any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

"8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

"9. Requests all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not excluding any of the measures provided in that Article;

"10. Emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965);

"11. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

"12. Deplores the attitude of States that have not complied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, and censures in particular those States which have persisted in trading with the illegal régime in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, and which have given active assistance to the régime;

"13. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence;

"14. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

"15. Requests States Members of the United Nations, the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to helping her solve such economic problems as she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of these decisions of the Security Council;

"16. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

"17. Considers that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole;

"18. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

"19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September 1968;

"20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following tasks and to report to it with its observations:

"(a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the present resolutions as are submitted by the Secretary-General;

"(b) To seek from any States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State (including information regarding the commodities and products exempted from the prohibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or regarding any activities by any nationals of that State or in its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Security Council;

"21. Requests the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to provide the committee with any information which it may receive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution and resolution 232 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;

"22. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized agencies themselves, to supply such further information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

"23. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments."

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Decision of 3 August 1966 (1295th meeting):

Rejection of the joint draft resolution submitted by Jordan and Mali

By letter 18 dated 21 July 1966, the permanent representative of Syria requested the President of the Security Council that an urgent meeting of the Council be convened to consider "the grave situation arising from the act of aggression committed by Israel against Syrian territory on the afternoon of 14 July 1966", which seriously threatened peace and security in the area and which was the subject of his letter, 19 of 18 July 1966.

18 S/7419, OR, 21st yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1966, pp. 38-39. 19 S/7412, ibid., pp. 30-32. In the letter the representative of Syria stated that at 1710 hours local time, a number of Israeli jet fighters and bombers had violated the Syrian airspace, shelled seven Syrian areas situated on the site of the Jordan River development scheme, hit mechanical and engineering equipment, destroyed bulldozers with napalm bombs, wounded nine civilians and killed one. It was stated further in the letter that Syria could not be held responsible for the activities of the Palestinian Arab organization El Fatah and El Essefa striving to liberate their conquered and
By letter dated 22 July 1966, addressed to the President of the Security Council, the permanent representative of Israel requested that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider the following complaints of Israel against Syria:

1. Repeated acts of aggression committed by Syrian armed forces and by armed saboteur groups operating from Syrian territory against citizens and territory of Israel, in violation of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement.

2. Declarations by official spokesmen of the Syrian Government against the people, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel and openly inciting to war against Israel, in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement.

At the 1288th meeting on 25 July 1966, the Security Council had before it a provisional agenda which, under the general heading "The Palestine question", listed as sub-items (a) and (b) the letters submitted by Syria and Israel respectively.

Following a brief procedural discussion, the agenda was adopted. It was also decided that the Secretary-General be requested to obtain two reports for the Council from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization covering the two complaints on the agenda. The Security Council considered the question at its 1288th to 1295th meetings, held between 25 July to 3 August 1966. The representatives of Syria, Israel and Iraq were invited to take part in the discussion.

At the 1288th meeting on 25 July 1966, the representative of Syria stated that the situation on the demarcation line between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States had deteriorated as a result of a series of attacks perpetrated by the regular Israel forces against Israel's neighbours. These acts culminated in an aerial attack on Syria which took place on 14 July 1966. It was needless to prove that this aggression was premeditated because that same place had been attacked several times before by Israeli regular forces. The question of Israel's attack on Syria could not be described as a simple matter of a localized frontier incident. The behaviour of Israel had threatened more than once to engulf the whole Middle East area; it was for the Council to consider this grave situation and to prevent the alarming dimensions that the situation would certainly assume if it were to remain unchecked.

