Economic and Social Council

 Distr. GENERAL
10 July  1997
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Substantive session of 1997
Geneva, 30 June-25 July 1997
Agenda item 8


         SPECIAL ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE

                 Review of the capacity of the United Nations
                      system for humanitarian assistance

                        Report of the Secretary-General


                                   CONTENTS

                                                             Paragraphs   Page

  I.  INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1 - 11      2

 II.  UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK FOR HUMANITARIAN
      COORDINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 - 34      4

III.  CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM
      TO RESPOND TO COMPLEX CRISES. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35 - 79     10

      A.  Early warning, contingency planning,
          preparedness, information and rapid response. . . .  35 - 45     10

      B.  Local capacities/relief and development . . . . . .  46 - 49     12

      C.  Resource mobilization and United Nations
          financial capacity for humanitarian assistance       50 - 60     13

      D.  Accountability, monitoring and evaluation of
          humanitarian activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61 - 65     16

      E.  Human resources management and development issues    66 - 71     17

      F.  Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72 - 79     19

 IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80 - 91     20



                               I.  INTRODUCTION

1.    The escalation in the past decade of ruthless internal conflicts
and the phenomena of imploding State structures have changed
dramatically the context in which humanitarian actions are undertaken.

2.    In its resolution 1995/56, the Economic and Social Council urged
the United Nations humanitarian system to review its capacity to
respond to humanitarian crises and disasters.  Since then the
United Nations humanitarian system, in collaboration with non-
governmental, bilateral and international organizations, has assessed
its effectiveness and considered options for overcoming limitations and
enhancing its capacity to respond to crises.

3.    Since the adoption of Council resolution 1995/56, the governing
bodies of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) have examined and
in many instances adopted recommendations to strengthen their
organizational capacity, as well as to encourage cooperation with the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) of the Secretariat and other
organizations to ensure a coherent system-wide approach to humanitarian
assistance.

4.    The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) undertook a detailed
review of systemic issues most relevant to a coherent system-wide
approach.  The deliberations and decisions of the governing bodies of
the United Nations humanitarian organizations were considered during
these inter-agency consultations.  The main objective of IASC in
undertaking this review was to move towards a more strategic approach
to humanitarian assistance that would not only enable members of IASC
to respond better to crises but would also focus on capacity building
and enhance support and linkage with recovery and rehabilitation
activities -  a strategic approach that would contribute to the peace-
making and peace-building efforts of the United Nations.  The review
process by the Council in itself was useful in fostering an improved
culture of cooperation among members of IASC.  In preparing this
report, due weight was given to the deliberations, conclusions and
recommendations of IASC.

5.    The highly volatile nature of today's conflicts and resultant
threats to regional peace and security have brought about an increased
role for the Security Council.  Yet there is rarely sufficient
consensus within the international community to address the root causes
of these crises.  Given the political context, it is fitting that IASC
has adopted an approach to coordination that recognizes the importance
of an integrated response to crises wherever possible.  However, one
must recognize that without political action, humanitarian activities
are but a palliative.

6.    Humanitarian activities take place in a political environment and
thus are affected by and affect that environment.  One must ensure that
there is effective provision of humanitarian assistance and that it is
provided in an impartial and appropriate manner that meets the
differing needs of intended beneficiaries.  Within the United Nations,
the challenge is to respect humanitarian principles and the distinct
nature of the humanitarian endeavours, while ensuring a coherent
approach among the political, security, and humanitarian sectors.

7.    Civilians are increasingly subject to intentional human rights
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law.  People in
need are denied access to humanitarian assistance for reasons of
political and military expediency.  Massive population displacements
result from these violations;  how to ensure respect for international
humanitarian law by warring parties is a growing challenge.  The
humanitarian community is also grappling with an ambivalence towards
its role with respect to human rights.  Some fear that reporting human
rights abuses will jeopardize humanitarian access to the victims
thereof and worry that judging who is responsible for human rights
abuses will impede the ability to act with impartiality and neutrality. 
Others believe that humanitarian action can be credible and effective
only when the protection of basic human rights is ensured.  The
specific issue of the protection of women's human rights in times of
conflict is also a complication that has not been addressed adequately.

8.    The abuse of humanitarian assistance and resources and the
targeting of humanitarian aid workers through harassment, hostage-
taking and murder are increasing.  Attacks on aid workers have varied
objectives:  disrupting negotiations, preventing humanitarian workers
from helping the "enemies", and removing potential witnesses to
atrocities.  Such abuse and attacks further complicate the provision of
humanitarian assistance.

9.    Effective provision of aid and targeted prioritization are
dependant on a comprehensive analysis and understanding of the impact
of conflict on different segments of society, on gender relations, and
on the distribution of power within communities.  Much of the current
critique of the international response to crisis has focused on the
lack of attention to these dimensions and their policy implications.

10.   The most important challenge facing the humanitarian community
remains the provision of coherent, effective, and timely assistance to
those in need.  Improved coordination among and between national
bodies, the United Nations and the international community is essential
to better serve those in need.  It is with these ends in mind that 1995
and 1996 saw intense debate by humanitarian organizations both within
and outside the United Nations.  The Joint Evaluation of Emergency
Assistance to Rwanda and the review engendered by Council resolution
1995/56 were the two most prominent catalysts to this debate.  

