United Nations | UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement

The Humanitarian-Peace Nexus

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UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement

About the High-Level Panel

The High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement was established by the UN Secretary-General to find concrete solutions to internal displacement. The High-Level Panel will work to increase global attention on internal displacement, while developing concrete recommendations for Member States, the United Nations system and other relevant stakeholders. The Panel will build on ongoing efforts related to internal displacement by Member States and relevant stakeholders within the humanitarian, development, and peace communities. The Panel's report is expected to identify innovative and concrete recommendations to better prevent, respond, and achieve solutions to internal displacement.

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Humanitarian response, sustainable development, and sustaining peace are "three sides of the same triangle", UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in his inaugural speech to the General Assembly in 2016, reinforcing the so-called triple nexus as the dominant orthodoxy for the aid sector. New Humanitarian

While there is a 30-year history of efforts to increase collaboration between humanitarian and development actors, the idea of strengthening relations between humanitarians and peace actors has only surfaced on the international agenda in the last five years or so. The concept of the 'triple nexus' seems to date from both the twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace in the UN Security Council and General Assembly and the Secretary General's inaugural speech in 2016.[1] They both emphasized the significance of insecurity as a driver of vulnerability and called for the development, peace and security, and human rights pillars to work together to prioritize prevention, address root causes and support institutions for sustainable peace and development. This came to be known as the HDPN (humanitarian-development-peace nexus) or 'triple nexus' and the concept has become something of a mantra, given a major boost by a spate of publications,[2] largely from the humanitarian community,[3] and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the triple nexus.[4]

This short background paper is intended to give the High-Level Panel an overview of current thinking about the triple nexus – and specifically on collaboration between peace and humanitarian actors -- and to suggest some possible directions the Panel may want to take in developing its recommendations. It is based on a review of written literature on the triple nexus, a limited number of interviews with actors working in the field and on a roundtable discussion organized by the Stimson Center in June 2020 with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding experts. This paper does not specifically address the development-peace nexus although the engagement of development actors with issues such as governance and rule of law might yield more opportunities for strengthened collaboration.[5]

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[1] United Nations General Assembly, Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. 2016. https://undocs.org/A/RES/70/262
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2282 (2016). 2016.

[2] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2282.pdf

[3] See for example: Mariana Caparini and Anders Reagan, "Connecting the dots on the triple nexus." SIPRI, 29 November 2019. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/connecting-dots-triple-nexus#:~:text=The%20concept%20'triple%20nexus'%20is,and%20move%20towards%20sustainable%20peace. Marc DuBois, *The Triple Nexus – threat or opportunity for the humanitarian principles.* Center for Humanitarian Action, May 2020. https://www.chaberlin.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2020-05-discussionpaper-triple-nexus-threat-opportunity-humanitarian-principles-dubois-1.pdf Center on International Cooperation, *The Triple Nexus in Practice*, Dec 2019. Synopsis. https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/triple-nexus-in-practice-brochure-december-2019-final.pdf; FAO, NRC and UNDP, *Financing the Nexus: Gaps and Opportunities from a Field Perspective.* 2019 (?) https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf; Perret, Liam, *Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus: Lessons from Colombia Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey*. International Organization for Migration. 2019. https://publications.iom.int/books/operationalizing-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-lessons-colombia-mali-nigeria-somalia

[4] OECD, DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. OECD/Legal/5019. 2020. https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf

[5] For example, the World Bank's work on Fragility, Conflict and Violence, while not explicitly referencing internal displacement, strives to address the causes of conflict in its development work and calls for greater collaboration between humanitarian, development and peace and security actors. Fragility, Conflict and Violence Overview (worldbank.org)

Introduction

To begin with the obvious: conflict is a main driver of internal displacement. The resolution of conflicts is needed for IDPs to find durable solutions, and durable solutions for IDPs are necessary for consolidation of peace. Or to put it in negative terms, without peace, it is difficult for IDPs to find durable solutions and without durable solutions for IDPs, it is difficult for peace to be sustained. While the relationship is clear, the fact is that different actors are responsible for ending conflicts, consolidating peace and supporting IDPs. Both preventing and ending conflicts – peacemaking – falls largely in the domain of political leaders, while humanitarian actors are largely responsible for protecting and assisting IDPs and at least in the past, have been expected to facilitate solutions for IDPs. This seems to hold true at both the national level – where different ministries are usually responsible for humanitarian aid and for conflict-resolution – and at the international level. Similarly, the process of sustaining peace – whether through peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding initiatives or transitional justice mechanisms – is usually led by different actors than those working with IDPs.

