

Funding for United Nations Development Cooperation: Challenges and Options

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Foreword

Over the past decade, the world has witnessed a radical transformation in international development assistance. The international development architecture continues to evolve rapidly, presenting both opportunities and challenges to United Nations development cooperation. There is an upward increase in levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and “new” resources are often being allocated through “new” mechanisms. Funding needs for the United Nations development system should be considered in light of the overall trends in financing of multilateral organizations involved in development cooperation activities.

Increasing the volume of financial contributions and improving the ways in which those contributions are secured is essential to United Nations system efforts to help Member States achieve their internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In development cooperation, the role of the United Nations system focuses not on financial aid, but on building national capacity. Continuing to perform that role effectively will require three essential ingredients: (i) strong unearmarked or “core funding”; (ii) good management practices; and (iii) corresponding reforms within the United Nations system.

The publication explores and aims to stimulate debate on the various funding options for increasing financing for the operational activities of the United Nations system in development. Activities of the system are key components of efforts to implement the global development agenda emerging from United Nations conferences and summits. The analysis highlights the need for a strong commitment to mobilize a “critical mass” of resources to enable the United Nations system effectively to play its supportive role at the country-level, helping developing countries to translate global objectives into their national development strategies.

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The context

Funding for the United Nations system's operational activities for development should be seen in the context of the current development challenges facing the international community.

The Secretary-General, in his report to the high-level segment of the 2005 session of the Economic and Social Council (E/2005/56) emphasized the need to gear the work of the entire United Nations system towards the advancement of the broad United Nations development agenda, of which the Millennium Development Goals are a major, integral part.

The United Nations system continues to be an important source of intellectual leadership on development. Building on this role, its accumulated country-level experience, the substantive capacities of its structures and staff, the fundamental characteristics of its operations (that is, their universal, voluntary and grant nature, their neutrality and their multilateralism), its flexibility and its respect of and support for national ownership enable it to provide a unique service to developing countries. Because of these characteristics, the system is especially well suited to assist Governments in making effective use of external development support. The system is also expected to exercise leadership, especially in supporting national development capacity, although, in order to enable developing countries and the international community to reap the full benefit of this contribution, it is imperative that it be provided with adequate resources to effectively perform its key role in development.

In the 2000 Millennium Declaration, and in the 2005 World Summit Outcome of the General Assembly, world leaders expressed confidence that humanity could, in the years ahead,

make measurable progress towards development, security, disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance.

In the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005), and in the 2005 World Summit Outcome of the General Assembly, each developing country with extreme poverty was called upon to adopt, by 2006, a comprehensive national development strategy to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015. The Secretary-General also called on all developed countries that have not already done so to establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance (ODA) by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5 per cent by 2009.

The global partnership for development advanced in the Millennium Declaration and furthered in the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 is based on mutual responsibility and accountability of all actors, Governments, United Nations organizations, international financial institutions, the private sector and civil society to work together to achieve the agreed development goals. The Secretary-General has urged all Member States and other development actors, including the organizations of the United Nations system, to scale up action to make this global agenda genuinely operational and capable of producing concrete results.

This requires both major domestic efforts as well as increased international support. All types of resources for development, national and international, public and private, financial and human, technological and organizational, will need to be mobilized at the required levels.

There are some positive trends in this global partnership. Policy reforms and improved governance have become watchwords throughout the developing world. There have also been recent improvements in the overall levels of ODA, which reached \$78.6 billion in 2004 (0.25 per cent of the national income of donor countries). This is encouraging, especially after years of declining trends. Nevertheless, levels of ODA still fall short of the 0.33 per cent of the late 1980s, and the long-standing

target of 0.7 per cent.¹ However, most of the increase is associated to debt write-offs, expenditures on security and emergency relief, and the effects of currency fluctuations². In addition to the five countries currently meeting or exceeding the 0.7 per cent target, seven more donors have pledged to reach the target before 2015. Moreover, the European Union announced in May 2005 its decision to set a new, intermediate target for ODA of 0.56 per cent by 2010 (corresponding to \$50 billion), in order to achieve 0.7 percent by 2015. Thanks to new commitments, ODA is now expected to increase from \$80 billion in 2004 to \$130 billion in 2010. This decision represents additional funding of €20 billion euros by 2010.

In his report, "In larger freedom" the Secretary-General noted that, although "the most direct way to increase ODA volumes is to allocate increasing shares of donor countries' national budgets to aid", new ways to scale-up development financing are well worth exploring.³ At the initiative of Algeria, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany and Spain, a "menu of options" has been developed.⁴ In the same broad context, the Secretary-General, in his report for the High-level Plenary Meeting in September 2005, has supported the launch of the International Finance Facility (IFF) proposed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Facility is intended as a temporary framework, which would cease financing new operations after 15 years, with a further period of 15 years required to repay all borrowings. In an effort to apply the principles of the IFF on a smaller scale, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden have committed nearly \$4 billion to support the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm), and the first disbursement is expected at the end of 2005 or the beginning of 2006. Another example of innovative initiative is based on a solidarity contribution levied on airplane tickets. In launching that initiative, France has proposed to create a pilot scheme that would serve as a showcase

1 That target was reaffirmed at the International Conference on Financing for Development. See *Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico 18-22 March 2002* (United Nations publication, sales No. E.02.II.A.7), chap. I resolution 1 annex. See also A/59/2005, paras. 48-53.

2 See *World Economic and Social Survey 2005*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Chapter IV on Official Development Financing.

3 A/59/2005, para 51.

4 See also the *World Economic and Social Survey 2005*, page 134.


of the feasibility of innovative financing mechanisms while, at the same time, contributing to meet urgent financing needs (such as the fight against HIV/AIDS).

Even significantly higher levels of ODA will however not suffice to achieve the Millennium Development Goals unless they are combined with higher quality, better delivery, more effective use of resources, simplified and harmonized operational processes reduced transaction costs and enhanced national ownership.⁵

Donors have introduced changes in aid modalities, increasing the use of sector-wide approaches and budget support modalities (general or direct budget support) that significantly affect the way in which development cooperation is programmed, organized, delivered and financed. In both cases, the relationship between governments and donors is altered: government leadership is enhanced; development cooperation is integrated within a government-led policy, document or strategy; and national procedures for disbursement and accountability become applicable to all donors. Donors participate in these new modalities by pooling their financial support in “baskets” that support the overall sector programme or the general budget, moving away from single project funding or area-based programmes, and providing non-earmarked funding consistent with the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and other international goals. In programme countries, these new modalities will require a substantial expansion of national capacities to ensure sound programming and prioritization of the use of funds. This, in turn, is likely to increase the demand for the services of the organizations of the United Nations system, in particular for national capacity-building in development management.

⁵ In the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability” of 2 March 2005, 91 countries and 25 international organizations made specific pledges to enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid, agreeing to introduce “indicators” to monitor progress in terms of ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability.

Figure 1: Distribution of official development assistance (average 1992-2003)



Despite recent signs of improvement in overall levels of ODA, not all the channels through which ODA is transmitted have performed equally well. Concern has been expressed in different United Nations governing bodies that donors may be increasingly favouring other channels over the United Nations to achieve common goals. Indeed, most donors that have increased their ODA commitments have done so through their bilateral cooperation programmes, selected multilateral organizations and the increasing use of thematic global funds. The fourteenth replenishment of the International Development Association for the period from 2006 to 2008, agreed in February 2005, shows an overall increase in commitments authority of 25 to 30 per cent over the thirteenth replenishment

New mechanisms, such as multi-donor global funds, have been quite successful in mobilizing resources in the pursuit of specific objectives. Created to target specific, well-defined goals, global funds often are a prime example of public-private partnerships, since they may include not only public but also private resources. These funds have attracted significant volumes of resources for global purposes, benefiting from broad support from the general public in donor countries because of their easily understood purpose, and making an important contribution to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Grant-based contributions originating from the private sector and civil society (including charitable foundations, corporations, specialized

research institutions and other types of non-governmental organizations) are acquiring a growing importance.

While global funds are an increasingly important source of funding for some agencies of the system, they constitute supplementary contributions and should not be seen as a substitute for the basic flow of core or regular resources. Additionally, the relationship of such funds with the United Nations system needs to be carefully established and managed. Global funds work closely with the United Nations system and the World Bank, but utilize distinct governance systems. As it continues to work with global funds, the United Nations system should further explore the most effective institutional and operational ways of relating to them.

The role that the United Nations system is called upon to play in development is unique. New and growing demands on its services result not only from the overall pursuit of the United Nations development agenda but also from the specific new aid modalities being introduced by the donor community. It is essential, under these circumstances, that enhanced bilateral cooperation, increased funding for the international financial institutions (particularly the International Development Association), and the expanded role of global funds be pursued in such a way that they are not in competition with but rather complementary to, funding for United Nations development cooperation.

The Key Problem

The volume of voluntary contributions for United Nations operational activities is often decided at the tail end of the donors' decision-making process. Instead of being a function of the quality and priority of the United Nations programmes, funding is thus determined on the basis of the volume of funding that remains unallocated once donor agencies have taken care of assessed and negotiated contributions and other commitments to other development cooperation entities. Ways must be found not to perpetuate this situation.

Action to ensure that the level of United Nations development cooperation funding is adequate should be accompanied by measures to introduce much greater predictability and long-term stability to such funding.

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
Funding for United Nations development cooperation: overall trends

“Core” and “non-core” resources

Overall contributions to the organizations and bodies of the United Nations system for development assistance have grown slightly over the period from 1992 to 2003 (see figure 2), amounting to an average of 11 per cent of total ODA over the whole period and to 13.4 per cent of total ODA in 2003.