11.   The present is an interim report, describing the setting and
focusing on the capacity of the United Nations humanitarian system to
respond to complex crises.  The report does not, at this stage, address
institutional issues or include specific recommendations.  These issues
will be dealt with and IASC recommendations drawn upon, in the first
instance, in the report on United Nations reform that will be presented
to the General Assembly on 16 July.  They can be further pursued in a
subsequent report to the Council, should it so request.


         II.  UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK FOR HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION 

12.   It is the responsibility of each national authority to meet the
humanitarian needs of its citizenry, but the scope and nature of a
crisis often require the support of the international community.  This
section presents the framework through which the United Nations
responds. 

13.   In the humanitarian field, organizations have either sectoral or
target-group specific mandates that could lead to intersection and
overlap if not addressed through coordination.  A review of recent
experiences of complex emergencies has revealed certain gaps in the
system.  While progress has been made on furthering complementarity in
action, the issue of gaps remains a critical one.

14.   In the context of crises, UNHCR and UNICEF have mandates to
protect and assist refugees and children; WFP, FAO and WHO have
sectoral mandates in food aid, food and agriculture, and health care. 
UNDP has a role in fostering sustainable development practices. 
Coordinating responsibilities for humanitarian assistance rest with
DHA.  United Nations operational organizations are generally involved
to varying extents in all three phases of an emergency:  pre-crisis and
prevention, crisis, and recovery.  Even if mandates are very clear, it
is obvious that overlap may occur.  The gaps in mandates within the
United Nations humanitarian system requiring critical attention are: 
(a) the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons; (b)
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (c) mineþrelated
activities; and (d) the provision of common services.  Other gaps
include joint contingency planning, assessments and training.  In such
cases, the humanitarian needs are addressed on an ad hoc basis,
although sometimes without the optimal experience and expertise.

15.   In order to enhance coordination and improve response
effectiveness, particularly in avoiding duplication and minimizing
gaps, humanitarian organizations have entered into Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) 1/ and other bilateral agreements to clarify
division of responsibilities.  These agreements recognize and rely on
each organizationþs comparative advantages and special skills.  They
aim to give consistency and predictability to the relationship between
organizations.  Aspects elaborated include joint contingency planning,
joint assessments and the development of standards and guidelines. 
These agreements are also important for accelerating response in
emergency situations.  IASC should review current MOUs and similar
agreements and encourage new ones.

16.   Progress has been made in clarifying and furthering relationships
between United Nations humanitarian organizations and those outside the
United Nations system.  Thus bilateral agreements govern relationships
between various United Nations entities and non-governmental
organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 2/ the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
and the International Organization on Migration (IOM).  Some of these
understandings are meant to be global, others are region-specific.  In
addition, several organizations are actively strengthening their
cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions.

17.   The General Assembly, in its resolution 46/182, established IASC
to serve as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination and to
formulate and guide coherent and timely United Nations responses to
emergencies.  IASC is responsible for the development of system-wide
humanitarian policies, and for ensuring an integrated, strategic
approach for complex emergencies.  It determines priorities and
allocates responsibilities, including the selection of humanitarian
coordinators.

18.   The members of IASC are the heads or the designated
representatives of the United Nations humanitarian organizations (UNDP,
UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO and WHO).  In addition, there is a standing
invitation to IOM, ICRC, 2/ IFRC and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the NGO consortia the
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), InterAction and the
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) to attend.  The
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons
and the Bretton Woods institutions are invited to participate on an ad
hoc basis, as appropriate to the subject-matter.  The work of IASC is
supported by a number of subsidiary bodies, including the IASC Working
Group.

19.   The effectiveness of IASC to serve as the primary mechanism for
inter-agency coordination rests on the premise that its members are
committed and accountable to the Committeeþs decisions and processes. 
As the chairperson of IASC, the Emergency Relief Coordinator has a
special responsibility to ensure that the Committee functions
effectively.  For IASC to function effectively as a central policy and
operational decision-making forum, it requires effective administrative
and substantive support.

20.   NGOs are an integral part of the humanitarian assistance
activities of the United Nations.  Their field workers, in most cases,
are the ultimate service providers, working as implementing partners
with United Nations organizations.  Three NGO consortia - InterAction,
ICVA and SCHR - contribute actively to debate within IASC and thus add
their collective knowledge and experience.  The consortia see a serious
need to improve cooperation among members of IASC if disaster victims
are to receive adequate assistance and donor funds are to be spent
prudently and effectively.  These organizations will continue to
participate actively in the work of IASC.

