

UNOPS Myanmar

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

**Project Evaluation of the Center for
Diversity and National Harmony funded
by the Peacebuilding Fund**

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- (CDNH) Center for Diversity and National Harmony
- (CSO) Civil Society Organization
- (DAC/OECD) Development Assistance Committee/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- (EAO) Ethnic Armed Organizations
- (FGD) Focus Group Discussion
- (IRF) Immediate Response Facility
- (IDPs) Internally displaced persons
- (INGOs) International Non-Governmental Organizations
- (NGO) Non-governmental Organization
- (NLD) National League for Democracy
- (NVC) National Verification Card
- (OSASG) Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary General
- (PBSO) Peacebuilding Support Office
- (PBF) Peacebuilding Fund
- (PSF) Peace Support Fund
- (RUNO) Recipient United Nations Organization
- (SOP) Standard Operating Procedure
- (UNRCO) United Nations Resident Coordinator Office
- (USAID) United States Agency for International Development

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The evaluation assessed the project for the setting up and maintenance of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH) in Myanmar which was supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). PBF allocated USD 2,538,122 to the project in March 2015 up to April 2017. CDNH had the overarching objective of enhancing social harmonization, peaceful coexistence and mitigation of violence in Myanmar through research, training in civic education and peace related issues, promotion of awareness raising activities, and the management of an Early Warning Early Response System (EWER).

PBF answered the request for funds coming from the UNRCO in Myanmar and the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary General (OSASG) in the country which was aware of the issues and sensitivities in place. The OSASG at the time was at the center of the peacebuilding dialogue and they knew about the major demands which proved beneficial to the design of the project.

The evaluation looked at the overall impact of the project to support Myanmar's peacebuilding agenda, the management and oversight structures of the project, identified key lessons learned, and made recommendations. The evaluation focused on a qualitative analysis based on desk review, semi-structured interviews, and focus groups discussions. In total, 80 stakeholders were interviewed, including Implementation Facilitators, Recipient United Nations Organization (RUNO), Influencers, Donors, Implementation Partners, and Implementers in Yangon, Bago, Sittwe and Meiktila.

The evaluation found that CDNH is a highly-recognized institution in the international community of Myanmar. This applies to the Donors, Implementation Facilitators, RUNO, and Implementation Partners interviewed. They have been able to attract many partners for their work and this speaks in terms of the space they have built for themselves in the development scenario of the country.

There was a consensus of all the stakeholders interviewed in terms of the relevance and credibility of CDNH's landmark reports which were Rakhine Needs Assessment I and II. Donors, Implementation Partners, and Implementation Facilitators highly praised the reports as the best reference to getting to know the state of Rakhine. Even though the international community agrees on the importance of focusing on Rakhine State, about a third of beneficiaries outside Rakhine considered that CDNH should expand its operations beyond the state and further work in other regions of Myanmar.

Further on their target groups, in this project gender was considered in multiple ways: the support given to Women's forum in Rakhine, where various community leaders met, the participation of young women in the youth forums and on the promotion of CDNH work where many women were hired to work and they were also included in some of the leading positions. Youth was also very much considered, as the youth camps and forums were a key part of their work.

Beyond their reports and target groups, the evaluation found that CDNH's trainings are well regarded on the ground and that there is demand for more. The feedback on the youth camps was also positive, however the youth find it difficult to use the knowledge learned because few people attend the trainings and there is resistance in the community to disseminate the contents they are exposed to.

Concerning the Early Warning Early Prevention System (EWER) of CDNH, it is widely used by the international community in Myanmar as a source of information. The CDNH EWER is regarded by Implementation Partners and Facilitators as the most comprehensive in Myanmar and is used by the UN to help feed into their decision-making process.

As far as implementation arrangements, the work of RUNO was well assessed by the Implementers. However, there were some implementation challenges with the project as the staff was not familiar with UNOPS Procedures.

Perceptions are varied in regards to the recognition on the ground with beneficiaries and influencers. CDNH received some suspicion at the beginning by various members of the community, but it later gained support of important community leaders from both sides.

The major factors of success of the project were: 1) Leadership; 2) Knowledge of the context; 3) Qualified staff; 3) Political momentum; 4) Extensive networking; 5) Listening to the people on the ground as subjects and building trust.

There were also challenges, given the context of the project. The major challenges faced were mainly in: 1) Operations; 2) Suspicion on the ground; 3) Government change; 4) Instability of scenario; 4) Outbreak of violence in October 2016.

There were also many lessons learned in the project such as: 1) Value of research as a way of inciting action; 2) Methodology for reconciliation meetings; 3) Reaching up and down do various levels of stakeholders; 4) Creation of a space of dialogue for various actors; 5) Creation of UN Synergy in Headquarters and Myanmar; 6) Joint donor efforts towards the same initiative and 6) Creating CDNH as a NGO.

Finally, the recommendations were to: 1) Foster new leadership and strengthen CDNH as an organization; 2) Expand the trainings to government officials; 3) Document methodology, share and train local organizations to use it; 4) Expand the support to local organizations; 5) Enhance CDNH's coordination role; 6) Invest on professional management; 7) Further disseminate research outputs; 8) Develop a communication strategy; 9) Feed into broader development strategies of the country; 10) Fundraise for research; 12) Review the results matrix and M&E efforts. For the UN and the donor community, two recommendations were made: 1) Expand education efforts for Myanmar's transition; 2) Invest in other think tanks in the country (both governmental and non-governmental).

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purpose of the Evaluation

In early 2015, PBF (Peacebuilding Fund) approved the allocation of USD 2,538,122 through the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) to assist with the set up and maintenance of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH) in Myanmar. The Center was created as an independent non-governmental organization with the objective of enhancing social harmonization, peaceful coexistence and mitigation of violence in Myanmar through research, training in civic education including other peace related issues, promotion of awareness raising activities, and the management of an Early Warning Early Response System (EWER). The Center built on the expertise of several professionals of Myanmar who had been involved in the Rakhine Investigation Commission and the Myanmar Peace Center.

The PBF identified UNOPS Myanmar as the Recipient United Nations Organization (RUNO) for the project and on March 31st, a Grant Support Agreement was signed between the latter and the newly established Center. The project document included a final evaluation at the end of the 18-month period of the initiative (predicted to end on August 1st, 2016). The project had a no cost extension amendment and is meant to end on April 30th, 2017.

According to the Terms of Reference for the assignment, the evaluation should look at the overall performance of the project and to the PBF's strategic decision making regarding its investment and the overall project design, approval and implementation process.

1.2. Description of the project

The project, 'Establishment of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH)' had the overall purpose to fund, implement, and monitor staff recruitment, procurement, and operations to establish the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH). The total Project Cost was USD 2,790,122, of which USD 2,538,122 came from the Peacebuilding Fund. The Government of Myanmar gave in-kind through renting the venue of the center for a special rate, CDNH committed USD 252,000 and there was also additional support committed by the Government of Norway of approximately USD 1,000,000 for staff salaries over three years.

The project was meant to start March 1st, 2015 and end August 1st, 2016 with a total duration of 18 months. The PBF Focus Areas was to, "Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts" (Priority Area 2 – 2.1 National Reconciliation). The head office was to be established in Yangon with support offices in Sittwe and Mandalay.

The project had four outcomes:

1. Enhanced comprehension of the current situation of violence, its nature, the local context, and trends through systematic information gathering and research.
2. The mitigation of risks is enhanced and responses to threats of social violence are improved through the setting up and the maintenance of an early warning system.
3. Local capacities for conflict resolution are enhanced and acceptance of differences through public outreach, awareness raising, increase in training, and a growing constituency for social harmony is created and fostered.
4. CDNH is recognized as an effective institution for reducing community tensions in Myanmar and its continued existence is assured.

The mission of CDNH focuses on the research and addressing of communal violence. Specifically, “To conceptualize, inform and enhance the debate on social violence and its prevention in Myanmar in order to support policy formulation and decision-making at every level. Using its in-depth knowledge of the actors and its unique position as liaison between the estranged communities and between them and the government at all levels, it can help constitute a constituency for social harmony and support local and national confidence building measures” (Project Document, 2015). The major impact statement of the project was, “The level of social violence has diminished and there is increased peaceful interaction between different ethnic and faith communities” (Project Document, 2015).

The project was formally governed by a Project Board with the overall responsibility for the management and implementation of the project. The United Nations Resident Coordinator (RC) was given the role to act as the Executive of the project and to maintain overall oversight. The CDNH was the main beneficiary and local partner for the project, while the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary General (OSASG) was entitled to provide project assurance, advice, and assist with monitoring the broader outcomes of the project. UNOPS took the role of Senior Supplier to the project and was requested to serve as the Recipient UN Organization (RUNO), being responsible for all project management, verification of funds disbursement, monitoring and evaluation of project outputs, and reporting.

1.3. Dimensions assessed

The evaluation was divided into the following three components:

a. Evaluation of overall impact of project to support Myanmar's peacebuilding agenda.

The DAC/OECD (Development Assistance Committee/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) dimensions were considered in the evaluation. The dimensions of Relevance, Effectiveness/Impact, Sustainability, Efficiency plus Project Coordination were used as the main streams of analysis. Three themes were discussed as cross-cutting: gender, youth, and the 'Do No Harm' Principle.

The questions below framed the evaluation efforts under the first component:

Relevance

- Has the project considered a previous conflict analysis to define its aims and approach?
- How relevant was the project design to the peacebuilding process in Myanmar?
- To which extent did the project contribute to any broader strategic goals of the Government of Myanmar or the UN in Myanmar?
- To which extent was the 'Theory of Change' for the project coherent to the needs on the ground?
- Did the project target the right beneficiaries and geographic zones?

Effectiveness/impact

- How effectively did the project achieve its intended outcomes?

In terms of Research:

- Were the reports produced by CDNH useful and reliable to understand the situation of conflict in Myanmar?
- Were the reports widely disseminated?

In terms of the Early Warning Early Prevention System:

- Is the Early Warning Early Response System in place?
- Was the EWER able to mitigate risks?
- Was the EWER able to give responses to threats of social violence in Myanmar?

Training, public awareness activities and reconciliation meetings:

- Were the trainings and awareness raising activities (e.g. youth camps, conferences) able to foster the acceptance of religious differences? What is the evidence for that?
- To which extent did the reconciliation meetings help to bring the different communities together?

Public Recognition:

- How is CDNH perceived by different stakeholders in Myanmar (donors, local and international NGOs, government officials and beneficiaries)?
- Was CDNH able to secure funding to continue its activity after the end of PBSO Fund?

Project Coordination:

- To which extent did the activities of the project complement each other and have strategic coherent approach?

Sustainability:

- To which extent are the results of the project sustainable, considering the commitment of the government (including financial) and other stakeholders?
- What, if any, catalytic effects did the project have (financial and non-financial)?
- What was the legacy the project left in terms of legal framework and impact that is deemed to be long standing?

Efficiency:

- How efficient was the implementation of the project, including the selection of Recipient UN Organization (RUNO), time used for different components and how significant were the transaction costs?
- Why and how efficiently did the project take risks to achieve peacebuilding activities, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so?
- Overall, did the PBF investment in the project provide value for money and is this kind of investment (establishment of and operational support to a new institution) worthwhile?

Cross-Cutting:

- Gender: To which extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout the PBF support to Myanmar?
- Youth: To which extent were youth involved in the effort to promote a culture of peace?
- Do no Harm: To which extent did the project design and implementation consider 'Do No Harm` principles?

B. Evaluation of Management and oversight structures of Myanmar.

This item looked at the arrangements designed by the project which include the areas of funding, programming and decision-making between all the actors.

- How effectively and efficiently did the individual RUNO implement the project?
- To which extent did UNOPS collaborate with any other UN entities towards common objectives?
- How did the SOPs work in the implementation of the projects?

- To which extent were gender and youth considered throughout not only in the project design but also during implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- To which extent did this project respond to PBF's global added value/niche?

C. Key lessons learned and recommendations.

This item will consider the major factors of success, challenges and good practices across programming and administration.

- What were the main programming factors of success?
- What were the main programming challenges?
- What were the main implementation/administration factors of success?
- What were the main implementation/administration challenges?

There were the three principal areas addressed in the evaluation and that were requested in the Terms of Reference of the assignment.

1.4. Methodology

For this work, it is proposed to use a combination of qualitative research tools and triangulation mechanisms for ensuring consistent information. The triangulation will be done through the comparison of information between individual interviewees, the desk review and the focus groups. The following items shall be considered in the methodology:

- a. A careful documentary review of program, its working arrangements and the budgetary evolution based on the information provided by UNOPS;
- b. The design of a Program Theory as a way of showing its rationale and pointing out at results expected and mapping major actors involved and identifying the connection points between different parts of the program and its relationship with the outside world. This exercise will be fundamental to lead to a comprehensive evaluation.
- c. A stakeholder analysis in the planning of the field work with the purpose of identifying the key actors to be interviewed and take part in the Focus Group Discussions and to answer the evaluation questions.
- d. The promotion of semi-structured interviews with major actors involved, both from the management side and the beneficiaries of the program, including UNOPS counterparts, government key informants, the international Community in Myanmar and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) This selection of actors may include

informants not directly involved in the program but which are relevant in the field and might give a distinct perspective of the Relevance Dimension.

- e. The promotion of Focus Groups Discussions in the case of Beneficiaries and CSOs. Focus Groups are a very effective way of collecting data of various actors and analyzing contrasts and meeting points of diverse stakeholders.
- f. The organization of field visits to selected Regions for semi-structured interviews and the collection of non-verbal relevant information and for the checking of information not able to collect from distance. The details of the field visit were discussed between UNOPS and the local consultant.
- g. Constant conversation with UNOPS and PBSO counterparts as to validate choices made and check documents using the perspective of 'Utilization-Focused Evaluation' (Michael Patton), where there is a very close interaction between the evaluator and the contractor as a means of making the evaluation useful and relevant.

The 'Theory of Change' of the Program is presented next considering the project document and the field work that was done.


The project worked in four areas which were: 1) Production of research reports; 2) Setup and maintenance of and EWER; 3) Reconciliation meetings, trainings and community awareness activities; 4) Setup of CDNH and position it as a credible institution in the country which had the overall purpose of decreasing the level of social violence in the country and increasing the number of peaceful interactions between different ethnic and faith communities.

