

she questioned how the Soviet Union reconciled the principle of absolute Soviet sovereignty with the doctrine of limited **sovereignty** propounded in a 1968 *Pravda* article, in which the Soviet Union had claimed the **right** to invade any Soviet-bloc country that threatened to deviate from loyalty to Moscow, as well as the right to intervene in the affairs of States that were not a part of the Soviet bloc.

She stated that, ultimately, the question before the Council was whether a country not at war had the right to shoot down planes that entered its airspace **without authorization**; her delegation did not believe that the protection of its **sovereignty** gave a State the right to shoot down any plane flying anywhere over its territory in peacetime."

The representative of Zimbabwe stated that his **delegation** had abstained in the vote on the draft **resolution** because it was not satisfied that all the circumstances surrounding the incident had been made known and fully explained, nor that irrelevant factors had not been brought to bear upon the Council's consideration of the **matter**.¹⁷

The representative of Japan, claiming that the evidence his country had provided through the United States delegation on 6 September proved conclusively that the Soviet Union had shot down an innocent civilian air liner, stated that the Soviet veto of the revised draft resolution was an abuse of the veto and that his country would not relent in its efforts to uncover the facts and force the Soviet Union to accept its responsibility."

The representative of the Republic of Korea stated that the allegations he had made in his **first** statement before the Council had been irrefutably proven during the ensuing debate and that the Soviet veto of a revised draft resolution, which called for an impartial investigation could be interpreted only as an admission of guilt. His Government **reaffirmed** the demands they had made on that occasion on behalf of the future safety of all air **travellers**, whatever their nationality, in order to prevent the use of armed force against international civil **aviation**.¹⁸

NOTES

- ¹ S/15947, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ² S/15948, *ibid*.
- ³ S/15950, *ibid*.
- ⁴ S/15949, *ibid*.
- ⁵ S/15951, *ibid*.
- ⁶ For details, see chap. III of the present Supplement.
- ⁷ 2470th mtg. See also chapter III of the present Supplement.
- ⁸ 2470th mtg.
- ⁹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15, No. 102, p. 295.
- ¹⁰ 247 1st mtg.
- ¹¹ 2472nd mtg.
- ¹² 2473rd mtg.
- ¹³ 2474th mtg.
- ¹⁴ S/15966, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ¹⁵ 2474th mtg.
- ¹⁶ S/15966/Rev.1, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ¹⁷ 2476th mtg.
- ¹⁸ For the vote, see 2476th mtg.

26. LETTER DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NICARAGUA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter dated 12 September 1983, the representative of Nicaragua requested the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider what he termed as the situation brought about by a new escalation of acts of aggression against his country.

At its 2477th meeting, on 13 September 1983, the Council included the question in its agenda. The Council considered the item at the same meeting.

At that meeting, the representative of Nicaragua charged that his country was once again forced to alert the Council to the alarming escalation of the aggression against Nicaragua during the past few weeks revealing that United States assistance to Somozist and mercenary groups was **increasing**. He said that the latest **attacks** against his country clearly demonstrated that those groups were being supplied with an increasing amount of sophisticated equipment. He charged that the United States controlled all the counter-revolutionary activities against Nicaragua and had been able to establish co-ordination between the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) based in Honduras and the **counter-revolutionary** and mercenary forces operating along the southern border. He accused the United States of attempting not only to destroy the Nicaraguan revolution and to overthrow its Government but also to terrorize the Nicaraguan people. Referring to the statements of senior United States **officials**, he stated that war continued to be the centre of the United States policy toward Nicaragua. He concluded by reiterating Nicaragua's readiness for dialogue and understanding with the United States.²

The President of the Council announced that there were no further **speakers** and that the Council would remain seized of the **matter**.²

NOTES

- ¹ S/15975, OR, 38th yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1983.
- ² 2477th mtg.

27. THE SITUATION IN GRENADA

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

Decision of 27 October 1983 (2491st meeting): rejection of a three-Power draft resolution

By a letter dated 25 October 1983, addressed to the President of the Council, the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua requested an urgent **meeting** of the Council to consider the invasion of Grenada by United States troops.

At its 2487th meeting on 25 October 1983, the Council included the item in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following at their request, to participate, without a vote, in the discussion of the item: at the 2487th meeting, the representatives of Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Grenada, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico and Venezuela; at the 2489th meeting, the