21.   The magnitude and complexities of emergencies over the past five
years have clearly demonstrated the critical role of the Emergency
Relief Coordinator in the coordination of humanitarian assistance.  The
Coordinator reports to the Secretary-General and interfaces with the
Department of Political Affairs and the Department of PeaceþKeeping
Operations and with the Security Council.  The growing need to deliver
humanitarian assistance in internal conflicts and other insecure
environments has underscored the importance of the Coordinator in
advising the Secretary-General and the Security Council on the
humanitarian perspective of the overall United Nations response to
these crises.  The Coordinator must ensure a wellþcoordinated,
effective and rapid system-wide response to emergencies, as well as
assume a global advocacy role to facilitate a United Nations response
that addresses the political, security and humanitarian dimensions of a
crisis, while upholding the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian
assistance.

22.   DHA provides support to the Emergency Relief Coordinator in
discharging his/her coordination responsibilities for complex
emergencies and natural disasters.  In this regard, DHA assists the
Coordinator to ensure the coordination of United Nations response to
complex emergencies and natural disasters, to ensure clear and timely
division of labour among United Nations operational agencies, to
support advocacy for humanitarian principles and issues, to promote
best practices in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to
identify and assign responsibility for gaps within the humanitarian
response.  The responsibilities of DHA also encompass prevention,
mitigation and response to natural, technological and environmental
disasters.

23.   The exponential growth in humanitarian assistance requirements
and the burgeoning complexity of crises, combined with the sheer
numbers of organizations responding, demand more intensive levels of
consultation, cooperation and coordination at the field level.

24.   Historically, the Resident Coordinator has assumed the role of
harnessing humanitarian assistance.  However, in complex or overtly
political situations, such as Cambodia, southern Sudan, northern Iraq
and the former Yugoslavia, special arrangements were put in place on a
case-by-case basis, including the designation of a lead agency to
coordinate the international humanitarian response.  In several recent
emergencies, such as Angola and Liberia, Humanitarian Coordinators have
been appointed separate from the Resident Coordinator.  In other cases
the two functions have been carried out by the same individual.

25.   IASC examined a number of different coordination arrangements. 
Distinctions were made between strategic and operational coordination. 
A unitary system of coordination based on the resident coordinator
system was considered desirable in order to provide better linkage
between relief and development assistance, avoid duplication, and
streamline coordination structures.  IASC would be fully involved in
the selection and appointment of such humanitarian coordinators.  IASC
further considered that the resident/humanitarian coordinator should
not have operational responsibilities and should be accountable to the
Emergency Relief Coordinator.  Furthermore, the responsibilities of the
humanitarian coordinator should be delinked from the responsibility of
the resident representative of UNDP.  Certain circumstances, however,
may still require the appointment of a humanitarian coordinator
separate from the resident coordinator.

26.   Where there is a special representative of the Secretary-General
with overall responsibility for United Nations system activities in
country, IASC highlighted the importance of clearly defining the
relationship between the resident/humanitarian coordinator and the
Special Representative as soon as possible.

27.   International assistance and protection for tens of millions of
internally displaced persons are hampered by the absence of a coherent
and organized response to their needs.  The protection of internally
displaced persons is the responsibility of the individual government,
but where the national authorities are unable or unwilling to provide
this, humanitarian organizations have found it necessary to give
protection to this most vulnerable population in the context of their
humanitarian assistance.

28.   Over the past few years, United Nations agencies and partner
organizations have strengthened their capacities to address the needs
of internally displaced persons.  Assistance and protection have been
provided to such persons as a vulnerable population within the mandates
of United Nations agencies or, in the case of UNHCR, on a case-by-case
extension of its mandate.  However, no agency has a global or
comprehensive mandate to assist and protect internally displaced
persons, nor are there satisfactory arrangements at Headquarters or in
the field to coordinate assistance.  

29.   In 1994, DHA was assigned the role of the focal point in the
United Nations system for action against landmines.  Its task includes
advocacy for the global banning of mines and support for mine clearance
activities, mobilizing resources, promoting capacity-building for mine
action programmes, and management of the Voluntary Trust Fund for
Assistance in Mine Clearance Activities.  

30.   Relevant United Nations organizations and increasing numbers of
NGOs are involved in various aspects of humanitarian mine clearance and
mine awareness/education activities.  ICRC is also very active in
advocating for the ban on landmines and caring for victims of
landmines.  In the field, therefore, DHA aims to ensure that all
elements of the United Nations mine programme are in place, that
priorities have been negotiated and established and that the programme
is executed efficiently and effectively.  In consultation with the
national Government, United Nations agencies and NGOs, DHA works out
the necessary division of responsibilities among operational
organizations, taking into account their comparative advantage and in-
country capacity.  

31.   Precipitate exit from a humanitarian assistance programme may be
as damaging as one that is too late.  If survival conditions have not
been attained or security guarantees for the population are not in
place, early exit may trigger further conflict and place populations at
risk and create new humanitarian crises.  However, a delayed exit might
have similar consequences and delay long-term, sustainable solutions if
the beneficiaries have become dependent on humanitarian assistance and
have expectations that the Government is unable to satisfy. 

32.   A strategy is also required that outlines the criteria and
process under which humanitarian assistance participants exit a complex
emergency.  Prerequisites for the implementation of an exit strategy
include a significant reduction in the number of civilians impacted by
the emergency, a successfully negotiated peace settlement and an end to
hostilities, resumption of social, political and economic activities,
restoration of human rights, and the existence of a government capacity
to nurture and protect the population.  