There were many assumptions involved in relation to the quality of the staff hired and involved in the project such as: stability in relation to the level of violence in the country, acceptance of the local government – including the beneficiary communities and the independence, and the ability of CDNH to network with various partners. The assumption that the overall situation of conflict was going to remain stable with no major incidents was implicit. Of course, conflicts always have a degree of unpredictability but the logic behind the project was that all the activities in place and outcomes delivered would be able to contribute for the promotion of an overall decrease in the level of violence in the country and more specifically in Rakhine State, which did not happen due to the outbreak of violence on October 2016 towards the end of the project.

The activities foreseen created a linear relation since research was meant to feed into trainings, while meetings and trainings would feed into EWER. In the matrix of the project, the outputs (mainly the activities) are not given for outcomes #3 (local capacities enhanced)

and #4 (recognition of CDNH), but they were reorganized in this diagram to better reflect the logic behind the project.

Figure 1. Theory of Change of CDNH Project



1.5. Data Collected

The field visit took place from 22-31 March 2017. The evaluation team visited several places and conducted semi-structured interviews and carried out Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with key stakeholders such as: the UN, INGOs, Local CSOs, Religious leaders, and Beneficiaries.

CDNH operates in five states and regions: Rakhine State, Mandalay Region, Bago Region, Mon State and Kayin State. The evaluation team visited Yangon, Rakhine (Sittwe), Mandalay (Meiktila) and Bago as CDNH activities are more intense in those regions.

In total, 80 people were interviewed, all the stakeholders included. The table below shows the number of people interviewed by type of stakeholder.

Table 1. Number of interviews by stakeholder type

Stakeholder Type	Number
Implementation Facilitator	5
Recipient UN Organization	4
Influencer	5
Donor	7
Implementation Partner	5
Implementer	11
Beneficiary	43
Total	80

1) Field work in Yangon

From the 22-24 March 2017 (additionally on 30 March 2017), the evaluation team met with the Recipient UN Organization, Donors and Implementers including UNRC Office, UNOPS Office, UNESCO Office, Norwegian Embassy, Swiss Embassy, Denmark Embassy, Religious leaders, and members of the CDNH office to understand about their involvement and contribution to CDNH and their views on CDNH's work.

In Yangon, a FGD took place at CDNH's office with the International NGOs who work as CDNH's Implementation Partners.

2) Pann Pyoe Latt Monastic Education Center, Bago

The team also visited Bago township on 25 March 2017 to meet Dr. Ashin Pyin Nyaw Bha Tha who is the principal of the Monastic Education School and often takes part in CDNH youth camp activities to share basic Buddhism concepts to the Youth and promote religious tolerance.

3) Sittwe, Rakhine State

The team made two day visit to Sittwe township in the Rakhine State where CDNH activities are mostly focused on (26-27 March 2017). Rakhine State is situated on the western coast of Myanmar, it is bordered by the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh to the Northwest. Like many parts of Myanmar, it has a diversity of ethnic groups, but the Rakhine make up most the population. The 2012 Rakhine State riots were a series of conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in the region.

At Rakhine, the team also met the Sittwe RC Sub Office, the Director of Unicef Rakhine Office and CDNH former staff members. The interviews focused on how relevant CDNH activities were for the promotion of communal reconciliation in the state.

There were also two FGDs on 26 March 2017 at CDNH Sittwe Office, one with the youth and the other with CSO leaders from Sittwe, Kyauk Taw, Mrauk-U, Myay Pone, Rathedaung and Pauk Taw townships of Rakhine State. Nine youth and seven leaders actively participated in the FGD. Four key questions were asked: 1) How effective are CDNH activities in enhancing the harmonization of the diverse groups? 2) How is CDNH seen by beneficiaries and other stakeholders? 3) What are recommendations to improve CDNH activities? 4) What are good practices of CDNH's work? (in terms of methodology and results). Those were the four questions used in all the FGD for the beneficiaries in the field.

On 27 March 2017, the team visited the Thet Kae Pyin Camp, situated in the northern part of Sittwe township in which 1501 HH and 8971 residents live (Myanmar Shelter Cluster, 2015). There was a FGD with 12 Muslim beneficiaries including Village Leaders, the Muslim Youth Network and the Youth Volunteer Association. The team also had the chance of visiting a CDNH training that was being conducted in the camp and had the chance of interacting with the participants and hearing their opinion about the training and the work of CDNH.

4) Meiktila, Mandalay

The team also visited Meiktila which is situated in the eastern most part of the district in Myanmar's central dry zone and on the banks of Meiktila Lake in the Mandalay Region.

The team stayed for two days (26-27 March 2017). On 26 March 2017, there was a FGD with three key leaders from Htila-Thukha-Ther-Maggi who were involved in CDNH activities and an individual interview with a journalist from The Voice Daily Newsletter. On 27 March 2017, there were two FGDs with beneficiaries from Thazi, Yamethin and Pyawbwe where various local organizations were present, including White Marker Group, Multi-Religious Aid Association and National Harmony and Development Association.

The full list of participants in the field work is in ANNEX III.

CHAPTER II. COUNTRY CONTEXT

2.1. Brief overview of Development Landscape

Before going into the project results and details, it is important to look at the country context. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is undergoing a process of intense economic growth. GDP is expected to grow at 7% to 8% per year for a decade and more. Per capita income of its citizens is expected to be between USD \$2,000 and \$3,000 by 2030.¹

Despite recent economic growth acceleration, Myanmar lives the result of decades of underinvestment in the economy and social sectors. Myanmar is a rural country, with an urban population of only 35.3%². In Myanmar, there has been a significant urban-rural gap with 25.6% of poverty rate³. Human Development Index (HDI) for the country was 0.556 in 2016, slightly higher than in 2015 (0.536). Myanmar is behind in relation to the East Asia and Pacific Region in HDI which is 0.72. The country lags especially in the areas of maternal health and mortality rate for children under five years of age. In Myanmar, Maternal mortality ratio is 282 (per 100.000 live births) according to the latest census (2014) and Infant mortality rate is 62 per 1000 live births (Census 2014). There are about 260.000 internally displaced people - a result of the severe armed conflicts in the country and the distress caused by communal violence.⁴

Box 1. Development Policy Landscape⁵

- National Sustainable Development Strategy 2009 (NSDS)
- National Strategy on Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development (NSPARD) 2011
- Framework for Economic and Social Reform (FESR) (First 5 years) 2011
- National Comprehensive Development Plan 2014 (NCDP) 20 years (2011-2030)
- Social Security Law in 2012 & Social Protection Strategic Plan
- Foreign Investment Law and Citizen Investment Law 2012
- New central bank law 2013
- Special Economic Zones Law 2014
- Economic Policy 2016

¹ ASIA Development Bank, *Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges, 2012, 1.*

² Department of Population Ministry of Immigration and Population Office (2015). *The Union Report Census Report Volume 2*, Yangon.

³ Asia Development Bank (2016). *Basic Statistics 2016*. Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, Development Economics and Indicators Division.

⁴ OCHA (2017). *Myanmar: Humanitarian Snapshot*. OCHA, Myanmar.

⁵ A presentation made by Khin Win Kyi in CSO conference “From Risk to Resilience” conducted in Yangon, in March 2016: “*Sustainable Development Goals in Myanmar*” .

Myanmar business development is hampered by lack of comprehensive business legislation that can attract foreign investment and protect local investors. Moreover, without a consistent or effective inflation control policy, Myanmar is weak in macroeconomic management. Access to finance in Myanmar is limited, particularly in rural areas and interest rates are comparatively high.⁶

Climate change also hurts Myanmar's economy. Given that 70% of people live in the rural areas and most of them have low adaptive capacity, they are vulnerable to environmental shocks and stresses such as drought, floods, extreme weather conditions that are expected to increase in frequency and intensity because of climate change.⁷

State companies and monopolies are still the most important corporate organizations.⁸ There is a crucial problem of lack of infrastructure in Myanmar. For both logistics performance and the quality of infrastructure they are comparatively low in the region particularly on sectors such as transport, electricity, and telecommunication. Only about 26% of the population has access on electricity, which is typical in cities.⁹

However, due to recent process of democratization and opening of the country, many investors are willing to come to Myanmar, especially nearby countries such as Thailand, India, and China. There are many programs in place to help the country live its new period and to assist the nation with building governance capacity, rule of law, institutional strengthening and better performance to deliver better public services.¹⁰

2.2. Conflict Analysis – Myanmar and the question of the Rakhine State

Some historical background is necessary to better locate Myanmar at its peace building process. The history of the region where the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is currently placed is that of continuous conflict with brief periods of unity under far-reaching Kingdoms of one ethnic group conquering political hegemony over the others (Pagan, Taungoo, Konbaung etc.). There are many ethnic cleavages that have shaped the history of the country up to now.

These ethnic cleavages and the struggle for hegemony have produced innumerable armed conflicts. In more recent history, the independence of the country from the British on 1948 was led by the Burma ethnic group on the promise of some groups would become independent. This did not happen and gave rise to continuous fights between the central

⁶ Ibid, 20

⁷ Ibid, 14

⁸ Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (2016). Myanmar Country Report, 21.

⁹ Asia Development Bank (2012). Myanmar in Transition: Opportunities and Challenges, ADB, 22.

¹⁰ Nehru, Vikram (2012). Myanmar's Economic Policy Priorities, Carnegie Endowment for international peace, 3.

government and the numerous armed groups spread throughout the country, leading to a long standing civil war. Moreover, the military regime (1962-2015) promoted a political propaganda that fostered ethnic and religious dissension in Myanmar, having the Muslims as their main target as to avoid joined action among the various groups against the military government. During the military regime, there was also the building of a strong ideology of nationalism based on a religious identity with Buddhism.

According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor (March 2017), on January 2015, at the inception of the project, there were 23 armed clashes reported and three peace talks took place. The Myanmar Peace Process is complex and has three arms: Government Policy, Conflict and Peace Talks, and Ethnic Policy¹¹. These three fronts work in parallel. There is the work on legislation and government policy in the first area, high level negotiations between the government and armed groups in the country which fall under the conflict and peace talks, while there is also work done on the ground as far as ethnic policy which involves training and capacity building.

At the time when CDNH was conceived, the national ceasefire agreement (NCA) was being negotiated. On October 15th, 2015, it was finally signed between the government and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAO's). However, the level of conflict had risen in the Rakhine State. The rape of a Rakhine by a Rohingya stirred up the conflict between the Rakhine and Rohingya and led to violent attacks of the first group against the later in the period 2012-2014 leading to about 140,000 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), the vast majority being Muslims in camps with inadequate conditions.

The year of 2015 saw the junction between the end of the military regime and the new government. Under the military government, the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) was supported by the government and was entitled to produce research on the peace process. CDNH inherited some of the work of the MPC, but now as a civil society organization.

Towards the end of the project, on August 31st, 2016, the new government called the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong in which the Panglong Agreement was signed in reference to the first Panglong Conference of 1947, when General Aung San called in the different ethnic groups to unite the country and promote independence from the British.

The first civilian government after many years of the military in power brings hope to a lot of people for a more transparent and accountable government. On February 2017, for instance, there were 11 armed clashes reported and 14 peace meetings had taken place (Myanmar Peace Report, 2017) much fewer than in 2015. However, this transition is still on-going, and the peace process in Myanmar is full of swings and backlashes caused by unexpected events such as the murder of U Ko Ni, Chief Legal Advisor to the National League for Democracy (NLD) and a prominent figure in the Muslim community.

¹¹ Myanmar Peace Monitor (<http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/peace-process/peace-process-overview>)

In the Myanmar peacebuilding process, several ceasefire agreements and bi-lateral agreements have been signed. The military government reached ceasefire agreements with a total of 40 groups prior to 2010 in an unwritten format led by the Military Intelligence (MI) and later by the Military Security Affairs (MSA). These agreements involved the negotiation of business privileges for the armed groups.¹²

Box 2. Key actors of Myanmar peace process

- UPCC-Union Peace Central Committee
- NPWG-National Peace Working Group
- NRPC-National Reconciliation and Peace Center
- House of Representatives: Ethnic Affairs and Internal Peace Committee
- Lower House: Ethnic Affairs Committee
- Brotherhood Federation Peace Committee
- Armed groups Coordination committee
- PDSG-Peace Donor Support Group convened in 2012
- MPSI-Myanmar Peace Support Initiatives
- IPSG-International Peace Support Group (UK, EU, AUS, Norway, WB, UN)
- Nippon Foundation, MPSI Norway, China, JICA, ODI
- CBOs, CSOs.

The same unstable scenario for the country applies in the case of Rakhine State. According to the CDNH First Rakhine Needs Assessment, the state is one of the poorest regions in Myanmar and has been plagued by communal problems since the turn of the 20th century. Rakhine is seen by many as the 'biggest stumbling block' in Myanmar's reform process (CDNH, 2015).

The problem of communal conflicts converges with overall underdevelopment of the state. The state has high levels of poverty, food insecurity, weak infrastructure, limited access to healthcare, and little Disaster Risk Reduction measures for dealing with natural hazards. Education is reported to be widely available, although with low quality standards.

Both Rakhine and Rohingya report fear of communal violence, while the Rohingya are more willing to meet for reconciliation, due to their more difficult living conditions (CDNH, 2015 and interviews). Reliable information is scarce and rumors spread without many means for verification. Economic interactions between both groups decreased and the Rohingya are kept without access to government posts and higher education for not having citizenship in

¹² Oo, Min Zaw (2014). Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements, Catalyzing reflection. Swiss Peace: Yangon.

the country. The lack of national verification cards (NVC) of some Rohingyas does not allow them to freely move within Myanmar.

Rohingya and Rakhine have different perceptions on whom to trust. They both agree in entitling the Union Government with more trust, but Rakhine have more trust in the Rakhine State government and less in the Village Administrator, local police, and the military while the Muslims trust their religious leaders and international organizations most.

