

she questioned how the Soviet Union reconciled the principle of absolute Soviet sovereignty with the doctrine of limited **sovereignty** propounded in a 1968 *Pravda* article, in which the Soviet Union had claimed the **right** to invade any Soviet-bloc country that threatened to deviate from loyalty to Moscow, as well as the right to intervene in the affairs of States that were not a part of the Soviet bloc.

She stated that, ultimately, the question before the Council was whether a country not at war had the right to shoot down planes that entered its airspace **without authorization**; her delegation did not believe that the protection of its **sovereignty** gave a State the right to shoot down any plane flying anywhere over its territory in peacetime."

The representative of Zimbabwe stated that his **delegation** had abstained in the vote on the draft **resolution** because it was not satisfied that all the circumstances surrounding the incident had been made known and fully explained, nor that irrelevant factors had not been brought to bear upon the Council's consideration of the **matter**.¹⁷

The representative of Japan, claiming that the evidence his country had provided through the United States delegation on 6 September proved conclusively that the Soviet Union had shot down an innocent civilian air liner, stated that the Soviet veto of the revised draft resolution was an abuse of the veto and that his country would not relent in its efforts to uncover the facts and force the Soviet Union to accept its responsibility."

The representative of the Republic of Korea stated that the allegations he had made in his **first** statement before the Council had been irrefutably proven during the ensuing debate and that the Soviet veto of a revised draft resolution, which called for an impartial investigation could be interpreted only as an admission of guilt. His Government **reaffirmed** the demands they had made on that occasion on behalf of the future safety of all air **travellers**, whatever their nationality, in order to prevent the use of armed force against international civil **aviation**.¹⁸

NOTES

- ¹ S/15947, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ² S/15948, *ibid*.
- ³ S/15950, *ibid*.
- ⁴ S/15949, *ibid*.
- ⁵ S/15951, *ibid*.
- ⁶ For details, see chap. III of the present Supplement.
- ⁷ 2470th mtg. See also chapter III of the present Supplement.
- ⁸ 2470th mtg.
- ⁹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15, No. 102, p. 295.
- ¹⁰ 247 1st mtg.
- ¹¹ 2472nd mtg.
- ¹² 2473rd mtg.
- ¹³ 2474th mtg.
- ¹⁴ S/15966, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ¹⁵ 2474th mtg.
- ¹⁶ S/15966/Rev.1, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ¹⁷ 2476th mtg.
- ¹⁸ For the vote, see 2476th mtg.

26. LETTER DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NICARAGUA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter dated 12 September 1983, the representative of Nicaragua requested the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider what he termed as the situation brought about by a new escalation of acts of aggression against his country.

At its 2477th meeting, on 13 September 1983, the Council included the question in its agenda. The Council considered the item at the same meeting.

At that meeting, the representative of Nicaragua charged that his country was once again forced to alert the Council to the alarming escalation of the aggression against Nicaragua during the past few weeks revealing that United States assistance to Somozist and mercenary groups was **increasing**. He said that the latest **attacks** against his country clearly demonstrated that those groups were being supplied with an increasing amount of sophisticated equipment. He charged that the United States controlled all the counter-revolutionary activities against Nicaragua and had been able to establish co-ordination between the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) based in Honduras and the **counter-revolutionary** and mercenary forces operating along the southern border. He accused the United States of attempting not only to destroy the Nicaraguan revolution and to overthrow its Government but also to terrorize the Nicaraguan people. Referring to the statements of senior United States **officials**, he stated that war continued to be the centre of the United States policy toward Nicaragua. He concluded by reiterating Nicaragua's readiness for dialogue and understanding with the United States.²

The President of the Council announced that there were no further **speakers** and that the Council would remain seized of the **matter**.²

NOTES

- ¹ S/15975, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ² 2477th mtg.

27. THE SITUATION IN GRENADA

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

Decision of 27 October 1983 (2491st meeting): rejection of a three-Power draft resolution

By a letter dated 25 October 1983, addressed to the President of the Council, the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua requested an urgent **meeting** of the Council to consider the invasion of Grenada by United States troops.

