

**Peacebuilding Commission**  
**Country-Specific Configuration on Central African Republic**

**National initiatives and support by the International Community to the  
development of a Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

**Context**

1. In the last ten years, the Central African Republic (CAR) has faced a situation of insecurity in the North-West, the North-East and the Centre of the country. Banditry and armed political movements are the main sources of internal insecurity. Incursions by armed groups from neighbouring countries, who use the Central African territory as back base or as corridors, also contribute to the number of violent acts committed to the Central African territory.

2. In the North-West and the Centre of the country, insecurity is caused by activities by rebels, extremely violent road blockers (*zaraguinas*), often originating from neighbouring countries, and by the response given by security forces. Two groups are active in the North-West and Centre: the APRD and the FDPC. The North-East of the country is partly controlled by combatants from the rebel UFDR. In that zone of the country, violence is currently contained by the presence of international missions of the EUFOR and MINURCAT. Throughout the territory, the *zaraguinas* also represent a security threat to the populations.

3. National authorities are facing difficulties in affirming their control beyond the capital Bangui. Continuously confronted to a multitude of emergencies in various areas, but also because of a lack of experience in good governance, national expertise, and means, the Government tries to the best of its capabilities to manage daily crises. Chronic insecurity in the CAR is threatening the whole sub-region. The return to stability in CAR is therefore crucial for the international community.

4. In this context, the global peace accord signed in Libreville, Gabon, on 21 June 2008, by the Government and two of the three principal politico-military movements, is symbolic for the re-launch of a dynamic toward stabilization. The peace accord signed under the auspices of the President of Gabon, confirms the cease-fire agreement between the parties. It also requests the government, inter alia, to promulgate a general amnesty law, a pre-condition to the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD), and to a process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) of the rebel troops.

5. At the same time, the Central African authorities published, in June 2008, in the context of the allocation from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a priority plan for peacebuilding. The priority plan identifies SSR as the first area of intervention, and addresses the related issue of DDR. In this context, SSR is seen as a process of restructuring and training, involving all segments of the security sector, notably the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), the national gendarmerie, national police,

customs officers, certain non-state actors, judiciary and penitentiary administration, intelligence services, and protection of natural resources administration (rangers, etc...).

6. The progress achieved in the IPD, SSR, and DDR could potentially be mutually reinforcing. With this in mind, the IPD process would allow parties to engage in a national reconciliation dynamic, and to define modalities for the cantonnement of politico-military movements and for the return to stability in the country; the process of SSR would for its part allow for a thorough reform of the institutions essential for the stability of a democratic state; the DDR process, finally, would allow for the reintegration of rebel groups into society.

### **Key challenges in the Security Sector**

7. The start of the Inclusive Political Dialogue is currently hampered by serious difficulties. The Central African Government blames the various politico-military movements for having taken up the arms again despite the cease-fire agreements. Part of the parliamentary opposition, and of the armed opposition have rejected the draft Amnesty Law voted on 29 September, and have requested a more balanced representation in the preparatory committee for the dialogue. The Central African Government has committed to actively seek a solution to the deadlock. Since then, on 13 October, the President promulgated the Amnesty Law.

8. The delays incurred in starting the IPD highlight the importance of sequencing the SSR and DDR processes. By setting progress in the IPD as a condition for progress in SSR and DDR, delays are bound to occur in the latter processes. A way out from that impasse would be to consider the IPD and SSR as two separate processes, which need to progress in parallel, thus avoiding that delays incurred in one affect the other.

9. On the other hand, launching a DDR programme is partially conditioned by the Amnesty Law. Thus, the crisis in this context directly affects the implementation of such a DDR programme. The Government and its international partners should not, however, delay preparations for this programme. As a matter of fact, once modalities have been worked out between the parties, implementation should proceed immediately. It should be noted that a number of former combatants could, as of now, take part in a detailed census in view of a first batch of DDR.

### **Efforts by the Government and International Partners**

10. With respect to SSR, the Central African Government is currently engaged in the implementation of a process of restructuring and training of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and of the National Gendarmerie, with the support of France. A draft law for military programming and police training is expected to be adopted at the parliamentary session at the end of 2008.

11. For its part, the European Commission (EC) has contributed financially to the CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) from 2004 to

July 2008, and contributes to the ongoing MICOPAX1 (CEEAC's Peace Consolidation Mission in Central African Republic). Furthermore, the EC is currently developing a pension's scheme to facilitate the retirement of Central African military (armed forces and gendarmerie) who have reached retirement age as stipulated in Article 3(2)(g) of the *Règlement financier de l'Instrument de Stabilité*.

12. Concurrently, the Central African Government brought together, with the support of UNDP and the analytical support of a Belgian expert, all concerned parties (political representatives, security sector, civil society, private sector and international community at the national and local levels) in a Nations Seminar on the Reform of the Security Sector, which took place from 14 to 17 April 2008. This initiative, the first of its kind to date in Africa, was marked by the Government's candid analysis of the state of its security sector. This seminar identified the key elements of a general reform of the sector, and established a timeline for concrete actions in the short (8 months and medium term (24 months).

13. The activities outlined in the timeline are subdivided in five pillars. The Ministry of Defence has the responsibility for the first pillar, related to FACA and the National Gendarmerie. The second pillar, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, relates to the national police and paramilitary forces. The third pillar is under the responsibility go the Ministry of Justice, and concerns judiciary and penitentiary administration. The forth pillar is managed by the parliament and deals with governance issues at the political, economic and financial fields. Finally, the Ministries of Defence and Interior share the responsibility for the fifth pillar, related to intelligence services.

