Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Mali

2014-2018

Final Report

30 July 2019

Submitted by:
- Salif Nimaga (Team Leader)
- Amagoin Keita (National Expert)
- Charles Petrie (Strategic Advisor)
Content
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... i
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. i
Country Context .......................................................................................................................... i
Overview of PBF Engagement in Mali ....................................................................................... i
Evaluation scope and methodology ......................................................................................... ii
Evaluation findings ..................................................................................................................... iv
  Relevance ................................................................................................................................ iv
  Effectiveness ............................................................................................................................ iv
  Impact and Sustainability .......................................................................................................... v
Efficiency ................................................................................................................................... vi
Gender ....................................................................................................................................... vi
Management and Oversight ..................................................................................................... vi
Recommendations .................................................................................................................... vii
  Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) ........................................ vii
  Recommendations for the Steering Committee in Mali ....................................................... viii
  Recommendations for the PBF-Secretariat ........................................................................ ix
Recommendations for RUNOs/NUNOs ................................................................................ x
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Country Context ................................................................................................................ 2
  1.2 The International Community and Mali ........................................................................ 4
  1.3 Overview of PBF Engagement in Mali ........................................................................... 5
  1.4 Portfolio .............................................................................................................................. 7
2. Evaluation Features ............................................................................................................... 7
  2.1 Scope .................................................................................................................................. 7
  2.2 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9
  2.3 Limitations of the evaluation ............................................................................................ 11
3. Evaluation findings ............................................................................................................... 12
  3.1 Relevance ........................................................................................................................... 12
    3.1.1 Relevance relating to key drivers of conflict ............................................................... 12
    3.1.2 Relevance of proposed theories of change ................................................................. 14
    3.1.3 Relevance relating to national and regional peacebuilding priorities ......................... 16
    3.1.4 Relevance relating to UN strategic frameworks and priorities .................................. 18
  3.2 Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................... 19
**List of acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE2C</td>
<td>Audit Expertise Comptable &amp; Conseil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPV</td>
<td>Centre National de Promotion du Volontariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDD</td>
<td>Cadre pour la Relance Economique et le Développement Durable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCRDP</td>
<td>Cadre Stratégique pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTMS</td>
<td>Comité Technique Mixte de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVJR</td>
<td>Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Community Violence Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-CAP</td>
<td>Directeur du Centre d’Animation Pédagogique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG/RC/HC</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERAR</td>
<td>Équipe Régionale d’Appui à la Réconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSC</td>
<td>Forum des Organisations de la Société Civile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPI</td>
<td>Gender Promotion Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREFFA</td>
<td>Groupe de Recherche, d’Étude, de Formation Femme-Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GYPI</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Youth Promotion Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMRAP</td>
<td>Institut Malien de Recherche Action pour la Paix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Response Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARN</td>
<td>Mission d’Appui à la Réconciliation Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEFP</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPFEF</td>
<td>Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme, de l’Enfant et de la Famille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPTF-O</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRN</td>
<td>Ministère de la Réconciliation Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUNO</td>
<td>Non-United Nations Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>Programme d’Actions du Gouvernement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIRC</td>
<td>Plan de Sécurisation Intégré des Régions du Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Reflecting on Peace Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUNO</td>
<td>Recipient United Nations Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoW</td>
<td>Statement of Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>State and Peacebuilding Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>United Nations Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBG</td>
<td>Violence Basée sur le Genre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPI</td>
<td>Youth Promotion Initiative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Introduction

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the United Nations Secretary-General's fund designed to meet immediate needs in (post-)conflict countries. It is part of the UN peacebuilding architecture created in 2006 at the request of the General Assembly (Resolution 60/180) and the Security Council (Resolution 1645). The PBF became operational in 2007 and began its support to Mali in 2014. As the country’s five-year eligibility period comes to an end in 2019, the purpose of this evaluation is to assess PBF’s results achieved and analyze the portfolio’s overall added value to peacebuilding in the country. The evaluation will be used for learning and accountability and to contribute to the PBF’s decision-making regarding further engagement in Mali.

Country Context

Mali, a vast land-locked country of 1.24 million square km with more than 16 million inhabitants, has been experiencing a protracted political, security, identity and humanitarian crisis since 2012, which has proved to be the most serious since its independence. This crisis has exposed the fragility of the Republic's institutions and compromised progress in decentralization and democratic governance, resulting in the withdrawal of public administration and the suspension of the provision of basic services in several parts of the territory. The rapid conflict analysis that has been undertaken by the evaluation highlights the following key drivers of conflict: (1) Poor governance and widespread corruption, (2) Inequalities and discrimination in access to resources; (3) Weakness of the judicial system; (4) Religious radicalism; (5) Marginalization and exclusion of the majority of the population; (6) Regional security threats.

Mali is the biggest recipient of donor funds amongst the G-5 Sahel member states with annual support around US$ 1.3 billion during the last five years. ODA funding in support to peacebuilding is significant with US$ 192m in 2017. The main areas of support are inclusive political processes, core government functions, basis safety and security and human rights and the Rule of law.

Overview of PBF Engagement in Mali

Within this context, the US$ 35.7m invested by the PBF since 2014 through 20 projects are an important but comparatively small contribution. The portfolio can be divided into a pre-eligibility IRF, two phases of programmatic support (the first focusing on the northern regions Gao and Timbuktu starting in 2014, the second on the central regions Mopti and Ségué starting in 2017) and a substantial number of additional ad-hoc projects. The projects are implemented by UN agencies, funds and programmes, and civil society organizations, in close collaboration with MINUSMA. The portfolio is overseen by a Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Government of Mali (represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the UN (represented by the DSRSG/RC/HC). The portfolio is characterized by a high level of diversity in terms of recipient organizations, namely 13 UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as three civil society organizations.
Evaluation scope and methodology

In 2019, the PBSO commissioned a final, independent evaluation of the PBF’s investments in Mali since 2014. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the PBF portfolio in light of the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency and sustainability, how gender equality was factored in, to what extent catalytic effects were achieved. In addition, it was to provide lessons and useful evidence-based input for decision-making on future support. The substantive work on evaluation began on 21 January 2019 with document review and remote data collection. Data collection in Mali lasted from 18 February to 8 March and included interviews with around 140 stakeholders in Bamako and Gao.
One of the main challenges for the evaluation was the heterogeneity of the portfolio and the fact that out of 20 projects, 13 had not yet finished all their activities at the time of in-country data collection. The consequence was to assess the whole portfolio against some criteria, such as relevance, efficiency and gender equality. The criteria of effectiveness, impact and sustainability are analyzed based on a sample that focuses on Phase 1. This is also due to the fact that Phase 1 and Phase 2 focused on different regions and only one field visit to either one of these regions was possible. In addition, Phase 2 projects were still in the implementation. The evaluation is conscious of the limits regarding how representative these findings on impact and sustainability are of the portfolio as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1, with a focus on Gao and Timbuktu</th>
<th>IRF-84: Cantonment; IRF-101: Éducation pour la paix; IRF-102: Réintégration durable; IRF-105: Femmes victimes de violences sexuelles; IRF-106: Capacités de résilience aux conflits des femmes et des jeunes (since 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2, with a focus on Mopti and Ségou</td>
<td>IRF-217: Peers for Peace building social cohesion in Mopti and Ségou Regions, IRF-218: Projet de renforcement de la résilience sécuritaire; IRF-219: Les jeunes acteurs pour la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale (since 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF strategic funding windows, including GYPI and cross-border projects</td>
<td>IRF-146: Participation des femmes dans la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix; IRF-158: Femmes, Défense et Sécurité (Interpeace); IRF-161: Jeunesse Alafia (ACORD); IRF-165: Appui aux Autorités Intérimaires de Taoudéni et Ménaka; IRF-182: Promotion de la sécurité communautaire et de la cohésion sociale dans la région Liptako-Gourma; MAL/D-1: Emplois et jeunes pour la paix; IRF-234: Engaging Youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali (Mercy Corps); IRF-260: Deuxième décennie pour la paix; IRF-291: Jeunes et paix; IRF-299: Appui aux initiatives transfrontalières de dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF Secretariat projects</td>
<td>IRF-98: Cellule d’Appui du Comité de Pilotage; IRF-231: Cellule d’Appui à la coordination des projets PBF au Mali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluation collected and analyzed quantitative and qualitative data in a mixed method approach. A case study approach was chosen for the five substantive projects of Phase 1, including a field visit to Gao. Data collection tools include document review, a small online survey, qualitative semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, focus group discussions and observations in project areas. Reflecting on Peace (RPP) was used as means of Theory of change validation/reconstruction.

The evaluation encountered several obstacles which limited its findings. Apart from the problematic timing for a summative evaluation, the other limitation was the lack of available data at the portfolio level, such as strategic results frameworks with relevant base- and endline data. In addition, the volatile security situation in Mali dictated some decisions. Phase 1 had been implemented in Gao and Timbuktu regions and it would have been ideal to collect data from both localities. However, the evaluation team had no choice of locations for the field visit, as a security clearance could only be obtained for Gao. In Gao, movement was restricted to the town of Gao and more rural areas of project implementation remained inaccessible, further biasing findings.
Evaluation findings
The following presents a snapshot of the findings relating to the evaluation criteria as well as observations on the management arrangements.

Relevance
The relevance of the portfolio in addressing key drivers of conflict is varied. A number of projects have adopted a peace dividend rationale that focused on addressing (socio-economic) consequences of the conflict rather than its (socio-political) root causes. This approach appears justified for the first phase of PBF-engagement in Mali following the 2013 Ouagadougou Preliminary Accord and the 2015 Algiers Peace Accord. However, going forward, the PBF’s investments would be more strategically utilized supporting interventions that explicitly address root causes of conflict.

The PBF-portfolio in Mali supported a number of national and regional peacebuilding priorities, such as provisions from the above-mentioned Peace agreements (e.g. on cantonment and the creation of interim authorities) as well as support to the G5-Sahel. The portfolio also supported a number of UN priorities both at the national level (UNDAF+, operating on the principle of national appropriation, and the MINUSMA mandate), as well as at the regional (UNISS) and global level (SRC 1325, 2250).

The choice of geographic locations for Phase 1 (Gao and Timbuktu regions) and Phase 2 (Mopti and Ségou regions) was very well justified by conflict dynamics and the progressive shift of conflicts towards the South. At the same time, it should be noted that many of the root causes of conflict are of national scope which manifest themselves differently in various parts of the country. Three projects, namely IRF-182 (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), IRF-291 (Mali, Burkina Faso) and IRF-299 (Mali, Niger), are cross-border projects and as such good examples of how to respond to the sub-regional dimensions of the Malian crisis.

Effectiveness
The criterion of effectiveness asks the question to which degree intended results of the PBF portfolio were achieved. The PBF-portfolio had elements characterized by a weakness of overall coherence and strategic orientation limiting its effectiveness. Only Phase 1 had a common results framework with two overarching outcomes, namely 1) Individuals, groups and communities at risk of (re)engagement in conflict use dialogue platforms and local conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve their disputes peacefully and 2): Increased inclusion and integration of individuals, groups and communities at risk of (re)engagement in conflict, through more equitable/improved access to sources of income and basic and legal services. This common results framework, which was the developed after the approval of the individual projects, served as the foundation for data collection and reporting until 2016. According to available data, the overarching outcomes were mostly not achieved: for example an increase of mistrust of dialogue mechanisms was noted and 10% of young people targeted by interventions apparently rejoined armed groups. However, some contributions were made in support of durable solutions in the reintegration of formerly displaced persons in Gao and Timbuktu regions.
Phase 2 did not develop an overarching results framework. Once this phase will have finished implementation, it will be difficult to document the contribution of these projects to higher level peacebuilding results due to the lack of data. This is a step back from the approach in Phase 1. Finally, half of the portfolio has been approved outside of programmatic considerations in an ad hoc fashion. While these projects show the potential of the PBF to flexibly support emerging peacebuilding opportunities and attempt containing the spreading of the crisis, the absence of a priority plan or strategic framework and the number of individual projects make it very difficult to speak of cumulative effects of the peacebuilding portfolio. Going forward, it is suggested to further increase the programmatic approach of interventions to increase coherence and complementarity in the portfolio, identify and address gaps in peacebuilding needs and avoid duplication.

Impact and Sustainability

The criterion of impact aims to analyze positive and negative changes that the PBF portfolio in Mali has generated, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily. As it was difficult to analyze the impact of the portfolio as a whole, the evaluation chose to work based on a sample, consisting of Phase 1 projects. On the basis of this analysis it was possible to approach the criterion of impact. The projects of Phase 1 have largely achieved their intended outcomes. Their overall contribution to higher-level peacebuilding impacts varies as does the sustainability of results.

- IRF-84 (Cantonment) saw some mitigated results. The cantonment sites were finished – after substantial delay – in 2016 but still have not been used for their intended purpose due to overall delays in the DDR process. The construction of the sites served as political bargaining piece, in particular in the Commission Technique Mixte de Sécurité (CTMS), charged with the supervision of the cease-fire agreement, as they rendered the demobilization process much more tangible. However, questions of value for money might be raised.

- IRF-101 (Peace education), IRF-102 (Displacement) and IRF-106 (Resilience of women and youth) have largely followed a peace-dividend approach, focusing on school access, socio-economic reintegration of returnees into host-communities and income-generating activities. All projects also contained dialogue mechanisms. The projects facilitated the reintegration of 3800 children into the education system and supported roughly 1500 people through economic activities. While results were achieved, the question of scale needs to be raised, given limited PBF-funds confronting enormous needs.

- IRF-105 (Gender based violence) produced strong results at various levels. At the individual level, holistic support to GBV survivors was provided as part of the project (including medical and psycho-social support). At the institutional level, the project piloted GBV One-Stop-Centers which are now supported by other donors and have been integrated in national policy and legislation. In addition, a number of durable community mechanisms, most notably the Case de Paix, have been supported.

Phase 2 projects have largely built on the projects of Phase 1. In this sense, they largely present a geographic extension with few – but important elements – of innovation with the possibility of increased impact.
Efficiency

The majority of projects have encountered challenges in implementation largely due to the security context with impact on access, procurement procedures, implementing partners etc. One indicator for these challenges is the fact that expenditure rates during the first year of 18-month IRF-projects are usually below the roughly 2/3 one would expect. RUNOs often don’t catch up on these delays, which accounts for the high number of no cost-extensions.

Gender

The Mali portfolio has a strong focus on women and youth which are at the heart of more than half of the 20 projects, with six projects financed through the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) alone. Stakeholders often reference women and youth as the primary victims of conflict. However, projects do not only focus on addressing the consequences of conflict but go further and aim at harnessing the positive potential that women and youth can bring to the peace process and to conflict resolution at the local level, through dialogue and communication about peace and social cohesion.

Management and Oversight

The management and oversight mechanisms in place have overall produced good results. This includes PBSO, the SC, the PBF-Secretariat, RUNOs & NUNOs as well as the collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT. However, certain reforms would contribute to strengthening management and oversight and prepare for a better foundation to seize new opportunities.

Overall, PBSO contributions are widely appreciated by stakeholders in Mali. The flexible nature of PBF support has been highlighted, e.g. in the approval of IRF-84 or the openness to readjust project design based on changes in the context (e.g. IRF-158). However, there has been some frustration stemming from the feeling that initiatives are PBSO-driven and that allegedly unrealistic deadlines are imposed.

The work of the Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the DSRSG/RC/HC and completed by Canada and the Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FOSC), is appreciated by stakeholders, though some room for improvement remains. Going forward a review of the composition and the working methods of the Committee would contribute to even greater effectiveness.

The PBF-Secretariat is located in the Stabilization and Recovery Section of MINUSMA and currently comprises four people. Its support and coordination role is appreciated by most stakeholders even though the full potential of bridging the work between the mission and the UNCT is not yet fully realized. One function that is not sufficiently fulfilled is the engagement of the international and donor community in order to facilitate (financial) catalytic effects, usually played by PBF-Secretariats in other contexts.

RUNOs and NUNOs ensure implementation of projects in often difficult environments. They need to be commended for this challenging work but they also need to ensure that major components of the project management cycle are fulfilled properly and in a timely manner.
These include timely implementation and project closure, dedicated M&E capacity and engagement in resource mobilization. The high number of no-cost-extensions points to challenges in planning and there is a high number of projects that are not (financially or operationally) closed, despite the fact that implementation ended a long time ago.

The collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT has demonstrated some good examples of integration, with the Plan de sécurisation intégré des régions du centre (PSIRC) and the Campagne Folon being the most recent promising activities. However, some major efforts still need to occur in particular in regard to the harmonization of funding mechanisms such as the PBF, the Stabilization Trust Fund, Quick Impact Projects (QIPS), Community Violence Reduction Projects (CVR) and programmatic funds. In particular the Trust Fund, which allows for hard earmarking and has fast and flexible approval procedures, has had an impact on the positioning and visibility of the PBF in Mali. Instead of seeing these instruments as competing, the opportunity for creating coherent and complementary UN support should be seized through intensified work on the Integrated Strategic Framework as well as the preparation of the transition scenario.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations provide actionable and evidence-based suggestions to build on the strengths of PBF-investments in Mali and to address the major weaknesses. While change will only be produced in a collaborative fashion involving all stakeholders, the recommendations try to identify the main responsibilities for the PBSO, the Steering Committee, the PBF-Secretariat and the RUNOs/NUNOs.

**Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**

- Request and support (localized) conflict analysis at all stages, but particularly at critical junctures in the development of the portfolio, and update regularly. Building on conflict analyses by other actors, the analysis should
  - be participatory involving relevant national and international stakeholders;
  - identify root causes and key drivers of conflict, with a focus on political factors in addition to socio-economic factors;
  - undertake a detailed actors analysis and stakeholder mapping, including local infrastructures for peace;
  - include where possible an analysis of previous (successful and unsuccessful) interventions and gaps;
  - identify entry points for PBF interventions, linking analysis to programming.
- Apply the new PBF Guidelines on the PRF-modality to extend the regular project duration to 24-30 months.
- Strengthen the communication with Mali-based stakeholders to further sensitize about PBF-niche and global funding priorities.
- Provide sufficient time in the development of concept notes and project documents taking into account known bottlenecks.
- Continue to prioritize joint implementation.
- Consider the inclusion of NUNOs as fund recipients also outside the special funding window of the GYPI and explore feasibility to provide direct funding to smaller national CSOs presenting dynamic and innovative approaches to peacebuilding.
- Continue to invest in capacity building of Mali-based stakeholders in the areas of conflict analysis, the design of effective peacebuilding projects, monitoring and evaluation as well as selected thematic areas based on documented needs.
- Provide technical support to project evaluations through the PBF-Secretariat to ensure that they sufficiently capture peacebuilding results (or the lack thereof).
- Continue to invest in cross-border projects with a focus on joint analysis, which highlights the cross-border/regional nature of conflict drivers, and explicit cross-border/regional programming (instead of programming limited to peripheral border areas).
- Wait for the end of projects and evaluation findings before investing in similar types of projects.
- Continue to support outreach and resource mobilization efforts linking relevant actors in New York, Bamako and capitals of donor countries.
- Verify that all necessary project information on the MPTFO Gateway is available and up-to-date.

**Recommendations for the Steering Committee in Mali**

**Composition**

- Review the composition of the Steering Committee and ensure that it is fit for purpose to play its role of strategic oversight of the PBF-portfolio in Mali.
- Create a technical support body (Technical Committee) to the Steering Committee comprising as a minimum government and civil society stakeholders as well as UN representatives, as a means to strengthen national ownership and to liberate the Steering Committee to play its role of strategic oversight more effectively.
- Invest in the capacity building of the Technical Committee to provide quality support in line with PBF Guidelines and national and ensure quality control of PBF interventions prior to their discussion by the SC.

**Organization of meetings**

- Schedule meetings more in advance to allow for meaningful preparation of all participants.
- Increase the efficiency and strategic focus of SC meetings through an emphasis on strategic decisions at the portfolio-level and not on details of individual projects.
- Reduce the number of documents that SC members are required to read through increased support from the newly created Technical Committee and the PBF-Secretariat.
- Communicate decisions and their underlying rationale with maximum transparency to all concerned stakeholders.

**Working methods**

- Further strengthen national ownership in setting priorities for the development of the PBF-portfolio in Mali based on the clear understanding of the niche and comparative advantages of the PBF.
- Encourage the development of an overarching results framework to strengthen programmatic coherence of the PBF-portfolio and support the monitoring of its implementation. The formulation of strategic outcomes should provide guidance for project development.
- Prioritize PBF-funding for interventions addressing socio-political root-causes of conflict and support economic interventions only where and when theories of change clearly demonstrate how other factors than poverty and unemployment are addressed.
- Leverage the niche of the PBF also in distinction to other UN funding mechanisms in Mali, such as the MINUSMA Stabilization Trust Fund. This could include an emphasis on the political and greater risk-taking nature, the accompaniment of infrastructure projects financed by other donors through community-based interventions, and the preparation of the handover of MINUSMA residual tasks to both the Government of Mali and the UNCT, as per the Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018).
- Develop and apply more robust criteria in the selection of projects and RUNOs as well as increase inclusion, transparency and communication throughout the decision making process. Increased communication with PBSO will also help to align in-country and HQ-based decision making processes.
- Continue to strengthen the effective and meaningful contribution of women and youth in decision making processes. At the same time, complement these interventions through an additional focus on engaging “hard to reach” constituencies, i.e., actors who are actively engaged in fueling conflict at the local and national level.
- Develop a communication and outreach strategy to increase visibility of PBF-funded interventions to national and international stakeholders, including CSOs, bi- and multi-lateral partners such as embassies and development cooperation agencies, international financial institutions etc. to increase catalytic effects and build on positive results of PBF projects.
- Lead on or facilitate increased donor coordination in the area of peacebuilding support to Mali.

Recommendations for the PBF-Secretariat

- Review the positioning of the PBF-Secretariat, also in light of the reform of the Resident Coordinator system, to maximize its effectiveness engaging all parts of the UN system, national counterparts, CSOs and the international community.
- Review contract modalities of UNDP-staff within the PBF-Secretariat to allow for efficient execution of financial and administrative procedures.
- Disseminate information on the strategic positioning of the PBF in terms of its niche and global funding priorities to Mali-based stakeholders. At the same time, effectively communicate peacebuilding needs (and constraints) in Mali to the PBSO thus facilitating the closer alignment between New York- and Mali-based decision making mechanisms.
- Lead on in-country conflict analysis exercises and undertake regular updates to take into account the dynamic and volatile context. Disseminate conflict analyses prepared by RUNOs/NUNOs and their implementing partners.
- Conduct a mapping of implementing partners and collect and update information on these partners to increase conflict-sensitivity.
- Continue to improve the communication/coordination among RUNOs/NUNOs to strengthen exchange and synergies.
- Develop a capacity building programme for RUNOs/NUNOs, implementing partners and national counterparts and allocate the necessary resources for its implementation.
- Ensure monitoring at the portfolio level, including large-scale perception surveys. Provide technical support and coordination for M&E activities ensuring that RUNOs/NUNOs remain the primary responsible for delivering on quality monitoring and evaluation functions.
- Ensure effective PBF-specific donor outreach through the PBF-Secretariat (or other instances in the Stabilization & Recovery Unit) to increase visibility of PBF-supported interventions.

**Recommendations for RUNOs/NUNOs**

- Conduct participatory assessments and conflict analysis relevant to the geographic and thematic area of interventions and increase the overall participation of national stakeholders during project design.
- Account for known implementation challenges during project design and adjust ambitions in the outcome formulation accordingly.
- Ensure efficient implementation in accordance with approved budgets, reduce the number of no-cost extensions and (financially and operationally) close all projects in a timely fashion.
- Strengthen coordination and collaboration of joint project at the field level.
- Employ local staff from the region of intervention as much as possible (and require implementing partners to do so), which enables to leverage local knowledge and – particular in the North – avoids perceptions of preferential treatment of people from the capital or Southern regions.
- Increase investments in conflict-sensitivity, also through capacity development of implementing partners.
- Accord greater importance to sustainability and exit strategies already during the design phase.
- Designate M&E focal points and develop more robust M&E systems, capable of documenting peacebuilding results, and use lessons learned in future planning activities.
- Increase communication efforts and engage donors more actively to secure follow-up funding for successful PBF-projects.
1. **Introduction**

1. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the United Nations Secretary-General’s fund designed to meet immediate needs in (post-) conflict countries. It is part of the UN peacebuilding architecture created in 2006 at the request of the General Assembly (Resolution 60/180) and the Security Council (Resolution 1645). The PBF became operational in 2007. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is responsible for the overall management of the PBF under the authority of the Secretary-General; the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) is the Fund’s Administrative Agent.

2. The United Nations general approach to peacebuilding has evolved in recent years. On 27 April 2016, the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council adopted identical resolutions on the architectures of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The Sustaining Peace Resolutions (GA70 / 262 and SC 2282) encouraged the Organization to pay greater attention to the preventive means of dealing with the causes of conflict, the idea being to reduce the need for the International Community to cope with the consequences of armed violence. More specifically, the resolutions acknowledged that peacebuilding is an inherently political process that requires an integrated, strategic and coherent approach of all partners, with a commitment to the strengthening of the rule of law at the international and national levels, which involves national ownership but must also acknowledge civil society’s role in promoting sustainable peace.

3. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace are a major priority for the current Secretary-General who has also highlighted the central role of the PBF: “The Peacebuilding Fund, as a timely, catalytic and risk tolerant instrument, is a critical vehicle as the United Nations steps up its efforts to build resilience and drive, at a greater scale, integrated United Nations action for prevention.” The Fund is set up to support “national partners and United Nations country teams in responding strategically to peacebuilding needs, aiding transitions from mission to non-mission settings and facilitating alignment with international financial institutions and other partners.”

4. When considering the eligibility of a country for funding, the PBF gives priority to a) Government leadership and commitment towards sustaining peace through agreements, clear policies or publicly communicated priorities and peace champions; b) Country/ situation is high on the UN’s agenda, including as part of Executive Committee discussions, Senior Peacebuilding Group discussions, Regional Monthly Reviews, deployment of UN Peacekeeping or Special Political Missions, or is the subject of an Inter-Agency Task Force; c) UN leadership on peacebuilding and positioning in the country for sustaining peace, including mandate, capacity, previous role and Government and development partner expectations; d) Size/scope of the country’s overall peacebuilding needs and gaps, and the likelihood of achieving tangible and/or catalytic results and influencing change through PBF; e) Significance of current circumstances in the country’s sustaining peace context, including transition or high-risk moments and specific opportunities to effect change; f) Size of a country’s own financial resources and readily available funds from other sources; g) Likelihood of PBF fully and effectively utilizing its niche/ added value in the country, including results from any previous PBF support to the country/ situation; h) PBF’s current portfolio of countries and its overall global financial position.

---

Initially, the Fund was intended to serve as a flexible tool to support the UN in its achievement of peacebuilding goals but it has since extended its direct support to non-governmental organization and (sub-)regional organizations.

1.1 Country Context

This section provides a short overview of the country context and some elements of a conflict analysis. The conflict analysis is longer than what would usually be expected for the purpose of such an evaluation. However, this proved necessary as a stand-alone conflict analysis for PBF-programming in Mali was never undertaken. In order to assess the relevance of the PBF-portfolio, the reconstruction of the conflict context was indispensable. In the preparation of this conflict analysis, the evaluation undertook a document review of existing conflict analyses, expert interviews and UN and non-UN stakeholder interviews. The team studied conflict analyses, which were published at different stages of PBF-engagement in Mali, i.e. starting from 2013. In the interviews, a particular emphasis was put on changes in the context between 2013 and today. Based on this information, the team formulated the following analysis as the perspective of the evaluation, taking note of different viewpoints expressed in some documents and interviews.

6. Mali, a vast land-locked country of 1.24 million square km with more than 16 million inhabitants, has been experiencing a protracted political, security, identity and humanitarian crisis since 2012, which has proved to be the most serious since its independence. This crisis has exposed the fragility of the Republic's institutions and compromised progress in decentralization and democratic governance, resulting in the withdrawal of public administration and the suspension of the provision of basic services in several parts of the territory. Above all, it crystallized the strong expectations of the populations for more efficient management of public affairs in order to better address their priority needs and improve their resource access.

7. Starting from a rebellion of independence fighters – the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) – the conflict in the north quickly spread to armed groups claiming to represent a radical Islam. During the nine-month occupation of the northern regions in 2012-13, members of moderate Maraboutic Sufi Islam and Christian populations were subjected, in the name of (this radical) Islam, to all kinds of abuses: theft, looting, ransacking of public buildings (health centers, schools and destroyed banks), forced marriages, rape of underage women and girls, desecration of graves, destruction of cultural monuments, corporal punishment and summary executions. Victims of persecution and other populations fled in large numbers to southern parts of Mali as well as neighboring countries resulting in a humanitarian crisis with more than 511,000 people displaced at the height of the crisis in 2013.

8. While the three northern regions (Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal) and the Mopti region were the scene of operations, it must be said that the repercussions of this armed conflict in the north affected all regions of the country. In the north, the armed conflict in addition to the recurrent impoverishment of the population has led to the deterioration of the social climate within and between communities. Populations affected by all kinds of abuses have developed an attitude of mistrust and suspicion between those with “black skin” and those with “lighter skin”.

2
9. After the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, emanating from the Algiers Process in 2015 (in short Algiers Agreement), the slow pace of its effective implementation produced political tensions between signatory parties, i.e. armed groups and the Malian government. Newly formed armed groups with unclear political claims have emerged to take advantage of the arrangements provided for in the Algiers Agreement. This situation has spread to the center of the country and Malian Defense and Security Forces are struggling to contain it despite the presence and support from international forces (Serval and then Barkhane, MINUSMA, G5 Sahel) and from technical and financial partners. In the center of the country, the first clashes took place in the Macina region in 2016 before spreading to the Dogon country. This ignited the entire central regions in 2018 with unprecedented intensity. The state’s powerlessness and the failure of its security policy are partly linked to the fact that state authorities are unable to find adequate responses to the challenges of diversity and the transparent and effective governance of public resources.

10. Despite efforts and progress made towards reconciliation, tensions between local communities are still perceptible in the north and the center. This situation persists because the government still struggles to effectively manage the diversity that is the hallmark of the Malian state. Struggling to maintain national unity, the government tends to propose standardized solutions that are based on a sedentary and urban model and do not sufficiently consider nomadic and rural environments. Faced with insufficient support for diversity and the withdrawal of administration from several parts of the territory, there is a proliferation of armed groups and self-defense militias ready to fill the void created by the absence of the state. Especially in central Mali, this has resulted in territorial fragmentation and increasingly violent conflicts over access to and exploitation of natural resources.

11. Informed observers of the Malian situation agree that the Malian crisis is also and above all caused by a cumulative deficit of governance in the socio-political, economic and security realm. The frustrations of the northern and central population regarding the failure of the government, public administration and security forces are constitutive of the frustrations felt by the entire Malian population. The main difficulty here is not the scarcity of resources or opportunities; rather, it is the inability of the state to establish and enforce rules uniformly, thus ending favoritism, corruption and abuses of all kinds. Therefore, there is not only the need to rebuild the country and restore it to working order (stabilization and recovery), but also to move towards more accountable and citizen-friendly governance (rule of law and inclusion).

12. In summary, according to this analysis there are a number of key drivers of conflict:
   - Poor governance and widespread corruption. Manifestations are frustrations of the population due to abusive practices by state agents; the absence of the state in large parts of the territory; absence of the specter of sanctions in public administration, whether positive (reward and advancement based on merit) or negative (administrative sanctions); decline in the decentralization process; and the lack of genuine frameworks for consultation and citizen involvement.

---

3 See also IMRAP/Interpeace (2015) : Autoportrait du Mali. Obstacles à la Paix.
- **Inequalities and discrimination in access to resources.** Manifestations are unequal access to resources (land resources, natural resources, youth employment income) and basic services (drinking water, education and health services); the vulnerability of the population to agro-climatic shocks affecting crops and livestock and other economic shocks; discrimination between rural and urban areas and between socio-economic strata as well as between regions; unaddressed grievances and feelings of exclusion.

- **Weakness of the judicial system.** Manifestations are difficult access by certain socio-professional strata to formal justice mechanisms; the long processing time of cases; corruption within the justice system; low credibility in the eyes of litigants; impunity; erosion of customary and religious justice mechanisms.

- **Religious radicalism.** Manifestations are presence of radical Islamist movements, with the emergence of “new preachers”; imposition of “religious citizenship” and the re-islamization of Malian society; capacity to exploit weakness of the state presence and the mistrust in public institutions.

- **Marginalization and exclusion of the majority of the population.** Manifestations are the cooptation of power by men of a certain generation to the detriment of women and youth; dominance of political and peace negotiations by armed groups to the detriment of civilian populations; traditional gender roles.

- **Regional security threats.** Manifestations are porous borders and weak state presence in peripheral areas allowing for illicit trafficking of people and goods; spill-over effects of political and security crises to and from neighboring countries; pressure from displacement of large populations.

13. These major challenges, which are part of the root causes of the Malian crisis, must be addressed in a context of protracted poverty that existed long before the crisis and the economic consequences for populations (mainly in the north and center) caused by armed conflicts and insecurity. The evaluation supports the interpretation, shared by a large part of its interlocutors, that this is not a problem limited to parts of the country (e.g. “crisis of the north”) but that the root causes engulf the country as a whole and manifest themselves differently in various parts of the country. It also supports the interpretation that while climate change, demographics and the conflict have had at times enormous impact on the economic situation, poverty and unemployment as such are not root causes of the conflict.

1.2 The International Community and Mali

14. Mali is part of a new regional configuration called the G-5 Sahel, which emerged following the war in Libya, and the subsequent displacement of large numbers of fighters to the Sahel. With Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger, Mali is of great concern to the international community. Aid to these five countries increased by more than 20 percent between 2009 and 2014, from US $ 3.4 billion to US $ 4.1 billion.

15. Mali is the biggest recipient of donor funds amongst the G-5 Sahel member states. In 2014 the country received approx. US $ 1.29 billion in official development aid (ODA), an increase of more than 40% since the beginning of the Libyan crisis in 2012. This support to Mali is sustained
at this level until now. The ten biggest donors from 2015-2017 were the EU (US $ 603m), United States (US $ 591m), World Bank (US $ 533m), France (US $ 343m), Canada (US $ 263m), Germany (US $ 184m), the African Development Bank (US $ 179), the Netherlands (US $ 108m), the IMF (US $ 107m) and Sweden (US $ 106). In 2017, the United Nations system raised US $ 206.68m for the implementation of the UNDAF+. The United Nations system as a whole and the PBF in particular are comparatively smaller donors.

16. ODA funding in support to peacebuilding is significant with US $ 192m in 2017 (2016: US $ 145m, 2015: US $ 230m, 2014: US $ 94m and 2013: US $ 136m). The main areas of support are inclusive political processes, core government functions, basis safety and security and human rights and the Rule of law. In comparison, the needs and level of humanitarian funding were in 2018: US $330 million, of which 54% were received (2017: US $305m, of which 49% received, 2016: US $354m, of which 41% received, 2015: US $377m, of which 35% received, in 2014: US $481m, of which 50% received and 2013: US $477m, of which 56% received). 4

17. The UN system is present in Mali with a Country Team that comprises 17 agencies, funds and programmes. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. As of January 2019 it comprises a total of 16,227 personnel (12,418 contingent troops, 1,767 police, 1,421 civilians, 424 staff officers, 158 UN volunteers and 39 experts on mission). Its current approved budget is US $ 1.07 billion.

1.3 Overview of PBF Engagement in Mali

18. Since 2014, PBF has allocated approximately $35.7 million to Mali through 20 projects. While the PBF can provide funding through two mechanisms, namely, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF), in Mali only the IRF modality has been used. Mali was the first country where PBF experimented with what is referred to as an IRF-package, i.e., a number of IRF-projects approved at the same time to increase programmatic coherence without having to invest in the development of a Peacebuilding Priority Plan (a requirement under the PRF modality until 2017). The portfolio can be divided into a pre-eligibility IRF, two phases of programmatic support and a substantial number of additional ad-hoc projects.

19. Pre-eligibility IRF. The first project (IRF-84) was approved in 2014 upon request of the DSRSG/RC/HC to support cantonment of ex-combatants as foreseen by the Ouagadougou Preliminary Peace Agreement (2013). At the time of the submission of the project, the idea for a more substantial engagement was already present and the project was seen as a strategic entry point.

---

20. **Phase 1 (Eligibility and IRF package).** The cantonment project was followed by an Eligibility request by the Government of Mali to access additional support from the PBF, which was granted by the UN Secretary-General in April 2014. The Eligibility included support to four areas, namely (1) national reconciliation; (2) security sector and the judiciary; (3) restoration of state authority and inclusive local governance; and (4) the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities.

21. The first IRF-package focused on northern Mali, on the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, and was approved at the end of 2014 (i.e., IRF-98, IRF-101, IRF-102, IRF-106). It intended to support high risk interventions through an integrated and innovative area-based approach. Working closely with communities during the conceptualization and implementation of projects, the approach aimed at opening up isolated regions and to catalyze existing funding with a view to creating an enabling environment for future interventions and to ensure that all regions of Mali were part of the national reconciliation and recovery process. Most of these projects had strong youth and/or gender components and promoted community dialogue to foster social cohesion across the communities affected by the conflict. They were complemented by a management project to finance the *Cellule d’Appui* (PBF-Secretariat) to the Steering Committee. A project of the 2014 Gender Promotion Initiative (IRF-105) was approved at the same time. These projects were supposed to contribute to a common results framework, which will be analyzed in more detail under 3.2.1. For the purpose of this evaluation, these projects together with IRF-84 will be considered Phase 1 of PBF-engagement in Mali.
22. **Phase 2.** In 2017, taking into consideration the risk of relapse into conflict and the worsening of the situation in central Mali, the Government counterparts and the international community decided to increase the intensity of their peacebuilding interventions in the regions of Mopti and Ségou. As part of this strategy, the PBF approved a second phase of four projects (IRF-217; IRF-218; IRF-219), focused on local governance and community-based conflict resolution in these regions. These projects, including a new project to support the *Cellule d’Appui* to the Steering Committee (IRF-231), began implementation in early 2018 and are expected to continue through 2019 and can be considered as Phase 2 of programmatic PBF-engagement in Mali.

23. **Additional projects.** In addition to these ten projects, the PBF has supported ten more projects (one in 2016, four in 2017 and five in 2018), including five from Gender and Youth Promotion Initiatives (IRF-146, IRF-158, IRF-161, IRF-234, IRF-260), three cross-border projects (IRF-182, IRF-291, IRF-299), one project piloting findings from a joint UN-World Bank study on employment and peacebuilding (MAL/D-1), and one seizing opportunities from the 2015 Algiers Agreement (IRF-165).

1.4 Portfolio

24. The projects are implemented by UN agencies, funds and programmes, and civil society organizations, in close collaboration with MINUSMA. The portfolio is overseen by a Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Government of Mali (represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the UN (represented by the DSRSG/RC/HC). The portfolio is characterized by a high level of diversity in terms of recipient organizations. The Statement of Work in Annex 1 provides a list of all projects.

![Distribution of projects/funds](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
<th>Total amount (in million US $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWOMEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOHR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Evaluation Features**

2.1 **Scope**

25. According to the Statement of Work (SoW), a final, independent evaluation of the PBF’s investments in Mali is requested by the PBSO’s Senior Management. The evaluation facilitates better understanding of PBF’s effectiveness regarding strategic decision-making and overall
learning on the portfolio’s contribution to peacebuilding results in Mali. Moreover, it helps inform decision-making on the appropriateness of continued PBF-engagement beyond the current portfolio.

26. The purpose of this evaluation is to:
- assess to what extent the PBF envelope of support has made a concrete and sustained impact in terms of building and consolidating peace in Mali, either through direct action or through catalytic effects;
- assess how relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable the PBF support to Mali has been;
- identify the critical remaining peacebuilding gaps in Mali;
- assess whether the peacebuilding interventions supported by the PBF factored in gender equality;
- provide lessons for future PBF support internationally on key successes and challenges (both in terms of programming and management of the PBF funds); and
- serve as a useful evidence-based input for decision-making on future support.

27. There are at least two main audiences for the evaluation, to whom the recommendations will be addressed: (1) the Mali PBF management team, including the Resident Coordinator’s Office and the Steering Committee; and (2) the PBSO/PBF. The evaluation’s evidence, findings and recommendations on the peacebuilding results of the PBF-funded work in Mali will be useful for consideration and action by relevant actors, including the PBF staff, staff of the MPTFO, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), MINUSMA and national partners. They will also serve as relevant inputs to the PBF policies and guidance, and other reviews.

28. The analysis of the portfolio shows that out of 20 projects, 13 did not finish all activities at the time of the in-country data collection. This creates the following division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>IRF-84: Cantonment; IRF-101: Éducation pour la paix; IRF-102: Réintègretion durable; IRF-105: Femmes victimes de violences sexuelles; IRF-106: Capacités de résilience aux conflits des femmes et des jeunes (since 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBF strategic funding windows</td>
<td>IRF-146: Participation des femmes dans la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix; IRF-158: Femmes, Défense et Sécurité (Interpeace) ; IRF-161: Jeunesse Alafia (ACORD); IRF-165: Appui aux Autorités Intérimaires de Taoudeni et Ménaka ; IRF-182: Promotion de la sécurité communautaire et de la cohésion sociale dans la région Liptako-Gourma ; MAL/D-1: Emplois et jeunes pour la paix ; IRF-234: Engaging Youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali (Mercy Corps) ; IRF-260: Deuxième décennie pour la paix ; IRF-291: Jeunes et paix; IRF-299: Appui aux initiatives transfrontalières de dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF Secretariat projects</td>
<td>IRF-98: Cellule d’Appui du Comité de Pilotage; IRF-231: Cellule d’Appui à la coordination des projets PBF au Mali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. With Phase 1 having completed implementation the evaluation will assess this part of the portfolio against all the criteria, i.e. relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, efficiency as
well as gender considerations. The scope for Phase 2 and the additional IRF-projects will be narrower, as these projects are still in implementation (some were only approved as recently as the end of 2018). This makes it too early to evaluate impact, effectiveness and sustainability of these projects, which will be covered by separate project-level evaluations zooming in on these criteria at a later stage. Nonetheless, these projects were included in the portfolio evaluation, as requested by the SoW because it will be the only opportunity to consider them as a whole, as they will likely not be part of the next evaluation covering the new portfolio.

30. In short, the criterion of relevance is assessed for the entire portfolio, including ongoing projects. The criterion of efficiency is also looked at across the entire portfolio, though some analysis, e.g. budget analysis is only performed as far as this data is already available. Finally, the issue of gender mainstreaming will be assessed for all projects, but to varying degrees depending on the status of project implementation. The criteria of effectiveness, impact and sustainability are analyzed based on a sample that focuses on Phase 1. This is also due to the fact that Phase 1 focused on Gao and Timbuktu and Phase 2 on central Mali, namely the Mopti and Ségou region and only one field visit to either one of these regions was possible. In addition, Phase 2 projects were still in the implementation. The evaluation is conscious of the limits regarding how representative these findings on impact and sustainability are of the portfolio as a whole.

31. In addition to these elements, there are a number of questions regarding management and oversight at the portfolio and project levels, which the evaluation will take into consideration, discussing the work of PBSO, the Steering Committee, the PBF Secretariat, 5 RUNOS/ NUNOs and the collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT.

32. The UN in general and the PBF in particular play an important convening role that is leveraged based on the qualities of the partnerships. These are evaluated with a focus on the Government of Mali, NGOs, bilateral partners and International Financial Institutions.

33. Both the portfolio evaluation as well as the evaluation of the management and oversight structures are exercises that are primarily backwards looking. At the same time, this evaluation plays a crucial role in planning processes concerning the further development of the PBF-portfolio in Mali scheduled for 2019, including the request for renewal of eligibility to receive funds from the PBF and the positioning of the PBF investments vis-à-vis a larger Integrated Strategic Framework. Therefore, a more forward looking perspective is assumed in the formulation of recommendations. The recommendations will be based on evidence generated throughout this evaluation and will provide action oriented guidance for key stakeholders.

2.2 Methodology

34. The evaluation matrix in Annex 2 describes in detail key (sub-)questions, criteria, data collection and analysis methods. The evaluation matrix served as the foundation of the evaluation process and from it resulted the design of the data collection process as well as the structure of the final report. The evaluation applied a mixed method approach and collected and analyzed various forms of evidence denoting how they were used to triangulate information.

---

5 Including two Secretariat projects: IRF-98 & IRF-231.
35. Regarding the substantive five projects of the first phase, a case study approach was used, focusing on the central implementation areas, with a field visit to Gao. Where possible, the interventions are described as a whole and in their context.

36. Data collection tools include document review, online survey, qualitative semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, focus group discussions and observations in project areas of the first phase. Reflecting on Peace (RPP) is used as means of Theory of change validation/reconstruction.

37. Tool 1: Document Review. Ample documentation regarding the PBF-portfolio in Mali exists, which is partly publicly accessible through the MPTFO-Gateway, and partly has been made available to the evaluation team. This includes the Eligibility Request, documentation for 20 projects, annual reports and minutes of meetings of the Steering Committee, reports from planning workshops and monitoring visits. This list is complemented by key documents of the peace process (such as the Ouagadougou and the Algiers Agreements), national strategy documents (such as the 2013-2014 Mali Sustainable Recovery Plan, the Government Action Plan (PAG 2014-2018) and the Framework for economic recovery and sustainable development (CREDD)) and UN strategic frameworks (UNDAF+, United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, mission mandates) as well as analysis and documentation produced by MINUSMA.

38. Tool 2: Semi-structured interviews. A total of approx. 130 people were interviewed either individually or in groups, including key stakeholders in Bamako and Gao representing UN staff from recipient organizations and MINUSMA, government representatives, civil society organizations (national and international, recipient organizations and implementing partners), local administration, beneficiaries etc. In addition, seven interviews were conducted over the phone/skype. Since much of the project-level documentation is self-reporting and produced for administrative and reporting processes, it often does not contain descriptions of processes, the motivations of involved actors, reflections on challenges and tangible results. To balance out this information gap, the qualitative semi-structured interviews were used to access these types of information. Annex 3 presents a sample interview guide that was adapted based on the group of stakeholders.

39. Tool 3: Thematic Focus Group Discussions (FDGs). FGDs were used in cases, where people from similar backgrounds or experiences were available to discuss a specific topic of interest in an in-depth manner. Participants were invited to co-construct their responses by agreeing and disagreeing with each other, thus providing insight into how the group thought about an issue as well as the potential range of opinions and ideas. FGDs were used at two levels: (1) with fund recipients that fall into certain categories (e.g. CSOs and RUNOs which have implemented a single PBF-project), (2) with stakeholders, including but not limited to beneficiaries in the intervention areas of the first phase.

40. Tool 4: Observation. A key aspect of the visit to the intervention area of Phase 1 was the opportunity to collect first-hand impressions of the results of PBF funded interventions to ascertain impact and sustainability. Taken together with the information gathered from FDGs and semi-structured interviews, the field visit to Gao contributed to rich and varied data for key components of the evaluation.
41. **Tool 5: Online Survey.** The evaluation tried to experiment with an online survey circulated among key stakeholders between from 8-17 March. While roughly 120 people from various groups such as UN agencies, funds and programmes (at the senior management level as well project staff), MINUSMA, national stakeholders from government counterparts to civil society organizations as well as the international community in contact with PBF investments in Mali (such as the bi- and multilateral donors, embassies, World Bank) were contacted, the response rate was very low with only 26 respondents. A part of the respondents were also interviewed in person but decided to clarify, underline or add information. The results are of limited statistically significance. However, some contributions provided additional layers of information and helped to triangulate data from other sources.

42. **Tool 6: Theories of change validation/reconstruction using Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) methodology.** The RPP approach contains a number of tools for the design, monitoring and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes and projects with an eye towards increasing effectiveness. For the purpose of this evaluation, the RPP-Matrix is used to analyze and map the portfolio which will allow for an assessment of programme coherence and for determining potential gaps in the portfolio. The Matrix is built on two key distinctions, namely, who is engaged (Key people or More people) and the type of envisioned change (individual change or socio-political change).

### 2.3 Limitations of the evaluation

43. **Evaluation timing.** The timing of the evaluation was problematic regarding the project-cycle of the portfolio. With 13 out of 20 projects still in implementation, the portfolio is still very much a work in progress and as such the timing for an expected summative evaluation less than ideal. The evaluation tried to deal with this challenge by focusing on Phase 1, while analyzing other parts of the portfolio to the extent possible.

44. **Security situation and access.** The security situation in Mali remains volatile. Phase 1 had been implemented in Gao and Timbuktu regions and it would have been good to collect data from both localities. However, the evaluation team could not influence the choice of locations for the field visit, and Gao was the only place for which a security clearance could be obtained. The same applies for the choice of locations within the region of Gao. While projects had been implemented in a number of areas, movement was limited to the town of Gao, biasing data collection as other – more rural areas – could not be reached.

45. **Timeline and available resources.** The timeline for this evaluation was too demanding in light of the demands from the SoW, with little over two months from the recruitment of the team leader until the submission of the draft final report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>(Expected) Start</th>
<th>(Expected) Finish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

2. Data collection in Mali through discussions with key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, and site visits; plus validation workshop  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>(Expected) Start</th>
<th>(Expected) Finish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Data collection in Mali through discussions with key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, and site visits; plus validation workshop</td>
<td>February 18, 2019</td>
<td>March 8, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Analysis and presentation of draft report for PBF approval</td>
<td>Commence during Task 2</td>
<td>March 25, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Finalization of report</td>
<td>Comments period: March 26-April 12, 2019  Draft report revisions: April 12-26, 2019</td>
<td>April 26, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46. The situation was further complicated by scheduling problems, which resulted in a situation where one team member could only participate during the last week of the in-country data collection and one team member could not participate in it at all.

