

allies in late July 2024 was among the key triggers of this deployment, which Saddam Haftar seized as an opportunity to enhance security cooperation between LAAF and Malian authorities (see annex 17).

3. Implications of armed conflict in the Sudan

30. LAAF interfered in the conflict in the Sudan by facilitating and allowing logistical support destined for the parties to the conflict – the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces – to pass through Libyan territory, where the presence of armed groups affiliated with both sides was permitted (see annex 12).²³ The Rapid Support Forces benefited more from training sessions and well-established supply air bridges and land routes. The Panel identified two such primary supply routes (see figure I).

31. As the armed conflict in the Sudan intensified in northern Darfur in late June 2024 and spilled into Libyan territory, LAAF started to disrupt the logistical supply routes, including by seizing materiel. The increased cross-border movements of fighters and civilians, including the growing influx of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Sudan, have been perceived as real security risks that LAAF attempted to mitigate through tight management of the Libyan-Sudanese border.

Figure I


Identified primary supply routes from Libya to the Rapid Support Forces in the Sudan that were active until June 2024



²³ Confidential sources (Sudanese armed groups).

Figure IV

New operational patterns of human trafficking and migrant smuggling in Libya



(a) Collaborative models

48. The Panel identified four illicit enterprises that involved collaboration between international trafficking and smuggling networks and Libyan armed actors controlling key operational areas in Benghazi, Musa'id, Ra's Judayr, Tubruq and Zuwarah. These actors, including individuals of the Ministry of Interior of Libya and LAAF, generated profits by exercising a leading role in coordinating trafficking and smuggling operations or permitting criminal networks to operate on the territory under their control in return for revenue and the use of migrants for forced labour.

(i) *Al-Habouni and Al-Katani networks in Tubruq*


49. The Panel identified seven members of the Al-Habouni Network and six members of the Al-Katani Network directly responsible for running complex international trafficking and smuggling operations, with central hubs in Musaid and Tubruq and cooperatives active in five countries (see figures V and VI). Both networks had well-developed logistical capabilities to move large groups of migrants through secret detention facilities, trafficking and smuggling them from Tubruq to Greece. In these facilities, 49 migrants endured beatings, floggings and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under armed guard, without potable water

Annex 15 Increase in Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM, QDe.159) affiliated fighters' movements and trafficking facilitated by tribal connections between Tuaregs

1. The Panel identified that *Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin* (JNIM, QDe.159)-affiliated Malian fighters intensified their crossings into Libya via its southern borders since December 2023¹¹², with temporary stays in Ghat. This surge happened following the capture of Kidal – a stronghold of Tuareg opposition – by the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA) and their foreign allies in November 2023. Following this development, large groups of Malian Tuaregs crossed into Libya, through Niger, and were infiltrated by terrorist fighters affiliated with JNIM.¹¹³
2. These fighters leveraged tribal and matrimonial connections among Tuareg communities in Mali, Niger and Libya to facilitate their cross-border movements and engage in regional illicit gold trade. The gold is primarily sourced from mines in northern Mali and then smuggled through Niger. A portion of the revenues generated from these trafficking activities was used to finance dormant cells of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, QDe.014) in Libya. These smuggling and trafficking networks are led by individuals with direct ties to AQIM, who use terrorist fighters to facilitate the cross-border movement of gold.¹¹⁴
3. The Panel identified that the route used by JNIM affiliated Malian fighters to enter Libya (figure 15.1) is the same used for other cross-border illicit activities between Mali, Niger and Libya, including arms and drug trafficking.

Figure 15.1

Identified route of JNIM-affiliated Malian fighters crossing into Libya's southern borders



¹¹² This increase was established following the capture in November 2023, by Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA) and their foreign allies of Kidal, which was considered as the Tuareg opposition's stronghold. Following this development, large groups of Malian Tuaregs crossed into Libya, through Niger, and were infiltrated by terrorist fighters affiliated with JNIM.


¹¹³ CS (local sources, Libyan official sources).

¹¹⁴ CS (local sources and Malian armed groups).

by local LAAF elements in their role of LAAF officers and owners of temporary facilities. From those facilities migrants were transfer to larger trafficking hubs in Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Tripoli and Tubruq controlled by Libyan armed actors running trafficking and smuggling operations in collaboration with well-organised trafficking networks (see annexes 24 and 26).²²⁵

Figure 23.1

Identified human trafficking and migrant smuggling routes in Libya



Source: CSIHL-19, 20, 26, 27, 30, 47-82, 85-140.

Table 23.1

Key parameters of new international and regional human trafficking and migrant smuggling routes with operations centres in Libya²²⁶

Departure point	Means of transport	Transit countries	Entry points Libya	Transit points Libya and border countries	Exit points Libya
Cameroon	Via land	Chad	Al-Kufra	Sabha, Tripoli, Sabratha, Zawiyah, Tubruq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Zuwara/western territorial waters to Italy. ■ Tubruq/eastern territorial waters towards Greece.
Lebanon (Arida)	Via sea	Direct route to Libya	Territorial waters in the east	Territorial waters in the east of Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Territorial waters in the east of Libya to Italy.
Mali (multiple locations)	Via land	Algeria	Debdeb	Ghadames, Sabratha, Tajoura, Zawiyah, Zuwara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Sabratha, Zawiyah, Zuwara/western territorial waters to Italy.

²²⁵ Panel interviews with CSIHL-49, 50, 53, 126-128.

²²⁶ Panel interviews with CSIHL-19, 20, 26, 27, 30, 47-82, 85-140.

Figure 36.A.2

Gren-class vessel at inner berth no. 2, west pier; twelve heavy equipment transporters (HETs), three of which loaded with military trucks with small trailers, in the eastern part of Tubruq port (naval base) at 08:52 UTC on 14 April 2024




Figure 36.A.3.

Gren-class vessel at inner berth no. 02, west pier; five military trucks on pier facing northwards, three of which are towing small trailers





Figure 65.2

Start and end points of periods without AIS signal of MT *Mardi*, February to August 2023



Source for data; S&P Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite.

C. Ship-to-ship transfers

8. The AIS data for MT *Mardi* recorded 23 STS loading operations since February 2023.⁴³⁸ None of these resulted in a reported draft change. One STS loading operation (29 July 2023) was reported to the Panel by EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI, which had observed the operation. When Operation IRINI assets hailed the MT *Mardi* on 31 August 2023, its master reported that the vessel had been at sea since 29 January 2023 since they left the dry dock at Tuzla, Türkiye. He explained the vessel's non-transmission of AIS data since 20 August 2023 as "technical difficulties". Based on the above analysis, the Panel assesses that neither information is correct: the vessel had made port calls to Benghazi old harbour and had deliberately deactivated its AIS.

9. Out of the 23 STS operations on record, 14 corresponded in terms of timing and movements to periods following MT *Mardi*'s assessed loading activities in Benghazi old harbour. The Panel assesses that these transfers in all likelihood involved petroleum illicitly exported from Benghazi (table 65.2).

⁴³⁸ S&P Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite.