



COUNTER-TERRORISM

IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE CTITF

CTITF Working Group Report

**INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
IN THE EVENT
OF A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL
TERRORIST ATTACK:
CURRENT STATUS, FUTURE PROSPECTS**

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United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force

Report of the Working Group on Preventing and Responding
to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks

Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Terrorist Attack: Current Status, Future Prospects



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About the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established by the Secretary-General in 2005 to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system. CTITF is chaired by a senior United Nations official appointed by the Secretary-General and consists of 25 United Nations system entities and INTERPOL.

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which brings together into one coherent framework decades of United Nations counter-terrorism policy and legal responses emanating from the General Assembly, the Security Council and relevant United Nations specialized agencies, has been the focus of the work of CTITF since its adoption by the General Assembly in September 2006 (General Assembly resolution 60/288).

The Strategy sets out a plan of action for the international community based on four pillars:

- Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
- Measures to prevent and combat terrorism;
- Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard;
- Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

In accordance with the Strategy, which welcomes the institutionalization of CTITF within the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General in 2009 established a CTITF Office within the Department of Political Affairs to provide support for the work of CTITF. Via the CTITF Office, with the help of a number of thematic initiatives and working groups, and under the policy guidance of Member States through the General Assembly, CTITF aims to coordinate United Nations system-wide support for the implementation of the Strategy and catalyse system-wide, value-added initiatives to support Member State efforts to implement the Strategy in all its aspects. CTITF will also seek to foster constructive engagement between the United Nations system and international and regional organizations and civil society on the implementation of the Strategy.

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Executive Summary

The Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks (the Working Group) is one of the groups through which certain activities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) are organized to support the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The CTITF was established by the Secretary-General in 2005 to ensure the coordination and coherence of UN system-wide counter-terrorism efforts. It now consists of 30 entities from the United Nations system and other international organizations.

This report is the first put forward by the Working Group and aims both to familiarize Member States with existing mechanisms in individual entities of the Working Group, as well as interagency mechanisms, in the context of nuclear and/or radiological weapons and materials, and to identify opportunities for strengthening this coordination. In addition, the report serves as a vehicle for further work by examining the experience of well-established systems for nuclear and radiological security with a view to exploring how best to develop similar interagency mechanisms in the context of chemical and biological weapons and materials.

In reviewing the existing mechanisms for preventing and/or responding to nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks, the report drew not only from regular meetings and discussions of the Working Group entities but also, in particular, from the March 2010 CTITF workshop ('International Response and Mitigation of a Terrorist Attack Using Nuclear and Radiological Weapons or Materials'), hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Further input was provided by members of the Working Group in the producing this report.

The report concluded that a well-developed system for dealing with radiation emergencies is in place, firstly through the central coordinating role and responsibilities of the IAEA and, secondly, through an established interagency mechanism: the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE). The report also reviewed the wide-ranging contributions and capabilities that exist within the other entities of the Working Group.

On this basis, the report puts forward three recommendations:

- Build upon the IAEA's existing role as the global focal point in public information coordination in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency and

facilitate participation of UNHQ, as appropriate, in order to manage all aspects of public information and communications demands.

- Enhance the participation of DSS within the existing interagency mechanism (i.e. IACRNE); and
- Request that a representative from the CTITF WMD Working Group be invited to participate in IACRNE meetings and exercises as an observer;

Follow-up on the recommendations outlined above will be determined by the individual entities of the Working Group as appropriate and within their respective mandates.

The CTITF/WMD Working Group is grateful to the European Commission for its generous financial support of this study.

Chapter I

Background

Mandate from the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

1. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) on 8 September 2006 by consensus. The Strategy provides a strategic framework and plan of action for prevention and response to terrorism. It identified four pillars of action: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build the capacity of States to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism.
2. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) was established in 2005 by the Secretary-General to ensure coordination and coherence of United Nations system-wide counter-terrorism efforts. It now consists of 30 entities inside and outside the United Nations system and supports the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
3. Specifically, the CTITF Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Attacks (hereinafter, the Working Group) was established to strengthen the exchange of information and knowledge among relevant UN entities and international organizations related to response to terrorist attacks involving WMDs.¹ The membership of the Working Group includes both UN and non-UN entities.²

Objectives and methodology in producing the report

4. The Working Group has formulated a work plan to focus on a specific element of the mandate of the Strategy, noted above: an assessment of how the UN and certain international organizations would engage on the issue of a terrorist attack where chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or materials were used, and the level of coordination between them. The first phase of the work plan, which is the subject of this report, aims to both familiarize Member

States with current interagency mechanisms in the context of nuclear and/or radiological weapons and materials, and to identify opportunities for strengthening this coordination. Experience and lessons learned in this phase of work will be taken forward, as appropriate, to the next phase of work which will focus on chemical and biological weapons or materials.