At its 2487th meeting on 25 October 1983, the Council included the item in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following at their request, to participate, without a vote, in the discussion of the item: at the 2487th meeting, the representatives of Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Grenada, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico and Venezuela; at the 2489th meeting, the

representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Dominica, Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria, Saint Lucia, Seychelles, the Syrian Arab Republic and Viet Nam; and, at the 249 1 st meeting, the representatives of Benin, Brazil, **Bulgaria**, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, **Czechoslovakia**, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, **Egypt**, the German Democratic Republic, Guatemala, **Guinea-Bissau**, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and **Principe**, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, the **United Republic of Tanzania**, Yugoslavia and **Zambia**.² At the **2491st** meeting, the Council also agreed to a request made by the representative of **Jordan**³ to extend an invitation to Mr. **Clovis** Maksoud under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. The Council considered the question at the **2487th**, **2489th** and **2491st** meetings, from 25 to 27 October 1983.

The representative of Mexico opened the discussion by **stating** that it would have been desirable to hold the **meeting** before the events in Grenada. The Council was not in a position to act as early as would have been desirable, as it was facing *faits accomplis*. A military force of the United States, supported by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Samt Lucia, had landed on Grenada and had begun hostilities against its inhabitants for reasons which were unacceptable. It was a clear violation of international law, a flagrant act of aggression against the territorial integrity of Grenada and obvious interference in its **internal** affairs.

He unreservedly condemned the military intervention, which was totally **unjustified**. He **said** that the events were unquestionably a violation of the basic principles of the Charter, in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, as well as **article 18** of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). No convention, agreement or subregional understanding could run counter to those rules. The Act of the **Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECs)** provided for collective **defence** measures only against external aggression, based explicitly on **Article 51** of the Charter of the United Nations. None of those instruments authorized the intervention by another State in the internal affairs of the region.

He added that the efforts by various Latin American countries to promote a peaceful negotiated settlement to the disputes in Central America and the Caribbean should be supported by the cessation of foreign interference and a total prohibition of the threat or use of force. He urged the Council to take the necessary measures to have foreign troops withdrawn immediately. He stressed that the people of Grenada alone were allowed to decide freely their own form of Government without foreign **interference**.⁴

The representative of Nicaragua said that the treaty that established OECS could not justify **intervention** in Grenada's internal affairs. He maintained that to prevent the State of Grenada and its people from **exercising** the rights conferred on them by the charter of OAS, in article 3, and to prevent them from **enjoying** the protection of Articles 2 and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the protection of other relevant provisions of international law, was obviously unjust. The reasons given by the United

States Administration in that case, such as the protection of the United States citizens on the island, the **desire** to prevent greater chaos and to help to restore order, governmental institutions and democracy, were merely prettexts. The real purpose was to subject the people to American control and to form a Government that met the strategic interests of the United States. The United States could have used a number of legal instruments, treaties and conventions.

By intervening militarily in Grenada, the United States had violated the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of Rio de Janeiro of **10 October 1933** and the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Restoration of Peace of 23 December 1936. Furthermore, the United States had violated several provisions of the charter of OAS, namely articles 18, 20 and 21, as well as Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States Administration had violated not only international law but also the American Constitution. The speaker concluded by reading out the **communiqué** issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua, in which it condemned the invasion and called for the immediate withdrawal of the American troops.⁵

The representative of the United States suggested that it would have been more appropriate to start the debate in the Council the next day in order to allow the current Head of State, President of OECS, to be present while the **Council** considered the **issue**.⁴

