. The session will also reflect on the PBC's role in bringing together Member States, civil society, and regional organisations to align peacebuilding strategies. Additionally, it will highlight the need to enhance capacity within the PBC, the UN Secretariat, and UN Country Teams to ensure effective, locally responsive peacebuilding efforts.

Plenary Presentation:

- **Diloro Kadirova**, Prevention and Peacebuilding Advisor, UN Development Coordination Office (DCO)

Roundtables:

1. **Coherence:** PBC's role in promoting coherence for UN Peacebuilding. (Facilitator: Marina Kumskova; Rapporteur: MS)
2. **Capacity:** Enhancing the PBC, UN Secretariat, and UN Country Teams for responsive and effective peacebuilding. (Facilitator: Jordan Ryan; Rapporteur: MS)
3. **Convening Power:** Exploring how the PBC can increase inclusive engagement with and beyond national governments. (Facilitator: Sigrid Gruener; Rapporteur: MS)

Guiding Questions:

- *How can the PBC promote coherence among UN entities and to reduce fragmentation and promote alignment with common peacebuilding objectives?*
- *What mechanisms can the PBC develop put in place to support coordination and alignment of peacebuilding strategies among UN entities at the country level?*
- *What is needed to ensure that the PBC, the UN Secretariat, and UN Country Teams are adequately resourced, financially, in terms of staff and technical support to carry out their peacebuilding mandates effectively?*
- *What specific actions should the PBC take to increase inclusive engagement beyond national governments, ensuring that local communities, civil society, and regional organisations play a central role in peacebuilding efforts?*

12:00-13:30 Working Lunch: National Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies

The lunch will feature a presentation and moderated discussion by the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) on findings and recommendations for effective national prevention and peacebuilding strategies and how the PBC can support the development and implementation of as well as sharing of experiences between countries on such strategies.

- **Céline Monnier**, *Acting Director and Senior Program Officer* at Center on International Cooperation (CIC).
- **Sophie Rutenbar**, *Visiting Fellow*, at Center on International Cooperation (CIC).
- **Q&A moderated by DHF**

13:30-14:45 Interactive workshop sessions continued

Session 3: Peacebuilding Financing and Partnerships to Sustain Peace (75 min)

The session explores how the PBC can strengthen collaborative efforts to support peacebuilding financing and take forward previous recommendations, notably in RES 76/305. Topics include engaging with International Financial Institutions and Regional Development Banks, enhancing synergies between the PBC and the PBF while maintaining the Peacebuilding Fund's integrity, and securing funding for national

prevention and peacebuilding strategies. The session will also explore how the PBC can serve as a platform for partnerships with the private sector.

Plenary Presentations:

- **Bushra Hassan**, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser, Peacebuilding Support Office, UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
- **Mariska Van Beijnum**, Independent Peacebuilding Expert

Roundtables:

1. ***Engagement with IFIs and Regional Development Banks.***
(Facilitator: Cedric de Coning; Rapporteur: MS)
2. ***Resources for Peace*** - enhancing PBC's role in mobilising resources
(Facilitator: Henrik Hammargren, Rapporteur: MS)
3. ***Financing National Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies.***
(Facilitator: Céline Monnier; Rapporteur: MS)
4. ***Open Space Roundtable*** – capturing what has not been raised in other sessions
(Facilitator: Maya Ungar; Rapporteur: MS)

Guiding questions:

- *What actions can be taken by the PBA to strengthen operational relationships between the UN and the IFIs, including Regional Development Banks?*
- *How can synergies between the PBC and the PBF be improved without compromising the independence and integrity of the Fund?*
- *How can the PBC serve as a platform for different partnerships and dialogue with Member States in developing, implementing, and reviewing their peacebuilding and prevention strategies?*

14:45-15:45 *Concluding reflections and next steps for the formal phase of the PBAR*

- Presentation of Workshop outcomes, highlighting actionable steps for the taking forward ideas.
- The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review process.

Annex B. Workshop Participants

Region / Org.	Member State Affiliation	Surname	Name	Title
Europe:	Croatia	Šimonović	Ivan	Permanent Representative
	Croatia	Zubčević	Irena	Senior Advisor
	Denmark	Stage	Maria	Senior policy advisor
	Denmark	Rudebeck Eilertzen	Thomas	Special Advisor, Migration, Peace and Stabilization, MFA
	France	Dharmadhikari	Jay	Deputy Permanent Representative
	France	El-Fatah Badr	Mohammed	First Secretary
	Germany	Faure	Anna	First Secretary
	Germany	Zahneisen	Thomas	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Italy	Fedele	Francesco	Counsellor
	Netherlands	Scheerder	Amie	Policy Officer Rule of Law and Peacebuilding
	Netherlands	Van Beijnum	Mariska	Independent Expert
	Netherlands	Djeyhoun	Ostowar	Counsellor, Deputy Head of Political Affairs Section
	Netherlands	Tahzib-Lie	Bahia	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Norway	Johnson-Petri	Rui	Policy Adviser
	Norway	Løvold	Andreas	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Sweden	Salomonsson	Gustaf	Counsellor
	Sweden	Bertelman	Hanna	Head of UN Unit, Folke Bernadotte Academy
	UK	Byangoy	Datcha	Peacebuilding Adviser
Northern America:	Canada	Snowden	Michael	Senior Political Advisor
	Canada	Tayyem	Sarah	Senior Adviser, Global Affairs Canada
	Canada	Cockell	John	Deputy Director, Global Affairs Canada

