Brief description of context

General Background

Guyana, roughly the same size as the UK, is the only English speaking country on the mainland of South America. The country is rich in natural resources such as forests, minerals, fauna and flora, and has some of the most spectacular unspoilt wilderness areas in the world, including the majestic Kaieteur Falls. For more than 200 years the economy has largely depended on timber, rice, bauxite, sugar, and to a smaller extent, fish.

Population wise Guyana is a small country with 751,000 people in 182,615 households. According to the 2002 census report East Indians comprise 43.5 percent of the population; persons of African heritage 30.2 percent; those of mixed heritage 16.7 percent; and Amerindians 9.2 percent. Whites, Portuguese, Chinese make up the rest (0.46 percent).

Ninety percent of the population lives along a narrow coastline, which lies below sea level and is protected by sea defences.

Historically Guyana formed part of the three Guiana’s, namely British Guiana (the present day Guyana), Dutch Guiana (Suriname) and French Guiana. Both Suriname (to the East) and Venezuela (to the West) claim parts of Guyana. Brazil lies to the South and is officially connected to Guyana by a single gravel road – the only access to Guyana’s harbours.

History and nature of conflict

The conflict in Guyana is multi-faceted. The fact that national patriotic songs are sung about “One nation, one people, one destiny” and “We’re not giving up...a blade of grass” speaks not only about commitment to overcome ethnic divides, but also about deep pride in the sovereignty of this unique country. Mr Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, reported to
the sixtieth session to the UN Commission on Human Rights as follows on the history of the ethnic conflict in Guyana:

12. Colonization, first by the Dutch (1580-1803) and then by the British (1803-1966), has left Guyanese society deeply scarred by racial stereotyping and ethnic division …

13. …Following the abolition of slavery by Great Britain in 1838, the Africans (estimated at 82,000) refused to accept the pittances offered by their former masters and left the plantations in large numbers, establishing villages along the coast where they cultivated small plantations. The shortage of labour forced the British planters to bring in indentured workers, including Chinese, Portuguese and, in particular, Indians.

14. …Because the Indian indentured labourers accepted the low pay offered by the planters, they were seen as strike-breakers and immediately aroused the Africans’ hostility.

15. The colonial plantation system … gave rise to lasting animosities that hampered the construction of an integrated society…

16. Colonial economic and demographic policy, in combination with the mistrust arising from cultural differences, thus sowed suspicion and hostility between the various ethnic groups… In effect, the British colonial system had created a social hierarchy between the groups, with each group’s social standing determined by its contribution to the plantation economy. The Amerindians, having lost their role as trackers of runaway slaves when slavery ended, were for the most part pushed to the margins of the colonial system and forced back into the jungle. The large numbers of Africans recruited into the forces of law and order were used when necessary to enforce the British system of division, control and dominance, notably in putting down uprisings by Indo-Guyanese farm workers demanding pay rises.

17. By the end of the colonial era, Guyana was thus a de facto multiracial and multi-ethnic country, but one split right down ethnic lines in political, social and economic terms…

18. …It is certainly true that Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese politicians have played on the fears of the communities as a means of attaining their electoral and hegemonic ends.

19. As independence approached, the Afro-Guyanese, who, as a matter of survival and adaptation, had embraced Christianity and obtained a European education, were recruited in large numbers into the civil service, business and the fledgling industrial sector. The Indo-Guyanese, who, having held onto their religious traditions, were excluded from the predominantly Christian British education system for a time, managed to improve their standard of living through rice farming and trade. The Afro-Guyanese were in the majority in the urban centres and the Indo-Guyanese in the rural areas. Thus the country’s two main racial groups, with their legacy of resentment, mistrust, prejudice and fear of subjection, settled into a cyclical struggle to win and remain in power as the ultimate means of survival and self-preservation.

