



Chad: Breaking the Cycle of Farmer-Herder Violence

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What's new? Farmer-herder conflict in Chad has reached unprecedented levels during the political transition following the former president's death in 2021, leaving more than 1,000 people dead and more than 2,000 injured. This violence is exacerbating the country's perceived north-south divide.

Why does it matter? A growing number of cattle owners are from the north. The sedentary populations of the south and centre see the northerners as protected by the central authorities, fuelling resentment. The farmers' grievances, sharpened by May's disputed presidential election, could lead them to take the law into their own hands.

What should be done? President Mahamat Déby should make resolution of farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term. His government should provide security and impartial justice in the affected areas, involving residents in mediation efforts to help restore their confidence in the authorities.

I. Overview

The southern and central provinces of Chad have seen some 100 clashes between sedentary farmers and groups of herders in the last three years, with the country undergoing a political transition following the death of the long-time president, Idriss Déby Itno. The violence has left more than 1,000 people dead and over 2,000 injured, also exacerbating food insecurity in the affected regions and the country's perceived north-south divide. Driven by identity-based demands, the multi-faceted conflict continues to intensify, with some groups of pastoralists now taking up automatic rifles. If left unchecked, the intercommunal strife could lead farmers to form militias, which would risk widening the divisions among Chadians even further. The current president, Mahamat Déby Itno, should make resolving farmer-herder conflicts a priority. He should rapidly introduce measures to curb the use of firearms and prevent the emergence of self-defence militias. He should also support initiatives to prosecute perpetrators and facilitate conflict mediation, enlisting the aid of community representatives.

On 6 May, Mahamat Déby won 61 per cent of the vote in a presidential election marred by numerous irregularities, ending a three-year transitional period. A junta had installed him at the country's helm in April 2021, after his father Idriss, who had held power for three decades (1990-2021), died. After first opening political space for

the opposition and convening a national dialogue, the transitional government reversed course, launching a bloody crackdown in October 2022 on demonstrators demanding the return of civilian rule. More than 100 people were killed in the protests and several opposition figures went into exile.

When the transition began, many people in the south, who make up around 60 per cent of Chad's population, pressed for change at the top of the state, which had been dominated since the 1980s by northern elites, particularly from the Zaghawa (to whom both Débys, father and son, belong), Gorane and Arab ethnic groups. Such a change, southerners hoped, would bring greater autonomy for Chad's various regions or even be a first step toward federalism. The southerners also saw an opportunity to put an end to what they perceived as the clannish and nepotistic practices by which northerners exercised a monopoly on the state apparatus.

But the transitional authorities did not move in this direction. The new constitution, approved by referendum in December 2023, kept a unitary, centralised model for the state, though the revised basic law introduced a small measure of decentralisation. None of the three southerners appointed as prime minister during the transition – Albert Pahimi Padacké, Saleh Kebzabo and Succès Masra – did much to address the grievances of their communities of origin. Nor did any of them serve as a counter-balance in a power structure whose political and administrative personnel were still overwhelmingly from northern Chad.

The resulting grievances have deepened the sense of abandonment felt by the population in the south and centre of the country, helping fuel conflict between farmers and herders. Unlike in other Sahelian and central African countries, the Chadian state plays a leading role in the livestock industry, the second-biggest pillar of the national economy after oil. Since the 2000s, representatives of the administrative and military authorities in the north have personally owned herds of cattle in the south. To protect the herds, they have hired drovers who, believing that state power is on their side, have used armed force in disputes with the sedentary population. Under Mahamat Déby, the number of cattle owners from the north has continued to increase, as has the number of weapons supplied to the cowhands, especially from the neighbouring Central African Republic. Farmers in the south and centre have thus come to believe that the northern elites used the transition to strengthen their grip on the state apparatus at the local level, including through violence.

In 2022, the central government introduced well-publicised but largely inadequate measures in response to rising violence. Government delegations made whirlwind visits to southern and central locales after clashes to facilitate mediation between farmers and herders and removed administrative and military authorities from hotspots to prevent further incidents. But the state has not sent the security and judicial reinforcements demanded by the local population. More importantly, it has failed to redress its own perceived bias in adjudicating disputes between farmers and herders.

These shortcomings have contributed to turning a regional problem into a national one. The February 2022 events in Sandana, a village in southern Chad's Moyen-Chari province, are the most significant example. In that month, armed herdsman killed thirteen people in Sandana, triggering a wave of protest across the country, with participants accusing the central authorities of protecting the assailants. Social media played a key role in mobilising public opinion.

The persistence of farmer-herder violence could increase the temptation for sedentary populations in the south and centre of Chad to take the law into their own hands. In recent years, following each major outbreak of violence, many of these people have called for forming self-defence militias, particularly on social media. Far from bringing peace, such groups would risk perpetuating a cycle of intercommunal violence in these regions and further dividing Chadian society.

President Mahamat Déby should tackle the problems underlying farmer-herder conflict head on. He should seek governance and justice reform to restore the confidence of southern and central populations in the central state. He should also discourage both farmers and herders from enforcing rough justice of their own. To this end, the government could encourage reactivation of the *Comités d'entente mixtes*, which proved effective in reducing clashes in the 1990s. Bringing together community representatives, these committees could enable organisation of mediation sessions at which the conflict parties can negotiate agreements. They could also make it possible to publicise reports of incidents to push the judicial authorities to prosecute troublemakers. Finally, it is essential that security forces step up patrols to prevent further violence and discourage certain groups of herders from forming permanent armed gangs.

II. An Unprecedented Wave of Farmer-Herder Conflict

A. The Origins of Tensions

Rising farmer-herder violence in the south and centre of Chad is the result of decades of built-up tensions between sedentary populations and certain groups of herders, fuelled by the political exploitation of identity-based discourses, an unequal distribution of resources and the effects of climate change.¹

After oil, animal husbandry is the second pillar of Chad's economy. In 2021, the country had more than 30 million head of cattle.² The largely informal livestock sector accounted for around 30 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and 35 per cent of its exports in 2022.³ The Arabs and the Goranes, who remain largely nomadic, the Fulani and the Hausa are the main ethnic groups in Chad who depend

¹ Chad is affected by several intercommunal conflicts and other types of violence. This briefing focuses solely on farmer-herder conflict. Southern ethnic groups include the Sara, the Mayo-Kebbi and Tandjilé. Groups in central Chad include the Mubi and Hadjarai. Ethnic groups engaged in herding include Arabs, the Hausa and the Fulani, as well as a few Gorane in the south. Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, March 2023; Chadian transhumance specialist, N'Djamena, January 2024.

² According to the World Bank, Chad's livestock population comprised 30,612,461 head of cattle and 74,656,361 head of small ruminants (goats and sheep) in 2019. "Report on Marketing Opportunities for Livestock and Livestock products", World Bank, February 2022.