33.   If a peace agreement is signed, the existing humanitarian
coordination structure should be reviewed immediately in the light of
changing objectives, scope and impact, focusing on the need to bridge
humanitarian assistance with rehabilitation and reconstruction
programmes.

34.   The resident/humanitarian coordinator should be charged with
determining, in consultation with the in-country team and the
Government, whether conditions exist for a total or partial exit of
humanitarian participants.  The final decision should be made by IASC.


            III.  CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
                  HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO
                  COMPLEX CRISES 

              A.  Early warning, contingency planning, preparedness,
                  information and rapid response

35.   An early warning capacity within the humanitarian sphere is a
tool to improve decision-making in anticipation of crises.  If linked
to timely and decisive response mechanisms, early warning can assist in
preparing for and even preventing crises. 

36.   Building on their areas of expertise, several agencies have
developed early warning systems for specific crisis circumstances.  For
example, monitoring of food supply and demand (through the FAO Global
Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS)),
health (WHO) and refugee movements and numbers (through databases like
the UNHCR REFWORLD) helps warn the humanitarian community of potential
crises.  The Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) of DHA draws on
the work of existing early warning mechanisms within and outside the
United Nations system and brings sectoral information together with
more specific socio-economic and political information.  UNICEF and
UNDP aim at prevention by identifying and addressing underlying
vulnerabilities and several agencies' field presence plays an important
role in their early warning capacity. 

37.   Much improvement has taken place in the development of
information processes serving the system but information exchange could
be further improved to strengthen the early warning capacity.  To this
effect, the interþagency consultations on early warning should be
resumed and the conclusions fed into the IASC process in order to
facilitate contingency planning and preparedness.

38.   Much of the effectiveness of the initial response to an emergency
depends on the contingency planning and preparedness activities carried
out in response to early warning signals.  Contingency planning
includes identification of possible emergency scenarios, their
differing impacts and resulting humanitarian needs, evaluation of
existing capacities and actions needed to strengthen capacity, and
overcoming or mitigating obstacles to effective response.  Contingency
planning should be followed by countryþspecific preparedness actions. 

39.   The past two years have seen an increasing acceptance of the need
for more systematic implementation of contingency planning and
fieldþlevel preparedness.  The United Nations system should also
increase understanding and garner support from local authorities for
concrete preparedness actions. In addition, there is a critical need
for the development of a common interþagency methodology for
contingency planning to provide a basis of common planning parameters. 
To the extent feasible these efforts should involve as wide a range of
humanitarian partners as possible, including NGOs.  

40.   United Nations international and national staff in-country
typically handle the immediate response and are the core around which
the subsequent emergency response effort is built.  If a rapid increase
in in-country staff capacity is necessary, United Nations agencies use
various rapid deployment staffing mechanisms, including stand-by teams,
and sometimes supplement these with experienced staff from outside the
United Nations system or with United Nations Volunteers.  United
Nations agencies have generally developed adequate capacity to rapidly
deploy necessary staff and relief and logistical support materials
(vehicles, personal support kits, etc.). 

41.   Special mechanisms to handle fast-breaking emergencies at
Headquarters level include de facto task forces that integrate and
coordinate Headquarters activities and emergency situation centres that
act as focal points for information processing, reporting, and
management coordination of the agency's response.  Individual agencies
have also established special emergency administrative, financial,
procurement and other support procedures in order to accelerate their
emergency response.  However, within the United Nations Secretariat,
most rules and procedures are not conducive to rapid response.  More
streamlined United Nations system procedures for rapid recruitment, and
more flexible procedures in general should be pursued.

42.   Many United Nations agencies have decentralized their operations
through increased delegation of authority to the field, combined with
setting up or markedly strengthening regional and sub-regional offices. 
The merits of decentralization include quicker response to field needs,
greater sensitivity and understanding of local conditions and enhanced
ability of the in-country team to take timely and effective decisions,
under the leadership of the resident/humanitarian coordinator.

43.   Although contingency planning and implementation of situation-
specific preparedness measures are inexpensive activities and can be
extremely beneficial should an emergency actually occur, inadequate
funding remains an important constraint to their development.  Efforts
should be encouraged to include funding for preparedness actions in
consolidated appeals in the context of an ongoing emergency.  However,
this approach is not viable for actions needed before a sizable complex
emergency.  Possible alternatives include the setting up of trust
funds, utilization of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, broadening
the authority of United Nations agencies to utilize standby emergency
funds, and increasing the level of funds provided for these purposes.

44.   In any crisis, each United Nations agency collects and
disseminates information and analysis on its mandated sector and the
implementation of their humanitarian activities.  In order for the
humanitarian coordinator and the Emergency Relief Coordinator to carry
out strategic planning, coordination and advocacy, they must have
timely and accurate information and analysis to inform their decision-
making.  In addition, the humanitarian coordinator is also expected to
collate, analyse and disseminate information on the crisis.  