	United States	Gellis	Victoria	Adviser and Senior Development Counsellor
Latin America:	Brazil	Campos	Érika	Second Secretary
	Colombia	Sanmiguel	Paula	Third Committee Expert and responsible for PBC
	El Salvador	Baños Müller	Liliana Verónica	First Secretary
Asia:	India	Adhana	Surendra	Counsellor
	Japan	Takashi	Shoji	Counsellor
	Japan	Mikanagi	Tomohiro	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Nepal	Basnet	Shivani	Counsellor
	Republic of Korea	Park	Jeewon	First Secretary
	Republic of Korea	Cho	Hyunwoo	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Timor-Leste	Chaves	Joaquim	Second Secretary - P&S
Africa:	Algeria	Remaoun	Mehdi	First Secretary
	Egypt	Soliman	Mohamed	Second Secretary
	South Africa	Sterley	Murray	Second Secretary - P&S
Pacific:	Australia	Bryant	Rebecca	Deputy Permanent Representative
	Australia	Likos	Paige	Policy Adviser
Regional Org:	AU	Baouche	Sid	Senior Advisor on Peace and Security
	EU	Hansen	Steen Malthe	Minister Counsellor
	EU	Samson	Hedda	Deputy Permanent Representative
UN:	PBSO	Spehar	Elizabeth	Assistant Secretary General
	PBSO	Fontana	Paolo	Political Affairs Officer
	PBSO	Hassan	Bushra	Senior M&E Adviser
	DCO	Kadirova	Diloro	Prevention and Peacebuilding Advisor
Civil Society:	CIC	Rutenbar	Sophie	Visiting Fellow
	CIC	Monnier	Céline	Senior Program Officer and Acting Director, Prevention

	NUPI	de Coning	Cedric	Research Professor
	UNU	Gaston	Erika	Senior Policy Advisor and Head of the Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace Programme
	ICG	Ungar	Maya	UN Analyst
	Global Challenges Foundation	Möller-Loswick	Anna	Head of Common Security
	GPPAC	Kumskova	Marina	Senior UN Policy and Advocacy Advisor
	Save Somali Women and Children	Abdinasir	Ahmed	Deputy Director and Program Director
	Life & Peace Institute	Nzovu	Beatrice	Team Leader, Africa Programs
	DHF	Holmberg	Björn	Executive Director
	DHF	Gruener	Sigrid	Deputy Director and Programme Director, Peacebuilding
	DHF	Hammargren	Henrik	ED Emeritus and Senior Advisor
	DHF	Ryan	Jordan	Independent Expert

Annex C – Documentation and Resources on PBAR Recommendations
(attached separately)

Annex C – Documentation and Resources on PBAR Recommendations

This document summarises key UN documents and high-level agreements with recommendations on enhancing and developing the mandate and function of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It serves as a reference for participants in the workshop. While not an exhaustive list, it highlights materials considered useful for the workshop discussions and provides easy access to relevant information.

- *Section 1: Key Documents and Resources: This section outlines essential documents related to the PBC and its mandate, including UN high-level agreements.*
- *Section 2: Recommendations by theme - This section highlights some of the specific recommendations relevant for the workshop sessions.*
- *The Annex offers a reference list of written inputs to the informal phase of the PBAR thematically and outcomes of regional and country consultations.*

This document aims to support participants in understanding key issues and recommendations for strengthening the PBC and its contributions to sustaining peace.

1. PBC recommendations in official documents - resources and references:

- 1. Final Report from the Advisory Group of Experts (2015):**
 - *"The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture"*
 - <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/challenge-sustaining-peace-report-advisory-group-experts-2015-review-united-nations>
- 2. Resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2016):**
 - **General Assembly Resolution 70/262:**
 - *"Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture"*
 - <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2020-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>
 - **Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016):**
 - *"Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture"*
 - <https://press.un.org/en/2016/sc12340.doc.htm>
- 3. UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2018):**
 - *"Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace" (A/72/707-S/2018/43)*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s_g_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.as_issued.a-72-707-s-2018-43.e.pdf
- 4. UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2019):**
 - *"Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace" (A/73/890-S/2019/448)*
 - <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n19/158/83/pdf/n1915883.pdf>
- 5. UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2020):**
 - *"Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace" (A/74/976-S/2020/773)*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s_g_report_on_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.a.74.976-s.2020.773.200904.e_4.pdf