³ Livestock exports from Chad are destined mainly for coastal West Africa. "Rapport sur les opportunités de commercialisation du bétail et de leurs produits", World Bank, February 2022. "Projet d'appui à la productivité et à la compétitivité des chaînes de valeur viande et lait au Tchad (PAPCV-VL), Rapport d'évaluation", African Development Bank, 2021.

on livestock for their livelihoods.⁴ The Fulani and Hausa, however, rely on others to move their livestock from pasture to pasture, as they have become sedentary or semi-sedentary. Sedentary populations also often own livestock, which they use for agricultural work.

Like many other intercommunal conflicts in Chad, tensions between herders and sedentary populations stem from the civil strife of the 1970s and 1980s. During these internal wars, Chad's political and military leaders exploited cultural, ethnic and regional affiliations to rally supporters.⁵ The practice of appointing people to political and military posts on an ethnic basis – a remnant of this period – has contributed to growing resentment among southern and central populations. These groups feel excluded from circles with influence over the central government; in their view, these circles have been dominated by northerners for four decades.⁶

Since the 2000s, prefects and governors with a stake in the livestock industry have been appointed through ethnic and kinship ties. On several occasions, these regional authorities have mobilised the national armed forces to support groups of herders or their hired drovers in disputes with sedentary populations, undermining farmers' trust in the government and blurring the lines between these pastoralists and the state.⁷

These practices have proliferated during the transition after Idriss Déby's death, as his son Mahamat, now the elected president, has consolidated the existing patronage system and strengthened his grip on power, especially within the army.⁸ Over the past two years, it has become common for state officials to sell administrative or military posts to wealthy herd owners, giving the latter considerable state power and fuelling tensions. Meanwhile, the number of senior government officials who have bought herds as personal investments has also increased.⁹

Climate change is another driving force behind farmer-herder violence in the region, which has felt the effects of global warming since the 1970s and 1980s. With more frequent extreme weather events, particularly droughts and floods, grazing areas in the country's north have shrunk, forcing pastoralists to move into what is called the Sudanian zone, the southerly savannah where most Chadians live (as well

⁴ Most herders live in the provinces of Batha, Chari Baguirmi, Guéra, Salamat and Wadi Fira. In the twentieth century, Fulani cattle herders from northern Cameroon and Fulani and Hausa from Nigeria also arrived in Chad's south west.

⁵ The civil wars in Chad in the 1970s and 1980s had a devastating effect on the country. President François Tombalbaye was assassinated in 1975, leading to a military coup. The next government, led by General Félix Malloum, faced an uprising by the FROLINAT rebel group. In 1979, a peace conference in Nigeria led to the establishment of a transitional government, but violence between factions continued. Hissène Habré took power in 1982 and repressed his opponents. Conflict with Libya also intensified, culminating in the "Toyota war" of 1987, when Chadian forces managed to repel Libyan troops who had invaded the country.

⁶ Crisis Group interviews, anthropologist and political scientist, N'Djamena, March 2024.

⁷ "Administration du territoire : le Premier ministre rappelle à l'ordre pour les nominations des gouverneurs, préfets et sous-préfets", *Tchad Infos*, 1 July 2022. Investigations into the Sandana events revealed that the weapons and ammunition used by the herders came from military garrisons. "Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana", Commission d'Enquête sur les événements de Sandana, September 2022. Crisis Group interview, senior civil servant, southern Chad, 6 October 2023.

⁸ "Une nomination en haut-lieu qui fait scandale au Tchad", *Deutsche Welle*, 5 January 2023. "Tchad : après le départ de nombreux généraux, une vague de nominations à la tête de l'armée", *RFI*, 28 June 2023.

⁹ Crisis Group interviews, anthropologist and political scientist, N'Djamena, March 2024.

as in the country's centre).¹⁰ As a result of this migration, herds have sometimes destroyed fields and, in turn, farmers have killed livestock. Meanwhile, state initiatives to promote good land management have failed to reconcile agricultural and pastoral interests in a balanced way.¹¹

These hostilities are occurring amid growing impoverishment in southern Chad, with some regions of the south now among the country's poorest areas.¹² A major cotton-producing region, the south began suffering in the early 2000s, due to falling international cotton prices. Access to resources such as land and water got even more difficult as tens of thousands of refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR) arrived following that country's 2013 coup d'état. All of Chad went through an unprecedented economic crisis in 2016, with the dip in global oil prices, exacerbating the precarious position of people in the south.¹³

B. Unprecedented Violence

Between 2021 and mid-2024, farmer-herder conflict in southern and central Chad killed at least 1,230 people and injured more than 2,200.¹⁴ Some incidents left a particular mark, prompting people to express outrage on social media. One of these cases was the Sandana attack (Moyen-Chari province) in February 2022, in which armed herders killed thirteen villagers in a single day.¹⁵ In September of the same year, in the Lac-Iro department (Moyen-Chari province), between nineteen and 30 people were killed in a three-day conflict between herders and farmers.¹⁶ The same month, in Mangalmé (Guéra province), in central Chad, observers reported around 100 deaths

¹⁰ "Tchad : au moins six morts dans les affrontements entre éleveurs et agriculteurs dans le sud du pays", RFI, 5 July 2024. "Chad: Population Density", MapAction, 2020.

¹¹ The debate over the Code of Pastoralism, which began in the 2000s, is a striking example. After the National Assembly adopted the Code in 2014, it sparked fierce controversy among southern elites, who considered it too favourable to pastoralists, forcing President Idriss Déby to abrogate the law. Since then, the debate has reopened only slowly as farmer-herder conflict grows more complex. In early 2024, the Multi-Stakeholder Committee for the Monitoring of Land Policy Development and the Review of the Draft Land Code – set up in 2022 following the national dialogue held at the beginning of the political transition – adopted the Priority Action Plan for National Land Policy, stressing the urgent need to adapt the legal and regulatory framework to customary practices. "Tchad : Un projet de Code pastoral très controversé sur la table de l'Assemblée nationale", Inter-réseaux développement rural, 12 November 2014. "Tchad : Validation du Plan d'action prioritaire de la mise en œuvre de la Politique foncière nationale", *Journal Le Pays*, 6 March 2024.

¹² "Tchad : Évaluation de la pauvreté", World Bank, 2021.

¹³ "Privé de sa rente pétrolière, le Tchad s'enfoncé dans la crise", *Le Monde*, 26 May 2017.

¹⁴ Crisis Group estimate, based on UN data published between 2021 and 2024. "Aperçue des conflits intercommunautaires", UN OCHA. "Chad: intercommunity clashes have left more than 500 people dead since the beginning of the year", UN, 16 November 2022. According to data from the Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines (CRASH), a think-tank based in N'Djamena, this type of conflict caused 270 deaths in 2021, more than 300 in 2022 and more than 150 in 2023.

¹⁵ The Sandana events caused strong reactions online and fuelled demonstrations across the country. Women played a prominent role, marching naked to express their anger at the government. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°183, *Chad's Transition: Easing Tensions Online*, 13 December 2022.