Over the years and continuing to the present, there has been considerable resistance from some humanitarian actors towards becoming more involved in preventing conflict and violence as well as resolving and consolidating peace. In large measure, this resistance is due to a fear that humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality will be compromised by their engagement in political actions necessary to prevent and resolve conflicts. This resistance was brought sharply into focus in the early 2000s over the issue of UN integrated missions which were "designed to streamline UN efforts to ensure that the objectives of all UN forces and agencies are channeled towards a common overarching goal."[6] Humanitarians tried to insist on the need for independent humanitarian action, even while recognizing the need for joined-up action to support peace.[7] When humanitarian aid is given in support of political objectives – even noble political objectives of ending conflicts – humanitarians may no longer be seen as independent and impartial, but rather aligned with political actors in ways that might limit their access to people in need. While integrated missions have gone ahead, similar issues are now surfacing with respect to the peace-humanitarian nexus. Indeed, the tension over humanitarian principles is probably the greatest impediment to increased collaboration between humanitarian and peace actors.

A recent IOM publication contrasts two interpretations of how humanitarian principles can be dealt with in humanitarian-peace and security collaboration. A 'distinct but complementary' approach emphasizes the need for independent humanitarian action in order to safeguard humanitarian principles. The 'merged but principled' approach emphasizes that humanitarian action should support broader objectives such as the Sustainable Development Goals and breakdown the siloes which currently exist.[8]

The issue of the humanitarian-peace nexus is of vital importance to humanitarian donors. As the DAC recommendation points out, today, 90 percent of humanitarian aid goes to protracted crises. Donors are asked to fund humanitarian operations year after year, and it is not unusual for humanitarian programs to run for decades as in Sudan and Colombia. Some government donors are asking for more effort to resolve and sustain peace as a way of reducing both the suffering of individuals in protracted displacement and reducing their own financial burden.

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[6] Erin A. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative.* Kofi Annan International Peace Training Center, Monograph No, 4, June 2006, p. 5. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1EE897418FD9945CC12571CE003EB9F8-KAIPTC-Jun2006.pdf

[7] For an overview of these discussions, see Erin Weir, *Ibid.;* Emilie Combaz, *The Impact of Integrated Missions on Humanitarian Operations.* GSDRC. 2013. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq939.pdf. Also see the various country analyses carried out by the Overseas Development Institute, 2011-2014. https://www.odi.org/events/2660-search-coherence-un-integrated-missions-and-humanitarian-space

[8] Perret 2019, op cit, p.1.

Research shows that prolonged humanitarian aid can extend crises, diminish IDPs' coping strategies, encourage dependency and contribute to grievances by both IDPs and host populations.[9]

While finding durable solutions for IDPs would reduce the negative impacts of protracted displacement on IDPs, host governments, and donors, it is also important for consolidating the peace. A study by SIPRI reminds us that one-third of peace agreements fail within five years.[10] The presence of large numbers of displaced people unable to return or settle permanently in other parts of the country – particularly when they have grievances -- can be a source of instability.[11]

While the relationship between peace and displacement is clear, implementing the triple nexus is difficult for many reasons.

Challenge Number 1. Who are the peace actors?

The peace and security landscape is complicated, and it is difficult to single out who the peace actors are in order to strengthen their collaboration with humanitarian and development agencies. Peace and security actors include: state armed forces, non-state armed actors, UN and regional peace support operations, stabilization actors, police, mediators (including international organization mediators, state mediators and private diplomacy mediators), peacebuilding agencies and transitional justice mechanisms (such as truth and reconciliation commissions and reparations/compensation initiatives.) All of these types of actors have their own mandates, histories, budgets, accountability mechanisms and often their own distinct analyses of the causes of specific conflicts. While there are normally some operational coordination mechanisms in peacekeeping settings, there are few strategic initiatives for coordinating the work of peace and security actors and humanitarian actors.

While peace and security actors are often grouped together, there are important differences. A state security force that is actively engage din armed conflict would require a completely different type of engagement than a UN-mandated peacekeeping operation or a UN peacebuilding initiative or an NGO focused on conflict-resolution.

Of all the humanitarian actors, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement probably has the most experience in working with armed forces (both state and non-state)[12] to provide humanitarian aid, and there is substantial literature on humanitarian diplomacy in which humanitarian actors interact with armed actors to secure access to affected populations.[13] But this humanitarian diplomacy has not focused on solutions to displacement.

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[9] See for example, Jonathan Papoulidis, "Fixing fragility: why it's time to rewrite the rulebook," *The New Humanitarian*, 10 April 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/04/10/fixing-fragility-why-it-s-time-rewrite-rulebook. Mercy Corps, World Vision, Search for Common Ground and Fond Social de la Republique Democratique du Congo *Assessing the Humanitarian Response to Chronic Crisis in North Kivu,* October 2014. https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/MercyCorps_DRC_AssessingHumanitarianResponseNorthKivu_2014.pdf

[10] Caparini and Reagan 2019 op cit.

