dialogue was the source of the solution to problems. She advocated the Esquipulas Agreements and was currently engaged in dialogue with the opposition political parties and in direct negotiations with the Contra leadership, aimed at achieving a ceasefire, and announced his Government’s unilateral suspension for 30 days of all offensive military operations by the Sandinista People’s Army upon agreement on a ceasefire, with the view to the reintegration of the irregular forces into the country’s political life.

She considered that the pressure placed by the President of the United States on the Congress to approve a package of funds to continue his terrorist policies ran counter to the peace efforts of his Government and were part of the belligerent interventionist escalation. She concluded by reaffirming her Government’s flexibility and readiness for dialogue and expressed the hope that the Government of the United States would respect the determination and efforts of the Central American leaders to establish lasting peace.

The representative of the United States said that facts should not be lost sight of when commenting on the Sandinista incursion into the national territory of Honduras, in particular, the Sandinista aggression against its neighbour and that the aggression was premeditated. He gave an account of the Nicaraguan actions, including the indication of the forthcoming offensive in the speech of the President of Nicaragua, a massive build-up of material, assembling troops, transporting of large quantities of fuel, repositioning aircraft and creating a command and control centre in the region, and finally the crossing into the territory of Honduras of an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Sandinista combat troops. He considered that the overriding strategic goal of the offensive was destruction of the Nicaraguan resistance as an effective fighting force. The factors that forced the Sandinistas to retreat back into Nicaragua without achieving their objective were the forceful reaction of Honduras by launching an air counter-attack against Sandinista positions; prompt deployment by the United States of more than 3,000 troops in response to a request from the Honduran Government; and the Sandinista underestimation of the resistance.

The representative commented on the Declaration of the members of the Contadora and the Support Groups. He asked whether the authors had referred solely to the presence as a result of invitation of the United States troops in Honduras, or if they had intended to condemn Nicaraguan actions. He noted that not once had the document identified and condemned the Sandinista regime as an aggressor who bears responsibility for violating the territorial integrity of Honduras.

Finally, the speaker gave his opinion on the Nicaraguan request for an observer mission. He had his doubts as to what the United Nations fact-finding mission could accomplish, since the Central American Governments had taken the peace process into their hands. If there was a role for an international organization, that would be more appropriately for OAS. It was his understanding that the Secretary-General of OAS had decided not to send an observer team.

In conclusion, he summed up the basic points: the United States fully supported the principles of the Guatemala Accords; stability and peace would return to the region when the Nicaraguan Government lived up to the commitments it had made in Guatemala; implemented a genuine dialogue and initiated a reconciliation process with civic opposition and the Nicaraguan resistance; and no longer asserted its self-appointed right to subvert the neighbouring democracies.

The President of the Council said that there were no more speakers on the list, and that the next meeting would be fixed in consultations with the members of the Council.

35. THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN


At its 2828th meeting, on 31 October 1988, in accordance with the understanding reached in the Council’s prior consultations, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection: "The situation relating to Afghanistan".

At the same meeting, the President drew the attention of the members of the Council to the text of a draft resolution which had been prepared in the course of the Council’s consultations.

The President also drew to the attention of the members of the Council the letters dated 14 April and 22 April 1988 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council and a letter dated 25 April 1988 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General.

At the same meeting, the draft resolution before the Council was put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as resolution 622 (1988). The text of the resolution reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling the letters dated 14 April and 22 April 1988 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, signed at Geneva on 14 April 1988.

Recalling also the letter dated 25 April 1988 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General.
GENERAL'S LETTERS OF 14 AND 22 APRIL 1988, IN PARTICULAR THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE TEMPORARY DISPATCH TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN OF MILITARY OFFICERS FROM EXISTING UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES.

The United States requested that the terms of the proposed invitation be put to the vote.4

The Council voted upon and adopted the proposal, which received 10 votes to 1, with four abstentions.5

The first speaker at the 2807th meeting was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia. He related that, on 16 April 1988, a group of Israelis equipped with 9-millimetre Uzi sub-machine guns had broken into the Tunisian residence of Mr. Khalil al-Wazir “Abu Jihad”, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). At the same time, an Israeli aircraft flying near the Tunisian coast had jammed the telecommunications network in the area where the attack was carried out.

Tunisia requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation created by the attack, and invited the Council to condemn Israeli terrorism forcefully and to take the appropriate steps to avert and prevent the repetition of such acts.

The Council considered the matter at its 2807th to 2810th meetings, from 21 to 25 April 1988. At the 2807th meeting, the President invited, at their request, under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, the representatives of Egypt, Gabon, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia. The Council also invited, at the 2808th meeting, the representatives of Bangladesh, Cuba, Mauritania, Qatar, Turkey, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen; and at the 2810th meeting, the representatives of the Congo and Djibouti. At the request of Algeria, the Council further invited, at the 2807th meeting, Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States.

The President drew the Council’s attention to a letter1 dated 21 April 1988 from the representative of Algeria requesting that the Council invite Dr. Nasser Al-Kidwa, Alternate Permanent Observer of the PLO, in accordance with past practice. The President pointed out that the proposal had not been made pursuant to rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure but, if approved, the invitation to participate in the debate would confer on the PLO the same rights as those conferred on Member States invited under rule 37.

Regarding the proposed invitation to the PLO, the representative of the United States of America reiterated his Government’s consistent position that the only legal basis on which the Council could grant a hearing to persons speaking on behalf of non-governmental entities was rule 39.

He offered the following as conclusive evidence of the premeditated nature of the operation: (a) the advance infiltration of three individuals into Tunisian territory in order to provide logistical support to the terrorist group; (b) the rental of vehicles to transport the terrorists, who carried false identity papers; (c) the presence at the time of the operation of an aircraft flying near the scene of the crime; (d) the jamming of telecommunications from the beginning to the end of the operation; and (e) the vehicles which were left on the beach, and the footprints heading towards the sea, showing that the commandos had entered and left Tunisian territory by sea.

He claimed that statements made by Israeli leaders established the Israeli Government’s responsibility for the operation. Ariel Sharon, commenting on the assassination, had said that he had been insisting for years on the need to liquidate what he called the “leaders of terrorist organizations”. An Israeli military leader had said on Israeli armed forces radio that Abu Jihad was one of the four main targets of the Israeli intelligence services and had to be cut down. Following the attack, Mr. Shamir, head of the Israeli Government, had congratulated the terrorists, while Mr. Ezer Weizman, Israeli Government Minister and member of the Council of Ministers, had criticized the assassination in the strongest terms.

He cited numerous media stories which indicated that the assassination had been planned and implemented by Israel, including several as yet unconfirmed reports that the decision had been taken by the Israeli Government itself. He noted that international media, as well as experts on terrorism, had remarked that the operation had been

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1 S/19798.
2 S/19815.
3 S/19814.
4 S/2807, pp. 3-4.
5 Ibid., p. 4.