¹⁶ "Tchad : le bilan monte à 19 morts et 22 blessés dans les violences de Lac-Iro (procureur de Sarh)", *Alwihda Info*, 18 September 2022.

in clashes.¹⁷ In the spring of 2023, violence in several towns in the Logone Oriental province, in Chad's far south, left almost 40 people dead.¹⁸ Although the number of incidents decreased during the latest dry season, between October 2023 and May 2024, the fear of new clashes is still preventing displaced people from returning, thus disrupting agriculture.¹⁹

According to sedentary people, this violence is unprecedented, both in terms of its triggers and its targets. Coming after decades of festering resentment between the two communities, recent attacks have often been set off by minor incidents.²⁰ Moreover, while the perpetrators have traditionally directed most of the violence at men, who are generally perceived as a threat, they are now also going after women (including some who are pregnant) and children, sometimes with extreme brutality.²¹ Images of an infant shot in the head during clashes in the Monts de Lam department (Logone Oriental province) went viral among Chadians on social media, causing a considerable stir.²²

The conflict has also resulted in a great deal of material damage, with perpetrators doing such things as stealing livestock, looting shops and burning houses.²³ According to farmers interviewed by Crisis Group, the destruction of food stocks is also without parallel. As a resident of Kouyako, in the country's south, said, "The burning, even of granaries and fields, is something I've never seen before in this kind of conflict. If you're fighting someone and they're destroying your food stocks, then they really want to get rid of you and your family".²⁴

The conflict stems from deep-rooted prejudices. Rural dwellers interviewed by Crisis Group, for example, believe that the attacks are part of a plan orchestrated by northerners in collaboration with certain groups of herders to "exterminate" them and "appropriate their land".²⁵ Herders say they are also victims of the conflict. The nomadic herders, who are facing increasing difficulties in feeding their animals, accuse sedentary populations of indiscriminate acts of revenge, such as poisoning live-

¹⁷ "Tchad : les ressortissants du Guera annoncent plus de 100 morts dans les violences de Mangalmé", *Alwihda Info*, 3 October 2022.

¹⁸ "Tchad : 22 morts dans les violences dans le département des Monts de Lam", *Alwihda Info*, 18 April 2023. "Au Tchad, 17 morts dans l'attaque d'un village proche de la Centrafrique", *Jeune Afrique*, 12 May 2023.

¹⁹ Crisis Group telephone interview, Chadian researcher, May 2024.

²⁰ In Mangalmé, for example, the conflict started with a dispute over a toy snatched from a Moubi child by Arab children. Crisis Group interview, head of a local human rights association, Goré, July 2023.

²¹ Assailants have used knives or guns (some loaded with homemade bullets), such as in the villages of Dogoro, Bendjago and Dangnda (Logone Oriental province) in April 2023. Crisis Group interview, resident, Kouyako, March 2023.

²² "Au Tchad, 17 morts dans l'attaque d'un village proche de la Centrafrique", *op. cit.*

²³ The villages of Djowe and Bebolo in the canton of Balé (Lac-Iro department), for example, were ransacked and set on fire, with 243 hectares of surrounding fields ruined.

²⁴ Crisis Group interview, resident, Kouyako, March 2023. Similar damage was observed in the Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental and Guéra provinces. "Rapport d'enquête sur les événements de Sandana", Commission d'Enquête sur les événements de Sandana, September 2022.

²⁵ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, March 2023.

stock.²⁶ For their part, sedentary herders are somewhat caught in the middle. They emphasise their lengthy coexistence with farmers. They resent being lumped together with the nomads by sedentary people, who sometimes attack them, forcing them to take up arms, too, if only to protect themselves.²⁷ The Fulani settled in Chad describe themselves as peaceful. They criticise Arab herders for eschewing dialogue to resolve disputes and for receiving support from the army and the state.²⁸

Certain groups of herders and cowhands have adopted a new *modus operandi*, using more sophisticated weapons and planning increasingly elaborate attacks, according to farmers and other rural dwellers.²⁹ Their confrontations with farmers often involve coordination among several villages and herders' camps, also known as *ferricks*, whose denizens join forces for the duration of the attack.³⁰

Little is known about these armed groups' chain of command, but they seem to rely on smartphones for communication and motorbikes for transport, judging by how quickly they mobilise and strike.³¹ Their agility allows them to disperse easily after attacks, making it difficult for security forces to pursue them. After the September 2022 clashes in the Lac-Iro department, local sources said, most of the attackers disappeared while headed toward Bamingui-Bangoran, a prefecture in northern CAR bordering Chad.³²

The lethality of herder-farmer conflict is soaring due to the use of heavier weapons. Although some attackers are still wielding bladed weapons, more and more are carrying hunting rifles, as well as military-grade firearms like Kalashnikovs. Several factors explain the availability of guns.³³ Herders who have lived in southern Chad for a long time say the majority of assailants using firearms are recent arrivals, particularly from CAR, where some of the armed groups active since the 2013 coup have ethnic links with Chadian herders.³⁴ Also, the Central African army and its allies launched

²⁶ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, March 2023; Fulani chief, Danamadji, October 2023.

²⁷ Crisis Group interview, *ferrick* chief, Larmanaye, September 2023.

²⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Fulani chief, Danamadji, October 2023; Fulani herders, Danamadji sub-prefecture, October 2023.

²⁹ Crisis Group interviews, administrative official, Sarh, October 2023; Chadian herders, Danamadji sub-prefecture, October 2023.

³⁰ In the Lac-Iro department, more than ten villages in five different cantons (Begoula, Koskobo, Balé, Ganga and Singako) were attacked and looted over six days from 12-19 September 2022. In Mangalmé, four villages (Djandjol, Wagga, Bardé and Araka) in the sub-prefectures of Mangalmé and Kouka were attacked over three days from 30 September to 1 October 2022. In Sandana, *ferrick* residents from the cantons of Bekamba (Mandoul province), Djeke-Djeke (Moyen-Chari province) and Bedaya (Mandoul province) were reportedly involved in the attacks, in addition to those from Koumogo canton.

³¹ Crisis Group interview, head of human rights association's local branch, Goré, July 2023. Peter Fuchs, "Nomadic Society, Civil War and the State in Chad", *Nomadic Peoples*, no. 38 (1996), p. 153.

³² Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo, March 2023; president of Association pour la Résolution des Conflits Agriculteurs Éleveurs, N'Djamena, August 2023.

³³ Witnesses described the use of knives, assegais, spears, machetes and bows. Kalashnikovs are also called *gana-point* by residents. In the Lac-Iro department, the use of weapons other than Kalashnikovs was reported in the canton of Koskobo, although interviewees were unable to specify which. Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo, March 2023.

³⁴ Crisis Group interviews, *ferrick* chief, Larmanaye, September 2023.

an offensive in 2021, weakening these armed groups, some of which have since withdrawn to southern Chad, facilitating the sale and circulation of the guns.