[11] Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, *Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peacebuilding*. Brookings Institution, 2007. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2007_peaceprocesses.pdf

[12] See for example, ICRC, *Roots of Restraint in War* 2020 which identifies differences in armed actors and explores the implications of these differences for humanitarian action https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4352-roots-restraint-war which

[13] For background and an overview of these initiatives, see Antonio DeLauri, *Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*. Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Brief No. 2018: 4) 2018. https://www.cmi.no/publications/6536-humanitarian-diplomacy-a-new-research-agenda Also see: Philippe Regnier "The emerging concept of humanitarian diplomacy: identification of a community of practice and prospects for international recognition." *International Review of the Red Cross,* vol. 93, no, 884, December 2011. https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-884-reginier.pdf

Challenge Number 2. Conflicts are different.

Conflicts take many different forms and each conflict engages different peace and security actors -- a factor which impacts possibilities for enhancing collaboration with humanitarian actors. When there is a peacekeeping operation (PKO), for example, there are different channels of communication open with other UN agencies than when there isn't a PKO. Similarly, there are different phases of conflicts which impact both humanitarian and peace and security actors. For example, there are frozen conflicts with protracted displacement (e.g. Georgia, Azerbaijan); conflicts which continue to 'simmer' after peace agreements have been signed (e.g. Colombia); long-standing continuing conflicts with protracted displacement and peacekeeping missions (e.g. Darfur, DRC); more recent conflicts with displacement and peacekeeping missions (e.g. South Sudan, Mali); conflicts which seem to be winding down where stabilization missions are active (e.g. Iraq); and conflicts with both stabilization missions and peacekeeping operations (Mali). There are also conflicts, such as Syria, Myanmar and Yemen with widespread displacement but little (or as yet ineffective) international involvement in resolving the conflict. In each of these cases, the possibilities for humanitarian-peace/security collaboration differ. There is no one size fits all approach on how humanitarian and peace & security actors can and should interact.

Challenge Number 3. Fundamental differences in missions and expectations

Humanitarian and peace/security actors have different missions and different expectations about the nature of collaboration. While in the long-run these missions should converge – everyone wants peace and security in a given conflict, even if their reasons are different – in the short term, these different missions and different approaches complicate prospects for collaboration. As noted above, humanitarian agencies are often reluctant to work too closely with military actors for fear of being perceived as part of military operations. This is perhaps most starkly illustrated by the role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan in the early 2000s.[14]

At a minimum, humanitarian agencies should 'do no harm' to peace processes[15] and, at a minimum, peace and security actors should 'do no harm' to humanitarian efforts to save lives. While this sounds pretty basic, the fact is that humanitarian aid is an economic resource and often provokes conflict around its allocation. If there is a perception that aid is being distributed unequally, community tensions may increase. For example, UNHCR's policy of giving returning Somali refugees a cash grant reflected pressures from the Kenyan government, but by giving these grants (equivalent to an average year's income for Somalis), tension increased between the returnees and those who remained in Somalia during the conflict. There is a wealth of data on the negative impact that humanitarian and development actors have on local processes of trust, social cohesion and self-reliance.[16] At a minimum, then, humanitarian actors should not increase the difficulties in reaching peace agreements.

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[14] See US Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq.* 2008. https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0986r.pdf; Jaroslav Petrik, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: securitizing aid through developmentalizing the military." In S. Brown and J. Gravingholtz, *The Securitizing of Aid.* Palgrve Macmillan 2016. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-137-56882-3_8. Ariella Viehe, Jasmine Afshar and Tamama Heela, *Rethinking the Civilian Surge: Lessons from the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanisan.* December 2015. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/14082221/CiviliansAfghanistan-reportFINAL.pdf

[15] OECD 2020, op cit.

[16] See for example: Roisin Hinds, "Relationship between humanitarian and development aid." GSDRC, February 2015. http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/hdq1185.pdf
Monica de Castellarnau and Velina Stoianova, "Bridging The Emergency Gap." Médecins Sans Frontieres, April 2018. https://arhp.msf.es/sites/default/files/BRIDGING-THE-EMERGENCY-GAP-FULL-REPORT.pdf

Challenge number 4. How to engage IDPs in working for peace

IDPs are not a homogenous group. They have a diverse set of interests, which means that they can be agents for peace but also spoilers in peace negotiations.[17] Often – perhaps usually -- IDPs don't have a seat at the table in peace negotiations and their views may not sufficiently be included in efforts to find durable solutions. IDPs should be recognized as political actors and stakeholders, with discrete interests, rather than solely as victims. In that regard, there are some good examples of ways that IDPs have been included in peace processes; for example, Colombian IDPs' concerns were fed directly into peace negotiations between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) through a series of consultations. IDPs often need support to meet with each other and formulate common positions.

Challenge number 5. Financing mechanisms are often siloed.

While the volume of humanitarian aid almost doubled between 2010 and 2017, development and peacebuilding funds have remained fairly flat.[18] Peacekeeping operations face serious financial constraints, and cost-cutting measures often impact the civilian components of peacekeeping.[19] Most donors have separate funding mechanisms for peace and humanitarian operations. In spite of long-standing calls for more flexible, multi-year, joined-up funding, there are few examples of donors shifting their behavior to support the nexus.[20]

Possibilities for Collaboration

The following sections look at some areas where there are possibilities for more collaboration between humanitarian and peace and security actors with a particular focus on durable solutions. Of course, there is an overarching concern with preventing displacement in the first place, and this is also an area where peace and security actors are usually in the lead. As the issue of prevention is considered in another HLP workstream, this important issue is not addressed here. Rather, this section looks at IDPs and peace processes (working towards agreements) and the various ways that peace and security actors are – or can be – engaged with IDPs during displacement and in resolving conflicts. At the same time, resolving conflicts does prevent future or recurring displacement.