3. Evaluation findings

47. The findings are organized in two main parts, relating to (1) the PBF-portfolio in Mali since 2014 (sections 3.1 to 3.5) and (2) questions regarding the management and oversight of this portfolio (section 3.6). The first part is organized around the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency. Gender considerations are highlighted throughout but a short summary is presented under a separate point towards the end. The final section on management and oversight zooms in on the role of the PBSO, the Steering Committee, the PBF Secretariat, the RUNOs/NUNOs as well as the collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT.

3.1 Relevance

48. The relevance of PBF supported interventions in Mali is analyzed in regard to different parameters, namely to what extent they addressed key drivers of conflict, how the theories of change added up to a strategic intervention and how well national and UN priorities were implemented. In summary, the findings are mixed: While UN and national priorities are well addressed in the portfolio, there is an imbalance between addressing socio-economic consequences of conflict and tackling root causes of conflict. While this can be justified with an approach delivering on peace dividends, going forward the portfolio would benefit from a recalibration.

3.1.1 Relevance relating to key drivers of conflict

49. As has been previously mentioned, neither Phase 1 nor Phase 2 was based on a stand-alone in-depth conflict analysis as a starting point for programmatic interventions. A more general analysis was available on the side of MINUSMA and for the UNDAF+ for Phase 1; for Phase 2, an analysis by Interpeace/IMRAP was used. However, at the project level, all project documents contain conflict analyses, which vary in quality. The more successful analyses are specific to the geographic and thematic intervention areas and rely on a strong actor mapping without losing sight of larger national conflict dynamics. More problematic cases rely on aggregated data and/or high-level political analysis (see e.g. IRF-84 and IRF-102), which makes it difficult to link analysis to peacebuilding programming.

---

50. To assess the question to what extent projects addressed key drivers of conflict, the evaluation conducted a rapid conflict analysis based on document review and expert interviews in the country. While this exercise cannot replace a more in-depth analysis, it shows that there is a risk that the PBF supported interventions adopt an approach that might provide relief for a while, only for conflict to reappear (potentially even more violently) later on, as key drivers (and actors!) of conflict are not sufficiently addressed in a systematic manner.

51. **Phase 1.** The choice of Gao and Timbuktu regions as the focus of interventions was warranted by the fact that out of the accessible regions they were hit the hardest by the conflict. The rationale of this phase was to provide tangible results for populations having suffered from armed conflict and occupation. PBF projects thus aimed at restoring some basic social services such as education (IRF-101), water and sanitation (IRF-102, also boreholes in IRF-84), health services for victims of SGBV (IRF-105), access to economic opportunities (IRF-102, IRF-106 and minor components in IRF-84 and IRF-101), durable solutions for returnees (IRF-102) and increased security through the cantonment of ex-combatants (IRF-84). All projects, with the exception of IRF-84, were accompanied by dialogue or conflict resolution mechanisms and sensitization and training components. According to the understanding of this evaluation, the projects focused more on alleviating (socio-economic) consequences of conflict, such as the interruption of school education for children or support to economic activities of vulnerable groups such as returnees, women and youth, rather than addressing (socio-political) root causes. This can be justified for an early intervention and was also supported by the beneficiaries who underlined the relevance and timeliness of these activities.

52. **Phase 2.** With regard to the geographic targeting, the projects of Phase 2 projects have rightly positioned themselves in response to the changing context of the Malian crisis and moved to the center of Mali, i.e., Mopti and Ségou regions, where the conflict had shifted. The interventions largely focus on women and young people, whose vulnerability to conflict is highlighted. While present, the peaceful management of diversity and inclusive and accountable governance were somewhat but not sufficiently developed in comparison to Phase 1.

53. **Additional projects.** IRF-165 supporting the creation of Interim Authorities in Taoudénit and Ménaka presents a good example of the support to a political process resulting from the 2015 Peace Accord while addressing the conflict factor of weak state presence in peripheral regions and related grievances and mistrust by the populations. The majority of the rest of these additional projects come from various reiterations of the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI). By definition, all of them address the marginalization of women and youth and some of them hone in on institutional exclusion and discrimination of women in the political or security field (e.g., IRF-146 and IRF-158).

54. Three projects, namely IRF-182 (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), IRF-291 (Mali, Burkina Faso) and IRF-299 (Mali, Niger), are cross-border projects and as such good examples of how to respond to the subregional dimensions of the Malian crisis. They provide the opportunity to tackle the regionalization of inter-community violence and the social and religious demands of jihadist groups beyond the Malian borders in Burkina Faso and Niger. These projects hold the promise to create new dynamics that can facilitate dialogue and cross-border collaboration for the return of social cohesion and stability on both sides of the border. Still in implementation, these projects
need to ensure that they address regional drivers of conflict in a cross-border nature instead of limiting interventions to isolated activities in peripheral border areas.

55. In short, a significant number of projects of the PBF-portfolio seem to focus more on the consequences of the crisis than on its root causes. This limits the possibility for prevention, in particular regarding interventions claiming to fight radicalization and keeping youth from joining armed and extremist groups. A deeper analysis of the security and political elements of these groups are needed to balance the socio-economic intervention rationale. For example, in some villages, jihadists are perceived as the guarantors of security and even stability, which the State seems unable to provide. Their control has gained ground and their management methods have given them a certain degree of credibility with local populations. In such a context, holistic approaches combining military action with social, political and economic measures are necessary if one hopes to address root causes and make a lasting contribution to peacebuilding.⁸

Fighting poverty and unemployment as a means of conflict prevention
The majority of interlocutors (Government of Mali, UN AFPs, some CSOs, beneficiaries etc.) have highlighted the importance of addressing economic factors in preventing radicalization, crime and conflict. 12 out 20 projects contain elements of economic support (income-generating activities, financial support and training for entrepreneurs, high-labor intensive projects (cash for work). However, the question remains, whether the theories of change underpinning these interventions are sound and whether this is a strategic use of PBF-resources. The following challenges need to be considered in the approval of similar projects in the future:

- Sustainability: Spreading resources thin in the attempt to reach as many beneficiaries as possible can leave too little support for beneficiaries to develop substantial economic capital to ensure their livelihoods in a sustainable fashion. Increasing individual support runs the risk of limiting the number of beneficiaries. Even in the ideal case, the result is increased economic capacity of individuals or households, lacking further social elements.
- Scale: Roughly 50% of the Malian population, i.e. over 8 million people, lives in conditions of absolute poverty (less than $2 per day). Beneficiaries of PBF support with an economic development element usually range in the hundreds. It is thus questionable whether this makes significant enough of a contribution to conflict prevention, in particular in light of the asymmetric nature of conflict: armed and terrorist groups do not have to rely on large number of new recruits to keep up momentum. In addition, the economic benefits of PBF supported interventions will always pale in comparison to potential gains resulting from illicit or other criminal activities, further diminishing effectiveness.
- Do no harm: The selection of beneficiaries will inevitably result in frustrations because the number of potential beneficiaries, who fulfill all selection criteria, will inevitably far exceed available resources. Focus group discussions in Gao provided examples of frustration, resignation and feelings of injustice experienced by youth not having benefitted from PBF support. It is thus crucial to invest in transparent mechanisms for the selection of program participants as well as adequate communication strategies to manage expectations.

3.1.2 Relevance of proposed theories of change
56. The Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) methodology allows for an assessment of the relevance of the theories of change and the strength of a programmatic approach based on the visualization through the RPP-Matrix. The matrix is built on two key distinctions, namely, who

⁸ See, also Mercy Corps (2017): We Hope and We Fight: Youth, Communities, and Violence in Mali.
is engaged (Key people or More people) and the type of envisioned change (individual change or socio-political change).

57.  Key People Approaches focus on involving particular people or groups of people, who, due to their power and influence, are critical to the continuation or resolution of conflict. More People Approaches aim to engage increasing numbers of people in actions to promote peace. The assumption is that peace can be built if many people become active in the process. The success of projects or programmes does not rely on the choice of one or the other approach. However, experience has shown that peacebuilding projects are more successful if they engage more and key people over time.

58.  In regard to Individual/Personal Change it is important to make the distinction between a change in inter-personal relationships between members of different groups (individual change) and a change in group relationships (socio-political change). Socio-Political Change can take many forms and the underlying rationale is that peace requires changes in socio-political structures and processes, often supporting the creation or reform of institutions that address grievances or promote non-violent modes for handling conflict. Empiric research has shown that while a project can choose individual/personal change as an entry point, it is unlikely to achieve a sustainable contribution to peace if it does not achieve socio-political change at some point.

59.  Looking at the projects (without the cross-border and PBF-Secretariat projects), we can make the following observations:
   - Overall, the projects largely follow a more-people approach. Only IRF-84 supposed to target members of armed groups during the cantonment process and IRF-218, involving the Force Conjointe de G-5 Sahel in a Human Rights Due Diligence Process, clearly target key people with some power over the decision to continue or to end violent conflict.
   - There is a number of projects that steer into the area of key people, either through targeting so-called youth at risk (IRF-161, IRF-234) or through strengthening institutions playing a positive role in conflict transformation (IRF-146, IRF-165). Still, one can observe a lack of approaches tackling key people promoting violence and conflict or at least an approach to prevention with more refined targeting of people who are already more advanced on their path to radicalization.
   - Most of the projects struggle to achieve (or aim for) socio-political change. While many of them do include some efforts to promote some sort of institutional change, their emphasis usually tends to be on individual (attitudinal, behavioral or skill-building) change through sensitizations, trainings and income-generating activities. Still, things are moving in the right direction, if we compare the projects from Phase 1 and Phase 2. The GYPI projects also are overall doing better in this regard.
3.1.3 Relevance relating to national and regional peacebuilding priorities

60. The projects funded by the PBF are relevant in supporting national peacebuilding priorities. They have taken relatively good account of the agreements concluded between the Malian authorities and the armed groups (2013 Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement and 2015 Algiers Agreement). IRF-84 and IRF-168 on cantonment and interim authorities respectively articulate the most immediate link. Other projects take the Algiers Agreement as starting point for sensitizations and citizen engagement, rendering its implementation more inclusive, in
particular by enabling victim populations and vulnerable groups (youth and women) to take ownership of the spirit of the Agreement and participate in peace and reconciliation processes (e.g., IRF-146, IRF-218, IRF-219). The need to continue with these sustained efforts of the PBF projects is confirmed in the last report of the Independent Observer of the Peace Agreement which states that: “solid foundation has been laid for achieving the key pillars of the agreement – 44 percent of commitments are at the “achieved” or “almost achieved” stage. Yet these primarily preliminary steps will not be meaningful without significant progress on the core commitments at the heart of the agreement, which remain in “intermediate,” “minimal” and “not initiated” phases.”

61. The projects funded by the PBF are also relevant to institutional peacebuilding mechanisms put in place by the Malian government and its partners, such as the Ministry of National Reconciliation and the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR). The projects in the PBF-portfolio contribute to the implementation of the Strategic Plan of the Ministry in charge of reconciliation, in particular in its axes “Promotion of peace, national reconciliation and social cohesion” and “Support and accompaniment of national reconciliation actions”. In central Mali, IRF-219 provides institutional support the Equipes Régionales d’Appui à la Réconciliation in (ERAR) created by the Ministry.

62. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) has the mandate to listen to the victims of human rights violations perpetrated between 1960 and 2013, to investigate those violations and to recommend measures for reparation and the non-recurrence of the crimes. The Commission has benefitted from support of PBF projects (e.g., IRF-105 and IRF-146), which strengthen its capacities to include gender considerations into its work. They thus contribute to increased participation of women in truth finding and reconciliation processes, including but not limited to conflict related sexual and gender-based violence.

63. Projects also routinely make reference to government priorities enshrined in the Cadre Stratégique pour la Relance Economique et le Développement Durable (CREDD 2016-2018), the Cadre stratégique pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté (CSCRP 2012-2017) and the Programme d’Actions du Gouvernement (PAG 2013-2018). The CREDD for the period 2019-2023 is being finalized. It remains the integrating document for all public policies of the Malian Government. As such, it is important that PBF peacebuilding projects continue to refer to them and find inspiration for future interventions.

64. Finally, as already mentioned, Mali is a member of the G5 Sahel, an institutional framework for coordination of regional cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa. It was formed on 16 February 2014 in Nouakchott and comprises Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger as its other members. IRF-218, for example, supports the introduction of human rights due diligence procedures in the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, while other projects (IRF-219, IRF-291) support the implementation of the Stratégie Intégrée de la Jeunesse du G5 Sahel or collaborate with the Plateforme des Femmes du G5 Sahel (IRF-299).

---

3.1.4 Relevance relating to UN strategic frameworks and priorities

65. Finally, the PBF-portfolio is very relevant regarding the implementation of UN strategic frameworks and priorities in Mali. This can be demonstrated by referencing both national and global frameworks.

66. The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF+) 2015-2019 is a programme document signed by the Government of Mali, the UNCT and MINUSMA. It has four axes: (1) Peace, Security and National Reconciliation, (2) Governance, (3) Basic Social Service and (4) Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. PBF interventions are not formally aligned to the UNDAF+. However, in practice, they do make substantive contributions to goals formulated in the Framework, most notably its first axe. In addition, recent project documents are required to indicate relevant UNDAF+ outcome areas and SDGs.

67. For a number of years, it has been the institutional practice of the PBF not to provide direct funding to peacekeeping operations. Still, MINUSMA has played a role, more pronounced during the early days of the PBF-engagement in Mali. MINUSMA was established on 25 April 2013 by UN Security Council Resolution 2100. Shortly, afterwards the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement assigned a key role to the mission in its Art. 10, regarding the supervision and control of the cantonment of armed groups. It was a crucial moment for the mission to prove its operational capacity and without the funds that were provided by the PBF for IRF-84 in a fast and flexible manner, it might not have been able to fulfill this role. Similar observations apply to the support provided to the Interim Authorities in the Taoudénit and Ménaka regions through IRF-165, which support the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Agreement. Another important aspect relates to the areas of interventions: During Phase 2, PBF started to support interventions in central Mali, where MINUSMA could not intervene at the time, which pushed agencies, funds and programmes to reconsider their programmatic approaches in the region.

68. The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), endorsed by the Security Council in June 2013 (S/2013/354), is an instrument for conflict prevention. The Integrated Strategy came out of an African Union and United Nations interagency assessment of the impact of the Libyan Crisis on the countries of the Sahel conducted in December 2011. Acknowledging that many of the countries of the Sahel shared similar problems, the idea was to develop a regional approach to address these challenges exacerbated by the Libyan crisis. Regional in its nature, PBF cross-border projects such as IRF-182 (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), IRF-291 (Mali, Burkina Faso) and IRF-299 (Mali, Niger) can be seen as important test cases and early examples of truly regional project design and implementation.

69. Finally, the Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325) and the Youth, Peace and Security (S/RES/2250) resolutions provide global frameworks, to which a large number of projects in the Mali portfolio are aligned. Noteworthy, are the three projects approved as part of the PBF Gender Promotion Initiative, as well three projects as part of the Youth Promotion Initiative. Other projects make a concrete reference to the National Action Plan that has been adopted to implement Resolution 1325, for example IRF-105, IRF-146 and IRF-219.
70. In line with the joint Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Sustaining Peace of 2016, the UN Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank Group commissioned the joint study *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, which was received in 2018. Already in 2016, the joint study *Employment Programmes and Peace: A joint statement on an analytical framework, emerging principles for action and next steps* was published in collaboration between the World Bank, PBSO, UNDP and ILO. Unfortunately, the idea of a pilot project as a follow-up to this study, co-funded by PBF and the Bank could not be realized; a missed opportunity. MAL/D-1 presents a less ideal solution to this potential collaboration, whereby the UN (through PBF) and the World Bank (through an SPF grant) have undertaken a joint assessment and committed on the foundation of a parallel programming to conduct a joint evaluation.

3.2 Effectiveness

71. In this section, effectiveness is discussed at the portfolio-level and relates to the question of whether and how individual projects contributed to higher-level results of a common result framework. It cannot be answered for the entire portfolio but needs to be broken down into an analysis that takes the specifics of Phase 1 into consideration.

3.2.1 Phase 1

72. The projects of Phase 1 were approved at the same time and contributed to a common results framework. This framework was organized around two overarching results: the first one focusing on the use of dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms, the second one on a vague notion of social inclusion said to prevent (violent) conflict. The common results framework was created during the late stage of project development to facilitate monitoring. Given the timing of the framework’s development, the higher-level outcomes did not guide the design of the individual projects. All projects contribute to both overarching outcomes; so essentially the individual project outcomes are arranged to create some sort of higher-level coherence.

73. IRF-105, part of the Gender Promotion Initiative, followed a different approval process and was added to the common results framework. In retrospect, IRF-84 could also have been added to the framework as its area of implementation shifted from Kidal to Gao and Timbuktu regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overarching outcomes</th>
<th>Project Outcomes</th>
<th>RUNOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Les individus, les groupes et les communautés qui sont à risque de (re)engagement dans le conflit utilisent les plateformes de dialogue et les mécanismes locaux de résolution de conflits pour résoudre leurs différends sans recours à la violence.</td>
<td>IRF-101 : Outcome 2 and Outcome 3</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-102 : Outcome 1 and Outcome 2</td>
<td>UNHCR, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-105 : Outcome 1 and Outcome 3</td>
<td>UN Women, UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-106 : Outcome 1</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inclusion et intégration accrues des individus/ groupes/ communautés qui sont à risque de (re)engagement dans le conflit, à travers un accès plus équitable/ amélioré aux sources de revenus et aux services de base et juridiques.</td>
<td>IRF-101 : Outcome 1</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-102 : Outcome 3 and Outcome 4</td>
<td>UNHCR, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-105 : Outcome 2</td>
<td>UN Women, UNFPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRF-106 : Outcome 2</td>
<td>UNDP, UNIDO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
74. Phase 1 was accompanied by a pilot of what was intended as a community-based monitoring approach but resulted in a private Malian research firm *Audit Expertise Comptable & Conseil* (AE2C) conducting perception surveys to provide data for indicators in the common results framework.

75. The firm AE2C conducted three surveys and produced the corresponding reports (November 2015, June and November 2016) based on a sample of 800 interviewees (5 focus groups à 20 people in each of eight project communities in Gao and Timbuktu regions + 30 individual interviews with focus group participants in each community). The surveys did not include a control group in areas where PBF projects did not intervene. Neither did they distinguish in their questions and analysis clearly between mechanisms that were supported by PBF projects and those that were not.

76. The overarching Outcome 1 was not achieved according to the available data. While a substantial percentage of people engaged in a conflict did use dialogue or conflict resolution mechanisms (Timbukt: 79% and Gao: 72%), only about a quarter were satisfied with the work of these mechanisms (Timbukt: 20% and Gao: 26%) in November 2016. Worse, the level of satisfaction was going down (from 58% in Timbukt and 36% in Gao in 2015). In a similar way, the confidence in the capacities of the communities to deal with conflict is also decreasing from the baseline to the endline survey (Timbukt: 55% to 31%; Gao 47% to 38%). Local administrators and informal community leaders portray less confidence in the capacity of conflict resolution mechanisms (Timbukt: 20%, Gao: 14% in November 2016).

77. The overall security situation in the area of intervention remained highly volatile through the years. According to information from MINUSMA, there were a total of 340 terrorist attacks from 2013 to 2018 in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu alone. Other incidents of violence further exacerbate the security situation, with banditry and criminality being the most widespread, followed by inter-community violence and acts of radicalism. It is particularly worrying that while terrorist attacks have gone down, other forms of violence have doubled from 2017 to 2018 pointing to a deterioration of the security situation. There is not sufficient information to verify the impact of PBF projects, but these statistics suggest that, if anything, PBF projects were able to create islands of success within a deteriorating security environment.

78. Based on the available information, the assessment of the overarching Outcome 2 presents itself more difficult. There are a number of indicators that attempt to measure exclusion of ethnic groups from access to social services based on official records of health centers and schools. The surveys also attempt to answer questions regarding economic exclusion. However, this information is inconclusive based on questionable points of comparison (e.g. the percentage distribution of ethnic groups, which is not location specific).
79. Other indicators are more informative. The endline survey conducted by AE2C shows 86 young people who have (re-)joined armed groups despite having benefitted from PBF support, which equals roughly 10% as the survey is using a number of 834 young beneficiaries. This is partly attributed to the DDR-process and widespread expectations regarding potential benefits. More positive is the result in regard to durable solutions for returnees: all 621 beneficiaries who have received PBF support have remained in host communities at the time of the endline survey, while the reintegration of returnees who have not benefitted from PBF-intervention has failed in some instances, which led to their re-departure.

3.2.2 Phase 2

80. Phase 2 did not develop an overarching results framework. Regarding this phase, the most broadly consulted strategic orientation can be found in the results of a workshop organized by the PBF Secretariat and co-facilitated by Interpeace and PeaceNexus in Bamako on 11-12 May 2017. Participants of the workshop included the members of the Steering Committee, representatives of key ministries (Ministères de la Réconciliation Nationale (MRN), de la Promotion de la Femme, de l’Enfant et de la Famille (MPFEF), de l’Education Nationale (MEN) and de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle (MEFP)) UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as focal points from various MINUSMA sections and civil society organizations. The recommendations of this workshop were to prioritize Phase 2 of PBF programming in two ways:
   - Geographically, on the center of Mali, namely the regions of Mopti and Ségou
   -Thematically, on themes of local governance and the resolution of inter-community conflicts.

81. The results of this workshop do not mention a focus on women and youth as the main target groups. This focus of the second phase, likely came about due to a parallel process, namely the call for proposals for the 2017 GYPI. A large part of the rejected concept notes for this open call seem to have been used later as starting points for project development for Phase 2. The geographic focus on central Mali for Phase has been realized.

82. As the projects of Phase 2 do not contribute to an overarching results framework, it will be difficult to document the contribution of these projects to higher level peacebuilding results due to the lack of data at the portfolio level. This is a step back from the approach in Phase 1, which – despite its flaws – constituted at least an attempt to capture some of these results at the portfolio level. At least, the RUNOs engaged in Phase 2 do communicate regularly at the field level in the form of joint planning meetings. This increased collaboration is likely to increase complementarity and thus provide a foundation for increased effectiveness.

3.2.3 Additional projects

83. Finally, as mentioned before, half of the portfolio, i.e., ten projects, has been approved outside of programmatic considerations in an ad hoc fashion. While these projects show the potential of the PBF to flexibly support emerging peacebuilding opportunities, the absence of a priority plan or strategic framework and the number of individual projects make it very difficult to speak of cumulative effects of the peacebuilding portfolio. Going forward, it is suggested to further increase the programmatic approach of interventions to increase coherence and
complementarity in the portfolio, identify and address gaps in peacebuilding needs and avoid duplication.

3.3 Impact and Sustainability

84. The criterion of impact aims to analyze positive and negative changes that the PBF portfolio in Mali has generated, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or involuntarily. As it was difficult to analyze the impact of the portfolio as a whole, the evaluation chose to work based on a sample, consisting of Phase 1 projects. On the basis of this analysis it was possible to approach the criterion of impact. In conclusion we can note that the projects of Phase 1 have largely achieved their intended outcomes. Their overall contribution to a higher-level peacebuilding impact varies as does the sustainability of results. The following sections provide a more detailed appreciation of the five substantive projects.

3.3.1 IRF-84: Cantonment

85. IRF-84 provided US$ 2,997,414 to UNOPS to build three cantonment sites for members of armed groups in line with Article 10 of the Ouagadougou Preliminary Peace Agreement of 2013. While UNOPS acted as the recipient and implementing agency in charge of the financial and logistic tasks, the political dimensions of the project were handled by the MINUSMA DDR-section. The project, which started in February 2014 and was supposed to end 7 months later saw significant delays. The cantonment sites were supposed to be built in Kidal but following changes in the DDR-process ended up being built in the regions of Gao (Fafa and Innega) and Timbuktu (Likrarakar) in 2016. Findings are based on document review and interviews with key stakeholders in Bamako (MINUSMA DDR-Section, UNOPS and National DDR-Commission) and Gao (MINUSMA DDR-Section).

86. The PBF project was part of a larger intervention led by MINUSMA DDR-Section that supported the construction of a total of eight cantonment sites. For reporting purposes, the sites of Fafa, Innega and Timbuktu were considered to be built with PBF funds. The outcome language changes between project documents and reports, but in its modified form the project aimed at “Increased security in northern Mali (Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal regions) and increased confidence between the parties to the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement through the start-up of cantonment process in 3 camps”. This outcome has not been achieved in the intended way, mainly because the cantonment has not yet started as of the writing of this report. The delays in the DDR-process, which foresees the cantonment as one crucial step, are outside the control of the UN and fall under the responsibility of the Government of Mali and the armed groups that were signatories to the Ouagadougou and Alger Agreements. Currently, there is a plan for an accelerated DDR-process, which foresees to start cantonment in 2019.