5. It will then identify the mechanisms that have been developed within the individual entities of the Working Group to address nuclear and radiological terrorism. As an outcome of this review, the report will suggest ways in which the overall effectiveness of the existing arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the relevant international organizations in response to, and mitigation of, a terrorist attack may be improved in order to enhance the provision of assistance to all States that may be subject to a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological materials.
6. The substance of the report derives primarily from the knowledge, experiences, lessons, and observations shared at the CTITF workshop on ‘International Response and Mitigation of a Terrorist Attack Using Nuclear and Radiological Weapons or Materials’, as well as input received from the participants. The workshop, hosted by the IAEA and held in Vienna in March 2010, included a round table discussion on different scenarios and explored the various capabilities and experiences of participating entities and organizations with regard to nuclear or radiological dispersal events, particularly in the context of a terrorist attack.³ The workshop included, *inter alia*, various presentations by the IAEA in which the IAEA’s legal mandate and central role in responding to radiation emergencies and its role as the main coordinating body for the development and maintenance of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations (JPLAN) was explained. In addition, the existing interagency system for responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, known as the ‘Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies’ (IACRNE) was described.
7. At the workshop, the Working Group was also informed about a June 2010 meeting of IACRNE. The meeting included a tabletop exercise focusing on a scenario that involved an emergency at a nuclear facility stemming from a terrorist act, in order to examine links between safety and security authorities and identify weak points in the international response.
8. This report only covers coordination within the UN system and the international organizations. However, the CTITF recognizes that assistance may be available through other mechanisms such as regional organizations (NATO). Other international organizations that are not currently part of the CTITF WMD Working Group may also be of assistance. The World Customs Organization (WCO), for

instance, provides a technical platform for the implementation of regional and global operational enforcement activities, in particular on preventing the proliferation of material that may be used for weapons of mass destruction. Finally, in the case of an attack involving nuclear weapons, assistance will be provided through the positive security assurances provided unilaterally by nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Chapter II

Compilation and consolidation of existing responsibilities and mechanisms

9. It is important that the roles and functions of the various agencies that comprise the working group are clearly understood if effective, coordinated and timely assistance is to be provided to a State that has been subject to a terrorist act involving CBRN. Coordination *between* organizations is indeed essential to avoid duplication of efforts and to enhance the assistance that can be provided to States. It is therefore of fundamental importance to understand existing capacities, not only of individual entities but of the existing interagency mechanisms that currently work to address nuclear and/or radiological emergencies, as well as chemical and biological emergencies (even if such mechanisms have not, traditionally, focused on incidents that arise due to terrorism or other criminal acts). While this report focuses on the existing arrangements in responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting from a terrorist attacks, as noted above, similar projects are foreseen in the chemical and biological weapon fields. As a result, the recommendations put forward in Section IV of this report are preliminary; common overarching recommendations, which may also prove to be applicable in the context of chemical or biological weapons, are suggested in Section V.

Relevant inter-agency mechanisms

10. With respect to nuclear and radiological emergencies, the primary pre-existing interagency coordination mechanism is IACRNE, which was established in the wake of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986.⁴ The scope of activities covered by the Committee is based on two legally binding treaties: the *Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident* and under the *Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency*. As of May 2010, there were 108 States and four international organizations party to the Early Notification Convention, and 105 States and four international organizations party to the Assistance Convention.⁵
11. IACRNE, previously known as the Inter-Agency Committee on the Response to Nuclear Accidents (IACRNA), underwent its name change in 2009 in order

better to reflect its efforts in the context *all* types of nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies, not simply those that arise as a result of accidents. The IAEA provides the Secretariat for IACRNE, pursuant to its own roles and responsibilities as defined by the two Conventions noted above. According to its own Terms of Reference, the functions of IACRNE are, *inter alia*:

- to work towards coordinated and consistent international standards on preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies;
 - to exchange information among organizations concerning their respective plans, activities and harmonization of these plans; and
 - to identify new areas for interagency cooperation, to plan, coordinate and review joint actions related to preparedness and response for nuclear and radiological emergencies, including exercises.
12. The intergovernmental entities comprising IACRNE are divided into two types: *participating* and *corresponding* organizations. Participating organizations are identified on the basis of their sponsorship of JPLAN.⁶ Corresponding organizations are international organizations with activities in the field of emergency prevention, preparedness and response and who do not co-sponsor the JPLAN but wish to observe IACRNE activities.⁷
 13. The entities that make up IACRNE meet every 16–18 months in order, *inter alia*, to coordinate preparedness programmes and large-scale international exercises organized by IACRNE’s participating organizations. The IAEA is the lead organization for Convention Exercises (“ConvEx”). These are large-scale exercises that take place every three to five years, and are carried out in cooperation with a Host State, as part of a national exercise. They provide an opportunity to test response arrangements in a coordinated manner, with the goal of optimizing the involvement of international organizations and States in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency, including information exchange, provision of assistance and coordination of public information. As noted earlier, IACRNE also organizes smaller exercises approximately every other meeting which provide an opportunity for discussion on the response arrangements in the JPLAN.
 14. One of the primary roles of IACRNE has been in the development and maintenance of the JPLAN through the IAEA (and in cooperation with ICAO and UNSCEAR). The JPLAN is co-sponsored by all of the IACRNE participating organizations, although the IAEA serves as the JPLAN’s main coordinating body. In its latest 2010 iteration, the JPLAN is described as encapsulating a “common understanding of how each organization acts during a response and in making preparedness arrangements”⁸ in the event of a radiation emergency and irrespective of its cause (i.e. whether nuclear or radiological, safety- or security-related).