The representative of Israel referred to his letter to the President of the Security Council dated 14 July 1966 and stated that the recent incidents and Israel's reaction to them could not be regarded in isolation from their background. For a long time, the Israel border area had been kept in a state of tension and turmoil by gun-fire directed at civilian activities from Syrian military positions, and by the penetration into Israel of squads of saboteurs and terrorists under cover of darkness. In the past few months, there had been ten cases of sabotage raids and laying of land mines; there had been ninety-three instances of the Syrian armed forces opening fire on Israeli farmers working their fields with tractors and agricultural implements, on Israeli fishing-boats on Lake Tiberias, and on vehicles passing along the roads. In addition, there had been a number of cases of crops and plantations being deliberately set alight. In this course of constant harassment, Israel had suffered sixteen casualties and extensive damage to property, equipment and installations. From whichever neighbouring country the saboteur groups had actually crossed into Israel, all the information indicated that Syria was the source, the training ground, the principal supplier and the main political patron of the El-Fatah organization. The action on 14 July was taken reluctantly, after Israel had become convinced that all its efforts through United Nations and diplomatic channels had failed to deter Syrian aggression. The action itself was as brief and as limited as possible and the Israel Government had immediately assumed full responsibility for it. There would be no incidents in the border area if there was an unconditional and effective cease-fire and a complete halt to armed raiding into Israel territory.

At the 1290th meeting on 28 July 1966, the Council had before it two reports of the Secretary-General relating to sub-items (a) complaint by Syria, and (b) complaint by Israel, of the agenda.

At the 1291st meeting on 29 July 1966, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France maintained that reliance on the United Nations machinery had been called for and that it was for the parties to use it properly. They should be encouraged to co-operate to the fullest extent with the efforts of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to secure the stabilization of the unconditional cease-fire in the area and to secure agreement concerning the problems of cultivation in the demilitarized zone. Furthermore, the plenary meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission should be resumed, since it was in the Commission that the parties must try to engage in a direct exchange of views.

The representative of Jordan introduced a draft resolution jointly from Syria. After the incidents of the last two days, planes of the Israel Air Force had been ordered to take strictly limited action regarded as appropriate in the circumstances. They had carried out a brief attack to the south-east of Almajar on Syrian tractors and mechanical equipment, a type of target which had been under constant Syrian attack in the same Israel area. The planes had carried out their mission and returned safely to their base. This action had been meant to impress upon the Syrian authorities the gravity with which the Israeli Government viewed continual Syrian violence against the Israeli population.

1288th meeting, paras. 130, 134, 137, 138, 167.
1291st meeting, paras. 13, 29, 39, 40.
1292nd meeting, para. 32.
1293rd meeting, paras. 129, 134, 137, 138, 167.
sponsored with Mali and stated that it would be noted that the sponsors had been careful not to depart from the Council's usual practice in similar cases of aggression. They had deliberately used basically the texts of previous Security Council resolutions dealing with Israel acts of aggression. According to the draft resolution, the Security Council would recall its resolutions 111 (1956) of 19 January 1956 and 171 (1962) of 9 April 1962, and in particular the provisions in these two resolutions relevant to the maintenance of the armistice and the settlement of the disputes through the intermediary of the Mixed Armistice Commission (fourth preambular paragraph); (1) condemn Israel's wanton attack of 14 July 1966 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of Security Council resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria and of Israel's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; (2) deplore the losses, human and otherwise, caused by the Israel attack for which Israel must assume full responsibility; (3) reaffirm resolutions 111 (1956) and 171 (1962) and deplore the resumption by Israel of aggressive acts unequivocally condemned by these resolutions; (4) remind Israel that the Security Council had already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, and had called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such action; (5) reiterate its call on Israel to comply with its obligations under the Charter, in default of which the Council would have to consider what further measures should be invoked; and would (6) call upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, and urge that all steps necessary for reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of the mixed armistice machinery be promptly taken.

At the same time, the representatives of New Zealand and Argentina maintained that any resolution adopted should be aimed at ensuring that both Israel and Syria made every effort to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement and at the fullest use of those United Nations bodies which were at their disposal.