21 United at least in their nationalism against the colonial occupation, the leaders of the two groups did in fact make certain attempts at political rapprochement in the pursuit of a shared vision of the country’s interests. Indeed, the PPP, founded in 1950, was originally a multiracial party led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, of Indian descent, his wife, Janet Jagan… and Linden Forbes Burnham, of African descent. The PPP won the first parliamentary elections with 18 out of the 24 seats. By an internal arrangement, Burnham became the leader of the party while Jagan became leader of Parliament. Disagreements between Jagan and

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http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/ea5e4e3803879ae9c1256e61003c2e0d/$FILE/G0410124.doc
Burnham arising out of their power struggle split the PPP and led to Burnham’s creation of the PNC in 1955. Both parties adopted racial rhetoric in order to sway the sympathies of their main voter base in the communities... Both pre-independence elections, in 1957 and 1961, were won by the PPP, which had a solid Indian electoral base, and Cheddi Jagan became Prime Minister of Guyana’s autonomous Government. But the colonial Power continued to influence the independence process, which it wanted to mould to its own interests. The period between 1962 and 1964 was marked by a series of political and social upheavals and racial violence, with strikes, riots, guerrilla action and political purges... The situation deteriorated seriously in 1963, almost sliding into civil war, following a general strike... which brought about the downfall of Cheddi Jagan. It is thought that at least 700 people (out of a population of 700,000) were killed in 1964 during these political and social upheavals. The racial polarization still so characteristic of political and social life in Guyana dates back to that period.

Some historians attribute the lasting split between Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese to external factors linked to the cold war. They suggest that... the British colonial Power, fearing... that the Marxist-oriented PPP and Cheddi Jagan would allow communism to make further inroads in the Americas, replaced the first-past-the-post electoral system, under which the PPP would have won with the support of Indo-Guyanese voters, by a proportional representation system. The electoral reform enabled Burnham and the PNC to form an alliance with the Portuguese party, United Force, and take power in the 1964 elections... Burnham and the PNC remained in control - authoritarian control, according to some analysts - from 1964 to 1992...

Desmond Hoyte became President after Burnham’s death in 1985. He introduced economic reform policies that helped the country recover from its economic stagnation and decline. Increasing domestic and international pressure, including interventions by Pres. Jimmy Carter, resulted in free and fair elections in 1992 that were marred by violence after the PPP was declared the winner. Election related violence also occurred after subsequent PPP won elections in 1997 and 2001.

As the country braces itself for national elections in 2006 some politicians who promise a new political culture that would reverse patterns of racial voting are positioning themselves as a “Third Force”.

The general public is split not only along racial lines, but also between those who are still prepared to support political parties and those who have given up. “Only God can help this country”, is a popular saying.

Freedom from fear and want remain the most important needs of most Guyanese. People’s prevailing and consistent response is to migrate to the US, Canada or the UK. Guyana has lost 86% of its tertiary educated labour force to developed countries and ranks second among 20 countries in the world with the highest tertiary-educated emigration rates, according to a recent IMF report.2

At the macro level Guyana struggles to stand up against regional economic decline and the effects of international trade barriers and requirements. It is depending on oil for the

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generation of electricity and battles the enormous costs of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure.

Any attempt to analyse causes and levels of crimes as well as assessments of government’s responses and achievements remains a politically sensitive exercise that stirs up sharp differences in interpretation.

People’s tendency to focus only on the negatives impairs their ability to recognise and reward successes of the current government and its attempts to improve the lives of Guyana’s citizens. There have been very promising positive developments in recent years despite serious challenges. Guyana continues to play a positive role in regional and international politics. Domestic inflation has been reduced to single figures and foreign debt to manageable levels. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure have been significantly improved. Parliamentary processes show a slow but steady pace of improvement. Guyana enjoys freedom of expression and media freedom in the sense that private television stations and print media operate freely, provided they comply with the constitution and the laws of the country. However, there is still no Broadcasting Legislation in place.

From Dialogue to Constructive Engagement to National Conversation

“Dialogue”, in the Guyanese context, is commonly associated with failed attempts to secure sustainable agreements. Various efforts during the past 55 years to overcome sharp divisions were unsuccessful or were left unimplemented. For example, there are still items of the 1998 Caricom-brokered Herdmanston Accord and St Lucia Agreement that remain outstanding and unimplemented. The next phase of dialogue came after deterioration in the security and political climate in 2002. The Leader of the Opposition and the President entered into a “Constructive Engagement” process, resulting in a Joint Communiqué and Follow-up Agreement on a plan of action to implement outstanding constitutional reforms and other agreements. For various reasons “constructive engagement” lost momentum.

