


Map 1  
Locations of Houthi rocket attacks



*Findings from the Panel's visit to Mukalla*

From 20 to 23 October, the Panel visited Mukalla and met with Governorate authorities, officials of the security and armed forces, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre, the Yemeni Coast Guard, representatives of different political parties and members of civil society. The Panel also conducted an inspection of the dhow *Bari-2*, which is currently being held in Shihr (see para. 74).

Compared with other parts of Yemen, the coastal areas of Hadramawt have been fairly peaceful since the region was liberated from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in April 2016. However, threats of politically motivated violence remain, as evidenced by the assassination attempt on Governor Faraj al-Bahsani in Mukalla in June. The Panel was informed that 12 people were arrested in relation to the incident.

Both civilian and military authorities complained that military salaries in the region had not been paid since February.<sup>c</sup> This is likely to have an adverse effect on both the loyalty and efficiency of the security forces in Hadramawt. During a meeting in Riyadh, Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalek Saeed informed the Panel that the overall cash crisis had led the Government of Yemen to prioritize payments to soldiers on active military fronts, and that there was significant corruption in the security forces, including inflated payrolls.<sup>d</sup>

Several interviewees complained about delays with the clearance of cargoes (often reported as several weeks) at Mukalla port owing to bureaucratic problems with the Riyadh-based Ministry of Transport and the need for security inspections. Another issue raised repeatedly concerned electricity shortages in Mukalla, which, together


Emirates and the Southern Transitional Council to Al-Islah, and vice versa, fuels further unrest in Yemen (see annex 6).

61. The Panel documented the arrest, enforced disappearance and torture of one Yemeni, Radwan al-Hashdi, who was the former media office manager for the Abu al-Abbas Brigade.<sup>34</sup> There is evidence to indicate that the arrest was linked to his perceived opposition to Al-Islah forces in Ta'izz.

## VII. Maritime security

62. The Panel noted an increasing number of incidents involving suspicious approaches and attacks on civilian ships in 2020, in comparison with 2019. The Panel also remains concerned about the floating storage and offloading vessel *Safer* (International Maritime Organization (IMO) ship identification number: 7376472), which is in urgent need of repair and poses a critical threat to the environment of the Red Sea (see annex 21). Map 2 shows the distribution of maritime security incidents off the coast of Yemen.

Map 2  
Maritime security incidents, 2020




<sup>34</sup> See annex 35.

## A. Attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia

69. Following a hiatus of several months, in February, Houthi forces resumed their aerial campaign on targets inside Saudi Arabia and maintained it throughout 2020, using a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as uncrewed aerial vehicles (see map 3). While most attacks are foiled by the Saudi military without incurring significant damage, the group's ability to project power beyond Yemen remains a threat to regional stability and a challenge for future peace negotiations.

Map 3


### Missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks by the Houthi forces



70. The Panel inspected the debris of three ballistic missiles and one land attack cruise missile used in the attacks on Riyadh and Yanbu' (see annex 11), as well as the debris of several uncrewed aerial vehicles used in recent attacks (see annex 12). The Panel notes that the debris is consistent with liquid propellant ballistic missiles, likely a modified version of the Borkan-2H, which was deployed in 2017 and 2018 (see S/2018/594, paras. 80–91), and the Quds-1 cruise missile, which has been in use since 2019 (see S/2020/326, paras. 58–60).<sup>38</sup> Based on technical findings, the Panel continues to believe that the uncrewed aerial vehicles and waterborne improvised explosive devices are manufactured in Yemen, making use of commercially available components, such as engines, propellers and servo actuators sourced from abroad,

<sup>38</sup> On 23 November, the Houthis attacked an Aramco facility in Jeddah with what they claim is a new type of cruise missile dubbed Quds-2 (see <http://en.yagency.net/198784/>). The Panel is investigating whether this was indeed a new weapon system.

Map 4  
Maritime interdictions, 2019–2020




74. A second route involves trans-shipment at sea off the coast of Somalia and seems to mostly supply small arms and light weapons. It appears that some of the weapons are destined for Somalia, while others closely match arms documented in the Houthi arsenal. Three seizures during the analysis period fit into this pattern: on 17 April and 24 June 2020 the Saudi Navy interdicted two large shipments of small arms and light weapons (see annex 14). The first one involved a Yemeni dhow named *Al-Shimasi* (other sources give the name *Al-Khair 4*), which was seized about 90 nautical miles from Nishtun port, while the second, *Bari-2*, was a larger, Jelbut-type dhow with a Somali crew, which was seized 70 nautical miles north-east of Boosaaso. The Panel has been able to analyse the data from a GPS receiver found on the vessel and noted that it was headed towards a rendezvous point 10 nautical miles off the Somali coast. It carried cigarettes loaded in Dubai on 12 June destined for Boosaaso, as well as an illicit cargo of arms concealed in hidden compartments (see figure VIII). Documents found on the *Bari-2*, as well as GPS coordinates, show that the vessel has previously sailed between ports in Somalia, Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 15). A number of sources have informed the Panel that smaller Yemeni dhows carry the cargo from the Somali coast to ports in Hadramawt and Mahrah. It seems likely that the *Al-Shimasi* was one of those “feeders”.

## Annex 4: Main battle lines between the Government of Yemen Military Units and the Houthis

1. After a period of relative calm, as noted in the Panel's report (S/2020/326), the first half of 2020 witnessed some of the strongest clashes between the Houthis and the Government of Yemen, backed by the Coalition. This is despite the spread of COVID-19, including to military personnel in the first half of the year.<sup>2</sup> While the Government of Yemen has engaged in both offensive and defensive battles (see map 4.1 and table 4.1),<sup>3</sup> the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has been mostly defensive in its battles against the Houthis.<sup>4</sup>

### Map 4.1

Main battlefronts between Government of Yemen military units and the Houthis



Source: Panel

2. Despite the escalation of battles, and Coalition's support to the Government of Yemen, the Yemeni Government has not been able to maintain some of its front lines against the Houthis (table 4.1). In 2020, while the Houthis have fought to defend the territory they have gained elsewhere, they have largely focused on reinforcing and escalating on the Ma'rib fronts. Ma'rib will be a decisive battle for the Government of Yemen and the Houthis, as this is the only frontline governorate with the presence of forces from the central government, represented by the Vice President Ali Mohsin al Ahmar, and the

<sup>2</sup> Confidential military sources.

<sup>3</sup> In 2020, in Ta'izz, for example, there was also offensive operations conducted by the Government of Yemen forces. Information provided by the Ta'izz military.

<sup>4</sup> This includes the frontlines in al Dhalée, Abyan, and Lahj.

**Figure 10.6**  
Satellite imagery of al Wehdah schools on 22 April and 22 September 2020.




**Figure 10.7**  
Satellite imagery of Ahmed Fareg (Al Haya) schools on 22 April and 22 September 2020.



**Figure 10.10**

Locations of the schools where allegations of past and present military use have been reported to the Panel



*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.*


UNITED NATIONS  
Map No. 4619.4 (Dec 2020)

Office of Information and Communications Technology  
Geospatial Information Section



Source: Panel

**Figure 15.20**  
GPS Coordinates retrieved from the vessel's navigational device



NB: These coordinates do not necessarily imply that the dhow actually visited the locations.