Even though, CDNH's work focused more on Rakhine state, there was also work in other regions and field work in Mandalay State. In order to give the appropriate context to the evaluation, some key findings from CDNH's report *The State of Social Harmony in Mandalay Region (2016)* are presented below:

Box 3. Social Harmony in Mandalay Region

- Buddhist participants (14%) were considerably less likely than Christian (42%), Muslim (48%) and Hindu (41%) participants to claim they could be friends with someone outside of their ethnic group.
- 35% of Buddhists said they never have friendly interactions with people outside of their own ethnicity, while 21% said they did so every day. Contrastingly, 66% of Muslims, 61% of Hindus and 55% of Christians said they had friendly interactions every day.
- Buddhists were the least likely to accept neighbors, spouses, colleagues who differed from their own ethnicity or religion.
- Muslims received the highest degrees of rejection from their fellow participants.
- 32% of participants indicated that they could never accept a Myanmar Muslim as a work colleague, 34% could never accept one as an employee, 42% could never accept one as a superior, 37% could never accept one as a neighbour, 66% could never accept them as a spouse and 65% could never accept them as an in-law.
- 44% of Bamar participants felt there is never ethnic discrimination in Myanmar, compared to 44% of Muslims who believed there was definitely ethnic discrimination.
- Buddhists and Hindus were far more likely to answer that religious freedom did exist in Myanmar, compared to the 42% of Muslims who felt there was not. Muslims also reported a higher increase in in discrimination based on ethnicity and religion in the past 5 years.
- Residents in Kyaukpadaung, Meiktila, Taungtha and Yamethin, demonstrated the least interest in learning about other customs and cultures of other ethnic groups in Myanmar.

Mandalay is also a hot spot for communal conflict as it can be seen by the CDNH's report on the *State of Social Harmony in the state*. It is not as Rakhine, but it does have significant

tensions between Muslims and Buddhists. In Meiktila in March 2013, there was an outbreak of violence which led to the death of 40 people.

In the case of Rakhine, an important backlash in the process of dialogue between the Rakhine and the Rohingya was the attack by a Rohingya armed group against border posts in October 2016 in Northern Rakhine State on the border with Bangladesh where nine police officers were killed. That incident increased the levels of violence in the northern part of the State, where the military took aggressive measures in the region, provoking thousands of Rakhine Muslims to flee to Bangladesh. There are also concerns that the attack of the Rohingya might have the influence of armed groups outside Myanmar. In the below map, the attack against the police is located in the border between Rakhine State and Bangladesh.



Source: BBC

On this issue, three important reports have been released in February and March 2017. The first was a Flash Report written by the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) with interviews from Rohingya fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh. The other one was written by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Ms. Yanghee Lee, who also addressed the issue on a statement at the 34th session of the Human Rights Council. The other was from the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State – chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan and released as the evaluation mission was being prepared.

They address a situation of a humanitarian crisis and serious infliction of human rights. The Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution to establish a Fact Finding mission to investigate the Human Rights situation in Rakhine (and elsewhere in Myanmar). The Government of Myanmar has rejected the resolution and stated it will not cooperate with the Fact Finding mission once it is established. However, the Government fully endorsed

the recommendations by the Kofi Annan Commission and is now planning for how to implement the recommendations. The Government has its own Rakhine Inquiry Commission, chaired by the first Vice President.

The incident of October 2016 reaffirms the need of further work in the Rakhine State. Both contexts – the 2012-2014 eruption of communal riots and the escalation of violence after the incident of October 2016 have similarities in terms of the need for intervention in the region and the need to do work with communities, Union Government, and the Military.

Myanmar is now discussing the establishment of a federal system to give voice and political space to many ethnic groups throughout the country. However, this process of state building with democratic principles will be long and sensitive. Many armed opposition groups have developed long-established, even if under-resourced, structures in the fields of education, health, and local administration. Peace talks have yet to address how these non-state governance and service delivery regimes will relate to formal state structures¹³

Box 4. Key Milestones of Peace Process in Myanmar

- Kachin and Military armed conflict resumed in 2012
- Peace Process Working Group formed in 2012
- Peace Process Steering Committee formed in 2012
- UPMC-Union Peace-Making Committee formed in 2012
- UPCC-Union Peace Central Committee formed in 2012
- MPC-Myanmar Peace Center established in 2013 with following functions: Mine Actions, Peace Building, Cease Fire, Outreach, Political Dialogue
- JMC-Joint Monitoring Committee is created
- UPDJC-Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee was created in 2015
- Cease fire Code of Conduct developed in 2015
- Signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015
- NLD handed-over the leading process in 2015
- MPC is changed into National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) in 2016
- Central Emergency Management Committee set up in 2016
- UPC preparation committees One and Two are created
- UPC-Union Peace Conference: 21st Century Panglong convened in September 2016
- Creation of the Central Committee for the Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State in 2016
- The second 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference is expected to be convened in 2017 in Panglong

Source: Evaluation team based on BNI, MPC and the local media.

¹³ Petrie, C. & South, A. (2013). Mapping of Myanmar Peacebuilding: Civil Society. Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN), Brussels.

Some key issues will have to be addressed within Myanmar's peace negotiation and mediation process. They involve security issues such as disarmament, demobilization, and security sector reform of police and security forces; Justice and human rights issues which is about the protection of victims, judiciary reforms, and alignment between national and international legislation; State and Institutional building which will involve a debate on power sharing, constitutional reform, and elections; Economic and environmental Issues which will deal with the attraction of investments and wealth sharing in the country (tax system, distribution of public revenues to various regions and states); Refugees and IDPs which is a major problem especially in the state of Rakhine and the promotion of social integration despite religious and ethnic differences, added to the improvement in the educational system. ¹⁴

2.3. Some considerations on the issue of communal violence in the country

The landscape of communal violence in the country is complex and it is not the purpose of this report to do a specific analysis about it, but rather to give some general background context in which the project operates. It is with this purpose that a few further remarks should be made.

Communal Violence can be defined as, "Overtly performed, episodic, recurrent, sporadic, direct physical hostility between self-defining and mutually identifiable ascriptive communities".¹⁵ These ascriptive communities can be based on ethnical and religious identities often assigned by birth which tend to lead an individual to a certain experience and worldview and where he/she may also inherit previous conflicts of his/her group against other groups and accept it without much questioning for many generations. It is important to mention that the problem of communal conflict is not exclusive of Myanmar. Similar tensions can be found in several countries of South and South East Asia such as India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia.

In the case of Myanmar, 87.9% of the population is Buddhist, 6.2% Christian, 4.3% Muslim, 0.5% Hindus, 0.8% Animist, 0.2% other religion and 0.1% has No Religion¹⁶ which shows a scenario of great diversity and potential conflict. There is high level of mistrust among the different communities (see Box 3 as an illustration) and a history of community tensions aggravated by a historical bias of the government towards the Buddhist community.

¹⁴ Based on a presentation made by Zau Lum with the title of "Peace Building and Myanmar Peace Process", at Myanmar Peace Center on 30 September 2013.

¹⁵ Cheesman, Nick (2017). *Introduction: Interpreting Communal Violence in Myanmar*, Journal Of Contemporary Asia Vol. 47 , Iss. 3,201

¹⁶ RELEASE OF 2014 CENSUS DATA ON RELIGION, Statement by H.E. U Thein Swe, Minister for Labour, Immigration and Population at the Launch of 2014 Census Data on Religion (Nay Pyi Taw, 21 July 2016). Adjusted data considered the number of non-counted population in Rakhine which is very likely to be Muslim.

In the case of the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar, there is a fear from the part of Buddhists that Islam will grow and spread in the country and threaten the country's traditional culture. From the part of the Muslims, there is a sense that their religion and culture is not respected. Further, extreme leaders will tend to incorporate that collective feeling and incite violence between both groups.

In the case of the Buddhists, an important extreme group is called Ma Ba Tha (Organisation for Protection of Race and Religion) with the official name of Patriotic Association of Myanmar. It was founded in 2014 and inherited the work of another radical group called 996 Movement which suffered restrictions in the country due to its anti-Islam discourse.

Ashin Wirathu, a prominent Ma Ba Tha leader, is a good example of how hate speech is fueled in the country against the Muslim minority. In his speech, religious principles are mixed with a nationalist discourse and hate against Muslims which is propagated in Pagodas, Facebook, newspapers, and by more extreme followers (an illustration is given in Box 5).

Box 5. Interview of Ashin Wirathu produced by Open Hands Initiative, Global Post and The Ground Truth Project, 2013.

Journalist: What is the role of Buddhism in Burmese politics now?

Ashin Wirathu: The role of the monks is inseparable from Myanmar's politics.

Monks will be working for the people in Myanmar's politics without expecting any returns.

Journalist: Since there are some religious conflicts in Myanmar now, what responsibilities have the Buddhist monks taken in stopping these religious conflicts?

Ashin Wirathu: We practice non-violence and finding solutions within the confines of the legal system. In order for no new problems to arise, we are assembling problem-solving teams that include people of all faiths, to cooperate with each other in town and cities that are within our reach.

Journalist: Can we not say that Myanmar is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country where different groups are living together in harmony?

Ashin Wirathu: If every race and religion will become good, genuine friends there is no reason we can't live together peacefully. Whether we live together peacefully or not is not up to the Burmese people. It depends on the Muslims. They are devouring the Burmese people, destroying Buddhism and Buddhist order, forcefully taking actions to establish Myanmar as an Islamic country and forcefully implementing them. If they don't do these things, then there can be peace.

Journalist: Right now, the Muslim population in Myanmar is low. If half of Myanmar becomes Muslim, what do you think will happen?

Ashin Wirathu: Muslims are like African carps. They breed rapidly, have violent behavior and eat its own kind and other fishes. They also destroy the natural resources and beauty underwater. Even though they are the minority, our entire race has been suffering a great deal under the burden of the minority. The majority Burmese have not intruded, corrupted or abused them but we have been suffering under their burden. That is why if there are as many Muslims as there are Buddhists, Myanmar could never be at peace. ¹⁷

¹⁷ A Burmese Journey Q&A With Ashin Wirathu (English subtitle) from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qvEBaAiy5b4> accessed on April 23rd, 2017.

This discourse illustrates well how religious principles can be hijacked by politics and how a minority group can be blamed for being responsible for conflict - where there is no sharing of responsibility for communal violence.

From the Muslim side, there are also armed Rohingya militants, but there is not much information about them as they operate informally and may be related to groups outside the country. Groups such as Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, Rohingya Patriotic Front and Rohingya Solidarity Organization have operated in the past. According to the RC Office, the group that has taken responsibility for the 9 October attacks is called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, previously Harakah al-Yaqin and they also have close ties with the Rohingya diaspora.

The Rohingyas in Rakhine State do not have formal party representation and the State Legislature in Rakhine is dominated by the Arakan National Party and the Military with 22 and 12 seats respectively.

The issue of communal violence in Myanmar is highly sensitive and tends to be polarizing and difficult to deal with from a political perspective. In the past, the Union government passed legislation to protect Buddhism in the country. Under the new democratic government, the problem continues as measures to protect minorities are seen as highly unpopular by the Buddhist majority and the hardliners.

However, even in face of high level of conflict and as a step forward, on 31 May 2016, the Union Government created a Central Committee for the Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State with State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as chairperson. It includes 20 cabinet ministers and as it was reported by CDNH, senior staff members from the organization have been interacting with the Central Committee.

According to CDNH, there have been strong hardline movements in both communities which are currently stronger than the moderate counter movement. This gives to the current context a greater complexity and brings challenges to the work on the ground.

CHAPTER III. EVALUATION RESULTS

3. Impact on Myanmar Peacebuilding Agenda

3.1. Relevance

The dimension of relevance addressed five questions: 1) If the project had taken into account a previous conflict analysis in order to define its aims and approach; 2) How relevant the project design was to the peacebuilding process in Myanmar; 3) To which extent the project contributed to any broader strategic goals of the Government of Myanmar or the UN in Myanmar; 4) To which extent the 'Theory of Change' for the project was coherent to the needs on the ground; 5) If the project targeted the right beneficiaries and geographic zones.

In relation to the conflict analysis, many CDNH staff members were involved in the production of a series of reports entitled, "Citizen Voices in Myanmar's Transition," based on surveys carried out on the various regions of Myanmar which brought the views of Myanmar citizens on the state, nation, and peace building processes. Key CDNH staff members were also involved in the Rakhine Investigation Commission which was tasked to produce a report with recommendations for Rakhine after the 2012 outbreaks of communal violence. In this context, several memos were produced to advise key government officials. Therefore, a process of analysis was carried before CDNH inception and continued afterwards. One of CDNH's key activities was the production of information and reports about communal violence in the country.

CDNH focused on addressing the communal violence part of the peacebuilding process. The Rakhine Investigation Commission made a series of recommendations for dealing with communal violence in the state and several of those recommendations became materialized in CDNH. At the time, there was a close interaction between Dr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing and OSASG. There were talks on the need of having an organization working on Rakhine. The need for information and dialogue (between the Government and the international community along with communities) was also identified as crucial to the peacebuilding process. This context gives an answer to the second relevance question about how relevant the project design was to the peacebuilding process in Myanmar. It was very relevant in addressing the front of communal violence in the country. CDNH is unique in putting different ethnic groups to dialogue on the ground.

CDNH started from within the government structure. The organization came to fill some of the gaps pointed to the government at the time. So, it came to life out of a need identified by the government and the UN, via OSASG. As far as the UN in Myanmar, there is not an overall framework for the UN work on peace building in the country, but there is one for

Rakhine. The Framework for UN Support to Rakhine State was released in January 2015, updated in April 2016 and then again in February 2017. It addresses the work of the UN on peacebuilding, human rights, development, and humanitarian actions in the state.

The UN Strategy for Rakhine is very much aligned with the work of CDNH in all areas the organization has worked on: provision of data of what is happening on the ground, EWER and the promotion of dialogue between both the Rakhine and the Rohingya in the state. The document looks at the challenges of the UN in the state, where much of the Rakhine community sees the system as biased towards the Rohingya. It also proposes further dialogue between the UN and the government which is something that echoes with the field work of this evaluation where both UN actors and beneficiaries of CDNH's project called for deepening the interaction with the government.

Before the inception of the project, when the need of developing effective communication with the government was identified by the OSASG in the country, the current director of CDNH was considered as an actor able to help in that communication process. There are many possibilities of continuous engagement between the UN and CDNH, but this will be further addressed in items 4 and 5.

The next question is about the 'Theory of Change', how coherent was it to the needs on the ground? The 'Theory of Change' was anchored in three basic lines of work: Production of data, EWER system, and the promotion of trainings and meetings to bring both communities together. The overall aim of the project was to decrease the level of conflict in the regions addressed and increase the number of peaceful interactions between different communities.

The three lines of work were widely seen as useful and important on the ground, except for the trainings and reconciliation meetings which were not seen as much needed by a small percentage of the Rakhine interviewed (about 15% of the beneficiaries). This reinforces findings from the First Rakhine State Needs Assessment that saw how the Rakhine were less willing to have trainings on EWER and other peace related issues. There were also remarks from the Muslim community outside Rakhine state about the difficulties of engaging more people on the CDNH's trainings, which reflects some of the challenges on the ground.

