TRANSTEC

PEACEBUILDING FUND IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE EVALUABILITY STUDY

**Report
May 2017**

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Acronyms

ADB: African Development Bank

ADDR: Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

AGR: Activities Generating Revenues

CCSR: Coordination Unit for Monitoring and Reintegration

CDVR: Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission

CEI: Independent Electoral Commission of Côte d'Ivoire

CNE: National Commission of Enquiry

CNS: National Security Council

CONARIV: National Commission for Reconciliation and Victim Compensation

CSEI: Special Unit for Enquiry and Investigation

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DGAT: Directorate-General for Territorial Administration

DFJP SEM: Federal Police Department of Justice, State Secretariat for Migration

DPKO: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSF: Defence and Security Forces

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FRCI: Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire

GIZ: German Agency for International Cooperation

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency

MEMIS: Ministry of State, Ministry of the Interior and Security - Côte d'Ivoire

MFPES: Ministry of Women, Protection of Children and Solidarity

MSCSIV: Ministry of Solidarity, Social Cohesion and Victims' Compensation (MSCSIV)

NIS: National Institute of Statistics

NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council

ODSRSG: Office of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General -Peace Consolidation Support

OHCHR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

ONP: National Office of the Population

PALAJ: Project to Support Improved Access to Rights and Justice

PBC: United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

PBF: Peacebuilding Fund

PBSO: Peacebuilding Support Office

PNCS: National Program for Social Cohesion

PND: National Development Plan

PP: Priority Plan

PPU: Presidential Emergency Program

RCI: Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

RGPH: General Census of the Population and Housing

RSS: Reform of the Security Sector

RUNOs: Recipient United Nations Organizations

SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons

S-CNS: Secretariat of the National Security Council

TFP: Technical and Financial Partners

ToR: Terms of Reference

TS: Technical Secretariat

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNO: United Nations Organizations

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNS: United Nations System

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organization

Executive Summary

1.1. Objective

This study aims at analyzing the evaluability of interventions carried out in the context of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding in RCI, covering the period from 2015 to 2017. This analysis will be carried out by looking at different aspects: (i) coherence of the theory of change and the intervention logic; (ii) level of implementation of the actions; (iii) monitoring and evaluation system; (iv) parameters which are required for an evaluation; and (v) consideration given to gender aspect and conflict sensitivity.

1.2. Methodology

This study is based on a review of documents available at the office, the agencies and on the website of the Peacebuilding Fund. A field visit was carried out by the two consultants between 5 and 18 December 2016, which allowed them to visit project sites in the west, particularly in Bayota, Gagnoa and Guiglo, as well as in Bouna in the north.

1.3. Coherence

In general terms, the theories of change and the intervention logic are relevant when it comes to targeting the various conflict vectors and strengthening the country's stability. They are context-appropriate, complimentary, benefit from support at local level – with a particular focus on the community level – and the central level, and deal with both long-term and short-term dynamics. Government participation was however not clearly integrated and some key regional issues remain unaddressed.

The theories of change provide an unequal reflection of the various results which were expected and predicted by the chains of results of the different interventions. The contribution of AGRs (activities to generate revenue) to social cohesion mechanisms was particularly relevant, since this made it possible to provide a peace dividend – when it comes to "intangible" support, this peace dividend is not always apparent to members of the population living in great precarity. Some of the conflict factors were not considered, such as the demographic shift (growth of the Muslim population and its movement towards the south), political aspects (the existence of networks, role played by candidates and parties in manipulating young people, democratic governance), as well as the governance of natural spaces and resources. Some of the high-risk populations identified in the Plan (gold diggers, forest communities) were not targeted. Furthermore, progress in the area of reforms (civil registry, land management, transitional justice, and reconciliation processes) was essentially dealt with at the local level, which certainly limited the possibility of bringing about real change.

There appear to be some operational limits. The refurbishment of infrastructure for instance was not included in the theory of change, although it is included in several of the interventions. The fact that infrastructure was delivered as a turnkey solution meant that there was no clear link to an approach which would have strengthened social cohesion and local ownership. In some cases, beneficiaries also prioritized AGRs over infrastructure. The AGRs were mainly carried out within a given community, while the conflicts were essentially cross-community. Furthermore, the critical mass achieved by the projects was somewhat too low to have an impact (20,000 cases of statelessness dealt with out of 700,000 in the case of civil registry). In addition, the interventions mainly focused on urban centers, while it is the rural areas which tend to be more fragile.

The hypothesis that there would be a catalytic effect at various levels by funding different sectors, in several geographic areas and at multiple levels in order to achieve a knock-on effect, has been verified in several respects, i.e. it brought together the RUNOs or served as leverage for additional sources of funding. Some of the components funded by the PBF have been taken up by the authorities, for instance the socio-security dialogues. The creation of the Ministry for Social Cohesion and its decentralized bodies can also be considered a catalytic effect – even if the role of these bodies remains unclear. In certain cases, however, the PBF served more to complement existing funding means, adding components or extending the scope of interventions, without the specificity of the funding being visible.

In terms of its design, the content of the programs and the project, as it was expressed in the project documents, is generally coherent with the results expected in the Priority Plan. On the other hand, in terms of implementation, this chain of results is a lot less clear. Some of the outputs and target populations seem to be covered by various interventions, creating redundancy. At times, the level of funding for the programs does not seem very coherent with their respective positioning (program one with 5 million USD and support being mainly applied to the central level, program two with 3.85 million USD for interventions at the community level and 1.14 million USD for the coordinating function of the Technical Secretariat). The focus on women is relevant due to their ability to influence children and husbands, but young people were not targeted equally, although they were primarily affected by the conflicts. It should also be noted that there was a strong proliferation of committees at community level without them being truly complimentary, harmonized or unified. In more general terms, the interventions launched numerous dynamics at the risk of them being dispersed and having only a limited outcome.

The PBF brought together recipient UN agencies who worked together collegially on actions both at the community and the central level. Nevertheless, more national stakeholders would benefit from being involved to a greater extent in order to push forward certain files. In general terms, interaction between the various components was not defined from one program to another. Possible synergies could have been tapped into, which would have enabled the more precise identification of how to spread the various activities from the different projects over time, in different areas, in terms of the target beneficiaries and intervention modes. This does not appear in the summary documents. Furthermore, coordinating the interventions with other TFPs could have been increased so as to ensure synergies and a transformative effect. This is all the more essential in light of UNOCI and several other agencies and TFPs withdrawing from the decentralized level.

Risk-management matrices were developed for each of the interventions but they were not undated following the initial design and were not used very much in the context of programming. Most of the identified risks are political in nature, while programmatic, trustee-related and security risks are barely mentioned.

1.4. Implementation and feasibility of the objectives

The Technical Secretariat did not have a global overview of the activities which were planned within the projects / programs, of the level of implementation and the detailed execution, although work plans are provided on a yearly basis for each component. The minutes of the Steering Committee meetings are rather short, do not fulfil their function and are not sufficiently detailed to ensure the steering of the interventions. It should also be noted that there is a lack of homogeneity and coherence in the drafting of reports and the level of detail was not sufficient to allow a monitoring of the results. With few exceptions, the yearly program reports did not specify the activities which were carried out, or even simply the more general axes of intervention, particularly in relation to the work plan and the results framework. It is therefore difficult to identify the gaps and triangulate with elements which are covered in the PBF annual report. In some cases, particularly the refurbishment of infrastructure, actions were planned

which were not within the priority areas of the Plan, and the Secretariat did not identify this until participating in other coordination meetings by United Nations agencies. So far, it has not been possible to obtain a detailed financial report – not even from the Secretariat.

Some progress was however noted during the field trip. Generally, it cannot be denied that results were achieved as far as the contribution to social cohesion and peacebuilding is concerned. These can particularly be measured by the interaction which has been re-established between communities. Several testimonies were collected on this subject. In some cases, the activities were also seen as measures towards conflict prevention. The interventions contributed to strengthening the administration and the reach of the state, while also sometimes developing new approaches. They contributed to creating various structures at the national level (Ministry for Social Cohesion and decentralized structures) and local level (committees working on peace, monitoring, socio-security, community support). However, it is still uncertain whether they will be sustainable, due to limited financial resources provided by the state. The program also strengthened the democratic and governance framework by stocking up the capacities of power-balancing means, the media, civil society and citizens.

Some delays occurred in the beginning and the interventions started fairly late, in June/July of 2015. The support linked to the 2016 elections was provided too late to have a real impact on potential election violence.

The capacities of state services are still fairly weak, which may compromise the expected results (disruption of supplies to the civil registry, which is furthermore not digitized, and the risk of duplications). Communication and transport means for agents endorsed to resolve conflicts is also limited, which makes it difficult for them to access particularly remote areas.

The various ongoing reforms still lack awareness-raising and information, as was also the case for the referendum on the constitution (2016) and the land reforms which are still not very well known.

Finally, the quality of the refurbished infrastructure is sometimes low or not very durable (in the second Plan, the General Directorate of the National Police had initially requested the refurbishment of infrastructure which had already been dealt with in the first Priority Plan, since the infrastructure had already deteriorated).

The average level of disbursement is 54%, i.e. 6.4 million USD out of the 12 million USD which were allocated, which seems satisfactory, particularly when considering the delay in launching the activities.

Several documents and pieces of data contributed to the needs analysis, the analysis of contextual dynamics and the formulations of the programs. The beneficiaries were identified by the communities, which shows an effort to take local dynamics into account. Some of the state partners, such as the police, are however of the opinion that the priority zones did not always correspond to their needs in terms of infrastructure refurbishment. The stakeholders in Bayota were surprised that only one of the two cantons was targeted, since the one which was not targeted had experienced clashes and the risk in that area remains high.

The capacity for execution was essentially located at the level of the agencies while the Secretariat's role was not always very clear to the various stakeholders. The Program Coordination Committee met very infrequently which, according to the Secretariat, contributed to the limited synergies between the programs and the projects. It had indeed been planned that it should come together once per trimester.

Almost unanimously, the beneficiaries who were interviewed highlighted the role played by certain politicians and executives in manipulating young people. In some cases, these actors are in exile abroad and would benefit from being informed and more involved in meetings with young people and women, for instance. There is still a great need in terms of youth employment and in some cases, awareness needs to be raised among them on the peace

dividend. As far as ethnicity is concerned, the Fula people seemed to be less integrated into the activities than other groups, particularly in Bouna.

There is frequent interaction between the various actors involved and the level of mobilization among stakeholders seems satisfactory. However, information exchange was sometimes inconsistent, particularly in the case of agency reports being sent to the Secretariat.

Coordination mainly took place at the central level. At the local level, although agencies sometimes share the same buildings, there is no effective mechanism in place to ensure coordination, such as focal points in the case of the PBF or the UN system, which would ensure that there are synergies and that duplication between projects is avoided at the level of the sub-prefectures concerned. Coordination with state partners also seems satisfactory, although they were not always involved in defining the Priority Plan and the programs / projects during the development stage. Although there exist coordination mechanisms within each program / project, synergies between the various components were only barely tapped into.

1.5. Monitoring / evaluation

At the level of the Secretariat, the **monitoring and evaluation system** mostly took the shape of monitoring carried out by the Steering Committee on the basis of a very general results framework. A revision was carried out in 2016 to finalize the monitoring and evaluation plan, i.e. one and a half years after the start of PP2. Its usefulness to ensure the steering of the project will therefore be very limited. Furthermore, different formats were defined for the different types of reports, which also restricted the level and type of reporting and the different sections were not always informed in a coherent way, some elements did not appear in the corresponding sections and sometimes contradictory information was provided. A table to monitor the reports was generated by the Secretariat, along with a scoreboard to monitor indicators and other instruments. These different tools have not all been used yet. Although they would be useful, they also seem a bit ambitious. A simple scorecard would have provided a good basis. When it comes to the monitoring and evaluation reports, some changes are required at the levels of organization, planning, coordination, communication and drafting, in order to ensure that the system is credible for the partners.

The new monitoring/evaluation plan includes sub-contracting the monitoring role out to the National Office of the Population, with the request that the ONP collect certain indicators that were initially included in the results framework and which are available from the state partners, so the ONP would provide no additional added value, as well as indicators which are also directly available from the various institutions. Other restrictions still remain and while the sub-contracting may seem relevant to obtaining additional data, it also raises questions around the system's efficiency.

In addition to this more general level, the agencies sometimes also have a specific monitoring system for their interventions, and several monitoring and evaluation systems therefore overlap. The monitoring carried out by the agencies is not systematically relayed to the level of the Secretariat or the whole PBF. Most of the monitoring and evaluation work is carried out internally by the agencies and on the basis of indicators which were agreed with the PBF, albeit in function of their own system. Whether or not the monitoring and evaluation is solid therefore varies, depending on the programs and projects, including at a structural level. The overall system which is currently in place could therefore further capitalize on the different elements, by integrating them into the monitoring and evaluation plan and the collection of indicators and particularly by ensuring that the state partners have sufficient know-how and the capacity to work with the performance indicators that concern them.

The project and program indicators according to their revised form from December are generally coherent with those of the Priority Plan, but there are more of them and they are more comprehensive in the context of the results of the programs / projects (see annex 6).

However, some of the key indicators from the Plan were not included, such as the level of violence linked to the election. The difference between the output and the outcome is not always reflected in the indicators. It should be noted that the PBF includes the carrying out of perception surveys in order to measure the population's feeling with regard to security, the security forces or certain components of social cohesion. Indictors could have been used which were easier to access, based on surveys carried out by research institutes or international organizations, and on specific aspects of the communities (joint use of infrastructure, for example). There are few data bases available for the results frameworks specified in the project documents, as already stated above. However, this should be viewed in a nuanced way, depending on the projects, some of which were more appropriate than others for a quantitative analysis on the basis of government data. At this stage, no approach involving a comparison between focus groups has been identified, except for in the case of civil status, since in that case it is easier to compare beneficiary areas to non-beneficiary areas – although ethnic parameters need to be taken into account.

The pro-active steering of the PBF by the Secretariat should be strengthened, particularly in view of the substantial funding allocated to the technical support component. Increased monitoring by the PBSO in New York would also appear relevant in order to ensure the added value of the PBF over funding provided to other joint UN agency programs on a government level, or other sources of funding in general. In this respect, it appears that increased sharing of best practices and lessons learnt from the implementation of other PBFs would be relevant both for the PBF Secretariat and for implementing partners, UN agencies and state partners. This would also contribute to strengthening the role of the PBF in capitalizing on experiences in order to obtain catalytic effects.

1.6. Relevance of an evaluation

When carrying out an evaluation, the timing of the implementation of different programs and projects should be considered, particularly taking into account that three projects were due to start in January 2017 and last over a period of 18 months. Considering the delay in launching the activities, it is possible that extensions may be required for certain ongoing interventions. It therefore does not appear that an evaluation would be of much use before early 2018.

As far as coordination modes are concerned, beyond upstream planning with the different stakeholders, a review of studies or evaluations which are planned in the context of the various projects would be desirable, considering the various areas and levels of intervention. It will also be important to ensure that all the baseline documents (particularly on the duration of activities which were carried out and financial data) are available for each intervention.

The actors have stated that they are particularly interested in an analysis of the effects and results of the interventions and their impact, as well as in a consideration of the Technical Secretariat's role.

The PBF support in RCI is essentially structured around the results expected in the Priority Plan. This has two implications for an evaluation and could lead both to the necessity of focusing on the level of results of the Priority Plan and taking account of the strategic dimension of the fund at the national level, in terms of positioning with regard to other national funders and programs. The role of the PBF should also be considered in light of the withdrawal of the UNOCI.

1.7. Horizontal aspects

Gender is taken into account in all of the interventions to varying degrees:

– In terms of the content, the design and implementation of the PP, programs and projects and in terms of the composition of the PBF portfolio (women's AGR projects, Friends of Women Spaces for Peace).
– In terms of reporting: gender indicators were available – except for key election indicators, gender was generally (although not always) rated in the yearly reports on the state of project advancement.
– In terms of effects, in strengthening women's capabilities at different levels as well as increasing the recognition of their social, political and economic role, role as community relays and mediators in the peace committees set up by UNFPA. Significant challenges in the area of gender inequality still remain and should be addressed urgently.

The needs of young men on the other hand appear to be accounted for in a much more limited fashion, particularly when it comes to the development of a certain culture of violence. The role played by masculinity as a factor in conflict and peace respectively is not sufficiently addressed. Disaggregated data on young people are particularly rare.

Furthermore, the distinction between urban and rural communities is not always clearly defined.

There is no *Do No Harm* analysis or awareness-raising on specific conflicts, although these different aspects do indirectly appear in the risk analysis. Potential negative effects have not been identified, such as for instance the effect of strengthening certain actors at the local level rather than others. The level of participation in the various interventions also varied depending on the population categories. This contributed to creating gaps between the different social groups and increasing tensions which were already present in the social fabric. One possible risk which was highlighted by international reports on the matter is in particular the contribution towards strengthening actors – security forces – involved in human rights violations, or strengthening institutions that are to a certain degree limited in their functioning.

1.8. Recommendations

To the PBSO:

- Provide more active support to the Technical Secretariat on strategic issues as well as in defining a monitoring and evaluation system that is perhaps simpler, less ambitious and which would have a greater chance of being useful and used as a management tool.
- Prioritize the exchange of experiences between PBC/PBF countries, which would also benefit the implementing partners.

To the PBSO and the Steering Committee:

- Take into account the priority needs as they are expressed by the population: (i) AGRs, since in addition to providing economic self-sufficiency they are "the direct application of the conflict management training sessions" and represent "the peace dividend"; (ii) targeting young people, who remain vulnerable to political manipulation and who need specific forms of communication and specific activities in order to be engaged in defending peace; (iii) awareness-raising ahead of each electoral deadline.

To the Steering Committee of Priority Plan II:

- Increasingly take into account regional dynamics, space and demographic management as well as the consequences of non-treated crises.
- Clarify which structural problems can be influenced by the PBF and how (e.g. political party governance / support of political dialogue; law on the civil status reform; transitional justice; abuse of power by security forces…).

- Clarify the various forms in which the government of Côte d'Ivoire can support the interventions of the Priority Plan.
- Take into account the interventions by other TFPs in a much more targeted way in view of increasing coordination and/or synergies (e.g. EU support in almost all areas of the PBF, particularly infrastructure refurbishment for the security forces).
- Capitalize on certain other projects, actors and dynamics which are ongoing: synergies i.e. with the Agencies for Youth Employment.

To the technical Secretariat of the PBF:

- Ensure the comprehensibility of the interventions at the technical and financial level, in line with the guidelines.
- Strengthen the steering, through a dashboard for monitoring the work plans and coordination, particularly by organizing regular meetings of the program coordination committee.
- Ensure coherence of the indicators which are used in the reports and the monitoring documents.
- Ensure that indicators are used and that they are revised when necessary. Some indicators are already gathered as a matter of routine (e.g. Afrobarometer, Ibrahim Index), or are easy to identify by community (e.g. existence of infrastructure for each ethnic group or mixed infrastructure).
- In terms of monitoring and evaluation, identify and capitalize on efforts made by the RUNOs and partners and ensure that state partners become involved in monitoring the interventions from which they benefit.

To the implementing partners:

- Map the interventions according to villages and camps. This would make it possible to ensure that there is no duplication and that targeting takes place according to the most critical conflict factors and that a transformative effect is achieved.
- Review the balance of activities between urban and rural areas since certain regions require a more distinct deployment in rural areas while others need continual focus on urban areas, where tensions reside.
- Strengthen the dimension of "Peacebuilding" / social cohesion in infrastructure by moving from "turnkey solutions" to a more participatory approach involving members from the different communities.
- Ensure that the Project Coordination Committee is running smoothly and identify synergies between the programs and projects.

To the UN system and its Coordination:

- Ensure support by strategic and political levels in cases of deadlock or problems (Resident Coordinator in Abidjan / political office in Dakar).
- Put in place a coordination system between the programs in order to avoid multiple interventions on the same subjects, duplication, and participants already having benefited from other similar activities.
- Remain engaged: prioritize stable amounts over time for peacebuilding rather than sudden increases or decreases.
- Ensure the integration of social cohesion in a horizontal way through catalytic effects in other RUNO interventions and/or interventions by other development partners.
- Ensure the use and sustainability of elements put in place by the PBF, avoiding competing approaches or the creation or parallel systems.
- Support the training of trainers in the context of the desired catalytic effects.

1. Introduction

This study is the revised version of the evaluability study on the Peacebuilding Fund in Côte d'Ivoire for the PBSO (Peacebuilding Support Office). It will present the general context of the interventions, the methodology applied and will analyze the evaluability by looking at different aspects: (i) coherence of the theory of change and the intervention logic; (ii) level of implementation of the actions; (iii) monitoring and evaluation system; (iv) parameters which are required for an evaluation; and (v) consideration given to gender aspect and conflict sensitivity.

2. Context

After the end of the 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire has experienced a decade of great political instability which was marked by a coup d'état in 1999 (bringing to power a military junta) and two civil wars, the last of which ended in 2011. In 2002, during Laurent Gbagbo's presidency, a significant military-political crisis led to the country being divided into the central-north-western zone controlled by former rebel forces, and the southern part of the country, which remained under government control.

Despite peace agreements signed under the auspices of the international community (Ouagadougou, 2007) and the implementation of a coalition government, following the decision by the outgoing president Laurent Gbagbo not to recognize the election of Alassane Ouattara, a post-electoral crisis plunged the country back into a spiral of violence between December 2010 and May 2011. During that time, the country became the site of human rights violations committed by both sides, leading to considerable loss of human life (at least 3000 people died) and more than one million internally displaced persons and people living in exile in neighboring countries.

The context of peacebuilding has evolved since efforts were first undertaken to return to normalization and since the beginning of funding granted by the PBF in Côte d'Ivoire in 2008. Since May 2011, when the current authorities first took over power, some results have been achieved in the areas of post-crisis reconstruction and working on the resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict, although a large portion of the identified problems still needs to be solved. Since 2015 elections have been peaceful, although the situation remains fragile. Many challenges linked to the aftermath of the crisis and to structural dynamics still need to be addressed.

Persisting ethno-regional divides and forms of exclusion

The crises in Côte d'Ivoire grew from multiple and complex factors, particularly community relations which have historically been wrought with tension and "structural inequalities in access to basic social services and with regard to opportunities for development" (UNICEF, 2014). These were instrumentalized in a political environment based on exclusion – founded on the ideology of "Ivoirité" (Babo, Droz, 2008) – leading to significant social division. By way of example, in the west of the country there were many cases of land litigation, which were constantly evolving and erupted between autochthones and allochthones, between autochthonous and non-native populations as well as among autochthones themselves. Conflictual crises were apparent as early as the 1980s, at the same time as the economic crisis, the phenomena of increasingly scarce arable land and migration flows (Fofana, Traore, 2015). Muslim herders belonging to the Fula people were displaced southward, causing a lot of tension linked to the destruction of crops, the absence of confinement areas for the animals, and transhumance routes.

The smooth running of the 2015 elections (which Ouattara won with a majority of 83.6%) signified a break with the violence which had accompanied past elections. However, the results show that regional differences still persist and in some regions the abstention-rate was above 50%. In the context of Côte d'Ivoire, this illustrates ethno-religious divisions and feelings of marginalization experienced by part of the population, particularly in the south of the country "which is considered to be pro-Gbagbo and by extension pro-Ivorian Popular Front" (DFJP SEM, 2015; UQAM, Centre FrancoPaix, 2016).

Social fabric remains fragile and conflicts linked to identity remain likely, especially while victims do not trust in state institutions and response mechanisms, such as the National Commission for Reconciliation and Victim Compensation (CONARIV) and the National Program for Social Cohesion (PNCS) (Lopes, 2015). Available analyses have expressed serious reservations about the current system of transitional justice and reconciliation (clear lack of decisions which would allow to do away with the impunity enjoyed by some of those involved, regardless of their affiliation). Prevention and repairing the social and psychological damage done to vulnerable communities and groups (young people, women, displaced persons and former fighters) are essential conditions for achieving social cohesion. Institutions' legitimacy must be established through credibility and transparency of the political system which is in place as well as through democratic governance. Community reintegration and social integration also require full access to a civil status (including raising awareness among the population and providing training to local actors) (UNICEF, 2014).