The representative of Guyana declared that his country was willing to participate in the mobilization of forces of the Caribbean community (CARICOM) to defend the integrity of any CARICOM State against an external **aggressor** and no less willing to participate in any CARICOM peace-keeping force in certain circumstances and under agreed terms of reference. With re rd to Grenada, Guyana continued to be oppose8 to participation in any military invasion of the island since such action constituted interference in the internal affairs of that State. Guyana favoured instead the dispatch of a **fact-finding** mission, composed of CARICOM nationals and based upon certain clearly defined principles. No external elements should be involved in the search for a solution; the solution should be regional in character, formulated within the framework of CARICOM. Any solution should be fully in accordance with international law and with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations; and the primary purpose of any regional solution would be the restoration of normalcy in **Grenada**.⁴

The action taken against Grenada was in clear violation of Article 2, **paragraph 4**, of the Charter of the United Nations, as **well as** of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning **Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance** with the Charter of the United Nations,⁵ adopted by the General Assembly in 1970; and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of **States**,⁶ adopted by the General Assembly in 1981.

The speaker then introduced a draft resolution⁷ sponsored by Guyana and Nicaragua, which **approached** the situation in Grenada **strictly** from the perspective of the Charter of the United Nations and the **obligations** of all States strictly to comply with those principles. Among other things, in the operative part of the draft resolution the Council would

have condemned the armed intervention in Grenada and **called** for the immediate withdrawal of the invading troops; **called** upon all States to show strictest respect for Grenada's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely the development of the situation and to report to the Council within 48 hours on the implementation of the resolution.

The representative of Grenada read out the text of a telex dated 24 October 1983 sent from **the** Revolutionary Military **Council** of Grenada to the Embassy of the United States in Barbados, in which it was indicated that Grenada would view any invasion of the country, whether based on decisions of the CARICOM Governments, or on that of any other Government, as a gross violation of Grenada's sovereignty and of international law. Grenada viewed any threat or the use of force by any country or group of countries as unwarranted interference in its domestic affairs. The Military Council also reiterated that the lives, well-being and property of every American and other foreign citizen resident in Grenada were **fully protected** and guaranteed **by** the Government **of** Grenada.

The speaker added that the protection of United States citizens had been nothing more than a pretext for intervening in Grenada. President Reagan had pretended that he had intervened with United States troops under certain clauses of the OECS treaty, which the United States had never signed. Under article 8, an intervention could take place only if there were a request from a member Government and if there were a threat of external intervention against that particular Government. The article **of-fered no justification** for intervention, by forces of **Eastern Caribbean States** in association with **the** United States. Over 95 per cent of the forces invading Grenada were from the United States, in keeping with the **policy** of the United States towards the people of Grenada since the revolution of 13 March 1979. Contrary to the statement of the United States President that he had acted at the request of OECS, an Administration spokesman was quoted on radio and television as **saying** that actions **aga**inst Grenada of both covert **and** overt character had **been** stepped up considerably two or three weeks earlier in anticipation of what had taken place in Grenada.

Finally, the speaker **appealed** to the Council to call for an immediate **withd**rawal of all foreign forces from his country and to condemn in the strongest language possible what had taken place in Grenada.

Speaking of the American invasion under the pretext of helping **five** members of OECS to restore order and **democracy** in Grenada, the representative of **Cuba** indicated **that** no Grenadian revolutionary had appealed for help from the Caribbean countries. He categorically rejected the resort to article 8 of the OECS treaty and stated that Grenada, an independent **sovereign** and non-aligned country and a full Member of the United Nations, had been the victim of an act of armed, **unprovoked, unjustified** **aggression** in violation of the **Charter of the** United Nations and of international law. Condemning the invasion against Grenada, the speaker stressed that the Council could not allow the United States policy of aggression to **gove**rn international affairs, whether in the Middle **East**, in southern Africa or in Latin America. The international community should give serious thought to the risk involved for all Member

States if that act of aggression against a Member State was left unpunished.