87. Above-mentioned delays in the DDR-process have led to a situation where cantonment sites, built in 2016, have never been used, need to be guarded and maintained in in a difficult environment, while the constructions keep degenerating. Should the cantonment process start, additional resources will have to be used to enable the use of the original sites. It can be argued that despite the fact that the sites have not yet served their intended purpose, the larger (political) objective of increased confidence in the peace process has been served. The planning of the construction kept a dialogue open among the signatories of the Algiers Accord within the
Commission Technique Mixte de Sécurité (CTMS), tasked with the supervision of the ceasefire agreement. MINUSMA interlocutors expressed the opinion that the construction of these sites removed a practical obstacle and thus shifted the responsibility for the delays in the DDR-process to the armed groups. However, the question needs to be asked whether this political objective could not have been achieved in less costly manner, considering that eight sites (for roughly US $ 754,000 each) were built, which until now have not been used to their intended purpose.

88. In addition, the project might have produced unintended negative consequence. The DDR-process, despite its delays, has contributed to the assumption that there are potential benefits associated with being a member of an armed group. This is one of the reasons why a rush to arms could be noted in order to fulfill criteria to participate in a disarmament process. One indicator for this development is the drastic increase in people to be covered by the process: while initial estimations calculated with 10,000 members for each of the two armed movements, both groups later announced a need to include 17,000 former fighters in the process. This is also supported by the findings of the perception surveys carried out that showed a substantial number of young people joining armed groups in the hope to receive benefits. The DDR-process also contributed to an increase in the negotiating power of armed groups to the detriment of other stakeholders in northern Mali whose grievances tend to be overshadowed or excluded from political negotiations.

89. A positive consequence, which was not originally intended, can be attributed to a change in the design of the cantonment sites. Cantonment is inherently a transitory process; former combatants are supposed to stay in the camps no longer than 45 days in order to take part in key DDR-processes. The original design largely consisted of small scale building and large tent structures. However, throughout the process, more durable constructions were introduced, which could be handed over to local populations to serve civilian purposes as schools, health centers, economic spaces etc. While this has some merits in increasing sustainability of investments, this result is still hypothetical because this hand-over has not occurred. However, the fact that cantonment sites are mostly in remote areas decreases their utility in this regard.

90. Gender considerations were limited but appropriate. The cantonment camps all follow the same formula providing accommodation for 750 people, namely 75 male Senior Officers, 600 male Junior Officers and 75 female and juvenile soldiers. Separate quarters and sanitary buildings are foreseen for the last group. Given the fact that the camps have not yet been used for their intended purpose, it is impossible to assess how adequate this planning is in regard to gender. The project did not intend to contribute to women empowerment.

91. The project was politically the most sensitive and prominent project of Phase 1. While its results have been mitigated, it did serve an important function for MINUSMA in the time frame following its creation. MINUSMA interlocutors have underlined the importance of available funds from PBF at a moment when assessed contributions had not yet been allocated. They equally welcomed the quick approval of PBF-funds, which provided an important bargaining chip to the mission to play a role during and in the follow-up to the peace negotiations as well as the DDR-process. Even though the project saw significant delays in implementation, the
availability of funds allowed MINUSMA to show its capacity to follow up on its engagements in the area of DDR.

92. As mentioned above, PBF support to the cantonment process was further sustained by assessed contributions to the MINUSMA-budget of US$ 10m for the construction of additional cantonment sites. However, due to the delays in implementation, PBF funds had not yet been used to build cantonment sites by the time the assessed budget arrived. This qualifies the fast response to a perceived urgent need as well as the overall financial catalytic effect.

93. Lastly, the project provides important lessons for the collaboration between the mission and the UNCT, in this case represented by UNOPS. There was a clear division of labor between technical, financial and administrative tasks handled by UNOPS and the overall guidance and political planning and oversight entrusted to the MINUSMA-DDR section. However, in reality technical and political considerations could not always be neatly distinguished, which caused friction due to political solutions that were not technically viable and vice versa. A lesson would be that increased information sharing and a closer collaboration between MINUSMA sections and RUNOs should be prioritized going forward in order to avoid similar issues.

3.3.2 IRF-101: Peace education

94. IRF-101 (Projet de l’éducation pour la consolidation de la paix au Nord du Mali) provided US$ 2,499,519 to UNICEF. The initial approval occurred in December 2014 for the sum of US$ 1,999,519 and a cost-extension of US$ 500,000 took place in February 2016. The project ended implementation in June 2017 and was built around three outcomes. The following findings are based on document review (project document and reports as well as the external project evaluation), interviews in Bamako (UNICEF staff, Ministry of Education) and Gao (UNICEF, D-CAP) as well as the observation of an event of schools presenting different dance contributions with a peacebuilding theme in Gao supported by UNICEF in continuation of IRF-101.

95. Outcome 1 (La marginalisation des enfants et adolescents (déscolarisés ou non scolaires du fait du conflit) a diminué à travers leur réintégration à une éducation de qualité dans un environnement social favorable à la paix) was largely achieved. 3784 children (7-18 year olds, 1777 of which girls) who never attended school or had to interrupt schooling were trained in the accelerated programme supported by the project with the expectation to be re-integrated into the school system; falling 16% short of the original aim of 4500. Out of these 3269 (86.4%) passed the final exam of the accelerated course and 71.4% could enroll in regular schools afterwards. The long-term impact of this component on conflict prevention is difficult to ascertain, the short-term benefit, however, signaling a return to normalcy after the end of the occupation in these areas is evident.

96. Outcome 2 (Les enfants à l’école participent activement aux activités de promotion de la cohésion sociale et de culture de la paix) partly surpassed its intended results. The capacities of 1700 teachers in the Gao and Timbuktu regions in the area of conflict resolution were strengthened and 93,000 children (up from 68,000) participated in peace education activities promoting a culture of peace, including through cultural and sport activities. Competitions
between schools concentrated teachers, students and audiences alike to reflect on social cohesion and express positive messages relating to peaceful cohabitation. Similar activities continue beyond the end of the project, as could be observed by the evaluation team in Gao.

97. Outcome 3 (Les communautés scolaires jouent un rôle plus actif dans le dialogue inclusif comme moyen de résoudre leurs différends paisiblement et de cohabiter de manière à renforcer la cohésion sociale et à promouvoir la paix) focused on what are essentially school boards (comités de gestion or communautés scolaires) consisting of representatives of teachers, students and parents and that served as an entry point to strengthen governance and conflict resolution mechanisms in the education sector. In addition, there was a substantive sensitization component through community radios and listener 66 clubs, reaching at least 10656 community members.

98. The project did aim at reaching 50% women and girls as beneficiaries. However, most of the data generated by the project and the external evaluation is not disaggregated by sex, making the final evaluation of gender considerations difficult. Under Outcome 1, girls were somewhat underrepresented (46.9%) and they had slightly lower success at being reintegrated into schools (68.1% to 74.23%). Trainings and sensitization included gender specific elements.

99. The module on peace education that was developed as part of the project is now included in the standard training material for all teachers in Mali. This institutional change, adopted by the Ministry of Education, is the most significant aspect of sustainability. Some of the results at the individual level, are, however, mitigated by recent developments. A significant numbers of schools remain closed or have closed again. This phenomenon can be observed in many parts of the country for different reasons. In the Gao, 30 out of 168 schools were closed during the visit of the evaluation, insecurity and absent teachers being the main reasons.

100. In addition, the project was replicated in the region of Mopti with $ 1.5m provided by the Government of Japan. The project targeted 42,500 children, 850 teachers, 200 schools and 10,000 community members in what is the most significant financial catalytic result of the PBF-funded intervention. Currently, UNICEF is also implementing the project Promouvoir la Cohésion et le Développement d’un Environnement Favorable à la Scolarisation des Enfants dans les Régions du Centre et le Nord du Mali together with Search for Common Ground in continuation of IRF-101.

3.3.3 IRF-102: Reintegration of displaced persons

101. IRF-102 provided US$ 1.25m to each UNHCR and IOM and was implemented between January 2015 and June 2016. The overarching goal of the project was the creation of mechanisms that supported the reintegration of returnees (IDPs and refugees) in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, so they could enjoy their social and economic rights, freedom of movement and their physical integrity, while contributing to social cohesion in the areas of intervention. Four more specific outcomes aimed at contributing to this overarching goal. The following findings are based on document review (project document and reports), interviews in Bamako (UNHCR, IOM) and Gao (UNHCR, IOM, Selection committee for beneficiaries of income generating activities comprised of local authorities and representatives, beneficiaries) and observation of a market hall, constructed by IOM, and beneficiary market stands in the Chateau
neighborhood of Gao. While some of these tangible results were accessible to the evaluation, the potential change at the community level was largely inaccessible due to the security situation.

102. Outcome 1 (Le tissu social entre les communautés est reconstruit grâce à une maitrise des outils de dialogue et de gestion des conflits) is pitched at a high level and its results are somewhat more modest. Essentially, the project provided training in conflict management for 240 people (78 women), sensitization campaigns through radio and workshops (reaching at least 4527 people, with more than 55% women) as well as cultural and sports activities bringing together diverse communities. However, there has been little effort to sustain these individual level attitudinal changes and transform them into institutional practices.

103. This challenge is shared with Outcome 2 (Les autorités locales retrouvent la confiance de leur population), which mainly consisted in material support (computers, printers, solar panels, motor bikes, office furniture etc.) and capacity development for local authorities. The latter included the training of regional stakeholders on the Kampala Convention Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, which made it possible to request government services to provide migrants with documents to minimize obstacles to the freedom of movement, to facilitate the movement of underage migrants and release migrants in detention for nocturnal vagrancy. While potentially addressing the driver of conflict of mistrust between (local) state authorities and the population, it is difficult to ascertain the impact the project had.

104. Outcome 3 (Le tissu économique est renforcé et les communautés assistées arrivent à faire face aux besoins élémentaires de leurs ménages) was achieved for the benefit of 615 people supported by income generating activities. Committees were put in place, composed of local authorities and community representatives (women, youth, returnees and host communities), which developed criteria and identified beneficiaries. This successfully mitigated the risk of creating conflict by allowing for inclusion and local knowledge in the selection of beneficiaries. The members of one committee encountered by the evaluation in Gao still spoke positively about this work dating back 3-4 years. The project also realized some community infrastructures such as market buildings. All beneficiaries encountered by the evaluation unanimously appreciated the economic support that was provided and their only recommendation was to multiply similar efforts.

105. Under Outcome 4 (Les services sociaux et les infrastructures de base considérés comme prioritaires pour la réduction des tensions au sein des communautés cibles sont réhabilités et accessibles à toutes les communautés) 15 water access points were created or rehabilitated and 30 troughs for livestock realized. 15 water management committees were created and supported in the conflict-sensitive management of these infrastructures to reduce community tension. In addition, a secondary school in the urban community of Gao was built, ensuring school access for children, for girls in particular.

106. The project was gender-sensitive. A participation of at least 30% women was largely achieved, except for some activities geared towards local authorities and decision makers who were overwhelmingly man, thus reflecting the realities in the area of intervention. Women empowerment was mainly achieved in economic terms.
In summary, the project operated largely on the assumption that sensitization and training in combination with infrastructure and socio-economic recovery will contribute to increased social cohesion and peaceful resolution of conflict at the community level. This intervention logic did respond well to the situation in Gao and Timbuktu regions and provided some early economic recovery, albeit at a small scale. Some of these results, in particular regarding infrastructure and individual effects of income generating activities could be sustained after the end of the project. While the project was implemented with an eye to conflict sensitivity, wider peacebuilding effects, in particular at the institutional level were difficult to observe.

### 3.3.4 IRF-105: GBV response

PBSO approved US$ 998,310 for IRF-105 (US$ 655,910 for UN Women and US$ 342,400 for UNFPA), in December 2014 as part of its Gender Promotion Initiative. The project started in January 2015 and received additional US$ 500,000 in 2016 (US$ 353,000 for UN Women and US$ 147,000 for UNFPA) through a cost-extension. The project was built around 3 outcomes and ended on 31 December 2017. The following findings are based on document review (project document, reports and external evaluation), interviews in Bamako (UN Women, UNFPA) and Gao (implementing partner GREFFA, beneficiaries at the Case de Paix) and observation through a visit at the Case de Paix in Gao.

Under Outcome 1 (Le système judiciaire est renforcé pour une lutte efficace contre les violences basées sur le genre liées au conflit et l’accès des victimes à la justice) the project achieved significant institutional and normative changes. A draft law on GBV, developed by the Ministère de la Promotion de la femme, de l’Enfant et de la Famille (MPFEF) and the Ministry of Justice, was supported through capacity development and advocacy. In addition, the project strengthened the penal chain (police, paralegals, magistrates etc.) in regard to the prosecution of SGBV resulting in an increase in cases: 329 SGBV cases, including 157 cases of sexual violence have been filed in courts, compared to 7 at the start date of the Project. Finally, the National Police Action Plan for the fight against GBV 2018-2020 is one of the key results achieved within the framework and builds on the establishment of gender focal points in police stations including Timbuktu, Mopti and Gao. According to the endline survey carried out for the common results framework of Phase 1 projects, 92% of GBV victims who pursued charges positively appreciated the work of the justice system.

Outcome 2 (Les victimes de violences liées au conflit bénéficient d’une prise en charge holistique et d’un soutien communautaire pour un meilleur accès à la justice et la sécurité) provided substantial capacity building of institutions and organizations, which potentially come in contact with GBV survivors (30 state services, 76 midwives, 120 members of Cases de paix, 11 victims organizations, 80 religious and traditional leaders as well as media representatives). In addition, 289 emergency kits to treat GBV survivors were distributed to hospitals and health centers. However, one of the weaknesses of the project is that no data was collected or reported on the number of victims of GBV who benefitted from these services. According to the endline survey carried out for common results framework of Phase 1 projects, 82% of all people interviewed and 92% of women knew about the availability of services and how to access them.
111. Outcome 3 (Les normes et standards en matière de paix et sécurité sont mis en œuvre dans le processus de paix au Mali pour une meilleure protection des droits des femmes et des victimes de violences liées au conflit et une meilleure cohésion sociale) essentially focused on the support of the National Action Plan for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325. This lead to the inclusion of women and gender questions in key political and peacebuilding related processes, such as negotiations, DDR and transitional justice. One key result, is the creation of a Subcommission on Gender in the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) which was created in 2014.

112. The project was funded under the 2014 Gender Promotion Initiative and as such has a strong focus on women empowerment and gender equality. While a focus was on women survivors of GBV highlighting aspects of victimhood, the project also contributed in numerous ways to the socio-political empowerment of women. The *Case de Paix* at the local level and the work of CVJR at the national level can be mentioned as examples.

113. The project was a model of achieving sustainability of its results because of a good mix between advocacy and technical support. The above mentioned draft law on GBV and the National Police Action Plan reflect important normative change. Even after the end of the project some results can be observed, such as the integration of GBV kit distribution to hospitals and health centers into the national budget. National data on GBV cases is still collected through data collection and reporting mechanisms that were set up as part of the project. Some of these results can also be attributed to the fact that a former UNFPA staff member, who has worked on the project, now occupies a key position in the MPFEF. This highlights the leverage, a close collaboration between the UN and national counterparts can produce. Lastly, the project built on the capacity of local CSOs such as GREFFA and created and strengthened local institutions such as the *Case de Paix*, which continue their work in admirable ways even beyond the duration of the project, as was observed by the evaluation in Gao.

### 3.3.5 IRF-106: Resilience of Women and Youth

114. IRF-106 provided a total of US$ 2,611,119 to UNDP and UNIDO, with a first approval of US$ 2,111,110 in 2014 (US$ 1,071,605 for UNDP and US$ 1,039,505 for UNIDO) and additional US$ 500,019 as part of a cost extension in 2016 (US$ 260,005 for UNDP and US$ 240,004 for UNIDO). The project, built around two outcomes, started in January 2015 and ended in December 2017. The following findings are based on document review (project document, reports and external project evaluation), interviews in Bamako (UNDP, UNIDO, CNPV) and Gao (CNPV, beneficiaries and non-participating youth).

115. Outcome 1 (Les femmes et les jeunes ciblés ont acquis les capacités nécessaires à la gestion non-violente des conflits, à la conduite de processus de dialogue ouverts et inclusifs et œuvrent à la restauration de la cohésion sociale et de la paix dans leur communauté) was achieved in the sense that 1092 people, including 200 community leaders were trained in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. In addition 70 community volunteers (32 Women and 38 Men) were trained, who acted as multipliers and in turn sensitized 28190 (56.8% women) in their respective communities.
With 84% of the budget dedicated to this end, the economic recovery in Outcome 2 (Les communautés ciblées deviennent plus résilientes aux conflits et s’intègrent de manière durable dans leurs communes grâce aux nouvelles opportunités économiques pour les jeunes à risque et les femmes vulnérables) was the main component of the project. According to the final report, a total of 49 income-generating activities were financed benefitting 421 women; 15 women’s groups have benefited from equipment and 80 business plans were financed through Orange Money. In addition, almost 200 young people received basic vocational training (electricity, masonry, plumbing, etc.) and 200 young people from four regions were engaged in labor-intensive projects. The strength of the project was the assessments that preceded the socio-economic interventions, notably regarding value chains, training needs and a mapping of women groups active in agricultural food sector. Still, according to the end of project report, only 30% of the beneficiaries could increase their revenue.

As is apparent from the outcome formulation, women and youth were the main target groups for this project. In this way, it followed the assumption that women and youth, as the primary victims of conflict, should be treated with priority for socio-economic recovery activities.

The most durable result apart from individual economic improvements is the Centre d’écoute et orientation in Gao of the Centre national de promotion du volontariat (CNPV), the main implementing partner of UNDP. Through the support of the project, the youth center was strengthened to the point that it became the regional office of the CNPV and is supported by government resources. This formidable institutional strengthening, however, is somewhat mitigated by the very nature of CNPV’s work: As a volunteer organization, its emphasis is on increasing the employability of volunteers who ideally move on in their employment biographies. While this does not exclude that the volunteers apply their newly-acquired skills in conflict resolution in new settings, it reduces sustainability of project results as their engagement is by definition transitory.

### Catalytic results

Non-financial catalytic results, in particular in regard to IRF-101 and IRF-105, have already been mentioned. However, it is worth pointing out that financial catalytic results, i.e., the mobilization of new funds resulting from project implementation, have been varied. IRF-102 and IRF-106 did not report any additional contributions. As mentioned, cantonment sites were eventually built with additional US$ 10m of assessed budget, although it can be discussed whether these funds have been “catalyzed” by the IRF-84. IRF-101 received additional US$ 1.5m from Japan to scale up the project in another region. IRF-105 did support the implementation of the National Action Plan for Resolution 1325, which is also supported by other donors, such as Denmark, Belgium, Sweden. Some RUNOs were able to use the experience of PBF to receive more funding for similar activities from their headquarters, for example UN Women, who was able to recruit two additional Gender Advisors.

There are at least two reasons for this lack of additional funds. The first relates to the fact that the potential leverage of the projects to mobilize additional funds is neglected during the design and implementation of the project. RUNOs rely on the availability of funds from PBF and...
engage not sufficiently in outreach to donors to forge co-funding opportunities and/or promote successful projects to attract funding for continuation and scale-up of activities.

121. As has been mentioned, Mali is a country with a comparatively high engagement of the international community in the area of peacebuilding, including of the main donors to the PBF at the global level. In this environment, it is surprising that financial catalytic effects are not higher. This points to the second reason, discussed in more detail in the section 3.6, which relates to the visibility and positioning of the PBF in relation to other funding mechanisms in Mali. It appears that crucial communication and outreach functions are not properly fulfilled, with the effect that PBF-funded interventions are too little known. There are some positive instances in the rest of the portfolio, e.g., Interpeace and IMRAP (IRF-158) received additional funding from Canada, which is represented in the Steering Committee and WFP (IRF-217) has received US$ 1.1m from Germany, but these experiences are more the exception than the rule.

3.3.7 Lessons for Phase 2

122. Phase 2 continued the area-based programming approach with a focus on the center of Mali, namely the regions of Mopti and Ségou. The three substantive projects (IRF-217, IRF-218 and IRF-219) are largely an extension of Phase 1 with small elements of innovation that for the most part do not change the nature of the projects. As such, the overall impression is more of a scale-up to a different region than new programming.

123. IRF-217, implemented by UNHCR, FAO and WFP, largely replicates experiences from IRF-102 (in which UNHCR also participated). The element of innovation is an increased focus on natural resource management as a means of conflict prevention. However, Outcome 2, with roughly 67% of the budget the main project component, is combining a straightforward economic development intervention with a component on food security that operates under the assumption that material strain is a key driver of conflict. With a limit of the project to 500 households in the Mopti region, large scale or systemic peacebuilding results are not to be expected.

124. IRF-218, implemented by UNDP and UN Women combines elements of previous projects. The CNPV is a main implementing partner and so is the approach of community-based volunteers taken from IRF-106. UN Women continues its previous work on the implementation of the National Action Plan for Resolution 1325, which already featured in IRF-105 and IRF-146. However, two elements make this more than just a transfer of old projects to new regions: first, the project does not contain income generating activities but attempts to exclusively work on socio-political drivers of conflict; second, crucial in this regard is the inclusion of a new key stakeholder, namely security forces, to transform feelings of mistrust in particular held by young people.

125. IRF-219, implemented by UNICEF, UNESCO and IOM, builds on the peace education of IRF-101 (in the case of UNICEF) and the income generating and community infrastructure component of IRF-102 (in the case of IOM). The innovative component is the institutional strengthening of the *Equipes Régionales d’Appui à la Réconciliation* (ERAR) in Mopti and Ségou, a relatively new decentralized structure at of the Ministry for National Reconciliation.
Like IRF-218, the project targets (male and female) youth at the individual level, in addition to the institutional strengthening of women civil society organizations, creating some overlap, in particular through additional support to the implementation of the National Action Plan of Resolution 1325. This thematic similarity adds an element of imbalance to the three projects of Phase 2 and reduces coherence and strategic complementarity.

126. Likely, the lack of an in-depth conflict analysis in general and for two new interventions areas Mopti and Ségué in particular has led to more of a continuation between Phase 1 and 2 then would be expected in light of PBF’s preference for new and innovative project ideas.

127. Conflict sensitivity. An important lesson from Phase 1 relates to the necessity of conflict sensitive programming in the work of UN agencies, funds and programmes. An example for such a reflection is the consideration of how livelihood support in food-insecure areas can affect conflict dynamics (IRF-102 and IRF-217). Another example, are considerations of how to mitigate frustrations and other negative feelings in the selection of beneficiaries of income generating activities in a context characterized by widespread poverty (IRF-106 and IRF-219).

128. This increase in conflict sensitivity is laudable, despite the fact that one would expect it to be already much more firmly ingrained in the work of UN stakeholders in (post-)conflict settings whose entire work should be conflict sensitive. Interlocutors, e.g. from FAO and UNHCR, shared their experiences of how the PBF-engagement has strengthened the conflict-sensitivity lens. Some of these reflections even appear to be included in programming that is not supported by other resources than PBF.

10 For this section, see OECD (2012): Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2016).
129. These are important collateral benefits from PBF programming. However, conflict sensitivity in and of itself should not be confused with peacebuilding or sustaining peace. The additional requirement of addressing root causes and key drivers of conflict should receive more attention in determining the relevance of interventions and thus take a central position in the selection criteria for PBF-funding.

130. The question to what extent key drivers of conflict are addressed by a given intervention will also be helpful in better articulating the Humanitarian-Peace-Development Nexus. In other words, the attention of humanitarian and development interventions to conflict sensitivity is a central quality criterion. However, PBF would significantly increase relevance and impact and thus help better express the Nexus by prioritizing funding for humanitarian and development interventions that tackles root causes and key drivers of conflict more explicitly.

3.4 Efficiency

131. One indicator to gauge efficiency is to look at the approval process and determine the time it takes from the submission of project documents until the approval. The analysis of internal documents, such as the decisions of the PBSO Project Appraisal Committee (PAC), showed that the average time from submission to approval was less than calendar 12 days; the projects approved under the GYPI follow a different procedure which makes comparison difficult. The transfer of resources to the RUNOs/NUNOs occurred roughly 10 days after approval, though transfers for projects approved at the end of the 2017 took significantly longer. This is likely an anomaly related to the introduction of a new MoU between the MPTF-O, the administrative agent of the Fund, and the RUNOs/NUNOs. Based on these numbers, the PBF is delivering on its promise to be fast. These indicators do not, however, take into consideration the time dedicated on project development and iterations of comments provided by PBSO, which ensure that the project documents arrive in an approvable form.
Another way to gauge efficiency is to look at how fast RUNOs/NUNOs translated available resources into programming. An indicator for this the percentage of approved funds that are implemented during the first year. It is important to recall that all projects in the PBF-portfolio in Mali were approved under the IRF-modality which foresees a maximum project duration of 18-months. That means that roughly 2/3 of the funds should be implemented during the first year. The graphic provides an analysis of this aspect of efficiency and points to the fact that projects encounter significant challenges in the start-up phase.