6. **2020 Peacebuilding Architecture Review Resolutions:**
 - **General Assembly Resolution 75/201:**
 - *"Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture"*
 - <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2020-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>
 - **Security Council Resolution 2558 (2020):**
 - *"Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace"*
 - <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3895721>
7. **UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2022):**
 - *"Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace" (A/76/668-S/2022/66)*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s_g_report.peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.a.76.668-s.2022.66.corrected.e.pdf
8. **Peacebuilding Financing General Assembly Resolution (2022):**
 - *"Financing for Peacebuilding" (A/RES/76/300)*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s_g_report.peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.a.76.668-s.2022.66.corrected.e.pdf
9. **Peacebuilding Financing General Assembly Resolution (2023):**
 - *Investing in prevention and peacebuilding (78/257)*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a_res_78_257.pdf
10. **High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) (2023):**
 - *"A Breakthrough for People and Planet - Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future"*
 - <https://highleveladvisoryboard.org/breakthrough/>
11. **The UN SG New Agenda for Peace (2023):**
 - *"Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9"*
 - <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf>
12. **The SDG Summit (2023):**
 - *"The Political declaration"*
 - <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/SDGSummit2023/political-declaration/>
13. **The Summit of the Future (2024):**
 - *"The Pact for the Future"*
 - <https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future/>
14. **Peacebuilding Fund Thematic review 2024**
 - *"2024 PBF Thematic Review Synergies between Human Rights and Peacebuilding in PBF-supported Programming"*
 - https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2024_pbf_thematic_review_executive_summary_hires.pdf
15. **Letter from the PBC Chair (2024):**
 - *To be published in December*

2. Recommendations – by theme for the Workshop Sessions

Session 1: Strengthening the PBC's Advisory Role

New Agenda for Peace:

Action 12: The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council should ensure that the Commission is consulted in their proceedings. The Security Council in particular should more systematically seek the advice of the Commission on the peacebuilding dimensions of the mandates of peace operations.

Action 8: Exit strategies and transitions from peace operations need to be planned early and in an integrated and iterative manner to achieve successful mission drawdowns and ensure that gains are consolidated and the risk of relapse into conflict or escalation is minimized.

The Pact for the Future:

Action 41:

(C) Actively reinforce the ongoing efforts of the Security Council to review and enhance its working methods, including inter alia, penholding and co-penholding arrangements, and strengthen the cooperation and communication between the Security Council and the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies, including the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the Economic and Social Council and regional and sub-regional arrangements, including by continuing to fully implement and make use of General Assembly Resolutions 377A(V) (“Uniting for Peace”) and 76/262 (“Veto Initiative”).

(d) Improve the participation in and access to the work of the Security Council and its subsidiary organs for all members of the General Assembly, to enhance the Council's accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work.

Action 43:

(a) Continue to strengthen cooperation between the Economic and Social Council and Peacebuilding Commission and between the Economic and Social Council and the international financial institutions, in accordance with their respective mandates.

Action 44:

(b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States progress their nationally-owned and -led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the Commission's advisory, bridging and convening role, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the Commission's mandate.

Action 44:

(d) Ensure the Commission plays a vital support role to countries during and after the transition of a peace operation, in cooperation with the Security Council and supported by United Nations Country Teams, upon the request of the country concerned.

(c) Establish more systematic and strategic partnerships between the Commission and international, regional and sub-regional organizations, including the international financial institutions, to strengthen peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts and to mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help align national development, peacebuilding and prevention approaches.

Session 2: Promoting coherence, enhancing capacity and strengthening the convening role of the PBC

The 2018 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

I (SG) propose that the capacity of the Peacebuilding Support Office be strengthened within the existing resources of the peace and security pillar. In that respect, I ask Member States to consider favourably my detailed proposals for the restructuring of the peace and security pillar and to enhance the capacities of the Peacebuilding Support Office and other parts of the proposed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including through the use of the peacekeeping support account for peacebuilding activities in relevant peacekeeping settings. I also encourage United Nations entities to continue to second personnel to the Office both to reinforce its capacity and to strengthen system-wide synergy and coherence.

A/RES/75/201 and SC 2558 (2020 PBAR Resolutions):

Reaffirms that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system, and in this regard, emphasizes the importance of joint analysis and effective strategic planning in its long-term engagement in conflict-affected countries.

New Agenda for Peace

Action 12:

- Enhance the role of the Peacebuilding Commission as a convener of thematic discussions on cross-pillar issues, with a focus on the interdependent and mutually reinforcing nature of peace and development.

- Formalize the participation of regional and other organizations in the Commission to enable holistic engagement, coordination and inclusiveness in the deliberations of the Commission.

The Pact for the Future:

Action 44

(a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission.

Lunch session: National prevention strategies

New Agenda for Peace:

Action 3: Shift the Prevention and Sustaining Peace paradigm within countries

- Develop national prevention strategies to address the different drivers and enablers of violence and conflict in societies and strengthen national infrastructures for peace. These strategies can help reinforce State institutions, promote the rule of law and strengthen civil society and social cohesion, so as to ensure greater tolerance and solidarity.
- Member States seeking to establish or strengthen national infrastructures for peace should be able to access a tailor-made package of support and expertise.

