3. **Maritime attacks in the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Red Sea**

33. The launch of anti-ship missiles by Houthi or Saleh forces against the SWIFT-1, a vessel flying the flag of the United Arab Emirates, on 1 October and the USS Mason on 9 and 12 October, reported radar locks from the Yemeni coast against coalition vessels, the destruction by the United States Navy of three Yemeni coastal radar sites in Houthi-controlled territory by cruise missiles on 13 October and a maritime attack by unidentified forces against the Spanish-flagged MV Galicia Spirit on 25 October marked a significant escalation in the conflict at sea (see map 2).

34. The Panel considers attacks using anti-ship missiles to be a threat to the peace and security of Yemen, given that such attacks in the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Red Sea area may affect the security of maritime navigation and commercial shipping, thereby jeopardizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen by sea, in

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71. The evidence that the vessels originated from the Islamic Republic of Iran is irrefutable, but that seen by the Panel for the onward shipment of their cargo of weapons to Yemen from Somalia, or transfer at sea en route to divert from a Somali destination to a Yemeni destination is much less firm.

72. None of the interdicted maritime shipments contained munitions other than anti-tank guided weapons (see para. 76). Ammunition supplies are much bulkier than weapon supplies, by at least a factor of 10, because of their rate of use during combat — they require constant replenishment. This suggests that: naval interdiction has been unlucky and illicit ammunition shipments have been missed, which is considered unlikely by the Panel in the context of three seizures of weapons in such a brief time; ammunition is being shipped by air, which is unlikely with the air blockade in place; ammunition is being shipped by road (see para. 75); and/or that there are sufficient stocks already available in Yemen, which, based on black market prices, is the most likely scenario (see para. 79).

73. The Panel cannot, however, entirely discount the possibility that it was planned that the shipments would be cross-loaded to even smaller vessels in Somalia, or off the Somali coast, for onward transit to Yemen. The seizure of three vessels within a
76. The Panel has identified that seizures of anti-tank guided weapons on the land route from Oman to Ma’rib began to be reported in mid-2016. Given that the interdiction risks are high on this route, this is an indicator that the route opened for such trafficking around this time. Table 4 provides a summary of the operational use and seizure of anti-tank guided weapons from mid-2015 to 2016, with imagery provided in annex 37.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{103} For other Iranian weapons observed in individual Houthi use, see annex 38.
Annex 11: Conflict map

[Conflicts map of Yemen and surrounding areas, including data and locations provided by the Yemen Panel of Experts.]

Map No. 4960 UNITED NATIONS December 2018
Data and location source: Panel of Experts for Yemen, United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section
Annex 12: Activity along the border between Oman and Yemen

1. The Panel received from confidential official sources within the coalition indications of Omani support to the Houthi-Saleh alliance designed to sustain their fighting capability. The Panel learned that battle-winning weapons such as anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) and other military equipment are transited through Oman before finishing in the hands of smuggling networks associated with Ali Abdullah Saleh in al Mahrah. The weapons are then shipped across the land smuggling route to the Houthis.

2. Following a number of arms seizures between Eastern Yemen and Ma’rib, the Panel analysed commercially available satellite imagery of the area in order to examine the border crossing point (BCP) between al Mazyunah in Oman and Ashehn in Yemen. On the date when imagery was available (21 September 2016) the BCP was very active with several hundreds of trucks parked awaiting crossing.

3. The Panel received information that the Government of Yemen does not fully control this BCP and that it was the main smuggling point in the area. Although the 137th Infantry Brigade is responsible for security in that area, its Commander and other senior security officials in the Mahrah Governorate administration are supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi.003).

4. The Panel sent a letter to the Government of Oman requesting a visit to al Mazyunah. Oman subsequently verbally informed the Panel that a visit to al Mazyunah could not be arranged.
Al Mazyunah Border, Yemen 21 September 2016 satellite image

OBSERVATIONS on the satellite image 21 September 2016 at 10:05:33 UTM:
Approximately 840 vehicles and trucks are observed on the border checkpoint of Yemen.
Two vehicles are observed on the border 2.17 km south-east from checkpoint.

Image source: WV4 acquisition date 2016-09-21 time 10:05:33 UTM (c) 2016 DigitalGlobe