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya firmly condemned the invasion of Grenada by **the** United States. He demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal **of** the invading forces, and also called upon the Council to establish a **fact-finding** committee. The speaker also demanded indemnity for the victims. Finally, he called upon the President and members of the Council to shoulder their responsibilities at that crucial moment.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that the massive invasion of the island carried **out** by the United States Administration was a flagrant violation of the most **elementary** rules of international law and the principles of the **Charter**. The United States had tried to cover up its intervention against **Grenada** with exactly the same **excuses** as its intervention against the Dominican Republic in 1965. The actions of the United States Marines and the airborne troops were designed to bring about a restoration of American domination over the island and the return to power of an antidemocratic regime that had been rejected by the people. It was an attempt by force **of arms** to repress the will of the people of Grenada to independence and its right to determine its fate independently. That new act by Washington was one further element in the sharp exacerbation of tension in the whole region of Central America and the Caribbean. The representative concluded that the Soviet Union categorically condemned the aggression of United States **imperialism** against a small, non-aligned country and called upon the Council to censure the armed intervention against Grenada as an act of aggression and a violation of international peace and security and to call for the immediate withdrawal of the interventionist forces of the United States and of their vessels from the island.

The representative of the United States stated that the United States troops were involved for the purpose of protecting American citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those citizens who wished to leave and to provide support for the Eastern Caribbean forces as they assisted the people of Grenada in restoring order and establishing **functioning** **govern-**mental Institutions. Any continued **political involve-**ment in that co-operative effort **would be** guided wholly by the views of **OECS** and the Government being formed in Grenada. The United States **Govern-**ment believed that the support by the United States of OECS was justified on a number of grounds.

OECS had determined that conditions in institutions of authority had degenerated, that a climate of fear, anxiety and acute danger to personal safety existed on the island and that that condition also **posed** an unprecedented threat to the **peace** and security of the entire eastern Caribbean. **The** United States Government **accepted** that judgement by OECS as accurate and believed that the action was consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charters of the United Nations and OAS since it aimed only at the restoration of conditions of law and order fundamental to the enjoyment of basic human rights, which had been so **aggravantly** violated in Grenada.

At the 2489th meeting, the Prime Minister and Minister for External **Affairs** of Dominica and Chairman of OECS said that the member Governments of OECS had met at Bridgetown, Barbados, on 21

October 1983 to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising from the overthrow and subsequent killing of the Prime Minister and of the killing of some of his Cabinet colleagues and a number of other citizens. The OECS members had been deeply concerned that the situation would continue to worsen, that there would be further loss of life, personal injury and a general deterioration of public order as the group in control attempted to secure its position.

They had also been greatly concerned that the extensive military build-up in Grenada over the past few years had created a situation of disproportionate military strength between Grenada and the OECS countries. Therefore, they considered it of the utmost urgency that immediate steps should be taken to reverse that threatening situation. The speaker added that in fact the Governor-General of Grenada had requested assistance.

Under the provisions of article 8 of the OECS treaty concerning defence and security in the sub-region, member Governments had decided to take appropriate action, since the situation endangered peace and security in the region as a whole.

Lacking adequate military resources, the members had sought assistance from friendly countries within the region and subsequently from outside. Three Governments (Barbados, Jamaica and the United States) had agreed to form a multinational force and to conduct a pre-emptive defensive strike in order to remove the dangerous threat to peace and security and to restore normalcy in Grenada. Once the threat had been removed, the OECS members intended to invite the Governor-General of Grenada to assume executive authority under the provisions of the Grenada Constitution of 1973 and to appoint a broad-based interim Government pending the holding of general elections. It was anticipated that general elections could be held within six months. Further arrangements were to be made to establish effective police and peace-keeping forces in order to restore and maintain law and order in the country. After normalcy had been restored, the non-Caribbean forces would be withdrawn from Grenada. In conclusion, the speaker appealed for the support of all friendly countries regarding that initiative.⁷

The representative of Poland demanded the immediate cessation of armed intervention and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Grenada. He said that his delegation would like to see the draft resolution on the issue formulated in stronger terms.⁸

