Map 1
Western smuggling routes

Source: Based on a map created by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, as amended by the Panel of Experts on Libya.

51. The primary departure points are now Khoms, Garabulli and Zuwarah. Khoms, Tripoli and Zawiyah are the main disembarkation points following interdiction by the Libyan Coast Guard. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Medical Corps provide immediate shelter, relief and medical care on arrival at these locations. The Panel notes that disembarkation, registration and transportation procedures remain unclear and put migrants at further risk of exploitation.

38 32°38'55"N, 14°15'43"E.
39 32°45'N, 13°43'E.
40 32°56'N, 12°05'E.
41 IOM provides support facilities at 10 disembarkation points (Tripoli-Naval Base, Tripoli-Harbour, Tripoli-Tajura, Zuwarah, Marsa Dila, Zawiyah, Khoms, Garabulli, Misrata, Zawiyah), Panel interview with Libyan Coast Guard.
42 Independent partner of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Map 2
Range comparison of unmanned combat aerial vehicles used in Libya

Source: Geospatial Information Section, according to specifications by the Panel of Experts on Libya.

1. Wing Loong II unmanned combat aerial vehicles

108. In paragraph 124 of its 2017 report (S/2017/466) the Panel noted at least one United Arab Emirates Wing Loong I UCAV based at Al-Khadim airbase since at least 24 June 2016. The Wing Loong series of UCAVs were all supplied to the United Arab Emirates after 2011. On 20 April 2019, an air strike took place on the south-west approaches to Al Azizya. The Panel learned from the images of the recovered remnants that the ordnance used for the strike was a Blue Arrow BA-7 (LJ-7) air-to-surface missile (see annex 46). The type of weapons system was then confirmed from analysis of imagery obtained by UNSMIL from subsequent attacks at Camp Moz (20 April 2019), Ain Zara (21 April 2019) and Wadi Rabia (25 April 2019).

109. The BA-7 air-to-surface missile is ballistically paired to be delivered by the Wing Loong II UCAV, and by no other aviation asset identified in Libya to date (see

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116 32°31′50″N, 13°01′17″E.
117 Ballistic pairing is a process that integrates a weapons system into an airframe and then qualifies it for operational use. It requires software upgrades to the delivery system avionics, sighting and release systems to ensure that when the missile is aimed and delivered to a target that it actually follows the correct ballistic trajectory to accurately strike that target. The use of instrumented range facilities is needed for live firing trials to ensure accuracy and confidence in the integrated systems.
114. The Panel has identified a series of 10 flights by two Antonov An-12BK aircraft (registrations UR-CAH and UR-CNT), and one Antonov An-12BP aircraft (registration UR-CGW) that delivered 53.6 tons\(^{131}\) of “drone parts” and other UAV components from Istanbul, Turkey, to Misrata between 27 May and 16 June 2019. For these flights, the aircraft were all chartered by the Turkish office of ProAir-Charter-Transport GmbH\(^{132}\) and operated by Ukraine Air Alliance PJSC\(^{133}\) of Ukraine.

115. The cargo manifests and air waybills identified the consignor for all four transfers as the Embassy of Libya in Ankara and the consignee as the Ministry of the Interior, Libya. Ukraine Air Alliance PJSC specifically instructed the Turkish office of ProAir-Charter-Transport GmbH to ensure that all air carriage documentation was clearly marked “NO DG, \(^{134}\) NO WEAPONS, NO AMMO”, which is not an International Civil Aviation Organization requirement for such documentation. The aircraft Mode S transponders were often not visible on commercial aviation tracking websites once the aircraft left Turkish air space. Full details of the case can be found in annex 49.

116. The Panel finds that these flights transferred components for disassembled Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, and therefore Turkey, Ukraine Air Alliance PJSC, ProAir-Charter-Transport GmbH and the carriers’ agent Plures Air Cargo\(^{135}\) were all in

\(^{131}\) The word “ton” in United Nations documents refers to “metric tonne”.

\(^{132}\) See https://www.proair.de/en.

\(^{133}\) See www.uaa-avia.com.

\(^{134}\) Dangerous goods.

Annex 6: Maps of the conflict \(^3\)

Figure 6.1
Map of the conflict in Tripoli

\(^3\) See appendix A for list of codes for armed groups.
Figure 6.2
Map of the wider conflict in Libya
Technical analysis of physical evidence and determination of EO type

3. The UNSMIL inspection team measured the crater to the side of the runway as 1.0m, 1.4m and 1.6m.

4. Initial reports were that RBK cluster bomb units (CBU) were the EO used for the strike. The Panel supports this reporting based on:

   (1) One recovered fragment (figures 17.2 and 17.3) has a virtually identical profile, shape and approximate dimensions (400mm v 450mm) as that of the nose of an RBK-500 CBU (example at figure 17.4).