- For groups of Member States and regional organizations, develop prevention strategies with cross-regional dimensions to address transboundary threats, collectively harvesting and building on the wealth of knowledge and expertise existing at the national level on effective conflict prevention measures.

The Pact for the Future:

Action 18

(d) Strengthen and implement existing national prevention strategies and approaches to sustain peace, and consider developing them where they do not exist, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national priorities, to address the root causes of violence and armed conflict.

(e) Provide assistance to States, upon their request, including through the Peacebuilding Commission and the entire United Nations system, in full conformity with national ownership and needs, to build national capacity to promote, develop and implement their nationally owned prevention efforts and address the root causes of violence and conflict in their countries, including through sharing best practice and lessons learned.

Action 44

(b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States' progress in their nationally owned and nationally-led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the advisory, bridging and convening role of the Commission, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the mandate of the Commission.

Session 3: Peacebuilding Financing and Partnerships to Sustain Peace

The 2018 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, for the consideration of Member States. The options are set out below:

- (a) Voluntary resources. A number of Headquarters-level trust funds in the Secretariat are inactive and unutilized. To support the financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, I call upon donors to agree to allocate the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Fund;
- (b) Assessed contributions. These would provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding for peacebuilding, and reduce the costs of voluntary resource mobilization. It is important to note that the use of assessed contributions would send a powerful signal regarding the commitment of all Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace;
- (c) Assessed contributions during mission drawdowns. Mission transitions and drawdowns represent some of the most critical periods and the time during which investments in sustaining peace made by national authorities and their international partners over the years can be either sustained or lost in a matter of months. After a drawdown, United Nations country teams commonly face a "financial cliff" in support for peacebuilding activities. In the case of Liberia, the financial estimate in support of the peacebuilding plan is \$65 million per year for two years,

or approximately 55 per cent per year of the final full-year budget of UNMIL in the amount of \$116.95 million. In recognition of the imperative of well-managed and appropriately resourced transitions, I call upon the principal contributors to peacekeeping budgets to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission, to be contributed to peacebuilding activities through existing projects or the country-level pooled fund managed by the resident coordinator office, each year for a period of two years following the end of the mission's mandate;

(d) Unspent assessed contributions. Peacekeeping missions are sometimes left with unencumbered balances at the end of the financial period. At the end of the 2015/16 period, the balance amounted to \$279 million, which was credited to Member States as unspent funds. I call upon Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund;

(e) Assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund. In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture recommended that the General Assembly consider steps to ensure that core funding representing \$100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions together) be provided to the Fund annually from assessed contributions under the United Nations budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund's comparative advantage as a fast, unearmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under terms of reference approved by the General Assembly. I call upon Member States to consider the allocation of assessed contributions to the value of \$100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the total annual cost of peace operations to the Fund;

(f) Re-investing savings from assessed budgets. When the overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations decrease, some of the variance should be reinvested in peacebuilding. In years when the total approved resources for peacekeeping operations are less than those of the previous year, I call upon Member States to agree to be assessed the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total variance in the approved resources to finance the Peacebuilding Fund;

(g) Diversifying available resources. I am exploring the possibility of innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding, including contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levy and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. There are already several promising examples, which include social impact bonds to pay for rehabilitation centres in Mali, corporate partnerships for sustaining peace in Nigeria and South Sudan, and crowdfunded peacebuilding initiatives.

50. The United Nations mobilizes more than \$250 million annually from corporate partners and is engaging with the private sector on setting investment guidelines and on a wide range of other issues through the United Nations Global Compact. I welcome recent initiatives to strengthen partnerships for peacebuilding. In 2017, the fourth Business for Peace annual conference was held in Colombia. Colombia will become a test case for blended finance, using grant money to unleash commercial financing for peacebuilding. In Liberia, companies supported the project design and financially contributed to an initiative to mitigate concession-related conflicts. I encourage the United Nations system to further develop partnerships with the private sector and the investment community to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of companies, set conflict-sensitive investment guidelines and explore potential contributions to United Nations peacebuilding activities. This should be undertaken in accordance with the Guiding Principles on

Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.

51. To support this ongoing work, the Peacebuilding Fund, working closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, will assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding. This would include exploring opportunities for contributions from the private sector through traditional means, as well as considering partnerships and innovative financing methods. This capacity will work in coordination with the proposed United Nations development system innovative funding lab. The Fund will explore the possibility of establishing a web-based donation mechanism, the use of crowdfunding websites and establishing partnerships with companies to mobilize voluntary levies on products or services.

52. I also encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through the issuance of social impact bonds in peacebuilding, the voluntary implementation of a tax on the trade in (specific) arms, or the donation of fines imposed on defence industry corporations to United Nations peacebuilding activities.

New Agenda for Peace – Action 12:

Create a mechanism within the Commission to mobilize political and financial support for the implementation of the national and regional strategies suggested in action 3;

Formalize the Commission’s relationship with international financial institutions and regional development banks in order to align financing instruments with national priorities and enable the Commission to fulfil its mandate in marshalling resources for peacebuilding.