The representative of Jamaica claimed that the Jamaican troops were part of a multinational peace-keeping force intended to remove the threat to peace and security in the area and to restore normalcy to the island of Grenada. The Jamaican troops were there to assist the people of Grenada to free themselves from a military dictatorship and to establish conditions under which the will of the people could be expressed in free and fair elections. The Jamaican troops would leave Grenada as soon as it was clear that such conditions had been established. He urged the Council not to call for the withdrawal of all troops until the safety and territorial integrity of the people of Grenada had been secured.⁹

The representative of China said that in invading Grenada the United States had committed undisguised aggression against a small island State, had violated the independence and territorial integrity of

a sovereign State and had intervened in its internal affairs, thereby undermining the peace and stability of the Caribbean region and threatening international peace and security. If that outright act of hegemonism, in gross violation of the Charter and the norms governing international relations, could not be checked effectively, the same would happen to other States. He concluded by saying that the Chinese Government strongly condemned the invasion of Grenada and demanded the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign troops from that country.*

The representative of Argentina pointed out that the invasion constituted a violation of international law and of the Charter. The policy of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign Latin American countries was reaching alarming proportions. Argentina supported the restoration of Grenada's full sovereignty as well as the withdrawal of the invading forces and believed that the draft resolution contained the necessary elements for a satisfactory solution.*

The representative of Algeria recalled that non-interference in the internal affairs of States, as well as strict respect for the right of peoples freely to exercise their choice, was an inviolable rule. The overt invasion of Grenada by foreign armed forces could not claim any legality or legitimacy and should be duly condemned by the Council as an act of unprovoked armed aggression. With the same firmness, the Council, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, should require the immediate and unconditional evacuation of the occupying forces.⁸

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic called upon the Council urgently to condemn the American aggression against Grenada and to demand the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from the island. Compensation should be paid for the losses sustained and a fact-finding mission should be sent to the island. The delegation urged the Council to adopt without any modifications the draft resolution sponsored by Guyana and Nicaragua.⁹

The representative of Cuba summarized the communications between his Government and the United States Administration regarding the position and fate of the Cuban advisers. He pointed out that prior to the invasion his Government had suggested that the two countries should keep in touch on the question, to co-operate and ensure that any difficulty regarding the security and safety of those persons might be resolved favourably. The reply had arrived three days later on 25 October when United States troops were already attacking Cubans on Grenada. It said that the civilian representatives with the United States forces in Grenada had instructions to keep in touch with the Cuban Ambassador in Grenada to guarantee the security of Cuban personnel and to provide the necessary means to the Grenadian authorities to facilitate their prompt evacuation. While intense fighting was going on, the United States Government had sent a message saying that the actions of the United States troops in Grenada were not aimed at Cuban personnel residing there, and that the armed clashes between men of both countries had happened because of the confusion and blunders arising out of the presence of Cubans in areas close to the operations of the multinational troops. On 26 October, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations had again repeated its readiness to co-operate so that problems could be resolved without violence.*

The representative of France expressed distress and concern at the disturbances affecting Grenada. He deeply deplored the armed intervention and said that the reasons put forward relating to the internal situation of Grenada did not meet the conditions under which an intervention of that nature and magnitude could be justified. France had never accepted certain interpretations of the Charter whereby other organs could authorize armed intervention without the approval of the Council. **Every**thing should be done to allow the people of Grenada without any further delay to regain the right to decide their fate, independently and in full **sovereignty**.⁸

The representative of Antigua and Barbuda declared that in response to the situation in Grenada, which constituted a serious threat to the security and peace of the region, OECS and its CARICOM partners had met in urgent session and had agreed to assist their black brothers and sisters in Grenada, and had invited the United States, whose citizens had been threatened, to assist in the operation. OECS wanted to ensure that an interim Government would be established in Grenada to carry out the people's mandate for free elections. Once that was done and the constitutional right of the Grenadians had been restored, the OECS assistance would no longer be required and would be withdrawn.*

At the beginning of the 2491st meeting, on 27 October 1984, the representative of the United States raised an objection to the credentials of the representative of Grenada and questioned whether he was entitled to take the place reserved for **Grenada**.⁹