As for the target of CDNH and its choices of beneficiaries and geographic zones, most stakeholders in the Donor, Implementation Partner, and Implementation Facilitator clusters agreed on the importance of focusing the work on Rakhine and the inclusion of religious leaders, the youth and women in their activities. However, on the ground, about a third of beneficiaries outside Rakhine considered that CDNH should expand its operations beyond Rakhine and further work in other regions of Myanmar. CDNH does work in Rakhine, Mandalay, Bago, Mon and Kayin State but most of their work (about 50%) is in Rakhine. At the beginning, they also worked with Shan State and Sagaing Region, but they moved the

focus to places where there were higher risks of communal violence and better possibilities of establishing a network.

There were also questions from beneficiaries in terms of the participants in the Youth Camps, where some of the beneficiaries questioned if the youth selected were the best ones to pass on the message and mobilize other people once they came back from their camp experience. The challenge of passing on the message learned is certainly not a matter only of the individuals selected but also of the difficulties in the context. However, this is certainly a message to be considered.

3.2. Effectiveness/impact

Under Effectiveness/Impact the four outcomes of the project were explored in research, the EWER system, the work on training and mediation, and finally in terms of the recognition of the work of CDNH. These four outcomes are now going to be explored with the related evaluation questions.

The two questions related to the Research component of CDNH were 1) If the reports produced by CDNH were useful and reliable to understand the situation of conflict in Myanmar; 2) If the reports had been widely disseminated.

There was a consensus of all the stakeholders interviewed in terms of the relevance and credibility of CDNH's landmark reports which were Rakhine State Needs Assessment I and II. The first was published in 2015 and the later in 2016. The first report was taken in the project document as the baseline for their work in 2015. The clusters of Donors, Implementation Partners, and Implementation Facilitators which are basically members of the international community who work in Myanmar highly praised the reports as the best reference to getting to know the state of Rakhine.

CDNH produced several reports under the PBF support. The Citizen Voices in Myanmar's Transition were produced in nine volumes, for the Ayeyawady Region, Bago Region, Kayah State, Kayin State, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, Mon State, Sagaing Region and Yangon Region. These reports built on previous work from the Myanmar Peace Center focused on state, nation, and peace building in the country, while the Report State of Social Harmony focused on commitment to diversity, 'colour blindness' and intercultural understanding, freedom from discrimination, exclusion and tension, social trust, acceptance and connectedness, interracial and religious acceptance in several types of relationships. These reports were produced to Ayeyawady Region, Bago Region, Kayah State, Kayin State, Magway Region, Mandalay Region, Mon State, Sagaing Region and Yangon Region. Both series were based on large surveys and focus groups on the various states.

The evaluation focused on the major stakeholders related to Rakhine, where about 50% of CDNH's operations are carried out, so there was no formal feedback in terms of how the other reports were regarded in the rest of the country. However, considering that CDNH inherited the legacy of the Myanmar Peace Centre which was at the heart of the previous government efforts for peacebuilding and the production of peace related research and considering that there is a lack of systematic production of information in the country, these two series of reports can be taken as a reference for anyone who would like to have a better perspective of Myanmar produced by local institutions.

When it comes to dissemination, a launch event was held in Yangon for the presentation of the Rakhine State Needs Assessment and that was well received by many Donors, Implementation Partners, and Implementation Facilitators interviewed. Another launch event is being planned to take place in June 2017.

However, more dissemination efforts can certainly take place. It was the opinion of about 40% of Implementation Partners and Influencers combined that more dissemination events could take place where the findings could be presented and further explored as a way of raising awareness towards the key issues researched. A revision of the layout of the webpage and the posting of research outputs could also be considered as a way of facilitating their access (e.g. separating the documents in Burmese and in English, clustering the civic education books in one section, placing the series on 'Citizen's Voice' together, on 'The State of Social Harmony' etc.). The topic of communication will be further explored in item 5.

The second outcome stated, "The mitigation of risks is enhanced and responses to threats of social violence are improved through the setting up and maintenance of an Early Warning Early Prevention System" (Project Document, 2005). Three evaluation questions were explored. The first was if the EWER Response System was in place, second if the EWER had been able to mitigate risks and third if the EWER had been able to give responses to threats of social violence in Myanmar.

The EWER system has been set at CDNH and is widely used by the international community in Myanmar as a source of information. It has developed a network of key informants that help to feed a database which categorizes several types of incidents, effects and responses according to various locations in Myanmar. It also produces weekly newsletters and situation updates, promotes training to informants and government officials and does advocacy through recommendations in the weekly newsletters and the memos that might be produced by request of certain actors. They also monitor social and print media.

For the mobilization of its network, CDNH used as a strategy to invite as many people as possible and later select those who would be willing to work as volunteers in the EWER system. By undergoing this type of selection – and not offering any financial return, a committed group of people came together to help the system operate. All the Donors,

Implementation Facilitators, and Partners reported receiving the weekly updates and showed appreciation for the information they received. The mailing list has about 500 names.

EWER sent out an evaluation survey on September 2016 and received feedback on the format, frequency, and content of its newsletters. All of which were well received by most of the respondents. Respondents from this survey said they wanted to see more analysis and information on policy development. They also reported that they wanted to see more information gathered from local network members and government (57%), recent research (53%) and social media (42.6%). There were also demands to look more at national issues. Most respondents came from international organizations (the survey was in English) and they used it mostly to get an understanding of communal tensions in Myanmar (34%) and to stay afloat of events through a brief overview (32%). Most respondents (52%) shared the EWER reports to other people (from 1 to 106). There were also suggestions towards having more graphics and information of sources.

The CDNH EWER is regarded by Implementation Partners and Facilitators as the most comprehensive in Myanmar and is used by the UN as one of their most important sources to help feed into their decision-making process.

There were several cases of violence reported by stakeholders as being prevented due to the EWER. The stories were two-fold. They included community members who reported to CDNH about possible events in certain townships and there were also cases of community members who helped to settle conflict because of mediation techniques and reporting procedures they had learned during CDNH trainings. However, this evidence is always anecdotal, due to the nature of the events (counterfactual) and due to a lack of a monitoring and evaluation system built in EWER. CDNH staff members also reported the case of rumors that an international organization was meant to be attacked and they reported to the appropriate authorities. UN agencies also use it for assisting with the issuance of Security Clearances in the country.

The story told by one of the beneficiaries in Mandalay helps to illustrate the use of EWER on the ground (specific dates of this event were not mentioned in the Focus Group Discussion):

From my experience, there were houses from the two groups¹⁸, there was a clash, at the time I and other members of the Community went and negotiated. In the training of EWER we discussed about conflict management. We negotiated and prevented the conflict. The government department thanked us for that”.

Woman in Mandalay

¹⁸ Buddhists and Muslims.

One of the respondents also suggested more work on advocacy also linked to the research team, which means following up on the recommendations made and further developing the 'early response' part of the system. About one third of Implementation Partners also suggested enhancing the response portion of the system, encouraging action to take place based on the data available. Perhaps what is missing here is not the 'prevention' part of the system per se, but more clarity in terms of the work around the 'response' part of the system, a communication strategy for partners to see actions coming through and a M&E system to help track the impact of their work.

Finally, according to the EWER survey and to one of the implementation partners interviewed, it would be good to be explicit about their methodology to help people trust their data even more.

As far as training and mediation, two evaluation questions were asked: 1) If the trainings and awareness raising activities (e.g. youth camps, conferences, youth forums) were able to foster the acceptance of religious differences and what the evidence for that was; 2) To which extent the mediation activities had helped to bring the different communities together.

In terms of the trainings promoted, they were on various issues and in many contexts. There were trainings which were specific to the EWER system, there were trainings on conflict prevention, rule of law, interfaith dialogue, social and political tolerance, and civic education (which had a specific project supported by the Peace Support Fund).

There were different views in terms of the selection of participants. From the Donor and Implementation Partners point of view, CDNH could identify the right participants for the workshops, from the part of beneficiaries on the ground; many claimed that not the right people were selected. The workshops usually had the moderate, as the hardliners would not come to a workshop of this nature.

According to CDNH, the organization carried out work with highly nationalistic hardliners and was able to change the mindset of these people. They reported inviting them to reconciliation meetings when they found were ready to do so.

There was also a trip made to Sri Lanka, where they have a strong network to promote similar issues. CDNH took participants from different religions including Buddhists, Christians and Muslims. There was very positive feedback in relation to that mission where participants visited monasteries and had a good interaction with Bangladesh experts in the country.

There is also a common perception of the merits of CDNH in carrying such a challenging task of putting the two communities together.

“CDNH puts more emphasis on the youth, the elders are tougher to work with. Initially, they faced challenges, it was difficult and later they came together. They got very good relationships with the other groups”.

Rakhine participant

Rakhine are not very exposed, they are unemployed. It is good to have them gather in one place. This is one benefit. They are occupied in something. There are risks in the workshop, but CDNH does not stop. It is very helpful”.

Implementation Partner, Focus Group Discussion

In terms of impact, there are mixed views from the beneficiaries. While some praise the trainings, and see the knowledge in their daily life, in preventing conflict, educating, writing articles for the paper, seeing that the other side is not ‘so bad’, there are also some skeptical beneficiaries who do not see much impact. The views in this regard tend to be diverse.

“CDNH really tried hard to meet the two communities. In Rakhine, there are not many people who would like to be with the Rohingya. The relationship is still at very low stakes. We cannot see much impact, one side is not willing to move forward”.

Rakhine in Sittwe

“The meetings are very good for both parties. Each party had the opportunity to express themselves. When they asked about the name of the Rohingya, the Rakhine argued that they are Muslims, not Rohingya. They can say that openly in the discussion. CDNH created face to face discussion and it was very good. The trainings prevented future conflicts. We got the concept of how to do Peace building”.

Rakhine Youth in Sittwe

“I realized that basic human rights are for all regardless of race and religion”.

Rakhine Youth in Sittwe

Reality has multiple layers and perceptions. A concrete result of CDNH’s work on the trainings and reconciliation meetings was the development since March 2015 of a joint committee in Maungdaw and Buditaung townships with Rakhine and Rohingya community leaders. Also, CDNH’s methodology of putting the two communities together was a paradigm shift for most of the beneficiaries as Rakhine and Rohingya have decreased their interaction.

Most beneficiaries interviewed asked for the presence of more trainings in the Community and for CDNH to be more entrenched on the ground. According to one of the Beneficiaries, “If we are to see Harmony, CDNH should make more events”¹⁹. Some participants also recommended having government officials taking part in the trainings.

CNDH organized two types of activities with a focus on the youth: youth camps and the youth forums. The purpose of youth camps was to bring two communities together. The purpose of youth forums was to help youths to organize themselves in their own communities. The youth were asked about what they thought of the CDNH’s activities they took part in. What was heard on the ground was feedback about the youth camps.

The feedback on the youth camps was very positive. There were many statements from the youth about how they had a chance of seeing the other side. That they became closer through the interaction. But, there were also concerns regarding the information learnt and its disbursement to the greater community. Since few people attend these camps, the community has raised concern as to the overall sustainability of such efforts.

There were also skeptical remarks about the government. There is usually appreciation about showing the value of different religions and awareness on other issues such as a Human Trafficking. In one case, for example, CDNH promoted the Women’s Forum where 21 women from this association took part in awareness raising activities around human trafficking.

CDNH supports local groups via small funding (USD 500-1000) for awareness raising activities. In one occasion, they supported an awareness campaign by giving some food costs and making shirts. In one community, one beneficiary reported that

“Before I had no awareness of conflict. We promoted sports in our Community. There is a specific place for the Muslims, the parents also came when we promoted the activities. After that, we promoted interaction between different groups, through sports. These groups can discuss EWER together. The conflicts can start with the rumors, they have a chance to discuss together. In the campaigns, the Community becomes aware. The impact is that whoever would like to contribute will contact us”.

Beneficiary, Mandalay Region

As there were many demands for increasing CDNH’s reach in different communities, enhancing local partnership might be a way of increasing the scope of their work.

¹⁹ Rohingya leader in Sittwe Camp.

In terms of methodology, there was an interest of many beneficiaries to learn more about the methodology to use it in their own work in the community. According to one of the beneficiaries, the trainers try to bring the theory into practice.

There were also reconciliation meetings taking place in Yangon, where both communities came together. CDNH benefited from the experience of community meetings in Rakhine in 2012, where there were members of the international community taking part. Based on this experience, CDNH staff visited Rakhine and selected Community members who had moderate mindsets and brought them to Yangon. On the first day, Rakhine Community leaders talked. On the next day, Muslims came and discussed among themselves. On the third day, the two communities came together and the agendas were built along the two first days. This methodology evolved based on the experience of CDNH staff members and these previous conversations with both communities was an innovation in Myanmar peacebuilding context.

Another innovation as the combination of research, networking and work on the ground in Myanmar. Very often, these two types of work come separate. The research helped to feed into the communal activities and informed the larger international and national community of what was happening, which also encouraged further action from various actors.

The fourth outcome was about public recognition. The questions were about how CDNH was perceived by different stakeholders in Myanmar (donors, local and international NGOs, government officials and beneficiaries) and if CDNH was able to secure funding to continue its activity after the funding from the Peacebuilding Fund ended.

CDNH is a highly-recognized institution in the international community of Myanmar. This applies to the Donors, Implementation Facilitators, RUNO, and Implementation Partners interviewed. They have been to attract many partners for their work and this speaks in terms of the space they have built for themselves in the development scenario of the country.

As far as the recognition on the ground, with the beneficiaries and with influencers, perceptions are varied. Some key leaders of CDNH were members of an organization called Myanmar EGRESS composed by Myanmar citizens who left the country and later returned and which held a political agenda which is not always supported by all the stakeholders. On the ground, the same applies. Some key members of CDNH were part of the Rakhine Investigation Commission and some members of the Rohingya community showed dissatisfaction with the final report of the commission, which according to another stakeholder, "It was what could be done at the time with the circumstances in place". CDNH

was received with some suspicion at the beginning by various members of the community, but it latter gained support of important community leaders from both sides.

In the Mandalay Region, one difference they had was a greater participation of women in the community and several joined activities promoted with the purpose of bringing Muslims and Buddhists together (e.g. Sports, children's activities etc.).