15. The Plan, therefore, is not prescriptive. Rather, it sets out and describes the arrangements of the participating international organizations (those who make up IACRNE, as identified above) in responding to radiation emergencies, not only on the ground, but with regard to coordinating international assistance and public information.
16. The roles and responsibilities of the international organizations involved reflect their various statutory and legally assigned functions. For example, the IAEA, in keeping with its role as JPlan's coordinating agency (and, as will be detailed in the following section, in keeping with its mandated role under its statute and under relevant legal instruments) is tasked with activating the interagency emergency response and serves as "the focal organization for the response coordination".⁹
17. Since its inception in 2000, JPLAN has undergone regular updating by the co-sponsoring organizations (in 2002, 2004 and 2006). The most recent iteration of the Plan was released in January 2010 and provides, *inter alia*, elaborated response actions and additional clarification of arrangements and response tasks.¹⁰ It also takes into account the entry into force, since 2006, of relevant international instruments and has updated the capabilities and contact details of the co-sponsoring organizations. The next regular update is planned to be issued in two to three years.

Significance of the interagency mechanisms

18. The existence of IACRNE, and its related JPLAN, demonstrates that there is already an effective and comprehensive interagency mechanism in place, providing coordination and facilitating clarity with regard to the roles and capabilities of the participating international organizations in preventing, preparing for and responding to nuclear or radiological emergencies. However, neither IACRNE nor JPLAN supersede the work that the individual organizations undertake in this context (nor the fact that primary responsibility for addressing nuclear/radiological security lies with the State). Rather, the participating organizations bring their own individual contributions to the issue of preventing, preparing for and/or responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Each has some capacity to provide assistance to States on the prevention and/or response to a terrorist attack using nuclear/radiological materials. These contributions are identified in the following subsection.

Chapter III

Relevant existing mechanisms and responsibilities of WMD Working Group participants: prevention and response

19. The current roles, activities and responsibilities of individual international organizations, with regard to assistance to States in dealing with nuclear or radiological terrorism, fall broadly under two main headings: prevention and response. Some organizations undertake activities related only to one (for instance the 1540 Committee, which focuses exclusively on supporting preventive measures against nuclear or radiological terrorism). Others, such as the IAEA and INTERPOL, have established capacities in both prevention and response. In addition, bilateral interagency cooperation on specific activities (e.g. between the IAEA and FAO to ensure coordinated response actions in regard to food and agriculture; the IAEA and WMO on meteorological assessment support; or the IAEA and WHO on medical preparedness and response) is also well-established. In addition, the IACRNE participating organizations have established a network of public information offices as a mechanism for coordinating the handling of information during emergencies. However, written coordination procedures are still lacking.

Prevention

International Atomic Energy Agency

20. As might be expected, among the international organizations the IAEA has the most well-developed set of capabilities in the area of nuclear security and, specifically, the prevention of (and, as will be noted below, the response to) nuclear terrorism or any other malicious acts, including the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The IAEA has begun the implementation of its third dedicated Nuclear Security Plan (NSP).¹¹ The first covered the years 2002–2005 and the second covered 2006–2009. The Plan's objective is to contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and

maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction. The objective is also to assist adherence to and implementation of nuclear security related international legal instruments; and to strengthen the international cooperation and coordination of assistance given through bilateral programmes and other international initiatives in a manner that also contributes to the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology.

21. Such activities derive not only from the IAEA's Statute but from a platform of international legal instruments, both binding and non-binding, in which the IAEA is identified as the international organization possessing the greatest capacity for assistance with implementation. Chief among these, in the context of the *prevention of nuclear/radiological terrorism*, are the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment* (CPPNM, of which the IAEA is the depositary) and the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*.
22. The IAEA has developed a set of activities and services aimed at assisting Member States, upon their request, in preventing nuclear or radiological terrorism, including the protection of nuclear installations and facilities, as well as prevention of the loss of nuclear/radiological materials through theft and illicit trafficking.¹² The Agency offers training, advisory and evaluation services, legislative assistance, and technical advice.
23. The 'International Nuclear Security Advisory Service' (INSServ) may be requested by a State and entails a mission of IAEA experts to review and assess that State's existing measures to prevent nuclear terrorism and proposed ways in which those measures might be improved or upgraded. The mission experts focus on, *inter alia*, the existing legislative and regulatory system surrounding the State's nuclear security measures; physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material; illicit trafficking of materials; and relevant human resources development.
24. In contrast to the wide-ranging scope of the INSServ missions, the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) focuses primarily on the system of physical protection of nuclear/radiological facilities and materials. In the case of IPPAS missions, the assembled team of experts is international (i.e. not drawn exclusively from IAEA staff). When invited to do so by a State, the team of experts assesses the State's physical protection systems against existing international best practices. Agreed follow-up activities may be undertaken at the request of the State.

25. The IAEA, in addition, offers assistance and advice to States with regard to developing an effective state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC). While this is a critical part of the State's ability to fulfil its non-proliferation commitments, a functioning SSAC also allows the State to maintain security over its nuclear material and aids in the prevention of illicit trafficking. The IAEA's International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) missions assist States by reviewing their SSACs to provide suggestions on improvements that could be made to their systems. Numerous training and educational activities are also provided to States, not only on SSACs, but in the form of Design Basis Threat¹³ workshops and other courses related to physical protection.
26. The Agency is also in the process of developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance, in consultation with Member States and eight international organizations, to be published in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series of publications. This guidance is intended to help States to establish, implement, maintain and sustain national nuclear security, comprising preventive measures at facilities, transports or other locations in which nuclear or other radioactive material is used, stored or transported, as well as measures to detect any unauthorized or criminal use of such material outside of such facilities or locations and respond effectively to any such event. The IAEA has so far published 12 documents in the Nuclear Security Series. In the course of the year, it anticipates finalizing the four 'top tier' publications comprising the fundamentals of a State's nuclear security regime, as well as three Recommendations level documents: on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5); on radioactive material and associated facilities; and on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
27. Finally, the IAEA provides legislative assistance and advice to its Member States to create awareness of international instruments in the nuclear field and help them comply with their international obligations. In addition, the IAEA helps Member States in developing comprehensive national nuclear laws, including not only nuclear security related legislation but also covering all branches of nuclear law (e.g. safety; safeguards; emergency preparedness and response; and liability).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

28. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has given UNODC a mandate to assist States, upon request, in:
 - ratifying all 16 universal legal instruments against terrorism, including those relating to CBRN¹⁴;

- putting in place domestic legislation that fully incorporates the offences set forth in those treaties as required by Security Council resolution 1373 and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy; and
 - building capacity to implement those legal instruments.
29. UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC/TPB) provides technical assistance in the fight against CBRN terrorism through different mechanisms such as the drafting of relevant national laws upon State request, the development of model criminal provisions in the implementation of relevant instruments, the elaboration of training material and the organization of interregional, regional and national workshops on the suppression of acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. In addition, UNODC maintains and develops a comprehensive electronic database on criminal legal texts, in all six UN official languages, with specific links to relevant national legislation on CBRN terrorism.
30. In the context of nuclear/radiological terrorism, UNODC has often cooperated with the IAEA. These activities have entailed not only ratification support of relevant legal instruments, but legislative implementation of penal provisions and support for national counter-terrorism capacity-building for criminal justice systems via specialized training. The IAEA and UNODC have cooperated in organizing IAEA training courses and workshops on nuclear security, as well as on UNODC/TPB workshops focusing on, *inter alia*, the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and the implementation of penal provisions on nuclear terrorism.

1540 Committee

31. The 1540 Committee monitors the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which requires States, in accordance with their national procedures, to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.¹⁵ The 1540 Committee also facilitates assistance to States in implementing the resolution. Finally, the Committee engages in outreach activities to assist States in implementing the resolution, including workshops and bilateral consultations.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

32. UNICRI's CBRN risk mitigation efforts centre on knowledge exchange and the development of an e-learning platform. This is carried out through the creation of a network of information and knowledge exchange, which facilitates

the interaction of the national experts and representatives of international and regional organizations, and which enhances sharing of information related to illicit CBRN trafficking and enables access to information that helps strengthen capabilities in terms of effective security of facilities, border control, law enforcement operations, national export controls and trans-shipment controls. The ‘Knowledge Management System’ (KMS) currently exists in south-east Europe, the Caucasus, and North Africa and has received technical support from the IAEA, among others. UNICRI’s CBRN KMSs enable experts from participating States to confront new security challenges, learn to collectively develop solutions and critically analyse the outcomes of their decisions, therefore resulting in a durable cooperation legacy. The IAEA is a member of the KMS and is actively involved in KMS project meetings and mentoring services. The IAEA contributes analysis of RN trafficking, based on its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), for inclusion in comprehensive CBRN risk analyses produced within the framework of KMS. The CBRN comprehensive approach used by the KMS allows the transfer of lessons learned and best practice among the different CBRN fields and it facilitates identification of potential common trafficking patterns that might not be apparent were the chemical, biological and RN fields studied in isolation.

33. In addition, UNICRI, with the technical support of a number of partner organizations, is supporting the European Commission in developing ‘Centres of Excellence for CBRN Risk Mitigation’. The objective of the centres is to create a network for enhancing national policies and capabilities for mitigating CBRN risks (e.g. from terrorists, criminals, etc.), aiming to maximize the use of existing resources and facilitate national ownership over CBRN risk mitigation policy. UNICRI is in the process of joining IACRNE.

International Maritime Organization

34. The IMO’s activities with regard to the prevention of nuclear/radiological terrorism are part of the spectrum of the IMO’s broader work on the security of international shipping. Maritime security includes not only combating terrorism, but also dealing with such issues as piracy and armed robbery and attempts to board a ship as a stowaway or illegal migrant. Such efforts are primarily undertaken pursuant to two legal instruments: the *International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea* (SOLAS) — specifically, Chapter XI-2 — and the *International Ship and Port Facility Security Code* (ISPS Code). The IMO plays a role in the area of information services, education and training, technical services, and technical assistance, and is a participating organization of IACRNE (and co-sponsor of the JPLAN).