45.   In response to the information gap that existed during the
earlier stages of the crises in the Great Lakes region of Africa, DHA
formed the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) to manage an
up-to-date flow of information to and from humanitarian participants
engaged in the Great Lakes region.  IRIN synthesizes and analyses
information from a wide variety of sources.  An IRIN/West Africa is now
being established.  DHA has also developed ReliefWeb as a platform for
field and Headquarters information related to crisis preparedness and
response.  ReliefWeb consolidates and organizes information on current
humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters and makes this
information immediately available on the Internet. 

                  B.  Local capacities/relief and development

46.   The importance of mutually supportive actions addressing relief
and development aspects of emergency situations has been recognized as
critical to saving lives and sustaining livelihoods.  Collaborative
actions in volatile conditions contribute to averting conflictþrelated
emergencies, mitigate against further deterioration of support systems
and establish early foundations for recovery.  Development activities
can take place effectively side by side with emergency activities in
many crisis situations.  Organizations such as UNICEF and WFP with
mandates for both relief and development have a useful advantage in
efforts to link relief and development.

47.   Populations and institutions stricken by emergencies often resort
to a variety of coping mechanisms that, while inadequate, provide a
means of survival.  Recent programme reviews and evaluations have
highlighted negative consequences of relief assistance and its
potential to undermine local capacities.  At the same time, additional
experience has been gained in identifying ways and means by which
relief assistance can strengthen local capacities, including those of
women and women's organizations, thus helping to underpin longerþterm
processes of recovery.  As emphasized by the World Food Summit,
although the provision of free relief goods is often needed to address
the threat of immediate starvation, such relief distributions should be
approached with greater caution.

48.   Over the past two years, the Consultative Committee on Programme
and Operational Questions (CCPOQ) has undertaken an extensive
examination of the role of the United Nations system in post-conflict
situations.  The review identified the need to develop a comprehensive
approach covering action (a) during both crisis and post-crisis
conditions, (b) linking relief and development, and (c) involving
extended partnerships with other external participants and with
national and local authorities.  IASC has, at the same time, adopted a
number of important principles and agreements aimed at enhancing the
consideration of coping mechanisms and capacities in United Nations
relief operations.  Full complementarity with the IASC review has been
ensured through crossþparticipation between CCPOQ and IASC working
groups.

49.   The Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) has supported
the need for parallel and complementary actions.  It concurred that
relief and development programmes must overcome divisions reflected and
reinforced by the separation of approaches, budgets and functions.  ACC
has also endorsed the need for broad elements of a strategic framework,
concentrating on three primary components:  analysis of inþcountry
environment; setting of policy parameters; and the establishment of
priorities for the response programme.  The formulation of this
framework will be flexible and pragmatic.  

             C. Resource mobilization and United Nations financial
                capacity for humanitarian assistance

50.   The success of collective response to humanitarian crises depends
not only on a wellþcoordinated and integrated plan of action, but also
on the availability of the human, material and financial resources
necessary to ensure that timely assistance is provided.  With
increasing demands on donor resources, there is a demand for an
approach to resource mobilization that meets prioritized needs within a
broader framework - one that sets clear goals, helps to better address
the causes of the crisis, and forges the links with recovery.
Financial capacity and emergency funding mechanisms

51.   Over the past few years the variety and scope of mechanisms for
funding of humanitarian assistance programmes, and in particular rapid
response to crises, have increased significantly.  At present, United
Nations organizations resort to trust funds, the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund, agency specific emergency funds, and voluntary
contributions to finance their response to crises.  Individual
organizations have, over the past year, provided their governing bodies
with comprehensive information on their own financial capacities,
highlighting enhancements and areas where additional strengthening or
flexibility is required.

52.   One of the primary mechanisms designed to ensure the rapid
response of United Nations organizations to an emergency is the Central
Emergency Revolving Fund managed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator. 
Since the Fund was established in 1992, a total of US$ 124 million has
been disbursed, of which $111 million has been reimbursed.  The Fund
has maintained a solid financial standing and has been utilized by
operational organizations of the United Nations system on 48 occasions
to meet urgent relief requirements.

53.   Of  the disbursements, $109 million (88 per cent) were made
during the period 1992 to 1994.  In 1995 and 1996, only six advances
were requested by United Nations operational agencies, representing a
total of $11.8 million.  Requests for utilization of the Fund over the
past two years have declined dramatically for several reasons.  The
absence of a waiver for high-risk loans (i.e., where there is no
assurance of reimbursement from a donor) has made agencies reluctant to
borrow from the Fund in fear of not being able to repay the balance. 
Also, individual organizations have made efforts both to increase their
own internal emergency resources and to minimize those administrative
procedures which in the past precluded action in advance of the actual
receipt of funds.  Finally, fewer large-scale emergencies have occurred
during this period than in the first three years of the Fundþs
existence.

54.   During the current review process, recommendations were
formulated to create a "second window", which would enhance the
capacity of organizations to meet priority needs, particularly in
critically under-funded sectors and in less visible situations where
donor support is less forthcoming.  There has, however, been reluctance
among donor countries to accept such a proposal.  Consultations are
required to provide options on how the Fund could be structured to
ensure its continued effectiveness.  IASC has proposed that NGOs that
have been identified as implementing partners within the consolidated
appeal should be able to access the Fund.

During the emergency

55.   The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) remains the single most
important mechanism for coordinating and facilitating the capacity of
the United Nations system to meet its emergency resource requirements. 
During the period of 1992 to 1996, a total of $10.4 billion was made
available through 68 appeals launched by DHA.

56.   An extensive review of the CAP has been undertaken with the
objective of formulating recommendations on how it can best enhance
individual agency initiatives within a common framework of
collaboration, integration and prioritization.  One theme that has
arisen repeatedly has been the fundamental importance of developing a
strategic framework that sets clear goals for the humanitarian
programme and provides a holistic approach incorporating relief and
development where appropriate.  The CAP - a field based programming
process - serves as a resource mobilization tool for the implementation
of the strategic framework.  IASC has identified the responsibilities
of agencies and the resident/humanitarian coordinator for ensuring
prioritization, emphasizing the importance of the country level
consultations in setting the priorities.  It was also agreed that
relevant activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights should be included in the CAP.

57.   While re-affirming the CAP guidelines, IASC organizations have
agreed that there is a lack of coordination between resource
mobilization and planning processes in the relief and development
community.  This results in gaps, delays and/or duplication of efforts. 
An approach that allows relief and development-oriented aid to co-exist
in a mutually reinforcing manner is essential.  Rather than creating
new mechanisms which might cause further compartmentalization in
funding approaches, the CAP should be expanded to cover rehabilitation
and recovery requirements.  The Emergency Relief Coordinator and the
Administrator of UNDP, in consultation with IASC, should examine ways
of operationalizing this approach. 

58.   Traditional dichotomies in donor funding pockets may hinder the
provision of resources to meet simultaneous relief and development
needs, as well as to address rehabilitation and recovery activities. 
Obtaining resources for transition activities presents a further
challenge as there has been a downward trend in financing available for
development cooperation. Another problem is the slowness in donor
disbursement procedures for rehabilitation and recovery. 

59.   While the integrated programming approach of the CAP should be
strengthened, it must be recognized that when resources are inadequate
for certain sectors or types of activities, the effectiveness of the
overall humanitarian programme is compromised.  Failure to provide
assistance for rehabilitation activities, such as in agricultural
recovery, risks the creation of relief dependency syndrome among
persons affected by crisis and may result in increased assistance
requirements at a later date.

60.   In recognition of the fact that there must be a mechanism for
rapidly mobilizing resources wherever a new emergency exists, the DHA-
coordinated flash appeal mechanism will be utilized within 10 days of
the crisis in order to secure immediate first-phase funding.   If
necessary, this should be followed by a fully-developed strategic
framework and a consolidated appeal.  The relationship between the
programmes and funding requirements in the flash appeal and the CAP
must be clarified.

               D.  Accountability, monitoring and evaluation of
                   Humanitarian activities 

61.   The main task of monitoring is to measure the progress of
activities and output against established schedules and factors from
which changes in the programme can be decided.  Because of the greater
complexity of today's humanitarian programmes, monitoring should pay
particular attention to inter-relationships of projects and components
and to the effectiveness of management and coordination arrangements.

62.   The past two years have witnessed a spate of initiatives in the
United Nations system, in inter-governmental organizations, and within
the donor and NGO communities aimed at increasing the accountability of
humanitarian assistance providers vis-a`-vis both the donors and the
recipients of assistance.  Individual donors and NGOs are also
increasingly concerned with the need to regulate humanitarian
activities through verifiable training standards, personnel practices
and reporting procedures.  

63.   IASC has agreed that simple field-based monitoring systems should
be established in all complex emergency situations in which the United
Nations system is involved in order to facilitate accountability, to
optimize utilization of resources, to avoid duplication of effort and
to adapt to changing circumstances. The establishment of the system
will be an interþagency effort carried out under the leadership of the
resident/humanitarian coordinator.  It is intended to reinforce
existing monitoring activities carried out by operational organizations
for various sectors or target groups.  Efforts should be made to ensure
the full participation of NGOs and donor representatives as well as
national and local entities of governance in the programming and review
process.  It is essential that the resident/humanitarian coordinator,
in collaboration with all relevant participants, set objectives with
clear benchmarks of assistance.

64.   Monitoring should be seen as an integral part of the programming
cycle - its outputs are essential for re-programming and re-assessing
priorities.  The guidelines for consolidated appeal preparation, if
fully applied, provide a coherent framework and programming structure
against which progress and constraints could be measured.  Therefore,
the process of monitoring should be clearly stated in the consolidated
appeal for a country, and resources required for monitoring identified
in the CAP.  Also, the monitoring system should be coupled with
tracking by DHA of funding of consolidated appeals to form the basis of
a consolidated reporting system on the direction and performance of the
humanitarian programme.