In April 2005 the only constitutional commission, the Guyana Ethnic Relations Commission (ERC) in partnership with the Social Cohesion Programme organised a conflict transformation workshop for parliamentary political parties. Government, as distinct from the ruling party, other parliamentary party delegations and a few civil society leaders met for two days “to explore and exchange ideas from the conflict transformation perspective to help us collectively chart a peaceful course for the future.” The international resource person was Mr Roelf Meyer who served in the cabinets of Presidents FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela.

The outcomes of the workshop were very positive. All the parties committed themselves to continue the conversation process through a multi-stakeholder forum (MSF). The President called for a “national conversation” – a process that will include civil society in a more comprehensive way. The President and the Leader of the Opposition were both supportive of ongoing efforts to resolve the impasse. Efforts to include civil society in the MSF did not
happen until the end of September 2005. This has caused regrettable delays, which hopefully can be amended, although time is not on Guyana’s side.

**Brief summary of the conflict in Guyana**

The conflict in Guyana is about:

- **Governance**: The right to govern (early 50s and 60s), practice of governance (inclusion/exclusion; “winner takes all” versus consensual paradigm\(^3\)) and the capacity to govern (weak or under performing institutions and lack of control over work ethos, transparency, corruption and violent crime).

- **Leadership**: The (in)ability to unite people around a vision of a prosperous Guyana; and the absence of magnanimity and statesmanship. The UN Special Rapporteur, Mr Diéenne, says in the report: “None of its political leaders have managed, during their various terms in office, to devise a political programme or policy that might encourage interaction between the communities or promote a vision of the nation transcending the racial divides and highlighting shared values and aspirations.”\(^4\)

- **Political culture**: The inability of political parties to rid themselves of perceptions of race-based politics and failure to respond constructively to conflict by proactively seeking mutually benefiting win-win solutions.

- **Mistrust**: The inability to trust the motives and contributions of people other than those from your own group and to earn the trust of others.

- **Overcoming hurts of the past**: Slavery, colonialism and politically motivated violence left deep scars on Guyana’s collective psyche. Recently both main political parties expressed interest in a Truth and Reconciliation type process, but nobody has taken any action.

- **Inequality, socio-economic justice and poverty**: Poverty affects all population groups. Yet, some people perceive the cause of their poverty to be the actions of the other ethnic group.

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\(^4\) Diéenne Report, paragraph 17
Social integration steps and stakeholders (how it progress/regress within six stages of social relations, and who are the stakeholders)

From a *historical perspective* the Guyana case does not seem to fit neatly into the proposed “Stages of Social Integration” model. Social integration is not something unique or new to Guyana as the country seems to have experienced various levels of cohesion, collaboration and coexistence before 1957 when Burnham broke away from the PPP. This split brought to the fore race-based politics that would plague the nation for the next 48 years.

If one accepts the definitions in the “Draft Overview PD-SIP” of 10 October, Guyana seems to have moved during the last 55 years through the stages in the following sequence:

1. **Coexistence** (prior to 1950)
2. **Collaboration** (to form the PPP in pursuit of ridding the country from colonialism)
3. **Cohesion** (in the run-up to the first election)
4. **Polarization** (1953 when Burnham broke away and violence spiralled out of control up to independence in 1966)
5. **Exclusion** (of East Indians during the next 28 years of PNC rule and to a lesser extent since 1992)
6. **Fragmentation** was happening all the time as a common thread throughout the past 55 years.

![Figure 1](image-url)
From the political and social perspectives the Guyana case challenges the model even more.

When politicians play the music, polarisation, exclusion and fragmentation dance by themselves in circles. Coexistence sometimes joins as a reluctant partner. Collaboration and cohesion wonder why they were invited to the dance in the first place. They actually feel more at home at the citizen’s party.

When ordinary citizens play the music, coexistence opens the dance floor. Collaboration and cohesion join in and contribute to a great party, as only the Guyanese can enjoy. Yet, people find it hard to relax because they keep hearing the deafening noises from the politician’s party next door.

There are very few places where politicians across the divides and ordinary Guyanese celebrate together. However, there are notable exceptions, one of which is at the Bourda Cricket Ground. The other is Mashramani, the Independence Day celebrations carnival.