Strengthening the management of population movements and security in order to mitigate the securitiy risks which still exist

Although the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire has improved over the last years[1], which has made it possible for numerous refugees and internally displaced persons to return, ensuring the country's security remains a challenge, particularly due to a lack of means and capabilities among police and gendarmerie to respond to local security needs (UNOCI, OHCHR, 2016). Some regions are particularly vulnerable to specific security risks (DFJP SEM, 2015). The west of the country for instance stands out due to the presence of armed groups coming from Liberia, and there are a lot of former fighters and weapons in circulation in the north (former stronghold of the rebellion).

National capacities in the areas of Reform of the Security Sector, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and countering the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) still need to be strengthened (Charbonneau, 2013) and balanced. The perceived imbalance that exists in the DDR process risks becoming worse if many of the ex- fighters from the former pro-Gbango groups feel that they are being left out (UQAM, Centre FrancoPaix, 2016).

Beyond the need to consolidate the efforts that are being carried out and expand them to other areas, other major challenges need to be overcome to ensure sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire: corruption, limited inclusion of gender and human rights in government politics and programs, "the ghost of conflict which grows with the appearance of new economic, particularly mining, opportunities"[2]. The health context which currently affects neighboring countries could also endanger the country's social and physical reconstruction. Finally, the 2020 presidential elections will constitute an essential deadline, since tensions which lie dormant risk being revived.

Initiatives to come out of the 2010-2011 crisis over the period between 2012 and 2015

Following the end of the 2010-2011 crisis, several strategic documents, mechanisms and entities were put in place. Without going into further detail on their various functions and

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[1] Report by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), May 2015

[2] PBSO/PBF, second Priority Plan for Peacebuilding, 2014

hierarchy, one should mention the Presidential Emergency Program (PPU), the first National Development Plan (PND, 2012-2015), the PNCS (established in 2012), the National Commission of Enquiry (CNE) which in 2013 was transformed into a Special Unit for Enquiry and Investigation (CSEI, a working group of judges and prosecutors tasked with investigating crimes committees during the post-election crisis) and the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR, responsible for hearing victims and whose mandate came to an end in 2014).

The CONARIV was put in place more recently (March 2015) in order to provide compensation to the victims through a new reparation fund. At the same time, the government established an RSS plan and created the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (ADDR), whose activities surrounding the reintegration of demobilized former fighters was temporarily taken over by the Coordination Unit for Monitoring and Reintegration (CCSR). The independent election committee was restructured by law 2014-335 on 5 June 2014 (Gros, Santopinto, 2015).

Although this set of initiatives led to a peacebuilding dynamic, some challenges which were targeted by the government together with international donors still remain on the agenda in 2017. A list of international aid interventions in areas related to the PBF is included as annex 7.

3. Reminder of the study's objectives

This study aims at analyzing the evaluability of interventions carried out in the context of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding in RCI, covering the period from 2015 to 2017. The first Peacebuilding Plan was implemented between 2011 and 2014 and targeted: i) restoring state authority, ii) improving the security environment, iii) identifying the populations, iv) national reconciliation, social cohesion and reducing the number of conflicts linked to access to land, v) economic reintegration of people who had been affected by the post-election crisis.

The study's objectives as defined in the terms of reference can be found in the relevant sections of the report:

Objectives in the ToR	Relevant section
• *Assess the formulation of the program, including the theory of change, the logical framework and performance indicators.*	Coherence
• *Assess the program's implementation. Analyze the plausibility of the program's objectives and outcomes being achieved, taking into account the program's structure and its reality.*	Implementation and feasibility
• *Analyze the data system and the monitoring and evaluation capacity.*	Monitoring / evaluation
• *Develop a chain of impact for the program which shows the relationships between the resources, activities, outputs, outcomes, external factors and hypotheses.*	Coherence
• *Determine the evaluability and the ways in which the program's structure and the monitoring and evaluation framework can be strengthened. In order to do this, the team will have to develop a checklist or another means of analysis.*	All sections

• *Obtain an agreement on the program formulation and the required modifications, as well as for the monitoring and evaluation framework.*	All sections
• *Obtain an agreement on the priorities for and uses of a final evaluation and develop options for a final evaluation strategy, as well as elements to be considered in the ToR of that evaluation.*	Parameters of an evaluation

4. Methodology

The study was carried out according to an analysis grid which was developed in the preparatory report on the basis of the questions listed in the terms of reference and covering various aspects of evaluability: coherence, level of implementation, monitoring/evaluation system and the extent to which gender and conflict sensitivity was taken into account. The study combines an overall analysis with specific project analyses in order to establish a level of results for each element.

Following an initial stage of analyzing documents which were available on the internet, which led to a preparatory report outlining the methodology, two consultants carried out field research in Côte d'Ivoire:

- Cécile Collin, from 5 to 16 December 2016
- Juana de Catheu, from 5 to 13 December 2016

The field work involved working sessions with (i) the PBF coordination team, (ii) coordinators of PBF programs and projects, and (iii) the technical committee of experts. These various work sessions and discussion groups allowed the consultants to have an exchange with members of the project coordination and implementation on results obtained, difficulties faced, strategies developed to overcome these difficulties, the implementation methodology for the peacebuilding plan and the running of the work on evaluability.

A second round of working sessions took place between the consultants and technical representatives of ministries responsible for implementing the projects and programs, in order to assess the level of national ownership of the initiatives on prevention, peaceful conflict management, and promoting social cohesion with support from the PBF.

The consultants were able to visit several geographic areas which received funding and which represent a wide range of intervention contexts: Gagnoa, Bayota, Guiglo in the west which had already benefitted from the first Priority Plan, and Bouna in the north-east, a new intervention zone where in particular an FAO project has been put in place to develop a pilot approach to information, awareness-raising and training on law no. 98-750 from 23 December 1998 in the area of rural land ownership. The work plan is included as an annex. A restitution session took place in the Plan Ministry with the partners involved and a restitution report was submitted to the PBSO at the end of the mission.

As far as data collection tools are concerned, the consultants combined semi-structured interviews, focus groups, visits to project sites and direct observation of the Technical Secretariat. They met with the following actors:

- Technical Secretariat of the PBF
- Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNO)
- State partners at national and decentralized level
- NGOs which were involved
- Traditional authorities (community Chiefs and King of Bouna)
- Beneficiary communities (particularly groups which were supported, social mobilizers, and Peace Committees)

During focus group sessions with the beneficiaries, the technique of most significant change was used in order to determine the effects of the interventions at their level and in the specific intervention context. Afterwards, their evaluation of the project performance was triangulated with other focus group participants or other sources. Relevant testimonies appear in various sections of this report.

Women who are members of peace and oversight groups and committees in Bayota

As indicated in the preparatory report, in as far as possible the team carried out a nuanced analysis of the various projects and programs, which allowed the creation of a scoring system consisting of four levels:

G	G Green	On track	
G A	G A Green/Amber	Nearly on track	
A R	A R Amber/Red	Nearly off-track	
R	R Red	Off-track	

The purpose of these scores is not to pass judgment on the actors involved, but rather to indicate which topics future efforts should be directed towards.

5. Coherence

The following table sums up the assessment of the different programs and projects in light of the study questions on coherence, with further detail provided after the table (section 5.1 and following):

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	PBF/CIV.A-3 Preventing and peacefully managing conflict	PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil status	PBF/CIV.H-2 Support of the Priority Plan
Theory of change	G A	G A	G A	G A
Coherence of the chain of outcomes	A R	G A	G A	G A
Link between project / program and Priority Plan	G	G	G	G
Convergence	G	G	G	G
Risk management for the PBF portfolio	A R	A R	A R	G A

5.1. Theory of change

The theory of change is well explained for each type of intervention, as well as in the Priority Plan as a whole, and has been generally confirmed by this study. In the following, some comments will be made on the hypotheses and external factors.

Overall intervention logic

Overall, the intervention logic can be confirmed, particularly due to:

➢ Relevance in terms of the context: the interventions generally corresponded to the priorities, even taken into account that factors for and ways in which conflict manifests itself are multiple and continuously evolving. In particular, these included: aftermath of the post-election crisis; tensions surrounding identity; mistrust towards and tensions with "uniformed personnel"; conflicts over land ownership; tensions surrounding the return of refugees, immigrants and displaced persons "from the north", conflicts between farmers and herders; the issue of governance and representativeness of political parties; lack of employment and crime to a certain extent; violence against women and children… Furthermore, conflicts over land-ownership may involve different communities, etc. One of the people we met said: *"We have achieved peace from weapons, but not peace in our hearts"*.

> Complementarity between local interventions (awareness-raising; socio-security dialogue; activities to generate revenue; local committees and support for groups…) and support at the central level (institutional capacity-building; laws, strategies and plans…) in most of the sectors covered by the PBF (see table 1). This constitutes an essential factor for success. At the local level, one can also find thematic complementarity when activities with the same beneficiaries included awareness-raising, training and activities to generate revenue (AGRs), even when the latter were limited. It should be noted that the projects under Priority Plan 2 did not aim at directly bringing about improved means to make a livelihood through the AGRs, but that the AGRs were to serve as a lever towards consolidating social coherence at the local level. The effects of awareness-raising and training were reinforced by the AGRs, since the main principles which had been taught were put into practice. The AGRs enabled greater autonomy, thereby reducing manipulation (i.e. of young people) and increasing influence (i.e. of women).

> Combining support to national institutions to put in place reforms / strengthen the state, aimed at medium to long-term effects, with local support, which allows the immediate management of risks of violence. The focus however lies on the community level, contributing to a strengthening of the social fabric and the promotion of a culture of peace, while structural and political reforms are less visible. The following table shows actions at the local and central levels by project / program, as they are specified in the project documents.

Table 1: Distinction between central / local level by intervention

	Central level	Local level
Program 1	Communicating the CDVR report; Supporting the program formulation; Implementation of recommendations; Social cohesion strategy; Situation room; Peace education (media, schools, CSOs); Contact group; Support for RSS and the formulation of laws and policies; Support the formulation of the PNCS.	Support the police, gendarmerie and units maintaining order; Regional Security Committees; Socio-security dialogues; Dialogue platforms; Support the participation of women; Civic education; Community rehabilitation; Community reconciliation.
Program 2	Support the PNCS / Ministry for Solidarity; Support the formulation of strategic tools to prevent and manage conflict; Communication system on rural land ownership.	Strengthening the local authorities' and local leaders' capacities in the area of conflict prevention and management; Managing conflict through Peace Committees and community leaders and authorities; Raising awareness on rural land-ownership and managing conflict through village committees; AGRs for women and young people; Supporting Friends of Women Spaces for Peace and micro-projects; Community relay with community actions and educational talks on social cohesion; Implementation and functioning of Community Peace committees; Supporting Mothers' Clubs; Supporting women's and young people's groups in order to manage conflict; Supporting groups of herders and farmers (land ownership, conflict management, crops).
Civil status	Action plan on civil registry; Draft law on civil registry; Specifications for the central register.	Raising awareness among the population; Capacity-building for civil status centers; Producing and disseminating data.

State participation was not clearly laid out in the Priority Plan, leading to a certain degree of weakness in the logic, although the institutions which were involved at a technical level clearly supported the Plan and the activities related to it. All of the PP initiatives did however lead to an increased participation of state institutions over time. A financial contribution of 3 million USD provide by the state was mentioned in several documents from 2015[3], but this money has not yet been made available. The success of the interventions does however depend to a large extent on political dynamics and structural reforms across all sectors, also an area of state involvement, and the limits of this can be felt in the implementation of the interventions. It is therefore important to include these hypotheses, which have an effect on the results of the interventions.

PP2 had not set itself the goal of solving all of the regional issues. Nevertheless, some key phenomena linked to stabilization have not been addressed to this day, such as population movements and the possible return of refugees based in Liberia, the occupation and eviction from protected areas, the increased arrival of people from northern border countries into more and more geographic areas, although refugees / returnees were targeted by the FAO project. Thus, the PBF does not cover certain key topics at the supranational level, which would however enhance peacebuilding across the country. These dynamics include both short-term issues linked the effects of the crisis, and long-term socio-demographic and economic phenomena.

Review of the theories of change by intervention

The theories of change provide and unbalanced reflection of the outcomes which were desired and expected by the output chains of the various interventions. This is understandable, since the theories are meant to only cover main elements in the impact chain of the interventions and the plan. The theories of change are recalled in the following, including hypotheses which were identified by the team and related comments.

Supporting the strengthening of trust, coexistence and security stabilization for peaceful elections in Côte d'Ivoire (PBF/CIV.B-3, called "Program 1")

In the fragile context of forthcoming elections, if
* *key actors in Ivorian society (political parties, women, young people, the media etc.) can become "agents for peace and cohesion"*
* *and are mobilized to make a contribution as agents for peace and cohesion and push for representation in the processes of elections and national reconciliation,*
* *with an enhanced level of trust between groups and towards the security forces whose role it is to maintain order and respect for human rights,*
then the environment will be peaceful during the electoral cycle.

Hypotheses linked to Program 1 and comments:

➢ The underlying hypothesis of Program 1 is that one of the main sources of instability is the fact that elections are held, since that is the program's main component:
  - PBF activities prior to the referendum (2016) and local elections (2016), which had required a request by the government and approval by headquarters, particularly targeted civil society organizations, women (candidates and voters) and young people.
  - Furthermore, the theory of change specifically targeted political parties, while electoral violence is in fact linked to a variety of factors: demographic (growth of the Muslim population and its movement towards the south) and political changes (the

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[3] Mentioned for instance in the minutes of the CTCT in September 2015 and of the COPIL meeting in March 2016.

existence of networks, role played by candidates and parties, democratic governance) as well as access to resources. These aspects are partially addressed by other components, but the progress was fairly limited compared to the needs.

➢ The ToC did not refer to the issue of ethnicity, which therefore apparently required no specific action, such as interventions which would provide a framework for mediation between different communities and political parties, linked to the elections (the community aspect is however addressed in the context of outcomes, via community leaders).

- This indirect approach is partially justified by a desire to avoid targeting specific ethnic groups in the context of elections, which would be particularly sensitive. However, awareness-raising around the elections could not necessarily include the possibility of addressing some of the vectors of the conflict, such as conflict between communities and inter-community dialogue, although the awareness-raising did take place at two levels: community and political.

➢ Political actors have a vested interest in peacefully resolving conflict and promoting cohesion.

- In actual fact, political actors remain potential agents for destabilization by instrumentalizing young people, and sanctions provided by law for behavior which incites violence or even racial hatred are not applied, since the desire to retain power is greater.
- The population also does not have any structures or platforms in place to ensure the accountability of their politicians and executives and to thereby influence their behavior and hold them to account on the issue of stabilizing the country.

➢ Actors for social cohesion, including women and young people, can effectively pursue their rights in the context of the Ivorian community.

- This hypothesis is limited in that patriarchy remains a dominant force (i.e. on issues of land ownership: HRW, 2015) and young people are often not very involved in local / community governance.

➢ The legal framework and the modalities for carrying out elections (poll office, electoral register) allow representation.

➢ Women play a major role when it comes to elections.

- This role mainly includes their ability to have an influence within their family and more broadly to support the call for democracy promotion and stabilization of the country.

➢ Trust in defense and security forces (DSF) essentially rests on their ability to act as well as on their knowledge and implementation of human rights, including the representation of women among "uniformed personnel" and an increased investigation of gender-based sexual violence (GBSV) by the DSF.

- Notwithstanding, beyond this, trust in the DSF also depends on a variety of other factors which have not been addressed to this day:
- People's knowledge of the DSF's role and their responsibility towards the people;
- Understanding between the DSF themselves, which necessitates socio-security dialogues;
- The overall quality of relations between communities;
- Community-based biases which are still prevalent within the DSF, particularly in the west;
- Wrongdoings committed by the DSF, which are seldom documented.

Supporting the prevention and management of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire (PBF/CIV.A-3)

At a global level,
If the existing capabilities of territorial agents and mechanisms are strengthened to mediate and manage local conflicts peacefully,
and if the population is aware of and can pursue their rights,

> *then* the risk of local conflict will be decreased and social cohesion will be strengthened.
> This result can be achieved, *since* (i) local leaders will effectively ensure that conflict is prevented and resolved peacefully and (ii) the enforcement of the law on rural land ownership will benefit the participation of the population and (iii) enhancing the emergence of social cohesion within the population or different social groups working on the implementation of community activities will bring them together. In this way, conflict resolution mechanisms will function and will include gender and be more inclusive, since they involve key actors who are able to bring about change, particularly local authorities, traditional Chiefs and women and young community leaders.

Hypotheses underlying Program 2 (outputs towards outcomes and outcomes towards the overall objective), and comments:

➤ The central hypothesis is that social cohesion and the level of conflict in a given region essentially depends on local dynamics and that strengthening the state at the local level will allow for mediation and the resolution of local conflicts.
  - This intervention decreases the risk of violence but does not allow to address certain recurring causes of conflict. As the field visits revealed and confirmed, be it in the west or the north-east, "executives" (noteworthy individuals coming from towns but mobilizing people from Abidjan or abroad, also called "absent third parties") constitute one of the top factors of conflict (see also section 6.4).
  - There are also other structural problems, against which social cohesion at the local level provides only fragile protection: for instance governance of the political parties; a system of rules and institutions which is not adapted or adequate to manage conflicts between herders and farmers; a truth and reconciliation process which is still barely implemented, significant youth unemployment or under-employment; a lack of decentralization, particularly when it comes to land registration services and sometimes a complete lack of administrative reach. The theory of change does not specifically highlight the structural problems which the PBF (or other partners of Côte d'Ivoire) might influence, or how. The hypothesis, independently of the topic, often seems to be that reforms "will happen", without it being clearly defined how the PBF (together with the UN system and other TFPs) are working towards that goal. The program includes the question of land-ownership to a certain degree, essentially at the local level.
  - In more general terms, the second Priority Plan (2015-2017) identifies new risk groups (gold diggers, new forestry communities), as well as new conflict factors which do not appear to have been targeted by specific projects. There therefor appears to be a mismatch between programing and factors contributing to fragility, which limits the potential impact in terms of peacebuilding.
➤ Beyond their improved capacities, local actors have an interest in resolving conflicts peacefully.
  - The low level of local actor involvement is a structural problem which is addressed by Program 2 (in addition to the issue of land-ownership, which remains one of the main challenges for peacebuilding);
  - However, the peace dividend is not always visible to all groups, especially where livelihoods remain extremely precarious. Some community relays have highlighted how difficult it is for them to raise awareness among certain inhabitants who are particularly affected by this issue and who responded with: "*What good is peace going to do us? Get out! We don't have anything to eat!*".
➤ Economic activities in "high-risk" groups will increase their ability to manage conflict and their social integration, rather than reigniting tensions.
  - The link between activities to generate revenue / supporting people's livelihoods and social cohesion immediately creates a peace dividend and brings together different communities around a shared objective, while providing unemployed young people

with something to do and a structure. This indirect approach therefore appears to be particularly relevant, including when it comes to peacebuilding interventions.

- ➢ Rural populations understand the law on land ownership and will become stakeholders in land management.
  - This aspect is essential since it is one of the main conflict vectors. Managing populations of herders and migrants however, is not something that the rural population can address, since this necessitates clear national policies and guidelines, although clarifying the law will make local governance easier and some conflicts can indeed be addressed at the community level.
  - In addition, the PBF has contributed to promoting customary authorities, such as the Chamber of Kings, and involving them in matters of land ownership and conflict resolution. This is relevant since they have major influence and are also decision-makers at first instance.
- ➢ The CDVR recommendations are accepted.
  - The CDVR report and its recommendations were indeed made public in October 2016. Since then, a process of disseminating the report and its recommendations has been ongoing. The report was published online on the PNCS and the government's websites. A follow-up workshop on the CDVR recommendations will be organized by the MFPES.
- ➢ Other levels of outcomes include increasing the standard of living among the groups which were supported, developing economic trade and an increased sense of community, thereby combining short-term effects with more long-term ones.
  - The communities which we met stated that the AGRs also contributed to reducing the possibility of young people being manipulated since *"an empty stomach has no ears"*. They also mentioned that for instance *"we have understood that we are like a mouth. There are different parts: the tongue, the teeth… and sometimes the teeth may bite the tongue, but they all work together in order to speak."*

Supporting the registration of births and deaths within the time limits and supporting the civil registry in Côte d'Ivoire (PBF/CIV.E-2)

If the population, particularly women, know what is at stake and what the procedures are concerning the civil registry, particularly (i) that registering births is free of charge, (ii) that the law makes it obligatory for parents to have their children registered with the civil register, (iii) that a birth must be declared within the first three months,
then they will be encouraged to take the necessary measure to register their children with the civil registry within the time limits provided
and if the capacity of the civil registration centers to provide a high-quality service is strengthened, particularly by training staff on registration procedures and providing equipment,
then the "clients" will be satisfied by the service they receive and other people will be more motivated to turn to the civil registration centers within the statutory time frames, thereby reducing the feeling of exclusion, the risk of statelessness and the perception of the risk of conflicts linked to identity.

Hypotheses underlying the Program (outputs towards outcomes and outcomes towards the overall objective), and comments:

- ➢ The issue of identity is central to the conflict dynamics in RCI, political problems and access to resources. Solving this issue will contribute to reducing conflict.
  - To a large extent, conflict is linked to challenges around the definition of what it means to be Ivorian, be it in connection with demographic dynamics and conflicts over identity, or in connection with access to resources disputed between autochthones, allochthones and non-native populations. There has also been a lot of movement among the population, with many Ivorians moving abroad and many people from neighboring countries, especially to the north, migrating to Côte d'Ivoire.
- ➢ Policies on civil status have effectively been put in place in a harmonized way.

- The project document indeed underlines that "the achievements will be ephemeral if they are not consolidated within a more global reform dynamic concerning the entire system of civil status". The theory of change seeks to act on two fronts when implementing policies on civil status and, over time, bringing more peace to the issues of identity: the population's ignorance, and the inability of the civil registration services to provide a high-quality service. The theory of change as it is expressed in the project documents does not refer to any outcomes expected from the project, such as regularization, support for the reform and data distribution. This is significant, since the measure or the results are limited by such weak links.
- Furthermore, the project managers report that certain negative effects may occur, which are linked to the regularization operations. People living in areas where there are often mobile court services may not register their children, considering that regularization may take place.

> ### Supporting planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the PP implementation (PBF/CIV.H-2)
>
> *If, with support from the Technical Secretariat, regular meeting of the Steering Committee and the Joint Technical Committee were to take place during which they would take decision and approve technical documents*
> *and if various field visits took place and the recommendations they generate were put into practice,*
> *then coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and communication of the objectives of the Priority Plan would be ensured, in a way that works efficiently towards successful peacebuilding in Côte d'Ivoire.*
> *If the Technical Secretariat's capacities for coordination, communication, and monitoring and evaluation were strengthened,*
> *then the Joint Steering Committee would be functional and the monitoring of the implementation of the Priority Plan for Peacebuilding as well as the peacebuilding priorities in the national strategic documents would be guaranteed and the results of the Priority Plan would be reached.*

Underlying hypotheses linked to the Project and comments:

➤ In organizational terms, the Technical Secretariat (TS) is well-placed in the UNS and the TS's capacities are strengthened to allow it to exercise leadership in monitoring and evaluation, to support decision-making in the Steering Committee, to play a supervising role in the implementation, and to communicate strategically on the implementation of the Priority Plan.

- The theory of change rests more on the process than on the deliverables. Neither this theory of change – which is worded in quite a complicated way – nor the project document in more general terms, nor the PBF guidelines specify any particular expectations (quality, deliverables) concerning the Technical Secretariat, whereas the stakeholders we met with on the other hand have very clear expectations. This concerns for instance showing some leadership in monitoring and evaluation and defining simple indicators which would be meaningful and for which data would be available, as well as, beyond simply compiling the data, carrying out quality control and an analytical summary of the compiled data (see chapters 3.2 and 3.3).

➤ There is enough of a consensus between the members of the Steering Committee to define the strategic orientation for the implementation of the Priority Plan.

The following table provides an overview of the Priority Plan's intervention logic, the results of which correspond to the programs / projects which were implemented, with the civil status component covered by result 2. It is structured according to Priority Plan results. The recorded hypotheses for each program are applied to the different levels of results.