INTERPOL

35. Chief among INTERPOL's capabilities is its secure police communications network, considered a core function. The organization is able to issue international search and arrest warrants for terrorists and other criminals who may be involved in the trafficking or use of nuclear or radiological materials. Notices further serve to alert police of fugitives, dangerous criminals, suspected terrorists, missing persons, or weapons threats. This system is applicable both in the context of preventing, as well as in responding to, an act of nuclear or radiological terrorism. The notice programme consists of six colour-coded notices, which range from a notice seeking the arrest or provision arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition, to one providing warning to the police, public entities and other international organizations about potential threats from disguised weapons, parcel bombs and other dangerous materials.
36. INTERPOL's 'Project Geiger' is an ongoing analytical programme focusing on the radiological and nuclear threat. Its goals include gathering comprehensive data on the illicit use of radiological and nuclear materials, analysing the threats and assisting with international investigations. Project Geiger maintains a database containing trafficking and other unauthorized activities regarding radiological and nuclear materials. Analytical activities focus on assessing patterns and trends, potential risks and threats, routes and methods, and weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Intelligence is a key component of any prevention programme. Analytical reports are made available on the secure INTERPOL web sites and are available to officials by request.
37. In addition, INTERPOL is in the process of forming a radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention unit which is intended to function within a broader future INTERPOL CBRN terrorism prevention programme with the current Bioterrorism Prevention Unit (as well as a proposed Chemical Terrorism Prevention Unit). INTERPOL is a participating organization of IACRNE and a co-sponsor of the JPLAN. Future CBRN terror prevention programming at INTERPOL will be based on international police and national security service best practices regarding prevention programmes. Such programming can be divided into countermeasures, or 'soft', programmes, such as specialized training of law enforcement personnel and comprehensive exercises, and tripwires, or 'hard' programmes, which seek to create definitive preventive reactions in police services based upon the detection of suspicious activity concerning CBRN materials and the personnel using them maliciously. It is expected that INTERPOL will develop an intermediate level training course for police officials that will instruct in the method-

ology of the creation of preventive programmes and then further support those officials as they seek to create these programmes in their respective countries.

Preparedness and response

International Atomic Energy Agency

38. Activities and assistance to States under the broad heading of response to a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack are two-fold: firstly, there are activities related to *preparedness for a response* to a nuclear/radiological emergency; secondly, there are activities related to assistance *in direct response to an actual emergency*. The IAEA's response mechanisms incorporate both types of activities. Notably, the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions place specific functions on the IAEA with regard to assisting States in developing their own preparedness and response arrangements for nuclear and radiological emergencies. Such efforts include the development of emergency response plans or the development of appropriate legislation, as well as training programmes for relevant preparedness and/or response personnel (i.e. the national first responders to a nuclear/radiological incident) in States.
39. An *International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies* was endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in 2004. The main objective of the Action Plan was to improve and strengthen the international emergency preparedness and response system by focusing the efforts of IAEA Member States, the Secretariat and competent authorities, as defined under the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions. The Action Plan identified three main areas for strengthening the existing system: international communications, international assistance and sustainable infrastructure. The IAEA Secretariat, working with its Member States, subsequently addressed the actions identified in the Action Plan, and is currently finalizing a report, with recommendations, that will be submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011 for its consideration and approval.
40. Within the IAEA Secretariat, the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) serves as the global focal point for notification, information exchange and response to nuclear or radiological incidents or emergencies (regardless of their origins) or threats. This role is derived not only from the IAEA's Statute, but also from the responsibilities placed on the IAEA by the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention. The IEC provides 24/7 coverage, with an on-call emergency response manager, logistics support officer, radiation safety specialist, nuclear installation safety specialist, and nuclear security specialist. In addition,

a public information officer is also on-call. During any time when the IEC is in activation mode, a public information officer will have direct access to, and regular communication with, the emergency response manager.

41. In the event of a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological materials, the IAEA Incident and Emergency System has three primary roles: to facilitate the exchange of official real-time information among States/relevant international organizations; to provide assistance/advice to States/relevant international organizations upon request; and to provide relevant, timely, truthful, consistent and appropriate public information. The IEC works in coordination with States. Therefore, information that the IEC will have, in the first instance, will come from States participating in the system. The IEC's response system, concept of operations, organization and responsibilities are all outlined in the IAEA Response Plan for Incidents and Emergencies (REPLIE),¹⁶ which not only provides the basis for the IAEA Secretariat's own emergency preparedness and response, but is compatible with the interagency JPLAN, discussed earlier.
42. The IAEA also provides on-the-ground assistance on radiological crime scene management, evidence gathering, forensics, and attribution, and has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with OCHA, which addresses the specific responsibilities of each in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The MOU (and the JPLAN) recognizes that OCHA will coordinate all aspects of on-the-ground disaster relief assistance, while the IAEA will be responsible for coordinating relevant scientific and technical assistance.
43. The IAEA also assists States, upon request, in investigations in the aftermath of an event, as well as with environmental remediation and radiological cleanup. Regular field exercises are conducted by the IAEA to support States in evaluating the effectiveness of their own response procedures and performance.
44. The IAEA has also developed appropriate safety standards relating to preparedness for nuclear or radiological incidents and emergencies, regardless of their origin. The *Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency*, and *Arrangements for Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency* (publications in the IAEA Safety Standards Series) are the two primary examples of this effort, and are co-sponsored by FAO, OCHA, ILO, PAHO and WHO.
45. In addition, the IAEA's Emergency Preparedness and Response documents put forward best practices that can be used by States wishing to learn how to prepare for a nuclear or radiological emergency. The IAEA's Nuclear Security Series sets out nuclear security fundamentals and best practices on implementing those

fundamentals. In addition, a number of technical guidance publications are available, including reference manuals, training guides and service guides.