Figure 2: ODA contributions from Governments and other sources to the United Nations system and non-United Nations multilateral organizations for development cooperation (1992-2003)

(Billions of United States dollars)



These positive trends were mostly the result of the expansion of supplementary funding, while “core” resources

represented a declining share: only 39.9 per cent of total contributions to the United Nations development system for the period 1996-2003, and 33.2 per cent in the year 2003. (See Figure 3)

A note of caution on the overall estimates of contributions for United Nations development cooperation

Positive trends of overall contributions to the United Nations development system for their country-level activities for development should be interpreted with caution, since they overestimate long-term development cooperation of the United Nations system. This is because they include:

(a) Contributions to humanitarian assistance channelled to World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), among others, although they are not part of the strict definition of operational activities for development used by the General Assembly, which refers only to long-term development activities. Both flows are classified as ODA but humanitarian assistance should not be confused with long-term development efforts; and


(b) Contributions to the United Nations system from national governments or entities or other multilateral organizations that are channelled through organizations of the system only to make use of their administrative services (e.g., procurement or personnel recruitment) in exchange of a fee for the agencies.

It could be questioned whether these activities, although they may be relevant to the mandates and priorities of the United Nations organizations that are involved in them, are genuine development cooperation efforts. Contributions that amount to mere financial intermediation or pure provision of management or consulting services should however been excluded. It is, however, difficult (if not impossible) to isolate these purely "fiduciary services" from other joint operations, which are genuine efforts to combine, in a participatory way, development contributions from more than one partner, often labelled as "multi-bi" operations, cost-sharing, joint ventures, joint activities, joint programmes, or self-supporting "cash" contributions of national authorities.

When we include also contributions from other multilateral institutions, there is an obvious problem of double counting.

Figure 3: Share of “core” and “supplementary” resources to the United Nations system for development cooperation (excluding WFP): 1996-2003

(Average percentage)



Notwithstanding the strong commitment of a few donors to the “core” budgets of United Nations funds and programmes, “core” resources of the United Nations system did not grow significantly over the period from 1996 to 2003⁶ in nominal terms, fluctuating at around \$2 billion a year, except for a net increase in 2003. Supplementary funding has, on the other hand, registered a pattern of continuous growth across the United Nations system, reflecting a marked preference of donor countries for this funding method. (See Table 1).

6 We had to exclude the World Food Programme data from these statistics, since WFP undertook a major reclassification in 1999 between “core” and “non-core” resources that would have altered the entire analysis.

Table 1: Contributions to the United Nations system’s operational activities for development (excluding WFP): core and other resources

(Millions of United States dollars)

	<i>Total contributions</i>	<i>Core resources</i>	<i>Other resources</i>
1996	4 165.7	1 987.0	2 178.7
1997	4 329.1	2 197.2	2 131.9
1998	4 784.7	2 076.3	2 708.4
1999	5 406.2	2 125.7	3 280.5
2000	5 707.3	2 129.5	3 577.8
2001	5 981.3	1 969.4	4 011.9
2002	6 231.5	2 152.5	4 079.0
2003	7 673.2	2 544.5	5 128.7

This is evident even more in figure 4, where the lower area under the curve for “core resources” has remained constant while the supplementary resources are constantly growing.

Figure 4: Contributions to the United Nations system’s operational activities for development (excluding WFP): “core” and supplementary resources

(Millions of United States dollars)





Figure 5 shows that the share of “core resources” as compared with “supplementary resources” has been declining overall between 1997 and 2003.

Figure 5: Share of “core” or supplementary resources for the United Nations system (excluding WFP)

(Percentage)



Regular or “core” resources are expected to cover the basic operating infrastructure of an organization, meeting basic expenses that are fundamental for fulfilling its institutional mandates, ensuring an adequate country presence and securing a platform for its country-driven programme activities. **The insufficiency of core resources for both administration and programme development represents the single most important constraint on the performance of development entities of the United Nations system.**

The role of supplementary resources has increased for all organizations of the system, although some organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and some specialized agencies have become more dependent on “non-core” or “supplementary” resources than others.

The General Assembly has repeatedly highlighted the need to enhance the “core” or regular” part of the contributions to the United Nations development system in order to guarantee the availability of those capacities that are required to promote longer-term development cooperation. At the same time, the Assembly has not ignored the increase in “non-core resources” as a mechanism that supplements the means of operational activities for development and an important vehicle to increase the total resources available for the operational activities for development of the system. The contributions that are classified as supplementary resources also include essential inputs that

complement the “core” resources, letting the organizations of the system achieve more ambitious development cooperation goals. Supplementary resources”, however, should only be in addition to the level that guarantees the basic performance of an agency, given its institutional functions and mandates and, to use the terminology of the General Assembly in paragraph 20 of its resolution 59/250, “are not a substitute for core resources.”

The notion of “core” and “supplementary” resources

Total contributions can be classified in two groups: (a) “regular” or “core” resources, and (b) “extra-budgetary” or “non-core” or “supplementary” resources. The General Assembly refers to these categories as “core” and “non-core” resources.

The notion of “core”, which originated within UNDP, is currently used for comparison by other funds and programmes as well, since they introduced a common structure for the presentation of their budgets. The term “core resources” is not used by specialized agencies and other United Nations entities, which prefer the notion of “regular” budget.

The notion of “regular” or “core” resources is, in general, associated with a parallel concept of “regular” or “core” budget, which is expected to fund those expenses that are fundamental for the existence of the organization and its institutional mandates.

While most United Nations funds and programmes apply similar definitions of “regular” or “core” resources, the use of the expression “regular” resources across the system may differ, especially if the approval of the “regular budget” for one organization is associated with a specific funding modality. For example, in particular, contributions of “regular” resources to several specialized agencies are often assessed contributions, while “extra-budgetary” contributions may be funded with voluntary contributions (e.g., with trust funds).

“Core” contributions and supplementary funding by selected organizations

Table 2 compares “core” and “supplementary” resources in selected agencies or groups of agencies.

Table 2: Ratio of “core” and “supplementary” resources over total contributions by selected agency or group of agencies

(Percentage)


	<i>Average (1996-2003)</i>		<i>2003</i>	
	<i>Core resources</i>	<i>Other resources</i>	<i>Core resources</i>	<i>Other resources</i>
UNDP*	34.8	65.2	27.6	72.4
UNFPA	80.0	20.0	77.0	23.0
UNICEF	52.5	42.7	47.5	57.3
Specialized agencies	33.9	66.1	32.7	67.3

* This includes only contributions to UNDP and excludes other UNDP-administered funds.

The contributions to the regular budgets of the specialized and technical agencies have shown a slightly rising trend below the overall \$500 million mark, except in year 2003 (see figure 6). In general, there is clear evidence that “extra-budgetary” contribution to these agencies as a support to their operational activities for development grows much faster than “core resources.”

Figure 6: Assessed and extra-budgetary contributions to the United Nations specialized and technical agencies: 1993-2003

(Millions of United States dollars)



Comparing “core” resources with other ODA flows

The comparison of the contributions to “core” resources of the United Nations system (excluding WFP) with other international ODA flows shows a situation which is less positive for the United Nations system than would emerge from the conclusions reached on the basis of the overall contributions to the United Nations system for development cooperation. This is evident from table 3.

Table 3: Comparison between “core” contributions to UN development cooperation (excluding WFP) and total ODA, non-United Nations multilateral ODA and bilateral ODA (1996-2003)

(Millions of United States dollars and percentage)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
UN system “core” resources	1 987	2 197	2 076	2 125	2 129	1 969	2 152	2 544
Total contribution to UN system (“core” and supplementary resources)	5 499	5 542	5 832	6 973	7 278	7 775	8 138	10 493
Non-UN multilateral ODA	17 827	18 003	18 735	19 156	20 089	20 085	21 502	25 197
Ratio UN system “core” to non-UN multilateral ODA	11.1%	12.2%	11.1%	11.1%	10.6%	9.8%	10.0%	10.1%
Bilateral ODA	39 928	33 253	35 935	38 378	36 847	36 033	43 463	52 832
Ratio UN system “core” to bilateral ODA	5.0%	6.6%	5.8%	5.5%	5.8%	5.5%	5.0%	4.8%
Total ODA	56 698	49 628	53 124	54 259	54 877	53 612	61 493	72 307
Ratio UN system “core” to total ODA	3.5%	4.4%	3.9%	3.9%	3.9%	3.7%	3.5%	3.5%

While the overall contributions to the United Nations system, including those to WFP, represented 13.4 per cent of total ODA, contributions to its “core” resources (excluding WFP) represent only 3.5 per cent of the total ODA. In comparative terms, those to non-United Nations multilateral organizations account for 18.8 per cent of ODA, while bilateral cooperation represented 67.7 per cent of total ODA. Similarly, the overall contributions to the system amounted to 71.4 per cent of the volume of contributions to non-United Nations multilateral organizations in 2003, whereas “core” resources (excluding

WFP) were only 10.1 per cent of those contributions to non-United Nations multilateral ODA.

A comparison of contributions of the United Nations system and flows for bilateral cooperation shows that “core” resources (excluding WFP) represented only 4.8 per cent of the level of bilateral programmes in 2003, while the ratio of overall contributions to the United Nations system (**US \$10,493 million in 2003**) and bilateral cooperation (**US \$52,832 million in 2003**) reaches almost 20 per cent of the bilateral ODA efforts.

The contributions to “core” resources of the United Nations system, therefore, play, in relative terms, a much more modest role in international financing for development as compared with other flows.

Core resources and unearmarked resources

The distinction between “core” resources and supplementary resources is often used as a proxy to define the notion of “unearmarked contributions.” Only “unearmarked contributions” allow an agency to align the allocation of its resources to criteria that fully depend on its priorities, as opposed to “earmarked contributions” (often considered an alternative expression for “tied-aid”), which would tie the utilization of a contribution to a specific pre-determined use. For that reason, the General Assembly stressed that “unearmarked contributions are vital for the coherence and harmonization of the operational activities of the United Nations system.” (para. 20 of resolution 59/250). Earmarked contributions, however, can be tied to themes that are central for the institutional mandates of the agency. Moreover, it should be recognized that while “core resources” are by definition “unearmarked”, supplementary resources are not necessarily “earmarked”, since they may be of both types.