Table 2 – Intervention logic built up out of the Priority Plan and the main hypotheses for each level of results

Objective in the Priority Plan	Supporting peaceful elections and peacebuilding by strengthening trust, peaceful coexistence and security stabilization, as well as preventing and peacefully resolving conflict by building up the capacities of the state and other mechanisms that are in place		
Hypotheses	*1. The main source of instability was the elections.* *2. The issue of trust towards security forces and between social groups (religious and ethnic allegiances, political affiliation) is essential, but the issue of ethnicity need not be addressed directly.*	*1. Social cohesion and the rate of conflict in the provinces depends mainly on local dynamics.* *2. Beyond their improved capacities, local actors have a vested interest in resolving conflict peacefully.*	*1. There is sufficient consensus among members of the Steering Committee to define strategic orientations to implement the Priority Plan.*
Results	**Strengthening trust, peaceful coexistence and security stabilization for peaceful elections in RCI**	**Preventing and peacefully resolving conflict by building up the capacities of the state and other mechanisms that are in place**	**Planning, coordinating, implementing monitoring and evaluation and communication on the results of the Priority Plan is efficiently ensured**
Hypotheses	*1. The issue of trust towards security forces and between social groups (religious and ethnic allegiances, political affiliation) is essential, but the issue of ethnicity need not be addressed directly.* *2. The CDVR recommendations are accepted.* *3. Beyond dialogue, political actors effectively pursue their rights and have a vested interest in peaceful conflict resolution* *4. The legal framework and modalities for carrying out elections (poll offices, electoral register) allow representation.*	*1. Territorial agents are the main actors in mediating and managing local conflict* *2. Beyond their capacities, local and customary authorities as well as "high-risk" groups have an interest in resolving conflicts peacefully* *3. Policies on civil status have effectively been put in place in a harmonized way* *4. Economic activities in "high-risk" groups will increase their ability to manage conflict and their social integration rather than reigniting tensions* *5. Rural populations understand the law on land ownership and will become stakeholders in land management*	*1. The TS is well placed within the UNS and the TS's capacities are strengthened to allow it to exercise leadership in monitoring and evaluation, to support decision-making in the Steering Committee, to communicate strategically on the implementation of the Priority Plan.*
Outputs	**1. Increased trust between the population and the security services** **2. Supporting the development of a strategic framework for the implementation of the CDVR recommendations**	**1. Strengthening of the capacities of local and customary authorities to mediate and manage conflicts within and between communities** **2. Policies on registering births and deaths and consolidated reform of the civil status at the national level in order to prevent conflict around these issues**	**1. Planning, coordination and implementation of peacebuilding priorities are efficiently ensured by the Joint Steering Committee** **2. Monitoring and evaluation and communication on results of the Priority Plan are guaranteed in an efficient way**

	3. Dialogue and trust between political actors, particularly women, young people and civil society are strengthened for peaceful elections	**3. Economic activities involving high-risk groups contribute to the peaceful resolution of local conflict**
		4. Rural populations are better informed on the law on rural land ownership
Input	Projects (i) women community initiatives; (ii) RSS; (iii) trust for peaceful elections; (iv) prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict; (v) civil status; and (vi) support of planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan – in conjunction with other UN support (UNOCI and UNS)	
Context	Ethnic and regional divisions; national reconciliation process is ongoing; conflict over land ownership; policies on territorial development are unbalanced; inequalities linked to gender; security and health risks; management of natural resources and gold mining	

In general terms, **infrastructure refurbishment** was not part of the theories of change, but was addressed by several interventions and its final budget is not yet known. This concerns the refurbishment of 15 police commissariats and 15 police stations, the construction of Friends of Women Spaces, in some cases conference rooms were constructed in the prefecture (Guiglo) and houses were rebuilt following riots in Bayota. This approach has certain limitations in the context of peacebuilding.

The rehabilitation of security infrastructure under Program 1 certainly fits in with output 2 of the program, which seeks to improve the quality of services provided by defense and security forces to women, young people and the communities. Indeed, the evaluation which was carried out by the program team showed that one of the conditions for providing high-quality services to the population was to ensure that the working conditions were good. This prerequisite was unanimously expressed by almost all of the police and gendarmerie agents in the intervention areas: *How can you expect us to provide high-quality services when we ourselves are working under such inadequate conditions?* The refurbishment work which was carried out is therefore part of a global package to improve the quality of services provided to the population and in turn to strengthen trust between security forces and the population. These are therefore not isolated cases of refurbishment. To date, this infrastructure was provided as a turnkey solution, which did not require the involvement or participation of beneficiaries and communities. In Bayota, this rehabilitation led to a decrease in intercommunity tensions and to the consolidation of social cohesion at the local level. To a certain extent, these interventions had a catalytic effect, since at the same time they allowed the state to address the thorny question of compensation of victims from the community. The Minister for Social Cohesion furthermore told UNDP and UNOCI how pleased he was with this support. Along the same lines, in Guiglo the meeting room is indeed located in the Prefecture for the local authorities to ensure ownership, but it serves in the context of exchanges and actions for all of the actors intervening in social cohesion in that municipality and contributes to strengthening ties between the authorities and the population. This confirms how solid the hypothesis is. However, the role of infrastructure in conflict transformation could be much more direct if the different communities contributed to the work or provided the materials. This would allow for greater ownership of the achievements and would make it easier to get the community involved in maintenance while enhancing interactions between different ethnic groups around a shared objective. In addition to rehabilitation, one could also envisage support for community governance by having the communities plan the rehabilitation or carrying out a training session on conflict management.

Furthermore, the MARP study (UNFPA, 2015) shows that there is a need for women to have a physical and conceptual space which they have been lacking so far in order to build peace and social cohesion. It is important that women can have exchanges among themselves, prepare themselves for providing leadership as mediators and strengthen their empowerment,

coordinate and report on economic activities for community-building. However, according to focus groups carried out by the team, prioritizing conference rooms or Friends of Women Spaces for Peace when several public meeting rooms already exist in a certain place, in Guiglo for instance, can give rise to questions, while the women who benefitted said themselves that they would rather prioritize activities to generate revenue.

In addition, according to the RUNOs, although the AGRs contributed to building cohesion, the beneficiaries of the AGRs were often part of the same community with the same economic interests, while problems of cohesion often arise between different communities. Supporting basic community infrastructure which does not belong to just one community or ethnic group is therefore often better, since it is used by all communities.

Taking into account the needs, the project does not always appear to have the **critical mass** to achieve significant results. The groups which were supported only make up a very limited part of the total number of groups in an area. In the case of civil registry, only 20,000 cases of risked statelessness were addressed to date, while there are 700,000 people affected by this issue. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the catalytic effect, which should justify the pluri-sectoral approach of the PBF.

More generally, the hypothesis of a **catalytic effect at different levels** achieved by providing funding to multiple sectors in multiple geographic areas, at multiple levels, creating spillover effects can be partially verified in several ways. Firstly, according to the people interviewed, the PBF made a significant contribution to supporting joint analysis and programming by United Nations agencies, thereby enabling the various conflict vectors to be addressed globally. Furthermore, spillover effects are visible in the form of secured funding from other donors such as the ADB, which was enabled by this first experience of concluding projects with the PBF. The components which were supported are furthermore backed by several Technical and Financial Partners (TFPs): JICA and the EU have initiated socio-security dialogues taking into consideration only the police component, FAO has come in on the AGRs and UNOCI on electoral violence. At the institutional level, certain components which were funded through the PBF were taken up by the authorities, such as the socio-security dialogues, since via the National Security Council the state has demonstrated its ownership by contributing financially and by completely funding the dialogues in areas which were not covered by the PBF. These catalytic effects at government level are however weak in other areas, such as civil status. The creation of the Ministry for Social Cohesion and its decentralized entities can also be considered a catalytic effect, even though the role of these entities is not yet clear, particularly their relationship with prefects and structures which are already carrying out interventions on social cohesion. Other interventions have furthermore been developed, with an extension planned for conflict management in urban areas (UNICEF/UNDP).

In actual fact, in several cases the PBF took over some promising approaches, rather than the other way around (e.g. advisory ethics committee which were part of the police were funded by the EU and then civil-military committees were supported by the PBF, bearing in mind that the EU does not finance defense forces). It therefore sometimes took on a more complementary role rather than acting as a catalyst. The PBF also finances programs which are already ongoing through some UN agencies (such as UNICEF's legal clinics), without there being a clear added value other than ensuring that the support that was already provided in the First Priority Plan is continued. In addition, in some cases, like support for the National Program on Social Cohesion, legal clinics, or support for civil status reform, the PBF provides additional funding to the national programs which already exist at the level of other UN agencies without the specificity of this funding being clearly visibility. At the operational level, however, there were only few training sessions for trainers and the new aspects funded by the PBF were barely integration into the school curricula, although training sessions for police and gendarmerie officers did take place in three targeted schools, EGA, ENP and EGT, and specific modules were taught to all new police and gendarmerie recruits.

In terms of **geographic distribution**, PP2 prioritized eleven regions. The PBF showed a certain level of adaptability, shifting from a focus on north and west to a focus on west, north and north-west. The issue of targeting eleven priority zones however was picked up on by stakeholders, since some important regions like the south-west were not included. Limiting the geographic target of PP2 does make sense in view of providing integrated, multidimensional support which is likely to have the biggest impact and since some factors of insecurity are fairly standard in the country's fragile areas. However, it would require a more in-depth analysis of the priority zones by the various stakeholders, possibly more frequent updates of the priority zones and keeping to a short execution timeframe, considering the volatility of the context. Mapping the interventions at the level of villages and camps would allow to ensure that there is no duplication, that the most critical conflict factors are targeted and that thereby a transformative effect is achieved. The interventions do have an effect in practice and so far, emphasis has been placed on urban centers in various regions, while the problems are more pronounced in rural areas as far as civil status, land-ownership and trust in the DSF is concerned. Nevertheless, those security agents who did participate in the socio-security dialogues included gendarmes, water and forestry agents, etc., whose work takes them beyond urban areas.

5.2. Coherence of the results chain

The content of the programs and projects, as expressed in the project documents, is generally coherent with the results expected in the Priority Plan in terms of design (see table 1): the steps between input – output – intermediate outcomes – impact are clear and logical, apart from the reservations mentioned above. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation (see chapter 6), this chain of results becomes a lot less clear: there is a lack of detail on the advancement of the activities and outputs which were produced (including because the outline of the PBF does not necessarily make it possible to go into detail for each activity due to the limitation on the number of characters per paragraph!); indicators on the intermediate results and the impact are ill-defined and badly presented. Some points are provided by the results frameworks and work programs, but since no detail is provided on the delays and spending, it is hard to assess what was done.

Program 1

In the project document, the total budget was listed as being 5 million USD[4], of which 1.1 million USD would support the security forces, including 500,000 USD for infrastructure refurbishment, and 1.3 million USD would support output 3.3, national ownership of the election process. Most of the interventions concern carrying out and implementing monitoring structures, with a very broad definition of the audience, number of beneficiaries and targeted intervention zones, leading to the impression that there is some redundancy between the components. For example, in the project document, the distinction between several components is not very clear: "1.3 capacity-building among community leaders on social cohesion" and "1.4 socio-economic integration of vulnerable groups", with "6.1 community leaders are made aware of participation by women", or "6.2 capacity-building for women and female organizations at the community level" and "7.2 focus on women's and youth organizations". The same is true when looking at security forces: "1.1 infrastructure and capacity-building among prefectural and security actors" with "restoring security", "2.2 restoring state authority".

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[4] According to UNDP, the breakdown of the budget is: 1.7 million USD for trust between DSF and population, 1.3 for transitional justice in combination with social cohesion, 1.5 for election process, 0.2 for UN Women, and 0.3 for UNESCO and the election process.

Program 2

Some redundancies appear between the various outputs and activities planned around result 3, since four outputs relate to supporting the AGRs and groups, without it being clear what the different approaches or targets are, with the main difference appearing to be the implementing agency: UNFPA, UN Women and FAO, depending on the output.

The amount for Program 2 is 3.85 million USD, which does not seem like a lot when compared to Program 1 and considering its position at mainly a local level, therefore targeting the largest number of beneficiaries and directly supporting output means. The interventions also appear fairly efficient, with 92 groups being supported, i.e. 3200 people whose living conditions and resources should be directly improved.

Support provided to the Technical Secretariat

The 1.15 million USD in funding includes some expenses which are not clearly justified, particularly 120,000 USD for meetings of the Technical Experts Committee, or 53,000 USD for designing and implementing a communication strategy. In spite of the allocated budget, some activities were sparsely carried out, such as the periodic Program reviews (45,000 USD), field visits (39,000), or mapping activities (30,018 USD). The Secretariat's budget seems particularly generous compared to that of other interventions and considering its own needs and absorption capacity.

As far as the **target beneficiaries** of the various components of the Priority Plan are concerned, the focus placed on women in peacebuilding is justified, due to their ability to influence the role played by their husbands and children within the conflict dynamics. Young people are however not targeted consistently, even though they are prone to manipulation and main actors of the Ivorian conflicts. Finally, the Fula people (in areas where they are currently or potentially involved in conflict) should be included in a more systematic way, e.g. involved in the Peace Committees, Friends of Women Spaces, as community relays, etc.

When looking at the **intervention modes** of the various components of the Priority Plan, one notes for instance a proliferation of overlapping committees, several of which already existed before the PBF: local security committees; advisory ethics committees; socio-security committees; peace committees; oversight committees. It is true that the roles and responsibilities, as well as the different actors, of these various committees have been defined and validated by the state partners. However, there is no harmonization and unification of these committees under a national approach which would group together all of the different structures, and they remain unclear to the population (*"There are committees everywhere, we are being force-fed committees"* said one woman leader in Gagnoa).

In more general terms, **the interventions launched several dynamics**, thereby risking dispersion and limited achievements, particularly when these were not clearly taken up by the three new projects launched in January 2017 (e.g. the role of entities belonging to the Ministry for Solidarity in conflict management, the conflict identification system by the DGAT), although they deal with the same topics.

As far as these new projects are concerned, the theories of change pick up on existing approaches in terms of consolidating the social and economic fabric as well as security management, as shown by the analysis of these projects.

The **"Project to support sustained involvement of women in peacebuilding and security in western Côte d'Ivoire"** which was implemented by CARE, aims to strengthen citizen participation in peacebuilding and security through sustained involvement of women and young people in monitoring and reporting on problems of security and peaceful coexistence which affect economic activity, peacebuilding and trust between citizens and authorities in western Côte d'Ivoire. In doing so, it targets cross-border dynamics at the economic (very indirectly),

social and political level, which seems particularly relevant to the Ivorian and regional context since it targets a strategic area at the security level and targets both criminal dynamics affecting the population, and political-security dynamics (elections will take place in Liberia in 2017). The project in fact combines the axes of intervention of programs 1 and 2 and takes on a certain number of actions which have already been carried out. It therefore contains a risk of analyses being duplicated, particularly the mapping of government initiatives and key institutions which should already mostly be available, or a study on the role of women and young people in peacebuilding. The project does however introduce some innovation, such as the community scorecard and an approach to support local ownership of governance and accountability, making it possible to also address issues around transparency or the efficiency of national programs and reforms. It also includes meetings held between security forces and the community, without going into synergies or risks of duplication with respect to institutionalized socio-security dialogues already in place. The project includes almost exclusively intangible components. It will therefore be difficult to see its benefits on the ground or to support the dynamics of coming together according to well-understood common interests or the "peace dividend". The project aims at improving public services, but it is not specified to what extent the relevant institutions have the tools to meet the citizens' expectations. The project has a budget of 1 million USD.

The **"Project on cross-border cooperation between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire for lasting peace and social cohesion"** also addresses issues of trust between communities and security forces, focusing in particular on supporting security forces at the cross-border level. According to the PBSO guidelines, the actions are mostly intangible, particularly in the communities, which also raises the question of their direct interest in social cohesion. The requested budget was 5.186 million USD for two countries, but the budget covered in the project document is only 1.5 million USD, which corresponds to the amount allocated to Côte d'Ivoire in the context of the PBSO funding, while the project should also be co-funded by the DPKO, who have not yet confirmed their funding to date. The link to the socio-security dialogues which are already in place has not been clearly specified, either, which also entails a risk of duplication. This project does not target the PBF's priority zones, since this initiative seeks to complement the PP2 areas.

The project **"Women and young girls as actors in conflict prevention through early warning and information networks"** with UN Women and UNICEF seeks to prevent conflict, build peace and social cohesion in the north, the west and Abidjan in community, urban, rural areas and schools by strengthening the role that women and young girls play in early warning systems and peacebuilding, with a budget of one million USD. It picks up on issues addressed in the two other new projects.

5.3. Link project / program

The interventions are different in nature: two programs and two projects, one of which was completed in June 2016. Their content as expressed in the project documents is coherent with the results expected from the Priority Plan (see table 3). The interaction between the various components of the Priority Plan however is not specifically defined.

Table 3 Correlation between results expected from the Priority Plan and the PBF

Results expected from the Priority Plan (source: Priority Plan)	Results expected from the programs and projects (source: annual reports 2016)
Strategic result 1. Strengthening trust, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections	**PBF/CIV.B-3. Supporting the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and security stability for peaceful elections**

R1. Trust of the population in security and defense forces is enhanced	R1. Trust within the security and defense forces on the one hand and trust of the population in the security and defense forces on the other hand is enhanced to ensure peaceful and safe elections
R2. Supporting the definition of a strategic framework to implement the CDVR recommendations	R2. Trust between the population, particularly victims of the post-election crisis, and national institutions is enhanced by drafting and implementing a strategic framework for social cohesion and the implementation of the CDVR recommendations, particularly the ones relating to victim compensation
R3. Dialogue and trust between political actors and particularly women, young people, civil society are strengthened, contributing to peaceful elections	R3. Political parties and organizations representing civil society, women, young people, and the media become "agents for peace and cohesion" so that the election process can take place in a participatory, democratic and inclusive way without violence
Strategic result 2. Conflict prevention and their peaceful resolution by strengthening the state's capacities and other mechanisms already in place	**PBF/CIV.A-3 Supporting prevention and peaceful management of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire + PBF/CIV.E-2 Support the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and civil status reform in Côte d'Ivoire**
R4. Local and community authorities enhance their capacities to mediate and manage conflicts within and between communities through training and improved analyses of local areas of conflict	R4. Local and community authorities as well as peace committees are empowered and contribute to preventing and peacefully resolving conflict
R5. Policies for registering births and civil status reform is consolidated at the national level in order to prevent conflict linked to a lack of identification, such as statelessness	R5. Births are declared and recorded in the civil register within the legal timeframe, contributing to the prevention of conflicts linked to identity
R6. In areas which are characterized as "sensitive", economic activities linked to high-risk groups help consolidate the process of peaceful conflict-resolution at the local level	R6. Social cohesion becomes prevalent in the population and different social groups work together to implement activities bringing the communities together
R7. Rural populations are better informed about the implementation of the law on rural land-ownership.	R7. The application of the law on rural land ownership is supported by the population and contributes to preventing and resolving conflict
_	R8. Support for the coordination, monitoring, evaluation and communication of the results of Program 2
Efficient coordination, monitoring, reporting, evaluation and communication on the achievement of the objectives set by the Priority Plan and the projects linked to it	**PBF/CIV.H-2. Support the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding**
_	R9. Planning the peacebuilding priorities, coordinating, monitoring and evaluating their implementation, as well as communicating on their results should be carried out in an efficient way

The projects which began in 2017 are also in line with the results expected by the Priority Plan, although they do not explicitly mention the border component. In some cases, the intervention areas go beyond the framework of the priority intervention zones, but this is justified by the fact that these projects are also funded by other sources. Specifically, they are directly linked to several of the results expected in the Priority Plan (R1/Enhanced trust of the population in defense and security forces; R3/ Dialogue and trust between political actors and particularly women, young people, civil society are strengthened, contributing to peaceful elections) and are a useful addition to the Plan's activities on expected results R4 (Local and community authorities enhance their capacities to mediate and manage conflicts within and between communities through training and improved analyses of local areas of conflict).

5.4. Convergence

The PBF encourages convergence between recipient UN agencies and members of the Joint Monitoring Committee in general (including government and civil society) on the programs, with one lead agency for each type of intervention and a complementarity between actors. There is a good level of exchange and shared understanding of the context, the theory of change, Priority Plan 2 and the projects. Several UN stakeholders even went as far as saying that "an excellent instrument which brought us all together, UNS and even UNOCI, is the PBF". This collegial approach applied to all of the programs and projects that the team studied, both for actions at community and at central level. However, there is one caveat linked to the level of involvement of local actors; more stakeholders would have benefitted from being involved at a higher level in order to move forward certain dossiers, such as for instance the reform and functioning of the civil registry (need for new legislation, budgetary needs for basic equipment and supplies). The Ministry of the Interior is however represented in the Steering Committee via its UNS coordination unit.

The stakeholders with whom we met (government, civil society) generally seemed well-informed, including at the decentralized level (sub-prefectures). The government has determined focal areas for each topic: socio-security dialogue (and S-CNS), social cohesion and mapping of conflicts (DGAT)…

In general terms, interaction between one component of the program and another was not defined (see section 5.3). Possible synergies could have been strengthened, including a more precise identification of the distributions of the various activities of the different projects in multiple areas, over time, in terms of target beneficiaries and in terms of intervention modes, which does not appear in the summary documents.

Furthermore, coordination with the interventions of other TFPs could have been increased in order to ensure synergies and a transformative effect. The final evaluation of Priority Plan 1 (2014) already noted that: "*It is not the multitude of actors intervening in the field on the issue of social cohesion but rather a lack of coordination between the initiatives in this area. That is why it would be relevant to carry out a mapping exercise in order to have an overview of the various actors which are intervening in the area of reconciliation and social cohesion*". Since then, two coordination frameworks have been put in place, both at the inter-ministerial level and at the level of actors intervening in the field of social cohesion, thereby showing a certain level of coordination between the committees. This is all the more essential given that UNOCI and several other agencies and TFPs have withdrawn from the decentralized level. The first Priority Plan 1 interventions in prefectural and security infrastructure rehabilitation may have had the effect of mobilizing EU funding to extend the interventions to the national level – idem for the socio-security dialogues supported by the PBF. However, during its 2017 mission the EU highlighted that as far as it was concerned there was little coordination and even less of a synergy, even though the EU and PBF were working on many of the same areas (e.g. support for police station refurbishment, inter-community dialogue, local security committees). In order to be at the right level and achieve an impact that corresponds to their ambitions, the PBF

interventions would benefit from better coordination with other TFPs (complementarity in political dialogue; in operational and analytical activities…).

Outside of Abidjan, coordination is weak at the decentralized level (sub-prefectures). Although the team found no duplication or major contradiction, we highlight yet again the lack of synergies identified and *a fortiori* exploited on site (see the above point on proliferation of committees dealing with security which were not clear to the population; section 6.5 below).

5.5. Risk management

There is a matrix for risk monitoring included in the Priority Plans. This matrix did identify obvious and critical risks as well as mitigation strategies together with the actors responsible, but it has not been updated since it was first drafted in 2014 (e.g. the first risk that was identified in the matrix, concerning the CDVR, has since materialized). Nor has it been clearly integrated into the program. Thus, in order to move forward the topic of the civil registry in the absence of any signs of political will (except for those government agencies which are directly concerned), the joint responsibility of RUNOs and the government for the execution of the intervention was not spelled out. Most of the risks that were identified are political in nature, while program-based risks, risks related to trustees, and security risks are barely mentioned. This shows that there were some gaps in then analysis and integration of these risks, while such an analysis could contribute to providing the strategies and program with orientation, while being better developed and monitored. Furthermore, the risk of duplication / multiplication of training sessions or awareness-raising workshops with the same actors are hardly taken into account, while participants pointed out that they had already attended several such activities.

Similar observations can be made for each project:

For **Program 1 "Supporting the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and security stability for peaceful elections"** there is a matrix for risk monitoring, accompanied by a strategy for risk mitigation and the identification of actors who are responsible. The risks identified are obvious and critical, although there is one important thing lacking: risks linked to the 2016 elections are not mentioned. The strategies for risk mitigation rest on advocacy work towards the government and planned initiatives on direct dialogue in the context of program activities through workshops and other fora for planned and implemented exchanges, but activities with potential spoilers or support for fora in which these spoilers can be addressed through dialogue ("resistant" elements in the DSF, executives, opposition groups) would benefit from being enhanced.