46. Along with WHO, the IAEA has developed a training manual on generic procedures for a medical response.¹⁷ A manual for national first responders (police, fire-fighters, medical personnel) has also been developed, together with training materials. The IAEA offers a range of training courses and workshops to address the needs of States, from the State's first response to a radiological emergency to nuclear forensics best practices and radiological crime scene management. The IAEA also offers Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions as a service to independently appraise preparedness for a radiation incident or emergency in States. In addition it maintains the Response Assistance Network (RANET) — a network of States capable and willing to provide, upon request, specialized assistance by appropriately trained, equipped and qualified personnel with the ability to respond quickly and effectively to radiation incidents and emergencies.
47. In the event of a *threat* involving a terrorist attack with nuclear or radiological materials, the IAEA provides assistance to States in: assessment (e.g. the credibility of the threat and potential consequences); search for the material (e.g. by providing a radiation survey); identification (e.g. of the radionuclide involved and its intended use); and rendering the site in question safe (e.g. through source seizure and isolation).

INTERPOL

48. INTERPOL provides key professional support to the police services (i.e. investigation/management of crime) of any member country in the event of a malicious act involving nuclear or radiological material. It should be noted that, as an international police organization, INTERPOL prepares its response to a nuclear or radiological event under the assumption that it could be due to terrorism or otherwise the product of a malicious act, until clear and convincing evidence to the contrary is available.
49. INTERPOL's activities in this area are carried out under close cooperation and coordination with the IAEA. Currently, this entails the sharing of data and expertise as part of Project Geiger (see above), although the related MOU also contains provisions for the coordination of analysis and response activities. In the event of a malicious act involving nuclear or radiological material, INTERPOL can provide secure voice and data police communication services to its member countries through its network involving national central bureaus, regional bureaus and the General Secretariat itself in Lyon, France.

50. Within the area of operational data services, INTERPOL can query its databases for previous notice information concerning suspects, fingerprint identification information and DNA information to its member countries, in support of the post-event investigation. Real-time travel document searches are available to member country police services. For police services that have a consequence management portfolio, INTERPOL offers support in disaster victim identification.
51. Operational support includes, at the request of the victim member country, the deployment of a Rapid Investigation Team (RIT), made up of career police and INTERPOL professionals whose capabilities will be at the disposal of the victim member country. Additionally, the RIT would facilitate communication with the various INTERPOL constituencies and lend expertise in the investigation of a crime involving nuclear/radiological material to the requesting police service. Furthermore, the proposed INTERPOL CBRN terrorism prevention unit will provide services in another core function of the organization — Operational Police Support. INTERPOL currently has seconded officers and contract analytical personnel that can staff an INTERPOL Response Team in the event a member country requests CBRN incident and investigative support. This support includes facilitating communication with INTERPOL databases, providing substantive CBRN expertise, and facilitating the location and transportation of specialized technical assistance, where needed.

World Health Organization

52. The revised international health regulations (IHR) of 2005 are the global rules to enhance national, regional and global public health security. The regulations, which are binding upon WHO Member States, have served as the framework for the effective response by the WHO and its Member States to public health emergencies, including those resulting from a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack. The IHR define the rights and obligations of countries to report public health events, and establish a number of procedures that WHO must follow in its work to uphold global public health security.
53. With specific reference to nuclear or radiological public health emergencies, WHO developed a Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness Network (REMPAN) in 1987, in order to fulfil its own obligations under the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention (which, as noted above, also place specific obligations on the IAEA to coordinate overall interagency response). REMPAN is a network of over 40 WHO Collaborating Centres and Liaison Institutions, which specialize in the management of radiation emergencies and their consequences. Through REMPAN, WHO provides technical assistance

to a State, by helping to prepare that State's health system for responding to a nuclear/radiological emergency or threat. It can also assist in strengthening the preparation and response capabilities of a State's health sector, via technical guidance, information sharing, coordinated research, training and exercises. WHO can also assist in the response to an actual dispersal event by providing expertise on diagnosis, monitoring, dosimetry, treatment and long-term follow-up of radiation injuries, acute radiation syndrome, internal contamination and other radiopathology. WHO is also currently exploring the possibility of a new global stockpile of treatments for radiation emergencies.

54. WHO coordinates closely with the IAEA on medical response to any type of nuclear or radiological incident. This has included the joint development of recommendations to Member States and coordination on areas of overlapping activities or mandates. WHO is a participating organization of IACRNE and a co-sponsor of the JPLAN.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

55. Overall, UNICRI's role in response to a potential CBRN terrorist attack is best characterized as a supporting one. The KMSs enhance the access of participating States to information that can help strengthen preparedness and capabilities to respond to illicit CBRN trafficking. Further, the CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative aims to establish a policy network that can help strengthen national policies and capabilities for CBRN response, notably by maximizing the use of existing national, regional and international resources and providing access to specific projects and expertise. UNICRI representatives have actively participated in the development of a forthcoming IAEA nuclear security series publication on detection and response, which will be co-sponsored by UNICRI. In addition, UNICRI has the ability to work on the development of cross-cutting methodologies for the analysis of response to CBRN terrorist attacks (across different fields, organizations, etc.). Such methodology might also be adapted for application to responses to CBRN accidents or malicious acts, including terrorism.

International Maritime Organization

56. Although IMO does not have a response role related specifically to a nuclear/radiological terrorist attack, it does have general responsibilities pursuant to the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS Protocol 2000). It also plays a role under the 2005 Protocols to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention (1988), which *inter alia* establishes boarding and reporting procedures that can

be used once an incident has occurred. As such, the IMO is empowered to cooperate with other agencies and organizations to facilitate the delivery of assistance in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident involving or affecting a vessel at sea or in port. Its response capabilities would also include serving as a liaison for communications with the maritime community, including global maritime distress and safety information services or warnings. It is able to facilitate access to specific technical information and expertise with national maritime focal points.