C. *The Spectre of Self-defence Militias*

The rising farmer-herder conflict – and its exploitation for political ends – have angered sedentary populations. They are increasingly vocal about the need to set up militias for communal defence, believing that the authorities have neither the means nor the will to protect them.³⁵

While such groups are not widespread in Chad, they are not new, either. In the 1980s, for example, southerners formed militias called Codos in response to the violence of Hissène Habré's regime (1982-1990). In the public sphere today, a discourse on identity similar to what those militias used has re-emerged.³⁶

These ideas are circulating on social media, particularly on Facebook and in WhatsApp discussion groups.³⁷ After the May 2023 clashes in the Guéra province and Lac-Iro department, for example, multimedia messages appeared on WhatsApp, encouraging young men in the south to take up arms to counterbalance the armed herders' power. One message said: "Young people, wake up and defend your country before it's too late. Support your brothers who have decided to take up arms to defend you".³⁸

Most of the calls for armed struggle have come from the Chadian diaspora, where many opposition figures from the south live, using conspiracy theories to appeal to an audience of jobless young men.³⁹ To gain visibility, some of these figures have also linked Chad's conflict to the war that has been devastating Sudan since April 2023, claiming that the ruling elite is pursuing a strategy of "Arab colonisation of black Africa".⁴⁰ Although the calls to arms have not yet led to mass mobilisation, they are taking root with each violent incident.

Even if these messages are few, they sometimes lend farmer-herder conflict a sectarian dimension, as many of the former are Christians and many of the latter Muslims. There have been attacks on mosques, which rural dwellers may see as a sign that more herders who are now nomadic or semi-nomadic desire to settle. In Moroumgoulaye (Mandoul province), for example, herders stole cattle from farmers, provoking the wrath of residents, a group of whom killed five herders and set fire to a mosque in retaliation.⁴¹

³⁵ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, March 2023.

³⁶ "Tchad : 22 morts dans les violences dans le département des Monts de Lam", *Alwihda Info*, 18 April 2023. "Chronology for Southerners in Chad", Minorities at Risk Project, 2004.

³⁷ Crisis Group interview, CRASH researcher, N'Djamena, September 2023. See also Crisis Group Briefing, *Chad's Transition: Easing Tensions Online*, op. cit.

³⁸ Videos shared on WhatsApp in May and June 2023 and viewed by Crisis Group.

³⁹ Crisis Group interview, opposition party executive, N'Djamena, January 2024.

⁴⁰ Crisis Group has listened to audio recordings circulating on WhatsApp following the bloody clashes in the Guéra province in August 2023. Chadians of non-Arab ethnicity can be heard calling on "black people" to prevent Arabs from massacring people in the south, especially after the mass killings of non-Arab people by the Arab-identified paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Darfur, Sudan.

⁴¹ Radio FM Liberté, 30 December 2023.

D. Major Humanitarian and Socio-economic Consequences

The violence in southern and central Chad has seriously worsened the socio-economic situation of an already impoverished region. In the Lac-Iro (Moyen-Chari province) and Nya Pendé (Logone Oriental province) departments, the clashes have displaced masses of people, particularly to the towns of Kyabé, Donia and Goré, where the security forces can provide them with greater protection.

In March 2023, some 26,700 people were forced to flee their villages and seek refuge in Goré, according to the NGO Caritas, which has several branches working in Chad.⁴² Many of them remain displaced elsewhere in the country or across the border in CAR. Catholic Relief Services and Caritas Germany, with the help of foreign governments and UN agencies such as UNICEF, distributed food and household supplies at the time of the displacement, but the uprooted people also need assistance with return, as well as psycho-social support.⁴³

Humanitarian organisations further reduced the limited emergency response when the Sudanese crisis started in April 2023, redirecting their resources to the east of Chad, where most of the people displaced by the war in neighbouring Sudan are now residing.⁴⁴

Finally, farmer-herder conflict is exacerbating food insecurity in the affected areas, as the fear of fresh attacks among sedentary populations has impeded agriculture, which has often been reduced to family gardening.⁴⁵ Conditions are particularly difficult for the poor and vulnerable. In September 2022, for example, at least 3,000 people, mainly women, children and elderly, were forced to seek refuge in the town of Kyabé in the Lac-Iro department. To get there, they had walked for several days in the middle of the rainy season, with many suffering from hunger and malaria. A number of elderly men and women reportedly died on the way from exhaustion and lack of food.⁴⁶

III. An Inadequate State Response

With central and southern Chad facing the risk of escalating violence between herders and farmers, the state's response has so far been inadequate. Politicians are exploiting the communal tensions to gain support, which, combined with the worsening socio-economic crisis, risks polarising the country along the perceived north-south divide. That would be a big step backward, as the recommendations of the October 2022 na-

⁴² Crisis Group interviews, Caritas staff, Goré, October 2023.

⁴³ Only a limited number of displaced people returned home after the violence, for instance to Koskobo (Lac-Iro) and Don (Nya Pendé). Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo, March 2023; Caritas staff, Goré, October 2023.

⁴⁴ Since April 2023, the conflict in Sudan has forced almost 600,000 people to flee to Chad. "Des milliers de réfugiés soudanais sont bloqués aux frontières du Tchad en raison de pénuries de financements, alors que les premières pluies arrivent", UNHCR, 28 May 2024.

⁴⁵ As of April, 648,457 people of 4.5 million were food insecure. "Aperçu de la situation humanitaire au Tchad", OCHA, May 2024. "Chad: Summary of key components of FEWS NET's June/July analyses in relation to conflict and climate shocks", FEWS NET, 1 August 2023.

⁴⁶ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo, March 2023.

tional dialogue clearly link the country's main problems to poor governance and maldistribution of resources.⁴⁷

A. *Exploitation by Politicians*

The Chadian state's response to farmer-herder violence is closely tied to socio-political dynamics in the country since the 1970s civil war. This conflict fragmented public authority along regional and religious lines, opening rifts between two large groups, one amalgamating northerners, Muslims and Arabic speakers and the other southerners, Christians and Francophones. When Idriss Déby Itno, the current president's father, seized power in 1990, the country was deeply divided.