3

Modalities of funding for United Nations development cooperation

A. Modalities for core/regular resource funding: assessed contributions and multi-year financing frameworks

The regular budgets of the specialized agencies, based on assessed contributions, have been locked at historically low levels because of the application of zero or no nominal growth policies. This has constrained their ability to adjust their core capacity to support their response to the new demands emerging from the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals. Given the instability of funding for the United Nations funds and programmes, the specialized agencies can no longer rely on contributions from these funds and programmes to finance their own “extra-budgetary” activities, as used to be the case until the early 1990s.

Multi-year financing frameworks⁷ were designed, *inter alia*, to reduce the volatility of voluntary contributions to the largest programmes and funds. While these instruments have been effective as planning devices, establishing links between resource benchmarks and targets on a multi-year basis, and thus both relating resource requirements with their uses and expected results and enhancing accountability, they have not yet served to assure a sufficient critical mass of “core” contributions.

⁷ The functioning of multi-year financing frameworks and their potential to address the problems connected with funding for United Nations development cooperation were analyzed in several reports of the Secretary-General. See A/56/70-E/2001/58 and A/57/332.

Thus, the conclusion cannot be escaped that present practices governing both assessed contributions and voluntary funding modalities have not succeeded in securing an adequate volume of “core” or “regular” resources for the United Nations development system. The challenge of enabling the system to reach the critical mass of regular resources required to respond effectively to the new demands facing it remains to be met.

B. Two alternative funding models: the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the United Nations Environment Programme

In addition to the multi-year financing frameworks, there are two other funding modalities used in the system: the negotiated replenishment applied by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the “voluntary indicative scale of contributions”⁸ applied by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on a trial basis.

In IFAD’s “negotiated replenishment”, contributions are first estimated on the basis of a review, undertaken under the responsibility of the Governing Council, of the adequacy of the resources available to the Fund. The Governing Council may invite members of the Fund to make additional contributions. The replenishment process is a complex mechanism, which includes a full review of the policies pursued by the Fund, including the performance-based allocation system for its resources and an assessment of the results and impact of field operations. Since its establishment, IFAD has used a voting structure partly linked to contributions paid by individual donors. The process ensures an ongoing level of votes for the programme countries, while the pool of votes available to donor countries can shift according to the amount of funds provided. Like most organizations with such voting structures, IFAD strives to take its decisions by consensus. If consensus cannot be achieved, countries vote with different voting shares. These shares are also a factor in determining donor representation on the Fund’s Executive Board.

8 The voluntary Indicative Scale of Contributions (ISC) is based, inter alia, on the United Nations scale assessment, with a minimum indicative rate of 0.001 per cent, a maximum indicative rate of 22 per cent (0.01 per cent for LDCs). It takes into account the economic and social circumstances of a country, providing for increases of its contributions over the current level. While remaining voluntary and annual, it aims to broaden the donor base.

The “negotiated replenishment” modality is also used for the International Development Association, which is part of the World Bank Group and by some global funds, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. While complex, this modality has shown itself capable, given the necessary political will and the right environment, of mobilizing a significant volume of resources for the concerned entities.

As a new experiment, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has introduced a hybrid modality known as a “voluntary indicative scale of contributions”. Since its inception, UNEP has received some funding from the regular budget of the United Nations to finance the expenses of its secretariat, with programme activities being funded through voluntary contributions to the Environment Fund. In the early years, the contribution from the United Nations regular budget covered more than 20 per cent of UNEP’s expenditures. That input has now fallen to about 4 per cent of its total budget. A voluntary indicative scale of contributions has been established to help guide Member States in setting their levels of voluntary contributions for programme expenditures. The voluntary scale applies to the Environment Fund, which finances UNEP’s core programme of work, while additional funding is secured through trust funds and other earmarked contributions.

Experience with this indicative scale has so far been positive and has led to a significant increase both in the number of countries making voluntary contributions and in the level of their contributions to UNEP.

C. A short-term solution: the expansion of supplementary funding and its consequences

United Nations funds and programmes as well as the specialized agencies recognize that increasing the flow of supplementary voluntary contributions, in the form of trust funds, co-financing, and contributions from other multilateral organizations and global funds, is, in present circumstances, not an option, but a necessity.

Strategies adopted by organizations of the system to complement their regular resources through supplementary funding include diversification of the donor base, decentralization

of some fund-raising functions to the country level, reliance on donor co-financing or “cost-sharing” operations and various combinations of other collaborative arrangements, with the intent of generating funding to cover not only the direct cost of development assistance activities, but also proportionate shares of the programme support costs and to contribute to the coverage of administrative expenses. As part of these diversification strategies, the contributions from the private sector have also grown, and have become particularly significant for some organizations (for example the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)).

The increase in the supplementary resources available to the organizations of the United Nations system is serving to augment their total resources available for country-level operations, complementing their regular resources, and enabling the achievement of more ambitious development cooperation goals. Most organizations accept only supplementary funding that fits within their strategic priorities and is consistent with the pursuit of the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals, through the alignment of the common country assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework processes towards these goals. Yet, the selectivity and fragmentation inherent in supplementary funding constrains the United Nations system in its pursuit of the full range of the United Nations development agenda.

As the funding of core capacities becomes dependent primarily on supplementary funding, maintaining the basic technical and programming capacity of United Nations entities becomes increasingly difficult. Over-reliance on supplementary funding makes United Nations organizations vulnerable to changes in donor preferences and priorities, both in terms of the level and the composition of funding. This crucial set of problems, and some of the main constraints involved, are briefly analysed below:

(i) *Substitution effect*

As already mentioned, while recognizing the complementary value of “non-core” resources, the General Assembly, in its resolution 59/250, sent a clear signal that

supplementary contributions should not be “a substitute for core resources”.⁹ This call has not, as yet, been adhered to: so far, the increased volume of supplementary funding has not been additional to regular resources, and supplementary funding has, in some cases, taken the place of adequate regular funding.

(ii) *Earmarked resources*

Supplementary funding is often earmarked, in varying levels of detail, to specific uses and beneficiaries, eliminating the flexibility needed to make alternative use of the resources in order to address priorities established at the inter-governmental level for the achievement of the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals. Typically, earmarked contributions are subject to criteria that are determined a priori, reducing the ability of recipients to reallocate the resources to evolving international or national priorities.

(iii) *The “gap-filling” role*

When approved for specific purposes and projects, supplementary funding results in a piece-meal, fragmented approach to development cooperation work. Therefore, the shift to supplementary funding, when combined with the increasing use by some donors of non-United Nations channels of ODA, risks marginalizing the United Nations system to a “gap-filling” role in the implementation of the global development agenda.

(iv) *Strategic approach and supplementary funding*

Supplementary funding may yield higher volumes of resources in a given year but does not necessarily lead to assured multi-year pledging, which is a condition for the effective long-term programming of development cooperation activities. An appropriate application of multi-year financing frameworks may mitigate this problem by establishing a strategic framework that covers both core and supplementary funding.

The shift to supplementary funding may result in a situation where large portions of United Nations system

⁹ See General Assembly resolution 59/250, para 20

development assistance activities fall outside of national and international governance processes. Even where the approval of these contributions depends on some kind of strategic appraisal criteria, these contributions do not allow for systematic resource allocation according to strategic programming criteria and do not facilitate strategic resource allocation according to the United Nations development agenda.

(v) *Increased competition in fund-raising*

Fund-raising throughout the system is often of a competitive nature, with the different fund-raising capacities of the funds, programmes and agencies competing for donor funding. Competition in fund-raising is obviously accentuated by the dependence on supplementary funding.

This competition can create an incentive for improving the quality of the services provided and gives more flexibility to both donors and programme countries to choose among different operational agents. Excessive competition, however, clearly restricts the space for a strategic approach, even where contributions are generally aligned to overall priorities such as the Millennium Development Goals.

Most negotiations for supplementary funding are either bilateral, with one donor at a time, or with small groups of donors. Under these conditions, the risks of distortions in priorities are high, both at the level of the system as a whole, and in relation to the programme thrust and directions of individual organizations. The result may be, and experience shows that it not infrequently is, a concentration of operational work on particular themes that correspond more to donor preferences than to overall programme priorities defined at the national or international levels, thus engaging more agencies than their comparative advantage or priorities defined by their governing bodies would justify.

(vi) *Field-level fund-raising and resource allocation rigidity*

The headquarters dialogue with donor agencies will typically cover both core and supplementary resources. Contacts in the field with the same donor, however, are generally restricted

to supplementary resources. The current shift in programming and resource mobilization from headquarters to the field, while a positive development from a number of different vantage points, particularly responsiveness to needs as perceived at the country level, risks to further advance the present movement from “core” to supplementary funding, thus further increasing rigidity in resource allocation for programming development cooperation activities. Thus, for example, funds raised at the country level may not be used to finance programme expenditures at the headquarters level or in other countries, although the support cost income generated at the country level could cover some related headquarters administrative expenditures.

(vii) *Supplementary funding and cost recovery*

Member States have recently underlined the importance of full cost recovery being applied to supplementary activities, although there is no common and agreed methodology for it. An outstanding question is the extent to which cost recovery should also make a contribution to the basic administrative costs of the organization and to some part of the programme support costs that cannot be clearly attributed to any specific programme activity.