For **Program 2 "Supporting prevention and peaceful management of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire"**, in addition to observations already made, the risk of a lack in funding for programs dealing with delimitation of land had been confirmed at the time of the evaluability mission, but the team is not aware of a change in strategy. Also, the lack of funding to carry out economic activities which bring communities together should be highlighted in particular, since these activities support community mechanisms for the prevention and peaceful management of conflict which have already been established. The strategy to support economic activities is however a gateway to promoting gender equality and ensuring that peace initiatives and social cohesion are anchored in the community. This should be included in an updated version of the risk matrix.

As for the **project "Support the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and reform of the civil registry in Côte d'Ivoire"**, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (RCI) is currently engaged in a process to reform its civil registry, which will lead to a legislative review and the drafting of a budgeted action plan. However, as already mentioned above, the issues surrounding office supplies, which would seem fairly elementary, shows how slowly the reform is moving forward. Furthermore, the mitigation strategy ("enhancing strategies to raise

awareness among the population and the prefecural authorities") does not appear to be sufficiently robust: It is highly likely that advocacy work will be needed vis à vis the central authorities and that mutual responsibilities will have to be identified (e.g. disbursements linked to progress being made on the civil registry legislation).

Finally, as far as the **project "Support the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding"**, the risks which were identified are similar to those for the Priority Plan. No risk along the lines of "limited influence of the TS over the RUNOs" was identified, but, in fact, the position of the TS coordinator, who is also Head of Office of the Resident Coordinator, makes her work easier – a model which could also be applied in other countries.

6. Implementation and feasibility of the objectives

Summary on evaluability (v-green, yellow, orange, red)

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	PBF/CIV.A-3 Prevention and peaceful management of conflicts	PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil registry	PBF/CIV.H-2 Support for the Priority Plan
Potential of results being achieved	G A	G A	G A	A R
Needs and contextual dynamics	G A	G	G	G A
Integration of actors	A R	A R	G	G A
Communication and coordination	G A	G A	G A	A R

6.1. Potential for results to be achieved

Many effects of the Priority Plan are already visible, particularly the carrying out of multiple analyses in various sectors, the implementation of dialogue and capacity-building activities, and community support. However, the analysis of the implementation level is heavily compromised by a lack of legibility of the interventions which were carried out.

Limits to the legibility of results

Beyond the financial data, the Technical Secretariat does **not have an overall vision of the activities planned in the projects / program, of the level of implementation or the detailed achievements**, although the work plans for each component are communicated on a yearly

basis. The minutes of the Steering Committee meetings tend to be brief, do not fulfill their function and do not provide enough detail to ensure the steering of the interventions.

A map (see below) was put together by OCHA to identify some of the activities which were carried out at the local level (sub-prefectures), but it does not include national interventions, does not specify the beneficiary communities and is dated June 2016.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE : Couverture géographique des interventions du Plan Prioritaire phase II / Période Juin 2015 - Juin 2016

The annual report also remains very general, particularly since the number of characters is limited by the various PBF outlines. For instance, the 2016 annual report for Program 1 states that: *"Services provided to women, young people and the population by security actors are more efficient due to technical support and materials provided in the context of the program: the program launched a process to restore equipment in 30 police stations and squads which is still ongoing",* which does not specify what stage these restorations are at or what services were specifically provided to women and young people. For some intervention levels however, the report specifies the number of people that were trained, which corresponds to an activity indicator. This reveals a lack of homogeneity and coherence in the drafting of reports which tend to be either too general or contain a level of detail which is not suitable to monitor the results. With few exceptions, the yearly program reports did not specify the activities which were carried out, or even simply the more general axes of intervention, particularly in relation to the work plan and the results framework. It is therefore difficult to identify the gaps and triangulate with elements which are covered in the PBF annual report, which remains very general. In addition, the two programs and two projects which were taken into account cover various aspects, sectors and geographic areas. It is therefore difficult to get a complete overview of the level to which the results were achieved, what actions were carried out and

what their effects were, since the interviews did not make it possible to overcome this lack of clarity and precision. Furthermore, some activities benefitted from *ad hoc* **funding,** which was not clearly documented.

This lack of a detailed evaluation system may lead to certain abuses. In some cases, particularly the rehabilitation of infrastructure, actions were planned which were not within the priority areas of the Plan, and the Secretariat did not identify this until participating in other coordination meetings of UN agencies.

The **reports which were drafted in the context of the PBF do furthermore not always reflect the whole reality of the actions** on site. For instance, the report which the team received entitled "Budgetary execution of the programs and projects of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding at the end of October 2016" mentions that one of the key and ongoing results for component 1 is the refurbishment of 30 infrastructure facilities, when this is actually an expected result and there is no data available on the current level of implementation.

Finally, no detailed financial report has been obtained so far, not even from the Secretariat, which would have allowed to identify which interventions have effectively been funded in the framework of the various programs and projects.

Level of results achieved

Nevertheless, some progress was identified during the mission.

Generally, there are some undeniable results in the area of **contributing to social cohesion and peacebuilding**. These can be measured particularly through interactions which exist between the communities. In Bouna for instance, following intra-community tensions, one community had stopped going to the central market and used their own market instead. Now they have once again started going to a joint market in town, which is also used by other communities. Members of the communities have noted changes in behavior and enhanced communication between ethnic groups which used to simply "stare at each other like statues". Having shared interests and objectives linked to the interventions (AGRs, infrastructure) brings communities together.

Various testimonies were gathered on this subject:

Member of the DSF, Gagnoa: "For me, the biggest change (thanks to the socio-security dialogue) has been that I finally know what people think of us. Otherwise, we only ever run into each other during moments of tension and we don't have an open dialogue. Now we have a shared understanding of problems in the area. Another change for me is that I have now met gendarmes and prison managers. Before, I did not really know what their job was."

Sales woman who participated in the socio-security dialogue in Gagnoa: "What has really made a change for all of us is that now young people have understood the message that you must not destroy things belonging to your own community. You wouldn't sell your teeth because you were hungry. They have to think of the future!"

Female peace leader, Gagnoa: "Change? Well, peace has returned to Gagnoa. And it's because we are searching for security together".

Secretary general of the Friends of Women Space for Peace, Guiglo: "Before, it was 'each to their own field'. Now we see women from Burkina Faso, from Mali, Malinke and Guéré women, all together in the same field".

In some cases, the activities were also seen as a way of preventing conflict, which should also not be neglected:

Regional director, Friends of Women Space for Peace, Guiglo: "No, I don't see a lot of change. But that's a good thing! We could have slid into Christian-Muslim conflict, but we didn't".

The interventions contribute to **strengthening the administration** and the reach of the state, while at the same time sometimes developing a new perspective. They contribute to creating various structures at the national (Ministry for Social Cohesion and decentralized structures) and local level (Peace Committees, oversight committees, socio-security committees, community relays). However, their sustainability remains uncertain, considering the state's low level of financial resources to take on some of the basic actions, such as building new police stations or providing adequate operational budgets to local institutions. Nevertheless, the fact that these needs have been included among the state's priorities is already the beginning of an ownership process which is vital for sustainability. The program also enhanced the **democratic and governance framework** by strengthening the capacities of countervailing powers, the media, civil society and citizens.

There were some **delays** in the beginning since the drafting of the Priority Plan and the interventions started quite late, in June-July 2015. Some of the agencies also ran into administrative difficulties which further delayed the process. According to them, the delays which were caused were made up for. However, support in connection with the elections was distributed too late to have a real effect on potential election violence. Finally, the time difference between the Priority Plan and the political dynamics also generated delays, particularly in the case of transitional justice (the CDVR report was not made public until 2016, while it had been worked on since 2014).

The **capacities of state services still remain relatively weak**, which could compromise the desired results. Thus, the three civil registry offices which we met pointed out for example that they sometimes run out of civil status registries, which need to be provided to them by UNICEF, since the state cannot guarantee supply. Furthermore, the civil registry system has not been digitized, which leads to the risk of duplication. Communication and transport means for agents endorsed to resolve conflicts is also limited, which makes it difficult for them to access particularly remote areas. This raises the question of partnership with the state: mutual responsibilities are not spelled out. One could consider the approach adopted by the PBF in other countries, such as Burundi, where material support was made subject to the prior adoption of reforms, meaning that partnerships with state structures were strengthened with a view to ensuring interdependent planning.

The various ongoing reforms often also suffer from a **lack of awareness-raising** and information, as was notably the case of the referendum on the constitution (2016) and the land ownership reforms, which are still not very well known (some actors on the ground still refer to compensation rates which are several decades old, in spite of the fact that they were reviewed in 2014, for example).

Finally, the quality of the refurbished infrastructure can sometimes be low (such as insulation problems in air-conditioned offices) or they are not durable (in the second Plan, the General Directorate of the National Police had initially requested the refurbishment of infrastructure which had already been dealt with in the first Priority Plan, since the infrastructure had already deteriorated).

The following table shows some implementation examples for each of the interventions in relation to the expected results.

EXPECTED RESULTS	
Strengthening trust in the authorities, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections in Côte d'Ivoire. Program 1 – "Supporting the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections in Côte d'Ivoire"	

EXPECTED RESULTS	
Result 1: Trust within the defense and security forces on the one hand and trust of the population in the defense and security forces on the other hand is enhanced to ensure peaceful and safe elections	Socio-security dialogues are institutionalized but data on the effects of the mechanism is still limited. However, there is good potential that the results will be achieved: dialogue channels between members of the community and DSF, among DSF, better knowledge of their mutual responsibilities and their mutual perceptions, agreement on principles of engagement and behavioral norms… Start of the refurbishment of 30 infrastructures. Four female gendarme officers were trained. Several training sessions focused on security. Six socio-security dialogues were carried out.
Result 2: Trust between the population, particularly victims of the post-election crisis, and national institutions is enhanced by drafting and implementing a strategic framework for social cohesion and the implementation of the CDVR recommendations, particularly the ones relating to victim compensation	Limited progress due to delays in publishing the report. Not likely that results will be achieved. Nevertheless: The MSCSIV, CDVR and CONARIV in charge of transitional justice are receiving technical assistance / technical know-how for victim hearings, setting up a data base of victims Support in the validation of a compensation grid made it possible to launch the process through two workshops and the establishment of an operation mode for the compensation process Supporting the archiving the CDVR and CONARIC document library Supporting the publication of the CDVR report with a start on the implementation of more than 80% of the recommendations Training magistrates, lawyers and court clerks on transitional justice with the OHCHR in order to facilitate the implementation of the legal CDVR recommendations Validation of the National Strategy on Reconciliation and Social Cohesion and the new National Program on Social Cohesion (2016-2020)
Result 3: Political parties and organizations representing civil society, women, young people, and the media become "agents for peace and cohesion" so that the election process can take place in a participatory, democratic and inclusive way without violence	Lack of data – to this day – on representation of women and young people in the election process in relation to performance indicators Clear results in the area of awareness-raising among women and young people in the areas 7 dialogue platforms were created 60 women leaders from different parties were trained; one draft legislation was drawn up to increase the rate of female representation. 155 media representatives were trained. Awareness raised among 200 young people on citizenship 95% of the prefectural corps were trained Mass campaigns on civic education and awareness-raising contributed to mobilizing over 820,000 people who were directly affected, 74 community relays and leaders and 430 local leaders (religious figures, community Chiefs, young people, women) around the issues of civic participation and the organizing of peaceful and inclusive elections. Enhancing the skills of women candidates with a reaffirmed commitment to winning an elected position. The actions contributed to better preparation and a more active participation of female candidates and made it possible to obtain a small increase in the number of women in Parliament. It should be noted that the results in this area occurred within the framework of another project.
Conflict prevention and their peaceful resolution by strengthening the state's capacities and other mechanisms already in place.	

EXPECTED RESULTS	
Program 2 – "Supporting prevention and peaceful management of conflict in Côte d'Ivoire"	
Result 1: Local and community authorities as well as peace committees efficiently ensure the prevention and peacefully resolution of conflict	Strengthening the capacities of local actors. Good potential to achieve results but some fragile communities were not targeted and the structural conflict vectors were not addressed (governance of natural resources, confinement of animals, compensation mechanisms for damage done to farmers / herders)
	352 local actors from 14 regions, including (i) 152 members of the prefectural corps and (ii) 200 community leaders and members of Civil Society Organizations were trained on conflict prevention and management over the course of 13 training workshops, with technical support from UNDP, UNOCI and DGAT
	Furthermore, DGAT equipped itself with a conflict data base and a system for uploading information
Result 2: The application of the law on rural land ownership is supported by the population and contributes to preventing and resolving conflict	Documents to support communication and enhance the skills of social actors on the 1998 law on land ownership is currently in its pilot phase, affecting 207 villages in the department of Bouna
	Participation by 445 traditional Chiefs (of which 155 women) from 104 villages in Bocanda and 404 participants (of which 121 women) from 215 territorial jurisdictions in Bouna in engaging in the management of land-related conflicts, certification of land and village delimitation. The involvement of the population in applying the law on land ownership still needs to be enhanced at the national level in 2017, since this will require significant additional means
	In Bocanda, contracts between agro-industrial companies and individuals for an operational duration of between 35 and 50 years over 8250 ha with a land certificate for 4 companies.
Result 3: Social cohesion becomes prevalent in the population and different social groups work together to implement activities bringing the communities together	Actions to support the AGRs are sometimes almost finalized (UN Women) and there are several examples of behavioral change.
	92 women's groups and 40 youth groups are being set up in the Program 2 areas. Members of those groups have been trained: 280 women trained in simplified accounting and association management; 210 young people trained in association management.
	At all sites, awareness-raising activities on social cohesion were carried out twice a month. Particularly in Bouna, support kits on dignity and awareness-raising were provided by the UNFPA/Social center for populations affected by community conflict. 240 people from 105 groups were trained in conflict prevention.
	40 Peace Committees and perpetuation committees were put in place with support from UNFPA and the Ministry for Solidarity, which constitute mechanisms for post-training follow-up and national and community ownership of the peace initiatives. The functioning of the Friends of Women Spaces for Peace contributes to this approach of gender-promotion and the sustainability of peace infrastructure, particularly at the local and community level.
	With the FAO in the west, joint intensive and sustainable farming of 72 ha of lowland (2 cycles of rice per year targeted in association with vegetable holdings) per 635 people from different communities, including 330 men, 305 women, of which 344 were young people. The agricultural input (seeds and fertilizers), the equipment (tillers, winnowers, moto-tricycles) and technical advice were the main support components.
	Eleven farmer school fields were set up in eight locations in the departments of Guiglo, Bloléquin and Duekoué, bringing together growers

EXPECTED RESULTS	
	from different communities and serving as a community-based place in which a training workshop on nutrition and food hygiene was provided. In the north-west, following the crisis in Bouna, 200 households including 166 women and 34 young men from 10 villages in vulnerable rural communities received 13 ha of vegetable crops and 7,200 kg of fertilizer.
Joint project – "Support the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and civil status reform in Côte d'Ivoire"	
Result: Births are declared and recorded in the civil register within the legal timeframe, contributing to the prevention of conflicts linked to identity	Potential for achieving the objectives at the level of the activities but the objective of increasing the rate of declared births by 10% within the time frames was ambitious. The project raised awareness among 92,000 people and close to 11,000 children were regularized

Rate of disbursement

Disbursement rates can be used as indicators of the level of achievement (details in annex). The average rate is 54%, i.e. 6.4 million USD out of the 12 million which were allocated, which seems satisfactory, particularly taking into account the delays in getting the activities going. The Priority Plan is valid until December 2017. In June 2016, disbursement for Program 1 was 11%, shifting to 56.43% in October 2016. As for Program 2, the implementation rate is currently 53.41% (out of 3,850,000 USD). The lowest rate concerns the UNDP interventions in the context of Program 2, with 30.61% of the allocated 800,000 USD disbursed, while the highest rate concerns UN Women, at 74.72% disbursement under Program 2, and UNICEF, at 73.12% in the context of the program to support registration of births.

It should be noted that the Technical Secretariat has already spent 45% of the 1.5 million USD, while in future the ONP is to be in charge of collecting routine data, which will generate quite significant costs.

6.2. Taking into account contextual needs and dynamics

Several documents and data contributed to the analysis of needs and contextual dynamics and to formulating the programs. A joint identification mission has already been carried out[5]. Furthermore, UNOCI reports on the situation in the country as well as conflict matrixes from UNOCI's civil affairs department were used. Further studies were carried out within the context of the PBF:

Program 1:

➢ Situational analysis of local committees and mechanisms to prevent and peacefully manage conflict in western Côte d'Ivoire, UNFPA, September 2015;

Program 2:

➢ Community diagnosis through active method of participatory research (MARP) for the implementation of "Friends of Women Spaces for Peace" in western Côte d'Ivoire (Duekoue, Guiglo, Danane, Zouan-Hounien), UNFPA, September 2015

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[5] Joint mission on peacebuilding challenges in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2014

> ➢ Situational reference analysis in the departments of Bouna and Bocanda in March 2016 carried out by the FAO and UNESCO with support from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry for Culture and Francophonie and Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development.
> ➢ Interpeace, study on obstacles to social cohesion and dynamics of violence involving young people in urban areas, July 2015.

Civil registry project:

> ➢ Basic study on civil registry centers and the knowledge, attitude and practices of the population in the regions of Gbeke, Guemon, Kabadougou, Tonkpi and Worodougou on civil registry matters, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, INS, 2013.
> ➢ UNFPA TRAC 2015 study on the deciding factors for declaring children under the age of 5 to the civil registry within the legal timeframe.

Support to the Secretariat: no basic analysis, which is understandable.

The beneficiaries were identified by the communities in order to ensure their legitimacy, as well as by agencies in the case of groups, one of the main criteria being a mixed ethnic structure (without relying on quotas, which would be damaging). This shows that efforts were made to be based on local dynamics.

Delays may have occurred due to discrepancies between the interventions required by the beneficiaries and the PBF financing or approval modalities. Some state partners, the police for instance, took the view that the priority zones did not always correspond to their needs in terms of infrastructure refurbishment. The 2016 annual report on Program 1 therefore states that: "Indeed, following several field missions, 7 of the 15 sites which had been suggested by the police had already been refurbished by other financial partners. At the level of the gendarmerie, urgent needs in the area of brigades to be refurbished did not always correspond to the constraints of the intervention zones under Priority Plan 2". Stakeholders in Bayota were surprised that only one of the two cantos was targeted, since the one which was not targeted had experienced clashes and the risk remains high. On the other hand, the targeting of activities implemented by the FAO in Guiglo is based on clear criteria: focusing on the return of displaced persons and refugees.

6.3. Implementation method

The Technical Secretariat plays a major role in the organization of the steering of the PBF. This role consists mainly of organizing meetings – often within a very short time frame, which limits the actors' capacity to ensure that these meetings are well prepared – and reviewing half-yearly reports. The TS also supports the Steering Committee in advocacy work and in mobilizing additional resources in the context of formulating new PBF initiatives.

Furthermore, several committees are in charge of the governance of the Priority Plan and certain interventions, playing additional roles, and the actors within each program carry out coordinated actions.

The Steering Committee, which is responsible for the Plan and related interventions and is also in charge of strategic management, is the only structure – alongside the Technical Secretariat – whose role is specified in the Priority Plan. It meets twice a year. The Technical Experts Committee, which provides program support, came together ten times between April 2014 and December 2016. The Program Coordination Committee in turn only met on a very irregular basis which, according to the Secretariat, contributed to limiting the synergies between the Programs and Projects. Indeed, it was planned that they would come together once per quarter. The minutes of the meetings were not available.

The capacity for implementation rested mainly with the agencies, while the Secretariat's role was not always very clear to the various stakeholders, particularly when it comes to monitoring and evaluation.

In addition, the PBF included the implementation of actions with similar goals, such as for instance the AGRs, by several UN agencies (UNFPA, UN Women) or community structures (Oversight Committees, Peace Committees, network of facilitators). These agencies often structured their interventions differently although they were operating in the same area, which led to a certain amount of imbalance and confusion, as reported by beneficiaries who could not understand why the AGR interventions were being carried out differently, for example.

6.4. Integration of relevant actors

Almost unanimously, as indicated under point 5.1, the beneficiaries which were interviewed highlighted the role played by some politicians and executives in manipulating young people and potential spillover effects this may have. These repeated interventions, particularly during election time, pose a threat to social cohesion and the long-term results of action which has been taken. Efforts have been undertaken by the local authorities to raise awareness among these politicians and executives and include them in conflict resolution mechanisms, and they have also been invited to attend certain training or awareness-raising meetings. However, in some cases these actors are exiled abroad (particularly in Liberia). The need to raise awareness among them and involve them more in meetings with young people and women for instance was pointed out by the communities, taking into account the possible threat they represent. This is particularly true for the context of Program 1 on violence linked to elections.

The needs are furthermore essential in the area of youth employment and in some cases awareness-raising among young people, as some of the community relays in Bouna pointed out. It is sometimes indeed difficult for them to explain what the peace dividend is. Some vectors could be used towards this aim, such as sport or music. The Youth Employment Agencies could also constitute an interesting relay. This aspect applies above all to Program 2.

As far as ethnicities are concerned, in some cases the Fula people were less integrated into the activities than other groups, as was particularly the case in Bouna.

6.5. Communication / coordination

There is frequent interaction between the various actors involved, and the level of stakeholder mobilization seems satisfactory. Exchanges of information are however sometimes unbalanced, particularly the transmission of reports to the Secretariat by the agencies. They may in turn be demotivated since the level of response or interest shown in this data has proven to be weak in the past.

Coordination essentially takes place at the central level. At the local level, actors do sometimes share the same buildings, but there is no effective mechanism in place for this, such as focal points for the PBF or for the UN system, for instance, which would ensure synergies and avoid duplication between projects at the level of the sub-prefectures which are affected. In particular, OCHA is no longer active. Coordination with state partners also seems satisfactory, even if they were not always involved in defining the Priority Plan and the programs / projects during the formulation phase.

Although there are coordination mechanisms within each program / project, synergies between the components were barely exploited. The PBF has however facilitated a coordinated approach by making use of certain relays – Peace Committees – to raise awareness on the subjects addressed in several of the programs / project. The joint character of the programs was also exploited through monitoring missions which generally brought together several agencies. The multiplication of basic structures linked to peacebuilding does however remain a challenge, since they are essentially linked to specific interventions. In this regard, increased coordination between the different organizations at the level of the RUNOs and all of the NGO and agencies would be relevant for limiting the number of structures in each community,

institutionalizing them where possible, and ensuring coherence between the various approaches. It should also be noted that both programs 1 and 2 contain training sessions on conflict management, social cohesion etc., which may sometimes overlap in terms of their audience: leaders, women and young people. The risk of duplication should not be neglected, while needs are still far from being met.

In terms of communication, there is a communications officer within the Secretariat and a specific strategy has been developed, but there were not really any specific communication actions that were taken. The PBF's visibility should be strengthened through specific visual aids since in some cases UNDP stickers were used, as there were no PBF stickers available. Media coverage of the PP2 activities has been ensured (TV, radio, print press, online press), communication visuals have been designed and there is an effective release of regular publications (reflections (01), newsletters (03), Twitter, Facebook), a database for photos and videos has been put in place.

The Technical Secretariat plays an important role as a liaison officer between the agencies receiving the funding and the government, through technical assistance to strengthen project management capacities, as well as monitoring and reporting. It also ensures that there are synergies and complementarity between actions carried out by different partners on peacebuilding. During the six months spent on formulating the projects, the Secretariat organized the setting up of working groups, and led and supervised the process of formulating the programs and projects. Recently, it also supported the formulation process of a cross-border project between Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia on strengthening security and social cohesion, as well as two projects launched by the PBSO on Gender Promotion Initiatives (GPI). According to some actors, the dissemination of information and the Secretariat's participation in technical aspects, such as during formulation, could be enhanced. In order for the information flow mentioned by the RUNOs to be improved, it would be useful for the agencies to hold Program Coordination Committee meetings as initially planned, since these meetings constitute a forum for information exchange, facilitating decision-taking during committee meetings and operational synergies.