14. In light of the implementation of these activities, the Central African authorities have established a "*Comité sectoriel*" for SSR, by a decree from the Prime Minister in May 2008, in conformity with the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This committee is tasked, among others, with developing and updating SSR policies, ensuring programmatic coherence within and among sectors, and analyzes the state of implementation of the priority action plan. The Committee will be supported by a Permanent Technical Secretariat for the daily activities, composed of a coordinator and three experts.

15. In addition, the UNDP and the EC have committed, at the end of the National Seminar of the Security Sector Reform, to support the process through a multidisciplinary team of experts to finalize the global SSR strategy and promote the implementation of the operational conclusions of the seminar. These experts would be placed in key ministries (Defence, Interior, Finance, and Justice notably) under the supervision of a coordinator.

16. With respect to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the first tranche allocation is in the process of being finalized. Three areas have been identified: SSR, Good Governance and the Rule of Law, and the revitalization of communities affected by conflicts. This should also allow for the funding of certain aspects of the SSR and DDR processes, not covered to date by other sources of funding.

17. The DDR policies could draw upon experience gained in the course of the last few years. As a matter of fact, the Government and international partners have been engaged since a number of years in the development of a coherent and concerted action. From 2004 to 2007, the *Programme de Réinsertion des ex-combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés* (PRAC), funded by the Multi Donor Demobilization and Reinsertion Programme (MDPR), and implemented by UNDP, had as an initial objective to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate 7,500 former combatants and has allowed to identify recommendations for future steps. Lessons learned could be drawn from negative and positive aspects of this experience.

### **Mapping of the needs and possible contribution from the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)**

18. The operational conclusions of the national seminar constitute an excellent basis for the future work of the PBC in the area of SSR in the Central African Republic, with due regard to national ownership. As a matter of fact, the operational conclusions and the timeline have been presented to the Council of Ministers. At that occasion, the Prime Minister invited ministers to ensure strict implementation of the activities under SSR. Also, the *Comité sectoriel* for SSR was established in May 2008. International partners have for their part, started to put together the multidisciplinary expert team, and the necessary resources for its funding. However, activities foreseen in the timeline have already incurred some delays. The attached annex provides an overall view of all the activities, ongoing and planned.

19. The country-specific configuration for the Central African Republic of the PBC could contribute to re-launching the process, notably by supporting the setting up of the pilot and support structures. The role of the CAR CSM could also be to encourage all parties to adhere strictly to the established timeline, and to ensure, in close collaboration with national authorities, the follow-up to ongoing activities. In this context, an assessment mission (composed of Central African representatives and international partners) is scheduled to take place in December 2008, or January 2009. This mission should allow participants to conduct an assessment of progress made in, a possible problems linked to the implementation of the national strategy for SSR. This assessment may prove to be very useful for the CSM's work.

20. Furthermore, the CAR CSM could facilitate the coordination between international partners, based on a methodology defined by the Central African Government, and marshal resources to fund planned activities according to the timeline. (The annexed table identifies those activities by the Government which require additional funding). Finally, the CAR CSM could contribute to an increased international visibility of SSR and DDR processes in CAR, and could provide political support to SSR pilots within the Central African State institutions.

21. The mutual engagement between the PBC and the Central African Republic will result in a strategic document for peacebuilding. The adoption of this document will guide the work of the CAR configuration and of future funding decisions in the context of

the PBF, under the aegis of the National Steering Committee, notably for the most urgent SSR and DDR aspects requiring additional funding.

22. With respect to the DDR programme, the budget allocation indicated in the PBF Priority Plan seems relatively low. Other partners should therefore be encouraged to support the government in short term activities, such as cantonnement, disarmament and demobilization, as well as long term, such as reintegration.

**Annex: Ongoing and planned activities, emanating from the operational conclusions of the National Seminar on Security Sector Reform (2008)**

<b>Ministries</b>	<b>Entity</b>	<b>Priorities: Financial support for:</b>
Defence	FACA / Gendarmerie	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Construction of barracks</b></li> <li><b>2. Payment of pensions and salary arrears</b></li> <li>3. Training and body gear (i.e.: livery, helmets...)</li> <li>4. Major equipment (non lethal)</li> </ol>
Interior	Police	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Training and body gear</b> (i.e.: livery, radio equipment, vehicles...)</li> <li><b>2. Infrastructure</b></li> </ol>
	Water and Forests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Technical assistance</b></li> <li><b>2. Training and body gear</b></li> <li>3. Infrastructure</li> </ol>
	Customs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Training for capacity building</b></li> <li><b>2. Hardware (Radio, Vehicles...)</b></li> <li>3. Strengthening of coordination with neighbouring countries</li> </ol>
Justice	Justice	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Training for magistrates (+ recruitment) and local officials</b></li> <li><b>2. Training and office supplies</b></li> <li><b>3. Detention institutions: mixed prison control and support to reinsertion</b></li> </ol>
Defence / Interior	Intelligence services	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Basic training for existing managers and support to reorganisation of the organization</b></li> <li><b>2. Training and hardware</b></li> <li>3. Support for recruitment</li> </ol>
Miscellaneous		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Support to Parliament</b></li> <li>2. Strengthening of <b>GENDER</b> mainstreaming</li> <li>3. Support to <b>MEDIA</b></li> </ol>