As organizations become increasingly dependent on supplementary resources to maintain important parts of their basic infrastructure and to maintain programme operations at a minimal level of critical mass, it would seem appropriate that supplementary resources should cover a fair share of the basic administrative costs of the programme.¹⁰

¹⁰ WFP has a relatively simple and transparent system in place that ensures that recovery from supplementary contributions covers all incremental costs plus an appropriate share of administrative costs (called “indirect support costs” in WFP terminology).

4

Looking ahead: challenges and options

A. Funding United Nations development cooperation: an entitlement or a response to development challenges?

A fundamental question, in considering how to improve the access of United Nations organizations to regular resources, is what should be funded with such resources. Indeed, any meaningful discussion on funding must be founded on a clear understanding of the development mandate of the United Nations system, rooted in the United Nations development agenda, and in the specific role of each of its constituent parts in fulfilling this mandate. Regular funding requirements need to flow both from the system's institutional development mandates as well as the urgent development needs of countries that the system and its constituent parts are called upon to meet.

Developing countries, especially the poorest ones, need to strengthen and develop their capacities to meet their economic and social goals through promoting investment, particularly in infrastructure, developing their institutions, introducing economic and social reforms, addressing priority problems of their societies and increasing training and employment. In supporting these efforts, the United Nations system is expected to make full use of all its capacities, knowledge and experience, ensure greater overall coherence in its country-level interventions and improve the integration of its programmes with national development efforts.

B. Defining the funding requirements

One of the key issues underlying discussions on funding is how best to finance the three basic categories of expenditures: programme expenses; programme support costs; and administrative expenses.

One of the main problems that most United Nations funds and programmes continue to face, in this regard, notwithstanding the introduction of the multi-year financing frameworks, is that basic administrative costs for their functioning have often been funded, like programme costs, through volatile annual contributions, thereby affecting the overall solidity of their organizational structures and planning processes.

The specialized agencies and other entities using assessed contributions to cover their basic administrative expenses have, as noted above, become “trapped” by rigid and poorly funded regular budgets, while remaining vulnerable to fluctuations in supplementary funding for their development programmes .

In order to address this vulnerability, some Member States argue that distinct methodologies and different funding modalities should be used to finance the basic administrative infrastructure and the core programme capacity of the various entities. However, under this approach, there is a high risk of linking administrative budgets to an abstract notion of “core” expenses, embedded in the agency’s historical mandates and past budgets, instead of the evolving demands being placed on it.

A proper definition of basic administrative costs is key to identifying the total funding requirements of United Nations organizations. At the same time, that definition cannot be static or mechanistic. Administrative expenses need to be allowed to adjust and expand, while ensuring all possible efficiency gains, to respond to the expansion of demand for development support so that the overall quality and quantity of programme activities does not suffer.

Therefore, the best methodology would seem to be one that seeks to arrive at a holistic identification of total funding requirements, starting from a demand-driven, country-based identification of programme needs, derived from the national development strategies as well as the regional and global

strategies to which the agency is called on to respond in its area of expertise, in order to maximize its support for the achievement of the United Nations development agenda.

Only once these programme needs are identified and the corresponding inputs of resources (financial, human, technological and organizational) are quantified can the administrative requirements of the “core” programme of an agency be properly estimated. The estimation should be related to current resource flows. It should identify gaps and ways to improve the agency’s response to country needs and should take due account of the global and regional activities that provide the overall framework of support.

Governing bodies should, therefore, seek to set administrative and programme support budgets on the basis of the size of the total programme of the entity concerned and adjust all related administrative support and capacities accordingly.

C. Sector-wide approaches and budget support: implications for funding the United Nations development system

The growing use of sector-wide action plans and budget support as new modalities for delivering development assistance¹¹ has not only altered the relationship between Governments and donors, it has also raised major questions about the way in which the United Nations system is to interact with these new modalities.

While the programmatic implications of these new delivery modalities for United Nations system support are progressively emerging, their implications for the funding of the system’s country-level activities remain unclear. If these modalities become the main way of delivering ODA at the country level, their funding implications for the organizations will involve a re-examination by each organization of its comparative advantage and assets at the country-level, so that it can secure the requisite role and an appropriate level of funding within the context of the sectoral programmes. In addition,

¹¹ See the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability”, on the more recent trends in this domain.

mechanisms will need to be devised for “reimbursing” the United Nations system for the administrative and other support it provides to these modalities, keeping in mind existing full cost recovery policies.

Overall, while the system’s interactions with these new delivery modalities, which are typically being pursued by development institutions (both bilateral and multilateral) with larger financial capacity, pose significant challenges for the system, they clearly provide important opportunities for overall progress in relation to both the overall impact of development assistance and its ownership by programme countries.

D. Funding modalities: voluntary funding, assessed contributions and negotiated replenishments

As developing countries and their development partners gear themselves for a major up scaling of efforts to achieve the internationally agreed development goals, and as the debate on financing for development, in particular for the poorest countries, acquires a new urgency, the critical question facing the organizations of the United Nations system is whether they will be able to play their policy, advocacy and capacity-building roles at the optimum level required in this new environment of scaleable actions and results with the traditional funding modalities that they have inherited from the past, or whether there is a need for a fresh look at how the system can be enabled to play its strategic role with the credibility that would come from a stable, predictable, long-term and expanding resource base, based on enhanced efficiency and effectiveness, linking resources with results.

Despite the different “core” funding modalities adopted by funds and programmes, the specialized agencies and other United Nations entities, all of them face the same challenge of securing a steadily growing flow of resources for their core budgets that will allow them to meet new expanding requirements.

One approach that has been pursued in recent years is to take current funding modalities as given and adopt a short-term funding strategy that maximizes supplementary funding, corrected for a number of elements, as indicated above. This

approach has brought increased resources to several United Nations entities, although many outstanding issues remain in terms of aligning the United Nations system development cooperation activities to the pursuit of the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals. In general, supplementary funding, while increasing total resource flows, is not conducive to furthering this alignment, nor does it guarantee the stable, assured, predictable and growing flows of “regular” or “core” resources that the system’s agencies require to optimize their contribution to advancing the United Nations development agenda.

Other solutions that could be explored include:

- (i) **Focusing on the use of multi-year financing frameworks and their link with results-based management.** Although current multi-year financing frameworks, as instruments to strengthen “core” resource mobilization, have produced mixed results, they are useful tools for addressing, in the same context, the strategic results frameworks and integrated resources frameworks of the organizations of the United Nations system, bringing together both programme and administrative resources. Indeed, the main benefit of the multi-year financing framework approach is that it integrates programme objectives, resources, budgets and outcomes. The multi-year financing framework has the potential to increase “core” funding by setting clear “core” funding targets, establishing links between fund-raising and results-based management, and, thus, relating these results with the ultimate objectives being pursued by the organizations concerned. Multi-year financing frameworks thus represent a key framework for securing policy coherence in relation to an organization’s performance, relating aggregate demand for its support (based on country-based information) to its response to such demand, regardless of funding sources. The extent to which the multi-year financing framework can serve to advance the enhanced predictability of “core” funding that the framework allows is linked to the multi-year nature of this instrument. The time has come for Member States to make full use of the potential benefits of this approach by committing “core” resources through sustained multi-year pledges over extended periods of time, as

indicated in the “core” resource targets agreed in the multi-year financing framework.

- (ii) Assessed contributions for “core” organizational budgets.** Funds and programmes seeking to increase the reliability of “core” funding could consider introducing a system of assessed contributions for meeting core expenses that guarantee their basic functioning. With appropriate modifications, the current United Nations assessment scale could be applied for this purpose. Membership in each organization would presumably include the obligation to pay the amount of contribution assessed. Provisions allowing for the re-evaluation of core needs, possibly on a yearly basis, should be built into any such system, in order to avoid the rigidity experienced by the specialized agencies in this regard.
- (iii) Combining assessed contributions with a voluntary contribution scheme.** This corresponds to the model adopted by UNEP, with its “indicative scale of voluntary contributions”, which guides donors in setting their levels of voluntary contributions for the “core” programme resources. Supplementary activities continue to be financed with separate funding.
- (iv) Negotiated replenishments for funding “core” budgets.** This mechanism requires the definition of an integrated programme, on the basis of which replenishments are negotiated. While this approach appears quite complex for small agencies, its value is linked to its capacity to bring about a critical mass of resources. Its feasibility should be well tested before it is launched. One key issue is how to handle burden-sharing among different donors. The international financial institutions have traditionally dealt with burden sharing by linking voting rights and representation on their boards with each donor’s share of capital. IFAD’s approach involves a system of voting shares that are adjusted when payments are received. In this way burden-sharing as addressed in financial institutions would require major adjustments before application to United Nations agencies, funds or programmes. Although it is unlikely that the pilot introduction of negotiated replenishments, possibly limited to one part of the budget,

would significantly modify burden-sharing among donors and bring about substantial change in the short-term, it may serve to start a discussion process between United Nations entities and Member States that could lead to significant funding results in the longer term.

- (v) **Negotiated replenishment mechanism for a combination of funds and programmes.** Should United Nations funds and programmes be able to move from harmonized programming to joint programming in the future, the application of the negotiated replenishment modality to their joint programmes would have the advantage of targeting a larger critical mass of resources, thereby saving transaction costs in what is typically a lengthy negotiation process.

While it is unlikely that the specialized agencies or entities of the United Nations system that rely on assessed regular budgets would consider introducing voluntary contribution schemes, such as negotiated replenishments, these organizations still need to address the challenge of servicing the growing amount of programme resources received through supplementary (extra-budgetary) funding with stagnant or diminishing “core” administrative budgets.