This study has not identified major differences linked to communication and coordination depending on the interventions.

7. Monitoring and evaluation

The following table provides a summary of assessment of the various programs and projects in light of the study questions on monitoring and evaluation, which will be elaborated on after the table (section 7.1 and following):

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	PBF/CIV.A-3 Prevention and peaceful management of conflict	PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil registry	PBF/CIV.H-2 Support for the Priority Plan
Monitoring and evaluation system	A R	A R	G A	A R
Quality of the indicators	A R	G A	G A	A R

Baseline data	A R	A R	G A	A R
Focus group	A R	A R	A R	n.a.

7.1. M&E system

The **M&E system** at the level of the Secretariat essentially takes the shape of monitoring carried out by the Steering Committee on the basis of a very general framework of results. Reviews are currently ongoing and two workshops took place in November to finalize the monitoring and evaluation plan, i.e. one and a half years after the start of PP2, which means that it will have a very limited usefulness in steering the project. The M&E plan that was finalized in December 2016 with actors, coordinators, and PBF focal points includes a monitoring framework for the various programs and projects, but there remain some limits. The monitoring plan for Program 1 does not include basic data and objectives, for instance.

In terms of monitoring and evaluation, in agreement with the National Office of the Population (ONP), the TS launched two perception surveys[6] (qualitative and quantitative) on the end of PP1, which served to obtain baseline data for PP2. An exercise mapping the interventions was carried out. Two field missions involving the Technical Secretariat have taken place since the launch of the second Priority Plan. They were carried out jointly with other agencies. Other missions had other work frames and made it possible for certain members of the Technical Secretariat to collect information on the implementation of project activities, in the context of its contribution to the workshop on drafting the compensation grid for victims of the crisis, and the workshops on establishing the 2014 and 2015 directories for the civil registry.

In addition, the **yearly reports** are put together during workshops bringing together the partners, who finance their own travel. To a certain extent, the inclusiveness of this process led to delays in finalizing the work plan, which in turn delayed the finalization of the annual reports, although monitoring and follow-up and the field missions were not planned at the beginning of the interventions.

The PBF guidelines define responsibility for the transfer of reports. This includes one annual report by the Steering Committee at the level of the program cycle, the transfer of reports on the status of project results by the UN agencies, and financial overviews at the end of the year as well as quarterly reports by the implementing partners. Only some general financial data was transferred without the expense details which had been requested from some of the agencies, including the Secretariat, being provided.

The various report types have specific formats, which also limits the level and type of reporting and the different sections are not always informed in a coherent way, some elements do not appear in the appropriate section and sometimes the information contradicts itself.

Besides the obligatory reports (quarterly and yearly reports on programs and projects and annual reports by the Steering Committee on the Priority Plan), the Secretariat is not in possession of all of the reports which were elaborated by the stakeholders, including for monitoring purposes, while it could well be playing a role in capitalizing on the data.

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[6] Study to measure the perception of the impact of the Priority Plan I and the basic level of indicators of Priority Plan II for peacebuilding. Qualitative and quantitative aspects, June 2016.

A table to monitor the reports was however put together by the Secretariat, as well as a dashboard structure in order to monitor the indicators (although not the implementation of the activities). Other tools were also developed:

- Indicator collection sheets for each program
- An operational plan for activity implementation
- A very detailed monitoring table for monthly tasks
- A monitoring table for the cost of activities by month
- A monitoring matrix for the implementation of activities
- An analysis matrix for achievements by project and program
- An integrated plan for missions / field visits
- An integrated monitoring / evaluation research plan (PISER) from 2014 to 2018
- A monitoring matrix for the implementation of recommendations.

Not all of these various tools were actually used. They would be useful, but also appear to be very ambitious. To monitor the activities and costs, it would be sufficient to e.g. use the Excel structure of the work plan and add certain lines and columns to indicate whether or not the activity was carried out and what its true cost was, particularly since the Priority Plan is due to deliver results in 2017. The use of Atlas and UNDP monitoring software (such as ROAR) could also be an option.

The new monitoring / evaluation plan includes **sub-contracting the monitoring function out to the National Office of the Population**, which carried out the perception survey that was published in July 2016, according to the Methodological Note for routine data collection for the monitoring of Priority Plan indicators of October 2016. This note provides a good basis for structuring the data collection and ensuring that relevant data is obtained. However, it also requires that the ONP collect certain indicators which were initially planned for within the results framework and which are available from state partners, and to which the OPN therefore brings no added value. This concerns DGAT data on conflicts or the number of women and young people taking part in the elections for CEI, the number of complaints made to the constitutional council or female candidates. Furthermore, the note contains indicators added to the results framework which are also directly available from the various institutions (e.g. "number of victims registered with the police and gendarmerie services following the presidential elections of 2015 or the legislative elections of 2016" or the "number of positive responses due to the nature of climate during the elections").

This note also addresses various levels of indicators but does not tackle all of the indicators in the results frameworks. It is not clear on what basis some indicators were selected over others in the collection system. One can also find indicators which were originally present but which were not informed due to a lack of sufficient data, but there are no elements which would allow to indicate a change in the availability of the data at this level.

The perception survey which was carried out also gives rise to some comments. The approach was relevant and included a solid methodology for surveying, encoding and analyzing the results. However, the tools used to collect the data are not mentioned in the reports.

The monitoring and evaluation framework which was reviewed in December furthermore includes results which were to be collected during a perception survey but which are not mentioned in the methodological note. Such as, for instance, the "proportion of people who did not feel safe following the post-election crisis but who feel safe now" and "proportion of people having said that they are satisfied with the interventions by the transitional justice mechanism from which they benefited".

The sub-contracting appears relevant as far as collecting additional data is concerned, but also raises the question of the efficiency of the system.

In addition to this more general level, the agencies sometimes also had a specific monitoring system for their interventions and **several monitoring and evaluation systems overlapped**, without the monitoring which was carried out by the agencies being systematically relayed to

the level of the Secretariat or the entire PBF. Most of the monitoring and evaluation work was carried out internally by the agencies on the basis of indicators agreed with the PBF but according to their own system. They were in charge of assessing the level to which the project for which they were responsible was achieving its goals: design of the key indicators and reporting, before the PBF Secretariat would even play a role in (i) liaising between the fund's beneficiary agencies and (ii) monitoring and quality assurance of the reports submitted to the Steering Committee and to the PBF in New York.

At the level of Program 1, the UNDP evaluation plan 2009-2016 which is available under erc.undp.org included a country program evaluation in 2015 as well as an evaluation of the project to support the election process. The Work Plan included a monitoring mission in 2016 which the team is not aware of to date.

Within the context of Program 2, UN Women carried out monitoring missions with its partners. A joint mission to evaluate the social cohesion needs was arranged by the PNCS and UNFPA in May 2017 in the department of Bouna (north-east) and was carried out. Two further joint monitoring missions also took place.

In terms of the project on civil registry, monitoring missions took place[7]. The PALAJ, Project to Support Improved Access to Rights and Justice, which the legal clinics of UNICEF are also part of, was evaluated in 2014. Furthermore, four control missions were carried out by the prosecutor of the court of first instance (Ministry of Justice) of Man in 2015 in the area of Tonkpi, according to one of the objectives under result 2, which is the carrying out of supervisory or control missions in the civil registry centers.

The level of monitoring and evaluation robustness therefore varies depending on the programs and projects, including at the structural level. Program 2 includes result 4 which is dedicated to coordination, follow-up and visibility, with specific performance indicators in terms of missions and documents produced, unlike Program 1. Furthermore, UNICEF, UN Women and UNFPA have specific people in charge of monitoring and evaluation in addition, which is not the case for the other agencies.

The general current system could further capitalize on the various elements by integrating them into the monitoring and evaluation plan and the gathering of indicators, particularly by verifying that state partners have good knowledge and steering capacity of those performance indicators that concern them.

7.2. Quality of the indicators

This analysis is based on the revised results framework, as laid out in the monitoring and evaluation plan of December 2016. The workshops at the end of 2016 planned to limit the number of indicators, to strengthen the differentiation of indicators from outcomes and outputs, and to ensure that they covered the various aspects of the expected results. The project and program indicators as revised in December are generally coherent with those of the Priority Plan, but there are more of them and they are more substantiated in the context of program/project results (see annex 6). Some of the Plan's key indicators were however not included, such as the level of violence linked to the elections. On the other hand, the revised indicators vary between the program and project results framework (in the monitoring and evaluation plan of 04 December 2016) and the monitoring framework which is mentioned in the same document.

Table 4 - Comparison between monitoring framework and results framework

Monitoring framework for program and project indicators	Project result framework

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[7] UNICEF, Trip Report, program visit AFJC, April 2015.

Effect 1: Trust within the security and defense forces on the one hand and trust of the population in the security and defense forces on the other hand is enhanced to ensure peaceful and safe elections	**Indicator 1.1:** Proportion of people (men, women, young people) who are satisfied with the services provided by the security forces	**Result 1:** Trust within the security and defense forces on the one hand and trust of the population in the security and defense forces on the other hand is enhanced to ensure peaceful and safe elections	Result indicator 1 a: Number of regions with an operational local mechanism for implementing the RSS
	Indicator 1.2: Proportion of people with access to security services in settling their disputes		Result indicator 1 b: Number of ethics committees which became functional between the population and actors in charge of security (police, gendarmerie, FRCI)
			Result indicator 1 c: Level of cooperation between the population and actors in charge of security
Product 1.1: the local population and authorities take on ownership of the RSS process	**Indicator 1.1.1a:** Number of regional security committees which were put in place and functional	Product 1.1: the local population and authorities take on ownership of the RSS process	Indicator 1.1.1: Number of regional security committees which were put in place and functional with at least 30% women
	Indicator 1.1.1b: Number of regional security committees in which women made up at least 30% of the members		
	Indicator 1.1.2: Level of RSS ownership among the various security forces		

The indicators used in the initial result framework are generally relevant, depending on the intervention, but they are **sometimes not sufficiently linked to the activities or are not complete enough in order to allow for all of the results to be monitored and evaluated**. For instance, the result 2 indicator of the Priority Plan is "Preventing and peacefully resolving conflict by strengthening the state's capacities and other mechanisms in place" and does not cover the aspects of prevention, strengthening the state's capacities or even the number of local conflicts recorder per area.

The **differences between the output and the outcome levels are furthermore not always reflected in the indicators.** For instance, result 1 / program 1 states as a result indicator 1c: Level of cooperation between the population and actors in charge of security; while this could actually be considered an output.

In addition, some indicators appear to be inconsistent, such as the performance indicator of the Priority Plan measuring whether the agencies submit their reports less than seven days after the deadline! Furthermore, this is not measured precisely and the Secretariat's reports mention a "small delay" in relation to this indicator.

The frame of reference for the indicators is furthermore sometimes imprecise, such as in Program 1

- *Result indicator 1 c: Level of cooperation between the population and actors in charge of security;*

Reference level: Weak level of cooperation between the population and actors in charge of security

Target: Strong cooperation between the population and actors in charge of security

- *Result indicator 3: Level of trust of population towards Ivorian security forces*

Reference level: population has a mixed perception of the security forces in the areas targeted by the PP (central west) (% tbd: perception survey)

Target: Existence of a framework for dialogue between the population and security forces.

A 50% increase in the percentage of people in the population that feels safe thanks to the security forces

Measuring perception requires a specific study which is more difficult to implement. It is not indicated what baseline data would allow to assess a 50% increase.

The same is true for

Priority Plan: Result indicator 5: Number of local conflicts in the "sensitive areas targeted by the Priority Plan" which were resolved by local authorities and mechanisms without resorting to violence

Reference level: CI records a significant number of local conflicts (land ownership, mining, inter-tribal, identity-based, between farmers and herders) (see PSCD mapping)

Target: Decrease the number of conflict recorded in the target areas by 20%

Increase the number of conflicts resolved by 50%

Furthermore, in some cases, the link between the interventions and the indicators appears confused.

Priority Plan: Result indicator 4: Number/adoption of CDVR recommendations which were monitored by the authorities

Reference situation: CDVR report and recommendations in the process of being finalized

Existence of several national reconciliation mechanisms

Target: Coordination and monitoring framework for the implementation of the CDVR recommendations exists and is functional

In the latter case, aiming to adopt a certain number of recommendations is not coherent with the stated reference situation and target.

In Programs 1 and 2, the indicators do not always appear to be coherent with the reference level, although the workshop in December 2016 did allow for some adjustments.

Result indicator 3 a: Number of dialogue platforms is enhanced to ensure peaceful elections	Reference level: Needs to strengthen the capacities of institutional actors for peaceful elections identified	Target: At least two (2) recommendations implemented
Result indicator 3b: number of organizations and institutions and state structures involved in the election process and peaceful coexistence among which awareness was raised and whose capacities were strengthened	Reference level: existence of a female parliamentary caucus 24/254 female members of parliament, 10 / 197 female mayors and 01/31 female presidents of regional councils	Target: At least 75% of target organizations and institutions are strengthened and/or implement peacebuilding activities for peaceful elections
Outcome: Prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict improves and consolidates peace and social cohesion in a coordinated framework in Côte d'Ivoire		
Indicator 1 a: % of local conflicts in the intervention areas of the Priority Plan "resolved by local authorities and mechanisms without resorting to violence"	Reference level: % (see CDVR project report, sub-prefecture of Blolequin)	Target: 70%
Indicator 1 b: Number of local conflicts in the "sensitive areas targeted by the Priority Plan" resolved by local authorities and mechanisms without resorting to violence	Reference level: The CI recorded a high level of local conflicts (land ownership, mining, inter-tribal, identity-based, between farmers and herders)	Target: Reducing the number of conflicts recorded in the target area by 20%. Increase the number of conflicts resolved by 50%

In some cases, the various output indicators are near repeats:

Indicator 3.2.4: Number of community-based women's organizations carrying	Reference level: 45 (IRF)	Target: 100

out inclusive and peacebuilding economic activities		
Indicator 3.3.1: Number of input beneficiary groups in which those responsible for production carry out joint collections, marketing	Reference level: tbd	Target: 20

Some objectives and indicators still need to be defined:

Indicator 3.1.3: Surface area being used by vulnerable populations for food-crop production	Reference level:	Target

At the level of the civil registry project, the indicators are relevant and clear.

As far as the project covering support for the PBF Technical Secretariat is concerned, the output indicators are fairly clear and measurable since they cover meetings held and the production of a work plan or monitoring documents. However, the quality level expected from the deliverables is not clearly defined and it would seem necessary for one of the performance indicators to be the on-time submission of deliverables, rather than after the deadline.

It should be noted that although the PBF plans for perception surveys to be carried out in order to measure the population's feeling on security, the security forces, or certain elements of social cohesion **indicators should have been used which were easier to access.** For instance, some institutes regularly carry out studies, such as Afrobarometer or the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Furthermore, other indicators, sometimes very community-specific ones, easily show changes in the area of social cohesion. In Bouna for instance, following inter-community violence, both Muslim and Christian communities started using their own markets. Following the interventions on social dialogue (by different actors), the population has now gone back to using a shared market. The fact that basic infrastructure and services are only used by specific communities is an example of a sign of division. Finally, state services could communicate data which is useful as a performance indicator and which is not yet integrated in the monitoring process, such as the number of incidences between the population and security forces, or the number of cases reported to the security forces by the population, the extent to which the hotline was used to report cases of abuse and the level to which the exchange structure function.

7.3. Baseline data

There is very little baseline data available for the results frameworks specified in the project documents, as stated above. This should however be seen in light of the projects, some of which lent themselves more easily to a quantitative analysis on the basis of government data than others. The perception survey was due to provide baseline data, but it was only finalized in 2016 (see section on Monitoring and Evaluation system).

In terms of the outputs, the indicators are often quantitative in nature, which makes it easier to obtain baseline data. In some cases, when it comes to producing a document or an institution, the baseline data mentioned is 0. This data could have been more nuanced or refined in order to better reflect the starting situation (for example, while a specific document may have been lacking, there may still have been relevant approaches within some institutions) and the results achieved (for example the inclusion of the formulation mode or the level of dissemination or application).

Program 1 used the level of violence during the 2011 elections as its baseline data. This data was updated during the workshop in Bassam in December 2016. Baseline data also existed

when it came to measuring the implementation of consultation structures, the number of services equipped, particularly in terms of prolonging ongoing interventions.

Program 2 used the level of conflict, but the baseline data was not specifically used as guidance at the level of the results.

The civil registry project focused on statistics concerning the registration of births and its baseline data consisted of the monitoring study on the First Priority Plan.

7.4. Control group

At this stage, no approach involving a comparison with control groups has been envisaged, except for in the case of civil registry, where it is easier to compare beneficiary areas with non-beneficiary areas, although the ethnic parameters will also have to be taken into account. The project documents however provide no data on this subject.

Bearing in mind the nature of the activities, the project's objective and the contextual specificities of each area, it is unlikely for this approach to be envisaged. Indeed, the Priority Plan focuses mainly on the most fragile regions which are prone to instability and therefore there would only be limited results if these areas were compared to areas which were not covered.

However, some comparisons could be carried out between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, be it for instance between commissariats with and without a gender office, groups of women and young people, communities with or without peace committees, Friends of Women Spaces, or facilitators.

Furthermore, the ONP studies analyzed above targeted Bocanda and Abidjan for the quantitative aspects and Abidjan, Bocanda, Bouna, Duékoué and Man for the qualitative aspects. These are all Priority Plan areas so there is no focus "region" in which no PBF interventions were carried out and with which one could attempt a comparison in order to see the difference made by the results. This could also be relevant for other fragile border areas. The survey methodology also does not mention control groups at the community level, which could contribute to evaluating the programs' effects. Whether or not the individual benefitted from the interventions is indeed not mentioned as a sampling criterion.

8. Relevance of an evaluation

The following table provides a summary of assessment of the various programs and projects in light of the study questions on the relevance of an evaluation, which will be elaborated on after the table (section 8.1 and following):

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	PBF/CIV.A-3 Prevention and peaceful management of conflict	PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil registry	PBF/CIV.H-2 Support for the Priority Plan
Risk management for an evaluation	G A	G A	G A	G A
Involvement of actors in an evaluation	G	G	G	G

Evaluation parameters	G A	G A	G A	G A

8.1. Evaluation parameters

When carrying out an evaluation, the different timeframes of the various programs and projects should be taken into account, particularly the fact that three projects were due to start in January 2017 and last for a period of 18 months. Bearing in mind the delays in getting the activities started, it may also be possible that some ongoing interventions will require an extension. The team therefore recommends an evaluation in early 2018. This evaluation could thereby take into account projects which started in 2017 as well as have an influence on the 2017-2019 transition program. Evaluability will be at its highest in 2019, but the usefulness of an evaluation would be limited at that time in terms of the transition program or a Third Priority Plan. This evaluation could run into certain difficulties since the programs and projects will be at different phases of implementation, which will have an impact on the level of analysis, efficiency and impact. For some concluded projects, it will be possible to analyze the impact and sustainability while in other cases, particularly the three projects which started in January 2017, the evaluation would probably take place in real time, except for the coordination and planning components. The portfolio to be evaluated includes eight projects and their joint analysis could be determined by intervention axes (effects at the level of rural and urban communities, effects in terms of local governance, administration's capacity and strengthening of key actors for change, effects in terms of support and capacity building for national institutions, support for reforms and key topics), as well as by key geographic area, which would make it possible to assess the multi-sectoral effect in the priority areas.

As far as coordination modes are concerned, beyond upstream planning together with the various stakeholders, it would be desirable to compile an overview of studies or evaluations which are planned in the context of the various programs since that could make a useful contribution to the analysis, bearing in mind the many intervention areas and levels. It will also be important to ensure that all of the baseline documents (particularly details on activities carried out and financial data) are available for each intervention. Furthermore, it will also be necessary to coordinate with the data which may potentially have been collected by the ONP. Further to the RUNOs, the priorities and worries of the beneficiary or relevant institutions should be taken into account in order to guarantee ownership.

The actors have stated that they are particularly interested in an analysis of the effects and results of the interventions, as well as their impact (wish expressed by the CNS in particular), as well as taking into account the role of the Technical Secretariat. The available data, collected by the team, made it possible to assess the relevance of the PBF to a certain extent, but not to judge the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the interventions, since this was not the aim of the study, certain data is missing, such as details on the activities and disbursements, and since certain interventions are in a pilot phase or have not been finalized.

PBF support in RCI is essentially structured around the results expected in the Priority Plan. This has two implications for an evaluation and could lead to the need to focus on the level of results of the Priority Plan and to take into account the strategic dimension of the fund at national level, in terms of its positioning with respect to other donors and national programs. The PBF's role should also be considered in light of UNOCI's withdrawal (beyond the very specific tasks identified in the Activity Transfer Plan "Consolidating the Achievements of Peacekeeping", version September 2016). It would also be important to reconstruct the

theories of change in light of the actions carried out and their results, both at a global level and for each of the projects.

The evaluation could be:

- summative, in order to review a program which has almost reached its end but which contains some elements to be taken up in a new phase of international cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire, following the withdrawal of UNOCI in 2017 and the 2020 elections; and which contains some good practices which could be applicable to other PBF countries.
- focused on the outcomes rather than on the impact, given the limited distance that the evaluators would have in 2018. It would also be important to analyze the ongoing dynamics in the target areas and the PBF's contribution in this regard. The process should be analyzed to a more limited extent, focusing particularly on prioritization and selection of the interventions.

As far as evaluation criteria are concerned, in order to determine the possible concomitant questions the following considerations should be taken into account during a final evaluation:

- **Relevance**: To what extent does the PBF target the priority conflict vectors in light of the evolution of the context since 2015 and interventions by other actors? To what extent did the various theories of change come true? Should there be a new plan, how were the PBF objectives adapted to the context throughout the time period (January 2015-2018)? Were the expected objectives and results defined in an appropriate way? What is the relevance of the intervention strategies? To what extent were priority actors included as beneficiaries or partners? To what extent were the most vulnerable groups included?
- **Internal coherence**: complementarity, synergies and duplications, validity of the intervention logic and the chain of results.
- **External coherence**: what were the synergies and duplications with other similar actions funded by other donors (EU, ADB, bilateral donors, NGOs and other RUNO programs)?
- **Efficiency**: what opportunities are there to improve the cost-benefit ratio for each project and to maximize the results by strengthening synergies / joint approaches? To what extent did the monitoring and evaluation system at the level of the PBF and its partners allow the steering of the Fund?
- **Effectiveness**: what is the level of implementation (or lack thereof) of the objectives of the Plan, its programs and projects and what were the success or blocking factors, particularly in terms of supporting reforms or strengthening capacities? What is the PBF's added value and how can the comparative advantages and modalities of this fund be capitalized on with regard to other sources of funding?
- **Impact**: since there is not a lot of distance, it will only be possible to partially assess the Priority Plan's impact. However, the evaluation could go into more depth on reflections being carried out by PBF partners on the positive and negative impact of the PBF support, particularly in light of the conflict vectors and intervention logics which were chosen.
- **Sustainability**: to what extent will the benefits of the programs and projects continue following the termination of the PBF support and what factors is that continuation due to (anchored in the community or in the central administration, technical and/or financial support from other development partners…)? This aspect would also address the PBF's catalytic effects, identifying the dynamics of replication / dissemination of knowledge and the institutionalization of some of the intervention components.
- **Horizontal questions**: gender (particularly by verifying that women who were trained in administrative bodies are not simply given more menial tasks, the level of functioning of the gender offices and the extent to which gender is taken into account at the level of local mechanisms), *Do No Harm* (including dividers / connecters, transfer of implicit messages, possible different effects depending on the social group).