The President of the Council informed the members that he had received a communication from the Governor-General of Grenada and it had been directed to the Secretary-General since he was the person concerned with the question of **credentials**.⁶ At the same meeting Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe submitted a revised draft **resolution**.¹⁰

The representative of Ecuador said that his Government condemned the armed action carried out **against** Grenada, an action that had **aggravated** the already troubled situation in the **Caribbean**. It appealed urgently for an end to the foreign intervention and for the establishment of the conditions necessary to enable the people of Grenada to exercise their sovereign right freely to elect their democratic **Government**.⁹

The representative of the United States mentioned that some of the speakers had attempted to present the events as a classical invasion of a small country by an imperial Power. The Charter prohibited **such** intervention. However, the prohibition against the use of force in the Charter was contextual, not absolute. It provided justification for the use of force against force in pursuit of other values also inscribed in the Charter, such as freedom, democracy, peace.

The representatives of Hungary, Sao Tome and **Principe**, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic found the reference to the security treaty as a legal basis and all the attempts at justification totally unacceptable. There could be no legal, political or moral justification for such a premeditated and unprovoked act of aggression. The delegations supported the draft resolution because its provisions correctly reflected the reactions and sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the international **community**.⁹

The representative of the United Kingdom suggested that the common aim should be the emergence of a constitutional Grenadian Government freely elected by the people of Grenada. He revealed that his Government had been approached as to what action it would be willing to take in conjunction with certain Caribbean countries. His Government had urged on all those who consulted it prudence and caution. But other views had prevailed. He said that his Government could not go along with a draft resolution that did not take adequate account of the concerns that had motivated OECS, Jamaica, Barbados and the United **States**.⁹

The representatives of Yugoslavia, Guinea-Bissau and Afghanistan joined the stance taken by the majority of the speakers condemning the United States military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign Grenada. Quoting the relevant provisions of contemporary international law, they demanded an immediate cessation of the foreign intervention in and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from **Grenada**.⁹

The representative of Trinidad and Tobago said that though his country had been host to an emergency meeting of the heads of 12 States members of CARICOM at Port of Spain on 22 and 23 October in order to discuss the Grenada situation, his **Government** considered it most unfortunate that efforts to resolve the Grenada situation could not have been peaceful and regional in nature. His Government maintained its original position on the matter and continued to hold **firmly** to the view that it was regrettable that a solution involving the non-use of force, proposed during the emergency meeting of the CARICOM heads of Government, had not been pursued and that instead a military intervention of such a nature had been imported into the commonwealth Caribbean.

He added that in pursuance of its original objectives, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago remained committed to pursuing a course of action that would result in: (a) the earliest possible withdrawal of combat forces from Grenada; (b) the **earliest** establishment there, through appropriate channels, of a CARICOM **peace-keeping** presence; (c) the establishment of a broad-based civilian Government to arrange as early as possible for free and fair elections; (d) the establishment of a fact-finding mission **comprising** eminent nationals of States members **of** CARICOM; (e) the restoration of normalcy in Grenada; and (f) the preservation of the unity of **CARICOM**.⁹

The observer of the League of Arab States drew the attention of the Council to the thesis advanced by the United States representative that the prohibition of the use of force was contextual and not absolute. He stressed that under no circumstances could an invasion be an instrument of policing the destiny of any State or any **society**.⁹

The representative of the Netherlands declared that although his delegation understood the concerns and preoccupations underlying the efforts of OECS, it was of the view that the action taken could not be considered compatible with the basic principles of the Charter. It was for that reason that the Netherlands would vote in favour of the resolution in its revised **form**.⁹

The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Jordan, characterized the invasion

of Grenada as a violation of the principles of the Charter and the rules of international law, in particular in respect of the non-use of or threat of use of force and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Jordan could not accept the occupation of an independent State, a Member of the United Nations, under any pretext whatsoever. The military activities against Grenada constituted a **grave danger**, for that precedent could be invoked to justify similar occupation operations in the **future**.⁹

The representative of the Soviet Union said that his delegation would vote in favour of a **draft** resolution calling for a **halt** to the abrupt and unceremonious high-handedness in international affairs, a halt to the military intervention by the United States.