In one of the most telling cases, the regular budget of a major specialized agency dropped from over two thirds of its total programme resources in the mid-1990s to less than 30 per cent of the budget forecast for the 2006-2007 biennium. In the present circumstances, there is little incentive for donor countries to adjust these budget policies, especially if, as an alternative, they can simply switch from regular to supplementary funding to support those aspects of the work of the agency they particularly favour. At the same time, the fungibility of funding between regular budget and extra-budgetary resources remains a key issue for most specialized agencies, which are increasingly depending on unpredictable supplementary funding to maintain their critical core machinery. At a time when the pursuit of the United Nations development agenda may well justify repositioning a considerable portion of activities currently funded with voluntary contributions as part of the core work of the system, many agencies are hard pressed to maintain even their historical roles in such areas as norms, standards, advocacy and other core global functions.

There should be further reflection on ways to increase the flexibility of current assessment mechanisms in several organizations, for example through alternative modalities inspired by the “indicative scale of voluntary contributions” or the replenishment type of negotiations applied by UNEP and IFAD.

These innovative funding modalities could be combined for different organizations of the United Nations system in several alternative ways and harmonized with current modalities. “Assessed contributions” systems, for example, could recast the way in which the components of the assessed budget are defined, with adjustments to the particular needs of individual organizations.

The feasibility of these modalities should be further tested. A number of criteria should serve as the basis for these tests:

- (i) **Adequacy** of the resource flows allowed by the modality (particularly with respect to the new development tasks faced by the United Nations);
- (ii) **Reliability, predictability and assuredness** of the resource flows (using agreed schedules to assure availability and verifying the “binding” nature of donors’ commitments);
- (iii) **Acceptable burden-sharing** among donors and likely consensus among major contributors.

E. Towards a system-wide approach to funding

It should be possible to conceive of an aggregation of system-wide resource requirements undertaken at the country level, comparing funding requirements of different agencies within the same country and verifying the basis and consistency of the demands for inputs addressed to each of them. Even if this aggregation were to be conducted only for a smaller subset of agencies operating in a country, for example in the context of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and its respective result matrix, it would increase the knowledge of the activities that the system may be requested to undertake in

a country, tying together the different elements of the UNDAF resource framework.

The quantification of the volume of resources required to fund system-wide activities in one specific country would not by itself bring about a joint system-wide funding or combined resource mobilization drives, but it could be the first step towards establishing some of the conditions for such an effort.

In theory, one could conceive of a process leading to an estimate of a global “development product” to be delivered by the United Nations system as a whole, with corresponding global resource targets, which could then be the object of a “negotiation” such as an indicative pledging negotiation with interested donors or the entire donor community. A process of that type would require the definition of a global “programme package” for the entire United Nations system, which donors would examine and compare with other packages that other development actors would submit to their attention.

The aggregation for purposes of establishing a global funding target for all country-level funding requirements of the United Nations system contained in instruments such as the UNDAF, along with requirements for regional and global programmes, would need to be clearly linked to the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals, in order to be a compelling instrument for concrete fund-raising.

The United Nations system is clearly at a disadvantage, given the fragmented nature of its institutional structures, in that it is not able to bring to the attention of donors a single, comprehensive worldwide “programme package” to negotiate. It does not have a global envelope similar to the one that the International Development Association offers to potential donors, with a comprehensive proposed programme document setting overall levels of resources required, criteria for their allocation and any additional policy indications required. Nor does the system possess at the moment the institutional channels required for this purpose.

As more progress is achieved at the country, regional and headquarters levels in the integration and harmonization of the system’s work and in its functioning, this aggregation of funding

5

Conclusions

The present publication has examined various options, some more practical, others more theoretical in the current circumstances, for funding the operational activities of the United Nations system in order to increase its predictability, long-term stability and adequacy, while preserving the advantages of present funding modalities. As they gear themselves to respond to the evolving needs of programme countries and as they seek to meet agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, United Nations organizations will need to continue to explore and promote the appropriate mixes of voluntary contributions, assessed contributions and negotiated replenishments best suited to their particular circumstances and institutional structures. They should be guided, in doing so, by best system-wide practices and by an assessment, steered by the central United Nations intergovernmental bodies, of solutions that are most conducive to progress in the quality of the services that the system as a whole provides to its membership. An aggregation of United Nations system development financing needs for country, regional and global activities could serve as the basis for a more harmonized dialogue with contributor countries, especially if the aggregation is clearly related to the United Nations development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals.

While this analysis has focused on issues such as adequacy, predictability, assuredness, burden-sharing and composition of contributions, distinguishing between “core” and supplementary resources, there are broader questions that need to be addressed relating to the overall role of United Nations

operational agencies and their comparative advantages vis-à-vis other channels for ODA in accessing ODA funding.

The international development architecture is rapidly evolving, presenting both opportunities and challenges. The funding requirements for the United Nations development system should flow from its role and its effectiveness in contributing to genuine progress in implementing its development agenda, including the Millennium Development Goals. The programme activities that the system proposes to undertake should be justified in terms of their coherence with and potential impact on the international as well as the national development objectives that it is called upon to serve.

The funding of the United Nations development cooperation should be addressed as an integral part of the effort to maximize support to developing countries in achieving the United Nations development agenda. In this report, country-based, demand-driven approaches, rooted in national priorities, are advocated to quantify funding requirements, since such an approach is closely linked to the comparative advantage and unique characteristics of the operational work of the United Nations system.

Possibilities for more collaborative approaches to fund-raising by the United Nations system are also raised, and are linked to progress in coordinating the overall functioning of the system at the country, regional and global levels.

The options and innovations in funding modalities outlined in this publication should be further discussed at the intergovernmental level in individual agencies and, for the system as a whole, in the context of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

Member States should be encouraged, as part of the follow-up to the outcome of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September 2005, to continue, with renewed determination and commitment and in a spirit of global partnership and solidarity, a high-level political debate on funding issues and modalities to effectively strengthen the development cooperation activities of the United Nations system.

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Acronyms

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFF	International Finance Facility
IFFIm	International Finance Facility for Immunization
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official Development Assistance
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

Statistical Tables

Contributions from Governments and other sources for operational activities of the United Nations system

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Table A-1. Contributions from Governments and other sources for operational activities of the United Nations system: Overview, 1999-2003
(Millions of current US dollars)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS FUNDS AND PROGRAMMES					
1. Contributions to UNDP					
a) CORE	681.3	634.1	651.7	663.1	769.9
b) OTHER RES. a/	1 393.0	1 375.7	1 569.2	1 706.9	2 015.5
Subtotal	2 074.3	2 009.8	2 220.9	2 370.0	2 785.4
2. Contributions to UNDP administered funds and trust funds b/					
a) CORE	47.6	45.6	50.3	46.8	53.2
b) OTHER RES. a/	11.8	13.5	15.0	24.5	24.0
Subtotal	59.4	59.1	65.3	71.3	77.2
Total (1-2)	2 133.7	2 068.9	2 286.2	2 441.3	2 862.6
3. Contributions to UNFPA c/					
a) CORE	244.1	256.4	260.2	246.5	288.5
b) OTHER RES. a/	30.2	130.6	103.6	92.4	85.9
Subtotal	274.3	387.0	363.8	338.9	374.4
4. Contributions to UNICEF d/					
a) CORE	585.9	596.7	541.4	697.2	720.9
b) OTHER RES. a/	500.2	515.6	638.9	702.0	967.2
Subtotal	1 086.1	1 112.3	1 180.3	1 399.2	1 688.1
5. Contributions to other United Nations funds and programmes e/	369.5	364.1	495.9	521.1	569.2
6. Contributions to WFP f/					
a) CORE	1 512.6	1 532.1	1 755.9	1 894.8	2 791.8
b) OTHER RES. a/	54.2	39.2	38.1	11.7	27.7
Subtotal	1 566.8	1 571.3	1 794.0	1 906.5	2 819.5
Total (1-6)	5 430.4	5 503.6	6 120.2	6 607.0	8 313.8
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES					
7. Assessed contributions to regular budgets g/	444.0	469.6	424.0	479.3	518.2
8. Extrabudgetary contributions	975.8	1 178.3	1 189.3	1 032.1	1 466.8
Total (7-8)	1 419.8	1 647.9	1 613.3	1 511.4	1 985.0
Grand total	6 850.2	7 151.5	7 733.5	8 118.4	10 298.8

Table A-1. (continued)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
CONTRIBUTIONS TO IFAD					
9. Contributions to IFAD	122.8	127.1	41.8	19.6	193.9
MEMO ITEMS					
EXPLANATORY ITEMS					
UNICEF Greeting Cards	202.9	163.3	161.0	125.9	151.5
Government "self-supporting" contributions to organizations and agencies	218.5	196.5	262.2	201.1	233.2

SOURCE: Financial Statements of United Nations Funds and Programmes and of WFP; IFAD.

a/ Includes cost-sharing and government cash counterpart contributions.

b/ Includes the Capital Development Fund, the Special Fund for Land-Locked Developing Countries, the Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, the Special United Nations Volunteer Fund, the United Nations Fund for Science and Technology for Development, the United Nations Development Fund for Women and the Trust Fund for Sudano-Sahelian Activities; and other funds, accounts and trust funds of UNDP including trust funds established by the Administrator, and contributions for the Junior Professional Officers programme. Includes cost-sharing contributions to these funds.

c/ Includes contributions to trust funds and "special population programmes" of UNFPA.

d/ Includes net profit from sale of greeting cards, which resources are then used in operational activities.

e/ Constitutes regular budget and extrabudgetary contributions, including government self-supporting contributions, in relation to the United Nations, and its regional commissions, UNCHS, UNCTAD and UNDCP. See also the annual UNDP document on UN system regular and extrabudgetary technical cooperation financed from sources other than UNDP.

f/ Includes contributions to the International Emergency Food Reserve and extrabudgetary contributions.

g/ I.e., the imputed share of regular budget financing of technical co-operation expenditures in relation to the distribution of assessments among Member States.