8.2. Risk management for the evaluation

There are no major risks involved in carrying out an evaluation, except for the lack of available data at the level of the Secretariat and the possible turnover in staff involved, particularly international staff. Unless the security events in January 2017 cause a more significant crisis, there are no immediate logistical or security risks. The evaluation risks are mostly low:

Table 5: Risks linked to an evaluation

Risks for an evaluation	Level of risk	Mitigation measure
Deterioration of the security situation makes a field mission impossible.	Medium	Frequent communication with the PBSO in New York, the Secretariat in Abidjan and ensuring the experts follow the UNDSS protocol; monitoring the situation through third-party sources. Focusing on Abidjan and making sure the evaluators call on known local consultants should the situation deteriorate.
Logistical difficulties	Low	Frequent communication with the PBSO in New York, the Secretariat in Abidjan in order to identify places to visit outside of Abidjan, particularly the Great West. Verifying the level of constraint with different actors working on site.
Insufficient availability of data on the activities and baseline documents as well as secondary data; lack of data on focus groups	High	Requesting data as early as the launch phase. Identifying the limitations in terms of data and baseline documents during the preparatory phase.
Lack of availability of the stakeholders	Medium	Communication with the Secretariat in Abidjan ahead of the time of the field mission in order to identify stakeholders and make appointments with them; introducing the evaluators (who would hold a mission letter) to the stakeholders
Lack of good communication and mutual understanding between the evaluators, the PBSO in New York and the PBF Secretariat in Abidjan.	Low	Frequent communication with the PBSO in New York, the Secretariat in Abidjan to understand and manage the various expectations
Delays in providing the baseline documents and reactions to the study	Medium	Being aware of this risk ahead of time and carrying out preparatory work and putting together a document data base. Accountability of the various actors involved.

8.3. Involving the actors in an evaluation

Most of the actors were relatively available and accessible during this study, even though they had been informed of the mission at quite a late stage. In light of this and taking into account their interest in the evaluation of the immediate results and the impact of the PBF support, it is likely that the stakeholders will be involved in the evaluation. They are interested both in the monitoring of immediate results (outputs) and in the contribution to peace. Some government partners would furthermore like to carry out an analysis of the impact of the activities they benefited from, particularly the socio-security dialogues. Finally, the RUNOs have ongoing or planned evaluations themselves and could make a useful contribution to defining and carrying out the evaluation.

Actors involved in an evaluation will be:

1. Primary: Steering Committee, Technical Experts Committee, state and non-state partners, UN system
2. Secondary: Other international organizations and state actors, organizations working in the field of peace consolidation
3. Tertiary: community-based leaders & communities

Table 6: Interest of the actors

Stakeholders	Roles / interest in the Peacebuilding Fund	Likely interest in an evaluation
Contact group for Peacebuilding	Liaising with various political parties, candidates and actors involved in the election process in order to guarantee peaceful election campaigns, equal treatment of all candidates and acceptance of the proclaimed results	Lessons learnt for following the transition program 2017-2019

Possible usefulness in terms of government accountability. |
Joint Steering Committee of the Priority Plan, co-chaired by the government and the United Nations	Strategic guidance and management of the Peacebuilding Fund in Côte d'Ivoire	
Joint Technical Expert Committee of the Priority Plan	Technical support	
Project Coordination Committee	Coordination, updating the work plans	
Monitoring structure of Priority Plan (supported by a Technical Secretariat)	Operational guidance	
United Nations system:

UNFPA, UN Women, UNDP, UNICEF, HCR, OHCHR, FAO, UNOCI (DDR, RSS, Political Affairs Civil Affairs) in | Implementation partners for the Priority Plan, recipients of PBF funding. Responsible for monitoring and evaluating their projects. | |

Stakeholders	Roles / interest in the Peacebuilding Fund	Likely interest in an evaluation
New York, Abidjan and local and regional offices		
Ministries, agencies and other government entities: Ministries for Interior and Security affairs; Defense; Plan and Development; Justice, Human Rights and Public Liberties; Solidarity, Family, Women and Children; Health and fight against AIDS; Agriculture and rural development; civil registry centers; health care structures; courts in target areas; armed forces; gendarmerie; prefectural and sub-prefectural authorities; National Council for Security / Presidency of the Republic; National Program for Social Cohesion; National Commission for Reconciliation and Victim compensation; Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission	Implementing partners of the Priority Plan and/or co-deliverers (not direct recipients of PBF funds) and beneficiaries	
Local NGOs, leaders, community groups and associations (Association of female lawyers of Côte d'Ivoire; women community leaders; traditional leaders; NGOs for local development such as ODAFEM, OIS; women and youth associations; National Association of Chiefs, Kind and Queens of Côte d'Ivoire; Peace Committee; Security Committee; Awareness-raising and Oversight Committees; Committees for oversight and prevention of gender-based violence)	Direct beneficiaries (not direct recipients of PBF funding)	
Political parties and the media	Direct beneficiaries (not direct recipients of PBF funding) – or indirect – TBC	
Victims of the crisis; refugees; women; young people Former fighters Communities affected by the post-election crisis Other communities	Indirect beneficiaries	Better targeting, better monitoring and better impact following the study
Technical and financial partners	Co-funders of certain activities (e.g. EU co-	Lessons learnt for the design and implementation of their

Stakeholders	Roles / interest in the Peacebuilding Fund	Likely interest in an evaluation
	funding of legal clinics with the PBF)

Additional support funders (e.g. support by JICA to the Ivorian police, USAID support to CVDR; UNICEF support for civil registry…) | programs aimed at peacebuilding, particularly those co-funded by the PBF; taking into account recommendations from the evaluation, where appropriate to possibly inform funding decisions. |

9. Horizontal aspects

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	PBF/CIV.A-3 Prevention and peaceful management of conflict	PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil registry	PBF/CIV.H-2 Support for the Priority Plan
Gender	G A	G A	G A	A R
Other groups	G A	A R	G A	G A
Do No Harm	G A	G A	G A	G A

9.1. Gender

Gender is taken into account in all of the interventions to varying degrees:

- At the level of content, design and implementation of the PP, the programs and projects and in terms of the makeup of the PBF portfolio (women's AGR projects, Friends of Women Spaces).
- In terms of reporting: indicators available by gender – except key election indicators; gender rating in the annual reports on project advancement generally (although not always) provided.
- In terms of effects, in strengthening women's capacities at different levels and enhancing the recognition of their social, economic and political role, their role as community relays and mediators in the peace committees set up by UNFPA.

Content of the interventions

Women are the main beneficiaries of most of the actions, particularly in terms of groups for the AGRs. The underlying theory could be summed up as follows: if their leadership and financial autonomy are strengthened, women, although they are often "voiceless" in the public sphere, will have a direct and positive influence on their husbands and children when it comes to non-violent conflict management, and they themselves become motors for change in strengthening social cohesion. The team was able to verify the merit of this theory in several communities: for instance, during the 2015 campaign launched by UNFPA and the Ministry for family and community relays "zero electoral violence", and from several testimonies that were gathered.

> ***Female community chief, Friends of Women Space for peace, Guiglo:*** *"Guiglo saw a lot of violence in 2011 and there was mistrust between the communities, including among women (from different communities). But now we are able to have exchanges among ourselves. And we came to trust one another. This is necessary since when there is a problem, we are the ones who suffer. We and our children. We are autonomous. We had a surplus and set up a cassava manufacturing unit. And this meant that our husbands and children listen more. For instance, I am the first elected female community chief in the region."*

The needs of young men on the other hand seem to be taken into account in a more limited fashion, particularly in terms of the development of a certain culture of violence. The role of masculinity as a factor for conflict and peace respectively is not sufficiently addressed (e.g. association between masculinity and armed groups; difficulties, particularly economic in nature, when entering the age of adult life from a social perspective, which leads to seeking refuge in alternative schemes). It would be worth thinking about
- how to reach and influence young people specifically, who are different from other targets
- how to promote a positive view of masculinity as non-violent and respectful of gender equality.

At the level of each program/project:

- For **Program 1** "**Support the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections"**: in addition to political parties, young people and the media, women are specifically targeted as "victims but also actors of conflict", "key actors in Ivorian society" and "agents for peace and cohesion". The active participation of women in RSS, security services provided to women, trust of women in the DSFs, civic participation of women, support for elected women are specifically targeted.
- **Program 2 "Supporting conflict prevention and their peaceful resolution in Côte d'Ivoire"** aims among other things at setting up Friends of Women Spaces dedicated to female leadership, particularly in peacebuilding. Gender also plays a role in training session on land ownership and conflicts within and between communities.
- The **project "Supporting the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and reform of the civil registry in Côte d'Ivoire"** takes into account differences in knowledge and behavior between men and women when it comes to declaring births. It thereby targets the enhancement of women's knowledge of the state tools on civil registry.
- The **project "Supporting the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding"** highlights that one of the TS's role, among other things, is to ensure the integration of issues surrounding gender equality and women's participation in the PBF programs and projects.

Existence of disaggregated data

The reports by the Steering Committee and the various programs and projects generally contain data which is broken down by gender or is aware of gender. For example,

- The Steering Committee reports contain an indicator on the participation of women in politics (as candidates or elected) and the elections. However, this does not seem sufficiently complete or in line with the ambitions and effective activities of the Priority Plan.
- For **Program 1** "**Support the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections"**, the annual reports contain indicators on the "number of public security units and protection services for women and children which are refurbished and equipped and where staff is trained", but the corresponding data is not provided (2015 report).
- **Program 2 "Supporting conflict prevention and their peaceful resolution in Côte d'Ivoire"** has several indicators which are aware of gender, such as e.g. "number of women's groups which were initially adversarial and which carry out activities for community rapprochement" and "number of Friends of Women Spaces for Peace", "Proportion of people with a positive view of the role of women in the peaceful resolution of community conflicts, other than over land ownership". However, the data for these indicators is not available (2015 report).
- The **project "Supporting the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and reform of the civil registry in Côte d'Ivoire"** contains several indicators which are gender-sensitive, e.g. "proportion of people, particularly women, which is aware that declaring a child's birth is obligatory, free of charge and has to occur within three months following the birth" and "proportion of people, particularly women, which knows that the mother is entitled to declare the birth of her child" and "proportion of people, particularly women, which knows that they have to resort to the courts if the deadline were to pass". However, beyond certain baseline data which is available, the data for these indicators is not available since it is planned that they be provided at the end of the project when the monitoring study is carried out (2015 report).
- The **project "Supporting the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding"** does not contain any gender-specific or gender sensitive indicators. It is not very likely that its performance to "ensure the integration of issues pertaining to gender equality and women's participation in the PBF projects and programs" can be measured merely by the gender indicators mentioned in the Steering Committee report (above). The 2015 annual report on the project limits itself to pointing out: "the Technical Secretariat regularly ensured that gender was taken into account in the implementation of the PBF programs and projects".
- Finally, scores in terms of gender are provided in a very irregular way (table 7).

Table 7: Scores in terms of gender (*gender marker*)

	PBF/CIV.B-3 Peaceful elections	**PBF/CIV.A-3 Prevention and peaceful management of conflict**	**PBF/CIV.E-2 Civil registry**	**PBF/CIV.H-2 Support for the Priority Plan**
Evaluation note on parity	Prodoc: 2 2015 annual report: 2	Prodoc: 2 2015 annual report: no note	Prodoc: 2 2015 annual report: no note	Prodoc: 1 2015 annual report: no note

Effects in terms of gender

The interventions contributed to improving the situation of women in the country by promoting gender within the security and political dynamics.

The Steering Committee reports and the various program and project reports highlight the positive outputs and impacts in terms of gender. For example:

- The 2016 Steering Committee report mentions and increase of "at least 20%" in female participation in politics and elections, without however stating its source. In qualitative terms, it also mentions "implementing *gender desks* within police and gendarmerie units, socio-economic activities carried out by women's groups, support for the integration of women in the gendarmerie", as well as "training and coaching female leaders", their increased involvement in electoral contests, the implementation of Friends of Women Spaces with stronger participation in managing local conflicts. Most of these efforts were noted by the team (sampling, during their visits).

- For **Program 1** "**Support the strengthening of trust, peaceful coexistence and stability of the security situation for peaceful elections"**, the 2015 annual report notes that "awareness on security management was raised among 70 women leaders from the political class, defense and security forces, and civil society organizations". It concludes that "strengthening the capacity of women leaders and their awareness of the importance of taking gender into account in the security sector has allowed them to fully fulfil their leadership role in the process of reforming the security sector in Côte d'Ivoire and fulfilling their role in democratic control of the security sector". The PBF furthermore allowed for the country's first female gendarmes to be trained. In addition, the target of "one institution, 30 women's CSOs, 24 elected woman deputies and 10 political parties and organizations strengthened and sensitized" was reached in 2016, and the target of "a 10% increase in participation and a 5% increase in representation of women and young people in the election process" was exceeded. The report also notes that the participation of women in the presidential elections of October 2015 had progressed by 29% compared to 8% in 2010, without it however being identified whether the PBF had directly contributed or what the source of this data was. Activities to strengthen women participation in the legislative elections allowed for better ownership by the female candidates of the legal environment of the elections and the successful organization of election campaigns. Furthermore, training and coaching women leaders as well as advocacy for better female participation in the area of political decision-making contributed to strengthening the skills of female candidates and their reaffirmed commitment to win an elected position. These actions contributed to better preparing female candidates and increase their active participation, as well as obtaining a small increase in female parliamentary representative. In spite of the government's affirmed will, and notwithstanding various measures to support this in the context of these initiatives, the representation of Ivorian women remains marginal compared to other African countries. Of these countries, one can mention in particular: Rwanda: 63.8%, Senegal: 42.7%, South Africa: 42.0%, Mozambique: 39.6%, Cameroon: 31.1%, Togo: 17.6%, etc. These countries have experienced considerable advances in terms of equality between men and women, but also when it comes to female participation at all levels of the decision-making sphere. Significant challenges to gender equality still remain and require urgent attention.

- The 2015 annual report on **Program 2 "Supporting conflict prevention and their peaceful resolution in Côte d'Ivoire"** highlighted that 360 women in positions of responsibility and members of community-based associations in 12 localities participated in community diagnosis of the needs for implementing Friends of Women Spaces for Peace (Bouna, Bocanda, Bouaké, Ouragahio, Bayota, Gagnoa, Vavoua, Divo, Toulepleu, Blolequin, Bangolo). The report on Program 2 also states that 445 traditional chiefs (including 155 women) coming from 104 villages in Bocanda, and 404 individuals (including 121 women) from 215 territorial jurisdictions in Bouna participated in capacity-building and are involved in managing conflicts related to land ownership, land certification and village delineation. And the Social Center and UNFPA 2016 report

states that 6430 people, 51% women and 49% men, participated in educational talks on peace and social cohesion carried out by 60 community relays in Bouna.

- The **project "Supporting the recording of births and deaths within the time frames and reform of the civil registry in Côte d'Ivoire"** does not at this stage have any data on its effects in terms of gender. The knowledge of women and the improvement of their knowledge will be measured at the end of the project by the monitoring study.

- As mentioned above, the 2015 annual report on the project **"Supporting the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Priority Plan for peacebuilding"** limits itself to stating: "The Technical Secretariat regularly ensured that gender was taken into account in the implementation of the PBF programs and projects".

Building a gender office as part of the gendarmerie in Guiglo

9.2. Involvement of other groups

Young women and men

The PBF contributes to integrating young people in governance mechanisms, particularly on security issues, but these effects remain more limited than in the case of women's groups.

The category of young men and women does not appear often in the project wording, except for in the composition of the committees to manage conflicts over land ownership.

Young people do however make up a specific category which is explicitly targeted in several of the Priority Plan's components:

"P 1.1: Women, young people and local actors actively participate in the RSS at a decentralized and devolved level: the program supported the CNS in organizing a strategic workshop to implement Regional Security Committees involving prefectural authorities and local actors, including youth leaders and women leaders.

P1.2: The services provided to women, young people and populations by the security actors are more efficient due to technical and material support provide within the context of this program: the program launched a process to refurbish and equip 30 police stations and brigades which is still ongoing.

P 1.3: The trust that women, young people and society have in the Defense and Security Forces has increased: More than 1200 youth leaders, women leaders and community leaders

as well as 300 security force agents were involved in 6 socio-security dialogues in Bouaké, Bouna, Divo, Gagnoa and Guiglo."

Young people are also mentioned in certain outputs expected from Program 1, particularly in all outputs for outcome 1 and two of the outputs for outcome 3.

This disaggregation is however not always transcribed at the level of the indicators, particularly for the outputs (except for output 3.2: Clear progress in civic participation, particularly among women and young people, especially due to the support provided to initiatives carried out in their favor).

Rural communities

The distinction between urban and rural communities is not always clearly defined, particularly in Program 2 when it comes to agricultural groups and Peace Committees – which target rural areas *a priori* but may also concern urban and semi-urban agglomerations.

As far as Abidjan is concerned, the distinction is easier since the intervention regions are mentioned in the project documents, but no specific intervention is mentioned therein, except for support for the Secretariat and the concluded project on supporting women's initiatives in favor of peacebuilding.

9.3. *Do No Harm*

There is no *Do No Harm* analysis or sensitivity on specific conflicts, although these different aspects do indirectly appear in the risk analysis. Potential negative effects have not been identified, such as for instance the effect of strengthening certain actors at the local level rather than others (Peace committees rather than traditional chiefs).

Support for certain groups and the provision of varying support depending on the partners can also contribute to generating frustration among the population. Furthermore, the project sometimes created certain expectations which remain hard to meet and the messages which are transmitted are not always in line with the difficulties encountered by the inhabitants. Thus, for instance, the messages of peace and social cohesion meet with limited support when the population is faced with the destruction of an entire year's harvest by livestock.

One possible risk in particular is the contribution towards strengthening actors – the Defense and Security Forces – which are committing human rights violations, as international reports on the topic show, or that institutions are being strengthened whose functioning has certain limits, particularly in terms of corruption. Many demonstrations are also banned by the authorities, which shows certain limits to democratic expression. In more general terms, the risk of confirming a dominant official discourse on the crisis and its consequences needs to be considered. Thus, the government's position on managing the consequences of the crisis is sometimes opposed by contradictory analyses by civil society. It would therefore be important to ensure that the strengthening of actors not be accompanied by any guarantees in terms of democratic space and that instead good governance be ensured that would benefit the various groups of the Ivorian population.

The level of public support for the various interventions can also vary depending on the population categories. For instance, in terms of the civil registry, the message was more easily disseminated in urban areas, while camps in which the most vulnerable populations live, were targeted less. Furthermore, certain groups have a tendency to understand the utility of the civil registry more easily than others which experience less pressure in terms of identity questions. This contributes to creating gaps between different social groups and to increase tensions which already exist within the social fabric.

Certain new tasks represent an additional workload for state officials as well as for the mobilized volunteers, which also needs to be taken into account during the planning,

particularly in terms of communication / strategy to mobilize actors in the aim of sustainability, since it implies a certain degree of material or external pressure.

10. Conclusions

In general terms, the theories of change that were developed and the intervention logics put in place are relevant to target the different conflict vectors and enhance the country's stability. The approaches which were selected have largely been verified.

However, some highly political subjects at the national level, such as the civil registry reform and the issue of land ownership, and which concern the structural dynamics which led to the eruption of conflicts (national reconciliation, governance in the various sectors and access to employment), are still addressed too indirectly, although the PBF projects accompany ongoing reforms and strategic reflections, in connection with the mandates of the agencies (for instance the FAO for agricultural policies and governance of land ownership regimes – land and natural resources). Local conflict management can only provide a short-term response of a limited scope to these questions, a response which will have to be repeated if there is no progress on these structural challenges and they are not tackled at a fundamental level together with the various parties concerned. For the subsequent Priority Plan it will be necessary to state what is planned to accompany the national political dialogue (including political party governance and the role of executives); to ensure a more efficient dialogue with the government on policies (particularly on the civil registry and transitional justice); to specifically target young people; to ensure the management of population movements; to put in place mechanisms for potential compensation of farmers/herders and to ensure the fair distribution of natural resources. Policy on herding and land use planning in agro-sylvo-pastoral spaces as well as the use of farm land still remains a challenge. Monitoring and the implementation of the CDVR recommendations also remains essential.

There also exist limits to the operational synergies between components of the Priority Plan, particularly at the local level and in terms of targeting the sub-prefectures. The PBF has however directly contributed to a joint reflection within the UN system on the issue of peacebuilding and has influenced the RUNOs in terms of projects funded/co-funded by the PBF and even the broader RUNO portfolio. It would be desirable that this influence continue, considering that the UNOCI is currently retreating and that temptation is strong to return to business as usual.

From an evaluability point of view, the legibility of the results is limited due to the absence of specific tools to monitor the execution of the projects and programs. This makes it impossible to have a concise overview of the PBF performance and thus its contribution to the transformation in post-crisis Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, taking into account the very general level of reporting, the team was not able to obtain details on the interventions and the expenses funded by the PBF, not even simply for actions carried out by UNDP and the PBF Secretariat, and the achievement rate compared to the work plans cannot be measured. The existing tools should be reviewed in order to capture the essential elements and the maximum amount of data and information. The PBF report framework, which is supposed to synthesize the results from all of the projects and programs which are joint initiatives should also be revised. Some changes at the level of organization, planning, coordination, communication, drafting of reports and monitoring and evaluation are required in order to ensure that the system is credible vis à vis the partners.

The pro-active steering of the PBF by the Secretariat should be enhanced, particularly in light of the significant level of funding which is dedicated to the technical support component. Increased monitoring by the PBSO in New York also appears relevant in order to ensure the PBF added value over funding for joint UN agency programs surrounding a governmental plan or over other sources of funding in general.

It appears that to this effect, a greater level of sharing best practices and lessons learnt during the implementation of other PBFs would be relevant, both for the benefit of the PBF Secretariat but also of the implementing partners, UN agencies and state partners. This would also contribute to strengthening the role of the PBF in capitalizing on experiences in order to obtain catalytic effects.

11. Recommendations

To the PBSO:

- Provide more active support to the Technical Secretariat on strategic issues as well as in defining a monitoring and evaluation system that is perhaps simpler, less ambitious and which would have a greater chance of being useful and used as a management tool.
- Prioritize the exchange of experiences between PBC/PBF countries, which would also benefit the implementing partners.

To the PBSO and the Steering Committee:

- Take into account the priority needs as they are expressed by the population: (i) AGRs, since in addition to providing economic self-sufficiency they are "the direct application of the conflict management training sessions" and represent "the peace dividend"; (ii) targeting young people, who remain vulnerable to political manipulation and who need specific forms of communication and specific activities in order to be engaged in defending peace; (iii) awareness-raising ahead of each electoral deadline.

To the Steering Committee of Priority Plan II:

- Increasingly take into account regional dynamics, space and demographic management as well as the consequences of non-treated crises.
- Clarify which structural problems can be influenced by the PBF and how (e.g. political party governance / support of political dialogue; law on the civil status reform; transitional justice; abuse of power by security forces…).
- Clarify the various forms in which the government of Côte d'Ivoire can support the interventions of the Priority Plan.
- Take into account the interventions by other TFPs in a much more targeted way in view of increasing coordination and/or synergies (e.g. EU support in almost all areas of the PBF, particularly infrastructure refurbishment for the security forces).
- Capitalize on certain other projects, actors and dynamics which are ongoing: synergies i.e. with the Agencies for Youth Employment.

To the technical Secretariat of the PBF:

- Ensure the comprehensibility of the interventions at the technical and financial level, in line with the guidelines.
- Strengthen the steering, through a dashboard for monitoring the work plans and coordination, particularly by organizing regular meetings of the program coordination committee.
- Ensure coherence of the indicators which are used in the reports and the monitoring documents.
- Ensure that indicators are used and that they are revised when necessary. Some indicators are already gathered as a matter of routine (e.g. Afrobarometer, Ibrahim Index), or are easy to identify by community (e.g. existence of infrastructure for each ethnic group or mixed infrastructure).

- In terms of monitoring and evaluation, identify and capitalize on efforts made by the RUNOs and partners and ensure that state partners become involved in monitoring the interventions from which they benefit.

To the implementing partners:

- Map the interventions according to villages and camps. This would make it possible to ensure that there is no duplication and that targeting takes place according to the most critical conflict factors and that a transformative effect is achieved.
- Review the balance of activities between urban and rural areas since certain regions require a more distinct deployment in rural areas while others need continual focus on urban areas, where tensions reside.
- Strengthen the dimension of "Peacebuilding" / social cohesion in infrastructure by moving from "turnkey solutions" to a more participatory approach involving members from the different communities.
- Ensure that the Project Coordination Committee is running smoothly and identify synergies between the programs and projects.