In many cases RUNOs/NUNOs are not able catch up on these initial delays, which explain the high prevalence of no-cost extensions in the portfolio. These findings qualify the claim of PBF as a funding instrument to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging peacebuilding challenges. While the approval process is indeed fast, it does take – often considerable – time to translate the available funding into activities with tangible results on the ground.

There are some good reasons for the delay. RUNOs/NUNOs do an exemplary work in a difficult environment. The area-based programming approach chosen by PBF is focusing on conflict hotspots. This includes a debilitating security situation with the accompanying security restrictions, which make implementation impossible in the worst case, slow in the best case.

The question of access is crucial, slightly more problematic for RUNOs than for NUNOs, and limited access leads to the need to find alternatives to direct implementation. Projects often take place in regions, where RUNOs have limited to no presence. Implementing partners – mostly national CSOs or state institutions – who are able to intervene in these difficult environments usually take over the day to day work, sometimes entirely. Security measures slow down implementation and increase costs.

Procurement is challenging, as procedures do not always take into account the realities on the ground. RUNOs often will not only have to find contractors who can get the job done but also invest time and energy to find creative solution to actually get them hired in line with administrative procedures. Intimate knowledge of the area of intervention can help to increase conflict sensitivity and efficiency in the choice of contractors but is not always available at RUNOs with limited presence in the envisioned area of intervention.

With the exception of the Secretariat projects and IRF-101, which was implemented by UNICEF alone, all other UN projects in the portfolio are essentially joint projects (IRF-84, IRF-165 are effectively jointly implemented with MINUSMA and IRF-182 has an IOM component). agencies, funds and programmes are not well accustomed to truly joint implementation, which has the tendency to slow down implementation a bit further. It is, however, experienced as a great benefit of the PBF to stimulate such joint endeavors. On paper, the GYPI projects with
CSOs as fund recipients are single entity projects. However, in practice they also implement jointly with national partners (e.g. IRF-158: Interpeace and IMRAP or IRF-234: Mercy Corps and Think Peace).

138. While these are real challenges that need to be overcome to ensure robust peacebuilding programming, none of them are new or unknown to fund recipients. Therefore, it must also be stated that there is an element of over-ambitious (or bad) planning that does not take into account existing implementation challenges, which contributes the fact that projects are hardly ever closed in time. The other reason is the RUNOs/NUNOs frustration with the 18-month project duration, which is considered as insufficient to realistically effect peacebuilding change.

3.5 Gender
139. Gender considerations are well represented in the portfolio. A first observation is that out of the 20 projects, 3 were approved under various iterations of the Gender Promotion Initiative, and 3 were approved under the Youth Promotion initiative, which also applies increased scrutiny to gender considerations. In addition to these projects supported through special funding windows, one additional project mentions women explicitly in its title (IRF-106). All projects of the second phase make explicit mention of women and girls. Out of the whole portfolio, only two substantive projects (IRF-84 and IRF-165) plus the two PBF Secretariat projects do not focus on women or youth.

140. As mentioned before, women and youth are often seen as the primary victims of conflict. They are also engaged or targeted by projects because they are “easy to reach”. In the Mali portfolio this also means neglecting the “hard to reach”, namely political and/or security actors propelling violence, whose influence would need to be limited over time for any sustainable peacebuilding to take place.

141. Finally, while women and youth are often targeted this does not always translate in more equality or increase in decision-making power. Many projects focus on sensitization and capacity building and do not got a step further to create or support (political) processes in which these newly gained perceptions and skills can be integrated and applied. This move from individual to socio-political and institutional change would be crucial for increasing the portfolio’s contribution to women empowerment.

3.6 Management and Oversight
142. The analysis will focus on five areas of management and oversight in regard to the PBF-portfolio, each focusing on the performance of a different set of actors, namely PBSO, the Steering Committee, the PBF Secretariat, RUNOs and NUNOs, as well as the collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT.

3.6.1 How effective was the contribution of PBSO?
143. PBSO capacities dedicated to the management of the PBF in Mali consist largely of a Programme Officer and an alternate, who in the beginning had additional M&E related tasks. Additional support is provided on an ad hoc basis, e.g. in regard to project and portfolio
evaluations, which are supported by a dedicated evaluation post. For all these posts, Mali is only one among several countries that fall under the responsibility of these staff. At the senior management level, PBSO supports engagement in Mali through the ASG of Peacebuilding as well as the Chief of the Financing for Peace Branch, who oversees the management of the PBF.

144. PBSO support consists of technical support, training, facilitation of processes between country level between various UN-internal stakeholders such as MINUSMA, the UNCT and the PBF Secretariat etc. This support is largely appreciated by its primary recipients in country and in some instances in other UN Secretariat Departments, such as DPO. The fast and flexibly nature of PBF support was highlighted, which is also reflected in the fast approval of projects (see above). The case of the first PBF-project in Mali (IRF-84) in particular was singled out in this regard, as it provided resources to MINUSMA at a critical point during its set-up.

145. However, there seems to be room for improvement in a number of areas. The first point relates to the fact that no conflict analysis has been done at the portfolio-level prior to Phase 1 or Phase 2, although the PBSO usually puts a strong emphasis on this element according to its guidelines. Regarding Phase 1, two reasons have been advanced for this: access to a lot of existing analysis and the motivation to provide support to Mali in a fast and flexible way without the more time-intensive processes related to a full-fledged Peacebuilding Priority Plan. Regarding Phase 2, a review exercise and external conflict analysis provided by one of the NUNOs (Interpeace/IMRAP) apparently replaced a stand-alone analysis and were used to justify the shift of programming to the central region of Mali. Going forward, it is strongly suggested that the PBSO invests in and supports the process of an in-depth conflict analysis specific to regions and potential thematic areas of its interventions and requests regular updates to keep up with volatile conflict dynamics.

146. Another challenge is that local stakeholders see New York as the main locus of the approval process. During interviews, in particular the development of Phase 2 was cited as an instance, which saw differing opinions between PBSO and stakeholders on the ground. This has potential consequences for the full realization of national and local ownership. Related to this aspect is that the PBF’s positioning at the global level is not always fully understood at the national level. In consequence, strategic funding priorities are perceived as being set by the PBSO. Strengthening inclusive processes of conflict analysis and priority setting with a stronger role of the PBF Secretariat in Bamako as a link between the PBSO and stakeholders on the ground might be able to mitigate this criticism.

147. RUNOs almost unanimously criticized that time frames to develop concept notes and project documents were too short in recent years. This might be related to the fact that the GYPI entails now a yearly call for proposals, which can be tasking, especially for smaller agencies. In addition, the diversity of the Mali PBF-portfolio has been pointed out earlier, which includes 13 RUNOs. This complexity increases the time for consultation and slows down in-country decision making processes. Where possible, the PBSO should be mindful of these bottlenecks and continue to strengthen planning processes, jointly with the PBF Secretariat, to set realistic deadlines.
Lastly, the limit of 18-months project-duration was unanimously criticized by in-country stakeholders as too short considering implementation challenges as well as the expectation to deliver higher-level peacebuilding results. This issue should be less of a challenge going forward. It can be expected that the PBSO applies its 2017 Guidelines in the sense that most projects in Mali will be governed by the PRF-modality which allows a maximum of 36 months. In light of the quickly changing context, a middle ground of 24-30 months could be explored that would take into account those implementation challenges over which the recipient organizations have little control.

3.6.2 How effective was the contribution of the Steering Committee?

At the time of its creation in 2014, it was decided to create a light and flexible Steering Committee comprising four members, the Co-Chairs (the DSRSG/RC/HC and the Minister of Foreign Affairs), and on a rotation basis one member representing civil society (currently the Forum des Organisations de la Société Civile au Mali (FOSC)) and one representing the international community (currently the Embassy of Canada). According to the ToRs, the Steering Committee is “responsible for the strategic orientation of projects to be submitted to the PBF for approval, for making decisions on the selection and approval of projects and for quality assurance in the implementation of projects.”

Overall, the evaluation of the work of the Steering Committee by stakeholders is positive, with some qualifications as to strengthening the effectiveness of its work. A participatory review exercise in May 2017, for example, had already developed suggestions for a reform of the Steering Committee, including the creation of a technical-level support body that would provide a vector for more national ownership and a more in-depth engagement with the decisions to be taken by the Committee. These observations were repeated by key stakeholders, including by members of the Steering Committee, during the in-country data collection. The addition of a technical support body would also allow the Committee to concentrate on its role of strategic oversight of the PBF-portfolio in Mali, without getting bogged down in the details of technical considerations of individual projects. Ideally, this would also mitigate the challenges that arise repeatedly concerning scheduling, which has been portrayed as a painful exercise. It must, however, be underlined that the increase in national ownership at the level of the Steering Committee (or a technical support body) will eventually also rely on government counterparts dedicating sufficient time and resources to exercise their oversight role.

Regarding the composition of the Steering Committee, it must be noted that after the departure of IMRAP there is no longer any specialized peacebuilding expertise represented in the committee. One potential solution might be to enlarge (or change) the membership of the Committee, e.g. through the inclusion of the Ministry of National Reconciliation, which is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Peace Accord and coordinating peacebuilding activities in the country. Another option might to address this challenge through more inclusivity in the composition of above-mentioned technical support mechanism. In any case, there should be additional investments in creating a joint understanding of the articulation of the PBF-niche in Mali, as some actors are tempted to see it merely as additional funding to support more general development initiatives.
152. The small size of the Steering Committee limits the immediate visibility of PBF-funded interventions, as in other contexts more stakeholders, including donors, receive regular updates on the work of the PBF just through their participation in the Steering Committee. Canada, as a representative of the donor community, acts as a bridge to other technical and financial partners. However, its engagement towards this end – together with that of all other Steering Committee members – could be increased as a potential remedy for comparatively low levels of financial catalytic effects.

153. Some interlocutors have expressed frustrations with the transparency of decision-making and communication by the Steering Committee in regard to funding decisions. Given the size of the UNCT with 17 UN agencies, funds and programmes, there is a big competition to access PBF resources, which is also reflected by the fact that 13 AFPs have already received PBF support. Open calls for concept notes have so far been the preferred choice to manage this competition. The advantage of this approach is that it encourages the broadest of participation. However, interlocutors have complained about a lack of transparency in communicating the results of these calls. It will not be possible to erase this frustration entirely. The hard truth might be that although the PBF serves the UN system as a whole, it might not be the best use of its limited resources to distribute them (equally) among all members of the UNCT. A clear set of criteria and priorities should be developed – in cooperation with PBSO – that guides the work of the Steering Committee which applies it rigorously and communicates decisions in a transparent manner. This increase in procedural fairness would help reduce frustrations.

3.6.3 How effective was the contribution of the PBF Secretariat?

154. The PBF Secretariat, in the language of the relevant project documents referred to as the Cellule d’Appui, is located in the Stabilization and Recovery Section of MINUSMA and currently comprises four people (in light blue in the organigram): the PBF Programme Manager, a national expert, a UNV responsible for M&E support and a Programme Assistant. The Secretariat was previously under the Senior Programme Manager and was moved under the supervision of the Senior Coordination Officer in 2018. At the end of the same year, the position of the international UNV for M&E was filled for the first time.
155. The PBF Programme Manager is a staff member of MINUSMA and paid out of the mission budget, the M&E expert is an international UNV and the National expert and the Programme assistant have UNDP (service provider) contracts. This constellation, with placement of the PBF Secretariat within a peacekeeping operation is unusual and provides an interesting learning opportunity. One of the disadvantages in the current setup is that the PBF Programme Manager is three steps removed from the DSRSG/RC/HC, whereas in other contexts the management to PBF programmes is much closer and directly related linked to the RCO, which increases visibility and the potential for strategic leverage.

156. The support of the PBF Secretariat consists of convening meetings, technical support (design, monitoring and evaluation of projects), information sharing etc. This support was widely appreciated by recipient agencies (both UN and non-UN), implementing partners and most Steering Committee members. Interlocutors appreciated the inclusion of dedicated M&E capacity within the Secretariat. Monitoring of the contribution of projects to peacebuilding results is crucial and RUNOs need support in this area. The added M&E capacity should focus on capacity development and technical advice. However, some of the challenges of Phase 1 should be avoided, where some RUNOs considered an outsourced M&E capacity as a replacement rather than as an addition to M&E tasks for which they should retain the primary responsibility.

157. However, some aspects merit further development: The Secretariat provided guidance and technical peacebuilding support to key stakeholders. However, as mentioned before, no separate and in-depth conflict analysis was undertaken in the development of neither Phase 1 nor 2. In collaboration between the PBSO, the MINUSMA Political Affairs Division and UNCT, the Secretariat should lead on in-country conflict analysis exercises and regular updates to take into account the dynamic and volatile environment.
158. The PBF Secretariat is the representation of the Fund in Mali. It should therefore increase dissemination efforts regarding the strategic positioning of the PBF, so that key stakeholders in the country have a clearer understanding of the niche and funding priorities of the PBF. Ideally, the Secretariat would even further strengthen its role of a link between the PBSO and Mali stakeholders. It could thus effectively communicate peacebuilding needs in Mali to the PBSO, while ensuring the translation of the PBF’s global funding priorities into locally meaningful initiatives. This would reduce friction and strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the Secretariat due to a closer alignment between New York- and Mali-based decision making mechanisms. At the same time, it would maximize the benefit of PBF funding opportunities available for Mali.

159. The presence of MINUSMA and UNDP staff in the Secretariat provides opportunities and challenges. The representation of both the mission and the country team is in itself a positive factor that could contribute to more integration. In practice, the opportunities of this arrangement are not fully realized when it comes to administrative processes and simplified communication. One challenge is the nature of the UNDP contracts. Both staff members hold service provider contracts, which limit their access and approval authority in the UNDP internal system (Atlas). This often causes delays in administrative processes which could be addressed by changing their contracts to temporary appointments with more administrative access and authority.

160. Finally, as mentioned before the strategic outreach to the international community present in Mali, in particular potential donors, is weak. In other settings, this would be a key role for the PBF Secretariat, which does not play this role in Mali. Unfortunately, this function is not fulfilled either by other parts of the Stabilization and Recovery Section. A clarification of roles and responsibilities involving the DSRSG/RC/HC, the leadership of the Stabilization and Recovery Section of MINUSMA and the PBF Secretariat is needed to identify who would be best placed to ensure this strategic outreach with the potential to provide more visibility to PBF interventions and increase the potential for resource mobilization.

3.6.4 How effective were management and oversight by RUNOs/NUNOs?

161. Some observations relevant to this section have already been addressed in previous sections on efficiency and effectiveness. Let us recall, the need for realistic planning based on known implementation challenges to avoid the proliferation of no-cost extensions.

162. RUNOs alleged funding restrictions by the PBSO in regard to staff positions. Yet, budget lines for staff are included in all projects. In light of the difficult implementation environment the need for dedicated staff needs to be balanced with value for money criteria. A more programmatic planning approach with the approval of a set of larger projects at a time might be beneficial, as it would allow for integrating staff capacities and sharing human resources between different projects involving the same organizations. At the same time, it must also be noted that given the fact that direct implementation is more the exception than the rule in the current security environment, the kind of staff and the amount of time charged to the project need to be carefully explained.
163. The (potential) role of the Steering Committee and the PBF Secretariat regarding visibility and increased catalytic effects has already been mentioned. However, it must be underlined that the primary responsibility falls to the RUNOs/NUNOs. They should therefore invest more in developing pilot projects and showcase results to donors in the attempt to mobilize resources for the continuation or scaling-up of activities. This requires, however, the accompaniment with robust M&E mechanisms, as otherwise necessary documentation will not be available. The new M&E capacity in the PBF Secretariat should be used to support these efforts. NUNOs seem to fare slightly better in this regard, as they tend to have more substantive peacebuilding experience including appropriate M&E and communication tools (see, e.g., the audio visual material produced for IRF-158).

164. Some basic project management functions are currently not fulfilled: Only one project (IRF-102) of Phase 1 has been financially closed, IRF-101, IRF-102 und IRF-105 are listed on the MPTFO-Gateway as operationally closed, while the other projects from that phase are still listed as on going. The proper financial management of PBF resources is also not always ensured. Some RUNOs (UNOPS: IRF-84; UNDP: IRF-98; UNHCR/IOM: IRF-102) show substantial deviations between budget categories in the approved budgets and actual expenditure in Phase 1. There seems to be insufficient control of this practice, but it is hoped that based on revised reporting formats in 2018, this will be less of an issue. Initial evidence points in the direction that NUNOs are more judicious in following PBSO guidelines on these issues.

3.6.5 How effective was the collaboration between MINUSMA and UNCT?

165. Some projects have seen a close involvement of MINUSMA in PBF programming and implementation (IRF-84, IRF-105, IRF-165), while the majority seem to fall exclusively to the UNCT when it comes to design and implementation. To help ensure coordinated and integrated support to the peace process in Mali, the UN has recently adopted an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) at the request of the Security Council (Resolution 2423, para 29) that sets the UN’s overall vision, joint priorities and internal division of labor to sustain peace in Mali. The PBF-experience in the country provides some important lessons for this endeavor.

166. As mentioned above, the integration between MINUSMA (DDR-Section) and UNCT (UNOPS) was the least developed in IRF-84 with a strict separation between political planning and operational responsibilities. The collaboration between the MINUSMA Gender Section and UN Women and UNFPA in the implementation of IRF-105 was much more successful in leveraging comparative advantages of the three partners in regard to analysis, programmatic work, advocacy and technical support. Similar observations can be made about the cooperation between MINUSMA (Civil Affairs Division) and UNDP in the implementation of IRF-165. Success factors are open exchange of information, joint analysis and implementation combined with operational capacities.

167. More problematic is the institutional setting: The PBF is one of several UN funding mechanisms supporting peacebuilding efforts in Mali. In terms of funding envelopes, the PBF at US$ 35.3M is situated in the middle between Quick Impact Projects (QIPS) and the MINUSMA managed Stabilization Trust Fund. In time scale the three funds are viewed as complementary, the QIPS being the shortest-term funding source of up to six months, the Trust Fund allowing for projects of up to one year, and the PBF providing support of up to eighteen months (and
beyond). In addition, there are community-violence reduction (CVR) projects by the MINUSMA DDR-Section. Despite different focus, all mechanisms can support (and have done so in the past!) similar activities in regard to providing peace dividends, income generating activities and supporting dialogue and conflict resolution initiatives. While some UN-internal stakeholders might have a clear understanding regarding the unique value of each mechanisms, to others and external actors they might not be evident. The confusion is increased by the fact that the management units of QIPS, the Trust Fund and the PBF are all located in the Stabilization and Recovery Section.

168. Problematic in regard to the Trust Fund and the PBF is that they largely benefit from voluntary contributions by the same group of donors. The hard earmarking as well simplified approval procedures for the Trust Fund with most of the decision making power located in Mali make it the more attractive option for donor engagement.

169. Frustration over the fact that MINUSMA sections cannot benefit directly from PBF resources, the understanding has settled in that the PBF is for the UNCT, while the Trust Fund is for the mission, as UN agencies, funds and programmes only implement a small share of Trust Fund resources. In the past, these feelings of competition have overshadowed the opportunity for a truly integrated UN support to peacebuilding activities in Mali. A key in this regard could be, an amalgamation of various funding mechanisms, seizing the opportunity to leverage the specific political and greater risk-taking nature of the PBF. The PBF could be used to prepare the conditions on the ground for the transition of MINUSMA and the handover of its residual tasks to both the Government of Mali and the UNCT, as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution 2423. Ongoing conversations within MINUSMA on re-aligning and maximizing the use of funding mechanisms are a positive sign in the right direction and hopefully result in greater complementarity.

170. Another positive development pointing towards closer integration is ambitious UN campaign to stabilize the central part of the country, and more specifically the areas around Ségou and Mopti. Demanding a whole of system approach, the military capabilities of MINUSMA have been deployed to create the security conditions for the development and humanitarian partners to operate. The framework of the approach has been laid out in the Plan de Sécurisation Intégré des Régions du Centre (PSIRC) and the operation itself given the designation of Campagne Folon. Seen as a success, the collaborative effort has allowed for much needed assistance to reach the affected populations. Yet to be gauged is the sustainability of this intervention.

4 Partnerships
171. One of the characteristics of the PBF is its integrative nature which allows for a number of partnerships to be built. Thus, some key partnerships will be analyzed in this section, namely those with the Government of Mali, international and national Non-governmental organizations, bilateral partners and international financial institutions.
4.1 Government of Mali

172. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *The Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale* has been the long-standing partner of PBF in Mali since the beginning. The Minister is the Co-Chair of the Steering Committee together with the DSRSG/RC/HC.

173. **Ministry of National Reconciliation.** The current *Ministère de la Réconciliation Nationale et de la Cohésion Sociale* was created in September 2013 under the newly elected President of the Republic under the name of *Ministère de la Réconciliation Nationale et du Développement des Régions du Nord*. The Ministry now is charged to take the lead role in the implementation of the Peace Accord and to “conduire la politique nationale de réconciliation, concourant au retour de la paix et de la cohésion entre la mosaïque de populations et de cultures qui composent le Mali.” Based on this newly defined role, a strengthened role of the Ministry in the management and oversight of the PBF-portfolio in Mali seems crucial.

174. In 2017, the Ministry has set up the *Mission d’Appui à la Réconciliation Nationale* (MARN), whose action is supported at the regional level by the *Equipes Régionales d’Appui à la Réconciliation* (ERAR). The work of some ERAR is currently supported through IRF-219.

175. **Ministry of Women.** The *Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme, de l’Enfant et de la Famille* has been involved in the PBF-portfolio both at the strategic level through the participation in Steering Committee meetings as well as at the operational level as an implementing partner. It has been a particular strong partner in the implementation of gender projects, in collaboration with UN Women and UNFPA. The Ministry leads on the implementation of the National Action Plan for Resolution 1325.

176. **Ministry of Youth.** In a comparable way, the *Ministère de la Jeunesse, de l’Emploi et de la Construction Citoyenne* has also been a strong partner, not surprising in light of the large number of youth-centered projects. The *Centre National de Promotion du Volontariat* (CNPV), a Public Administrative Establishment (EPA) with legal personality and management autonomy under the supervision of the Ministry, is a key implementing partner in number of projects such as IRF-106, IRF-182, IRF-218, IRF-291, MAL/D-1 etc.

177. Overall, the cooperation between the Government of Mali and the PBF in the country is positive. However, efforts to strengthen national ownership need to be further reinforced. This includes the development of a shared understanding of PBF funding priorities at a global level and its strategic added value. In turn, this would provide the foundation to increase national ownership in the definition of priorities at the portfolio level and the distribution of resources at the project level, which are currently largely decided by UN stakeholders.

178. At the same time, the Government of Mali also needs to play its part to increase national ownership. This includes the political will to engage on the PBF-portfolio, the dedication of capacities and the coordination between different ministries.

---

179. This strengthening of national ownership in decision-making processes is a smart investment in the sustainability of results, as a closer alignment with government priorities can be achieved right from the start. The case of legal and policy changes in the area of SGBV as well as in the education sector provide promising examples.

**4.2 NGOs**

180. In line with changes at the global level of PBF management, the most significant new partnership that was formed in Mali is the integration of NUNOs in the portfolio, i.e., CSOs as direct recipients of PBF-resources. Currently, three organizations are directly implementing PBF-projects, namely Interpeace (IRF-158), ACORD (IRF-161) and Mercy Corps (IRF-234). The strength of these organizations is their dedicated peacebuilding expertise, strong analysis, process orientation as well as their capacity to work in closer contact with the populations, making this altogether a very positive new experience. In terms of value for money, it can be noted that CSO projects also tend to have smaller budgets than comparable UN projects.

181. The NUNOs’ appreciation of the collaboration with PBF is also positive and the fast and flexible nature of the Fund as well as the support received from the PBF Secretariat stand out as positive points. There is room for improvement in towards an even further integration of NUNOs in the implementation of the portfolio. For example, they could be more routinely associated in analysis and advocacy work carried out by other UN agencies, funds and programmes and MINUSMA sections. This would require more information sharing and increased communication.

182. In addition to the NUNOs, numerous CSOs, national and international, act as implementing partners in the rest of the portfolio. This is due to the fact that direct implementation is often not feasible due to problems of access in the current security environment. One the one hand, this is of great benefit to the implementation, as RUNOs can benefit from the embedded local knowledge of their implementing partners. On the other hand, there are also risks associated to this implementation model, as local organizations – especially at the community level – can be conflict parties themselves. It is suggested to further invest in monitoring capacities to reduce this risk and increase conflict sensitivity.

