


Map 1  
Houthi military gains, September–October 2021



#### A. Withdrawals by the Joint Forces on the West Coast from Hudaydah in November 2021

18. Around 10 or 11 November 2021, brigades of the Joint Forces began withdrawing from their positions on the north-western strip of the Hudaydah coastline. According to the Coalition and the Joint Forces, this was a pre-planned national military strategy,<sup>10</sup> aimed at reinforcing the Shabwah and Ma'rib fronts.<sup>11</sup> On 12 and 13 November, Houthi forces took control of the vacated areas (see map 2).<sup>12</sup> Around 14 November, the Coalition launched airstrikes to prevent further Houthi advances, reportedly its first engagement in the area since the signing of the Stockholm Agreement.<sup>13</sup>

19. The withdrawals had adverse consequences on the humanitarian situation of civilians. Civilian and military authorities were informed of the withdrawals 24 hours before they occurred, which did not give them sufficient time to evacuate vulnerable people from the areas.<sup>14</sup> The Government of Yemen informed the Panel of 54 alleged violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Houthi forces after they gained control over vacated areas; most occurred on 12 November 2021.<sup>15</sup> By

<sup>10</sup> For the statements, see annex 5.

<sup>11</sup> Confidential sources.

<sup>12</sup> The Houthis, having been taken by surprise, reportedly did not initially have sufficient troops to occupy those areas.

<sup>13</sup> See [www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/un-calls-for-new-talks-on-yemens-hodeidah-as-frontlines-shift).

<sup>14</sup> Reportedly, it was difficult to regroup the concerned units. Some Joint Forces fighters were killed.

<sup>15</sup> The Panel also received information from multiple sources but has not yet been able to investigate.

Figure V  
Major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (second from right)




Source: [https://hodhodyemennews.net/en\\_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence](https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2021/01/18/yemens-defence-minister-yemen-is-rapidly-developing-new-weapons-of-deterrence).

#### IV. Maritime security


45. Since December 2020, the Panel has documented five attacks on commercial vessels, as well as several suspicious approaches<sup>62</sup> and one sighting of armed persons onboard small boats in the waters around Yemen (see map 4). Compared with the previous reporting period, where three commercial vessels were attacked in the Gulf of Aden, the focus shifted back to the Red Sea, where four attacks occurred.

Map 4  
Maritime security incidents since December 2020



<sup>62</sup> In at least two cases, the reported suspicious approaches turned out to be hailing by the Yemeni Coast Guard, which was not conducted in line with international procedures.

Map 5  
Missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle strikes since 30 December 2020




57. Attacks in the border areas took place several times a week. Longer-range operations were less frequent and often occurred in waves, i.e. Houthi forces launched several uncrewed aerial vehicles and missiles at multiple targets as part of the same operation. Locally manufactured uncrewed aerial vehicles and Badr rockets accounted for most of the attacks. The frequency of the attacks shows that the Houthis are easily able to source components for these weapons from abroad.

58. The Panel is aware of a single attack using a cruise missile and of three confirmed longer-range ballistic missile attacks during the reporting period. Those numbers are consistent with previous years, showing that the Houthis continue to struggle with sourcing sophisticated missile systems from abroad. According to the Coalition, between the start of the conflict and 31 October 2021, a total of 781 uncrewed aerial vehicles and 409 ballistic missiles were launched at targets in Saudi Arabia.

59. Houthi targets during the reporting period included civilian infrastructure, e.g. the Saudi Aramco bulk plant in Jeddah (see annex 16) and Abha International Airport (see annex 17). The purpose of these attacks is primarily political: the Houthis want to push Riyadh towards accepting a political settlement beneficial to them. This contrasts sharply with the use of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles in Yemen itself, where the aim is maximum lethality, as evidenced by the attack on Aden International Airport on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), aided by the absence of effective Government of Yemen air defences.