To the UN system and its Coordination:

- Ensure support by strategic and political levels in cases of deadlock or problems (Resident Coordinator in Abidjan / political office in Dakar).
- Put in place a coordination system between the programs in order to avoid multiple interventions on the same subjects, duplication, and participants already having benefited from other similar activities.
- Remain engaged: prioritize stable amounts over time for peacebuilding rather than sudden increases or decreases.
- Ensure the integration of social cohesion in a horizontal way through catalytic effects in other RUNO interventions and/or interventions by other development partners.
- Ensure the use and sustainability of elements put in place by the PBF, avoiding competing approaches or the creation or parallel systems.
- Support the training of trainers in the context of the desired catalytic effects.

Annexe 1. Plan de travail

Plan de travail - Abidjan			
Heure	Activités	Lieu/Institution	Personnes à rencontrer/Point focal
Lundi 05 décembre			
9h00 – 10h00	Séance de travail avec le Secrétariat technique du CoPil	ONUCI, Bureau Chef Unité de Coordination	Marie Goreth Nizigama Didier Semon
10H30 - 11h30	Séance de travail avec le Comité technique conjoint d'Experts PBF élargi (CTCE)	Ministère du Plan, salle de conférence	Membres du CTCE ; Coordonnateurs Prog et projet / Points focaux ; Unesco ; Fao
13h45 - 14h45	Séance de travail avec le SNU récipiendaires des fonds et responsables de l'exécution des projets /programmes, Programme 1, Projet genre et consolidation de la paix	ONUCI, salle 314	PNUD (Arsène Assandé) ONUCI / CA (Oulei Louis)
15h00 - 16h00	Séance de travail avec le SNU récipiendaires des fonds et responsables de l'exécution des projets /programmes	ONUCI, (salle de réunion 340 /ODSRSG	FNUAP (N'da Constant) FAO (Fadiga Souleymane)
16h30 - 17h00	Prise de contact avec M. le CR	PNUD	Babacar Cissé Marie-Goreth Nizigama
Mardi 6 décembre			
9h00 - 10h30	Séance de travail avec le SNU récipiendaires des fonds et responsables de l'exécution des projets /programmes, Programme 2	ONUCI, salle 314	FNUAP (N'da Constant) PNUD (Arsène Assandé) FAO (Fadiga Souleymane)
11H00 - 12h30	Séance de travail avec le SNU récipiendaires des fonds et responsables de l'exécution des projets Projet Etat civil	ONUCI, salle 314	UNICEF (Hyacinthe Sigui) FNUAP (N'da Constant) UNHCR (Francis Djaha) UNESCO (Evelyne)
	Départ en mission de terrain		Didier Semon
Mardi 13 décembre			
	Séance de travail avec le ST /UC	Bureau MGN	Marie-Goreth Nizigama Didier Semon
11h00 – 12h30	S-CNS, partenaire dans le cadre du Programme 1	S-CNS	M. Kassi, chargé S&E, et Gabriel Ekanza, conseiller
13h00	Section coopération de l'UE	UE	Audrey Rochelemagne

	Plan de travail - Abidjan		
Heure	Activités	Lieu/Institution	Personnes à rencontrer/Point focal
14h30	Section politique de l'UE	UE	Charles Girard
14h00-	AFJCI	Siège de l'AFJCI	Présidente
16h30 – 17h20	Observatoire Nationale de l'Equité et du Genre, partenaire étatique du Programme 2	Observatoire Nationale de l'Equité et du Genre	Représentant de l'Observatoire Mme Kaba
17h	Entretien avec le CR	PNUD	Babacar Cissé
Mercredi 14 décembre			
9h00 – 10h00	DGPN /CE dans le cadre Programme 1	MEMIS DGPN	Commissaire Philippe Gnepa
10h30	Séance de travail avec les Affaires civiles (Programme 1 et Programme 2)	ONUCI Affaires Civiles et Droits de l'Homme	Maud Ropars Yacine Fall
12h00 – 12h45	Prise DE CONTACT Ministère de la Justice et des droits de l'Homme partenaire étatique du Projet Etat civil + ONI	Ministère de la Justice et des droits de l'Homme	Ouattara Souhalio Directeur DPS DG ONI
13h30	Direction du Foncier rural, partenaires étatiques du Programme 2	Ministère de l'Agriculture (Direction du Foncier rural)	Equipe cadastre
15h00 – 16h45	MSCSV, partenaire des Programme 1 et Programme 2	MSCSV PNCS	Directeur de Cabinet Kam Oleh N'Da Yao Ristide
17h30 – 18h30	Convention Nationale de la Société Civile	Siège de la CNSC	Présidente Convention Société civile
Jeudi 15 décembre			
9h30 – 10h30	Visite et entretien avec le Directeur de l'Ecole National de Police (ENP), bénéficiaire du Programme 1	ENP	Commissaire Touré Albert Directeur de l'ENP
11h30- 12h30	Séance de travail avec les Affaires civiles (Programme 1 et Programme 2)	UNPOL	Sossou Constant Prosper Ousseni Mansah
15h00	Séance de travail ONUFEMMES	ONUFEMMES	Jean Jacques (S-E) Nicolas
16h15	Séance de travail l'ONP, partenaire étatique	MPD ONP	Dr Hinin
17h15	Séance de travail la DGAT, partenaire étatique du Programme 1 et du Projet Etat civil	MEMIS DGAT	Amani Felicien (DG) Koffi Kan (DRH) Poho innocent

Plan de travail - Abidjan			
Heure	Activités	Lieu/Institution	Personnes à rencontrer/Point focal
18h45	Visite et entretien avec le Directeur de l'Ecole Nationale de Gendarmerie, bénéficiaire du Programme 1	Gendarmerie	Directeur Col Touré Alexandre
	Vendredi 16 décembre		
8h30 – 10h00	Entretien avec le Conseiller technique sécurité et Défense de la Présidence de la République	Présidence de la République	Paulin Yewe
11h00-13h00	Réunion de Restitution	MPD / PNUD	Comité de Pilotage Comité Technique d'Expert

Plan de travail – visite à l'intérieur du pays		
Date	Horaires	Activités
06-12-16	Après midi	Départ d'Abidjan pour Yamoussoukro
07-12-16	Matin (8h00)	Séance de travail avec le Coordonnateur de la cellule de projets SNU du MEMIS, partenaire étatique du Projet PBF Etat civil) Fidel Yapi Départ Yamoussoukro pour Gagnoa
07-12-16	10H00 – 20h00	Gagnoa / Bayota - Visite au Sous-Préfet de Bayota : Centre d'état civil de la sous-préfecture (Programme 1) - Visite d'activités de rapprochement communautaire et entretien avec les bénéficiaires et les membres des comités de paix (Programme 2) / (ONUFEMMES : Autonomisation économique des femmes et FNUAP) Village de Logouata - Rencontre et entretien avec des bénéficiaires des logements construits ou réhabilités (Programme 1) Gagnoa - Visite au Préfet : Briefing de la mission / échanges avec le préfet - Visite de l'activité de Dialogue socio –sécuritaire (Programme 1) et entretiens avec un imam, une femme leader, un membre des FDS - Directeur régional du MPFFPE - Entretiens (groupement de jeunes et de femmes réalisant des activités de rapprochement et animateur des comités de paix) (Programme 2)
08-12-16	Matin (8h00)	- Départ de Gagnoa pour Guiglo

	11H00-17H00	▪ Guiglo - Visite au Préfet : Briefing de la mission / échanges avec le préfet - Visite au Sous /préfet : échange avec les Chefs traditionnels - Visite des activités : 1/ Centre d'état civil de la sous-préfecture (Projet Enregistrement des naissances) 2/ Clinique juridique (Projet Enregistrement des naissances) 3/ Cohésion sociale / Entretien avec les bénéficiaires de l'Espace ami des femmes pour la paix et le Directeur du Complexe Socio-éducatif de Guiglo (Projet Genre et consolidation de la paix « Appui aux initiatives communautaires des femmes en faveur de la réconciliation et la paix en CI » 4/ Visite des Activités en faveur du rapprochement communautaire mises en œuvre par la FAO/ANADER/ONG 5/ Bureau ANADER
09-12-16	Matin 8h00-9h30	- Séance de travail avec Responsable local des activités de la FAO (échanges sur les activités de rapprochement communautaire autour des AGR) - Visite de la Brigade de gendarmerie et échanges avec le Commandant de Brigade Départ de Guiglo pour Bouna
	Matin (8h00)	Voyage avec escale à Abengourou pour Bouna
10-12-16	13h00	Bouna - Visite au Préfet : Briefing de la mission / échanges avec le préfet - Visite au Commissaire de police (présence d'un membre du cabinet du DG PN) - Directeur du MPFFPE de Bondoukou - Visite au Directeur du Centre social de Bouna - Directeur régional de la culture et de la francophonie sécurisation foncière et gestion des conflits
	17H00	Départ de Bouna pour Bondoukou
	Matin (8h00)	Départ de Bondoukou pour Bouna
11-12-16	9h00-17h00	Bouna - Visite au Roi - Visite au Sous-préfet / échanges. Centre d'état civil de la sous-préfecture (Projet Enregistrement des naissances) - Deuxième visite du Centre Social Bouna : cohésion sociale / Entretien avec les relais communautaires et le Centre social (superviseur des relais communautaires) (Programme 2)

Annexe 2. Bibliographie

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Annexe 3. Taux de décaissement

Programme 1 : 5 000 000 USD de budget total : Appui au renforcement de la confiance, la coexistence et à la stabilisation sécuritaire pour des élections apaisées en Côte d'Ivoire			
5000 000 USD	Budget total approuvé :		
2 821 381 USD	Dépenses au 30 Octobre 2016		56,43%

Agences	Budget total alloué	Dépenses cumulées	%
PNUD	4 500 000 USD	2 485 381 USD	55,23 %
UNESCO	300 000 USD	200 000 USD	66,67 %
ONUFEMMES	200 000 USD	136 000 USD	68%

Programme 2 : Programme d'appui à la prévention et à la gestion des conflits			
3 850 000 USD USD	Budget total approuvé		
1 948 789 USD	Total des dépenses		50,61 %

Agence	Budget total alloué	Dépenses cumulées*	%
FNUAP	1 400,000 USD	867 831 USD	68,7%
FAO	1 150,000 USD	598 000 USD	52%
UNDP	800,000 USD	244 896 USD	30,61
ONUFEMMES	500, 000 USD	373 600 USD	74,72 %

Projet conjoint sur l'appui l'enregistrement des naissances et à la réforme d'état civil :			
2 000 000 USD	Budget total approuvé		
1 272 813,39 USD	Dépenses totales		63,64

Agences	Budget total alloué	Dépenses cumulées	%
UNICEF	1, 431,900 USD	1 047 085,39	73,12
FNUAP	306,452 USD	96 206 USD	42,26%
UNHCR	261,648 USD	129 522 USD	49,50%

Projet Secrétariat technique : 1 150 000 USD de budget total :			
1 150 000 USD	Budget total approuvé		
449 754,69 USD	Dépenses totales		49,45%

Annexe 4. Cadres de résultats (nouveau Plan de Suivi/Evaluation)

a. Cadre de résultats du Plan prioritaire

Résultat stratégique 1 du Plan de priorités	Indicateurs de résultat
Renforcement de la confiance, de la coexistence pacifique et de la situation sécuritaire en période pré-électorale	Indicateur de résultat 1 : Niveau de violence et de tensions autour des élections de 2015 Niveau de référence : Crise postélectorale de 2011 ayant occasionné autour de 3000 morts et 600 plaintes Cible : Réduction de la violence et de tensions d'au moins 75% par rapport à 2011, Réduction de 50% des plaintes liées au processus électoral -société internationale déclare les élections comme paisible
	Indicateur de résultat 2 Niveau de représentativité des électeurs et de candidats dans le processus électoral Niveau de référence : Faible participation des femmes et des jeunes au processus électoral de 2011 (seulement 51% de femmes ont participé aux élections et seulement 11% femmes candidates députés AD pour les jeunes. Cible : Augmentation du nombre de femmes et jeunes électeurs et candidats d'au moins 20%
	Indicateur de résultat 3 : Niveau de confiance des populations aux forces de sécurité ivoiriennes Niveau de référence : perception mitigée des populations aux forces de sécurité dans les zones ciblées par le PP (Centre Ouest) (% AD : sondage de perception) Cible Existence d'un cadre de dialogue entre les populations et les forces de sécurité Augmentation de 50% du pourcentage de la population se sentant en situation de sécurité grâce aux forces de sécurité Indicateur de résultat 4 : Nombre/adoption de recommandations de la CDVR ayant fait l'objet d'un suivi de la part des autorités Situation de référence : Rapport et recommandations de la CDVR en cours de finalisation Existence de plusieurs mécanismes de réconciliation nationale Cible : Cadre de coordination et de suivi de la mise en œuvre des recommandations de la CDVR existant et fonctionnel

Résultat stratégique 2 du Plan prioritaire	Indicateurs de résultat
Prévention et résolution pacifique des conflits à travers	Indicateur de résultat 5 : Nombre de conflits locaux dans les zones « sensibles ciblés par le Plan prioritaire » résolus par les autorités et mécanismes locaux sans recours à la violence

le renforcement des capacités de l'état et d'autres mécanismes en place	Niveau de référence : La CI enregistre un nombre important de conflits locaux (fonciers, miniers, intertribaux, identitaires, agriculteurs-éleveurs) (voir cartographie du PNCS) Cible : Diminution de 20% du nombre de conflits recensés dans les zones cibles Augmentation de 50% de conflits résolus
	<u>Indicateur 6 : Niveau de mise en œuvre du plan national de réforme du système d'état civil</u> Niveau de référence : Etat des lieux du système d'état civil et Etude sur les nouveaux mécanismes disponibles 55% du taux d'enregistrement des naissances au niveau national 2 millions d'enfants non enregistrés à l'état civil 700 000 personnes à risque d'apatridie Cible : Plan national de réforme de l'état civil budgétisé, validé et qui connait un début de mise en œuvre Promotion de l'enregistrement à l'état civil (augmentation de 10% du taux d'enregistrement des naissances dans les délais, enregistrement de 200 000 personnes hors délais)
Coordination efficace, suivi, rapport, évaluation et communication sur les réalisations des objectifs du Plan de priorités et des projets s'y rattachant	**Indicateurs de résultat**
	<u>Indicateur de résultat 7</u> Rapport annuel du Comité mixte de pilotage soumis moins de 7 jours après la date limite Niveau de référence : Rapport soumis avec retard c'est-à-dire en décembre Cible : Rapport soumis dans les délais
	<u>Indicateur de résultat 8</u> Qualité des rapports annuels du Comité mixte de pilotage jugée « acceptable » par l'équipe d'examen du PBSO Niveau de référence : Rapport bon mais à améliorer avec un accent sur l'approche résultat et pas de feedback de PBSO Cible : Rapport axé sur les résultats atteints en termes de consolidation de la paix
	<u>Indicateur de résultat 9</u> Les projets du Plan de priorités remplissent tous les critères de sélection, y compris celui de rentabilité. Niveau de référence : Plusieurs projets avec des coûts de transaction élevés Cible : Approche programme en respect des critères de sélection et leur contribution à la consolidation de la paix
	<u>Indicateur de résultat 10</u> Principaux partenaires (par ex. entités de l'ONU bénéficiaires ainsi que parties prenantes hors ONU) satisfaits du niveau et de la rapidité de la communication et de la coordination du Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix à travers le Secrétariat technique PBF Niveau de référence : Niveau de satisfaction des partenaires mitigée Cible : Mise en œuvre d'une stratégie de Communication Niveau de satisfaction qualifié de bon

b. Cadre de résultats du Programme 1 « appui au Renforcement de la confiance, de la coexistence pacifique et de la stabilisation de la situation sécuritaire pour des élections apaisées en Côte d'Ivoire »

Résultat 1 : La confiance au sein des forces de défense et de sécurité, d'une part et la confiance des populations à l'égard des forces de défense et de sécurité d'autre part, est renforcée et les élections se déroulent dans un climat apaisé et sécurisé			
Indicateur de résultat 1 a : Nombre de régions disposant de mécanisme local opérationnel de mise en œuvre de la RSS		Niveau de référence : La mise en œuvre de la Stratégie Nationale sur la RSS est centralisée au niveau national	Cible : Au moins 10 (3 par an) régions disposent de mécanisme local opérationnel de mise en œuvre de la RSS
Indicateur de résultat 1 b : Nombre de comités d'éthique rendus fonctionnels entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité (police, gendarmerie, FRCI)		Niveau de référence : Existence de 7 comités fonctionnels dans la préfecture de police d'Abidjan	Cible : 116 comités d'éthique rendus fonctionnels entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité
Indicateur de résultat 1 c : Niveau de collaboration entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité ;		Niveau de référence : Faible niveau de collaboration entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité	Cible : Forte collaboration entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité
Produit 1.1 : les populations et autorités locales s'approprient le processus de la RSS	Indicateur 1.1.1 : Nombre de comités régionaux de sécurité mis en place et fonctionnels avec au moins 30% des femmes	Niveau de référence : 2 CSR à Abengourou et à Adzopé	Cible : Au moins 11 fonctionnels avec au moins 30% de femmes
Produit 1.2 : Les services rendus aux femmes, jeunes et aux populations par les acteurs de sécurité (police, gendarmerie, FRCI) sont plus efficaces grâce aux appuis techniques et matériels apportés dans le cadre du programme	Indicateur 1.2.1 : Nombre d'unités de sécurité publique et de services de protection des femmes et enfants réhabilitées et équipées et avec un personnel forme	Niveau de référence : 67 services de sécurité publique réhabilités et équipes

0 services de protection des femmes et enfants réhabilitées et équipées | Cible : 97 services de sécurité publique dont 15 unités de police, 15 de gendarmerie additionnelle

12 services de protection des femmes et enfants réhabilitées et équipées

au moins 390 policiers et gendarmes formés |
| | Indicateur 1.2.2 : Nombre de structures de formation appuyées pour la pérennisation de la formation des nouveaux gendarmes et policiers en genre, ALPC, maintien de l'ordre, protection de l'enfant et VBG | Niveau de référence : 0 écoles de formation | Cible 3 écoles (EPN, EGA, EGT) |
| Produit 1.3 : La confiance des femmes, des jeunes et la société civile à l'égard des forces de défense et de sécurité est accrue | Indicateur de résultat 1.3.1 : Nombre d'activités socio culturelles de rapprochement forces de défense et sécurité-population | Niveau de référence : 63 (PARPP) | Cible : Au moins 150 activités socio culturelles de rapprochement forces de défense et sécurité-population |

Résultat 2 : La confiance entre les populations en particulier les victimes de la crise post-électorale envers les institutions nationales est renforcée à travers l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'un cadre stratégique pour la cohésion sociale et la mise en œuvre des recommandations de la CDVR notamment celles relatives aux réparations des victimes

Indicateur de résultat 2 a : Nombre de recommandations de la CDVR appuyées dans leur mise en œuvre	Niveau de référence : soumission du rapport final de la CDVR au gouvernement	Cible : Au moins deux (2) recommandations mises en oeuvre	
Indicateur de résultat 2 b : Nombre d'acteurs nationaux, d'institutions nationales et internationales, de commissions nationales et de plateformes de la société civile formés pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de réconciliation et de cohésion sociale	Niveau de référence : Rapport final CDVR disponible ; Avant-projet de stratégie nationale en cours de rédaction et d'adoption	Cible : 700 Acteurs nationaux, 70 Institutions nationales et internationales, 37 commissions nationales et plateformes de la société civile formées pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de réconciliation et de cohésion sociale	
Produit 2.1 : Le gouvernement l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre du programme d'indemnisation des victimes des crises survenues en Côte d'Ivoire	Indicateur 2.1.1 : Nombre d'exemplaires sur les recommandations validées de la CDVR édités, publiés et diffusés	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : Au moins 1000 exemplaires
	Indicateur 2.1.2 : nombre de séminaires et ateliers tenus pour l'élaboration du programme national de réparation	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : Au moins 10 ateliers / séminaires organisés
Produit 2.2 : Les synergies entre les mécanismes de justice transitionnelle, de réconciliation nationale et de cohésion sociale sont renforcées	Indicateur 2.2.1 : Une stratégie nationale de réconciliation et de cohésion sociale et un plan d'intégration du genre sont disponibles et mise en œuvre	Niveau de référence : Non disponible	Cible : 1 document de stratégie et un plan d'intégration du genre sont disponible
	Indicateur 2.2.2 : nombre de Commissions/structures Locales pilotes pour la mise en œuvre des activités de réconciliations intercommunautaires et cohésion sociale mis en place	Niveau de référence : Existence d'instruments et d'acteurs locaux pour accompagner la mise en œuvre de la stratégie	Cible : Au moins 37 Commissions Locales et plateformes de la société civile fonctionnelles

Résultat 3 : Les acteurs contribuant au renforcement de la démocratie et à la promotion de la paix (les partis politiques, les organisations de la société civile, les femmes, les jeunes, les médias) jouent leur rôle pour que le processus électoral se déroule de façon démocratique, inclusive et sans violence

Indicateur de résultat 3 a : Nombre de plateformes de dialogue renforcés pour des élections apaisées		Niveau de référence : Besoins de renforcement des capacités des acteurs institutionnels pour des élections apaisées identifiés	Cible : Au moins deux (2) recommandations mises en oeuvre
Indicateur de résultat 3b nombre d'organisations et d'institutions et structures étatiques impliquées dans le processus électoral et la coexistence pacifique sensibilisées et dont les capacités sont renforcées		Niveau de référence : existence d'un caucus de femmes parlementaires 24/254 femmes parlementaires, 10 / 197 femmes maires et 01/31 femme présidente de conseil régional	Cible : Au moins 75% des organisations et institutions ciblées sont renforcées et /ou mettent en œuvre des activités de consolidation de la paix pour des élections apaisées
Produit 3.1 : Les plateformes de dialogue entre les femmes, les jeunes, les partis politiques, les organisations de la société civile, les médias sont créés et renforcées en vue de créer les conditions optimales de prévention de la violence électorale et de la consolidation de la paix	Indicateur 3.1.1 : Nombre d'institutions étatiques, d'organisations de la société civile, de médias et de plateformes de jeunes, Corps de Volontaires formées, sensibilisés, outillées et engagés à travers des activités de réduction de la violence pré et post électorales (présidentielles, législatives et locales)	Niveau de référence : Existence au niveau local, d'organisations / plateformes de la jeunesse, scolaires et estudiantines, de radios locales ; Elections 2010 tenues avec des violences post électorales, reprises dans 7 localités en raison de violences électorales	Cible : Au moins 700 OSC et structures
	Indicateur de résultat 3.1.2 : Nombre de plates formes de dialogues appuyées	Niveau de référence : 5	Cible : Au moins 20 plateformes
Produit 3.2 : La participation citoyenne et plus particulièrement celles des femmes et des jeunes est en nette progression notamment grâce au soutien apporté à des initiatives menées en leur faveur	Indicateur de résultat 3.2.2 : Nombre de femmes, de jeunes, d'organisations féminines, d'OSC et de leaders communautaires, sensibilisés et accompagnés pour une plus grande participation des femmes au processus électoral.	Niveau de référence : Les femmes ont des capacités limitées qui font qu'elles ne sont pas suffisamment représentées dans les instances de prise de décisions 24/254 femmes parlementaires 1/31 présidente de conseil régional 10/197 maires	Cible : Au moins 500 OSC et associations mettent en œuvre des actions de consolidation de la paix et de sensibilisation des femmes à la participation
	Indicateur 2.2.2 : nombre de Commissions/structures Locales pilotes pour la mise en œuvre des activités de réconciliations intercommunautaires et cohésion sociale mis en place	Niveau de référence : Existence d'instruments et d'acteurs locaux pour accompagner la mise en œuvre de la stratégie	Cible : Au moins 37 Commissions Locales et plateformes de la société civile fonctionnelles
Produit 3.3 : Le processus électoral est appuyé et renforcé pour une participation inclusive et une appropriation locale et nationale accrue	Indicateur 3.3.1 : nombre d'agents et commissaires, électoraux et forces de sécurités formés	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : au moins 500
	Indicateur 3.3.2 : nombre de campagnes de sensibilisations	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : au moins 50

c. Cadre de résultats du Programme 2 « appui à la prévention et gestion pacifique des conflits en Côte d'Ivoire »