Formalize the participation of regional and other organizations in the Commission to enable holistic engagement, coordination and inclusiveness in the deliberations of the Commission.

The Pact for the Future:

Action 18

Adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding is essential, and we welcome the recent General Assembly decision to increase the resources available to the United Nations’ Peacebuilding Fund

(h) Pursue stronger alignment between the United Nations, international and regional financial institutions and the needs of Member States affected by armed conflict and violence and the impacts of regional conflict, to support their economic stability, national prevention and peacebuilding efforts, in line with their respective mandates and in full conformity with national ownership.

Action 44

(c) Establish more systematic and strategic partnerships between the Commission and international, regional and subregional organizations, including the international financial institutions, to strengthen peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts and to mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help to align national development, peacebuilding and prevention approaches.

Examples on common general recommendations:

Pact for the Future:

- Action 18: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.
- Action 18 F: Address the risks associated with illicit trade in small arms and light
- Action 18 G: Address the risks associated with illicit trade in small arms and light
- Action 19: We will accelerate the implementation of our commitments on women, peace and security.
- Action 21f: Encourage the Secretary-General to convene regular high-level meetings with relevant regional organizations to discuss matters pertaining to peace operations, peacebuilding, and conflicts
- Action 44 A (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the Commission's mandate.

Annex 1: Written inputs to the informal phase of the 2025 PBAR

Thematic and Regional Consultations

1. [Chair's Summary - Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on the 2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture PDF](#)
2. [Summary of the session on “Enhanced Inter-Agency Collaboration Towards the Agenda 2030, Sustainable Peace, and Peacebuilding”](#)
3. [Aswan Forum - Conclusions on Re-envisioning Global Governance for Peace and Development PDF](#)
4. [Australian Aid, UN Women - Young Leaders for Women, Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific, Strategic Outcome Document - July 2024](#)
5. [Kingdom of the Netherlands - Contribution to the PBA Review 2025, Impact](#)
6. [DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance - Security Sector Reform and Governance \(SSR&G\) and Sustaining Peace](#)
7. [Shaping the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Meeting of Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Actors Working on Forced Displacement Issues in Geneva, Switzerland - June 2024](#)
8. [South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ACCORD - Building Resilient Peace: Strategic Pathways for Strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in Africa - October 2024](#)
9. [The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 75, New York Roundtable: Human Rights, Prevention and Peace, November 2023](#)
10. [The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 75: Civic space: Enhancing participation through strengthened Partnerships, September 2023](#)

Other Consultations

11. [Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation - “Enhancing partnerships for financing peace” Panel discussion at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development - May 2024PDF](#)
12. [Challenges Forum - Sustaining Peacebuilding Support Beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations - May 2024PDF](#)
13. [ODI - Outcome Document - Thematic consultation pre UN Peacebuilding Architecture - June 2024PDF](#)
14. [ZIF Xchange - Recommendations on Supporting transitions with peacebuilding tools - July 2024PDF](#)

15. [GPPAC, ICAN - 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review with Local Women Peacebuilders - August 2024PDF](#)
16. [Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict \(GPPAC\) - Outcome Document of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review - September 2024PDF](#)
17. [Peace in Our Cities, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime - Urbanization, Peace, and Security - September 2024](#)

Written Submissions

18. [Permanent missions of Argentina, Costa Rica, Germany, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, together with the Prevention Project hosted by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice of the School of Law at NYU - 'A Framework Approach to Prevention' A Brief on Possible Elements of National Prevention Policies](#)
19. [Kingdom of the Netherlands - Contribution to the PBA Review 2025, MHPSS](#)
20. [Policy Note: Perspectives from Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration \(DDR\) on the Peace Building Architecture Review \(PBAR\)](#)
21. [Women Building Peace in a Changing Environment -Report of the Women Mediator Networks Retreat - July 2024](#)
22. [How the UN System Can Advance Tangible Results on Women's Participation in Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding by 2030 - July 2024](#)
23. [Norwegian Institute of International Affairs - Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and enhancing the synergy of the Peacebuilding Architecture - October 2024](#)
24. [United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs - Peacebuilding Draft policy note as input to the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review](#)
25. [The Future of Human Rights and Peace and Security, December 2023](#)
26. [OHCHR Thematic Paper: The Contribution of Human Rights to Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#)
27. [OHCHR Thematic Paper: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#)
28. [OHCHR Thematic Paper: Joined-Up Rights-Based Analysis for Prevention](#)
29. [OHCHR Thematic Paper: Peacebuilding, Sustaining Peace and Transitional Justice](#)
30. [OHCHR Thematic Paper: The Universal Periodic Review and Sustaining Peace](#)

31. [OHCHR Recommendations to the Independent Eminent Persons, October 2024](#)
32. [NYU Center on International Cooperation - What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do to Support National Prevention Strategies? - November 2024](#)

Annex 1.2 - The SG's New Agenda for Peace 2023

Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace

Action 12: Build a stronger Collective Security Machinery

Elevating the work of the Peacebuilding Commission

The 2025 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture should operationalize the recommendations below and consider what adjustments need to be made in the Peacebuilding Commission's methods of work, composition and support capacities so that it can effectively perform these functions.

Recommendations

1. Enhance the role of the Peacebuilding Commission as a convener of thematic discussions on cross-pillar issues, with a focus on the interdependent and mutually reinforcing nature of peace and development.
2. Create a mechanism within the Commission to mobilize political and financial support for the implementation of the national and regional strategies suggested in action 3;
3. Formalize the Commission's relationship with international financial institutions and regional development banks in order to align financing instruments with national priorities and enable the Commission to fulfil its mandate in marshalling resources for peacebuilding.
4. Formalize the participation of regional and other organizations in the Commission to enable holistic engagement, coordination and inclusiveness in the deliberations of the Commission.
5. The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council should ensure that the Commission is consulted in their proceedings. The Security Council in particular should more systematically seek the advice of the Commission on the peacebuilding dimensions of the mandates of peace operations.

Annex 1.3 The SG's High Level Advisory Board on Multilateralism – 2023 report

Shift 5, Peace and Prevention - Empowering Equitable Collective Security, - shift from reactive measures to proactive peacebuilding initiatives.

HLAB provided several key recommendations to reform and strengthen global security and the and the UN peacebuilding architecture. HLAB proposed that the UN establish stronger frameworks for collaboration with regional organisations, the need for increased transparency and trust-building measures between states for de-escalating geopolitical tensions and fostering cooperative approaches to shared security challenges and suggested adopting a broader concept of security moving beyond military threats (addressing human security issues related to food, water, and climate security and recognising the interconnectedness of these threats to global stability).

Key among the recommendations in Shift 5, *Peace and Prevention - Empowering Equitable Collective Security*, is a focus on strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, particularly the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Reforms for a more responsive and inclusive UN Security Council Reform include expanding its membership; democratised decision-making and enhanced accountability.

HLAB proposes an expanded and enhanced role for the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to address a wider array of non-military threats to peace and security. Key recommendations for strengthening the PBC include:

1. *Broader Mandate:* The PBC should be empowered to address issues that go beyond traditional peacekeeping, including gender-related security threats, such as the link between violent misogyny and violent extremism, as well as the growing security risks posed by climate change and environmental degradation.
2. *Stronger Linkages with Financial Institutions:* The PBC should develop formal relationships with international financial institutions to ensure that global financial flows are aligned with efforts to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and environmental stress.
3. *Regional Resilience Councils:* A key innovation proposed is the establishment of regional resilience councils or other regionally-based bodies focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These councils would operate at the regional level to strengthen preventive measures, increase resilience, and address local causes of conflict more effectively. By empowering regional actors and fostering regional cooperation, these councils could serve as critical platforms for early intervention and peacebuilding in conflict-prone areas.
4. *Transforming the PBC into a Peacebuilding Council:* The PBC's transformation into a Peacebuilding Council is suggested as a way to give it greater investigative and decision-making authority. This would enable it to lead a new generation of peacebuilding operations aimed at tackling the root causes of violent conflict, rather than merely responding to crises after they occur.

Annex 1.4 - The 2020 twin SC GA Resolutions on Sustaining Peace: - *Key Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Commission*

The 2020 General Assembly resolution on sustaining peace contains several key recommendations regarding the Peacebuilding Commission. The recommendations underscore the Peacebuilding Commission's central role in supporting national efforts, enhancing UN system-wide coherence, and securing adequate financing for peacebuilding initiatives:

1. **Role of the Peacebuilding Commission:** The resolution highlights the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission in strengthening its advisory, bridging, and convening roles. It is called to enhance its efficiency and impact, particularly in supporting nationally owned peacebuilding priorities in countries and regions under its consideration.
2. **System-Wide Coordination:** The resolution emphasizes that effective peacebuilding requires the involvement of the entire UN system. It advocates for joint analysis and strategic planning to ensure long-term engagement in conflict-affected countries.
3. **Financing for Peacebuilding:** The resolution recognizes that financing remains a critical challenge for peacebuilding. It calls for a high-level meeting during the 76th session of the General Assembly to explore options for ensuring adequate, predictable, and sustained financing for peacebuilding.
4. **Review and Reporting:** The resolution mandates a further comprehensive review of peacebuilding in 2025. The Secretary-General is tasked with providing interim reports in 2022 and 2024 to assess the implementation of peacebuilding resolutions and the effectiveness of UN reforms in advancing peacebuilding efforts.