At the time, civil society groups were working to resolve internal conflicts, including those pitting farmers against herders, to promote national reconciliation. Taking advantage of the democratic openings in many African countries, these groups were encouraging bottom-up means of conflict management and resolution. In the 1990s, the state and traditional authorities joined forces with civil society to set up *Comités d'entente mixtes*, bringing together representatives of the communities involved in the violence. These committees helped to significantly reduce the frequency and intensity of attacks in the 1990s.⁴⁸

In the 2000s, however, these local mechanisms weakened as Idriss Déby gradually centralised authority in his own hands and the ruling elite monopolised state assets. The herders' power was reinforced by their tribal and economic links with senior members of the civil service, judiciary and army. Southerners began to think of the state as the exclusive property of a few ethnic groups, associated with the northern regions and with Islam.⁴⁹

The political transition that began after Idriss Déby's death in 2021 could have been an opportunity to make far-reaching reforms. In the transition's early months, Mahamat Déby showed signs of democratic openness, initiating discussions with the opposition and civil society and promising a national dialogue on institutional reform.⁵⁰

In practice, however, this dialogue, initiated in August 2022, dashed any hope of democratic political change. When the transition began, the African Union (AU) did not suspend Chad's membership (as it has normally done in cases of unconstitutional changes of power) on the condition that no transitional leader would stand in the presidential election at the end. But Mahamat Déby gave no guarantee that he would respect this condition. The main opposition leaders, including Succès Masra's Les Transformateurs party, therefore refused to participate in the dialogue. Although the

⁴⁷ This briefing focuses on parts of Chad where violence is more frequent and politically exploited. "Mécanismes de fonctionnement des contenus haineux sur les réseaux sociaux au Tchad", CRASH, April 2023. "Le Dialogue National au Tchad se termine dans un contexte d'incertitudes pour la transition", U.S. Institute of Peace, 12 October 2022.

⁴⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Caritas staff, Goré, October 2023. Many contributors to a 2006 colloquium on conflict management highlighted the fact that clashes had diminished in the 2000s. "Les religions et la violence: cas du Tchad", Centre d'Études et de Formation pour le Développement, 2019. "Mécanismes de Prévention et de Gestion Des Conflits au Tchad", *Afrique Contemporaine*, vol. 274, no. 2 (2022).

⁴⁹ Crisis Group interviews, youth association leaders in Lac-Iro department, Kyabé, October 2023.

⁵⁰ Enrica Picco and Charles Bouëssel, "Chad: Averting the Risk of Post-Transition Instability", Crisis Group Commentary, 3 May 2024.

dialogue provided space to discuss the country's major issues, its recommendations granted the transitional leaders, including the younger Déby, the right to run for president. On 20 October 2022, following this decision, thousands demonstrated in the streets of N'Djamena and several provincial towns, particularly in the south, attacking public buildings. The security forces cracked down heavily, killing 128 and arresting more than 900. Afterward, most opposition figures opted to remain silent, go into exile (as Masra did) or join the government.⁵¹

Subsequently, opposition figures from the south exploited the farmer-herder conflict to support their identitarian discourse. Armed struggle and secession dominated the discourse of the exiled opposition leader Masra. In February 2023, in a video broadcast live on Facebook and watched by more than 5,000 people, he spoke of the difficulty of reconciling the "herds of the north" and the "peanut fields of the south", using a metaphor that reduced the complex issues of national cohesion to a north-south duality.⁵²

Grievances about governance and lack of representation in the transitional bodies further tore Chad's social fabric. In January, Masra was appointed prime minister, leaving a large part of the southern population feeling betrayed. Masra had negotiated his return from exile without involving other opposition forces. He agreed to lead a government whose key ministers came from Mahamat Déby's party.⁵³

The May presidential election, which candidates from the south demanded be annulled due to irregularities, fuelled discontent among much of Chad's population, to which the ruling elite reacted by deploying the army across the country.⁵⁴ The new government is made up entirely of members of President Déby's own party or the supporting coalition, meaning that it is unlikely to bring the country together.⁵⁵

B. *Insufficient Security and Judicial Response*

Although the transitional authorities have taken mediation initiatives, along with security and administrative measures, to stem the surge of farmer-herder conflict, their response has been insufficient to break the cycle of violence.

After each major attack, the government has sent a delegation, usually led by the provincial governor or, in some cases, ministers from N'Djamena, on a whirlwind visit to show sympathy for the victims and provide them with financial support.⁵⁶ These delegations have enjoyed wide publicity and, when possible, brought the con-

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Speech by Succès Masra on Facebook, 11 February 2023.

⁵³ Picco and Bouëssel, "Chad: Averting the Risk of Post-Transition Instability", op. cit.

⁵⁴ The election's credibility was undermined by the ruling elite's grip on electoral institutions, the state's refusal to accredit nearly 3,000 independent observers and the arrest of 79 supporters of Masra's party, who were trying to document the vote. Mahamat Déby won with 61 per cent of the vote. "Présidentielle au Tchad : l'Union européenne déplore la mise à l'écart d'observateurs", *Le Monde*, 8 May 2024. "Présidentielle au Tchad : deux candidats déposent un recours et contestent les résultats", RFI, 15 May 2024. "Élection présidentielle au Tchad : la victoire de Mahamat Idriss Déby validée par le Conseil constitutionnel", *Le Monde*, 17 May 2024.

⁵⁵ "Tchad : un nouveau gouvernement restreint mais ressemblant au précédent", RFI, 27 May 2024.

⁵⁶ Crisis Group telephone interviews, residents and traditional authorities of Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, July-August 2023. "Tchad : le gouverneur du Moyen-Chari met de l'ordre dans le Lac Iro", *Alwihda Info*, 2 November 2022.

flict parties together with the aim of quickly reaching a reconciliation agreement.⁵⁷ At the same time, the authorities have reinforced the security apparatus in certain places and removed several local officials for failing to prevent the violence.⁵⁸

Rural dwellers interviewed by Crisis Group considered these responses inadequate in several respects.⁵⁹ First, the mediation agreements signed in the aftermath of violence have not addressed the roots of the disputes, such as resource sharing among communities and the impunity perpetrators often enjoy.⁶⁰ Despite conflict parties agreeing to “make peace” when government representatives visit, the violence will persist absent efforts to tackle its structural causes. In Sandana, clashes like those in 2019 recurred in 2022, while in Mangalmé, clashes like those in 2022 happened again the following year.⁶¹ In Andoum, in the Monts de Lam department, the April 2023 violence resumed immediately after the security forces and administrative authorities had passed through.⁶²

Secondly, military reinforcements have often been delayed and too few to apprehend the perpetrators and prevent further attacks.⁶³ After the 2022 clashes in the Lac-Iro department, for example, the authorities sent only twelve soldiers to the canton of Koskobo, which comprises 42 villages and more than 100 *ferricks* spread over a wide area.⁶⁴ In some cases, residents complained of abuses or partiality on the security forces’ part.⁶⁵ Although the authorities have sent strong conciliatory signals, eg, by replacing certain administrative and military personnel, their measures have not eased tensions. In Mangalmé, attacks resumed only a few months after the governor and head gendarme were dismissed.⁶⁶

⁵⁷ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia, Koskobo and Sandana, March 2023.

⁵⁸ “Tchad : le Gouverneur du moyen Chari relevé de ses fonctions”, *Nouvelles.td*, 5 October 2022; “Guéra : le ministre de l’Administration installe le nouveau gouverneur”, *Tchad Infos*, 7 April 2023.