At the 1293rd meeting on 1 August 1966, the representative of the Netherlands stated that the attention of the Security Council should be directed primarily to bringing about in the region an atmosphere which was most likely to induce both parties to adhere to the Armistice Agreement. No useful purpose would be served by a pronouncement that would be contested and could most likely aggravate tensions. In view of this, the joint draft resolution before the Council did not correspond to the prerequisite for the solution of the current discord. It might be true that its wording conformed essentially to the text of previous resolutions adopted by the Council. Those resolutions had been adopted, however, as a consequence of the situation existing at the time of their adoption, and any attempt to make the interpretation of circumstances conform to the wording of a resolution, as seemed to be the case with the draft before the Council, should be regretted. Full use should be made of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Com-

mission by the two parties, and their Governments should be told in unequivocal terms that they were expected to lend complete co-operation to the efforts of the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO to settle local problems and to refrain from any further action which might endanger the force in the area.
people for their liberty and independence, wherever they might be. The Syrian Government rejected categorically that Syria was the source of the two organizations “El-Fatah” and “El-Assefa”. The Government of Syria further denied as completely unfounded Israel’s attempt to attribute to Syria the responsibility for the incident of 8/9 October, as well as all similar incidents. It was apparent that Israel was using these so-called raids as a pretext to embark upon fresh acts of aggression against Syria. Israel alone would be held responsible for any expansion of the conflict and for jeopardizing the peace in the Middle East.

At the 1305th meeting on 14 October 1966, the provisional agenda 180 listed under the general heading “The Palestine question”:

“Letter dated 12 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7540).”

After a procedural discussion, the agenda was adopted 181 and the Security Council considered the question at its 1305th and 1307th to 1310th, 1312th to 1317th and 1319th meetings held between 14 October and 4 November 1966. The representatives of Israel, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia were invited 182 to take part in the discussions.

At the 1307th meeting on 14 October 1966, the representative of Israel* contended that in the recent incident on 7 October, in the Romema quarter in Jerusalem, demolition charges had exploded underneath two buildings causing damage and injuring four civilians. Twenty-four hours later, a jeep carrying border police rushing to the scene of the explosion in the village of Shaar Hagol had been blown up by a mine killing four members of the police patrol and wounding two others. The tracks of three men wearing rubber-soled shoes had led towards Syrian territory. Other incidents had been perpetrated in the northern part of the country near the Syrian frontier. On some occasions, the raiders had struck in the Dead Sea area near Arad and Sodom. They had come through Jordanian territory. But their point of origin and their centre of training and indoctrination had been Syria. Since January 1965, there had been sixty-one incidents which formed a single, organized system of violence. Syria was committed, by its membership in the United Nations, to respect them, the armistice machinery could not be expected to remedy that situation. It was implied in the Secretary-General’s report 185 of 17 October 1966 that the two incidents of 8/9 October, as well as all similar incidents. It was apparent that Israel was using these so-called raids as a pretext to embark upon fresh acts of aggression against Syria. Israel alone would be held responsible for any expansion of the conflict and for jeopardizing the peace in the Middle East.

At the 1309th meeting on 20 October 1966, the representative of Israel* stated that in the three days since the Council had last met, there had been further attacks and threats against Israel, and a new Syrian Government formed that week had openly pledged to carry on a people’s war against Israel. The two incidents dealt with in the Secretary-General’s report 185 of 17 October 1966 were links in a sequence of sabotage attacks since 1965. They were part of a single pattern and originated from Syria. Syria was the only Government which extolled these acts. Not only that, radio Damascus was the only media which carried El-Fatah communiqués relating to their guerrilla activities regularly. The representative stated further that the armistice machinery had functioned normally with full Israel co-operation. The difficulty of holding plenary meetings of the Commission was mainly caused by Syrian attempts to place on the agenda questions over which the Commission had no competence. He further pointed out that armistice machinery was designed to operate within the context of a certain inter-State relationship established between the two signatory countries by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949, which created a very specific set of mutual obligations between the two Member States. Should one repudiate these obligations and be unwilling to respect them, the armistice machinery could not be expected to remedy that situation. It was implied in the Secretary-General’s report that the two incidents of hit-and-run guerrilla war type before the Council, could not fall within the competence of this armistice machinery. The crux of the problem was a question of governmental attitude and policy. Did the Syrian Government accept its responsibility, under the Armistice Agreement, to prevent any illegal act? 188