Map 6

**Seizures of small arms and light weapons, anti-tank guided missiles and sights, 2018–2021**



65. In August 2021, the Panel inspected the cargo, comprising 2,556 type 56-1 assault rifles, 192 PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, 100 type 85 sniper rifles, 52 AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifles, 35 AKS-74U assault rifles and 194 RPG-7 launchers (see annex 20). The type 56-1 assault rifles and the sniper rifles, and 19 of the PKM-pattern machine guns, have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those made in China. Most were manufactured by Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26) between 2016 and 2017. Of the remaining machine guns, 164 have technical characteristics and markings consistent with manufacture in the Islamic Republic of Iran, while six were produced in Bulgaria and in three cases the origin remains unclear. The AKS-74U assault rifles have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured at the Tula arms plant in what is now the Russian Federation during the late 1980s. The AM-50 anti-material rifles and the RPG-7 launchers have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel also documented several Ghadir rifle scopes, which have characteristics consistent with those made in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as POSP telescopic sights manufactured in Belarus. The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the Panel that the machine guns and rifle scopes are not Iranian products and that, in its view, the “mere appearance or similarity in markings or technical characteristics between [such] equipment and the products of Iranian companies should not lead to conclusions regarding their origin”. In addition to the small arms and light weapons, the dhow also carried 50 wire-guided, container-launched anti-tank missiles, which have technical characteristics consistent with different versions of 9M111 and 9M113 missiles manufactured between 1978 and

	Type 56-1 assault rifle	RPG-7 launcher	AM-50 anti-material rifle	PKM machine guns	DshK machine guns	Optical sights from Belarus	Ghadir rifle scopes	Roshd Afzar sights	Anti-tank guided missiles (different types)
Gulf of Oman, 6 May 2021	X <sup>a</sup>	X	X	X		X	X		X <sup>a</sup>
Shahn border, <sup>c</sup> 22 Jun 2021								X <sup>b</sup>	

Sources: Panel and Member States.

<sup>a</sup> Items had similar packaging.


<sup>b</sup> Items were not inspected by the Panel.

<sup>c</sup> Shahn is a major border crossing point between Oman and Yemen (see map 6).

### C. Chain-of-custody investigations

68. The Houthis continue to source critical components for their weapon systems from companies in Europe and Asia, using a complex network of intermediaries to obscure the chain of custody (see map 7). The four cases described below illustrate this pattern, in line with the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 2511 (2020). Member States have repeatedly informed the Panel that those components are neither weapons nor dual-use items under national legislation. However, the Panel finds that, as these components have military applications, export control and customs authorities need to be particularly vigilant to prevent violations of the targeted arms embargo.

Map 7  
Houthi supply networks




## Annex 4 Battle for Ma'rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.<sup>2</sup> The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma'rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations<sup>3</sup> (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1

### Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma'rib City



*Source:* Panel


2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma'rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).

<sup>3</sup> For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta'izz. Information from military sources.

<sup>4</sup> The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma'rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

Map 8.1



**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.

4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit,<sup>108</sup> there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.”<sup>109</sup> This Information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

<sup>108</sup> The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.

<sup>109</sup> Letter from National Resistance dated 09 October 2021 and letter from the Government of Yemen dated 28 October 2021. Both letters had similar content and wording.

Table 8.1  
**Details of the attack on 11 September 2021**

<i>Target</i>	<i>Type of projectile</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Coordinates of targeted location</i>	<i>Description of the location</i>
Target 1	Missile	09.45	43° 13' 58.116" 13° 18' 33.8472"	Near a conference room.
Target 2	Missile	09.46	43° 14' 16.368" 13° 18' 34.1496"	A warehouse used by the West Coast Humanitarian Unit. <sup>110</sup>
Target 3	UAV	10.30	43° 13' 53.904" 13° 18' 36.936"	Base of the port control tower, which was approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile.
Target 4	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 18.492" 13° 18' 39.2112"	Exploded near an earth wall separating two maintenance yards.
Target 5	UAV	10.44	43° 14' 0.276" 13° 18' 20.3256"	Exploded next to an earth wall.
Target 6	UAV	11.03	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 7	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.
Target 8	UAV	11.15	Intercepted; exploded in mid-air	Port Guards responded by firing at the UAV.

**Sources:** Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2

**Locations of the five impact points**



<sup>110</sup> This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.