65.   One of the advantages of a joint monitoring capacity is that it
will provide a sound basis for more in-depth lessons learned and
evaluation exercises. Ideally, such monitoring will automatically lead
to systemic evaluation of humanitarian programmes.  IASC plans to
devote one of its forthcoming sessions to the issue of lessons learned
and evaluation as well as the possibility of maintenance of an inter-
agency mechanism.

             E.  Human resources management and development issues

66.   The United Nations system for humanitarian response can only be
as effective as the people assigned to implement it.  Thus, it is
essential for the United Nations system to recruit, train, support and
retain the best staff available to work in crisis situations. 

67.   Recognizing the difficulty of rapidly obtaining sufficient
qualified personnel for deployment in crisis situations, IASC has
adopted a number of recommendations aimed at increasing the flexibility
and professionalism of the humanitarian response.  These
recommendations encompass ways to simplify recruitment procedures,
calling for further development of rapid response teams, standardized
evaluation, and provision of adequate entitlement packages. 

68.   With increased emphasis by the agencies, both the quantity and
quality of training has improved in recent years.  Individual agencies
are responsible for and appropriately provide the preponderance of
training on emergency technical and sectoral issues to their staff. 
Training in better contextual analysis of the emergency situation and
gender sensitization remain a priority for all training initiatives. 

69.   All agencies participate actively in workshops to facilitate
national capacity-building and strengthen in-country coordination,
which are conducted through the Disaster Management Training Programme
(DMTP) and, jointly organized and sponsored by UNDP and DHA.  United
Nations agencies participate in the newly formulated DMTP Steering
Committee and contribute to the design of programme modules. 
Additional training for the United Nations system, also involving in-
country counterparts, is provided by the United Nations Staff College
Project through its programme of training in support of a coordinated
response for countries experiencing crisis.

70.   On a system-wide basis the Complex Emergencies Training
Initiative (CETI) is the main inter-agency forum in which training on
general issues of humanitarian assistance is discussed; policy
questions that arise are referred to the IASC (Working Group).  CETI
focuses on fostering teamwork and a culture of cooperation and
coordination.  IASC has identified several areas in which CETI should
continue to prepare training materials and identify additional training
resources for field staff. 

71.   The conditions under which much humanitarian assistance is
provided - isolation of humanitarian staff from their families, risk of
illness and injury, and increasing insecurity -  are resulting in a
steady rise in stress and health problems.  IASC recommendations
include provision of adequate insurance coverage and address the fact
that local staff are the most vulnerable, yet with contracts and
security arrangements that are significantly less supportive than for
international staff. 

                                 F.  Security

72.   In fulfilment of the responsibilities entrusted to them by
Member States, United Nations personnel have increasingly performed
their functions in extremely hazardous conditions not normally
encountered in the past.  This is particularly true in areas where
government authority is not adequately exercised or is non-existent. 
Whereas in the past personnel were assured protection by virtue of
their association with the United Nations, staff are now increasingly
at risk because of such association.  In addition, actions by the
United Nations in one part of the globe can generate threats to
United Nations personnel in another.

73.   As a result casualties have mounted.  In 1992, one staff member
was killed every month; in 1993, the rate was one every two weeks, and
in 1994, it exceeded one a week.  In 1995 and 1996, the numbers dropped
back to one a month.  By 1 March 1997, there had been nine fatalities
or more than four per month.  From 1992 to the present, over 131 staff
members have lost their lives and 119 have been taken hostage.  

74.   The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the
concerned United Nations agencies have therefore acted to strengthen
the United Nations  security system.  For example, there has been an
increase in the number of professional level Field Security Officers
who work under the direct supervision of the Designated Official (a
senior official, normally the United Nations Resident Coordinator,
responsible for security of United Nations staff and property at the
duty station) and the United Nations  Security Management Team.  These
Security Officers may be funded through a cost-sharing mechanism, or be
employed directly by one of the United Nations  agencies.

75.   Based on the recommendation of the 1996 Ad Hoc Inter-Agency
Meeting on Security, the Administrative Committee on Coordination
approved measures developed by The Office of the United Nations
Security Coordinator (in collaboration with the participating United
Nations entities), such as streamlining the recruitment of Field
Security Officers, sharing security-related information, and
development of a standardized system-wide security training programme. 

76.   The cost of providing security and dealing with related stress
cannot be seen as an optional item in the budgets of agencies whose
staff are being asked to risk their lives for the United Nations. 
These security-related costs, are still relatively small in relation to
the total costs of United Nations relief efforts.  However, too often
such costs are questioned or under-funded, whether the funds are sought
by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator or by one of
the organizations of the United Nations system.  Member States are
requested to provide the resources needed for such priority items as: 
adequate number of professional Field Security Officers, computers and
telecommunications equipment, protective equipment and security stores,
security training for all staff, and adequate systems for helping staff
dealing with critical incident stress.

77.   Members States can also assist with advocacy actions directed at
promoting the safety of United Nations staff and providing resources.  

78.   Organizations of the United Nations system are sometimes the
targets of accusations of serious lack of impartiality and active
involvement in local affairs by local officials.  This is often fuelled
by unwarranted criticism from the central government.  Member States
should intervene in these circumstances, reminding governments of the
United Nations principles of neutrality, and the commitment to it of
the agencies involved. 