IDPs and peace processes

The way in which conflicts are resolved and specific provisions contained in peace agreements are of vital and direct concern to IDPs. Most directly, peace agreements can contain commitments to uphold the rights of IDPs and to resolve displacement (as in the case of the Dayton peace agreement which affirmed the right of all displaced people to return to their homes). However, many other measures – such as procedures for demobilization of combatants, land reform, security sector reform, compensation for losses and other transitional justice mechanisms – are of deep concern to IDPs. Traditionally, negotiations around peace agreements have a small number of negotiators,

[17] Brookings-Bern Project 2007, op cit. Gerard McHugh, *Integrating Internal Displacement in Peace Processes and Peace Agreements,* Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and US Institute for Peace. 2010. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/USIP_PMT_Bern_IDP.pdf

[18] Louise Redvers and Ben Parker, "Searching for the nexus: it's all about the money." *The New Humanitarian*, 3 December 2019. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/special-report/2019/12/3/triple-nexus-aid-development-humanitarian-donors-cooperation Also see FAO, NRC and UNDP 2019 op cit.

[19] Wasim Mir, "Financing UN Peacekeeping: avoiding another crisis." *International Peace Institute*, April 2019. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/1904_Financing-UN-Peacekeeping.pdf

[20] See Sarah Dalrymple and Sophia Swithern, *Key Questions and Considerations for Donors at the Triple Nexus: Lessons from UK and Sweden.* Development Initiatives, 11 December 2019. https://devinit.org/resources/questions-considerations-donors-triple-nexus-uk-sweden/#downloads

primarily armed parties, and have been kept confidential. Consequently, there is not much room for either IDPs or humanitarian agencies to sit directly in the room when peace agreements are hammered out. But there are a number of alternative consultation formats, allowing IDPs to participate in peace talks without sitting directly at the table. Gerard McHugh's suggestions are uniquely helpful in this regard, noting for example that mediators can meet with IDPs outside of the negotiating room and feed their concerns into the process.[21] These models have gained traction in recent years as a result of a growing commitment to "inclusivity" in mediation.[22] There is also the potential for Track two dialogues between IDPs as part of peacebuilding efforts.

There are some examples where IDPs have been consulted or included in peace negotiations. As noted above, there was an extensive process of consultations and track 2 involvement of IDPs in Colombia in the leadup to the peace agreement between the government and the FARC. Sometimes, as in Darfur, there were efforts to mobilize stakeholder input into peace processes. Although these processes were flawed, they point to a willingness to engage with civil society organizations, including IDPs, in the peacemaking process.[23]

There are also cases where existing negotiation formats intended to resolve conflicts can be used to take up issues of concern to IDPs, including questions of humanitarian access to IDPs. Thus the Trilateral Contact Group (based in Minsk) dealing with the conflict in and around Ukraine has a working group on humanitarian issues which has been able, on occasion, to weigh in on humanitarian/displacement issues. Similarly the Humanitarian Task Force set up by the UN Envoy on Syria (co-chaired by the UN, the US and Russia) has occasionally dealt with issues of concern to IDPs.

Humanitarian diplomacy, where humanitarian actors negotiate with military/political actors over issues of access and assistance, may serve as a confidence-building measure for supporting ongoing negotiations to resolve conflicts. For example, UNICEF has successfully negotiated ceasefires or 'days of tranquility' to enable children to be vaccinated.[24]

Peace & security actors in responding to displacement

In 1999, the UN Security Council explicitly added protection of civilians (POC) to its agenda through Resolution 1265, and later that same year it tasked the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone with the first explicit mandate to protect civilians from the threat of violence. Since then, the Security Council has adopted many resolutions on protection of civilians.[25] Its initial focus was on 3 groups seen as particularly vulnerable: IDPs, women and children.

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[21] McHugh 2010. Op cit.

