The relationship between democratic governability, equity and economic
growth, and, in turn, between these dimensions and financing for development is arousing
increasing interest. The Consensus of Monterrey, the best developed version of the
international consensus in this area, stressed the responsibility of each country to
guarantee suitable conditions for financing development, but also stressed the essential
role of international cooperation.
International cooperation is a vital support mechanism for national
efforts and a tool for compensating the imbalances caused by factors exogenous to national
decisions. In relation to democratic governability, it ranges over at least five
closely-related areas, providing: support for building democratic institutions; financing
for integrated development strategies, complementing national resources; concessional
financing, with clearly defined objectives; a contribution to managing economic cycles and
effective anti-cyclical macroeconomic policies; and support for overcoming problems of
high indebtedness.
Within this framework, significant support programmes for consolidating
democratic institutions are being run by the IDB and other multilateral banks, providing
financing for processes such as judicial reform, parliamentary modernizations, stronger
supervisory bodies and improved record-keeping on individuals. In relation to integrated
development strategies, the multilateral bodies must take into account the complementary
nature of their financing, which must thus be subject to the political processes and
social participation mechanisms of the beneficiary countries.
With regard to concessional financing, and in line with the commitments
made at Monterrey, the trend in official development aid over the past 15 years must be
reversed. In Latin America, the consolidation of medium income democracies continues to
need support and international cooperation given their
"The international
financial bodies should provide financing with a clear anti-cyclical aim." |
vulnerability, particularly to financial crises and destabilizing capital
movements, and it is essential that this be recognized.
The experience of pronounced financial cycles underlines the importance of
the mechanisms created by the multilateral financial organizations to compensate for the
effects of sharp shifts in the capital account and the contagiousness of financial crises.
The international financial bodies should not only promote the design of anticyclical
macroeconomic policies but also provide financing for such purposes. One of the most vital
political decisions the Group of Rio should take is to give firm support to consolidating
the existing subregional multilateral development banks, and the Latin American Reserve
Fund (Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas).
To reduce the risks of external financing, debt issues can usefully be
encouraged to include contingency clauses linked to cyclical movements of GDP and/or
commodity prices or terms of trade.
The multilateral institutions must be asked, finally, to continue seeking
viable solutions to the problems of high indebtedness. Such solutions must go beyond the
collective action clauses that Latin American countries have begun to use in new bond
issues, and specifically should seek to resolve satisfactorily the problem of high risk
sovereign debt. In the case of collective action clauses, it is essential that these be
universally adopted and that the Group of Seven countries employ them in all debt issues,
to avoid the mechanism being transformed into a new form of discrimination against
developing countries in the private capital markets.