


supplied to HAF by the United Arab Emirates in 2019 (S/2019/914, para. 96, and annexes 28 and 40) and provided in mid-2020 to Russian private military operatives by the Russian Federation (see annex 23). The HAF tactics of trying to draw GNA-AF units out of position into rural areas, thereby making them vulnerable to more decisive attacks, in general failed. By that stage, military success by HAF appeared to be dependent on a local war of attrition.

61. The signing of a security and military cooperation agreement between the Government of National Accord and Turkey⁴⁴ on 27 November 2019 was a strong indicator that Turkey was to increase its military role in Libya. Shortly thereafter, Turkey deployed *Gabya*-class frigates (see annex 24) to provide a medium-range air defence “umbrella” along the western Libyan coastal littoral (see figure I), with MIM-23 Hawk surface-to-air missile systems⁴⁵ providing area defence for the airports in Tripoli and Misratah. Those systems were supported by the use of *Korkut* short-range air defence systems (see annex 26) and man-portable air defence systems to protect important locations.

Figure I

Illustration of Turkish air defence “umbrella” along western Libya coastal littoral (in support of the Government of National Accord Affiliated Forces)




62. The local air superiority of HAF was thus effectively negated early in 2020, allowing for an unchallenged build-up of military materiel through western Libyan ports and airports by Turkey in support of GNA-AF. Turkish military advisers deployed, which gave GNA-AF access to the advice of professional military staff, trained in North Atlantic Treaty Organization tactics and with extensive recent military operational experience. Operational planning was professionalized, with phased

⁴⁴ Abdullah Bozkurt, “Full text of new Turkey, Libya sweeping security, military cooperation deal revealed”, Nordic Monitor. 16 December 2020.

⁴⁵ The Panel reported on MIM-23 Hawks defending Jufrah; see S/2019/914, para. 97. See also annex 25.

Figure 77.6
 Reported sightings of Russian PMC operatives in Libya (September 2019 to December 2020)³⁰⁰



³⁰⁰ Table 3 refers.