[22] UN, *Guidance for Effective Mediation.* 2012. https://peacemaker.un.org/resources/guidance-effective-mediation. For discussion of recent trends in mediation, see: David Lanz, "Ten recent developments in peace mediation," *Perspective Mediation* 3, Swisspeace 2017. https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Articles/54af67adc6/Ten-Recent-Developments-in-Peace-Mediation-17-swisspeace-mediation.pdf

[23] See Doha Document for Peace developed by the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference in 2011. https://unamid.unmissions.org/doha-document-peace-darfur

[24] While these ceasefires have been successfully negotiated in many countries, there is little evidence that they have contributed to resolution of conflicts. UNICEF, "Negotiating Ceasefires to Save Children's Lives." UNICEF website. 2012. https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/negotiating-ceasefires-save-children%E2%80%99s-lives/7272

[25] See for example: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2475 (2019), 2019. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2475.pdf
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2417 (2018), 2018. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2417.pdf
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1674 (2006), 2006. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Arms%20S%20RES%201674.pdf
See as well: OCHA, "Protection of Civilians." OCHA Website. https://www.ochaopt.org/reports/protection-of-civilians
For further analysis on the Security Council's evolving role in POC see Richard Gowan, 'The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians', in Lisa Sharland (Eds.), *Evolution of the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping*, The Australian Strategic Policy

OCHA reports that POC developments have led to a 'culture of protection' within the Security Council.[26] Presently 8 of the 14 UN PKOs currently have mandates to protect civilians: MINUJUSTH (Haiti) MINUSCA (CAR), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (DRC), UNAMID (Darfur), UNFIL (Lebanon) UNISFA (Abyei) and UNMISS (South Sudan.) While the UN included POC mandates in peacekeeping operations since 1999, it took 10 years for the UN to offer guidance, policies and training on how these mandates can be implemented (and indeed another decade to produce a handbook on incorporating POC into peacekeeping operations).[27]

Historically, peacekeeping operations have successfully provided protection for the humanitarian delivery of relief goods to IDPs in situations such as Somalia and Bosnia.[28] Most dramatically, in South Sudan, UNMISS is currently providing shelter to 200,000 IDPs who have sought protection in its compounds.[29] (See the listing of peacekeeping missions along with the number of IDPs in each country in the Annex.) IOM has collaborated with UNMISS in supporting protection of civilian sites and in addressing housing, land and property issues as a way to resolve internal displacement.

As CIVIC points out in its 20-year retrospective of POC, the Security Council's use of POC has been somewhat ad hoc and often influenced by politics. Thus debates over POC in Libya and Syria have become a proxy for broader political disagreements among member states. The Security Council has helpfully included POC in thematic resolutions on issues such as protection of persons with disabilities and missing persons in armed conflicts. While the POC and Women, Peace & Security agendas were developed in parallel, there have been times when they worked at cross purposes.

Peacekeeping itself is undergoing major changes with regionally-led military operations, multinational and ad hoc military coalitions gaining prominence as the preferred means to mitigate conflict and stabilize post-conflict situations.[30] Budget cuts and reductions in staffing (particularly gender advisors, POC advisors and human rights officers) limit the ability of PKOS to implement their protection of civilians mandates. Political and financial pressures to downsize and move away from large-scale missions, in places such as the DRC, Haiti and Darfur, make it less likely that UN peacekeeping forces will play a more active role with IDPs in the future.

On the national level, some governments, notably Nigeria and Ukraine have developed national-level POC policy frameworks. In Afghanistan for example, UNAMA has undertaken active, structured engagement with the parties involved in the conflict on a range of protection-related issues.[31]

Institute, 2019, (pp. 7-10). https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/SR%20140%20Protection%20of%20civilian%20in%20UN%20peacekeeping.pdf

[26] See Jenna Russo and Evan Cinq-Mars. *POC20: Twenty Years of the Protection of Civilians: Challenges, Progress, and Priorities for the Future*. CIVIC. 2019. https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/policy/poc20-challenges-progress-priorities-report/

[27] UNDPO, *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook*, United Nations. 2020. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dpo_poc_handbook_final_as_printed.pdf

[28] Seybolt, Taylor B., *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure* (2007). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487382

[29] Damian Lilly, "Protection of civilian sites: a new type of displaced settlement." ODI Humanitarian Practice Network, September 2014. https://odihpn.org/magazine/protection-of-civilians-sites-a-new-type-of-displacement-settlement/. Jenna Stern, *Establishing Safety and Security at PoC Sites.* Stimson Center. 2015. https://www.stimson.org/2015/establishing-safety-and-security-protection-civilians-sites/ Also see Center for Civilians in Conflict, *Moving toward Mobility: Providing Protection to Civilians through Static Presence and Mobile Peacekeeping in South Sudan,* March 2019. https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/moving-toward-mobility/P

[30] See most recent review of UN Peacekeeping:
UN General Assembly, "Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture." May, 2016.
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_262.pdf

[31] See UNAMA poc report: UNAMA, "Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," July, 2020.
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2020_-_27_july-revised_10_august.pdf

However, protection of civilians remains an important 'hook' for engaging peacekeeping actors with internal displacement.

Peace & security actors in resolving displacement in post-conflict settings

While the previous sections looked at engagement of peace and security actors in resolving conflicts and aiding IDPs during conflicts, this section looks at the role – and potential role – of peace and security actors in supporting solutions for IDPs.