79.   The militarization of all refugees and internally displaced
persons camps should be strongly condemned and governments should be
requested to deal with such circumstances as a matter of urgency.  The
international community should be prepared to provide the necessary
assistance and expertise to do this - if so requested.  The result
would probably be a great saving in lives and resources and a quicker
return by refugees to their countries of origin.


                        IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

80.   As the end of the twentieth century approaches, the international
community is reminded that the creativity and capacity exist to make
extraordinary advances in science and technology, but the commitment
and commonality of purpose have yet to be demonstrated that would put
an end to warfare, growing marginalization, and the vulnerability of
millions of people.

81.   This is a time of dramatic change but one of the enduring
characteristics of the post-Cold War period is the way in which crises
and conflict continue to disrupt and destroy the lives and livelihoods
of civilians.  Providing humanitarian assistance in todayþs crisis
zones demands not only an efficient relief delivery system but a
capacity to protect vulnerable populations in order for them to survive
in a hostile environment, and also the capacity to avoid becoming a
substitute for the action necessary to eradicate the roots of conflict. 

82.   In todayþs world of increased internal strife, disputed
authority, disintegrating state systems, and the breaking apart of
societal structures, the political agenda of conflicting parties is
often difficult to determine.  Injustice, political oppression, human
rights abuses, social and economic inequalities, and the absence of
democratic freedom and development opportunities are often part of a
complex mix of underlying factors contributing to conflict.  In many
instances, warfare is triggered and sustained by the manipulation of
fears and animosities that may have little bearing on real or perceived
grievances; group identity along ethnic or communal lines has become
the rationale for intolerance, racism, hatred and such repugnant
concepts as "ethnic cleansing".

83.   In war zones where there are no front lines; when whole
communities and population groups become "the enemy" and the aim of
warfare is to destroy and displace them, it is vital to reconceptualize
threats to the peace and the role of humanitarian action in alleviating
suffering.

84.   In a time when humanitarian action has, as never before, faced
levels of abuse, distortion and cynicism, the decision of the Council
to request a study of the United Nations relief system was both timely
and prescient.  The outcome of this exercise must not be seen as an end
in itself but as an important contribution to the wider endeavour of
strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to tackle the
causes as well as the consequences of crises.

85.   An improved capacity to respond to humanitarian needs depends not
only on the effectiveness of the United Nations relief system to help
those in need of assistance to cope with crises but also on the
commitment of Member States to deal with the problems which generate
upheaval and political turmoil.

86.   The phenomenon of protracted and growing displacement, warfare
that targets civilians and demolishes communities, and the
disintegration of political, institutional and economic structures in
crisis countries all point to the need for a better understanding of
crises and their adverse impact on vulnerable communities.  Increased
attention to the gender dimensions of conflict and crisis is important. 
There is an equal need to understand the impact of life-saving and
life-sustaining interventions geared to mitigating and undoing the harm
that characterizes contemporary crises.

87.   This review and several other recent studies, including the
Multi-Donor Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda,
highlight the importance of improved accountability on the part of all
those involved in crisis management.  There is a general concern that
current approaches are inadequate and greater effectiveness needs to be
achieved in addressing the immediate longer-term requirements generated
by crises.

88.   The humanitarian community has already taken steps to develop
common standards and indicators essential for determining the overall
impact of multi-sectoral interventions on intended beneficiaries, with
particular emphasis on the way in which relief action strengthens or
undermines indigenous capabilities and recovery processes.

89.   Within the humanitarian arena, there needs to be a stronger
capacity to monitor the overall direction and effectiveness of
humanitarian operations, including the way in which funding and
resource allocation decisions affect the realization of a coherent
response.

90.   In line with the larger United Nations system reform, greater
attention and resources need to be made available to developing a
deeper understanding of crises, including the way in which policy
emanating from different fora impact on the humanitarian endeavour.  A
commitment to improved accountability necessitates specific steps to
utilize lessons and insights gained from different experiences in a
manner which leads to improved policy and our collective ability to
respond effectively to crises.

91.   This report will not be complete without paying a special tribute
to the United Nations staff and other humanitarian workers who have
lost their lives in the line of duty in bringing relief to human
suffering.  The United Nations is indebted to and proud of the
thousands of humanitarian workers who continue to provide relief to
disaster victims in increasingly insecure environments world-wide.


                                     Notes

1/  MOUs and similar agreements currently exist between WFP and UNICEF, FAO
and WFP, and between UNHCR and each of UNICEF, WFP, UNDP and WHO; cooperative
links are being developed between WHO and UNICEF.

2/  Since the creation of IASC, there has been certain ambiguities as to the
exact responsibilities and commitments of the non-United Nations members which
have a standing invitation to participate.  ICRC has given consistent proof of
its commitment to cooperation, while stressing its independence towards policy
statements issued by the IASC and its subsidiary bodies.

  

Date last posted: 29 November 1999 12:16:05
Comments and suggestions: esa@un.org