183. The *Forum des Organisations de la Société Civile au Mali* (FOSC), currently a member of the Steering Committee, pointed to the difficulties of national CSOs, including but not limited to its members, to directly access PBF-resources due to the funding requirements. The consequence is that many smaller local CSOs simply lose interest in the Fund. In the medium-term, the PBSO should engage in a reflection what possibilities can be created to provide opportunities for smaller national CSOs. In the short-term, outreach activities to national CSOs could be increased with the perspective to diversify the current list of implementing partners.

**4.3 Bilateral Partners**

184. The evaluation was only able to speak to a limited number of bilateral partners (Canada, UK, Norway and Switzerland) and therefore could not develop a global perspective on donor engagement in Mali. The feedback that was collected pointed to the lack of visibility of the PBF and critical questions regarding distinction between the PBF and other UN funding mechanisms,
notably the Stabilization Trust Fund. There was also a shared perception that the PBF that was principally managed for capitals and their representations in New York.

185. The reasons for this lack of understanding of the specific profile of the PBF and any attempt to leverage the political and risk-nature aspects of the fund could be as much structural as linked to inadequate communication. The fact that the PBF is contained within the MINUSMA Stabilization and Recovery Unit hierarchy, which also manages the Trust Fund, could stifle the visibility of the PBF.

186. There is a great potential to strengthen the catalytic nature of PBF investments through stronger involvement of bilateral partners, especially in light of the strong presence and engagement of a large number of countries, most of them among the top contributors to the PBF at the global level. At the same time, the reason that this is not happening can be attributed as much to a lack of outreach as to an overall lack of donor coordination. To the extent possible, future PBF-engagements should try to tackle both challenges in parallel.

4.4 International Financial Institutions

187. **World Bank.** As of June 2018, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, had aggregated commitments of $31.2 million, including investments in the financial, infrastructure, and agro-industrial sectors. IFC’s activities in Mali also include technical assistance projects that help boost financing for small and medium enterprises and, in collaboration with the World Bank, improve the business climate.

188. A missed opportunity coming out of an inadequate understanding of the PBF’s specificity is the forging of closer operational ties with the World Bank. MAL/D-1, which was intended as a co-financed project between the World Bank and PBF, ended up being solely funded by PBF with a complementary project funded by the World Bank to implement activities in central Mali around the Konna port. Today, the World Bank has scaled up its intervention in the central parts of Mali, with a significant portion of its funding directed there. Naturally there remains the possibility of a more collaborative arrangement through information exchanges.

189. In light of the joint UN-World Bank Study *Pathways for Peace*, the opportunity for greater collaboration on the ground would be desirous. Acknowledging that the two institutions were governed by different but yet complementary mandates, the study found that (1) violent conflict had increased after decades of relative decline, (2) the human and economic cost of conflicts around the world required all of those concerned to work more collaboratively, (3) the best way to prevent societies from descending into crisis, including but not limited to conflict, was to ensure that they were resilient through investment in inclusive and sustainable development, (4) the primary responsibility for preventive action rested with states, both through their national policy and their governance of the multilateral system, (5) exclusion from access to power, opportunity, services, and security created fertile ground for mobilizing group grievances to violence, especially in areas with weak state capacity or legitimacy or in the context of human rights abuses, (6) growth and poverty alleviation were crucial but alone would not suffice to sustain peace, (7) inclusive decision-making was fundamental to sustaining peace at all levels, as were long-term policies to address economic, social, and political aspirations, and (8) alongside
efforts to build institutional capacity to contain violence when it does occur, acting preventively entailed fostering systems that create incentives for peaceful and cooperative behavior.\(^\text{12}\)

190. Institutionally the PBF and PBSO are unique mechanisms for such a new collaboration. By being rapid and risk taking, PBF projects, if conceived conjointly with the Bank, can help bridge the period the World Bank needs to manage its procedures. And more importantly the pilot nature of PBF interventions would help inform the Bank of the changes in the operating environment and to the possibility of new realities since the inception of their programme thereby assisting in adapting the World Bank’s plans as they roll out. This becomes all the more relevant within the framework of the planned transition hand over of MINUSMA activities to the traditional UN Country Team presence and the Government of Mali, both at national and sub-national level.

191. African Development Bank. The 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper of the African Development Bank is executed against the backdrop of the implementation of the Algiers Agreement and increased empowerment of territorial communities. In this context, the Bank through: (1) its support to the process of transferring resources to territorial communities; and (2) its contribution to opening up the country and greater inclusiveness. It operates under two pillars, namely enhancing governance for inclusive growth and infrastructure development to support economic recovery.

192. A new possibility for leveraging the specificity of the PBF could lie with the African Development Bank with the potential for a future collaboration. launched an ambitious and costly road project in the north of the country, the Bank would welcome the PBF’s support in facilitating interactions with local communities and developing their capacity to capitalize on the employment and constructive revenue generating benefits of such an investment.

193. Having said the above, the PBF provides real opportunities for UN Country Team collaboration with the international financial institutions. Consideration should be given to associating both the World Bank and ADB in upcoming planning exercises, in view of identifying and better planning the potential catalytic effects and opportunities of upscaling PBF interventions. While there is still substantial need to invest in better understanding the respective priorities, strengths and weaknesses, the evaluation encountered great openness with interlocutors from both institutions to engage with the UN and the PBF on these issues.

5 Conclusions
194. The PBF has delivered important support to Mali: first in northern regions and now in the center of the country as well as in border areas with its neighbors in Burkina Faso and Niger. The Fund has engaged a number of partners and key stakeholders through a diverse portfolio implemented by 13 UN agencies, funds and programmes, three CSOs, several MINUSMA sections and the support by numerous national and international implementing partners.

195. While this engagement has undoubtedly contributed to improving the life of many people, strengthened resilience and brought about some institutional reforms, the sad news is that Mali is still facing enormous peacebuilding challenges: The latest report of the Independent Observer of the implementation of the Peace Agreement notes significant delays in the implementation of the 2015 Accord. Meanwhile, we witness the continuing deterioration of inter-community relations as well as the security and humanitarian situation in central Mali as sadly has been demonstrated by the most recent massacres of Dioura soldiers and civilians in Ogossagou (Mopti Region). It is likely that this crisis will continue to have significant economic, social and humanitarian repercussions and the persistent and growing insecurity will certainly hamper investment and economic growth.

196. The Government of Mali is in the process of finalizing its Cadre Stratégique pour la Relance Economique et le Développement Durable (CREDD 2019-2023) which should provide the foundation for renewed engagement on (1) closing the governance gap, (2) strengthening peace and security and restoring social cohesion, (3) creating conditions for structural transformation of the economy and strong and inclusive growth, (4) increasing protection of the environment and resilience to climate change, (5) developing human capital and thus capture the demographic dividend. These strategic objectives are based on the following vision: “A well-governed Mali, where harmonious coexistence of the different components of society is restored, peace consolidated and collective and individual security ensured in unity, cohesion and diversity, where the wealth creation process is inclusive and respectful of the environment and where human capital is valued for the benefit of young people and women in particular”. The measures envisaged by the Malian government strongly call on the PBF to contribute to the return of peace and social cohesion.

197. At the same time, the UN in Mali is in a process of change: A new UNDAF+ is developed, MINUSMA is looking at the possible changes the review of its mandate by the Security Council will bring in summer, the recently adopted Integrated Strategic Framework will have to deliver on the closer collaboration between the UNCT and the mission. The Government, supported by the UN system, is in the preparation for a new phase of PBF-engagement through a request for re-eligibility submitted to the UN Secretary-General in 2019.

198. Responding to the instructions of the Security Council Resolution 2423, the ISF sets out “the UN’s overall vision, joint priorities and internal division of labor to sustain peace in Mali”. As such it is complementary to both the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). Underlying the three policy documents is the UN’s recognition that for peace and reconciliation processes in Mali to be sustainable, they need to be fully owned and led by the Malians themselves. Strengthening the ability of communities to peacefully deal with conflict, creating inclusive and responsive governance structures (at the local and national level) and laying the foundation for strong political institutions capable if addressing root causes of the ongoing crisis are areas where the PBF’s flexibility and risk-taking appetite would provide the greatest contribution. The main challenge in the ongoing processes will be to invest into quality analysis and to identify and strengthen successful partnerships to find entry points.
6 Recommendations

199. The recommendations provide actionable and evidence-based suggestions to build on the strengths of PBF-investments in Mali and to address the major weaknesses. While change will only be produced in a collaborative fashion involving all stakeholders, the recommendations try to identify the main responsibilities for the PBSO, the Steering Committee, the PBF-Secretariat and the RUNOs/NUNOs.

200. The recommendations for the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) are the following:
- Request and support (localized) conflict analysis at all stages, but particularly at critical junctures in the development of the portfolio, and update regularly. Building on conflict analyses by other actors, the analysis should
  o be participatory involving relevant national and international stakeholders;
  o identify root causes and key drivers of conflict, with a focus on political factors in addition to socio-economic factors;
  o undertake a detailed actors analysis and stakeholder mapping, including local infrastructures for peace;
  o include where possible an analysis of previous (successful and unsuccessful) interventions and gaps;
  o identify entry points for PBF interventions, linking analysis to programming.
- Apply the new PBF Guidelines on the PRF-modality to extend the regular project duration to 24-30 months.
- Strengthen the communication with Mali-based stakeholders to further sensitize about PBF-niche and global funding priorities.
- Provide sufficient time in the development of concept notes and project documents taking into account known bottlenecks.
- Continue to prioritize joint implementation.
- Consider the inclusion of NUNOs as fund recipients also outside the special funding window of the GYPI and explore feasibility to provide direct funding to smaller national CSOs presenting dynamic and innovative approaches to peacebuilding.
- Continue to invest in capacity building of Mali-based stakeholders in the areas of conflict analysis, the design of effective peacebuilding projects, monitoring and evaluation as well as selected thematic areas based on documented needs.
- Provide technical support to project evaluations through the PBF-Secretariat to ensure that they sufficiently capture peacebuilding results (or the lack thereof).
- Continue to invest in cross-border projects with a focus on joint analysis, which highlights the cross-border/regional nature of conflict drivers, and explicit cross-border/regional programming (instead of programming limited to peripheral border areas).
- Wait for the end of projects and evaluation findings before investing in similar types of projects.
- Continue to support outreach and resource mobilization efforts linking relevant actors in New York, Bamako and capitals of donor countries.
- Verify that all necessary project information on the MPTFO Gateway is available and up-to-date.
Most of the recommendations are aimed at the Steering Committee in Mali, due to its key role in the management and supervision of PBF-investments in Mali. It will be up to the Committee to decide, which recommendations it will take on and which it will delegate to achieve the envisioned change. The recommendations are grouped under three categories, namely composition, organization of meetings and working methods.

**Composition**

- Review the composition of the Steering Committee and ensure that it is fit for purpose to play its role of strategic oversight of the PBF-portfolio in Mali.
- Create a technical support body (Technical Committee) to the Steering Committee comprising as a minimum government and civil society stakeholders as well as UN representatives, as a means to strengthen national ownership and to liberate the Steering Committee to play its role of strategic oversight more effectively.
- Invest in the capacity building of the Technical Committee to provide quality support in line with PBF Guidelines and national and ensure quality control of PBF interventions prior to their discussion by the SC.

**Organization of meetings**

- Schedule meetings more in advance to allow for meaningful preparation of all participants.
- Increase the efficiency and strategic focus of SC meetings through an emphasis on strategic decisions at the portfolio-level and not on details of individual projects.
- Reduce the number of documents that SC members are required to read through increased support from the newly created Technical Committee and the PBF-Secretariat.
- Communicate decisions and their underlying rationale with maximum transparency to all concerned stakeholders.

**Working methods**

- Further strengthen national ownership in setting priorities for the development of the PBF-portfolio in Mali based on the clear understanding of the niche and comparative advantages of the PBF.
- Encourage the development of an overarching results framework to strengthen programmatic coherence of the PBF-portfolio and support the monitoring of its implementation. The formulation of strategic outcomes should provide guidance for project development.
- Prioritize PBF-funding for interventions addressing socio-political root-causes of conflict and support economic interventions only where and when theories of change clearly demonstrate how other factors than poverty and unemployment are addressed.
- Leverage the niche of the PBF also in distinction to other UN funding mechanisms in Mali, such as the MINUSMA Stabilization Trust Fund. This could include an emphasis on the political and greater risk-taking nature, the accompaniment of infrastructure projects financed by other donors through community-based interventions, and the preparation of the handover of MINUSMA residual tasks to both the Government of Mali and the UNCT, as per the Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018).
- Develop and apply more robust criteria in the selection of projects and RUNOs as well as increase inclusion, transparency and communication throughout the decision making
process. Increased communication with PBSO will also help to align in-country and HQ-based decision making processes.

- Continue to strengthen the effective and meaningful contribution of women and youth in decision making processes. At the same time, complement these interventions through an additional focus on engaging “hard to reach” constituencies, i.e., actors who are actively engaged in fueling conflict at the local and national level.

- Develop a communication and outreach strategy to increase visibility of PBF-funded interventions to national and international stakeholders, including CSOs, bi- and multilateral partners such as embassies and development cooperation agencies, international financial institutions etc. to increase catalytic effects and build on positive results of PBF projects.

- Lead on or facilitate increased donor coordination in the area of peacebuilding support to Mali.

202. The recommendations for the PBF-Secretariat are the following:

- Review the positioning of the PBF-Secretariat, also in light of the reform of the Resident Coordinator system, to maximize its effectiveness engaging all parts of the UN system, national counterparts, CSOs and the international community.

- Review contract modalities of UNDP-staff within the PBF-Secretariat to allow for efficient execution of financial and administrative procedures.

- Disseminate information on the strategic positioning of the PBF in terms of its niche and global funding priorities to Mali-based stakeholders. At the same time, effectively communicate peacebuilding needs (and constraints) in Mali to the PBSO thus facilitating the closer alignment between New York- and Mali-based decision making mechanisms.

- Conduct participatory assessments and conflict analysis relevant to the geographic and thematic area of interventions and increase the overall participation of national stakeholders during project design.
- Account for known implementation challenges during project design and adjust ambitions in the outcome formulation accordingly.
- Ensure efficient implementation in accordance with approved budgets, reduce the number of no-cost extensions and (financially and operationally) close all projects in a timely fashion.
- Strengthen coordination and collaboration of joint project at the field level.
- Employ local staff from the region of intervention as much as possible (and require implementing partners to do so), which enables to leverage local knowledge and – particular in the North – avoids perceptions of preferential treatment of people from the capital or Southern regions.
- Increase investments in conflict-sensitivity, also through capacity development of implementing partners.
- Accord greater importance to sustainability and exit strategies already during the design phase.
- Designate M&E focal points and develop more robust M&E systems, capable of documenting peacebuilding results, and use lessons learned in future planning activities.
- Increase communication efforts and engage donors more actively to secure follow-up funding for successful PBF-projects.

7 Strategic Considerations
204. The evaluation was fortunate to have some insight into peacebuilding activities in Mali which go beyond the work of the PBF. This section builds on these observations and provides some strategic considerations for the overall UN engagement. As this goes beyond the immediate scope of the evaluation, this section is deliberately put after the recommendations.

205. In analyzing the work of the UN in regard to peacebuilding and the interventions that are put forward in the Integrated Strategic Framework a number of observations can be made. The first relates to the fact that there are top-down approaches focusing on the support to State institutions in the area of National Reconciliation, DDR, decentralization of state authority, truth finding, infrastructure development and inclusive delivery of basic services. At the same time, the UN supports bottom-up approaches at the grass-roots and community-level. The latter has also been a focus of PBF support.

206. The challenge is that support to top-down approaches risks being dominated by international considerations. Therefore, they run the danger of substituting service delivery by international actors for a genuine strengthening of national capacities. Bottom-up approaches, on the other hand, risk being limited in scale and geographic distribution, thus not developing critical upward momentum to affect institutional change. In short, the question is if and where top-down approaches and bottom-up approach actually meet in their aim for social transformation.

207. The plans put forward in the Integrated Strategic Framework highlight a related challenge. A lot of resources are invested in sensitization and trainings. There is less effort foreseen in the strengthening of processes, in which these newly acquired skills and knowledge can be meaningfully applied to effect peacebuilding results. While sensitization and capacity
development harness the opportunity for empowerment, they will fall short of expectations if they are treated as ends in themselves. Rather, a deeper participatory analysis on the institutions (existing or to be created) that can lead to the necessary societal transformation should be the starting point from which the necessary sensitization and capacity development activities developed.

208. These observations point to the need for holistic approaches combining short-, medium- and long-term interventions grounded in a deep understanding of political and social realities. It is along these lines that a potential harmonization of the available UN funding mechanisms could be organized that centers around the creation and support of viable and sustainable infrastructures for peace. Two examples shall serve to illustrate this point.

209. The first example takes the case of support to the construction of important infrastructure projects funded through the Trust Fund and dialogue mechanisms for civic participation funded by the PBF. Instead of implementing such projects in isolation, support from PBF could be used to organize and facilitate citizen engagement in a way to shape the design and construction of infrastructure in a participatory fashion. This would provide for citizens and state authorities to meet in meaningful concertation regarding relevant decision-making processes while demonstrating immediate and concrete results of such an engagement. At the same time, this would reduce the risk of the international actors substituting themselves for national stakeholders and it would address a key driver of conflict, namely the mistrust between state authorities and the population. Such an investment in the ecosystem around infrastructure projects could be extended to other forms of cooperation, e.g., with the African Development Bank which mentioned the upcoming construction of road in the North as a project that could benefit from such support.

210. The second example looks a bit closer at the extension of state authority. IRF-165 provided a good example of the positive results that could be achieved by deepening citizen participation through additional consultations that occurred at the community-level in Taoudénit and Ménaka. While the core support to the creation and strengthening of a decentralized state institutions might be better served by other funding mechanisms, deepening this engagement through additional participatory and conflict sensitive interventions might play to the strengths of the PBF.

211. This area of potential focus for PBF funding could turn to the early reinforcement of government’s capacity to engage in ongoing stabilisation efforts by the international community, and more specifically by MINUSMA. This would fit perfectly with the mandate given to the PBF by the Joint General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on Sustaining Peace, which acknowledges the need for the UN to support governments to assume responsibility for their internal problems without losing sight of the important function of civil society.

212. The risk-taking and political nature of the PBF becomes even more significant when viewing the potential of the Fund in the years to come. Security Council Resolution 2423 (2018) for MINUSMA formally requests that it prepare a strategy for the handover of residual tasks of the mission to both the Government of Mali and the UNCT. The task is not an evident one as MINUSMA activities have tended to be substitutive in their approach. The weakness of
government capacity has severely undermined the latter’s ability to engage with the UN mission, and resources to build such capacity at sub-national level have remained limited.

213. The focus on effective infrastructures for peace, the link between top-down and bottom-up approaches and the extension of participatory and consultative processes are not a panacea to render UN support to peacebuilding in Mali more effective and harmonized. However, they present some opportunities to push ongoing efforts a bit further into grappling successfully with the enormous peacebuilding challenges that exist in the current context and pave the way for an eventual transition.
8 Annexes
Annex 1: Statement of Work

Statement of Work for (1) Team Leader/Peacebuilding Specialist and (2) Mali Specialist for Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Mali

The PBF has been engaged in Mali since 2014. As the five-year eligibility period comes to an end in 2019, the purpose of this evaluation is to assess PBF’s results achieved from 2014 and analyze the portfolio’s overall added value to peacebuilding in the country. The evaluation will be used for learning and accountability, and to contribute to the PBF’s decision-making regarding further engagement in Mali.

This Statement of Work (SoW) outlines the work to be undertaken by a Team Leader/Peacebuilding Specialist and Mali Specialist for a final evaluation of the Mali portfolio, including overall progress in achieving higher-level outcomes, progress of project-level outcomes towards higher-level outcomes, institutional arrangements among the implementing agencies as well as Government stakeholders, expenditure rates, and opportunities for learning.

I. BACKGROUND

The PBF, established in 2005 through General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645, supports the United Nations’ broader peacebuilding objectives in countries emerging out of conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict. It is intended to be a catalytic fund, driven by planning, coordination and monitoring mechanisms tailored to support the peacebuilding strategies of in-country United Nations and Government leadership. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is responsible for the overall management of the PBF under the authority of the Secretary-General; the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) is the Fund’s Administrative Agent.

PBF provides funding through two mechanisms, namely, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF). The IRF is the project-based financing mechanism created to address critical and urgent peacebuilding needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict or because of a dramatic change in the country situation. Up to $3 million can be approved by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support on behalf of the Secretary-General without a formal eligibility process for the country. The PRF is the programme-based financing mechanism created to provide medium-term financing for countries declared eligible for PBF funding by the Secretary-General. To be eligible, countries must have national Government commitment towards sustainable and inclusive peace. PRF funding is based on an elaboration of a strategic plan for peacebuilding, which supports national efforts at peacebuilding.

In Mali, the PBF has supported the implementation of the preliminary Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and subsequently the agreement of June 2015, filling a crucial gap through high-risk interventions in volatile environments. PBSO’s first grant in early 2014 responded to a direct appeal by the UN SRSG of MINUSMA who was looking for financial support for cantonment at a time when a full disarmament agreement had not yet been made. Later, in April, the Secretary-General declared Mali formally eligible to receive PBF support in the following priority areas: (1) national reconciliation; (2) security sector and the judiciary; (3) restoration of state authority and inclusive local governance; and (4) the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities.

Since 2014, PBF has allocated approximately $32 million in Mali through 18 projects. The first phase of projects (5), through an allocation of approximately $9.4 million, supported peace dividend activities in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. The interventions focused on delivering basic services and creating employment opportunities in conflict-affected areas. Most of these projects had a strong youth and gender
component and promoted community dialogue to foster social cohesion across the communities affected by the conflict. These projects were implemented from 2014-2017. Subsequently, in 2017, taking into consideration the risk of relapse into conflict and the worsening of the situation in central Mali, as a region situated between the north and the southern zones around Bamako, the Government counterparts and the international community decided to increase the intensity of their interventions in central Mali. As part of this strategy, the PBF approved a second phase of projects (4) in central Mali for approximately $8.6 million focused on local governance and community-based conflict resolution in Mopti and Ségou. These projects began implementation in early 2018 and are expected to continue through 2019. In addition to these 9 projects, the PBF has supported 9 other projects, with 6 having a focus on gender and/or youth initiatives. Please see Annex 1 for a list of the Mali portfolio.

The projects are implemented by UN agencies and civil society organizations, in close collaboration with MINUSMA, and overseen by a Steering Committee (SC), co-chaired by the UN (represented by the DSRSG/RC/HC) and the Government of Mali.

II. PURPOSE AND USE OF EVALUATION

After sustained PBF-engagement, this evaluation presents an excellent opportunity to assess the PBF’s achievements and overall added value to peacebuilding in Mali since 2014 in four broad areas, namely: 1) national reconciliation; 2) security sector and the judiciary; 3) restoration of state authority and inclusive local governance; and 4) reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities. A final, independent evaluation of the PBF’s investments in Mali is requested by the PBSO’s Senior Management. The evaluation will contribute to better understanding the effectiveness of the PBF’s strategic decision-making and overall learning on how the portfolio has contributed to overall peacebuilding results. Moreover, it will help inform decision-making on the appropriateness of any continued PBF-engagement beyond the current portfolio.

Hence, the purpose of this evaluation is to:

- assess to what extent the PBF envelope of support has made a concrete and sustained impact in terms of building and consolidating peace in Mali, either through direct action or through catalytic effects;
- assess how relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable the PBF support to Mali has been;
- identify the critical remaining peacebuilding gaps in Mali;
- assess whether the peacebuilding interventions supported by the PBF factored in gender equality;
- provide lessons for future PBF support internationally on key successes and challenges (both in terms of programming and management of the PBF funds); and
- serve as a useful evidence-based input for decision-making on any possible future support.

There are at least two main audiences for the evaluation, to whom the recommendations will be addressed: (i) the Mali PBF management team, including the Resident Coordinator’s Office and the SC; and (ii) the PBSO/PBF. The evaluation’s evidence, findings and recommendations on the peacebuilding results of the PBF-funded work in Mali will be useful for consideration and action by relevant actors, including the PBF staff, staff of the MPTFO, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), MINUSMA and national partners. They will also serve as relevant inputs to the PBF policies and guidance, and other reviews.

The outcome of the final evaluation will include a report that presents main findings and recommendations, as well as presentations to the PBF Senior Management and other stakeholders, as appropriate. The evaluation’s findings and recommendations will be used to inform actions to further strengthen key aspects of the PBF’s current and future work. The recommendations should be actionable.
and on how the PBF and its partners can improve their effectiveness. The final report will be a public document.

III. SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The evaluation will consider the overall performance of the PBF support covering the portfolio in Mali since 2014 with a focus on the package of projects supporting interventions in northern Mali (phase 1) and the subsequent package of projects supporting interventions in central Mali (phase 2). The scope of the evaluation can be broken down into the following three components:

A. Evaluation of impact of the PBF-portfolio of support to Mali since 2014

The evaluation will examine the effect of the portfolio funded by the PBF in order to assess the PBF’s overall contribution to the building and consolidation of peace in Mali since 2014. The evaluation questions to be answered are based on the evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards (including those on gender mainstreaming). While examples of questions are provided below, the Team Leader should further adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report.