Once a conflict has ended – whether through a formal peace agreement or other means – governments face a host of challenges to consolidate the peace and prevent the resurgence of conflict, including de-mobilization of combatants, removal of explosive ordinance, physical reconstruction of infrastructure, repairing or replacing damaged housing, security sector and judicial reform, establishment of reconciliation or transitional justice systems, revitalization of the economy, return of refugees and so on. Given these urgent tasks, finding solutions for IDPs (particularly when internal displacement has dragged on for years) is often not prioritized.

There are three main ways that peace and security actors can help bring about solutions for IDPs in these settings: stabilization programs, peacebuilding initiatives and transitional justice – all of which involve different actors and different expectations. For the most part, all three have operated in parallel to humanitarian (and to a lesser extent, development) actors' efforts to support solutions for IDPs.

Stabilization programs have become a principal way that (mostly) military actors seek stability following a conflict. However, despite being used for decades, "the concept of stabilization remains ill-defined and poorly institutionalized across govt and multilateral structures." The US Departments of State and Defense and USAID "define stabilization as an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer term development."[32] While many UN PKOs are involved in stabilization measures, there are different understandings of what stabilization means – from robust engagement in counter-terrorism operations to supporting rule of law.[33]

For military forces, stabilization is part of the military mission. While humanitarian actors seem to associate stabilization with military action – and are often reluctant to associate themselves with these efforts, stabilization may create the conditions which enable displaced persons to return to their communities or provide security in areas where IDPs are living. But there seems to be very little coordination between humanitarian and stabilization operations. In the worst case, stabilization programs end up making humanitarian work more difficult – especially when humanitarians are seen as being allied with military forces in a way that compromises humanitarian principles. Mali is perhaps the most egregious case where stabilization programs have blurred the lines between humanitarian and military operations.[34]

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[32] US government. *Stabilization Assistance Review. A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of US Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas.* 2018. US DOS, USAID, DOD

[33] Alexander Gilder, "The Effect of 'Stabilization' in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace Operations," *Netherlands International Law Review,* 66, 47-73, March 2019.

[34] Emmanuel Tronc, Rob Grace and Anaide Nahikian, *Realities and Myths of the 'Triple Nexus': Local perspectives on peacebuilding, development and humanitarian action in Mali.* Harvard Humanitarian Initiative/ATHA. June 2019. https://africa.harvard.edu/news/realities-and-myths-%E2%80%9Ctriple-nexus%E2%80%9D-local-perspectives-peacebuilding-development

Alexandra Lamarche, "Mali's Humanitarian Crisis: Overmilitarized and overshadowed" Field Report, December 2019: Refugees International. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mali%2B-%2B2019%2B-%2B1.0-Anahita%E2%80%99s%2BMacBook%2BPro.pdf.

The scale or footprint of stabilization programs is often much larger than that of humanitarian agencies. For example, in Mali, the collective cost of stabilization and counterterrorism is estimated at over $2 billion annually – while the UN's Humanitarian Response Plan had received only $160 million at the end of 2019 – less than 1 percent of the cost of stabilization efforts. Meanwhile beneficiary communities struggle to differentiate between MINUSMA and aid workers as both are juggling service provision and state substitution.[35]

Coordination between stabilization programs and humanitarian efforts has been difficult. Coordination mechanisms are different in each situation, and even within government stabilization programs, there are problems with coordination mechanisms. The US government's 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review found that 86 percent of US government experts surveyed weren't clear about which US government agency is responsible for different elements of stabilization.[36] Other governments, such as France and the United Kingdom, have their own stabilization programs as do UN Peacekeeping missions. Clearly more and better coordination – or collaboration or simply information-sharing -- is needed but there doesn't seem a clear path forward. Given the sensitivities around humanitarian principles, it may be that development actors are better placed to work with stabilization programs.

A second set of activities that are relevant to finding solutions for IDPs is the *peacebuilding system*. This system, created by the United Nations in 2006, includes a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Fund and a Peacebuilding support Office. It is intended to respond to imminent threats to peace and to build or strengthen national capacities. After functioning as a separate entity, peacebuilding was brought into the newly-constituted Department of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs in 2019. Between 2006 and 2017, $772 million was allocated by the Peacebuilding fund to 41 recipient countries; 71 percent of the funding was allocated to or throughout UNDP.[37] The 2015 Lessons Learned working group highlighted the critical importance of trust between the government and the people as well as the key role played by local authorities. National ownership of peacebuilding is critical.[38]

Given the key role that solutions for displaced people play in sustaining peace, increasing engagement with the Peacebuilding Architecture would seem to be a critical area to encourage. The Peacebuilding Fund has provided funds to projects supporting durable solutions for IDPs and this support could be systematized in the future.[39] Presently the Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office act on the basis of proposals from governments requesting support for particular initiatives. Thus it is incumbent on governments to prioritize solutions for IDPs in their requests to the Peacebuilding Fund. One possibility – also mentioned in the background paper on institutional architecture -- is to develop and open a window for IDP solutions within the Peacebuilding Fund.