While both Rohingya and Rakhine beneficiaries reported that after joining the trainings, there were accusations from their peers criticizing their participation, there were also remarks that a lot of people agree with CDNH's work. There is also some suspicion that CDNH might have a bias towards the Muslim community, but that bias is a common perception of community members to work that is done in the state. As the problem with the Rohingya has attracted so much international attention and because of the international work with the IDPs, a caution needs to be in place to work with both communities. The same does not apply to Mandalay, where the beneficiaries interviewed showed that were less barriers in spreading the knowledge in the community.

There is also a lot of misinformation towards CDNH, as many people are not aware what CDNH does and what it stands for. After the training, participants became supportive towards CDNH, which clashes with the views of other community members. The same applies for Rakhine and Mandalay.

This mix of contradictory views is more than expected, considering the nature of the work which is to harmonize communities which have strong views in relation to each other. This finding also gives a signal for the need of strengthening CDNH's communication strategy and intensifying the partnerships with local organizations as to amplify their reach and better communicate their message to the ground level.

There were also statements about local organizations seeing CDNH as a competitor, of CDNH being extractive and not partnering with them. As CDNH grows this relationship building with other organizations of the same nature might also be a point to consider. As they gain more visibility, the ability to grow their partners might be a key aspect to guarantee political sustainability of the work they do.

There is one recent episode in terms of CDNH image that helps to illustrate how they are playing out in the country and the contradictions and challenges involved. CDNH released Civic Education Books that were used in their network to sensitize people in relation to peace building, different religions, reproductive health, environment, government structure, etc. One of the books had a display of basic ideas of various religions in Myanmar – Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and Christianity. A group of Buddhist religious leaders came

out in social media saying that CDNH had a Muslim bias and wanted to promote Islam in the country. This provoked a lot of reactions on social media. CDNH was invited for interviews and finally issued a declaration saying that they did not favor any specific religion. This made CDNH much more known than before.

As CDNH grows and gains more visibility and deal with issues that are very sensitive in the country, they will also have to grow in their ability of building relations with a wider network and having a well laid out communication strategy.

3.3. Project Coordination

Under project coordination, there was one evaluation question which was, “To which extent activities of the project complemented each other and had strategic coherent approach”.

As the field visit took place, there was an organization chart of CDNH which was under review. There were two distinct areas for Outcomes 1 and 2 of the project which were research and EWER. The trainings fell under the Human Resource Department. The whole CDNH team came together in the Rakhine Needs Assessment and the different teams often come together to give trainings. These are their main connection points.

When one considers the different activities CDNH has carried out on the ground and beyond (research, EWER related actions, field visit to Sri Lanka, various trainings, reconciliation meetings, youth camps) and relates to the organization chart, there seems to have been people allocated to direct the different activities but without a very clear space in the organization. The youth camps, for example, are organized by the M&E manager who works with a EWER member and responds directly to the director.

It is natural that real life cannot fit into small boxes and often teams come together from different areas to carry certain activities and that is part of the dynamic of any organization. But it is also part of organizational evolution to establish processes and methodologies which can help to settle the work in a more systematic way as to allow more robust technical and operational procedures to increase efficiency.

Such is the case, for instance, with the research team which has been creating manuals for team members to record their work and to allow a type of organization which is necessary for managing increasingly complex tasks (which involve many staff members, multiple actions and stakeholders). The training program also has both peace education and civic education training manuals.

There is demand on the ground and from UN staff members (e.g. UNICEF) to work with CDNH to increase operations. More synergy and organizational effectiveness will be needed

to make that work happen. This process will have to include investment in communications, in having clear and functional work processes and in documenting the methodology used by CDNH in its work. This may be the next step forward in their process of organizational evolution. Much has been done already, but an evaluation must also be forward thinking.

3.4. Sustainability

The theme of sustainability had three questions: 1) To which extent are the results of the project sustainable, considering the commitment of the government (including financial) and other stakeholders? 2) What, if any, catalytic effects did the project have (financial and non-financial)? 3) What was the legacy the project left in terms of legal framework and impact that is deemed to be long standing?

From its inception, CDNH received not only PBF funding, but also support from Norway, Switzerland, and Denmark. The government of Myanmar assisted CDNH by renting the facilities at a subsidized rate. As PBF funding ended in 2016, the operations of CDNH continued but with a decrease in the number of staff members (from about 60 to 48).

The expenditures of the Centre are currently being funded by Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland and the Peace Support Fund and USAID who came later on. The three initial donors are very committed to keep on supporting CDNH. There is also income coming from consultancy work which may increase in the coming years as they are receiving growing demand to do this type of work.

What the field work and the interviews with the Donors suggested is that there are many organizations willing to support CDNH – Donors and UN Agencies. They have become a reference for the work in Rakhine and if they continue the work and specially the networking of the director and the continuing conversations with the Embassies and the international community, there will be funds coming in. The following statements from donors help to support this view:

There is sustainability as long as they produce results and they do. They have several donors interested in funding them.

Donor

The UN provided the core funding. They have a success story. They came from a nascent institution to be quite well looked at. They received new resources. The seed money really worked in that sense. That worked. They created new partnerships, and there were new facilities built. They have been successful.

Donor

In terms of catalytic effects, from the financial point of view, CDNH was able to secure funding for its operation from the sources below:

Table 2. CDNH Funding Sources beyond PBF (June 2016-April 2017) as of April 2017

Source	Amount (USD)	Period
Denmark	726,527	April 2016-May 2017
Norway	411,300	June 2016-May 2017
Switzerland	240,000	November 2016-April 2017
Peace Support Fund	432,000	June 2016-June 2017
USAID/OTI	242,267	January 2017- December 2017
Total	2,052,094	

Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Peace Support Fund and USAID/OIT have assured CDNH to continue to provide support for the year 2017-2018 and there have also been proposals submitted for new funding to three of the funders.

A donor suggested that CDNH could sell consultancy services for people interested in Rakhine, another donor said that if they sold their services, there could be an issue with donors continuing to fund. This is a sensitive issue which would have to be further explored by CDNH.

Beyond finance, in terms of catalytic effects, there are many from the discourse point of view and from the point of view of the ground. One of these catalytic effects has been in terms of the civic education which has gained an unforeseen scale. There has been an increase in public debate on human rights. CDNH's core work is about bringing a change of mentality in the country, from a limited perspective of 'my ethnic group/religion' being at the center to a more encompassing world view where different ethnic groups and religions can coexist harmoniously in the country as a 'flower bouquet' as is often taught in their youth camps.

On the ground, there are also many examples of organizations that sprang up from CDNH's forums and dialogues. People met and started promoting different awareness activities and in various cases started to promote their own initiatives by creating a local CSO or networking to support different awareness raising campaigns.

Due to CDNH's work on producing contextual information on Rakhine and the rest of the country, this also helped to frame needs and give other actors direction to work on the key issues.

3.5. Efficiency

The efficiency item touched upon the implementation of the project, including the selection of Recipient UN Organization (RUNO). Additionally, time used for different components and how significant the transaction costs were, why and how efficiently the project took risks to achieve peacebuilding activities, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so. Lastly, if the PBF investment in the project provided value for money and if this kind of investment (establishment of and operational support to a new institution) is worthwhile.

In this project, UNOPS was selected by the OSASG and RC to as the Recipient UN Organization. UNOPS has a large portfolio in Myanmar. It manages the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT), The Three Millennium Development Goal Fund (3MDG), and the Joint Peace Fund (JPF). UNOPS is also the Principal Recipient for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and manage the Regional Artemisinin-Resistance Initiative (RAI) program in Myanmar and a portfolio of small and medium-sized projects. The support to CDNH is one of their medium-sized projects.

UNOPS charged 7% of operation costs plus a UNOPS 'Centrally Managed Direct Cost' and lump sums to pay for the contribution of some staff members who were to be involved in the project.

The work of RUNO was well assessed by the Implementers. Along the project timeframe, there were several staff changes which have caused some lack of clarity in terms of roles between the RUNO, the UNRCO and the PBSO in New York, but this will be further addressed under management structures.

UNOPS played a strong role in the operations of CDNH, especially in the beginning of the project as CDNH staff had little operational experience. The work of UNOPS was mainly in supporting the operations of the center and assisting them in developing the capacity to do the work on their own. There were three Senior Finance Managers along the project period, the longest standing is the current one who joined the organization on July 2016 and is up to now doing this work which has already received positive feedback from UNOPS.

At the beginning, there were some challenges with the project as staff had a research and political background and were not familiar with UN Procedures. Since the project beginning, UNOPS provided technical support to CDNH staff concerning finance and CDNH had a chance to contribute to develop and review all SOPs.

In project, financial progress was monitored and given technical support to CDNH by a Portfolio Manager and an Associate bi-weekly or weekly and after reviewing monthly expenditures incurred by CDNH. CDNH submitted interim reports, half year financial

reports and annual financial reports to UNOPS according to the Grant Support Agreement timeline.

CDNH internal finance team also tried to improve the finance system along the project and which resulted in improvement overtime. CDNH finance team conducted finance sharing meeting between support and program teams and gave guidance for them to be aligned with policies and procedures. They created procedures to give cost support to beneficiaries in the field. One achievement of CDNH finance team was the development of a financial system software so that all the financial data remains in one place and can be accessed by any senior staff member.

In terms of the risks the project took, it went far to work in places where no other organization would go and opened discussions between two opposing communities. However, that was not under the support of PBF alone. PBF did give a major contribution to the overall basic operational structure of the Center. CDNH work was based on the support of many funds which helped to increase the scale of their work.

The project was led by a university professor and other researchers which gave to CDNH a strong educational component from the highest level in government and international actors to the ground level, where information was provided and discussed.

The investment on helping to set up a new organization in a context of political instability such as Myanmar has its risks. PBF in the past gave support to the setting up of the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC). The MPC was closed at the inception of the new government. Its patrimony was transferred to the newly founded National Reconciliation and Peace Center.

Some of the work of the MPC was inherited by CDNH as many of its staff members are the same, the difference being that MPC was a government agency and dealt with the broader peace process from its political point of view, while CDNH is a non-governmental organization and has chosen to focus in Rakhine and issues of communal violence.

Answering a request for funds coming from the RC office in Myanmar and the OSASG in who was aware of the issues and sensitivities in the country seems to have been an appropriate strategy for PBF. The OSASG at the time was at the center of the peacebuilding dialogue, they interacted with the actors and understood the political context involved and the major demands.

A lesson learned from this process is not whether to support a governmental or non-governmental organization per se, which deals with research or communal violence, but rather to identify the right actors and demands on the ground from the key political figures as to ensure that the project afterwards will be sustainable from the financial and political

point of view. In this case, it proved to be. Choosing to be a NGO proved effective as to maintain independence.

The key leaders of CDNH are well connected in Rakhine and with the international community, but there may be room for building new relations with the current government as to increase the scale of their work and to increase their prospects of future sustainability.

3.6. Cross-Cutting

There were three cross-cutting themes in the evaluation: Gender, Youth, and 'Do No Harm Principle'. In this project, gender was considered in many ways: the support given to Women's forum in Rakhine, where various community leaders met, the participation of young women in the youth forums, and also on the promotion of CDNH work where many women were hired to work and they were also included in some leading positions.

A suggestion that came from the ground (Mandalay) was to deepen the involvement of women in EWER, as women tend to be very active in promoting conversations and dialogue. Also, one of the participants from the Women's Forum reported the lack of concrete results after the meetings they promoted. As with the methodology in reconciliation meetings, there could be some type of compromise among the different participants of these awareness activities and support from CDNH to help fostering further action.

Concerning the youth, one of CDNH's main training activities was the Youth Camps. At the camps, youth from different religions would come together for the period of one week and would receive training, take part in dialogues and socialize. All the youth taking part in the camps were unanimous about their appreciation of the activity, but with that consideration already made that they had difficulties in bringing back home their learning experience.

One of the youth interviewed in Rakhine who was a leader in his community was strong about calling the Muslim community Bengali (which is a term they do not like) and questioned why there was work with the Rakhine while there should be more work with the Muslims. He also voiced that it was not a conflict between Buddhists and Muslims, but rather between Rakhine and Bengali, bringing the issue more to an ethnic perspective. This youth probably never left the state and is caught in this long-standing conflict repeating the hate from his parents and grandparents. But, as a leader, his position attracts others. It may be very strategic in future trainings to develop a methodology to ensure very careful selection of youth participants. There may be also room there to give further exposure to youth outside the country. As an example of a possible activity there is the trip to Bangladesh promoted by CDNH to community leaders which was very well assessed by its participants.

The 'Do No Harm' principle was extensively considered in the project. The key leaders were from Myanmar, meaning that they had knowledge of the context and they also produced several reports and analysis about the situation of conflict in the country, people's perceptions about other ethnic groups, their views on the government and the transition process. This may be one of the strongest points about CDNH – which is knowledge of the context – which was provided to the international community. It was based on the Rakhine Needs Assessment that several actions were reviewed and projects designed afterwards.

4. Project management and oversight structures

This item will look at the arrangements designed by the project which include the areas of funding, programming and decision-making between all the actors.

The evaluation questions asked were: 1) How effectively and efficiently did the individual RUNO implement the project?; 2) To which extent did UNOPS collaborate with any other UN entities towards common objectives?; 3) How did the SOPs work in the implementation of the projects?; 4) To which extent were gender and youth considered throughout not only in the project design but also during implementation, monitoring and reporting?; 5) To which extent did this project respond to PBF's global added value/niche?

The first question was initially addressed under efficiency. UNOPS had a significant role in helping to build capacity at CDNH to run their operations. Especially at the beginning, the relationship was very close. Their major contribution was operational. However, they also benefited from CDNH expertise and from the interaction with the UNRCO and PBSO as they were involved in several other projects such as restoring a hospital in Sittwe, the capital city of Rakhine State. UNOPS worked together with the UNRCO, OSASG at the beginning, and PBSO in New York.

As the CDNH director was involved with various donors and UN agencies as well as helped to inform the international community about latest developments in Rakhine State, the relationship between CDNH and the UN gained a life of its own, beyond the borders of the PBSO project, and made CDNH's director an informal senior advisor to issues of peace building in the country. While CDNH received managerial assistance from UNOPS, CDNH director interacted with the RC. There were also technical interactions between the Peace Advisor Staff and CDNH EWER team, but to a limited extent.