Outcome : La prévention et la résolution pacifique des conflits améliorent et consolident la paix et la cohésion sociale dans un cadre coordonné en Côte d'Ivoire			
Indicateur 1 a : % de conflits locaux dans les zones d'intervention du programme du Plan prioritaire "résolus par les autorités et les mécanismes locaux sans recours à la violence	Niveau de référence : % (voir rapport projet CDVR, PP1, Sous-préfecture de Blolequin)		Cible : 70%
Indicateur 1 b : Nombre de conflits locaux dans les zones « sensibles ciblées par le Plan prioritaire » résolus par les autorité et mécanismes locaux sans recours à la Niveau de référence : la CI enregistre un nombre important de conflits locaux (fonciers, minier, intertribaux, identitaires, agriculteur-éleveurs)	Niveau de référence :		Cible : Diminution de 20% du nombre de conflits recensés dans les zones cible. Augmentation de 50% de conflits résolus
Indicateur 1 c : Perception des populations des zones d'intervention sur les capacités des autorités, des leaders à contribuer à réduire les conflits *(foncier, communautaire, politique)*	Niveau de référence : Assez bonne (PP2, P7)		Cible : Bonne
Résultat No 1 : Les autorités locales, communautaires et les comités de paix sont outillés et contribuent à la prévention et aux règlements pacifiques des conflits			
Produit 1.1 : Les autorités locales, chefs traditionnels et membres des comités de paix formés réalisent la prévention et la gestion pacifique des conflits dans leur zone d'intervention	Indicateur 1.1.1 : Nombre d'autorités administratives et membres de comités de paix formés en genre, à la prévention, la médiation et la gestion pacifique des conflits	Niveau de référence : 20% (acquis du PP1)	Cible : 70%
	Indicateur 1.1.2 : % des zones d'intervention du programme où les leaders communautaires (leaders femmes, leaders jeunes et traditionnels et religieux) sont outillés pour la prévention, la médiation et la gestion pacifique des conflits	Niveau de référence : 67 services de sécurité publique réhabilités et équipes 0 services de protection des femmes et enfants réhabilitées et équipées	Cible : 97 services de sécurité publique dont 15 unités de police, 15 de gendarmerie additionnelle 12 services de protection des femmes et enfants réhabilitées et équipées au moins 390 policiers et gendarmes formés
	Indicateur 1.1.3 : Nombre de rencontres trimestrielles organisées entre autorités administratives et les communautés sur la consolidation de la paix	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible 8
Produit 1.2: Une stratégie de coordination des structures et acteurs de paix est mise en en œuvre	Indicateur 1.2.1: Un document de stratégie de coordination des acteurs de paix existe	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : 1
	Indicateur 1.2.2: Un document de cartographie des conflits est disponible	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : 1
	Indicateur 1.2.3: Nombre de direction régionale du MSFFE et d'OSCS Equipés en ordinateurs	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : 4

Résultat No 2 : Les connaissances des populations rurales, des comités villageois de gestion foncière et d'autres acteurs sont améliorées sur la loi de 1998 relative au foncier rural et le niveau d'adhésion à son application augmente dans les zones d'intervention du programme

Produit 2.1 : une stratégie de communication sur la loi 1998 du foncier rural ciblée sur les communautés est mise en œuvre	Indicateur 2.1.1 : Un document de stratégie de communication sur le foncier est disponible	Niveau de référence 0)	Cible : 1
	Indicateur 2.1.2 : Nombre de documents liés à la loi foncière rurale (livret et prospectus) traduits en langues locales et diffusés	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible : 30 000
	Indicateur 1.1.3 : % de populations rurales et organisations des zones d'intervention du programme qui connaissent les modalités d'application de la loi de 1998 sur le foncier rural	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible 20%
	Indicateur 1.1.4 : Proportion de la population dans les zones cibles ayant écouté et retenu les messages clés sur la loi de 1998 diffusés sur les ondes des radios de proximité des zones d'intervention du programme	Niveau de référence : 0	Cible 20%
Produit 2.2 : la prévention, la médiation et la gestion pacifique des conflits sont mieux appréhendées (managées) par les communautés notamment les comités villageois de gestion foncière fonctionnels	Indicateur 2.2.1 : Nombre de leaders communautaires, de responsables locaux et de leaders féminins formés qui connaissent les modalités d'application de la loi de 1998 sur le foncier rural	Niveau de référence : 10	Cible : 200 (i) dont 125 hommes et (ii) 75 femmes
	Indicateur 2.2.2: Proportion de conflits fonciers résolus pacifiquement par le biais notamment des comités villageois de gestion foncière fonctionnels	Niveau de référence : 0%	Cible : 50%
	Indicateur 2.2.3: Proportion de la population dans les zones cibles ayant écouté et retenu les messages clés sur la loi de 1998 diffusés sur les ondes des radios de proximité des zones d'intervention du programme	Niveau de référence : 0%	Cible : 20%
	Indicateur 2.2.4: Proportion de conflits foncier résolus pacifiquement par le biais d'une intervention des Rois et Chefs coutumiers préalablement formés/sensibilisés	Niveau de référence : 0%	Cible : 50¨%

Résultat No 3 : **Les capacités économiques inclusives et associatives des groupements féminins et de jeunes vulnérables sont renforcées et la cohésion sociale est améliorée dans les zones d'intervention**

Produit 3.1 : Les capacités des femmes, et groupes de jeunes y compris des jeunes sont renforcées en vie associative, montage de projet en vue de la mise en œuvre des activité communautaires de rapprochement qui renforcent la cohésion sociale.	Indicateur 3.1.1 : Nombre de femmes, membres de groupement formés en comptabilité simplifiée, vie associative, technique agricole et élevage et qui bénéficient d'AGR	Niveau de référence 1000	Cible : 4000
	Indicateur 3.1.2 : Nombre de jeunes formés en comptabilité simplifiée, vie associative, technique agricole et élevage et qui réalisent l'auto-emploi	Niveau de référence : 100	Cible : 600
	Indicateur 3.1.3 : Superficie mise en valeur par les populations vulnérables en production vivrière	Niveau de référence :	Cible
Produit 3.2 : Les plates-formes et espaces d'échanges et de dialogue participatif sont fonctionnels et contribuent à la mise en œuvre des AGR et au rapprochement communautaire et à la cohésion sociale	Indicateur 3.2.1 : Nombre de femmes et de jeunes bénéficiaires d'AGR formés à la prévention et à la résolution des conflits	Niveau de référence : 500 (IRF)	Cible : 3500 (dont 3000 femmes et 500 jeunes)
	Indicateur 3.2.2: Nombre d'Espace Ami des Femmes pour la paix ou women friendly space installés et fonctionnels	Niveau de référence : 06 (IRF)	Cible : 14
	Indicateur 3.2.3: Nombre de participants aux plateformes et sessions d'échanges du dialogue participatif selon l'approche Recherche Action Participative (RAP)	Niveau de référence : 300 (Rapport Interpeace, 2013)	Cible : 1000
	Indicateur 3.2.4: Nombre d'organisations féminines à base communautaire réalisant des activités économiques inclusive et de consolidation de la paix	Niveau de référence : 45 (IRF)	Cible : 100
Produit 3.3 : Des activités économiques ou de relèvement consolident la résolution pacifique des conflits locaux	Indicateur 3.3.1 : Nombre de groupements bénéficiaires d'intrants dont les responsables de production réalisent la collecte groupée, la commercialisation	Niveau de référence : AD	Cible : 20

Cadre de résultats du Projet conjoint « appui à l'enregistrement des naissances et à la réforme de l'état civil »

Résultat : Les naissances déclarées et enregistrées à l'état civil dans les délais légaux contribuent à la prévention des conflits liés à l'identité			
Indicateur 1 a : Taux d'enregistrement des naissances dans les délais	Niveau de référence : 51% (2014)	Cible : 61% (2017)	
Indicateur 1 b : Niveau de satisfaction des populations relative aux prestations des services d'état-civil	Niveau de référence : 33% (2014)	Cible : 43% (2017)	
Produit 1 : Les connaissances des populations, notamment des femmes, sur les dispositions légales de déclaration des naissances à l'état-civil sont améliorées	**Indicateur 1.1 :** Proportion de personnes, notamment de femmes, qui savent à la fois que la déclaration des naissances des enfants est obligatoire, gratuite et qu'elle doit intervenir dans les 3 mois qui suivent la naissance	Niveau de référence : Ensemble (17%) Femmes (12%) (2014)	Cible : Ensemble (25%)Femmes (23%) (2017)
	Indicateur 1.2 : Proportion de personnes, notamment de femmes, qui savent que la mère est habilitée à déclarer la naissance de son enfant	Niveau de référence : Ensemble (20%) Femmes (17%) (2014)	Cible : Ensemble (30%) Femmes (28%) (2017)
	Indicateur 1.3 : Proportion de personnes, notamment de femmes qui savent qu'il faut recourir à la justice en cas de dépassement du délai prévu pour la déclaration d'un enfant à l'état-civil	Niveau de référence : Ensemble (48%) Femmes (39%)	Cible : Ensemble (55%) Femmes (52%)
	Indicateur 1.4 : Proportion de personnes, notamment de femmes qui savent que la déclaration de la naissance doit intervenir dans la circonscription du lieu de naissance	Niveau de référence : Ensemble (50%) Femmes (46%)	Cible : Ensemble (60%) Femmes (58%)
Produit 2 : Les capacités des services d'état-civil à délivrer des prestations de qualité sont améliorées	**Indicateur 2.1 :** Proportion de centre d'état-civil n'ayant pas enregistré de rupture en registres de naissance ou imprimés d'extrait d'acte de naissance	Niveau de référence : 55%	Cible : 100%
	Indicateur 2.2 : Proportion des acteurs (du personnel des services d'état-civil, personnel de contrôle et de supervision) ayant bénéficié d'une formation sur la pratique de l'état-civil y compris les aspects relatifs à la déclaration des naissances par les femmes	Niveau de référence : 13% (2014)	Cible : 50% (2017)
	Indicateur 2.3 : Proportion centres d'état-civil ayant reçu au moins une mission	Niveau de référence : 20% (2014)	Cible : 100% (2017)

	annuelle de supervision ou de contrôle		

Résultat : **Les naissances déclarées et enregistrées à l'état civil dans les délais légaux contribuent à la prévention des conflits liés à l'identité**

Produit 3 : Les mécanismes et outils de soutien à la réforme et à la diffusion de données de qualité en matière d'état civil sont développés	**Indicateur 3.1 :** Le plan d'action budgétisé de réforme de l'état-civil est disponible	Niveau de référence : Non (2014)	Cible : Oui (2017)
	Indicateur 3.2 : La proportion de centres d'état-civil qui transmettent des données désagrégées par sexe pour l'alimentation de la base de données de gestion de l'activité des centres d'état-civil	Niveau de référence : 44% (2014)	Cible : 100% (2017)
	Indicateur 3.3 : Existence d'un cahier de charges du fichier central	Niveau de référence : Non (2014)	Cible : Oui (2017)
Produit 4 : Des opérations de régularisation des enfants non déclarés et des réfugiés rapatriés sont conduites dans les sites du projet	**Indicateur 4.1 :** Nombre d'enfants réfugiés rapatriés à risque d'apatridie dont la situation est régularisée	Niveau de référence : 00	Cible : 22,000
	Indicateur 4.2 : Nombre d'enfants non déclarés dans les délais légaux dont la situation est régularisée	Niveau de référence : 308,602	Cible : 314,602

Annexe 5. Correspondance des indicateurs du Plan prioritaire avec les indicateurs des Programmes et Projets.

Indicateurs du Plan prioritaire	Indicateurs des Projets et Programmes (d'après les cadres de résultats des programmes et projets du Plan de Suivi / Evaluation du 4 déc.)
Renforcement de la confiance, de la coexistence pacifique et de la situation sécuritaire en période pré-électorale	**Résultat 1 :** La confiance au sein des forces de défense et de sécurité, d'une part et la confiance des populations à l'égard des forces de défense et de sécurité d'autre part, est renforcée et les élections se déroulent dans un climat apaisé et sécurisé
Indicateur de résultat 3 : Niveau de confiance des populations aux forces de sécurité ivoiriennes	Indicateur de résultat 1 a : Nombre de régions disposant de mécanisme local opérationnel de mise en œuvre de la RSS
	Indicateur de résultat 1 b : Nombre de comités d'éthique rendus fonctionnels entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité (police, gendarmerie, FRCI)
	Indicateur de résultat 1 c : Niveau de collaboration entre les populations et les acteurs en charge de la sécurité ;
	Résultat 2 : La confiance entre les populations en particulier les victimes de la crise post-électorale envers les institutions nationales est renforcée à travers l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'un cadre stratégique pour la cohésion sociale et la mise en œuvre des recommandations de la CDVR notamment celles relatives aux réparations des victimes
Indicateur de résultat 4 : Nombre/adoption de recommandations de la CDVR ayant fait l'objet d'un suivi de la part des autorités	Indicateur de résultat 2 a : Nombre de recommandations de la CDVR appuyées dans leur mise en œuvre
	Indicateur de résultat 2 b : Nombre d'acteurs nationaux, d'institutions nationales et internationales, de commissions nationales et de plateformes de la société civile formés pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de réconciliation et de cohésion sociale
	Résultat 3 : Les acteurs contribuant au renforcement de la démocratie et à la promotion de la paix (les partis politiques, les organisations de la société civile, les femmes, les jeunes, les médias) jouent leur rôle pour que le processus électoral se déroule de façon démocratique, inclusive et sans violence
Indicateur de résultat 1 : Niveau de violence et de tensions autour des élections de 2015	Indicateur de résultat 3 a : Nombre de plateformes de dialogue renforcés pour des élections apaisées
Indicateur de résultat 2 : Niveau de représentativité des électeurs et de candidats dans le processus électoral	Indicateur de résultat 3b Nombre d'organisations et d'institutions et structures étatiques impliquées dans le processus électoral et la coexistence pacifique sensibilisées et dont les capacités sont renforcées
Prévention et résolution pacifique des conflits à travers le renforcement des capacités de l'état et d'autres mécanismes en place	**Outcome :** La prévention et la résolution pacifique des conflits améliorent et consolident la paix et la cohésion sociale dans un cadre coordonné en Côte d'Ivoire
Indicateur de résultat 5 : Nombre de conflits locaux dans les zones « sensibles ciblés par le Plan prioritaire » résolus par les autorités et mécanismes locaux sans recours à la violence	**Indicateur 1 a :** % de conflits locaux dans les zones d'intervention du programme du Plan prioritaire "résolus par les autorités et les mécanismes locaux sans recours à la violence
	Indicateur 1 b : Nombre de conflits locaux dans les zones « sensibles ciblées par le Plan prioritaire » résolus par les autorité et mécanismes locaux sans recours à la
	Indicateur 1 c : Perception des populations des zones d'intervention sur les capacités des autorités, des leaders à contribuer à réduire les conflits *(foncier, communautaire, politique)*
	Résultat : Les naissances déclarées et enregistrées à l'état civil dans les délais légaux contribuent à la prévention des conflits liés à l'identité
Indicateur 6 : Niveau de mise en œuvre du plan national de réforme du système d'état civil	**Indicateur 1 a :** Taux d'enregistrement des naissances dans les délais
	Indicateur 1 b : Niveau de satisfaction des populations relative aux prestations des services d'état-civil
Coordination efficace, suivi, rapport, évaluation et communication sur les réalisations des objectifs du Plan de priorités et des projets s'y rattachant	**Résultat :** La planification des priorités de consolidation de la paix, la coordination, le suivi-évaluation de leur mise en œuvre, ainsi que la communication sur les résultats sont assurés de manière efficace.
	Indicateur 1 a : Prise en compte des priorités de consolidation de la Paix dans le Plan National de Développement (PND) et dans le UNDAF
Indicateur de résultat 7 : Rapport annuel du Comité mixte de pilotage soumis moins de 7 jours après la date limite	**Indicateur 1 b :** Rapport annuel du Comité Conjoint de Pilotage soumis dans les délais
Indicateur de résultat 8 : Qualité des rapports annuels du Comité mixte de pilotage jugée « acceptable » par l'équipe d'examen du PBSO	**Indicateur 1 c :** Qualité des rapports annuels du Comité Conjoint de Pilotage

Indicateur de résultat 9 : Les projets du Plan de priorités remplissent tous les critères de sélection, y compris celui de rentabilité.	**Indicateur 1 d :** Les projets du Plan prioritaire remplissent tous les critères de sélection, y compris celui de rentabilité
Indicateur de résultat 10 : Principaux partenaires (par ex. entités de l'ONU bénéficiaires ainsi que parties prenantes hors ONU) satisfaits du niveau et de la rapidité de la communication et de la coordination du Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix à travers le Secrétariat technique PBF	**Indicateur 1 e :** Niveau de satisfaction des principaux partenaires : Entités de l'ONU bénéficiaires et Structures Nationales (Gouvernement et ONG)

Annexe 6. Listes des projets recensés en matière de consolidation de la paix

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
Appui à la Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation	Gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire *Haut-Commissariat des NU aux Droits de* l'Homme – *ONUCI PBF*	Gouvernement : déploiement de la CDVR à l'échelle nationale OHCHR/ONUCI : assistance technique et financière à la tenue des activités d'audition des victimes et rémois dans les 37 centres d'écoute de la CDVR	Diverses phases, la dernière allant d'avril 2013 à décembre 2014 (extension) Prolongation jusqu'au 15 aout 2014	2 millions (y compris la dernière extension)
Appui à la restauration de l'ordre public et de l'autorité de l'Etat	Union Européenne et JICA	Appui au rétablissement de la sécurité (police) et de la cohésion sociale	Jusqu'en 2015	Extension de financement jusqu'à 5 millions d'euros (UE) et 1,5 millions de dollars (JICA)
Appui à la politique de DDR	Gouvernement de CI BAD UE	Finalisation du programme de DDR (74000 ex-combattants ciblés)	Jusqu'en 2015	30 milliards de CFA (BAD) 5 millions d'Euros (UE)
Appui à l'état civil – promotion de l'enregistrement des naissances et des personnes non déclarées dans les délais	Ministère d'Etat de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité, Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés publiques, Ministère de la Solidarité, de la Famille, de la Femme et de l'Enfant	Gouvernement : enregistrement des naissances, renforcement de l'état civil, identification des populations UNICEF, FNUAP, UNHCR, NRC, DRC, Caritas	Mai 2012- décembre 2014	3 millions de dollars
Appui aux initiatives communautaires	UN PBF		Juin 2014 – décembre 2015	1.5 million USD

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
des femmes en faveur de la réconciliation et de la paix en CI	Ministère d'état, plan et développement, ministère de la solidarité, d la famille, de la femme et de l'enfant FNUAP/ONUFEMMES/PNUD, ONUCI			
Appui à la définition de stratégies de mise en œuvre du foncier rural	Ministère de l'agriculture Multiples (UE, FAO, AFD, BAD, NRC)	Délimitation des terroirs villageois et amélioration des pratiques d'application de la loi de 1998	Depuis 2013 – en cours	Engagement de 30 millions d'Euros des partenaires du développement de CI
Formation sur la justice criminelle pour les pays d'Afrique francophone	Gouvernement ivoirien JICA	Formation sur la justice criminelle internationale (régional)	2014-2015	2 millions de dollars
Renforcement des communautés pour la promotion de la cohésion sociale du Grand Abijan	Maire d'Abijan MEMIS Communes de Yopougon et Abobo JICA	Initiatives de renforcement des services sociaux de base	2013-2015 – étendu jusqu'en 2016 « Au regard des résultats satisfaisants obtenus au cours de cette phase pilote et compte tenu des besoins importants dans le domaine de la cohésion social qui est un processus de longue durée, le Ministre d'Etat, Ministre de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité souhaiterait que le projet COSAY soit poursuivi	6 millions de dollars

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
			et étendu à d'autres collectivités territoriales »	
Projet d'appui à la réforme et modernisation du système judiciaire	Ministère de la Justice, droits de l'homme et libertés publiques Multiples (USAID, UE, ONUCI, GIZ, CICR, UNICEF et UNHCR)	Redressement et renforcement des capacités du système justicière Appui au déploiement de cliniques juridiques	Depuis 2011 – processus en cours (certains jusqu'en 2017)	Dizaines de millions au total (grands engagements de USAID et UE)
Développement des ressources humaines pour le renforcement de l'administration locale (Centre et Nord)	MEMIS JICA	Renforcement des capacités des administrations locales dans la gestion des affaires publiques	2013.11-2016.11	6 millions d'euros
Renforcement de la sécurité transfrontalière	Union du fleuve de Mano (dont fait partie la CI)	Développement de la sécurité et des échanges transfrontaliers	En cours	
Projets sur les droits de propriété et développement du diamant artisanal	Ministère de l'industrie et des mines UE et USA	Exploitation normalisée et traçabilité des anciens « diamants de sang » en CI	En démarrage	2 millions
Appui à la relance de la Formation professionnelle et	JICA	Programme de relèvement et de réintégration communautaires (PRRC)	Mars 2014 – Février 2015	2 million

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
à l'insertion des jeunes				
Projet d'assistance post-conflit	Banque Mondiale	Améliorer les possibilités de réintégration économique et d'accès aux services sociaux qu'ont les communautés et les individus affectés par les conflits, ce qui accélérera le redressement de la Côte d'Ivoire après sa sortie de crise et renforcera les perspectives d'une paix durable sur le territoire ivoirien.	Octobre 2015- 30 Juin 2016	120 millions
From crisis to credibility in ivoirian elections	USAID	"The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) and 14 civil society organizations to form an independent platform to provide outside verification of the credibility of the election outcome. The organization, called the Platform of Organizations for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (POECI), performed a parallel vote tabulation for the 2015 presidential election". […] *"Looking forward, the intention now is to keep POECI's technology-based model going, build on it, and deploy an observation mission for the legislative and local elections in 2016. The findings from the presidential election can be used as a baseline for statistical analysis to track political trends in the country".*		

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
Improving cooperation between ivoirian magistrates and judicial police and increasing access to justice	USAID	*"Funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through a cooperative agreement, the Justice Sector Support Program ("ProJustice") is a five-year judicial administration, accountability, and access-to-justice program that works with the Ministry of Justice, National Judicial Training Institutes, pilot courts, and civil society organizations. The program's overarching objective is to strengthen the delivery of justice services in Côte d'Ivoire, including improving administration and increasing access to justice. The expected results of the Justice Sector Support Program in Côte d'Ivoire include improved case management; more professional and effective judicial and other justice sector officials; wider understanding of justice issues; and fairer, more uniform adjudication of cases".* lien 1 lien 2	2013 – en cours (à confirmer)	

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
Strengthening representational government in côte d'ivoire	USAID	"Legislative Strengthening Program In 2011, after 12-years without a parliamentary election, the people of Côte d'Ivoire elected new representatives to the National Assembly. After that election, the new lawmakers required additional support because of the absence of a consistent, effective, and transparent government. The USAID Office of the Development Counselor launched a five-year, $13 million Legislative Strengthening Project in December, 2012 to support the members of the National Assembly in their essential governing roles and functions. USAID in Côte d'Ivoire is providing expert guidance, training, resources and organization plans to help cement the National Assembly as an independent government branch able to carry out needed oversight, effective policy development, and responsive constituent representation". lien 1 lien 2	2012 – 2017	
Participation Suisse aux composantes police et civile de l'opération des nations unies en Côte d'Ivoire.	DFA (Suisse)	*experts at the disposal of the (ONUCI) to help establish and support the country's police force. Switzerland also supports the civilian element of the ONUCI that is charged with advising Ivorian customs, in particular in Bouaké".* lien 1 lien 2		0.13756831

Résultat ou thématique visée	Source de financement	Projets majeurs	Durée des projets	Budget en dollars US
Appui au processus de réconciliation en Côte d'Ivoire	Belgique EU	Programme d'appui au processus de réconciliation nationale dans le district autonome d'Abidjan ; installation des forums permanents de gouvernance identitaire lien 1	2014 – A confirmer	0.09950909 (Belgique) (EU - à confirmer)
Support to the SALW (Small Arms and Light Weapons), Commission Côte d'Ivoire	German Federal Foreign Office	*« Support for the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Commission Nationale de lutte contre la prolifération et la circulation illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre – ComNat ALPC-CI) »* lien 1	2011 - 2016	0.46437575