Finally, there is the question of inclusion of internal displacement in *transitional justice*, which broadly aims to address human rights violations and promote reconciliation, through mechanisms, such as prosecutions, truth-telling, housing, land and property restitution processes, justice-sensitive security sector reforms, memorials and reparations/compensation. People who are displaced by conflicts experience diverse losses – in the worst case, the deaths of family members, but also loss of housing, land, and property. As victims of the conflict, and survivors of human rights violations, their losses should be acknowledged and redressed, whether through restitution, compensation, or a combination of different remedies. Their ability to reintegrate in their communities of origin or to settle elsewhere in the country is affected by legacies of past abuses, the desire for justice and the practical need to either recover their homes, lands and other property, or to be compensated for it. Yet humanitarian actors are

Also see Perret op cit.

[35] Refugees International op cit.

[36] US government op cit., p. 11.

[37] PBF Brochure, http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000

[38] https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/national_ownership_report.pdf

[39] See for example, ILO. *Supporting the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster and Implementation of the Durable Solutions Strategy for Zamboanga City. 2013-2015.* http://www.ilo.org/manila/projects/WCMS_222915/lang--en/index.htm. Other more recent examples include PBF support in the Democratic Republic of Congo to support state mechanisms for accountability and a PBF-supported initiative to address local challenges related to mass displacement returns in urban and peri-urban settings.

usually not equipped to provide this kind of support, and traditional justice actors may not automatically think of IDPs as a group in need of redress. The few studies that exist on transitional justice and displacement find that historically such mechanisms rarely include IDPs and refugees in their mandates, owing in part to practical considerations surrounding the large number of displaced persons, and concerns about overwhelming the capacity of limited and often poorly-funded transitional justice mechanisms that have traditionally focused on violations such as killings, detentions, torture and disappearances.[40] However, these abuses often fuel displacement, and IDPs may be at increased risk of systematic rights violations—making it essential to integrate displacement as a concern in transitional justice processes.

Although most IDPs still do not meaningfully benefit from formal transitional justice processes, this trend of exclusion is gradually changing. Increasingly, peace processes and the transitional justice efforts associated with them recognize IDPs as victims whose claims need to be addressed. Where IDPs have been included in transitional justice processes, the focus has often been on property restitution and encouraging returns, even where this is not IDPs' own preference. This narrow approach has at times limited the potential contribution of transitional justice mechanisms to addressing IDPs' concerns and advancing reconciliation. Achievements and challenges have emerged from the gradual inclusion of IDPs in transitional justice processes. In Colombia, for example, which took the far-reaching step in 2011 of including IDP as victims of the armed conflict, of the present 8+ million victims, more than 7 million are IDPs.[41] While Colombia has enacted provisions for property restitution, compensation and other forms of redress for IDPs (and is one of the few governments which has done so), estimates are that it will take years, indeed perhaps many decades, for the provisions to be implemented.

Understanding the relationship between political will, capacity and international engagement

The IASC developed a typology of international engagement[42] depending on the level of political will and capacity of the government, which is helpful in assessing the role and level of international engagement. While this was developed specifically for humanitarian actors, the notes in italics indicate the specific roles that development and peace actors may play.

Type 1. **Constrained.** Government/authorities unwilling to uphold obligations and responsibility to protect. Engagement of internationals: limited joint engagement with government but strong emphasis on local capacities. Remote management.

> *Humanitarian actors provide some assistance. Development actors continue operations. Peace & security actors may be active in the background.*

Type 2. **Capacity-driven**. Government/authorities willing to uphold responsibilities, but have little to low capacity. Engagement of internationals: strong emphasis on capacity-building, internationals providing significant service delivery in consultation with the government and with a view of handing over operations as soon as possible.

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[40] Roger Duthie, ed., *Transitional Justice and Displacement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Also see ICTJ and Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, "Transitional Justice and Displacement," July 2012. https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ%20and%20Brookings-LSE%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Displacement%20Report.pdf

[41] UNHCR, "2020 Planning Summary: Columbia," December 2019. https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GA2020-Colombia-eng.pdf

[42] IASC, "Typology of Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Response and Engagement Scenarios." https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/typology_of_response_scenarios_in_protracted_settings_-_hdpn_diagramme_0.pdf

Both humanitarian and development actors seek to build government's capacity. Peace & security actors may be active in the background.

Type 3. **Consultative**. Strong and responsible government/authorities, but ongoing high intensity or active conflict. Engagement of internationals: targeted service delivery under the government's leadership, relatively little international operational activity.

Humanitarian actors in the lead, development actors less active given active conflict. Peace & security actors active but usually on parallel track.

Type 4. **Collaborative**. Government/authorities are willing and able to uphold their responsibilities. International response is to support and complement existing capacity.

Humanitarian actors playing supportive role. Development actors as primary. Peace & security actors less active.

Type 5. **Comprehensive** (to be avoided). Failed state government shirks responsibility in the midst of active, high-intensity conflict situation. Local capacity is overwhelmed. International actors mobilize and take the lead. Blanket service delivery.

Humanitarian actors very active, development actors less so. Peace & security actors are most active.