The representative of Syria* maintained that on the question of co-operation with the Mixed Armistice Commission, the position of his Government had always been one of full co-operation with United Nations machinery and more specifically, with the Mixed Armistice Commission. On the other hand, the Security Council had on previous occasions reminded Israel authorities to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission. Therefore, it was Israel which should be reminded of its obligations towards the General Armistice Agreement. The representative reiterated that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Mixed

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180 S/Agenda/1305. For discussion on the adoption of the agenda see chapter II, Case 7.
181 1305th meeting, para. 131.
182 1305th meeting, paras. 134-135.
183 1307th meeting, paras. 19, 20, 22, 31, 37, 38, 42, 45, 51, 52.
184 1307th meeting, paras. 66-68, 84.
186 1309th meeting, paras. 120, 123, 130, 132-133, 136, 144-146.
Armistice Commission were the proper machinery to investigate these incidents.107

At the 1310th meeting on 28 October 1966, the representative of the United States introduced 108 a draft resolution, submitted jointly with the United Kingdom, under which the Council would: (1) deplore the incidents which had been subject of the debate; (2) remind the Government of Syria to fulfill its obligations by taking all measures to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operation for acts constituting a violation of the General Armistice Agreement; (3) call upon the parties for strict adherence to Article III, paragraph 3, of the Syrian-Israel General Armistice Agreement providing that no warlike act should be conducted from the territory of one of the parties against other parties; (4) call upon the Governments of Syria and Israel to co-operate fully with the United Nations machinery, including the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, for the effective implementation of the General Armistice Agreement in order to prevent incidents and to facilitate the work of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization personnel in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation line; (5) express the intention to consider further as soon as possible in the interest of the promotion of lasting peace in the Middle East what steps could be taken on the broader question of the Arab-Israel relations; and would (6) request the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution and to take such measures as might be necessary to ensure that the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine could effectively fulfill the functions assigned to them.

At the 1316th meeting on 3 November 1966, the representative of Uganda introduced 109 a draft resolution, submitted jointly with Argentina, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand and Nigeria, according to which the Secretary-General presented to the Security-Council the information on the matter before it based on some early reports received from the United Nations Military Observers. He stated that the investigations were continuing and that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine would transmit his report to the parties and to the Secretary-General as soon as investigations were completed.110

The agenda was adopted 111 and the Security Council considered the question at its 1320th to 1328th meetings between 16 and 28 November 1966. The representative of Israel was invited to take part in the discussion.112

At the 1320th meeting on 16 November 1966, the Secretary-General presented to the Security-Council the information on the matter before it based on some early reports received from the United Nations Military Observers. He stated that the investigations were continuing and that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine would transmit his report to the parties and to the Secretary-General as soon as investigations were completed.113

At the same meeting, the representative of Jordan stated that at approximately 6 a.m. on 13 November 1966, Israeli armed forces crossed the demarcation line in brigade strength, supported by a squadron of jets, heavy artillery, tanks and army personnel carriers. They started shelling the police post of Ruim el Madfa’a, which resulted in demolishing the police post and wounding members of the police force. The invading forces after penetrating into Jordan, split into two columns consisting of tanks and army personnel carriers. The first column proceeded in the direction of As-Samu and the second

Decision of 25 November 1966 (1328th meeting):

(i) Censuring Israel for the large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;

(ii) Emphasizing to Israel that actions of military reprisal could not be tolerated and if they were repeated, the Council would have to consider more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter.

By letter 114 dated 15 November 1966 to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan requested, pursuant to his letter 115 of 14 November 1966, an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the act of aggression committed by the Israeli armed forces against the citizens and territory of Jordan on 13 November 1966.

At the 1320th meeting on 16 November 1966, the provisional agenda under the general heading “The Palestine question” listed:

“The letter dated 15 November 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7587).”