In the political arena, politics seems to have a schizophrenic relationship with collaboration and cohesion, with cohesion being the more elusive and absent partner. Politicians talk about cohesion, but the electorate see them as the cause of fragmentation and exclusion. The irony is that politicians are able to find common ground and can even collaborate if and when the situation suits them. Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham joint forces to form the PPP when it faced the challenge to free Guyana from colonialism. Politicians will stand united on the issues such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, or preparations for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. But where policies for socio-economic development and servant leadership need this kind of collaboration and cohesion, one is more likely to find exclusion and polarization instead.

If the next elections again cause large-scale violence it will contaminate a whole new young generation who does not have vivid memories of the large-scale violence that occurred during the sixties and seventies. This could lead to extreme fragmentation, undoing a lot of the cohesion-building efforts so far.

**Limitations of the social integration model**

The division of stages into “negative” and “positive” stages does not seem to capture the multi-dimensional interactive dynamics of conflict. The so-called “negative elements” and “positive elements” are part and parcel of the same dynamics, just as protons, electrons and neutrons are essential components of an atom. The tension between good and evil, positive and negative energy, peacebuilders and destroyers will always be there. Another image that comes to mind is an ocean wave: It has low and high points, it changes continuously, and is constantly on the move. Similarly, conflict comprises both “negative” elements such as fragmentation, exclusion and polarisation, and “positive” elements such as coexistence, collaboration and cohesion. Even in the midst of the “negative” elements such as
fragmentation, exclusion and polarisation there are people and forces that refuse to be sucked into destruction and chaos. One would almost always find people or groups that operate as social adhesive, often against the popular discourse of “either-or” or “against-for” thinking. In Guyana, for example, there has been inter-religious dialogue and educational and sports integration throughout the past 40 years.

It would be interesting to explore whether or to what extent the model could be applied as a tool for stakeholders to determine at which stage(s) social relationships are when the tool itself is a two-dimensional (positive/negative), one-directional (from fragmentation through chronological stages) model. The tool does not seem suitable to gauge dynamic and interactive processes where all six stages could be present at the same time albeit in varying forms and intensity.

Furthermore, progression from fragmentation to eventual cohesion as the model suggests, does not have to move sequentially from one stage to the next. Relationships between stakeholders can migrate from anyone of the “positive” stages to anyone of the “negative” stages (or vice versa). While it is true that conflict can erupt suddenly and without any warning, it is equally true that, given a few identifiable conditions of good process, peace can also erupt. The peace process in Mali demonstrated how the energy released from a wise decision by the President to invite citizens to help stop the civil war turned the disaster around in a relatively short space of time. The possibilities for success were highly enhanced through the immediate implementation of solid developmental and locally owned processes and clearly defined roles. Simultaneous situations of fragmentation, exclusion and polarization moved rapidly towards almost simultaneous situations of coexistence, collaboration and cohesion. One of the keys to the Mali success story was the fact that politicians stayed out of local peace conferences. Citizens were able to own the process and the solutions. They were able to celebrate immediate successes and control over follow-up processes by the people affected by the outbreak of peace.

Where is Guyana?

Applied to the Guyana situation, it would seem that Guyana is in the transition between polarization (with political mobilisation along ethnic lines, but without overtly hostile social relationships) and coexistence (with ordinary citizens increasingly calling for peaceful coexistence). Locked in power struggles political opponents hardly collaborate. Yet, all of them would talk about the need for cohesion and prosperity. Unlike the Malians, ordinary Guyanese have not yet experienced the freedom to design their future in the absence of party-political interference in spaces free from political contest and blame. The first taste of such an experience was when the Constitutional Review Commission drafted a progressive constitution that enjoys the support of all Guyanese and during the parliamentary political parties conflict transformation workshop in April 2005.
Who are the stakeholders and what roles are they playing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Roles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The two main political parties (PPP/C and PNCR – the other parties are very small and have little influence on the general direction of the country)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government (national, regional and local)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society, which is also split along racial lines and generally fragmented and very weak</td>
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<tr>
<td>The business sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>The academic community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen’s groups (e.g. “social partners” and “citizen’s initiative”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Guyana Ethnic Relations Commission, a constitutional commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>The media, split along political allegiances and state/non state media;</td>
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<tr>
<td>The international donor community</td>
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<td>The UN</td>
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Dialogue procedures (variety of tools) used

The dialogue procedures will be described in two phases: before and after the start of the Social Cohesion Programme (SCP) in May 2003. During December of 2002, a multi-donor, multi-UN agency mission\(^5\) visited Guyana to assess the need for and nature of a possible intervention to help Guyana towards a more stable and peaceful future. This mission led to the establishment of the SCP, administered by the UNDP, in May 2003. The Government of Guyana and the UN agreed that the SCP would contribute to building capacity towards the peaceful resolution of disputes, increased human security and the implementation of political agreements.