Recommendations the HLP might want to consider

Low-hanging fruit:

1. endorse continued work on the humanitarian-peace nexus, ask IASC's Results Group 4 to commission an empirical review to analyze (and subsequently propose a framework for) the appropriate type of coordination and collaboration between humanitarian and peace/security actors based on the type of actor and the type of conflict. Such an empirical assessment could provide evidence of useful models for collaboration.
2. call for identifying IDP focal points in DPPO/DPO, including in the Peacebuilding Support Office
3. call for joint context assessments by humanitarian and peace actors in specific country or regional situations, using existing forums where they exist (such as UNAMID's joint protection working groups on the UN Country teams) or developing new mechanisms where they are lacking
4. call on national authorities and donors to provide more support for IDPs to organize themselves to play a role in peace talks through consultations with Track 1 negotiators and mediators or in track 2 processes.
5. encourage mediators to meet with humanitarian actors and IDPs to ensure that their concerns are incorporated into peace processes and agreements (even if IDPs do not directly sit at the table.)

More ambitious recommendations:

1. explore possibilities for more explicitly including IDP solutions in peace agreements, both by working on the process of IDP engagement – including sensitization of mediators on internal displacement and engaging directly with IDPs – and ensuring that issues of concern to IDPs (such as land, return or transitional justice) are included in the negotiations.[43]
2. urge the UN Security Council to explicitly include protection of IDPs in mandates of peacekeeping operations and develop guidance on the various ways that peacekeepers can create conditions which facilitate solutions for IDPs.

[43] Note that the suggestions in the McHugh Mediators guide (op cit) continue to be relevant in this regard.

3. call for greater collaboration between UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes relevant to solutions for IDPs, such as protection of civilians; Women, Peace & Security initiatives; R2P and atrocity-prevention mechanisms as well as the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire in light of COVID-19.
4. support empowered Resident Coordinators to prioritize joint assessments by humanitarian, peace and development actors on potential solutions for IDPs and to develop mechanisms for monitoring and assessing collective outcomes
5. challenge donors to coordinate humanitarian and stabilization initiatives in their programming and to insist on complementary approaches in the field.
6. call on transitional justice actors to recognize IDPs as an important group who must be included in transitional justice processes, and to provide appropriate measures for recognizing their losses and redressing their claims in the various mechanisms they develop.
    a. Equitably engage IDPs in the development and implementation of transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives, including but not limited to those associated with returns and property claims.
    b. During displacement, support IDPs to document their claims in preparation for eventual transitional justice processes.
7. call for all post-conflict durable solutions strategies to explicitly examine the relationship between the resolution of displacement, transitional justice and reconciliation, and identify concrete steps to strengthen the links between these processes.
8. call on the IASC to develop ways of engaging with various peace actors at both the global and country levels. This could include, for example, IASC convening an annual meeting with peace actors (, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, stabilization, etc) to develop ways of ensuring that their efforts consider solutions for IDPs.
9. call for the establishment of a 'window' to support solutions for IDPs in the UN Peacebuilding Fund to open a 'window' for IDP solutions

Annex.

Name of PKO, Country/Region, & Date Established	# of Contingent Troops; # of Military Personnel*	# of IDPs in Country, Date as of
MINURSO, Western Sahara, 1991	20; 245	Data is Unclear**
MINUSCA, Central African Republic, 2014	10,741; 11,650	592,000, 12/31/2020
MINUSMA, Mali, 2013	11,757; 13,289	208,000, 12/31/2020
MONUSCO, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2010	13,590; 16,215	5,512,000, 12/31/2020
UNAMID, Darfur, 2007	4,185; 15,845	2,700,000 (in Darfur), 01/31/2018
UNDOF, Golan, 1974	956; N/A	500,000 (specifically from Golan annexation), 07/2020
UNFICYP, Cyprus, 1964	718; N/A	228,000, 12/31/2020
UNFIL, Lebanon, 1978	15,000; N/A	7,000, 12/31/2020
UNIFSA, Abyei, 2011	3,486; 4,791	31,000, 12/31/2020
UNMIK, Kosovo, 1999	8***; 4,718****	16,000, 12/31/2020
UNMISS, South Sudan, 2011	13,932; N/A	1,352,000, 12/31/2020
UNMOGIP, India & Pakistan, 1949	43 (Experts on Mission)	251,000 (Kashmir specifically), 04/2015
UNTSO, Middle East, 1948	152 (Experts on Mission)	11,000,000 (roughly throughout MENA), 05/2019

*Military Personnel include contingent troops, experts on mission, staff officers, and other operatives in their counts.

**Because Western Sahara is not a recognized country and is de facto controlled by Morocco, there is little data on the number of internally displaced people specific to this region. However, it is estimated that more than half (about 165,000) of the indigenous Sahrawi population are displaced refugees living in camps in Algeria.

***These are "Experts on Mission" contributed by different countries, whose role is similar to troops. The # of "troops" was unavailable

****This is # of Police Personnel. # of Military Personnel was unavailable