Resolution Text:

- *Welcomes* the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace by Member States, including through the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations, and by the entire United Nations system, including through the reforms of the United Nations, and in particular at the field level through the work of peacekeeping operations, special political missions and United Nations country teams, and the important work of the Peacebuilding Fund, and encourages Member States and the entire United Nations system, in partnership with relevant stakeholders, including regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society organizations, local peacebuilding stakeholders and, where relevant, the private sector, to continue to take action to implement the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and to advance efforts to bring greater coherence to peacebuilding efforts, in support of national peacebuilding priorities, and in particular in conflict-affected countries;
- *Welcomes* in particular the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission, and calls on the Commission to continue strengthening its advisory, bridging and convening roles in support of nationally owned priorities and efforts in the countries and regions under its consideration, as well as to continue strengthening its working methods to enhance its efficiency and impact in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace;
- *Reaffirms* that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system, and in this regard, emphasizes the importance of joint analysis and effective strategic planning in its long-term engagement in conflict-affected countries;

- *Notes* that peacebuilding financing remains a critical challenge, and therefore decides to convene a high-level meeting of the General Assembly at the seventy-sixth session to advance, explore and consider options for ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, and invites, starting at the seventy-fifth session, the relevant United Nations bodies and organs, including the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with respective mandates, to present inputs in advance for Member States' consideration and discussion at this meeting, and affirms a commitment to pursuing action-oriented outcomes;

Annex 1.5 The Pact for the Future - Key Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Commission

Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.

72. We affirm our commitment to strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission through the 2025 review of the peacebuilding architecture to bring a more strategic approach and greater coherence and impact to national and international peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts. We decide to:

- (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the Commission's mandate.
- (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States progress their nationally-owned and -led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the Commission's advisory, bridging and convening role, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the Commission's mandate.
- (c) Establish more systematic and strategic partnerships between the Commission and international, regional and sub-regional organizations, including the international financial institutions, to strengthen peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts and to mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help align national development, peacebuilding and prevention approaches.
- (d) Ensure the Commission plays a vital support role to countries during and after the transition of a peace operation, in cooperation with the Security Council and supported by United Nations Country Teams, upon the request of the country concerned.

Annex 1.6 - The 2018 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, for the consideration of Member States. The options are set out below:

- (a) Voluntary resources. A number of Headquarters-level trust funds in the Secretariat are inactive and unutilized. To support the financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, I call upon donors to agree to allocate the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Fund;
- (b) Assessed contributions. These would provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding for peacebuilding, and reduce the costs of voluntary resource mobilization. It is important to note that the use of assessed contributions would send a powerful signal regarding the commitment of all Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace;
- (c) Assessed contributions during mission drawdowns. Mission transitions and drawdowns represent some of the most critical periods and the time during which investments in sustaining peace made by national authorities and their international partners over the years can be either sustained or lost in a matter of months. After a drawdown, United Nations country teams commonly face a “financial cliff” in support for peacebuilding activities. In the case of Liberia, the financial estimate in support of the peacebuilding plan is \$65 million per year for two years, or approximately 55 per cent per year of the final full-year budget of UNMIL in the amount of \$116.95 million. In recognition of the imperative of well-managed and appropriately resourced transitions, I call upon the principal contributors to peacekeeping budgets to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission, to be contributed to peacebuilding activities through existing projects or the country-level pooled fund managed by the resident coordinator office, each year for a period of two years following the end of the mission’s mandate;
- (d) Unspent assessed contributions. Peacekeeping missions are sometimes left with unencumbered balances at the end of the financial period. At the end of the 2015/16 period, the balance amounted to \$279 million, which was credited to Member States as unspent funds. I call upon Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund;
- (e) Assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund. In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture recommended that the General Assembly consider steps to ensure that core funding representing \$100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions together) be provided to the Fund annually from assessed contributions under the United Nations budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund’s comparative advantage as a fast, unearmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under terms of reference approved by the General Assembly. I call upon Member States to consider the allocation of assessed contributions to the value of \$100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the total annual cost of peace operations to the Fund;
- (f) Re-investing savings from assessed budgets. When the overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations decrease, some of the variance should be reinvested in peacebuilding. In years when the total approved resources for peacekeeping operations are less than those of the previous year, I call upon Member States to agree to be assessed the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total variance in the approved resources to finance the Peacebuilding Fund;

(g) Diversifying available resources. I am exploring the possibility of innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding, including contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levy and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. There are already several promising examples, which include social impact bonds to pay for rehabilitation centres in Mali, corporate partnerships for sustaining peace in Nigeria and South Sudan, and crowdfunded peacebuilding initiatives.

50. The United Nations mobilizes more than \$250 million annually from corporate partners and is engaging with the private sector on setting investment guidelines and on a wide range of other issues through the United Nations Global Compact. I welcome recent initiatives to strengthen partnerships for peacebuilding. In 2017, the fourth Business for Peace annual conference was held in Colombia. Colombia will become a test case for blended finance, using grant money to unleash commercial financing for peacebuilding. In Liberia, companies supported the project design and financially contributed to an initiative to mitigate concession-related conflicts. I encourage the United Nations system to further develop partnerships with the private sector and the investment community to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of companies, set conflict-sensitive investment guidelines and explore potential contributions to United Nations peacebuilding activities. This should be undertaken in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.