Formally speaking, as per the project document, the UNRCO would act as the Executive of the project and maintain overall oversight of the project. The OSASG should provide project assurance, advice and assist with monitoring the broader outcomes of the project while UNOPS as the Senior Supplier to the project was responsible for all project management, verification of funds disbursement, monitoring and evaluation of project outputs, and reporting.

The OSASG office was closed in 2016. One of their senior staff members was interviewed because of her involvement in the inception of the project, but the evaluation team could not identify whether the monitoring of CDNH's work by their office was actually carried on. From the part of the UNRCO, there were high level meetings with CDNH, but the team itself was not involved in maintaining overall oversight of the project, but in giving occasional assistance. As the Director of CDNH was delivering its projects outputs (publications, EWER newsletters, trainings etc.) and this was known to the UN actors, the reporting took place via UNOPS and the oversight took place in the Board Meetings.

The project evaluation team could not identify anyone from the part of the UN who had complete ownership of the project, who could give a full narrative of the vision behind it, its results, challenges and ways forward. Different people provided the evaluation team with information to build that narrative. Since CDNH was the main project implementer, had the same director from inception, could contribute to a global perspective from their point-of-view. This may not be a problem but should be taken as a point of reflection. A clear sense of ownership over the projects may be relevant to have initiatives come coherently together and to assist cases where local partners may have more difficulties in delivering intended outputs.

PBF manages about 100 projects in various countries and has a limited number of staff members who oversee these projects. The building of a systematic relation between local UN staff members and PBF on the substance of the projects might also prove helpful for feeding in the work of the UN as a whole.

The SOPs drafted by UNOPs jointly with CDNH helped to establish procedures for CDNH's operation and were useful according to their perspective. But, many adaptations were made as to better reflect their everyday reality. CDNH now is working with revised versions of the original SOPs that they did themselves, which is expected as reality is dynamic and changes are necessary.

During the implementation of the project, monitoring and reporting, gender and youth were considered. There were specific activities designed for women's participation (e.g. Women's Forum) and there was encouragement for women to take part in the meetings promoted by CDNH and there were the youth camps promoted by CDNH. The reports also included the work with the youth and the women.

In terms of PBF's global added value/niche, at the inception of the project it was considered as a high-risk initiative with much potential. It was a project centered on potential conflict with a focus on social tension in which there was a theory of change about how more research on the ground could help, doing public awareness and public raising to address the existing social tension. PBF saw it in the beginning as more direct and a good example of a project they wanted to do more of.

In this project, the UN found room to work with key actors in the country. The support of the UNRCO and the influence of OSASG were crucial at the time. The CDNH director wanted various kinds of information to go upwards.

In terms of PBF's portfolio, Myanmar is not one of their bigger investments. There was a perception from PFB that there were already many donors working in the country. PBF wanted to promote the engagement and discussion within the UN and to have the political dialogue and the development and humanitarian part working together and lay the groundwork for future engagement with the new government.

In that sense, the project fit well within this strategy, as it helped to mobilize various actors in what can be seen as one of CDNH's strongest features, which is the power of convening different actors to discuss the issues around Rakhine, communal violence and democratic transition. The project helped to gather various actors and foster dialogue on joined efforts around humanitarian efforts, development work, and political engagement. The UN Task force in Rakhine is moving towards more political engagement with the government and one of the Donors interviewed talked about the need of doing integrated work and mentioned the Solutions Alliance initiative which fosters the integration between humanitarian and development efforts.

As one of the Implementation Facilitators from the UN stated, "It is key to get the government and people from the country engaged". The CDNH project helped with that engagement and to promote the links between the national and international counterparts. The next step seems to forge stronger links with the current Union Government and at the same time help foster work on the ground with local CSOs as a way of reaching more people through trainings and awareness raising activities to promote a culture of diversity and tolerance.

PBF added value in terms of helping to provide Myanmar with information, analysis and dialogue which would help future work of all the international community in a new era in the development of the country.

5. Lessons Learned and Recommendations

This item will consider the major factors of success, challenges and good practices across programming and administration.

The major factors of success according to diverse stakeholders were based on: 1) Leadership; 2) Knowledge of the context; 3) Qualified staff; 3) Political momentum; 4) Extensive networking; 5) Listening to the people on the ground as subjects and building trust. These items are explored below:

1. **Leadership:** The director was the key person behind the project from the time of the Rakhine Investigation Commission when the project was conceived and had the support of the OSASG and UNRCO in Myanmar. He could develop an extensive network and mobilize people towards the need of producing information on Rakhine and the rest of the country, building EWER and promoting reconciliation meetings and trainings to deal with the communal violence in country. He could help build a bridge between the national government and the international community.
2. **Knowledge of the context:** Senior CDNH staff members came from previous work at the Myanmar Peace Centre, EGRESS (non-for-profit which promotes various trainings) and the Government. They had the connections and knowledge of what was happening in Myanmar from firsthand experience and they had previous engagement with the Peace Building process in the country. That experience was key to develop the work of CDNH. They also carried extensive research which gave them credibility and more in-depth knowledge of what was taking place on the ground.
3. **Qualified staff:** CDNH's staff has a diverse profile and come from various places. They are a mix of senior staff members, professionals with previous experience in think tanks and international members. They are a group of committed individuals who have been able to deliver the outputs of the project and work intensely to deliver products in often very tight schedules and adverse environments. There is a sense of pride in being part of CDNH.
4. **Political momentum:** The 2012 episodes of communal violence in Rakhine State took place in a time when the country was already opening and when there was increasing dialogue between the government and the OSASG in the country. CDNH was not born simply from an expert's idea, but came from a need posed by various actors - the Union Government, the UN and other members of the international community. It came to act in a place where there was a void in terms of action, which was information and dialogue between the communities to address communal violence in Rakhine State.
5. **Extensive networking:** CDNH worked with the State government, UN agencies, Donors, International NGOs, local CSOs, community leaders, religious leaders and various members of the community. Being from Myanmar and having good connections was key to help build that network which enabled the project to carry its activities. Myanmar is a country where rule of law is still in its infant stage, having the right connections and being from the right ethnic group is crucial to get the work done, especially on the ground.
6. **Listening to the people on the ground:** one of the Implementation Facilitators said that CDNH works with community members as subjects and not objects seen from

the outside. Being from Myanmar and having a profile of educators and researchers enabled CDNH to listen to community members and better understand what their needs were. CDNH played the role of the third party/mediator in putting the two communities together, something that would probably not happen without an external assistance.

There were also challenges, given the context of the project. The major challenges faced were mainly in: 1) Operations; 2) Suspicion on the ground; 3) Government change; 4) Instability of scenario; 4) Outbreak of violence in October 2016.

1. **Operations:** two of the donors interviewed and RUNO reported the challenges of CDNH accounting, reporting, estimating the cost and giving out information when requested (for planning trips, meetings etc.). Despite of these challenges, the project was able to deliver its outputs, but this gap in operations will have to be considered as the operation of CDNH expands. More complexity of work will demand a more refined management strategy.
2. **Suspicion on the ground:** the two communities initially met CDNH with much reservation, until some members of both communities took part in various activities and some of them became really fond of CDNH's work. This still represents a challenge, as the scenario of conflict is very sensitive.
3. **Government change:** CDNH was very close to the previous government. Just recently, the Chief Minister to Rakhine State changed. Operations continue despite of the changes in government, but there was at least a statement from a government official about some challenges with the relation in the new government. CDNH staff member who dealt with the State government also left the organization and was replaced by a new one. This relation will have to be monitored.
4. **Instability of scenario:** Rakhine is marked by violence and natural hazards. There were many changes in schedule of operations due to events which were out of control of CDNH. This did not pose a great threat to operations, but needed to be considered to have the work delivered.
5. **Outbreak of violence in October 2016:** the recent episode made the work scenario more difficult. It created violence on both sides. This was not expected and made the work of CDNH more difficult. Towards the end of the 2016, despite the extension of the contract to April 2017, the delivery of the project slowed down which may be partially due to the difficulties in the context.

Despite the challenges faced, outputs were delivered and helped to feed into the four outcomes of the project. There were many lessons learned from the project which are displayed below:

1. **The value of research as a way of inciting action:** Research in this case was very active as an intervention. It helped to identify gaps in the field and design new projects and initiatives. Support to action-linked research is useful when it is done under demand, when it comes with the political networking and dissemination for the right audience.
2. **Methodology for reconciliation meetings:** the project developed a methodology for reconciliation meetings based on their previous experience at the Myanmar Peace Center. CDNH made the communities talk to each other after listening to them separately and making a lot of preparation for them to come together. They also created much extra room for informal interaction between them. This was new in the context and helped to forge links between the communities.
3. **Reaching up and down:** the networking of the project reached high level authorities in the government and international community and also on the ground, something which was quite unique. There is a tendency of focusing on one level of stakeholders – either high level officials or communities on the ground. CDNH was able to work on trust building with both types of stakeholders.
4. **Creation of a space of dialogue:** CDNH convened various stakeholders for its dialogues, forums, presentation of research results. These meetings together with the EWER dissemination platform provided a space for interaction among different actors. There was a void of information before which was filled by CDNH and that helped to bring people together as a mapping of the situation was produced and demands were more clearly seen.
5. **Creation of UN Synergy in Headquarters and Myanmar:** the choice of PBF to support CDNH was strongly influenced by the UNRCO and OSASG endorsement of the project as the UN was moving towards stronger engagement with the government. PBF also had a vision of helping to promote the dialogue between the political side and the development efforts in the country. The project helped to do that as it helped to frame the policy landscape (by providing sound information of the context in Rakhine) and networked with high level government officials) and various UN agencies (UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA etc.).
6. **Joint donor efforts:** PBF played a crucial role in setting up CDNH, but the results it has achieved from its inception up to the end of 2016 also had the support of Denmark, Switzerland, Norway and the Peace Support Fund. Due to that pooled support, CDNH was able to mobilize more staff members and increase its operations. In that sense, these joined resources were important to increase the scale of the work and bring more value for money.

7. **Creating CDNH as a NGO:** this helped to ensure more political sustainability despite the change in government. As a NGO, CDNH enjoys more autonomy and can do its work more independently. MPC was closed in the new government and changed to be the National Reconciliation and Peace Center. Even though, PBF resources are still being used by the government with the same purpose, investing in non-state organizations might in some cases bring higher chances of continuity over time.

Given the factors of success, the challenges involved and the lessons learned, there are also many recommendations for the future of the project and the work of the UN in similar types of context. In this context, the recommendations are:

FOR THE CENTER OF DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL HARMONY (CDNH)

1. **Foster new leadership and strengthen CDNH as an organization:** one of the major assets of CDNH is its director, who leads the organization, has knowledge of the context and networks with the major actors in the country. While this is a great advantage, it also poses a risk for the organization to keep operating in his absence. Ideally, CDNH should be able to create a life of its own with other leaders being up front and supporting the director in his work. Good leaders ensure continuity of their work.
2. **Expand the trainings to government officials:** this was strongly demanded by beneficiaries in the field work. CDNH has done this in the project and more than one staff member expressed this will to move forward in that direction. As the country moves towards a new democratic period, training the police officers and government officials at all government levels will be crucial to help build a State which is based on universal human rights and inclusion as opposed to protection to certain ethnic groups.
3. **Document methodology, share and train local organizations to use it:** CDNH has developed several methodologies and tools to do their work (reconciliation meetings, trainings, EWER etc.). A demand from the ground was to have access to this methodology through books, CDs to duplicate at local organizations, meetings etc. This would be an efficient way of expanding CDNH's work and taking it to another level.
4. **Expand the support to local organizations:** There were many demands from the ground for CDNH to do more trainings, expand their work to other states and to go deeper in the community. A viable way to address that demand would be to empower the local organizations to do more things on their own, as they know what their needs are. Giving out more small grants might be an effective way of doing it combined with technical support.

5. **Enhance CDNH's coordination role:** CDNH has taken the role of gathering distinct groups around a common concern. There are many actors who recognize the convening power of CDNH. There is potential for CDNH to take that up, for example, through partnering more strongly with the UN in Rakhine to provide them with information and engaging in joined work. A possible space for that would be the weekly coordination meetings they have between the UN and international NGOs. Caution needs to be taken for the Rakhine not to take this move as a bias towards the Rohingya.
6. **Invest on professional management:** if CDNH is to expand its operations, it will have to evolve from an operational point of view to be able to handle more complex operations. Much has been developed through the two-year project time frame. Just recently, CDNH was being able to manage many simultaneous events. However, there is still feedback from the donors about the need of improving financial reporting, logistics etc.
7. **Further disseminate research outputs:** there is a hunger for information in Myanmar, as there is not much policy related research being produced in the country. Local conferences, 'lunch talks', 'coffee talks' promoted with some regularity might be possible ways of bringing people together and disseminating research outputs. There is demand in Yangon for this type of initiative.
8. **Develop a communication strategy:** CDNH has chosen to be low profile, do not disseminate much of its work due to its sensitive nature. However, as the work grows and CDNH gains more visibility, an active communication strategy will be necessary to promote the organization and to act in case of an eventual media crisis. The later will tend to increase as the organization becomes more popular (vis-a-vis the case of the Civic Education Books). The webpage could be revised to better show its research outputs and other activities. The Facebook page could also be enhanced.
9. **Feed into broader development strategies of the country:** there are many demands, the beneficiaries pose demands that go from infra-structure, education, health, security etc. and complain that the government is not active enough. UNDP has proposed a development strategy for Rakhine, the Kofi Annan report was well taken by the government and is aligned with many recommendations of the Rakhine Needs Assessment. There may be room for CDNH to foster a broader policy dialogue in Rakhine with the assistance of the UN.
10. **Invest in staff training:** some implementation partners suggested the need of training the trainers. As the organization expands its work, the staff will have to

be ready to another scale of operations and will have to improve their skills as trainers and managers. Investing in their education will be also key for the growth of CDNH.

11. **Fundraise for Research:** PBF focus is on peacebuilding activities, but there are many lines of funding in the international community specifically devoted for research that fosters development solutions (e.g. International Development Research Center and many others). This may also be a line of work for future fund raising.
12. **Review the results matrix and M&E efforts:** the matrix of the project contains many indicators which are difficult to monitor, such as the number of peaceful dialogues between the two communities. M&E efforts are not mainstreamed in the organization. They need to be taken up by the high administration of CDNH as to create a culture of results-based management that can ensure constant learning and improvement by operations and program team members.