At the **end** of the 2491st meeting, on 28 October 1983, the three-Power **draft** resolution was put to the vote and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the **Council**. The result of the voting was as follows: 11 votes in favour, 1 against and 3 abstentions."

NOTES

¹ S/16067, OR. 38th yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1983*; See also S/16072, *ibid.*

*For details, see chap. III of the present *Supplement*.

³ S/16091, incorporated in the record of the 2491st meeting. For details, see chap. III of the present *Supplement*.

⁴ 2487th mtg.

⁵ General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).

⁶ General Assembly resolution 36/103.

⁷ S/16077, OR. 38th yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1983*. Zimbabwe joined subsequently as a sponsor of the draft resolution.

⁸ 2489th mtg.

⁹ 2491st mtg.

¹⁰ S/16077/Rev.1, OR. 38th yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1983*.

¹¹ For the vote, see 2491st mtg.

28. LETTER DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1984 FROM THE **CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NICARAGUA TO THE UNITED NATIONS** ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By **letter**¹ dated 3 February 1984, the representative of Nicaragua requested the President of the Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation created **by** a new escalation in acts of **aggression** by Somoza and mercenary **counter-revolutionary** forces trained and financed by the United States.

At its 2513th meeting, on 3 February 1984, the Council included the item in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Honduras, at his **request**, to participate in the discussion without the **right to vote**.² The Council considered this item at the same meeting.

At that meeting, the representative of Nicaragua stated that he had come to the Council greatly alarmed **by** the most serious events over the past two years involving attacks against Nicaragua by Honduran military planes. Those events could be the precursors of a war between Honduras and Nicaragua provoked by the United States to justify inter-

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vention and constituted the greatest threat to peace and security yet in the region as it was the first time that warplanes had been used to continue the chain of acts of aggression against Nicaragua. He charged that at the present time American and Honduran troops were carrying out a joint military manoeuvre with the objective of making war against Nicaragua. He also charged that the two countries undermined the peace efforts of the Contadora Group while they created the impression that they supported them.²

The representative of Honduras rejected as completely unfounded allegations of its complicity in the events referred to by Nicaragua and charged that Nicaragua had once again tried to involve Honduras in Nicaragua's internal problems through false information harmful to neighbouring States and aimed at **provoking** confrontations to divert attention from those problems. Refuting the Nicaraguan charge that his Government obstructed the efforts of the **Contadora Group**, he hoped that Nicaragua would not continue to foster a climate of distrust which affected the Contadora process. He reiterated his **Government's** full support for that process.*

Responding to the Nicaraguan accusations, the representative of the United States said that **his** Government had not engaged in aggression against Nicaragua. He added that the **United States** did intend to continue to co-operate with its friends in Central America in **defence** of freedom, self-determination and democratic pluralism. He charged that it was the Sandinist **régime's** betrayal of those principles that had caused substantial numbers of **Nicaraguans** to take up arms against that **régime**. He further accused Nicaragua of exporting revolutions and of destabilizing free and democratic Governments throughout Central America and said that so long as such a situation persisted, so would tension persist in the **region**.²

The President of the Council announced that the next meeting of the Council to continue the consideration of the item on the agenda would be fixed in consultation with members of the **Council**.²

NOTES

S/16306, OR. 39th yr., *Suppl. for Jan.-March 1981*.

² 2513th mtg.

29. LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1984 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS **ADDRESSED** TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By a **letter**¹ dated 18 March 1984 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Sudan requested that the Council **be** convened in order to consider the aggression committed by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the Sudan on 16 March 1984, which constituted a blatant attack against the sovereignty, security and integrity of the territory and people of a State Member of the United Nations and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, regional charters and the principles of international law, and posed a serious threat to the peace and security of the countries of the region and to international peace and security. Charging that a