⁵⁹ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo and Logone Orientale, March 2023.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ See “Tchad : une mission gouvernementale à Sandana après un massacre”, RFI, 13 February 2022; “Guéra : Un conflit agriculteurs-éleveurs fait un mort à Djondjol près de Mangalmé”, *Tchad Infos*, 9 August 2022; and “Tchad: Un nouvel affrontement à Mangalmé ce dimanche”, *Alwihda Info*, 20 August 2023.

⁶² Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Logone Oriental, March 2023.

⁶³ Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Bessao, Donia and Koskobo, March 2023.

⁶⁴ The population of *ferricks* varies between 30 and 200. Crisis Group interviews, residents and traditional authorities, Koskobo, March 2023.

⁶⁵ A report by one local group said the villages of Dogoro, Bendjago, Mempon and Dangnda in the canton of Ngadjibian “were victims of attacks by herders and misconduct by security forces”. “Rapport de mission suite aux massacres des populations des cantons Ngadjibian et Bessao”, Collectif des Associations du Département des Monts de Lam, April 2023.

⁶⁶ In Mangalmé, in the Guéra province, the governor and head gendarme were removed from office in March 2023, but clashes resumed in June 2023. “Tchad : couvre-feu dans le centre après de nouveaux affrontements éleveurs et agriculteurs”, RFI, 16 June 2023. The Moyen-Chari province is probably the only exception, with a temporary drop in violence between October 2022 and January 2024 following the appointment of General Ousman Brahim Djouma as governor. Crisis Group telephone interview, member of Lac-Iro youth association, 26 March 2024.

In 2021, the state established a Joint Disarmament Coordination to counter the proliferation of firearms in the country, but so far, its efforts to collect weapons have failed to curb herder-farmer violence.⁶⁷ The body, comprising elements of the national gendarmerie, the nomadic guard and the national army, has confiscated some 6,000 weapons across the country since its creation. At the same time, however, the growing tensions in the southern and central regions have exacerbated intercommunal mistrust, making all parties increasingly reluctant to disarm.⁶⁸

The sedentary rural dwellers who spoke with Crisis Group said they felt a sense of injustice. Although it can be difficult for the justice system to establish individual responsibility when organised gangs attack, these people accuse the authorities of negligence, as they say the perpetrators are easily identifiable. For example, when the police arrested suspects in the 2022 Sandana atrocities, some victims recognised men who they said had been involved in 2019 violence but never brought to justice.⁶⁹

Even when the judicial authorities initiate proceedings, enforcing the law is often difficult because of the patronage system. In the Sandana case, the prosecutor at the Sarh District Court publicised an attempt to bribe him to release the suspects.⁷⁰ Such cases tend to reinforce suspicions of judicial bias and fuel mistrust of the authorities' stated intention to fight impunity – even if, in this case, the prosecutor's transparency points to an unbiased judiciary.

Finally, the Chadian authorities appear to be taking advantage of the insecurity in CAR to shift responsibility for the violence. In April 2023, following massacres in the Monts de Lam department, the authorities blamed bandits from CAR and threatened military intervention in the neighbouring country.⁷¹ The following month, Chad's army launched an operation in north-western CAR's Ouham-Pendé prefecture, arresting at least 50 men, after an agreement with Bangui whose details have remained secret. Central African civil society denounced the operation as a violation of national sovereignty and condemned the Chadian soldiers' violence.⁷² These operations, which have been going on for several months in various prefectures in CAR's north, risk exacerbating tensions between Central African rural dwellers and Chadian herders, who are often associated with the Chadian army, without addressing the conflict's root causes.⁷³

⁶⁷ The Joint Disarmament Coordination was created by presidential decree in July 2021. Its remit was to recover all illegally held weapons and to bring to justice any owner of such arms within two months of its launch. "Tchad : opération de désarmement, les défis persistants de l'insécurité", *Alwihda Info*, 25 May 2023.

⁶⁸ Crisis Group telephone interview, Chadian researcher, May 2024.

⁶⁹ "Tchad : cinq auteurs présumés de la tuerie de Sandana arrêtés", *Alwihda Info*, 15 February 2022.

⁷⁰ "Tchad : le procureur Wambel Assoucia dénonce une tentative de corruption", VOA Afrique, 15 June 2023.

⁷¹ "Tchad : Au moins 20 morts dans des affrontements au Logone Oriental", TRT Afrika, 19 April 2023.

⁷² According to Paul-Crescent Beninga, spokesman for the Civil Society Working Group, speaking on Radio Ndeke Luka in CAR's capital Bangui on 28 April 2023.

⁷³ Crisis Group interview, general director, Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Élevage, Bangui, 20 June 2023.

IV. Breaking the Cycle of Farmer-Herder Violence

The post-electoral period will be crucial for preventing the divisions in Chadian society from deepening to the degree that they threaten the country's stability. Farmer-herder conflict is a major factor in the perceived north-south divide and, therefore, a national security issue. Mahamat Déby, who shortly after his victory presented himself as the "president of all Chadians", should translate his words into action and make resolving farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term.⁷⁴ Should he do so, he would help create social peace conducive to developing the agriculture and livestock sector, which provides a livelihood for millions of people in the country.

To break the cycle of farmer-herder violence, the Chadian authorities should address the longstanding grievances linked to the country's clientelist system, which has persisted – and even become further entrenched – during the transition, despite promises of reform. If taken quickly, these measures, on the political, security and socio-economic levels, will help reduce the risk that sedentary populations will take the law into their own hands and prevent ethno-political divisions between farmers and herders from worsening.

A. A Committed State Response

On the political front, President Mahamat Déby should adopt the recommendations of the national dialogue he initiated. Regarding national reconciliation, these recommendations call for a fairer and more equitable distribution of the country's resources and propose laying the foundations of a reformed Chadian state by putting an end to "impunity" and "tribalism".⁷⁵

President Déby could begin by making the system for appointing administrative, judicial and military authorities more transparent and representative, using criteria based on experience and competence rather than ethnicity. To this end, appointment decrees could include a summary of the appointee's career, highlighting what makes the person suitable for the new post. As per the revised December 2023 constitution, President Déby should also ensure that local elections, scheduled for December, take place so that Chadians can elect their own governors, who are now appointed by the head of state.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ "Je suis le président de tous les Tchadiens" (Général Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno)", APA News, 10 May 2024.

⁷⁵ Cross-cutting recommendation 3: "Promote respect for human dignity by putting an end to impunity, tribalism, nepotism and favouritism in all their forms". Cross-cutting recommendation 4: "Ensure a fair and equitable distribution of national resources". Présidium du Dialogue Nationale Inclusif et Souverain, "Synthèse générale des recommandations et des résolutions des assises du Dialogue Nationale Inclusif et Souverain", October 2002. As part of the Multi-Stakeholder Committee for the Monitoring of Land Policy Development and the Review of the Draft Land Code, traditional chiefs have played a particularly active role in resolving herder-farmer conflict. "Tchad : Un projet de Code pastoral très controversé sur la table de l'Assemblée nationale", Inter-réseaux Développement rural, 12 November 2014. "Tchad : Validation du Plan d'action prioritaire de la mise en œuvre de la Politique foncière nationale", *Journal Le Pays*, 6 March 2024.