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY

1. **Expand education efforts for Myanmar's transition:** the time is ripe to invest in education for the transition of Myanmar. The country is opening and youth need to be exposed to what the world is like. Education expands frontiers and enables people to see beyond their small box of ethnicity or religion. One of CDNH's director new initiatives is to open a College of Liberal Arts in the country. Fostering initiatives like this may be very timely for the new period in Myanmar's history. It is also time for new scholarships, international field visits and university cooperation projects. There is demand for capacity building in all areas and levels and investment in higher education is crucial to help in that process. For vocational training, technical cooperation with other countries may also be a possibility.
2. **Invest in other think tanks in the country (governmental and non-governmental):** As the country opens, it will be necessary to have more thinking towards the challenges of the country, beyond the peace building process. Areas such as engineering, urban planning, health, education are crucial and will need to be further explored according to the reality of Myanmar. New thinking will help to foster the building and reform of the institutions in place.

ANNEX I. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT (QUESTIONNAIRE)

The basic questionnaire is outlined below. However, it was adapted for each stakeholder to be interviewed. It was not used in its full format for all the individuals and groups interviewed.

A. Evaluation of overall effect/impact of project support to Myanmar's peacebuilding agenda

Relevance

- Considering the historical context of communal violence in Myanmar due to differences in religion and ethnicity, and the escalation of violence particularly between the Rakhine and the Rohingyas in Rakhine State, how relevant do you think it was to set up an organization like CDNH to work on research, training and Early Warning and Response System?
- To which extent did the project contribute to any broader strategic goals of the Government of Myanmar or the UN in Myanmar that you are familiar with?
- Do you think the focus of the project on religious leaders and the youth in Myanmar, and more particularly in the Rakhine State was appropriate?

Effectiveness/impact

- How effectively did the project achieve its intended outcomes:

In terms of Research:

- Were the reports produced by CDNH useful and reliable to understand the situation of conflict in Myanmar and have they helped with decision making in your organization?
- Were the reports produced by CDNH widely disseminated? How did you have access to them?

In terms of the Early Warning System:

- Is the Early Warning System in place?
- Has the EWS been able to help you/your Community to prevent violence? Please, give examples.

Training and mediation:

- Were the trainings and awareness raising activities (e.g. youth camps, conferences) able to foster the acceptance of religious differences among the participants and create productive dialogue? Please, give examples.
- To which extent did the mediation activities helped to bring the different communities (the Rakhine and the Rohingya/Muslims more broadly) together?

Public Recognition:

- How is CDNH perceived by you and different stakeholders in Myanmar (donors, local and international NGOs, government officials and beneficiaries)?

Project Coordination

- To which extent did the activities of the project complement each other and have a strategic coherent approach?

Sustainability

- To which extent is CDNH work sustainable, considering the commitment of the government (including financial) and other stakeholders to continue to support its activities?
- What were the unexpected results, partnerships and resources that came out of the project?
- What was the legacy the project left in terms of legal framework and impact that is deemed to be long standing (information availability, change of mentality and perception etc.)?

Efficiency

- How efficient was the implementation of the project, including the selection of Recipient UN Organization (RUNO), time used for different components and how significant were the transaction costs? Were the resources used within the timeframe expected?
- Why and how efficiently did the project take risks to achieve peacebuilding activities, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so?
- Overall, did the PBF investment in the project provide value for money and is this kind of investment (establishment of and operational support to a new institution) worthwhile?

Cross-Cutting:

- Gender: To which extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout the activities of CDNH?
- Youth: To which extent were youth involved in the effort to promote a culture of Peace in the activities of CDNH?
- Do no Harm: To which extent did the project design and implementation consider 'Do No Harm' considerations?

B. Evaluation of management and oversight structures in Myanmar

- To which extent did UNOPS collaborate with any other UN entities towards common objectives in this Project?
- How productive and intense was the relationship among the various members of the Project Board?
- How did the SOPs work in the implementation of the project?
- To which extent were gender and youth considered throughout not only in the project design but also during implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- To which extent did this project respond to PBF's global added value/niche?

C. Key lessons learned and recommendations

- What were the main programming factors of success (consider the work of CDNH on research, the Early Warning Early Response System and the training and mediation activities)?
- Thinking through the activities you have taken part: consuming the research, partnering with the training (or attending it), attending the youth camps or using the information from the Early Warning Early Response System: how do you think these activities could be improved?
- Thinking through the activities you have taken part in the Project, what do you think that worked really well and is quite unique about the work that CDNH does?

ANNEX II. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. Revised Reporting Modalities CDNA.pdf
2. Annex A TOR.pdf
3. Annex B Budget.pdf
4. Annex C.1 Reporting.pdf
5. Annex C.2 Financial Report Template.pdf
6. Annex D General Conditions.pdf
7. 20150226 CDNH Project Documents.pdf
8. 20150402 GSA CDNH UNOPS.pdf
9. UNOPS IRF 114 Result Framework.docx
10. PBF-IRF-114 -Annual Report 2015.docx
11. PBF-IRF-114 CDNH Half Yearly Progress Update (January- June,2015).pdf
12. CDNH-UNOPS Half Yearly NarrativeReport.pdf
13. CDNH-UNOPS Annual Report Template (Jan-Dec'16).docx
14. Annual Report (PBF-UNOPS) -17 Nov 16.docx
15. 20160613 IRF 114-CDNH Half Yearly Report.pdf
16. 20160610 PROJECT HALF YEARLY PROGRESS REPORT.docx
17. Work Completion Report Final 05072016.docx
18. Advisory-Commission-Interim Report (1).pdf
19. Rakhine Needs Assessment – Part I and II.pdf

ANNEX III. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

No.	Name	Organization
1	Mr. Peter Barwick	Peace and Development Advisor, UNRCO, Myanmar
2	Ms. Linnea Lindberg	Peace and Development Officer, UNRCO, Myanmar
3	Ms. Nicole Starkey	Education Analyst, UNESCO
4	Ms. Mariann Ruud Hagen	Former Senior Management & Evaluation specialist, RC Office, New York
5	Mr. U Maung Maung Ohm	Former Chief Minister of Rakhine
6	Mr. Nicholas George	Head, Programme, Communications and Partnership Unit, UNOPS Myanmar
7	Ms. Nilar Myint	Portfolio Associate ,UNOPS, Myanmar
8	Ms. Su Mon	Grant Management Officer, UNOPS, Myanmar
9	Ms. Thanzin Aung	Former Project Manager , UNOPS, Myanmar
10	Mr. Duncan Keith Wilson	Planning, Communications and Partnerships Advisor
11	Mr. Mandie Alexander	Director of UNICEF Office, Sittwe
12	Mr. Aung Myo Hein	Program Development Officer, Kann Let - Aus Aid Funded Program
13	Mr. Al Haj UAYe lwin	Chairman, IDB Scholarship Programme Implementation Committee Myanmar
14	Mr. Andreas Indregard	Director, Advisory Commission, Rakhine State
15	Ms. Nilar Oo	Deputy Country Representative, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue
16	Ms. Joanna Lauterjang Kelly	Center for Peacebuilding
17	Ms. Karen Simbulan	Independent Consultant, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies
18	Mr. Sunra Lambert	Outreach Expert, Rule of Law Centers
19	Mr. Ashin Pyin Nyaw Bha	Principal, Pann Pyoe Latt Monastic Education Center,Bago
20	Mr. Baptiste Millet	Peace Support Fund
21	Mr. Peter Lysholt Hansen	Ambassador, Embassy of Denmark , Myanmar
22	Ms. Claudie Haenni	Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland, Myanmar
23	Mr. Einar Rystad	Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Norway, Myanmar
24	Ms. Nan Ohnmar Than	Development Advisor, Embassy of Norway, Myanmar
25	Ms. Tammy Smith	Peacebuilding Support Office, New York
26	Mr. Brian Williams	Former PBSO staff member
27	Mr. Kyaw Yin Hlaing	Director, CDNH
28	Ms. Maude Morrison	EWS Project Manager, CDNH
29	Mr. Constant Courtin	Research Project Manager, CDNH
30	Mr. Ye Htut Win	HR Manager, CDNH
31	Ms. Nyo May Lwin	Senior Finance Manager, CDNH
32	Ms. Sandy Soe	M&E Manager, CDNH
33	Mr. Thang Cin Thawng	Senior Project Manager, CDNH
34	Ms. Win Thazin Htun	Chief Operation Manager, CDNH

35	Mr. Moe Win Aung	Project Manager, CDNH
No.	Name	Organization
36	Mr. Aung Naing Oo	Center for Peace and Reconciliation
37	Mr. Myat Thu Ya	Former CDNH staff , Sittwe
38	Mr. Win Tin	Member of Peace and Social Development Organization, Sittwe
39	Ms. May Thazin Tun	Member of Peace and Social Development Organization, Sittwe
40	Mr. Soe Latt	Member of Peace and Social Development Organization, Sittwe
41	Mr. Aung Khaing Soe	Member of Youth Association, Mrauk U
42	Mr. Ye Myint Myat	Member of Youth Association, Mrauk U
43	Mr. Moe Zaw Myint	Member of Youth Association, Mrauk U
44	Ms. Phyo Thet Wai	Member of Rakhine Women Network
45	Ms. Khine Khine Myint	Member of Rakhine Women Network
46	Mrs. Nyo Aye	Leader of Rakhine Women Network
47	Mrs. Wai Wai Htun	Member of Rakhine Women Network
48	Mrs. Hla May	Member of Rakhine Women Network
49	Ms. Saw Mya Thandar	Member of Rakhine Women Network
50	Mr. Khaing Ko Win	Member of Rakhine Social Network
51	Mr. Tun Aye Khine	Volunteer, Mrauk U
52	Mr. Aye Chan	Volunteer, Pauk Taw
53	Mr. Kyaw Hla Aung	Muslim Lawyer, Sittwe
54	Mr. Shwe Hla	Muslim Leader, Sittwe
55	Mr. Myo Win	Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
56	Mr. Noo Ho Siem	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
57	Mr. Aung Thein Han	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
58	Mr. Maung Maung	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
59	Mr. Tin Hlaing	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
60	Mr. Than Shwe	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
61	Mr. Mg Pecem	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
62	Mr. Khin Mg Myint	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
63	Mr. Zaw Moe Win	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
64	Mr. Kyaw Kyaw Htun	Member of Muslim Youth Network , Sittwe
65	Mr. Tin Sein	Leader of Htila Thukha Them Maggi Association, Meiktila
66	Mr. Khin Soe	Leader of Htila Thukha Them Maggi Association, Meiktila
67	Mr. San Win Shwe	Leader of Htila Thukha Them Maggi Association, Meiktila
68	Mr. Kyaw Soe Moe	Reporter, The Voice Daily Newsletter, Meiktila
69	Mr. Aung Thein	Advocate, P.R.C Network, Yamethin
70	Mr. Nay Win Aung	In charge of P.R.C Network, Yamethin
71	Ms. Thet Su Win	Member of National Harmony & Development Association, Pyawbwe
72	Ms. Ei Mon Win	Member of Multi-Religious Aid Association , Pyawbwe
73	Ms. Thi Thi Mar	In charge of P.R.C Network, Pyawbwe
74	Mrs. Lay Lay Naing	Leader of White Marker Group, Thazi

75	Ms. Aye Thiri Soe	Member of White Marker Group, Thazi
No.	Name	Organization
76	Ms. Phyu Phyu Aung	Member of White Marker Group, Thazi
77	Mr. Nay Ko Oo	Leader of National Harmony & Development Association, Thazi
78	Ms. Chaw Chaw Win	Member of National Harmony & Development Association, Thazi
79	Ms. Mon Mon Aung Thu	Member of National Harmony & Development Association, Thazi
80	Ms. Thwal Thwal Ko	Member of National Harmony & Development Association, Thazi

ANNEX IV. TERMS OF REFERENCE

Title: Rebidding for Project Evaluation for the Establishment of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH)

Project: The Establishment of the Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH)

Expected timeframe: 30 working days

1. Background information - UNOPS

UNOPS mission is to serve people in need by expanding the ability of the United Nations, governments and other partners to manage projects, infrastructure and procurement in a sustainable and efficient manner.

Within these three core areas of expertise, UNOPS provides its partners with advisory, implementation and transactional services, with projects ranging from building schools and hospitals, to procuring goods and services and training local personnel. UNOPS works closely with governments and communities to ensure increased economic, social and environmental sustainability for the projects we support, with a focus on developing national capacity.

Working in some of the world's most challenging environments, our vision is to advance sustainable implementation practices in development, humanitarian and peacebuilding contexts, always satisfying or surpassing partner expectations.

We employ more than 6,000 personnel and on behalf of our partners create thousands more work opportunities in local communities. Through our headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark and a network of offices, we oversee activities in more than 80 countries.

Background information – Myanmar

UNOPS Myanmar develops, supports, and oversees a portfolio of programmes and projects in Myanmar which focus on post-disaster recovery, health and food security programmes. UNOPS Myanmar ensures that synergies between programmes and projects are effectively developed. UNOPS is also expanding its infrastructure, procurement and technical assistance services in Myanmar.

The UNOPS Myanmar portfolio currently includes fund management of the multi-donor Three Millennium Development Goal Fund (3MDG), Joint Peace Fund (JPF) and the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT). In addition, UNOPS is the Principal Recipient of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria grants to Myanmar (PR-GFATM).

UNOPS Myanmar plays a critical role in ensuring quality services to UNOPS' partners that meet stringent requirements of speed, efficiency and cost effectiveness. It is also responsible for liaison with government counterparts, donors, UN Agencies and other development partners.

Background information – Project Specific

Myanmar continues to vigorously pursue its peace process with ethnic armed groups as a critical component of national reconciliation and the political transition taking place. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has supported Government efforts to dedicate resources to the complex process. In July 2013, Myanmar was declared formally eligible to access funding of the PBF. To date, PBF has supported six projects in Myanmar totalling USD 7.8 million. Between 2012 and 2013, PBF approved funding for four peacebuilding projects designed to build confidence in the peace process, contribute to security sector reform and promote peaceful coexistence between Myanmar's diverse ethnic and religious groups. In 2015, the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) approved a project to support the newly established Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH). PBSO also approved a project to support the implementation of the Joint Action Plan signed between the Government and the UN Country Task Force to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw as well as to support their reintegration into their communities.