The agenda was adopted 116 and the Security Council considered the question at its 1320th to 1328th meetings between 16 and 28 November 1966. The representative of Israel was invited to take part in the discussion.117

At the 1320th meeting on 16 November 1966, the Secretary-General presented to the Security-Council the information on the matter before it based on some early reports received from the United Nations Military Observers. He stated that the investigations were continuing and that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine would transmit his report to the parties and to the Secretary-General as soon as investigations were completed.118

After the vote, the President, speaking as the representative of the United States, stated that the United States and the United Kingdom would not press for a vote on their draft resolution.119

107 1309th meeting, para. 165, 167.
108 1310th meeting, para. 62.
110 1316th meeting, para. 24.
112 1319th meeting, para. 55.
113 1320th meeting, preceding para. 2.
114 1320th meeting, para. 2.
115 1320th meeting, para. 5-14. For the report of the Secretary-General, see: S/7593 and Add.1, OR, 21st yr., Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1966, pp. 88-94.
column moved in a north-east direction towards Kherbit el Markaz. These locations were over six kilometres inside Jordan. As soon as the first column reached As-Samu, they started shelling, dynamiting, destroying the villages and killing Jordanian farmers. The Mirage jets subjected the villages of As-Samu, Rafaat and the police post of Rujm el Madfa’a to bombardment from the air. The village of Tawawani was also the target of heavy shelling by Israel artillery. As a result of the air bombardment and shelling by heavy artillery, the losses in life and property were very heavy, including a number of civilians and soldiers either being wounded or killed and a great number of houses and buildings demolished, thus rendering more than 1,000 farmers homeless. This had been a well-planned, deliberate and clearly an act of aggression. This attack on Jordan was a manifestation of complete defiance of the Security Council’s authority, and called for the Council’s consideration, in addition to condemnation of Israel, of further measures under the Charter to maintain and restore peace. Chapter VII of the Charter was the only answer in this specific case.

The representative of Israel said that his delegation wished to focus the attention of the Council on the complicated security problem with which Israel was confronted by the policies and actions of hostile neighbours. No constructive purpose could be served in disapproving a specific action without regard to the difficulties that prompted it. Recently organized terrorism and sabotage across the Jordan border became bolder and more frequent, involving certain villages on the Jordan side of the border which served as bases of operation and staging posts for terrorist and saboteur groups. The local inhabitants had harboured and assisted the saboteurs without any serious interference from the Jordanian security authorities. On 13 November, an army vehicle on a regular patrol was blown up by a mine, killing three of its occupants and wounding the other six. That incident took place in the border sector adjacent to the southern Hebron Hills and it was evident that the perpetrators had come from and returned to the same villages. The Israel Government had reason to believe that that incident was the first in a fresh series of attacks planned to take place in the locality. For this reason, it decided to carry out a local action directed at the villages involved, in the hope that it might serve as a warning and deterrent to their inhabitants. This defensive action was carried out by a relatively small and mobile task force which was under strict instructions to take every measure for the avoidance of casualties. This situation was forced upon Israel by the neighbouring States. It had been suggested that Israel should confine itself to the United Nations machinery on the spot, when it was attacked. However the United Nations observers were not in a position to intercept intruders, and that machinery had never been intended to cope with hit-and-run guerrilla raids. What the Government sought above all from the Council was a firm reaffirmation of those Charter principles and those Armistice provisions upon which peace in the Middle East region so vitally depended.

At the 1322nd meeting on 17 November 1966, the representative of Argentina stated that the time had come for the Security Council to adopt recommendations or measures to avert a recurrence of incidents with a view to preventing the worsening of the situation in the Middle East, with special emphasis on the need to supply the United Nations machinery operating in the area with necessary means to perform their task more effectively.

The representative of Japan observed that the action of Israel could not by any means possibly be condoned. Even if a terrorist incident preceded it, the Government of Israel should have resorted to peaceful means.

The representative of New Zealand contended that the Council’s concern was to prevent the recurrence of incidents which might threaten the peace in the Middle East. It was no apology for Israel’s retaliatory action to state once against the view that incidents which had occurred in the Israel territory must inevitably be a source of strain and tension in relations between Israel and those of its neighbours from which the infiltrators had come. Although the position of the majority of members of the Council on this aspect of the question had been made quite clear, the Council had not to this date, in any formal sense, been prepared to take this obvious fact into account in its decisions. It was not to condone this Israel action to express the view that the Council would not have dealt seriously with the immediate causes of the current violent situation as long as it did not address itself effectively to this problem.