Table A-2. Contributions for operational activities of the United Nations system, by donor 2003
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	COR E (3)	Other Res. (4)	COR E(5)	Other Res. (6)	COR E(7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Afghanistan	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Albania	0	116	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	116
Algeria	100	45	0	0	11	0	20	0	9 986	0	10 162
Andorra	16	0	15	0	12	0	169	257	67	0	536
Angola	2	5	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	10
Antigua and Barbuda	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Argentina	65	161 188	0	0	0	0	75	1 210	0	0	162 538
Armenia	0	25	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	33
Australia	4 667	14 898	213	9	1 377	85	4 087	27 461	35 650	846	89 293
Austria	5 380	169	180	0	370	542	3 406	716	2 193	0	12 956
Azerbaijan	0	1 956	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 957
Bahamas	3	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	6
Bahrain	56	1 155	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 211
Bangladesh	400	0	0	0	28	0	0	1	0	0	429
Barbados	0	12	1	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	21
Belarus	0	206	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	206
Belgium	12 941	5 912	895	5 336	4 178	3 247	8 533	8 831	10 622	0	60 495
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	50
Benin	0	- 364	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	- 361
Bhutan	26	33	0	0	6	0	15	0	0	0	80
Bolivia	0	41 635	0	0	4	0	5	436	0	0	42 080
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	2 309	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 309
Botswana	- 7	2 773	6	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	2 776
Brazil	200	96 872	0	87	0	70	1 482	4 789	0	0	103 500
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	27 033	0	0	11	0	- 36	0	0	0	27 008
Burkina Faso	0	146	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	147
Burundi	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6
Cambodia	0	11	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	14
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	33	70	117

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Canada	38 846	29 579	1 575	415	9 027	3 170	17 144	80 462	101 290	- 170	281 338
Cape Verde	0	0	0	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	9
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	50	23 183	0	0	5	0	112	217	0	0	23 567
China	3 150	29 550	90	24	820	0	1 250	316	1 250	48	36 498
Colombia	- 378	154 194	0	0	0	948	223	894	0	0	155 881
Comoros	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Congo	0	242	0	0	8	9	0	0	0	0	259
Costa Rica	217	467	3	0	6	0	9	0	0	0	702
Côte d'Ivoire	0	547	0	0	23	0	76	0	0	0	646
Croatia	0	0	0	0	1	0	224	63	0	0	288
Cuba	1 353	116	0	0	5	0	10	0	470	45	1 999
Cyprus	9	3	6	0	2	0	427	0	95	0	542
Czech Republic	320	398	61	0	94	0	459	88	178	0	1 598
Dem People's Rep of Korea	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	15
Dem Rep of the Congo	0	1 107	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1 109
Denmark	55 273	13 659	4 504	627	25 396	1 490	30 079	10 431	40 294	-1 472	180 281
Djibouti	5	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	7
Dominica	0	- 19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 19
Dominican Republic	0	3 807	0	0	0	13	41	0	47	0	3 908
Ecuador	0	17 814	0	0	0	0	136	313	0	182	18 445
Egypt	668	12 249	0	0	72	724	0	0	359	187	14 259
El Salvador	0	27 533	0	0	1	0	26	0	0	0	27 560
Equatorial Guinea	- 11	420	0	0	178	0	0	0	0	0	587
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	47	0	48
Estonia	28	22	0	0	2	0	42	0	0	0	94
Ethiopia	158	339	0	0	4	0	50	0	0	0	551
Fed States of Micronesia	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Fiji	0	- 28	0	24	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
Finland	14 532	4 060	595	588	13 940	2 366	17 750	6 114	17 680	0	77 625
France	18 283	3 116	1 820	162	1 437	0	37 014	13 020	14 940	1 418	91 210
Gabon	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	3	0	0	13
Gambia	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Georgia	0	1 381	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 382
Germany	28 285	12 657	2 976	261	16 038	1 982	56 282	35 627	46 761	42	200 911
Ghana	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	13
Greece	655	0	8	0	6	0	11 747	766	200	0	13 382
Grenada	0	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26
Guatemala	0	27 301	0	0	2	6 761	0	0	0	161	34 225
Guinea	0	- 10	0	- 60	0	0	0	0	0	0	- 70
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	0	102	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	105
Haiti	0	133	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	138
Honduras	0	92 476	0	0	4	0	24	185	3 708	305	96 702
Hungary	0	0	0	0	25	0	488	70	0	0	583
Iceland	0	0	34	82	13	0	166	0	237	0	532
India	4 533	600	15	0	195	0	0	0	4 153	62	9 558
Indonesia	- 243	36	0	0	33	0	237	329	20	0	412
Iran, Islamic Republic	0	143	0	0	25	0	233	0	0	0	401
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	13 967	3 570	1 476	103	2 727	0	9 697	10 624	10 128	0	52 292
Israel	0	50	5	20	25	0	139	0	6	0	245
Italy	16 269	28 472	2 524	1 593	2 629	43	51 366	31 803	42 271	- 468	176 502
Jamaica	0	57	0	0	0	197	0	0	0	0	254
Japan	86 770	87 203	1 644	2 753	39 517	1 000	122 581	96 714	128 304	2 809	569 295
Jordan	270	2 302	0	0	50	0	14	0	42	47	2 725
Kazakhstan	0	- 132	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	- 122
Kenya	0	13	0	0	5	0	- 2	0	2 778	0	2 794
Kiribati	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Kuwait	0	8 169	0	0	20	0	0	0	1 000	0	9 189
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lao People's Dem Republic	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	7
Latvia	8	310	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	322
Lebanon	0	8 605	0	0	2	133	58	- 6	0	0	8 792
Lesotho	0	383	0	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	389
Liberia	0	300	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	303
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0	2 393	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 393
Liechtenstein	11	0	6	0	8	0	8	2	0	0	35
Lithuania	0	120	0	0	0	0	12	32	0	0	164
Luxembourg	1 000	1 163	697	653	783	1 507	1 807	1 654	3 807	- 137	12 934

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Madagascar	0	17	0	0	2	0	0	161	0	3	183
Malawi	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1 132	0	1 135
Malaysia	385	1 019	5	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	1 424
Maldives	10	78	3	0	3	0	8	0	0	0	102
Mali	0	1 241	0	0	6	0	17	0	0	0	1 264
Malta	25	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	30
Marshall Islands	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Mauritania	0	340	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	342
Mauritius	30	0	0	0	4	0	9	0	0	0	43
Mexico	0	16 951	0	27	49	844	96	1 021	0	0	18 988
Monaco	10	142	0	0	0	0	84	0	20	0	256
Mongolia	13	300	0	0	4	16	11	0	0	0	344
Morocco	163	4 232	0	0	195	307	145	27	223	139	5 431
Mozambique	0	200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Namibia	0	733	0	0	1	0	1	97	0	0	832
Nauru	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Nepal	0	8	0	0	5	0	0	0	101	0	114
Netherlands	85 879	45 951	11 477	1 959	67 581	2 895	71 806	47 401	47 192	0	382 141
New Zealand	3 432	3 498	437	448	1 003	424	1 911	3 119	2 320	0	16 592
Nicaragua	10	6 166	0	0	5	0	5	3	0	19	6 208
Niger	- 10	17	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	12
Nigeria	0	1 390	0	0	20	0	208	75	0	0	1 693
Norway	91 639	57 972	6 849	2 233	32 951	5 852	47 271	67 498	49 307	-1 947	359 625
Oman	0	0	0	0	26	170	55	127	0	0	378
Pakistan	476	959	0	0	512	7 186	36	37	0	85	9 291
Palau	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Panama	0	123 012	1	0	25	0	64	330	1	0	123 433
Papua New Guinea	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Paraguay	0	11 975	0	0	0	46	11	11	0	0	12 043
Peru	0	101 404	0	0	0	2 613	92	0	0	300	104 409
Philippines	35	2 157	5	0	27	0	145	507	0	0	2 876
Poland	0	340	0	0	0	0	- 105	0	0	0	235
Portugal	1 600	1 190	0	0	40	0	4 763	565	447	0	8 605
Qatar	0	0	0	140	0	0	10	0	302	0	452
Rep of Korea	1 000	2 020	40	15	130	0	8 179	6 164	17 010	0	34 558
Rep of Moldova	0	199	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	199
Romania	50	340	0	0	10	0	12	0	0	0	412
Russian	450	8 220	0	0	150	0	500	15	11 000	0	20 335

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Federation											
Rwanda	0	37	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	38
Samoa	6	0	1	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	13
San Marino	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Saudi Arabia	2 000	9 309	0	0	300	0	1 712	82	3 302	0	16 705
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	79	0	0	0	79
Serbia & Montenegro	0	91	0	0	0	0	318	0	0	0	409
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sierra Leone	0	548	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	557
Singapore	300	0	40	15	0	0	97	0	0	0	452
Slovak Republic	0	2 351	0	0	5	0	128	29	697	0	3 210
Slovenia	0	384	0	0	0	0	985	280	0	0	1 649
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	2 978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 978
South Africa	0	120	12	0	17	0	92	97	19 253	0	19 591
Spain	6 853	2 858	68	0	633	0	18 255	10 503	4 489	0	43 659
Sri Lanka	600	0	0	0	18	0	15	227	106	0	966
St. Kitts and Nevis	0	63	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	63
St. Lucia	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Sudan	50	50	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	0	130
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Swaziland	6	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	16
Sweden	62 446	43 500	7 410	50	23 999	2 881	40 839	69 570	38 908	-1 022	288 581
Switzerland	38 518	9 160	1 133	222	9 259	360	22 182	9 848	29 337	0	120 019
Syrian Arab Republic	24	2 365	1	0	3	305	6	1	0	0	2 705
Tajikistan	0	130	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	132
Thailand	1 649	3	14	0	96	0	343	2 092	378	0	4 575
The FYR of Macedonia	0	227	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	232
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0	1	23	0	0	0	0	24
Togo	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
Tonga	- 3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	- 2
Trinidad and Tobago	0	2 828	0	0	5	0	4	0	0	0	2 837