⁷⁶ "Tchad : l'adoption de la nouvelle Constitution est validée", Deutsche Welle, 28 December 2023.

In addition, instead of highly publicised flash visits, civil and military authorities should go on more regular missions to rural areas riven by conflict, keeping the locals as frequently informed as possible of initiatives to investigate attacks and prevent further violence. This approach would help demonstrate that the authorities are fully committed to being proactive in resolving farmer-herder conflict.

At the same time, the Chadian authorities should step up efforts to reconcile the communities involved and swiftly address the sense of injustice among those affected by the violence. The authorities could opt to reactivate the *Comités d'entente mixtes* set up in the 1990s.⁷⁷ These committees could act as mediators between the conflict parties, organising meetings to reach agreement on resource sharing and avoid new confrontations. Testimonies gathered through this mediation could also help improve fact-finding during criminal investigations. By publicising their reports – while protecting their sources – these committees could also encourage the courts to take up cases, including those involving perpetrators close to the authorities. Such measures could pave the way for better understanding between the state and citizens.

The administrative and traditional authorities, as well as civil society groups, should ensure that these committees include an equal number of men and women. It is important that women, having been targeted in the recent wave of violence, are able to testify to the abuses and prejudices they have suffered and have a say in the mediation agreement.

Measures to prevent farmer-herder violence from being exploited for political ends, especially online, are also needed to mitigate the risk of communal militias emerging. As Crisis Group recommended in 2022, Chad's international partners, such as the European Union, should provide technical and financial support to develop an independent online media environment.⁷⁸ Given that citizens mainly express grievances through private chats such as WhatsApp, local journalistic initiatives could involve Chadians in verifying the information circulating on this application. These programs could use social media to deconstruct the narratives emerging from private groups, thereby encouraging civic mobilisation.

B. Taking More Appropriate Security Measures

In areas where attacks have occurred, security forces need better reinforcement, adapted in terms of numbers and quality to protect the most vulnerable populations and prosecute the perpetrators. For example, the authorities should increase army patrols in the most affected rural areas. They should also deploy police as quickly as possible to investigate crimes. Members of the security forces should also receive clear instructions from their superiors to treat the affected communities impartially and with due regard to the repeated trauma they have suffered.

⁷⁷ A circular note from the minister of territorial administration and decentralisation, Limane Mahamat, shows that the authorities are moving toward this type of solution. The note refers to the creation of "local multi-stakeholder consultation frameworks to enable the negotiation and conclusion of social agreements for the implementation of customary and administrative mechanisms regulating transhumance, as well as traditional conflict prevention and management mechanisms to promote the proper use of space and the schedule of herd movements". Circular note n.001 PR/PM/MATD/CAB/24, 5 June 2024.

⁷⁸ Picco and Bouëssel, "Chad: Averting the Risk of Post-Transition Instability", op. cit.

To prevent groups of herders from forming armed gangs, two sets of measures are needed. First, local authorities should set up early-warning systems among their constituents to identify militias that may be mobilising in the *ferricks* before these groups take action. Crisis Group's interviews show that many herders do not participate in the violence, but suffer its harsh consequences, particularly due to indiscriminate reprisals from farmers and others. It may therefore be in their interest to work with the authorities to prevent attacks.

Secondly, to stop the proliferation of firearms, the government should strengthen the Joint Disarmament Coordination. It should expand this body to include members of the conflict-affected communities, in addition to the security forces, enabling them to participate in searching for and confiscating weapons. It should also liaise with Central African authorities to intercept arms being smuggled across the border.

Finally, the Chadian authorities should work to head off possible tensions with CAR. N'Djamena and Bangui recently decided to reopen the border between the two countries, which has been closed since May 2014, after the Chadian army, deployed in CAR as part of the AU peacekeeping mission, was accused of violence against civilians.⁷⁹ To this end, President Déby should make public the contents of his military cooperation agreements with Bangui, authorising Chad to combat Chadian troublemakers in Central African territory. Understanding the Chadian army's mandate in CAR will enable Central Africans living near the Chadian border to know the rules and limits of military operations and, in principle, hold Chadian officers accountable for any violations. In the medium term, this measure will also help stop tensions between the two countries from rising again.

C. *Supporting Sustainable Socio-economic Initiatives*

On the socio-economic front, the Chadian authorities should back up the emergency measures taken in the aftermath of the violence with more sustainable initiatives, including with regard to land governance. These initiatives should be multi-sectoral, involving herders (nomadic, semi-nomadic and sedentary) and farmers. Destruction of food stocks and disruption of agriculture also require solutions that go beyond one-off financial compensation.

To prevent food crises, humanitarian agencies, particularly the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization, should support the authorities in setting up programs to meet the urgent needs of the population and help farmers prepare for the planting season.

Although the Sudanese refugee crisis might hamper efforts to mobilise humanitarian assistance for southern and central Chad, it is important that these regions do not feel neglected and benefit from some of the aid.

⁷⁹ "Le Tchad ferme sa frontière avec la RCA pour des raisons sécuritaires", RFI, 13 May 2014. "Le poste frontière de Sido entre le Tchad et la Centrafrique réouvre après 10 ans de fermeture", RFI, 25 May 2024.


V. Conclusion

Farmer-herder conflict has afflicted southern and central Chad for decades, but the associated violence has soared in recent years. The growing tensions stem from resentment between sedentary populations and certain groups of herders, fuelled by the effects of climate change, inequitable resource distribution and the political exploitation of identity markers. The three-year transition following the elder Déby's death, which raised hopes of reform after years of impunity and rule by patronage, has only exacerbated the antagonism.

Without adequate responses from N'Djamena, herder-farmer conflict will continue to fuel a cycle of violence that could further exacerbate the country's perceived north-south divide and threaten its stability. With the return to constitutional order, Chad can reverse this trend. But ad hoc measures to resolve disputes and prevent new ones will not be enough. To turn the page on the past, the government will need to take steps ensuring that agriculture and livestock management are transparent and giving Chadian society a voice therein.

Nairobi/Brussels, 23 August 2024

Appendix A: Map of Key Incidents of Herder-Farmer Conflict in Southern and Central Chad, 2021-2024



Appendix B: Timeline of Key Incidents of Herder-Farmer Conflict in Southern and Central Chad, 2021-2024

31 May 2021

Village of Doh (south)

A group of farmers attacked the village of Doh, 60km from Kumra (Mandoul province), killing five people and injuring eighteen others.

7 August 2021

Village of Boulala (centre)

A group of Arab herders attacked the Boulala farmers over land located 15km from Bokoro (Hadjer-Lamis province). At least 21 people were killed and twenty injured.