UN Department of Safety and Security

57. DSS has the responsibility of coordinating the crisis response within the UN, particularly if the crisis in question relates to the safety and security of staff members. The DSS Crisis Operations Group (COG) implements decisions made by the UN's Senior Implementation Policy Team (SEPT) and meets continually during a crisis, as well as facilitating the maintenance of 'mission critical functions', both during and after the crisis. DSS does not, however, possess the expertise for the technical aspects of emergency planning when dealing with nuclear or radiological events (or those involving other WMDs). DSS is a corresponding organization of IACRNE, rather than a participating organization, and thus is not a co-sponsor of the JPLAN.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

58. The bulk of UNODC's legislative assistance work in the area of nuclear/radiological security focuses on the preventive side (see above). However, UNODC also provides assistance in responding to an event through the provision of assistance to a requesting State on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the treaties dealing with the prevention and suppression of acts of CBRN terrorism. This includes assistance on the interpretation of aspects of extradition and mutual legal assistance.

Chapter IV

Working Group observations

59. The examination of the roles and functions of the various international organisations indicates that the IAEA has the central coordinating role in the UN system for responding to all types of radiation emergencies (regardless of their origin). This role derives from the coordinating responsibilities mandated to the IAEA by the relevant legal instruments and builds upon the expertise and long experience of the IAEA in engaging with these issues. In fact, because the IAEA mechanisms are based on legally-binding treaties, States Parties to the conventions would continue to be bound by the IAEA system.¹⁸
60. In addition, an effective and well-developed interagency coordination mechanism for dealing with radiation emergencies, including those resulting from acts of terrorism, is in place. This interagency coordination work includes a Joint Plan, which is regularly updated, and which details the roles of the participating organizations. The IACRNE mechanism also includes tabletop and large-scale exercises, which have focused increasing attention on radiation emergencies deriving from malicious/terrorist acts. The report therefore recommends that the IACRNE/JPLAN work and mandate — particularly in light of its recent focus on radiation emergencies deriving from malicious/terrorist acts — be further highlighted, not duplicated or replaced.
61. Finally, significant *ad hoc* bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the organizations has also been shown. This cooperation has taken the form of joint training efforts; co-sponsored and jointly developed publications; and regular communication and interactions in areas where there are overlapping efforts or mandates.
62. However, the Working Group feels that a radiological or nuclear incident linked to terrorism is expected to generate a high level of attention from the United Nations and involvement among Member States as well as among UN system organizations. Therefore, the Group also observes that existing interagency coordination may be further strengthened by increasing institutional linkages with United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ), in particular. This provides the basis for the recommendations outlined below.

Chapter V

Recommendations on next steps

63. The following recommendations should, at this point, be considered preliminary, as the CTITF WMD Working Group intends next to explore commonalities and areas of interagency coordination across the entire CBRN spectrum.

Recommendation 1: Build upon the IAEA's existing role as the global focal point in public information coordination in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency and facilitate participation of UNHQ, as appropriate, in order to manage all aspects of public information and communications demands.

64. A nuclear or radiological terrorist incident is expected to result in a high level of public and media interest. Along with IACRNE participating organizations, particularly the IAEA, key UNHQ communicators, from the Secretary-General and his spokesperson to DPI officials are also likely to be approached for public comment. Therefore, it is crucial that there be a high level of effective and efficient coordination on public information between the UN and all the relevant international organizations in order to facilitate accurate and consistent reporting by the media, thereby helping to assuage public fears and prevent panic.
65. As noted previously, IACRNE participating organizations have already established a network of public information officers as a mechanism for coordination of public information during emergencies. Moreover, the IEC serves as the primary global focal point for notification, information exchange and response to a nuclear or radiological incidents or emergencies (regardless of their origins) or threats. The IAEA's Division of Public Information, in direct coordination with the IEC, would serve as the point of contact for coordinating the public information aspect of any international response.
66. The DPI also runs a well established UN system-wide public information coordinating mechanism (i.e. the United Nations Communication Group), both at UNHQ as well as on a country team level. Therefore, regular engagement and established contacts between DPI and the IAEA Division of Public Information, in advance of any radiological emergency (including terrorism), should be

in place to facilitate a two-way flow of information and to ensure that the public information response from UNHQ and from the IAEA is fully coordinated, widely shared among key entities and readily available when needed. This will also help to ensure harmony and clarity in political messaging, while ensuring that technical and scientific questions on the event are directed to the IAEA.

Recommendation 2: Enhance the participation of DSS within the existing interagency mechanism (i.e. IACRNE).

67. Although DSS is not equipped with specific expertise on radiation emergencies, its mandate and responsibilities within the UN system include its role at the centre of any UN crisis coordination. As such, linkages with UNHQ would be further enhanced by DSS engaging with IACRNE as a full participating organization, rather than a corresponding organization. This would not only increase awareness within UNHQ of the existing response mechanisms already in place, but would facilitate DSS in directing any technical or scientific issues or concerns to the appropriate organization (specifically, in the context of a nuclear or radiological emergency, to the IAEA/IEC).

Recommendation 3: Request that a representative from the CTITF WMD Working Group be invited to participate in IACRNE meetings and exercises as an observer.