CDNH is an independent non-governmental organization established with an overall objective to enhance social harmonization, peaceful coexistence and mitigation of violence in Myanmar. CDNH builds on the research capacity and the community networks of many of the researchers and field staff who were involved in the investigation, data collection and preparation of reports on communal violence that occurred in Rakhine state. CDNH carries out its activities by establishing working relationships at both the coordination and policy levels with relevant governmental agencies, strengthening ties with local communities and people on the ground, and partnering with functioning networks of effective trainers.

CDNH's core programs include: research in social harmony and the political process across every state and region in Myanmar; training in civic education orientated around promoting peace through diversity, tolerance and enhancing knowledge on human rights; training on anti-human trafficking; and an Early Warning and Early Response team that works with CDNH's networks across the country. The head office for CDNH is in Yangon, where around 60 staff work. The Centre also has two field offices, one in Maungdaw, and one in Sittwe in Rakhine State. CDNH conducts training on human trafficking awareness etc. in areas where social disharmony and communal violence are highest while carrying out research nationwide. The PBF has provided over USD 2.5 million towards the establishment of CDNH, and more than USD 300,000 has been received from the Government of Norway to support their activities.

2. Purpose and Scope of Assignment

The Project Evaluation Team Leader will work under the direct supervision of the Portfolio Associate, UNOPS Myanmar and lead the project final evaluation as per the TOR. The incumbent will work in collaboration with national consultant(s) to complete the project evaluation. He/She will act as the overall team leader, responsible for methodology, quality assurance and reporting writing. It is the bidder's responsibility to recruit, pay and supervise the national consultant(s) who will act as interpreter and assist the Team Leader in drafting written outputs, organizing and facilitating or conducting interviews and making logistical arrangements etc. as may be required. The Team Leader is also responsible for making his/her own as well as the team's travel arrangements while UNOPS

can assist with any documentation required for visa etc. upon request. CDNH will also provide support in terms of coordinating with their field-based staff to arrange meetings in alternative locations where there are no imminent security threats.

The project final evaluation will consider the overall performance of the project as well as inform PBF's strategic decision-making regarding its investment and the overall project design, approval and implementation process.

At the outset, the evaluation team should review the analysis which underpinned the request for and approval of funding for this project, including any theories of change that framed the programming logic of the project. The evaluation team should propose, where necessary, suggestions for improvement or strengthening the existing theory of change. Similarly, the evaluation team should review the existing results framework to identify any gaps, particularly those related to missing information in the project monitoring system, and address how these gaps can be filled.

Structurally, the evaluation can be broken down into the following three components:

A. Evaluation of overall effect/ impact of project support to Myanmar's peacebuilding agenda

The evaluation will examine the progress with establishment of CDNH and the effect of each of CDNH's programmes, in order to assess its overall contribution to the building and consolidation of peace in Myanmar.

The broad questions to be answered are based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria and the UN Evaluation Group standards (including those on gender mainstreaming), which have been adapted to the context at hand as follows (these questions should be used as a guidance and may be expanded, added to or condensed by the evaluation team for maximum readability and clarity of the report):

Relevance:

- How relevant was the projects design and outcomes to peacebuilding in Myanmar and to the UN's added value in this area?
- To what extent did the project contribute to any broader strategic goals of the Government of Myanmar or the UN in Myanmar?
- To what extent was the 'theory of change' for the project coherent to the needs on the ground?
- Did the project target the right beneficiaries and geographic zones?
- To what extent did the project help address women's, girls' and youth' concerns, needs or attitudes regarding peace and the peace process, and did the theory of change address sufficiently gender equality and participation of youth?

Effectiveness/ impact:

- How effectively did the project achieve its intended outcomes? Please support with evidence and consider for each of the four intended project outcomes, i.e.:
Outcome 1: Enhanced comprehension of the current situation of violence, its nature, the local context and trends through systematic information gathering and research

Outcome 2: The mitigation of risks is enhanced and responses to threats of social violence are improved through the setting up and maintenance of an early warning system.

Outcome 3: Local capacities for conflict resolution are enhanced and acceptance of differences through public outreach, awareness raising and training is increased and a growing constituency for social harmony is created and fostered.

Outcome 4: CDNH is recognised as an effective institution for reducing community tensions in Myanmar and its continued existence is assured

Project coordination:

- To what extent did the sub-projects complement each other and have a strategic coherent approach?

Sustainability:

- To what extent can the results of the project be sustainable, taking into account the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders?
- What, if any, catalytic effects did the project have (financial and non-financial)?
- Did the project have an Exist Strategy and has is it been implemented?

Efficiency:

- How efficient was the implementation of the project, including the selection of Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), time used for different components and number of sub-projects and how significant were the transaction costs?
- How fast and responsive has the PBF been to supporting peacebuilding priorities in Myanmar in response to the requests from the UN Resident Coordinator?
- Why and how efficiently did the project take risks to achieve peacebuilding objectives, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so?
- Overall, did the PBF investment in the project provide value for money and is this kind of investment (establishment of and operational support to a new institution) worthwhile?

Cross-cutting:

Gender:

- To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout the PBF support to Myanmar?

Youth:

- To what extent were youth involved in the effort to promote a culture of peace?

Do No Harm:

- To what extent did the project design and implementation take into account Do No Harm considerations?

B. Evaluation of management and oversight structures in Myanmar

The evaluation will examine the management of this project in order to comment on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of arrangements. This should include the funding, programming and decision-making arrangements between all the actors. Some questions to be examined by the evaluation may include:

- How effectively and efficiently did the individual RUNOs implement the projects?
- To what extent did UNOPS collaborate with any other UN entities towards common objectives?
- Who was responsible for overall strategic management/ oversight of the project and did they get sufficient information to enable them to do so?
- How effective and efficient was the process for monitoring and compiling half yearly and annual reviews, and reports and what was the quality of those reports?
- What were the risk management and context assessment systems like?
- To what extent were gender and youth considered throughout not only in the project design but also during implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- To what extent did this project respond to PBF's global added value/ niche?

C. Key lessons learned and recommendations

The evaluation should provide an overview of key lessons and recommendations based on the assessment of the project results. Where possible, lessons should be made general and phrased in a way that can be used to strengthen future PBF programming in other countries. The lessons and recommendations should contain:

- the main programming factors of success;
- the main programming challenges;
- the main implementation/ administration factors of success;
- the main implementation/ administration challenges;
- Good practices and recommendations to address the challenges.

The major lessons and recommendations should come out clearly in the evaluation Executive Summary.

3. Monitoring and Progress Control

The project final evaluation will be summative, and will employ, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/ verify the substance of the findings through documentary evidence and existing data analysis. Reports should outline a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how different forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information.

The Team Leader is encouraged to employ innovative approaches to data collection and analysis. Reports should specify the role of each of the methodological approaches in helping to address each of the evaluation questions. The methodologies for data collection may include but not limited to:

- Rigorous desk review of documentation supplied by the RUNO and PBSO/PBF (also available through MTFO Gateway website), including: the project documents, correspondence on the initial allocation decision and subsequent project implementation and project reports. The evaluation should build on existing assessments or reviews of the PBF activities that have been initiated by the participating UN agencies. These include CDNH's own reports, reports

- published by organisation working on human trafficking, communal violence and social harmony and any relevant conflict analysis work in Myanmar.
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with all major stakeholders (partners and beneficiaries including PBSO/PBF and MPTF-O in New York, and the UN Resident Coordinator’s office, relevant UN agencies, implementing agencies, the Government, CDNH, a sample of individual beneficiaries, other development and peacebuilding partners in Myanmar). Beneficiaries should represent diverse groups, including women and youth from different ethnic groups and social-economic statuses. Proposals should clearly indicate how interview and focus group discussion data will be captured, coded and analyzed.
 - Systematic review of monitoring data from the RUNOs and other key sources;
 - On-site field visits and interviews of relevant PBF-funded project.
 - Survey of key stakeholders, if relevant. This might include a survey of those involved in the project within the UN or the Government, or a final perception survey of beneficiaries to capture results from the last phase of work.

In addition, the Team Leader should obtain end of project and end of program data and feedback from stakeholders to review, organize and potentially fill some gaps with regards to monitoring and baseline data for the indicators.

The Team Leader will directly report to the Reference Group. The Reference Group will be composed of the representatives from UNOPS, CDNH, PBSO and RCO (the Peace and Development Advisor) who will ensure the following.

- Efficient execution and follow-up on tasks as per the scope of responsibilities detailed above.
- Use of technology and electronic systems and tools to initiate work and share information with colleagues and clients.
- Proactive interaction with colleagues and clients to exchange information and feedback on requests in an effective and efficient manner.
- Demonstrate behaviour of professional and personal ethics, transparency and openness to encourage respect and similar behaviour from colleagues in the workplace.
- Updated, informative, clear and concrete documents are submitted on time.
- Efficiency and Effectiveness in handling important correspondence.

The tentative schedule of the evaluation is expected to be as follows:

#	TASK/ SCHEDULE
1	Scoping exercise: preliminary document review, teleconferences/ meetings with RCO, RUNO and CDNH in Myanmar and reference group, and write up of inception report for RUNO’s approval.
2	Field mission, including travel and interviews with all key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, site visits and surveys.
3	Analysis and preparation of draft report and its presentation to the RC and RUNO team in Myanmar and reference group for validation
4	Review time by the reference group (approx. 5 working days)
5	Finalizing of report following comments

The team leader is required to finalize the work plan and methodology and incorporate into the inception report.

4. Final Product/Deliverables

The team leader is responsible for the timely provision and quality of all evaluation deliverables. Their approval will be based on OECD DAC and UNEG standards for evaluations, tailored for the specific purposes of peacebuilding evaluations. Required language for each deliverable is noted in the schedule below.

Milestone	Content
Introduction Meeting	<p>Based on the TORs, the Project Evaluation Team Leader will present and discuss the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - key evaluation questions and methodological tools for answering each question; - list of key risks and risk management strategies for the evaluation; - stakeholder analysis; - proposed work plan for the field mission - table of contents for the evaluation report - strategies in addressing perceived challenges
Field Research	<p>Two regions to be visited for the field research Rakhine State (Kyauk Phyu, Ramree and Sittwe) Mandalay Region (Meikhtila , Thazi, West Bago)</p> <p>The evaluation team may select one location in each of the above two regions to take some sample data and information in consultation with CDNH/UNOPS.</p>
Meetings in Yangon	<p>Meetings with 4 religious organizations, NGOs, HD, Embassies (Norway, Denmark and Swiss), RCO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA, Rakhine Affairs Minister</p>
Inception/ Draft report	<p>The draft report will have a maximum of 40 pages, plus an Executive Summary and annexes.</p> <p>The draft report will be reviewed by the RUNO and the evaluation report and they will provide a consolidated matrix of comments which should be formally addressed in the final report.</p>
Presentation of the Draft report	<p>Draft report will be presented to the reference group for feedback and discussion.</p>
Final report	<p>The final report will have a maximum of 40 pages plus Executive summary, title page and annexes.</p> <p>The team leader will be responsible for ensuring that comments from the RUNO are formally addressed.</p> <p>The final report will include all the annexes. It will also have a five- to seven- page Executive Summary outlining key findings on successes and challenges, and recommendations, which can be used as a stand-alone document.</p>

	<p>The final report will be evidence based and will respond to all the questions in the Inception Report with clear and succinct lessons learned and targeted recommendations.</p> <p>Following acceptance of the final report, the RUNO will coordinate a management response to the evaluation report as a separate document.</p>
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5. Duration

The deadline for submission of final report after incorporating all the comments from the Reference Group is 21st April, 2017.

6. Qualifications

Project Evaluation Team Leader

a. Education

- A Master's degree in social/political sciences, economics, development studies, international affairs, project/programme management- or other related field is required.
- A combination of Bachelor's Degree with 2 additional years of work experience may be accepted in lieu of Master's Degree or equivalent.

b. Experience and Skill

- A minimum of 7 years of progressively responsible programme implementation and management with increasing independence and decision-making authority experience with international organisations or related experience is required.
- At least 7 years of experiences covering a range of the priority sectors relevant to this project, including peacebuilding, conflict management, human rights, migration, multi-faith based work, and ethnic conflict is required.
- At least 7 years of evaluation experience with strong methodological skills in quantitative and qualitative analysis, with a preference for some experience in post-conflict/peacebuilding evaluation.
- Prior experience working with governments and NGOs in developing countries would be highly advantageous.
- Prior experience working in Myanmar and with Myanmar government institutions is desired.
- Strong project management skills are required with multiple roles involving team leadership is desired.
- Strong communication and interpersonal skills are desired.
- Experience in the usage of computers and office software packages (MS Office 2010 and/or newer versions) is required.

c. Language

- Fluency in English is essential (must be able to effectively communicate in both oral and written form).

6. Key Competencies

Leadership - Provides others with a clear direction; motivates and empowers others; recruits staff of a high calibre; provides staff with development opportunities and coaching; sets appropriate standards of behaviour.

Integrity & Accountability – Ability to take ownership for all responsibilities and honours commitments and deliver quality output within prescribed time frame. Consistently approaches work with energy and a positive, constructive attitude. Remains calm, in control and good humoured even under pressure.

Respect for Diversity – Proven ability to relate to people from diverse backgrounds and cultures.

Creativity and Innovation – Ability to challenge mind-sets and think outside the box, as well as improvise in dynamic situations. Ability to exhibit original and innovative thinking in his/her work.

Professionalism – Ability to conduct independent research and analysis, identify issues, and recommend solutions; proven analytical skills. Familiarity with UN and UNOPS rules, regulations and policies. Ability to work systematically, accurately and under pressure.

Planning and organising - Ability to establish priorities and to plan, coordinate and monitor own work plan to meet the deadlines and those under his/her supervision.

Result-oriented - Ability to focus on the result for the clients and respond positively to feedback.

Client orientation - Ability to identify clients' needs and appropriate solutions; ability to establish and maintain productive partnerships with clients.

Communication - Proven ability to write in a clear and concise manner and to communicate effectively orally.

Teamwork - Strong interpersonal skills and; ability to establish and maintain effective working relations with people in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

Analysing Skills – Ability to make rational judgments for the available information and analysis and probe for further information or greater understanding of a problem and present with alternative options.

Self- reliant - Ability to act independently with a minimum of supervision. Specific assignments may be reviewed while in progress; however the majority is reviewed on completion. Routine duties are performed independently.

Technological awareness - Excellent computer skills and ability to use software tools to present data clearly and concisely; Good working knowledge of MS Office applications including proficiency in Excel, Spread sheets & Database Software.