51. To support this ongoing work, the Peacebuilding Fund, working closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, will assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding. This would include exploring opportunities for contributions from the private sector through traditional means, as well as considering partnerships and innovative financing methods. This capacity will work in coordination with the proposed United Nations development system innovative funding lab. The Fund will explore the possibility of establishing a web-based donation mechanism, the use of crowdfunding websites and establishing partnerships with companies to mobilize voluntary levies on products or services.

52. I also encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through the issuance of social impact bonds in peacebuilding, the voluntary implementation of a tax on the trade in (specific) arms, or the donation of fines imposed on defence industry corporations to United Nations peacebuilding activities.\

Annex 1.7 -Peacebuilding Financing General Assembly Resolution (2022):

"Financing for Peacebuilding" (A/RES/76/300)

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/sg_report.peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace.a.76.668-s.2022.66.corrected.e.pdf

42. Options to increase financing for peacebuilding and strengthen capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding 41. Several options to ensure sufficient peacebuilding funding have been presented as part of the 2018, 2019 and 2020 reports on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Acknowledging that sustaining peace is a shared responsibility and peacebuilding a long-term process, more efforts are required to ensure adequate, sustainable and timely investments in prevention and peacebuilding. Voluntary contributions 42. Some progress has been made on the options. First, the Secretary-General called for a “quantum leap” in contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund (\$500 million annually) through unearmarked and multi-year commitments. Voluntary contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund almost doubled to \$370 million and approvals more than doubled to \$564 million in the period 2017–2019. The Peacebuilding Fund remains, however, largely dependent on a few donors and demand for Peacebuilding Fund funding outpaces its ability to respond.

43. Second, it was proposed that Member States voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission to peacebuilding activities each year for a period of two years following the end of a mission mandate, which is one way to address the financial cliff often seen after a mission has ended. In the case of UNAMID, using the 2019/20 budget as the “final full-year budget” (\$514.5 million), 15 per cent is equal to \$77.2 million per year for two years. No Member State has implemented this recommendation yet.

44. Third, the Secretary-General asked donors to commit to spending at least 20 per cent of ODA on peacebuilding priorities in conflict settings. Only 10 Development Assistance Committee members meet this target (one third of all members). Finally, limited progress has been made concerning the call for Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund. Assessed contributions

45. The Secretary-General proposed (a) ensuring that missions have sufficient programmatic funding to support mandated peacebuilding activities, with the Peacebuilding Fund and missions working closely on operationalizing programmes during mission transitions; and (b) assessed funding for the Peacebuilding Fund. Assessed contributions provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding and would send a powerful signal regarding the universal commitment of Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as part of the organization’s core mandate. Details of this proposal are contained in a separate report (A/76/732).

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48. The Secretary-General has encouraged Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through public-private partnerships, which could include contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, social impact or peace bonds, micro-levies, tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. Some of these innovative financing mechanisms are designed to benefit conflict-affected countries directly. Exploring these options offers

additional opportunities but is not a substitute for voluntary or assessed contributions. Several Governments are supporting initiatives to explore innovative ways to apply blended finance approaches in peacebuilding contexts to generate impact, which requires deepening the understanding of the potential risks and opportunities; leveraging national development plans, domestic investors and domestic finance with public resources to support these initiatives; and bringing these options to scale. This has to be in line with conflict-sensitive principles in support of national ownership and involve local actors, including women and youth. The United Nations is a facilitator, bringing expertise, contextual knowledge, presence on the ground and financial structuring capabilities, leveraging greater alignment and acceleration.

49. The role of private sector actors in peacebuilding can include financing, partnerships, direct engagement in negotiation or peacebuilding, advocacy, respect for labour rights, protection of civilians, private donations towards peacebuilding from companies, foundations or individuals, corporate social responsibility initiatives and stronger risk mitigation. By investing in conflict-affected areas and contributing to economic growth, reconstruction and creating decent jobs, private sector actors can directly address the drivers of conflict through enhanced social cohesion. The private sector, through employers' and business members' organizations, with workers' organizations, promotes respect for labour rights and social dialogue in conflict affected situations and contributes to participatory democratic reconstruction processes and good governance. 26 By conducting Enhanced Human Rights Due Diligence in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies can prevent their operations from fuelling conflict.

55. Beyond financing, there is a need to mobilize broader capacities for prevention and peacebuilding within the United Nations system and among partners. Financial resources need to be accompanied by strengthened human resources at the local, regional, national and international levels to work on prevention and peacebuilding. They should be easily deployable and include a spectrum of expertise to provide technical accompaniment to national and local actors managing conflict. Investments need to be made in capacity-building and human resource development, such as the recently established academy on prevention, nexus and stabilization initiated by UNDP. There is also a need to allocate more resources for analysis, data gathering and impact measurement to ensure that action is impactful and timely.

56. Domestic resources are critical for building national capacities for prevention and peacebuilding. Development actors along with international financial institutions and development finance institutions have a supporting role to play in this area. With sufficient human resources and capacity, development actors could work more with partners and government agencies, for example by supporting the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in government or other partners' programmes, impacting on peacebuilding priorities beyond their own programmes.