68. The importance of a pre-existing interagency mechanism to deal with radiation emergencies is one that, as noted earlier, should be supported rather than duplicated. However, although the Committee currently comprises a number of international organizations, there is no formal participation from UNHQ. The inclusion of a technical representative from the CTITF WMD Working Group would increase awareness within UNHQ of the current interagency coordination, effort, and capacity already available in preventing, preparing for and responding to radiation emergencies, including those resulting from a terrorist act. It would also serve as a useful conduit in facilitating the timely and accurate flow of information between IACRNE participating organizations and UNHQ if a terrorist incident were to occur.

Chapter VI

Conclusions and looking to the future

69. As noted at the outset of the report, this study constitutes the first phase of a broader effort, which will also examine interagency mechanisms and coordination for responding to other types of WMD attacks by terrorists (i.e. using chemical or biological weapons). A key goal of this report is to look at the experiences of well-established systems for nuclear and radiological security, with a view to exploring how best to develop similar interagency mechanisms in the context of chemical and biological weapons and materials. Several of the lessons learned from this report may be applied to this next phase. Some of these are:
- IACRNE and the associated JPLAN demonstrate the value of an institutionalized interagency coordination mechanism that includes regular meetings and consultations, together with small and full-scale exercises.
 - The workshop held in March 2010 in Vienna, and hosted by the IAEA, was crucial in creating an awareness of the roles of the various CTITF Working Group entities in addressing the issue of nuclear/radiological terrorism. A similar workshop, held at the start of the next phase of work on the question of terrorism using chemical or biological weapons, would likewise prove useful in order to build new modes of cooperation and sustainable synergies among relevant stakeholders and actors in the chemical and biological field.
 - The importance of establishing linkages and regular contact between the public information officers of the relevant technical organizations and UNHQ, in order to allay public fears and ensure that the media receives consistent and accurate information on the event, the response, and its consequences.

Annex I

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Annex II Acronyms

CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
COG	DSS Crisis Operations Group
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment
CTITF	Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
DBT	Design Basis Threat
DPI	United Nations Department of Public Information
DSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
EC	European Commission
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Reviews
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
IACRNA	Inter-Agency Committee on the Response to Nuclear Accidents
IACRNE	Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IEC	Incident and Emergency Centre
IHR	International Health Regulations
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INSServ	International Nuclear Security Advisory Service
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPPAS	IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service
ISPS Code	International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISSAS	IAEA's International SSAC Advisory Service
ITDB	Illicit Trafficking Database
JPLAN	Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations

KMS	Knowledge Management System
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSP	Nuclear Security Plan
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOSA	United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organization
RANET	Response Assistance Network
REMPAN	Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness Network
REPLIE	IAEA Response Plan for Incidents and Emergencies
RIT	Rapid Investigation Team
SEPT	UN's Senior Implementation Policy Team
SOLAS	International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
SSAC	System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNODC/TPB	UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch
UNSCEAR	United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Endnotes

- 1 The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force: Fact Sheet, p.1.
- 2 The Working Group is co-chaired by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the lead for this phase of work, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with the participation of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA); the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI); the World Health Organization (WHO); Expert Staff of the 1540 Committee; the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); the International Maritime Organization (IMO); the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS); the UN Department of Public Information (DPI); and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) participates as an observer.
- 3 The participating organizations attending the March 2010 workshop were: CTITF (UN/DPA); IAEA; the 1540 Committee; DPI; DSS; IMO; INTERPOL; UNICRI; UNODA; UNODC; OPCW.
- 4 IACRNE was established following a meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), WMO, WHO and the IAEA at a Special Session of the IAEA General Conference in September 1986.
- 5 Accessed at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna_status.pdf; www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare_status.pdf
- 6 Currently, and in addition to the IAEA, these are the: European Commission (EC), European Police Office (EUROPOL), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/NEA), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA), United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UN/OOSA), World Health Organization (WHO) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO).
- 7 Corresponding organizations of the Committee are the: International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS), and WCO.

- 8 International Atomic Energy Agency, Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations, EPR-JPLAN 2010, 1 January 2010, p.15. Accessible at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/EPR-JPLAN_2010_web.pdf
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013: Report by the Director General, IAEA, GOV/2009/54–GC(53)/18, 17 August 2009. Available at: <http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/nuclear-security-plan2010-2013.pdf>
- 12 The IAEA is also providing assistance to non-IAEA Member States.
- 13 A ‘design basis threat’ (DBT) is derived from a threat assessment by the State, based on the current evaluation of the threats to its nuclear security. The DBT outlines the set of adversary characteristics for which operators and State organizations together have protection responsibility and accountability.
- 14 These instruments are: the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997 (in force); the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980 (in force); the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (not yet in force); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005 (in force); the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation (in force 28 July 2010); and the 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf (in force 28 July 2010).
- 15 Resolution 1540 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and is thus binding upon all Member States of the United Nations.
- 16 International Atomic Energy Agency: Response Plan for Incidents and Emergencies (REPLIE), Incident and Emergency Centre, EPR–REPLIE 2007, 1 September 2007.
- 17 International Atomic Energy Agency: Generic Procedures for Medical Response during a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA, EPR-MEDICAL-2005, April 2005. Accessed at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/EPR-MEDICAL-2005_web.pdf
- 18 This system also provides assistance to non-Member States and non-Contracting Parties.

www.un.org/terrorism