Before May 2003 dialogue attempts focused on the issue of negotiation—“Talk to each other because you have to!”—in order to avoid chaos and implosion. It was important to break the deadlocks and to get the top leaders to talk to each other. This was done through

a) direct dialogue attempts initiated by the leaders (e.g. the joint communique in 2003);

b) third party facilitation such as the Caricom brokered Herdmanston Accord and the subsequent St Lucia agreement in 1998;

\(^5\) UNDESA, DPA, RBLAC, BCPR, UNHCR, DFID, CIDA, EU
c) using the high offices of the Commonwealth and President Carter to influence leaders to enter into negotiations;

d) citizens’ initiatives to raise the profile of the need for constructive engagement (e.g. the Social Partners Initiative); and

e) citizens’ advocacy attempts to develop codes of conduct for political parties and the media during election times.

*During and since 2003* the SCP focused on processes that would make dialogue – “talk to each other because you want to” – a logical and safe thing to do.

### A framework for developmental cohesion building

The approach of the Social Cohesion Programme has been greatly influenced by the Development Practice Framework, developed by Cape Town based Community Development Resources Association. The SCP has adapted the framework to reflect its approach to develop and sustain a multi-dimensional and dynamic dialogue process that continuously moves through the following phases:

1. **Building relationships of trust**
   
   One on one discussions with key stakeholders, especially the political leadership, are of critical importance. Consistent transparency, solid processes, regular feedback, non-partisanship and knowledge sharing all contribute to trust in the process.

2. **Gaining understanding of the situation and accepting responsibility for the change**

   **Developing shared understanding**
   
   Attempt to stay clear of giving advice without entering into in-depth conversations where the focus is on the development of a shared understanding of the contents and the process: What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats at the physical, procedural, relationship, cultural, and identity levels?

   **Ensuring local ownership of and accepting responsibility for constructive and peaceful change**
   
   In many developing countries outsider organisations contribute to disempowerment of nationals. They often send missions who consult locals and then implement programmes on the basis of one-sided analysis. This practice often results in low levels of local ownership by the people who are affected by the initiative. Every single

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6 [www.edra.org.za](http://www.edra.org.za)
peacebuilding activity needs to involve those who are affected by the initiative from the inception phase right through to the evaluation and feedback phases. The message should always be that outsider organisations are there to support locals in developmental and sustainable ways.

3. **Facilitating transformation**

**Facilitating of high quality transformation processes**
Once relationships are strong and people understand and own the problems, processes and desired outcomes, they are much more likely to be committed to transforming the current situation. At first they may need assistance with facilitation (which outsiders could temporarily provide), but the aim should be to empower strategic role-players to design, lead and facilitate transformation processes. The programme has now entered a phase where trainers are being trained to respond to a growing demand for workshops to help bring about positive change. The SCP has also developed a checklist of criteria to measure key elements of social cohesion.

**Resolving the future**
A key element of capacity building work is to help people visualise a future characterised by positive peace and justice. It is a matter of finding inspiration in imagining changes that currently seem insurmountable.

4. **Grounding and support to ensure institutional strength**
Weak institutions produce weak results. Investments in building people’s capacity can be eroded if their networks and institutions remain locked in old paradigms. Conflict transformation and peacebuilding need to be accompanied by inputs from organisational development resource institutions. People need to be assisted to put commitment into continuing and disciplined practices (implementation).

5. **Review contents and process**
It is important to review not only the *what* (content), but also the *how* (process) and progress *with* partners instead of *for* them.