Relevance:
- What was the relevance of the proposed theory of change for the total portfolio and the different outcome areas?
- How relevant was the portfolio to the needs of the parties including different communities and groups?
- How strong was the strategic anchorage of the PBF support and the individual projects in the national and United Nations frameworks for Mali?
- To what extent did the portfolio address the drivers and causes identified in the conflict analysis?
- To what extent did the portfolio respond to urgent funding needs and peacebuilding gaps?
- To what extent did the proposed theory of change for phase 2 take into account relevant changes since phase 1?
- To what extent did phase 2 take into account contextual changes, any updated conflict analysis, and lessons learned from phase 1?
- To what extent did phase 1 and phase 2 complement each other and have a strategic coherence?

Efficiency:
- How fast and responsive were the PBF-funded initiatives in supporting peacebuilding priorities in Mali?
- How efficient was the implementation of the PBF support through the projects, and how significant were the transaction costs?
- To what extent were the resources programmed in an efficient and strategic manner, including the selection of implementing partners?
- Overall, did the PBF investments provide value for money through the projects?
- To what extent were efficiencies gained in implementing phase 2 based on lessons learned from phase 1?

Effectiveness:
- To what extent did the portfolio and the individual projects achieve higher-level results in the outcome areas from the common results framework?
- To what extent did the PBF-funded initiatives take risks to achieve peacebuilding objectives, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so?  
- How strategic was the portfolio at seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact and creating catalytic effects?  
- To what extent did the projects achieve their intended outcomes?  
- To what extent did the projects complement each other and have a strategic coherence?  
- How effectively were risk factors and unintended effects assessed and managed throughout the PBF support to Mali (both in the portfolio and the individual projects)?  
- To what extent did phase 2 build upon the results from phase 1?  

Gender:  
- To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout the PBF support to Mali (both in the portfolio and the individual projects)?  
- To what extent did the PBF-funded initiatives help address women’s needs during the conflict and post-conflict period, and did the theory of change address gender equality?  
- To what extent did the portfolio and the individual projects support gender-responsive peacebuilding?  

Sustainability:  
- How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of the PBF support and continuing any unfinished activities?  
- What, if any, catalytic effects did the PBF support in Mali have (financial and non-financial)?

In addition to the overall assessment of the portfolio, the evaluation will assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the PBF’s contribution to each of the outcome areas as defined in the common results framework. The Inception Report should include key evaluations questions by each outcome area.

B. Evaluation of the PBF management and oversight structures in Mali

The evaluation will examine the management of the PBF support in order to comment on the overall relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of arrangements both in-country and between the PBSO/PBF and the UNCT and MINUSMA. This should include the funding, programming and decision-making arrangements between all the actors and the quality and inclusivity of national ownership of the processes. While examples of questions are provided below, the Team Leader should further adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report.

PBF/PBSO:  
- How effective was the support provided by the PBF/PBSO (including PBSO in New York and the PBF Secretariat) to the Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs) and Non-UN Organizations (NUNOs), the UNCT, MINUSMA, the SC and other stakeholders throughout the process (approval, design, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation)?  
- How transparent, effective and efficient was the PBF/PBSO in its decision-making?  
- How timely was the process of project approval? What were the main factors facilitating or delaying it?

Steering Committee (SC):  
- How suitable was the SC composition to its role and how did the SC evolve over time?  
- To what extent did civil society organizations participate in the SC, including women and youth organizations?
- How strong was the government leadership/ownership of the SC?
- How effective were the SC support bodies, if any?
- How strategic was the selection of projects to be supported and of RUNOs/NUNOs to implement them?
- How effective was the in-country oversight of the projects by the SC, including quality assurance of monitoring data and reports, and in providing support to the RUNOs/NUNOs to implement the projects?
- What kind of early warning/risk management systems were in place and how were they used?

Implementing RUNOs/NUNOs and United Nations Country Team (UNCT):
- What was the implementation capacity of the individual RUNOs/NUNOs and their implementing partners?
- How did different RUNOs/NUNOs work together towards common strategic objectives?
- What was the process for compiling half yearly and annual reviews and reports and what was the quality of those reports?
- How effectively did the RUNOs/NUNOs monitor and report against higher-level outcomes?
- How was gender considered throughout the project, including design, implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- Was adequate gender expertise available in the country team to support the integration of gender within the PBF supported interventions?
- How were the principles of Do No Harm integrated in day-to-day management and oversight?

C. Key lessons learned and recommendations

The evaluation should provide an overview of key lessons and recommendations based on the assessment of the PBF support to Mali since 2014. These should be addressed to PBSO as well as the management in Mali (SC and UNCT) and consider important entry points with key Governmental Ministries. Where possible, lessons should be made general and phrased in a way that can be used to strengthen future PBF programming in Mali and other countries. The lessons and recommendations should speak to:

- the main programming/implementation factors of success;
- the main programming/implementation challenges;
- the main administration factors of success;
- the main administration challenges; and
- the ways to address the main challenges.

The major lessons and recommendations should come out clearly in the evaluation Executive Summary.

IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The evaluation’s methodology should identify a range of data collection tools and ensure that both qualitative and quantitative methods are used appropriately in a mixed-methods approach. Data will be derived from primary and secondary sources. The evaluation will be summative, and will employ, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide and verify the substance of the findings. The Inception Report should outline a strong mixed-methods approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information. The evaluation team should review any theories of change that framed the programming logic of the portfolio and projects and, where necessary, propose suggestions for improving or strengthening existing theories of change or identify theories of change where they are absent.
PBSO encourages evaluations teams to employ innovative approaches to data collection and analysis. The methodologies for data collection may include without limitation:

- Desk review of key documents including: strategic UN and national documents, project documents, results frameworks, pertinent correspondence related to the initial allocation decision and subsequent project design and implementation, project reports, other information produced by RUNOs/NUNOs with respect to PBF-funded projects, and any previous evaluations and other reviews. Some of these documents will be supplied by PBSO and UNCT (others are available through the MPTFOGateway website).
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with major stakeholders in New York, including PBSO, MPTFO, and key United Nations agencies and CSOs implementing PBF support in Mali
- Systematic review of monitoring data from the RUNOs/NUNOs, the SC or other key sources of information
- On-site field visits, including direct observation of PBF-funded projects, where possible
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with all major stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in Mali (including the SC, United Nations agencies, CSOs implementing agencies, the Government, beneficiary institutions, a sample of individual beneficiaries, other development and peacebuilding partners). Beneficiaries should represent diverse groups, including women and youth from different ethnic groups. The Inception Report should clearly indicate how interview and focus group discussion data will be captured, coded and analyzed.
- Survey of key stakeholders, if relevant

Other methodologies to consider, as appropriate, include the development of case studies, cluster analysis, statistical analysis, social network analysis, etc. The evaluation team will produce a detailed methodological plan during the inception phase, specifying which methods will be used to answer which key evaluation questions.

V. EVALUATION PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS

The evaluation findings will be evidence based and following the evaluation standards from OECD-DAC and UNEG. PBSO will brief the evaluation team on quality standards.

VI. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS

The PBF evaluation staff will manage and oversee the evaluation process. Day-to-day work of the evaluation team and their logistics will be supported by the PBF, with assistance from the in-country management team and the UNCT. While evaluations are fully independent, a PBF staff may accompany the evaluation team during data collection for quality assurance.

An Evaluation Reference Group of key stakeholders will be created to provide the PBF with advice on key deliverables, including the Inception and Final Reports. The Evaluation Reference Group is likely to have members from the SC, key in-country stakeholders and the PBF. The PBF will approve each of the deliverables by the evaluation team, following internal quality assurance and consultation with the Evaluation Reference Group. The evaluation team is expected to work responsively with the Evaluation Reference Group, while still maintaining independence.
The evaluation team will prepare an Inception Report to further refine the evaluation questions and detail its methodological approach, including data collection instruments. The Inception Report must be approved by the PBSO prior to commencement of the evaluation team’s in-country data collection trip.

In addition, before leaving the field following in-country data collection, the evaluation team will schedule a presentation of preliminary findings with the SC and UNCT for their validation. A separate validation exercise may be scheduled with the PBSO and Evaluation Reference Group prior to the submission of the draft report.

The PBSO will retain the copyright over the evaluation. The final evaluation report will be made public following approval by the PBF and incorporating feedback from relevant stakeholders.

VII. DURATION

The evaluation team will consist of a Peacebuilding Specialist who will serve as the Team Leader, a Mali Specialist, a Senior Strategic Advisor and the PBF Evaluation Advisor. The Team Leader will be responsible for the overall quality and timely submission of all the deliverables.

The review is expected to take approximately 10 weeks with the schedule broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Expected Start</th>
<th>Expected Finish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Scoping: document review, teleconferences/meetings with New York stakeholders (e.g., PBSO, MPTFO, RUNOs/NUNOs, etc.), and write-up of Inception Report for PBF approval</td>
<td>January 2, 2019</td>
<td>January 22, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Data collection in Mali through discussions with key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, and site visits; plus validation workshop</td>
<td>January 23, 2019</td>
<td>February 13, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Analysis and presentation of draft report for PBF approval</td>
<td>Commence during Task 2</td>
<td>February 27, 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this period, the Team Leader will be expected to work approximately 65 days, including approximately 20 days on in-country data collection.

The Mali Specialist will be expected to work approximately 40 days, including approximately 20 days on in-country data collection.

VIII. DELIVERABLES

The Team Leader is responsible for the timely provision and quality of all evaluation deliverables. Their approval will be based on OECD-DAC and UNEG standards for evaluations, tailored for the specific purposes of peacebuilding evaluations.
The **Inception Report** will include:
- the evaluation team’s understanding of the SoW, any data or other concerns arising from the provided materials and initial meetings/interviews, and strategies for how to address perceived shortcomings;
- evaluation matrix including key evaluation questions and methodological tools for answering each question;
- list of key risks and risk management strategies for the evaluation;
- stakeholder analysis;
- proposed work plan for the field mission; and
- table of contents for the evaluation report.

The **Aide Memoire** to be presented to key stakeholders during the last week of in-country data collection, will include:
- a summary of the purpose of the evaluation;
- an overview of in-country data collection, including activities assessed and stakeholders consulted;
- an overview of preliminary results and recommendations; and
- an explanation of next steps.

The **Draft Report** will include an Executive Summary and all annexes (including individual project evaluation summaries). The Executive Summary, which can be used as a stand-alone document, will outline key results and recommendations. The Draft Report will be reviewed by the PBSO and the Evaluation Reference Group. PBSO will provide a consolidated matrix of comments which should be formally addressed in the Final Report.

The **Final Report** will be evidence-based and respond to the questions in the Inception Report with clear and succinct lessons learned and targeted recommendations. The evaluation team will be responsible for ensuring that comments from PBSO and the Reference Group are formally addressed. Recommendations should be actionable on how the PBF and its stakeholders can improve their effectiveness and/or modify their activities in the specific areas being evaluated, taking into consideration any changes in the peacebuilding context. The evaluation team will revise the draft as many times as necessary to receive approval of the Final Report by the PBSO, following the PBSO’s consultation with the Reference Group.

Following acceptance of the Final Report, PBSO will coordinate a management response as a separate document.

**IX. QUALIFICATIONS OF CONSULTANTS**

The Team Leader/Peacebuilding Specialist should possess the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:
- Postgraduate degree in a relevant area including social sciences, international development, conflict studies, public administration, research methods, or evaluation;
- At least seven years of post-conflict/peacebuilding experience, including experience in peacebuilding programming design, implementation and evaluation;
- Demonstrated understanding of conflict analysis, conflict drivers and post-conflict recovery;
- Demonstrating understanding of more than one of the following areas: national reconciliation; security sector and the judiciary; restoration of state authority and inclusive local governance; and/or reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities;
- Demonstrated understanding of gender issues and women and peacebuilding;
- Demonstrated familiarity with the United Nations and its agencies, funds and programmes;
- Ability to plan effectively, prioritize, complete tasks quickly, and adapt to changing contexts;
- Strong teamwork and management skills;
- Strong analytical skills, including with qualitative and quantitative research methods;
- Excellent written and oral communication skills, including in cross-cultural contexts; and
- Fluency in French and English.

The Mali Specialist should possess the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:
- University degree in a relevant field, including social sciences, history, conflict studies, etc.;
- At least five years of relevant work experience, including experience working in Mali;
- Excellent knowledge of Mali’s cultural, political and socio-economic context with a focus on post-conflict recovery;
- Knowledge of Mali’s governance institutions and existing contacts in those institutions, facilitating the team’s communication and analysis of the stakeholders/beneficiaries of the PBF programme;
- Understanding of more than one of the following areas in Mali: national reconciliation; security sector and the judiciary, restoration of state authority and inclusive governance; and/or reintegretion of refugees and internally displaced persons into their communities;
- Experience in research and analysis of data;
- Strong teamwork skills;
- Strong written and oral communication skills; and
- Fluency in French and English.

X. DUTY STATION

The consultants will be home-based and will be requested to travel (economy class) to Mali. Roundtrip airplane ticket and daily allowance for the overnights in Mali will be paid for by the PBF. If the Mali Specialist resides in Bamako, daily allowance will be paid for by the PBF for in-country data collection taking place outside of Bamako.
## ANNEX 1 (to the SoW): List of projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Approved budget</th>
<th>Delivery rate</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>RUNOs/ NUNOs</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Short description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-84: Confidence-building through Support to the Cantonment Process in Kidal</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>2,997,414.00</td>
<td>99.69%</td>
<td>21-Feb-14</td>
<td>30 Nov 2016</td>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>No-cost extension. This needs to be closed.</td>
<td>This project provides support to the ceasefire and stabilization process defined in the Ouagadougou provisional agreement including the mechanisms established (CSE, CTMS &amp; cantonment) to support the agreement implementation and monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-98: Soutien a la cellule d'Appui du Comite de Pilotage</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>325,815.00</td>
<td>101.53%</td>
<td>29-Oct-14</td>
<td>31 Mar 2017</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Secretariat project: Phase 1. IRF package. This needs to be closed.</td>
<td>Le projet vise a appuyer et renforcer le role du dispositif de gouvernance et institutionnel du Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix (Comite de Pilotage) a travers la mise en place d'une Cellule d'Appui qui fournira un appui en vue de la selection, approbation et de la mise en oeuvre des projets de consolidation de la paix au Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-101: Projet de l'eduction pour la consolidation de la paix au Nord du Mali</td>
<td>Operationally Closed</td>
<td>2,499,519.00</td>
<td>99.98%</td>
<td>17-Dec-14</td>
<td>30 Jun 2017</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Cost-extension. IRF package. Project evaluation (yes). This needs to be closed.</td>
<td>Projet de renforcement de la cohesion sociale dans les zones des regions de Gao et Tombouctou, touchees par le conflit arme, a travers l'amélioration de l'accès equitable a une éducation de qualité pour les enfants vulnerables et l'instauration de dialogues communautaires inclusifs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-102: Solutions pour la reintegration durable et pacifique des personnes deplaces internes (PDI) et des refugies rapatries dans les regions de Gao et de Tombouctou</td>
<td>Financially Closed</td>
<td>2,500,000.00</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>17-Dec-14</td>
<td>30 Jun 2016</td>
<td>IOM, UNHCR</td>
<td>IRF package.</td>
<td>L' objectif du projet est de consolider la paix dans le nord du Mali en s'assurant que les PDI retournes et les refugies rapatries dans les regions de Gao et Tombouctou jouissent a nouveau de leurs droits sociaux et economiques, de la liberte de mouvement et du respect de leur integrite physique, notamment par la mise en place de mecanismes pennettant leur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Approved budget</td>
<td>Delivery rate</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>RUNOs/NUNOs</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Short description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-105: Programme d'amélioration de l'accès des femmes victimes de violences sexuelles et bases sur le genre à la justice et la sécurité dans le processus de consolidation de la paix</td>
<td>Operationally Closed</td>
<td>1,498,310.00</td>
<td>97.07%</td>
<td>18-Dec-14</td>
<td>30 Jun 2017</td>
<td>UNFPA, UN WOMEN</td>
<td>GPI II. Cost-extensions (2). Treat it with IRF package. <strong>This needs to be closed.</strong></td>
<td>reintegration durable, et le renforcement de la cohabitation pacifique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-106: Appui au renforcement des capacités de résilience aux conflits des femmes et des jeunes dans les régions de Gao et Tombouctou</td>
<td>Operationally Closed</td>
<td>2,611,119.00</td>
<td>97.96%</td>
<td>18-Dec-14</td>
<td>31 Mar 2017</td>
<td>UNIDO, UNDP</td>
<td>Cost-extension. IRF package. <strong>Project evaluation (?). This needs to be closed.</strong></td>
<td>L'objectif général est de renforcer la réponse judiciaire en matière de violences sexuelles et bases sur le genre liées au conflit, d'améliorer l'accès des victimes aux services pour une meilleure protection de leurs droits et l'amélioration de la cohésion sociale. Le projet vise à influencer la mise en œuvre des normes et standards sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité dans le processus de consolidation de la paix en cours, notamment des mécanismes de justice transitionnelle et le processus de RSS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-146: De victimes a actrices de la paix: Renforcement de la participation des femmes dans la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paix</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
<td>40.43%</td>
<td>20-Oct-16</td>
<td>31 Mar 2018</td>
<td>UNFPA, UN WOMEN</td>
<td>GPI III. No-cost extension.</td>
<td>Le projet vise à soutenir la participation des femmes dans la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paix en tant que membres des mécanismes de gouvernance, bénéficiaires des dividendes de la Paix et actrices de réconciliation au niveau communautaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Approved budget</td>
<td>Delivery rate</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>RUNOs/ NUNOs</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Short description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en œuvre de l’accord de paix et l’amélioration de la cohésion sociale</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,319,337.00</td>
<td>68.48%</td>
<td>31-Mar-17</td>
<td>30 Apr 2020</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>GPI III. Project evaluation (?)</td>
<td>Ce projet vise à contribuer à la consolidation de la paix au Mali en assurant une plus grande participation des femmes dans le domaine de la sécurité et la gestion pacifique des conflits, et en renforçant la confiance entre femmes, et entre femmes et les Forces de défense et de sécurité dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao en particulier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-158: Femmes, Defense et Securite Participation des Femmes a la Reforme du Secteur de la securite et au renforcement de la confiance entre les populations et Forces de defense et de securite</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>800,000.00</td>
<td>91.47%</td>
<td>05-Apr-17</td>
<td>31-Oct-2018</td>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>YPI I.</td>
<td>Ce projet contribue à améliorer la participation des jeunes hommes et femmes à la construction de la paix, en leur donnant la possibilité de s’informer, de renforcer leurs connaissances et capacités, de se faire entendre, d’améliorer leurs conditions économiques et de s’engager dans le dialogue pacifique afin de diminuer les risques d’adhésions aux groupes extrémistes et favoriser la paix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-165: Appui aux Autorites Interimaires de Taoudenit et Menaka</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,000,022.00</td>
<td>32.45%</td>
<td>08-May-17</td>
<td>30 Nov 2018</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>No-cost extension.</td>
<td>Renforcer les capacités des autorités interimaires et agents des Collectivités Territoriales et appuyer la fourniture des services sociaux de base au profit des communautés dans les régions de Taoudenit et Menaka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Approved budget</td>
<td>Delivery rate</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>RUNOs/ NUNOs</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Short description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-182: Promotion de la securite communautaire et de la cohesion sociale dans la region Liptako-Gourma</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
<td>47.66%</td>
<td>13-Sep-17</td>
<td>31 Jan 2019</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Cross-border Initiative (Burkina, Mali, Niger).</td>
<td>Ce projet a pour objectif de promouvoir la securite communautaire et la cohesion sociale dans la region Liptako-Gourma (Mali, Niger et Burkina Faso).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-217: Peers for Peace building social cohesion in Mopti and Segou Regions</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>2,500,000.00</td>
<td>11.89%</td>
<td>09-Jan-18</td>
<td>30 Jun 2019</td>
<td>FAO, UNHCR, WFP</td>
<td>Phase 2.</td>
<td>This project aims to restore traditional conflict mediation mechanisms and unlock the social and economic capital of peers for peace in the regions of Mopti and Segou to build greater social cohesion and mitigate inter and intra-community conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-218: Projet de renforcement de la resilience securitaire et de la prevention des conflits inter-communautaires pour la cohesion sociale et la paix dans les Regions de Mopti et Segou</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>3,090,646.00</td>
<td>52.16%</td>
<td>09-Jan-18</td>
<td>30 Jun 2019</td>
<td>OHCHR, UNDP, UN WOMEN</td>
<td>Phase 2.</td>
<td>Contribuer a la restauration d'une paix inclusive et durable dans les Regions de Mopti et Segou.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-219: Les jeunes acteurs pour la Paix et la Reconciliation Nationale</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>2,626,790.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>09-Jan-18</td>
<td>30 Jun 2019</td>
<td>IOM, UNESCO, UNICEF</td>
<td>Phase 2.</td>
<td>Le projet est aligne sur la nouvelle strategie gouvernementale de mise en oeuvre de l'Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation nationale par la creation en 2017 de la Mission d'Appui a la Reconciliation Nationale (MARN) et ses Equipes regionales mises en place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-231: Cellule d'appui a la coordination des projets PBF au Mali</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>418,511.00</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
<td>10-Jan-18</td>
<td>30 Jun 2019</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Secretariat project; Phase 2.</td>
<td>Le projet vise a maintenir et renforcer le fonctionnement de la cellule d'appui du comite de pilotage des projets PBF au Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Approved budget</td>
<td>Delivery rate</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>RUNOs/ NUNOs</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Short description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-234: Engaging Youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,700,000.00</td>
<td>48.35%</td>
<td>07-Feb-18</td>
<td>30 Jun 2019</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>YPI II.</td>
<td>The overall goal of this project is to promote the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace accord through an inclusive, &quot;whole-of-community&quot; approach to conflict prevention, mitigation and management and a reduction of youth involvement in violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/MAL/D-1: Emplois et jeunes pour la paix– Approche pilote intégrée de stabilisation et de consolidation de la paix par la promotion de l’emploi et de la participation des jeunes dans la région de Mopti</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>2,933,387.00</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>04-Sep-18</td>
<td>31 Mar 2020</td>
<td>UN WOMEN, FAO, UNDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ce projet pilote un concept d’approche locale, intégrée, rapide et duplicable, centrée sur la valorisation du rôle positif des jeunes femmes et hommes dans la stabilisation et la consolidation de la paix, à travers leur autonomisation économique et sociale et leur participation active au sein de leurs communautés et dans les processus de gouvernance locale dans 2 cercles de la région de Mopti affectés par les conflits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF-260: Deuxième décennie pour la paix</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,500,000.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>15-Nov-18</td>
<td>15 May 2020</td>
<td>FAO, UNICEF</td>
<td>YPI III.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**  32,320,870.00  
Phase 1  9,434,763.00  
Phase 2  8,635,947.00  

The list of projects in the SoW of work is not up to date. Two projects are missing:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Project Code</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>PBF/IRF-291: Jeunes et paix: &quot;Une approche transfrontalière entre le Mali et le Burkina-Faso&quot;</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,650,000.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>02-Jan-19</td>
<td>30 Jun 2020</td>
<td>UNFPA, UNDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>PBF/IRF-299: Appui aux initiatives transfrontalières de dialogue communautaire et avec les acteurs du secteur de la sécurité et de la justice pour la consolidation de la paix au Mali et au Niger</td>
<td>On Going</td>
<td>1,746,253</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>22-Jan-19</td>
<td>30 Jun 2020</td>
<td>UNWomen UNODC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexe 2: Evaluation Matrix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>(Sub-)Questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Sample or Census</th>
<th>Data collection instrument</th>
<th>Data Analysis</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>How relevant were PBF supported interventions in Mali from 2014-2019?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1</td>
<td>What was the quality of conflict analysis undertaken as part of the project development?</td>
<td>Quality of conflict analysis on a scale from 1-10</td>
<td>Project documents and strategic framework</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Census of projects</td>
<td>Scoring Guide</td>
<td>Score project documents on a scale from 1-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 2</td>
<td>To what extent did the portfolio address key drivers of conflict?</td>
<td>Extent to which key drivers of conflict are addressed by the projects/portfolio</td>
<td>Conflict and Context Analyses done by internal and external actors</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Census of projects</td>
<td>Project Evaluation Matrix</td>
<td>Reconstructed Conflict Analysis for Phase 1, Phase 2 Measuring project conflict analysis against reconstructed conflict analysis</td>
<td>Disaggregating analysis for Phase 1, Phase 2, and GYPI projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 3</td>
<td>What was the relevance of the proposed theory of change for the total portfolio and individual projects?</td>
<td>Extent to which ToC tackles key drivers and convincingly proposes intervention addressing these factors</td>
<td>Project documents and reports</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Census of projects</td>
<td>Reconstruction/Description of Theory of Change at the portfolio and project level Identifying envisioned changes and approaches in regard to target groups in line with RPP distinctions</td>
<td>RPP-Matrix analysis and visualization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 4</td>
<td>How well did the PBF portfolio reflect national peacebuilding priorities and strategic frameworks?</td>
<td>Overlap between project/portfolio priorities with national priorities</td>
<td>Project documents National frameworks</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Census of projects</td>
<td>Project Evaluation Matrix</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 5</td>
<td>How well did the PBF portfolio reflect UN strategic frameworks and priorities in Mali?</td>
<td>Overlap between project/portfolio priorities with UN priorities</td>
<td>Project documents UN frameworks (UNDAF+, Mission mandates, UNISS etc.)</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Census of projects</td>
<td>Project Evaluation Matrix</td>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 6</td>
<td>How inclusive was the portfolio to the needs of the parties including different communities and groups?</td>
<td>Perceptions of inclusiveness by key stakeholders</td>
<td>1) Online Survey 2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Questions for online survey</td>
<td>1) Sample: Returned questionnaires 2) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
<td>1) Quantitative and qualitative analysis of survey 2) Qualitative analysis of interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70
1. What was the perception of key stakeholders of the relevance of the PBF portfolio?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of appreciation / perceived relevance of the PBF portfolio according to key stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Online survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interview(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Survey
2) Interview