20 August 2021

Village of Tiyo (centre)

Farmers and herders clashed in Tiyo, 40km from Abéché (Ouaddaï province) due to a land dispute. Six people were killed and several injured.

19 September 2021

Villages of Tiyo, Kidji and Mina (centre)

Arab herders and farmers clashed in the villages of Tiyo, Kidji and Mina, near Abéché (Ouaddaï province), due to a land dispute. At least 27 people were killed and four injured.

22-23 November 2021

Village of Narambanga (south)

Clashes broke out between farmers and herders in the village of Narambanga, near Bekamba (Mandoul province). Four people were killed and several injured.

23 November 2021

Village of Deli (south west)

Armed farmers and herders clashed near the village of Deli (Logone Occidental province). At least three people were killed.

23 December 2021

Villages of Bitra and Touka (centre)

Boulala farmers and Arab herders clashed after cattle destroyed farmland in the village of Bitra (Batha province), leaving at least three people dead and eleven injured. On the same day, a confrontation between farmers and herders left three people dead and eleven injured in the village of Touka (Batha province).

5-6 January 2022

Canton of Koldaga (south)

A clash between farmers and herders, linked to the destruction of fields, killed seven people in the canton of Koldaga (Mandoul province). On 5 January, violence left three people dead and one injured. The following day, reprisals led to four deaths and the burning of houses and crops.

31 January 2022

Village of Liman (south)

A violent confrontation between herders and farmers left one dead and several injured in the village of Liman (Logone Oriental province).

8 February 2022

Village of Sandana (south)

A clash between herders and farmers in the village of Sandana (Moyen-Chari province) killed at least fifteen people.

7 June 2022

Village of Berem (south west)

Choa Arabs from the villages of Malia and Toukouroumaye clashed over a land dispute in the village of Berem (Mayo-Kebbi East province). Five people were injured.

7 July 2022

Canton of Leo (south west)

Violence broke out between farmers and herders in the canton of Leo (Mayo-Kebbi East province), leaving at least three people dead and many others injured.

7 August 2022

Canton of Leo (south west)

More clashes between farmers and herders in the canton of Leo (Mayo-Kebbi East province) left at least four people dead. Several houses were burnt down.

9-11 August 2022

Village of Djondjol (centre)

A clash broke out between farmers and herders in the village of Djondjol, about 30km from the town of Mangalmé (Guéra province). Nine people were killed and several injured.

12-14 September 2022

Village of Singako (south)

Nineteen people were killed and 22 injured in violence in the village of Singako (Moyen-Chari province).

30 September 2022

Village of Kouka (centre)

Intercommunal violence resulted in the deaths of more than 30 people in the village of Kouka, near Mangalmé (Guéra province).

1 October 2022

Village of Araka (centre)

Violent clashes between farmers and herders in the village of Araka (Guéra province) left eight people dead and fourteen injured, four of them seriously.

15 December 2022

Canton of Niellim (south)

A confrontation between farmers and herders in the canton of Niellim (Moyen-Chari province) left five people dead and many others injured.

30 January 2023

Village of Dokotchi (centre)

Arab herders and Kouka farmers clashed in the village of Dokotchi (Batha province). Two people were killed and several others injured.

18-19 April 2023

Village of Danda (south)

An altercation between farmers and herders in the village of Danda (Logone Oriental province) resulted in two dead and two injured. Village militias intervened. At least 22 people were killed in the subsequent clashes.

7-8 May 2023

Canton of Beka (south)

Assailants believed to be herders murdered fifteen people and wounded six others in two villages in the canton of Beka (Logone Oriental province).

26 May 2023

Village of Bara 2 (south)

In the village of Bara 2 (Mandoul province), a confrontation between farmers and herders killed eleven people (ten farmers and one herder).

10-14 June 2022

Town of Mangalmé (centre)

In the town of Mangalmé (Guéra province), tensions erupted after four people were killed by armed men believed to be herders.

18 August 2023

Village of Abkhoura (centre)

Farmers and herders clashed in the village of Abkhoura (Guéra province). Between six and ten people were killed, with many more injured.

20 August 2023

Village of Maimbaya (south)

A clash between herders and farmers broke out in the village of Maimbaya, near Moïssala (Mandoul province), leaving one person dead.

24-25 September 2023

Village of Mbaïbao (south-west)

A clash in the village of Mbaïbao (Logone Occidental province) left seven people dead and several injured.

17-21 March 2024

Canton of Balé (south)

At least 23 people were killed during seven days of clashes between nomadic herders and farmers in the canton of Balé (Moyen-Chari province). The violence, which involved the Arab and Sara-Kaba communities, left 23 people dead.

28 June-2 July 2024

Sub-prefecture of Goré (south)

At least six people were killed in the sub-prefecture of Goré (Logone Oriental province) during clashes between herders and farmers. The violence, which broke out following land disputes, also left many people injured.

Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in up to 80 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by President & CEO of the Fiore Group and Founder of the Radcliffe Foundation, Frank Giustra, as well as by former Foreign Minister of Argentina and Chef de Cabinet to the United Nations Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra.

Comfort Ero was appointed Crisis Group's President & CEO in December 2021. She first joined Crisis Group as West Africa Project Director in 2001 and later rose to become Africa Program Director in 2011 and then Interim Vice President. In between her two tenures at Crisis Group, she worked for the International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia.

Crisis Group's international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in the following locations: Abuja, Addis Ababa, Bahrain, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Guatemala City, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Kabul, Kyiv, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, Seoul, Tbilisi, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.

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August 2024

Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2021

Special Reports and Briefings

Nineteen Conflict Prevention Tips for the Biden Administration, United States Briefing N°2, 28 January 2021.

Ten Challenges for the UN in 2021-2022, Special Briefing N°6, 13 September 2021.

7 Priorities for the G7: Managing the Global Fallout of Russia's War on Ukraine, Special Briefing N°7, 22 June 2022.

Ten Challenges for the UN in 2022-2023, Special Briefing N°8, 14 September 2022.

Seven Priorities for Preserving the OSCE in a Time of War, Special Briefing N°9, 29 November 2022.

Seven Priorities for the G7 in 2023, Special Briefing N°10, 15 May 2023.

Ten Challenges for the UN in 2023-2024, Crisis Group Special Briefing N°11, 14 September 2023 (also available in French).

Africa

How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African Peace and Security, Africa Report N°297, 14 January 2021 (also available in French).

Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2021, Africa Briefing N°166, 3 February 2021 (also available in French).

Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2022, Africa Briefing N°177, 1 February 2022 (also available in French).

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Eight Priorities for the African Union in 2024, Africa Briefing N°195, 14 February 2024 (also available in French).

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New Challenges for Chad's Army, Africa Report N°298, 22 janvier 2021 (only available in French).

Rebels, Victims, Peacebuilders: Women in Cameroon's Anglophone Conflict, Africa Report N°307, 23 February 2022 (also available in French).

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