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Tunisia	133	136	0	0	21	0	165	22	0	0	477
Turkey	0	2 293	5	0	108	0	530	425	0	0	3 361
Turkmenistan	2	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21
Tuvalu	- 15	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	- 12
Uganda	0	32	0	0	10	0	0	0	536	0	578
Ukraine	0	865	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	865
United Arab Emirates	0	5 526	0	0	5	0	200	0	0	0	5 731
United Kingdom	60 448	87 874	4 747	2 876	30 221	10 084	32 528	118 270	135 868	-2 341	480 575
United Rep of Tanzania	- 6	0	10	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	9
United States	103 724	80 559	1 617	815	0	0	129 288	193 734	1 591 264	39 559	2 140 560
Uruguay	0	7 722	0	0	0	270	50	66	0	0	8 108
Uzbekistan	0	1 015	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 016
Vanuatu	0	15	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	16
Venezuela	0	15 989	0	0	5	0	111	144	206	0	16 455
Vietnam	29	0	1	0	4	0	0	27	3	0	64
Yemen	39	406	6	0	10	196	0	0	0	0	657
Zambia	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Zimbabwe	0	42	0	0	0	42	0	0	0	0	84
Total Member States	769 882	1 627 916	53 231	21 477	286 805	58 801	761 061	866 007	2 432 018	38 770	6 915 968
Non-Member States or areas											
Anguilla	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aruba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bermuda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
British Virgin Islands	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Cayman Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cook Islands	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
French Guyana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
French Polynesia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guadeloupe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Holy See	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 118	2 831	0	0	6 949

Table A-2. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	UNDP		UNDP Admin. Funds		UNFPA		UNICEF		WFP		TOTAL UN funds
	Core (1)	Other Res. (2)	CORE (3)	Other Res. (4)	CORE (5)	Other Res. (6)	CORE (7)	Other Res. (8)	CORE (9)	Other Res. (10)	(1-10) (11)
Member States											
Macau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martinique	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montserrat	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Netherlands Antilles	0	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	53
Niue	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reunion	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
St. Helena	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tokelau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turks and Caicos Islands	0	182	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	182
Other	0	-1 775	0	0	0	3 945	1 247	0	37	0	3 454
Total non-members	0	-1 520	0	0	1	3 945	5 365	2 831	37	0	10 659
Total countries	769 882	1 626 396	53 231	21 477	286 806	62 746	766 426	868 838	2 432 055	38 770	6 926 627
European Union	0	96 667	0	812	0	16 962	0	40 550	211 186	537	366 714
Inter-govt.	0	269 869	0	1 133	0	0	0	925	18 207	0	290 134
Non-govt.	0	19 672	0	548	1 911	0	0	17 857	7 551	0	47 539
CGO Cost operations	0	0	0	0	0	0	-82 068	0	0	0	-82 068
Total, Inter-govt/ non-govt org.	0	386 208	0	2 493	1 911	16 962	-82 068	59 332	236 944	537	622 319
Not elsewhere classified	0	2 961	6	29	- 184	6 268	36 505	38 982	122 772	-11 646	764 893
Subtotal	769 882	2 015 565	53 237	23 999	288 533	85 976	720 863	967 152	2 791 771	27 661	8 313 839

**Table A-3 Contributions for operational activities
of the United Nations system by donor, 2003
(Thousands of US dollars)**

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)		(1-2)	IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)		(2)	(3)	(4)
Member States					
Afghanistan	14	300	314	0	711
Albania	116	65	181	0	65
Algeria	10 162	45	10 207	195	17
Andorra	536	0	536	0	0
Angola	10	401	411	0	400
Antigua and Barbuda	1	0	1	0	0
Argentina	162 538	2 379	164 917	0	1 961
Armenia	33	0	33	0	0
Australia	89 293	11 200	100 493	2 128	0
Austria	12 956	3 281	16 237	0	- 38
Azerbaijan	1 957	0	1 957	0	0
Bahamas	6	- 4	2	0	- 5
Bahrain	1 211	254	1 465	0	377
Bangladesh	429	228	657	366	0
Barbados	21	10	31	0	286
Belarus	206	1	207	0	0
Belgium	60 495	21 265	81 760	4 223	0
Belize	50	0	50	0	0
Benin	- 361	0	- 361	0	164
Bhutan	80	31	111	0	31
Bolivia	42 080	2 178	44 258	250	222
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2 309	0	2 309	0	0
Botswana	2 776	1	2 777	100	205
Brazil	103 500	112 762	216 262	4 161	111 875
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	27 008	51	27 059	0	30
Burkina Faso	147	106	253	0	225
Burundi	6	20	26	0	479
Cambodia	14	230	244	0	230
Cameroon	117	91	208	0	687
Canada	281 338	56 017	337 355	9 179	40
Cape Verde	9	42	51	0	394
Central African Rep.	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	0	70	70	0	0
Chile	23 567	223	23 790	20	0
China	36 498	2 151	38 649	5 892	819
Colombia	155 881	841	156 722	0	831
Comoros	1	40	41	0	40
Congo	259	100	359	0	650
Costa Rica	702	59	761	0	28
Côte d'Ivoire	646	- 7	639	0	- 9
Croatia	288	52	340	0	50
Cuba	1 999	69	2 068	0	42
Cyprus	542	119	661	0	84

Table A-3. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)		(1-2)	IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Member States					
Czech Republic	1 598	710	2 308	0	134
Dem People's Rep of Korea	15	588	603	100	163
Dem Rep of the Congo	1 109	0	1 109	0	0
Denmark	180 281	23 990	204 271	17 335	0
Djibouti	7	36	43	0	36
Dominica	- 19	0	- 19	0	0
Dominican Republic	3 908	257	4 165	0	455
Ecuador	18 445	1 371	19 816	150	1 373
Egypt	14 259	3 507	17 766	0	0
El Salvador	27 560	316	27 876	0	300
Equatorial Guinea	587	6	593	10	6
Eritrea	48	0	48	0	0
Estonia	94	136	230	0	135
Ethiopia	551	2 383	2 934	0	2 383
Fed States of Micronesia	3	0	3	0	0
Fiji	0	1	1	0	0
Finland	77 625	8 387	86 012	2 157	0
France	91 210	13 344	104 554	9 560	0
Gabon	13	1	14	0	0
Gambia	2	0	2	5	0
Georgia	1 382	0	1 382	0	0
Germany	200 911	29 527	230 438	10 938	0
Ghana	13	8	21	300	6
Greece	13 382	1 624	15 006	600	724
Grenada	26	0	26	0	0
Guatemala	34 225	1 032	35 257	13	136
Guinea	- 70	74	4	0	74
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	105	32	137	0	32
Haiti	138	68	206	0	268
Honduras	96 702	1 010	97 712	52	999
Hungary	583	134	717	0	0
Iceland	532	8	540	377	0
India	9 558	3 199	12 757	4 158	1 855
Indonesia	412	33	445	3 000	39
Iran, Islamic Republic	401	2 083	2 484	0	1 668
Iraq	0	26 705	26 705	0	0
Ireland	52 292	10 430	62 722	0	15
Israel	245	57	302	0	0
Italy	176 502	94 471	270 973	0	0
Jamaica	254	2	256	0	0
Japan	569 295	69 800	639 095	14 634	174

Table A-3. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)		(1-2)	IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Member States					
Czech Republic	1 598	710	2 308	0	134
Dem People's Rep of Korea	15	588	603	100	163
Dem Rep of the Congo	1 109	0	1 109	0	0
Jordan	2 725	1 108	3 833	0	297
Kazakhstan	- 122	4	- 118	0	0
Kenya	2 794	56	2 850	50	54
Kiribati	2	0	2	0	0
Kuwait	9 189	169	9 358	0	- 10
Kyrgyzstan	0	60	60	0	69
Lao People's Dem Republic	7	5	12	0	0
Latvia	322	182	504	0	179
Lebanon	8 792	199	8 991	0	198
Lesotho	389	92	481	41	40
Liberia	303	0	303	0	0
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2 393	13 209	15 602	0	4 198
Liechtenstein	35	0	35	0	0
Lithuania	164	29	193	0	28
Luxembourg	12 934	7 055	19 989	182	0
Madagascar	183	155	338	88	155
Malawi	1 135	364	1 499	0	364
Malaysia	1 424	95	1 519	0	0
Maldives	102	41	143	0	40
Mali	1 264	566	1 830	21	565
Malta	30	68	98	0	0
Marshall Islands	2	0	2	0	0
Mauritania	342	199	541	0	199
Mauritius	43	1	44	20	0
Mexico	18 988	6 817	25 805	1 500	6 720
Monaco	256	205	461	0	0
Mongolia	344	90	434	0	89
Morocco	5 431	1 784	7 215	700	1 779
Mozambique	200	3 085	3 285	113	3 085
Myanmar	2	1	3	0	0
Namibia	832	961	1 793	0	1 117
Nauru	1	0	1	0	0
Nepal	114	182	296	0	312
Netherlands	382 141	81 606	463 747	12 743	0
New Zealand	16 592	1 629	18 221	0	0
Nicaragua	6 208	121	6 329	17	120
Niger	12	20	32	0	20
Nigeria	1 693	3 020	4 713	1 740	2 956
Norway	359 625	75 031	434 656	8 196	0
Oman	378	382	760	0	530