1) Sample: Returned questionnaires
2) Sample: Available stakeholders

1) Questions for online survey
2) Guide for semi-structured key stakeholder interviews

1) Quantitative analysis of survey
2) Qualitative analysis of interviews

2. To what extent did phase 2 take into account contextual changes and lessons learned from phase 1?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which phase 2 built on phase 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key stakeholder interview(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key stakeholder interview(s)
Sample: Available stakeholders
Guide for semi-structured key stakeholder interviews
Qualitative analysis

2. How efficient were PBF-funded initiatives in supporting peacebuilding priorities in Mali?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of days between critical process steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC minutes MPTF info</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document analysis
Census of all projects
Guide for document analysis
Table: Date of a) Submission, b) Decision, c) Transfer
Time from initial project idea until transfer of funds

2. How do key stakeholders evaluate the responsiveness of PBF support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived responsiveness of PBF support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Online survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interview(s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Online survey
2) Key stakeholder interview(s)
Sample: Available stakeholders
Guide for semi-structured key stakeholder interviews
Qualitative analysis

2. How fast did RUNOs/NUNOs translate available resources into programming?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of budget implementation during 1st year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPTFO Data: expenditure by year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document analysis
Census of all projects
Project Evaluation Matrix
Calculate percentage of overall budget spent during first year
Disaggregated by RUNOs and NUNOs

2. How fast did RUNOs/NUNOs translate available resources into programming?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of budget implementation during 1st year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPTFO Data: expenditure by year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document analysis
Census of all projects
Project Evaluation Matrix
Budget analysis
| 2. 5 | How do key stakeholders gauge the appropriateness of transaction costs for obtaining and managing PBF-resources? | Perceptions of appropriateness of transaction costs | Key stakeholder interviews | Key stakeholder interviews | Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for semi-structured key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis of interviews |
| 2. 6 | Did the PBF investments provide value for money through the projects? | Number of beneficiaries in comparison to budget? | Project documents and reports | Document analysis | Census of all projects | Project Evaluation Matrix | Document analysis | Feasibility needs to be determined |
| 2. 7 | To what extent were efficiencies gained in implementing phase 2 based on lessons learned from phase 1? | Extent to which phase 2 built on phase 1 | Key stakeholder interviews | Key stakeholder interviews | Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for semi-structured key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |

### 3. To what extent did the PBF support during the first phase prove to be effective and contribute to higher level peacebuilding outcomes?

| 3. 1 | To what extent did the projects achieve their intended outcomes? | Extent to which outcomes were achieved by projects | Project documents and reports | Project evaluations – where available | Field date through observation, interviews and focus groups | Sample: Projects of first phase | 1) Project Evaluation Matrix | 2) Observation guide | 3) Interview and focus group guide |
| 3. 2 | To what extent did the portfolio achieve higher-level results in the outcome areas from the common results framework? | Level to which projects formulated and contributed to peacebuilding outcomes | Projects documents and reports | Project report | Perceptions survey SC Reports Interviws | Sample: Projects of first phase | 1) Project Evaluation Matrix | 2) Observation guide | 3) Interview and focus group guide |

1) Document analysis 2) Quantitative analysis 3) Qualitative analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.3</th>
<th>To what extent did the projects complement each other and create synergies?</th>
<th>Extent of connection between projects during implementation</th>
<th>Project documents and reports</th>
<th>Project evaluations – where available Field data through observation, interview s and focus groups</th>
<th>1) Document analysis 2) Observation 3) Interviews 4) Focus Groups</th>
<th>Sample: Projects of first phase</th>
<th>1) Project Evaluation Matrix 2) Observation guide 3) Interview and focus group guide</th>
<th>1) Document analysis 2) Quantitative analysis 3) Qualitative analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>To what extent did the PBF-funded initiatives take risks to achieve peacebuilding objectives?</td>
<td>Overview of risks in regard to geographic targeting (including security situation), thematic intervention or actors involved</td>
<td>1) Project documents 2) Online survey 3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Project documents 2) Online survey 3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Sample: Projects of first phase 2) Sample: Returned questionnaires 3) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
<td>1) Project Evaluation Matrix 2) Online survey questions 3) Guide for stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Document analysis 2) Quantitative analysis 3) Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>To what extent did the PBF invest in (geographic or thematic) areas deemed too risky by other donors.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Online survey 2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Online survey 2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Sample: Returned questionnaires 2) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
<td>1) Online survey questions 2) Guide for stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Quantitative analysis 2) Qualitative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>To what extent did the portfolio produce financial catalytic results?</td>
<td>Amount of additional $ mobilized by project (area) Percentage of projects that did produce financial catalytic results</td>
<td>1) Project reports 2) Staff interview s (online or in person) 3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Project reports 2) Staff survey 3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Sample: Projects of first phase 2) Sample: Returned questionnaires 3) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
<td>1) Project Evaluation Matrix 2) (Online) survey questions 3) Guide for stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>1) Document analysis 2) Quantitative analysis 3) Mostly quantitative analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. 7 To what extent did the portfolio achieve non-financial catalytic results?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of projects that did produce significant non-financial catalytic results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Staff interviews (online or in person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-financial catalytic results achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Staff survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Evaluation Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Sample: Projects of first phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Sample: Returned questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Project analysis
2) Quantitative analysis
3) Qualitative analysis

3. 8 How well were catalytic results envisioned at the design stage and during implementation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which catalytic results have been taken into consideration during planning and implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Project documents and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Staff interviews (online or in person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project evaluation matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Staff survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Evaluation Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Sample: Projects of first phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Sample: Returned questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Project analysis
2) Qualitative analysis
3) Quantitative analysis

3. 9 How effectively were risk factors and unintended effects assessed and managed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existence and functionality of risk management in practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Project documents and reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Online survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project evaluation matrix – where available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Online survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Evaluation Matrix (or only first phase projects?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Sample: Returned questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Sample: Available stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Project analysis
2) Quantitative analysis
3) Qualitative analysis

3. 10 Which (unintended) negative consequences, if any, did the projects produce?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project documents and reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Document analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Focus Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Evaluation Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Sample: Projects of first phase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Project analysis
2) Quantitative analysis
3) Qualitative analysis

4. How sustainable were results of the first phase?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1</th>
<th>To what extent did projects create self-sustainable structures that continue activities regardless of external support?</th>
<th>Examples of self-sustainable structures</th>
<th>Project documents and reports</th>
<th>1) Document analysis</th>
<th>Sample: Projects of first phase</th>
<th>1) Document analysis</th>
<th>2) Qualitative Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|   |   |   | Project evaluations – where available  
Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups | 2) Observation  
3) Interviews  
4) Focus Groups |   |   |   |   |
| 4.2 | How strong is the commitment of the Government to sustaining results of the PBF support and continuing any unfinished activities? | Inclusion of PBF project components in national policies, priorities, practices?  
Availability of state budget for previously PBF-funded activities | 1) Project reports and evaluations, where available  
2) Online survey  
3) Key stakeholder interviews | 1) Document analysis  
2) Online survey  
2) Key stakeholder interviews  
3) Sample: Projects of first phase | 1) Project Evaluation Matrix  
2) Online survey questions  
3) Guide for stakeholder interviews | 1) Document analysis  
2) Qualitative analysis  
3) Qualitative analysis |
| 4.3 | How strong is the commitment of donors/partner to build on results achieved by PBF supported intervention? | Inclusion of PBF project components in programs supported by other actors?  
Availability of donor budget for previously PBF-funded activities (see above: financial catalytic effects) | 1) Project reports and evaluations, where available  
2) Online survey  
3) Key stakeholder interviews | 1) Document analysis  
2) Online survey  
2) Key stakeholder interviews  
3) Sample: Projects of first phase | 1) Project Evaluation Matrix  
2) Online survey questions  
3) Guide for stakeholder interviews | 1) Document analysis  
2) Qualitative analysis  
3) Qualitative analysis |
| 5.1 | To what extent were gender considerations included at the level of individual projects and/or the portfolio-level? | Number of project documents that contain explicit gender considerations (and quality of these considerations) | Project documents, reports and evaluations where available | Document analysis | Census of all projects | Project Evaluation Matrix | 1) Document analysis  
2) Qualitative analysis  
3) Qualitative analysis |
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
5. How did projects address gender considerations during project implementation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent to which gender considerations were considered during project implementation</th>
<th>1) Online survey</th>
<th>1) Survey</th>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>2) Online survey questionnaires</td>
<td>2) Guide for stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>3) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>3) Focus group guide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. To what extent did PBF - projects of the first phase contribute to women empowerment and gender equality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution to women empowerment and gender equality</th>
<th>Extent of availability of sex disaggregated information</th>
<th>1) Document analysis</th>
<th>1) Sample: Projects of first phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project documents and reports</td>
<td>Project evaluations – where available Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>2) Observation</td>
<td>2) Observation guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Online survey</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>3) Intervi ws</td>
<td>3) Interview and focus group guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Online survey</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>4) Focus Groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. How effective was the contribution of PBSO?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available support from PBSO Appreciation of this support</th>
<th>1) Online survey</th>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. How effective was the support provided by PBSO in New York throughout the process (approval, design, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Online survey</th>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. How effective was the support provided by PBSO in New York throughout the process (approval, design, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Is the PBF Secretariat fit for purpose?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
<th>1) Online survey questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
<td>2) Key stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>3) Field data through observation, interviews and focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>How effective was the support provided by the PBF Secretariat/Cellule d’Appui in Bamako to the Steering Committee?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>How effective was the support provided by the PBF Secretariat/Cellule d’Appui in RNUOs/NUUNOs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>What was the added value of the perception surveys/communit y based monitoring during phase 1?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>How well positioned was the PBF Secretariat/Cellule d’Appui to bridge the peacebuilding work of MINUSMA and the UNCT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Is the Steering Committee (SC) fit for purpose?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8.1 | How suitable was the SC composition to its role and how did the SC evolve over time? | Composition of the SC (over time?) | 1) ToRs of SC  
2) Online survey  
3) Key stakeholder interviews with donors & senior UN management | 1) Census  
2) Sample: Returned questionnaires  
3) Sample: Available stakeholders | 1) Document analysis  
2) Online survey questions  
3) Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | 1) Document analysis  
2) Quantitative/qualitative analysis  
3) Qualitative analysis |
| 8.2 | To what extent did civil society organizations participate in the SC, including women and youth organizations? | % of women and youth in the SC  
% of representatives from women and youth organizations | Key stakeholder interviews  
Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |
| 8.3 | How strong was the government leadership/ownership of the SC? | Working methods of the SC  
Participation of government | Intervies with SC members and key stakeholders | Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |
| 8.4 | How strategic was the selection of projects to be supported and of RUNOs/NUNOs to implement them? | Factors considered during decision making | Key stakeholder interviews  
Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |
| 8.5 | How effective was the in-country oversight of the projects by the SC, including quality assurance of monitoring data and reports, and in providing support to the RUNOs/NUNOs to implement the projects? | Description of effectiveness of oversight role | Intervies with SC members and key stakeholders  
Key stakeholder interviews  
Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |
| 8.6 | What kind of early warning/risk management systems were in place and how were they used? | Description of early warning/risk management systems in place | Intervies with SC members and key stakeholders  
Key stakeholder interviews  
Sample: Available stakeholders | Guide for Key stakeholder interviews | Qualitative analysis |
| 9 | How effective were management and oversight by RUNOs/NUNOs? |  |  |  |  |
**9.1** How effectively did the RUNOs/NNOs monitor and report against higher-level outcomes?

- **Existence, quality and use of M&E plans**
  1) Project documents (M&E section) and M&E plans
  2) Staff interviews
- **1) Document Analysis**
  2) Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Census of all projects**
  2) Sample: Available stakeholders
- **1) Project Evaluation Matrix**
  2) Guide for Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Document analysis**
  2) Qualitative analysis

**9.2** How did different RUNOs/NUNOs work together towards common strategic objectives?

- **Extent and quality of cooperation between RUNOs (within in joint projects and across projects)**
  1) Project documents (M&E section) and M&E plans
  2) Staff interviews
- **1) Document Analysis**
  2) Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Census of all projects**
  2) Sample: Available stakeholders
- **1) Project Evaluation Matrix**
  2) Guide for Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Document analysis**
  2) Qualitative analysis

**9.3** How were the principles of Do No Harm integrated in day-to-day management and oversight?

- **Extent to which elements of conflict sensitivity were integrated in monitoring practices**
  1) Project documents (M&E section) and M&E plans
  2) Staff interviews
- **1) Document Analysis**
  2) Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Census of all projects**
  2) Sample: Available stakeholders
- **1) Project Evaluation Matrix**
  2) Guide for Key stakeholder interviews
- **1) Document analysis**
  2) Qualitative analysis

**10.1** How well did the collaboration between MINUSMA and UNCT work?

- **What formal coordination mechanisms exist to increase collaboration between MINUSMA and the UNCT in regard to sustaining peace?**
  - **Description of coordination mechanisms**
  - **Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Sample: Available stakeholders**
  - **Guide for Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Qualitative analysis**

**10.2** How effective are these existing coordination mechanisms?

- **Perceptions on the effectiveness of MINUSMA-UNCT coordination mechanisms**
  - **Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Sample: Available stakeholders**
  - **Guide for Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Qualitative analysis**

**10.3** Which role do PBF investments play to enhance the UN’s normative and coordinating legitimacy vis-à-vis other actors?

- **Extent to which PBF investments enhance legitimacy**
  - **Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Sample: Available stakeholders**
  - **Guide for Key stakeholder interviews**
  - **Qualitative analysis**
Annexe 3: Data Collection Tools
Guide d'entrevue semi-structurée (à adapter selon les besoins)

Date:
Personne(s) à interviewer: [nom, organisation, fonction]

Section 1 : Considérations stratégiques (pertinence)

1. Comment la décision de s'engager à travers des projets PBF au Mali a-t-elle été prise ?
   • Premier projet IRF (Cantonnement et premier paquet IRF ?
   • Deuxième paquet IRF ?
2. Quelles étaient les analyses et évaluations sur lesquelles ces décisions ont été fondées ? Quels ont été les critères de décision des interventions à financer ? Quelles étaient les raisons pour lesquelles on a renoncé à un cadre de résultats global pour la phase 2 ?
3. Est-ce que tu pourrais décrire les rôles des différents acteurs dans le processus (PBSO, MINUSMA, UNCT, Gouvernement, OSC, autres) ? Comment caractérise-toi le niveau global d'appropriation nationale ?
4. Quels sont, selon toi, les principaux avantages et défis du choix de s'engager sous la forme d'un paquet IRF ?
5. Dans quelle mesure le paquet IRF a-t-il reflété les priorités stratégiques de l'ONU (UNDAF, MINUSMA) et du gouvernement du Mali à l'époque ?

Section 2 : Élaboration des projets

6. Comment s'est déroulé le processus d'élaboration des projets ? Quels ont été certains des succès et des défis au cours de cette phase ?
7. Quel type de soutien a été fourni pendant cette étape ? Était-ce suffisant et où avez-vous détecté des lacunes ? [Interpeace, PBSO]
8. Comment évaluez-vous la qualité des projets ? Y en a-t-il qui se sont distingués positivement ou négativement en termes de design ?
11. Dans quelle mesure les considérations de genre ont-elles été bien intégrées dans les projets ? En ce qui concerne les équipes de projet, les groupes cibles, les bénéficiaires, etc.
Section 3 : Efficacité

12. Comment décririez-vous la mise en œuvre des projets du point de vue de l'efficacité ? Quels ont été les principaux défis de la mise en œuvre ?
14. Comment se déroule le processus de suivi ? Connaissiez-vous des cas où les projets ont adapté leur approche au cours de la mise en œuvre ? Comment ces décisions ont-elles été prises ? Sur quels critères ces décisions étaient-elles fondées ?
15. Comment évaluez-vous l'optimisation des ressources de ces projets selon vous ?

Section 4 : Impact, efficacité et durabilité

16. Quelles sont, selon vous, les principales contributions des interventions soutenu par le PBF à la consolidation de la paix au Mali ?
17. Dans quelle mesure des systèmes d'alerte précoce et de gestion des risques étaient-ils en place et utilisés ? Connaissiez-vous des conséquences négatives non-attendues des interventions soutenues par le PBF ?
18. Selon vous, dans quelle mesure les contributions à la consolidation de la paix obtenues en particulier par la première phase des projets sont-elles durables ? Quels sont les facteurs critiques qui ont contribué à la durabilité ?
19. Pouvez-vous donner des exemples d'effets catalytiques financiers des projets PBF ?
20. Rétrospectivement, dans quelle mesure vois-tu la pertinence des décisions stratégiques qui ont été prises par rapport à l'orientation géographique et thématique (pour la première phase/la deuxième phase ? Voyez-vous des lacunes politiques/stratégiques qui auraient dû être comblées ?

Section 5 : Gestion

21. Comment la gestion du portefeuille des projets PBF a-t-elle été organisée ?
22. Comment caractériserez-vous l'efficacité du Comité de Pilotage ? Comment évaluez-vous le degré d'appropriation de la surveillance par le Comité directeur ?
23. Est-ce tu pourrais décrire le rôle du Secrétariat PBF/Cellule d’appui plus en détail. Quels sont les forces et les faiblesses ?
24. Comment évaluez-vous la collaboration entre la MINUSMA et l'équipe de pays des Nations Unies ?
25. Quelles sont vos recommandations pour l'amélioration des processus de gestion et de contrôle ?
Section 6 : Résumé et voie à suivre

26. En résumé, comment vous décrivez la valeur ajoutée de l'engagement du projet PBA au Mali ?

27. Quelles sont, selon vous, les leçons les plus importantes à tirer de l'expérience pour les futurs programmes de consolidation de la paix au Mali et au-delà ?
Sondage en ligne

Introduction

Le Bureau d'appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix à New York a commandité une évaluation indépendante des investissements faits par le Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix (PBF) au Mali depuis 2014.

Nous vous saurions gré de bien vouloir participer à ce bref sondage en ligne, qui ne vous prendra que 15 minutes. Vos observations seront fort utiles pour avoir une compréhension équilibrée du portefeuille du PBF au Mali et aider à formuler des recommandations pour le futur soutien du PBF au Mali.

Veuillez noter que les résultats de ce sondage ne seront accessibles qu'à l'équipe d'évaluation.

Merci d’avance.

Pour plus d'informations consultez: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fr/fund

1. Comment évaluez-vous votre connaissance du portefeuille du projet PBF au Mali?

2. Veuillez inclure s'il-vous-plait votre Prénom et Nom, Organisation et Fonction

(Vos informations personnelles, seulement nécessaires pour bien comprendre vos réponses, resteront confidentielles. Comme indiqué précédemment, vos réponses ne seront accessibles qu'à l'équipe d'évaluation.)

3. J'ai…

... participé à la conception d'un projet PBF
... été impliqué(e) dans la mise en œuvre d'un projet PBF
... participé à l'orientation stratégique du portefeuille du projet PBF, p. ex. à travers le Comité de Pilotage

4. Dans quelles années étiez-vous impliqué(e) dans le portefeuille du PBF au Mali?

5. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les projets du PBF ont répondu aux défis de la consolidation de la paix au Mali?

6. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les projets PBF reflètent-ils les priorités et les cadres stratégiques nationaux en matière de consolidation de la paix?

7. Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les projets PBF correspondaient-ils aux cadres stratégiques des Nations Unies et aux priorités en matière de consolidation de la paix?

8. Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous que les projets PBF sont inclusifs?

9. Quels groupes/communautés ont été (potentiellement) négligés dans la conception et mise en œuvre du portefeuille des projets PBF?

10. Rétrospectivement, pouvez-vous identifier des défis importants en matière de consolidation de la paix qui n'ont pas été abordés par les projets PBF? Lesquels?

11. Pensez-vous que le PBF est un instrument de financement qui soutient les priorités de consolidation de la paix d'une manière rapide et flexible?

12. Veuillez donner un exemple:

13. Que suggérieriez-vous pour améliorer (d'avantage) la réactivité du PBF?
14. Comment évaluez-vous les risques pris par les projets PBF?

15. Le PBF a-t-il investi dans des domaines dans lesquels d'autres bailleurs n'ont pas investi?

16. Veuillez donner une exemple:

17. Connaissez-vous des investissements du PBF qui ont donné lieu à un financement supplémentaire de la part du gouvernement ou d'autres bailleurs?

18. Veuillez donner un exemple (en précisant le projet, le bailleur et le montant)

19. Est-ce que d'autres acteurs se sont engagés à continuer ou à intégrer les activités soutenues par le PBF dans leurs programmes? (par exemple le Gouvernement du Mali, bailleurs de fonds, ONGs etc.)

20. Veuillez préciser qui, quand et comment

21. Quel soutien a été fourni par le Bureau d'appui à la consolidation à la paix (PBSO) à New York (à vous ou aux autres acteurs)?
   - Aucun soutien n'a été fourni
   - Information sur des modalités et possibilités de financement par le PBF
   - Facilitation des analyses des conflits
   - Information sur la consolidation de la paix
   - Appui à l'élaboration des projets
   - Information sur les Agendas Femmes/Jeunes, paix et sécurité
   - Appui technique en matière de suivi et évaluation
   - Formation
   - Mobilisation des ressources

22. Comment évaluez-vous la qualité de ce soutien?

23. Quel type de soutien le Bureau d'appui à la consolidation à la paix (PBSO) à New York vous a-t-il fait défaut /voudriez-vous voir amélioré en termes de quantité ou de qualité dans l’avenir?

24. Quel soutien a été apporté par la Cellule d'Appui de Bamako (à vous ou aux autres acteurs)?
   - Aucun soutien n'a été fourni
   - Appui technique et administratif au Comité de pilotage
   - Information sur des modalités et possibilités de financement par le PBF
   - Facilitation des analyses des conflits
   - Information sur la consolidation de la paix
   - Appui à l’élaboration des projets
   - Information sur les Agendas Femmes/Jeunes, paix et sécurité
   - Appui technique en matière de suivi et évaluation
   - Formation
   - Mobilisation des ressources
   - Communication

25. Comment évaluez-vous la qualité de ce soutien de la Cellule d'appui à Bamako?
26. Quel type de soutien vous a-t-il fait défaut / voudriez-vous voir amélioré en termes de quantité ou de qualité dans l’avenir?

27. Quelle est, selon vous, la valeur ajoutée du soutien fourni par le PBF au Mali?

28. Quelles sont vos recommandations pour améliorer le soutien futur du PBF au Mali, y inclus la distribution et la gestion de ces ressources ?

29. S'il-vous plaît, veuillez partager votre adresse email pour que l’équipe d’évaluation puisse vous contacter ultérieurement en cas de besoin d’information complémentaire. Elle servira également pour partager le rapport final avec vous.
## Annexe 4 : Team Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Members</th>
<th>Primary Role</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salif Nimaga</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>Coordinate evaluation process and lead team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct Desk Review and scoping calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Inception Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lead in-country data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lead presentation of Aide Memoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Draft Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Review and finalize Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amagoin Keita</td>
<td>National Expert</td>
<td>Conduct desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to Inception Report, focusing on areas of specialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participate as National Expert during in-country data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to presentation of Aide Memoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to drafting of Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Petrie</td>
<td>Strategic Advisor</td>
<td>Contribute to Inception Report, focusing on areas of specialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participate as Strategic Advisor during final part of in-country data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to presentation of Aide Memoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to drafting of Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yun Jae Chun</td>
<td>PBF Evaluation Advisor</td>
<td>Advise on evaluation methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contribute to Inception Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>