6. **Learning lessons toward improved future strategy and practice**
In addition to and as part of the review process, it is important to discover and record the lessons learnt for the sake of improved future actions. Successful implementation is dependent on good planning. Good planning draws on lessons learned. Lessons learned follow thorough review and thorough review is based on the action that was planned.
7. **Appropriate systems and support**

The challenge here is to guard against dependency (on the UN). Peacebuilding assistance need to promote the idea of sustainable and locally owned systems and then supports local partners for the long run in coordinated and collaborative manners.

8. **Building capacity for and enhancement of active or servant leadership.**

Ongoing capacity building discussions and workshops focus on the issue of leadership as a critical component. The style of leadership is often culturally bound. Servant leaders are leaders who plan and act with the well being of their people in mind while listening closely to their inputs and feedback. Leaders need to serve as they lead.

**The application of the framework in practice**

Examples of SCP activities through this approach are the following:

- The creation of safe spaces to explore ways forward (e.g. media round tables, workshop for political parties, ongoing discussions with key role-players);
- Strengthening ownership of and commitment of stakeholders to sustain efforts to develop a national conversation;
- Capacity building in conflict transformation, human rights, facilitation and process design;
- Sending opposing senior and party youth leaders on training courses together;
- Peace education workshops with youths and educators;
- Psycho-social support for victims of trauma;
- Support for community based cohesion building initiatives;
- Support for UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination in Guyana;

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7 More than 250 people representing the political youth arms, parliamentary political parties, Ethnic Relations Commissioners, religious and cultural leaders, trade unions, youths from Region 4, the private sector commission, magistrates and judges, NGOs, and RDC councilors attended conflict transformation workshops. At the time of writing, a group of 24 participants have completed the first training of trainers courses in facilitation and process design. Some of these participants have already done workshops with Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs) and head teachers of schools in Region 3. The group has formed a Spirit of Guyana Movement – an open forum for peacebuilders to continue to meet, take initiatives, coordinate and enhance their skills and understanding. Several ideas are currently pursued, including peace campaigns and training at community level.
• Technical support to government departments and the Ethnic Relations Commission;
• Support for cohesion building initiatives in the Regional Development Councils (RDCs);
• Support for the Caribbean Millennium Development Goals Business Initiative;
• Strategic planning workshops for the private sector and trade unions; and
• Facilitative assessments by a UN core group.

The core group, comprising of UN officials from headquarters (see footnote 2) visits Guyana once a year and has recently helped the Social Cohesion Programme develop a Strategy for the Prevention of Election Violence in 2006. This strategy is currently under discussion with the Government of Guyana and other national stakeholders. Key elements of the strategy are the following:

a) **Ensure national ownership**, through respectful, considered and relevant engagements with Guyanese and their institutions.

b) **Support key nationals** to lead and contribute to efforts aimed at preventing electoral violence.

c) **Facilitate coordinated approaches** for the national and international Development Partners

**Positive and negative changes**

The most important positive change is support for a national conversation process at the political level. An important contributing factor is the fact that political role-players have had a positive experience of the workshop in April. The workshop, despite initial hesitations, created a safe space that focused on joint exploration instead of debating and political contest. The challenge for the SCP is to stimulate the emergence of a credible civil society facilitation group that can work with political parties and the ERC to move the idea of a national conversation forward.

Another positive change is the fact that the two youth arms of the two dominant political parties have committed themselves to develop a joint calendar of activities and to dialogue as the first response on issues of fundamental differences. The two youth leaders expressed appreciation for the fact that the SCP did not drive the programme. Rather, they were able to move at their own pace without pressure from outsiders.

The third positive change is the change in language. Politicians and civil society commonly talk about the need for cohesion. The challenge is to help people visualise a country where people live in harmony and positive peace.
The fourth positive change is better collaboration and synergy in the international donor community between the latter and government institutions within the framework of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. UNDP continues to play a facilitative role in this regard.

The last positive change, even though unrelated to the impact of the SCP, is the very high level of inter-racial marriages and social interaction. The percentage of “mixed” people has grown from nine percent to seventeen percent in the last decade. This upward trend is happening almost in defiance of the negative efforts to fragment and divide and its significance could very well accelerate the change process.

The Social Cohesion Programme is committed to promoting social change towards social integration and cohesion.

Chris Spies [chris.spies@undp.org]
Peace and Development Advisor, on behalf of the Social Cohesion Programme team at UNDP Guyana

10 November 2005