Table A-3. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)		(1-2)	IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Member States					
Czech Republic	1 598	710	2 308	0	134
Dem People's Rep of Korea	15	588	603	100	163
Dem Rep of the Congo	1 109	0	1 109	0	0
Pakistan	9 291	249	9 540	0	750
Palau	2	0	2	0	0
Panama	123 433	2 703	126 136	0	2 686
Papua New Guinea	5	0	5	0	0
Paraguay	12 043	0	12 043	0	0
Peru	104 409	5 577	109 986	78	5 051
Philippines	2 876	389	3 265	113	363
Poland	235	793	1 028	0	285
Portugal	8 605	1 185	9 790	292	0
Qatar	452	385	837	3 254	207
Rep of Korea	34 558	3 676	38 234	875	269
Rep of Moldova	199	0	199	0	0
Romania	412	44	456	25	154
Russian Federation	20 335	1 378	21 713	0	3
Rwanda	38	40	78	0	40
Samoa	13	0	13	0	0
San Marino	5	0	5	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe	2	0	2	0	0
Saudi Arabia	16 705	9 747	26 452	0	9 650
Senegal	79	- 8	71	70	- 10
Serbia & Montenegro	409	0	409	0	0
Seychelles	1	0	1	0	0
Sierra Leone	557	81	638	0	80
Singapore	452	85	537	0	70
Slovak Republic	3 210	60	3 270	0	27
Slovenia	1 649	24	1 673	0	16
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	2 978	700	3 678	0	700
South Africa	19 591	37	19 628	0	0
Spain	43 659	12 371	56 030	3 038	12
Sri Lanka	966	- 16	950	0	91
St. Kitts and Nevis	63	0	63	0	0
St. Lucia	10	76	86	0	76
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	10	0	10	0	0
Sudan	130	195	325	195	358
Suriname	0	- 21	- 21	0	- 21
Swaziland	16	0	16	56	0
Sweden	288 581	36 918	325 499	23 894	24
Switzerland	120 019	24 478	144 497	5 080	0
Syrian Arab Republic	2 705	30 172	32 877	0	30 168

Table A-3. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total (1-2)	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)			IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Member States					
Czech Republic	1 598	710	2 308	0	134
Dem People's Rep of Korea	15	588	603	100	163
Dem Rep of the Congo	1 109	0	1 109	0	0
Tajikistan	132	0	132	0	0
Thailand	4 575	4 339	8 914	0	4 254
The FYR of Macedonia	232	1	233	0	0
Timor-Leste	24	0	24	0	0
Togo	3	26	29	0	124
Tonga	- 2	0	- 2	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	2 837	1 478	4 315	0	1 601
Tunisia	477	103	580	0	35
Turkey	3 361	276	3 637	100	- 1
Turkmenistan	21	0	21	0	0
Tuvalu	- 12	0	- 12	0	0
Uganda	578	26	604	0	123
Ukraine	865	7	872	0	0
United Arab Emirates	5 731	372	6 103	0	300
United Kingdom	480 575	152 480	633 055	8 633	0
United Rep of Tanzania	9	631	640	49	631
United States	2 140 560	143 725	2284 285	29 906	0
Uruguay	8 108	128	8 236	0	70
Uzbekistan	1 016	0	1 016	0	0
Vanuatu	16	7	23	0	0
Venezuela	16 455	1 432	17 887	2 736	1 414
Vietnam	64	1 999	2 063	200	1 984
Yemen	657	59	716	0	58
Zambia	6	367	373	0	367
Zimbabwe	84	0	84	0	0
				0	
Total Member States	6 915 968	1147 367	8 063 335	193 908	216 979

Table A-3. (continued)
(Thousands of US dollars)

	Total UN funds	XB contrib. to spec. agencies	Total	Memo Item	
	A-2 (col.11)		(1-2)	IFAD	Govern. self. support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Member States or areas					
Anguilla	0	0	0	0	0
Aruba	0	25	25	0	25
Bermuda	0	0	0	0	0
British Virgin Islands	10	0	10	0	0
Cayman Islands	0	0	0	0	0
Cook Islands	1	0	1	0	0
French Guyana	0	0	0	0	0
French Polynesia	0	0	0	0	0
Guadeloupe	0	0	0	0	0
Guam	0	0	0	0	0
Holy See	0	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	6 949	18	6 967	0	0
Macau	0	81	81	0	68
Martinique	0	0	0	0	0
Montserrat	10	0	10	0	0
Netherlands Antilles	53	0	53	0	214
Niue	0	0	0	0	0
Reunion	0	0	0	0	0
St. Helena	0	0	0	0	0
Tokelau	0	0	0	0	0
Turks and Caicos Islands	182	0	182	0	0
Other	3 454	33 919	37 373	0	14 343
Total non-members	10 659	34 043	44 702	0	14 650
Total countries	6 926 627	1181 410	8 108 037	193 908	231 629
Assessed contrib. spec. agencies'					
regular budgets	0	0	518 167	0	0
European Union	366 714	0	366 714	0	0
Inter-govt.	290 134	113 998	404 132	0	0
Non-govt.	47 539	169 276	216 815	0	0
CGO Cost operations	-82 068	0	-82 068	0	0
Total, Inter-govt/ non-govt org.	622 319	283 274	1 423 760	0	0
Not elsewhere classified	764 893	2 169	767 062	0	1 565
Subtotal	8 313 839	1 466 853	10 298 859	193 908	233 194

**Table A-4. Extrabudgetary contributions for operational activities
by specialized and technical agencies, 2003**
(Thousands of US dollars)

	WHO	FAO	UNIDO	ILO	UNESCO	ITC	IAEA	Other	Total
Australia	7 960	2 811	55	27	227	0	28	92	11 200
Austria	247	- 47	2 747	150	56	0	0	166	3 319
Belgium	5 823	9 035	- 152	2 384	3 623	0	5	546	21 264
Canada	45 279	2 726	- 8	2 439	1 442	3 783	38	318	56 017
Denmark	10 462	316	1 056	6 529	3 525	1 848	0	254	23 990
Finland	2 320	1 735	574	570	1 421	505	1	1 261	8 387
France	2 103	1 577	2 061	4 061	1 000	642	163	1 736	13 343
Germany	6 784	12 209	267	5 330	2 824	1 556	26	532	29 528
Italy	15 276	16 928	8 959	15 018	37 194	525	0	572	94 472
Japan	13 714	12 618	2 510	3 428	32 135	0	338	5 046	69 789
Netherlands	44 074	14 127	274	18 061	2 897	2 102	3	68	81 606
New Zealand	1 141	0	1	0	477	0	0	11	1 630
Norway	40 374	15 430	367	7 817	8 169	1 648	0	1 225	75 030
Sweden	13 682	10 383	1	3 609	4 656	1 809	9	2 745	36 894
Switzerland	9 065	2 100	5 081	2 306	1 627	4 073	2	223	24 477
United Kingdom	114 640	15 733	547	14 671	4 275	1 313	31	1 270	152 480
United States	79 353	5 996	0	39 913	8 567	1 033	5 345	3 518	143 725
Other countries	44 515	70 361	18 069	8 311	105 756	365	5 496	81 386	334 259
Total countries	456 812	194 038	42 409	134 624	219 871	21 202	11 485	100 969	1181 410
Multilateral non- United Nations system	19 224	62 800	5 218	2 842	5 332	617	53	17 911	113 997
Non-governmental organizations	150 908	0	1 861	2 995	8 750	0	1 169	3 594	169 277
Total multilateral and non-governmental organizations	170 132	62 800	7 079	5 837	14 082	617	1 222	21 505	283 274
Not elsewhere classified	0	0	2 120	0	0	0	0	49	2 169
Grand Total	626 944	256 838	51 608	140 461	233 953	21 819	12 707	122 523	1 466 853

**Table A-5. Extrabudgetary contributions for operational activities
of specialized and technical agencies: Overview by donor, 1999-2003**
(Thousands of US dollars)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Australia	8 796	13 403	8 549	5 282	11 200
Austria	3 876	2 128	4 165	4 043	3 320
Belgium	15 263	15 623	18 732	18 660	21 265
Canada	7 296	12 458	25 028	30 379	56 017
Denmark	25 677	30 783	28 681	23 615	23 990
Finland	6 812	9 065	5 649	5 911	8 387
France	11 587	11 060	10 531	10 774	13 344
Germany	19 390	10 090	10 111	18 642	29 527
Italy	56 144	76 117	85 908	75 387	94 471
Japan	68 725	67 100	39 267	36 991	69 790
Netherlands	75 844	132 793	144 505	82 486	81 606
New Zealand	691	199	212	901	1 629
Norway	41 763	44 593	50 664	63 852	75 031
Sweden	34 208	30 373	28 204	27 302	36 895
Switzerland	18 939	19 313	16 756	19 088	24 478
United Kingdom	56 786	133 658	82 781	88 198	152 480
United States of America	93 035	99 593	92 068	102 031	143 725
Other countries	199 691	233 604	283 444	260 293	334 257
Total Countries	744 523	941 951	935 257	873 836	1 181 410
Multilateral non-United Nations system	38 031	32 858	41 389	64 687	113 998
Non-governmental organizations	162 297	182 868	182 257	87 781	169 276
Total inter-non-governmental	200 328	215 726	223 646	152 468	283 274
Not elsewhere classified	31 349	20 588	30 388	5 796	2 169
Grand total	975 763	1 178 265	1 189 291	1 032 100	1 466 853

**Table A-6. Extrabudgetary contributions for operational activities
by specialized and technical agencies:
Overview by agency, 1999-2003
(Thousands of US dollars)**

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
WHO	444 144	627 946	625 736	452 163	626 944
FAO	144 920	168 264	161 360	181 727	256 838
UNIDO	43 639	34 556	38 710	44 748	51 608
ILO	86 480	85 649	82 899	66 557	140 461
UNESCO	133 326	182 666	199 684	188 101	233 953
ITC	11 386	14 214	12 461	17 333	21 819
IAEA	4 254	4 946	6 616	6 473	12 709
Other	107 614	60 025	61 826	74 999	122 521
Grand total	975 763	1 178 266	1 189 292	1 032 100	1 466 853