At the 1323rd meeting on 17 November 1966, the representative of the Netherlands stated that if strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization along certain sections of the border could contribute to the prevention of military actions as well as other acts of violence, the Council should seriously consider such a possibility. At any rate, the Council must find a way of stopping the continuation and the escalation of violence in the Middle East.

The representative of Israel contended that the time had come for the Council to deal with the situation as a whole and the Council should insist, among other things, on a halt to threats and incitement and a halt to terrorist raids across the border, and not merely focus its attention on a halt to threats and incitement and a halt to terrorist raids across the border, and not merely focus its attention on a reaction to these raids. Above all, the Council must insist on the strict fulfilment by all the Governments concerned of the obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

The representative of Jordan stated that what the Council was expected to decide was whether or not there was any link between this act of aggression which was before it and any other act committed by the Government of Jordan. So far not a single statement had been heard in the Council implicating the Government of Jordan in the commission of any act which could be linked with the crime committed by Israel. Therefore, there was but one single issue before the Council: a crime committed deliberately, intentionally, without any provocation of any kind on the part of the Government of Jordan.

At the 1324th meeting on 21 November 1966, the representative of Jordan stated that any resolution similar to...
those adopted in the past would not ease the explosive situation in the area. In the view of the Government of Jordan, the Council, in order to prevent any further aggression in the future, should condemn Israel for the wanton attack of 13 November 1966; it should express its grave concern at the failure of Israel to comply with its obligations; it should decide that Israel action was a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the General Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel; it should further decide that this armed attack constituted aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter and it should call upon Members of the United Nations to adopt the necessary measures for applying economic sanctions against Israel.

At the 1327th meeting on 24 November 1966, the representative of Nigeria submitted a draft resolution sponsored jointly by Mali.

At the 1328th meeting on 25 November 1966, the joint draft resolution was adopted by 210 votes in favour, to none against, with 1 abstention, as resolution 228 (1966).

The resolution read:

"The Security Council,

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israel military action which took place in the southern Hebron area on 13 November 1966,

"Having noted the information provided by the Secretary-General concerning this military action in his statement of 16 November and also in his report of 18 November 1966,

"Observing that this incident constituted a large-scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces of Israel,

"Reaffirming the previous resolutions of the Security Council condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the General Armistice Agreement between Jordan and Israel and of the United Nations Charter,

"Recalling the repeated resolutions of the Security Council asking for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

"Reaffirming the necessity for strict adherence to the General Armistice Agreement,

"1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on 13 November 1966;

"2. Censures Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;

"3. Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that, if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter dated 2 August 1966, the deputy representative of the United Kingdom requested the President of the Security Council to convene an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation arising from an "unprovoked and indefensible attack" on 30 July 1966 on the town of Nugub in the Amirat of Baihan in the Federation of South Arabia, for whose protection and for the conduct of whose external affairs the United Kingdom was responsible. It was further stated in the letter that according to the evidence, the aircraft responsible for the attack were those of the United Arab Republic operating from an airfield in Yemen.

At the 1296th meeting on 4 August 1966, the Council included the question in its agenda. The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Yemen were invited to participate in the discussion. The Council considered the question at its 1296th to 1300th meetings.

Decision of 16 August 1966 (1300th meeting):

Statement by the President expressing the consensus of the Council that:

(i) the parties concerned each on its part be asked to contribute in lessening the tension;

(ii) the Secretary-General be invited to continue his good offices in an endeavour to settle the outstanding question in agreement with the parties concerned

At the 1296th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the air attack on the town of Nugub was deliberate and not the first against the territory of the Federation of South Arabia. The United Kingdom Government was determined to carry out its declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence not later than 1968, but in order that this task might be satisfactorily accomplished, it was necessary that the area should enjoy peace and security. Attacks originating from Yemeni territory could only make achievement of United Kingdom aims, and those of the United Nations, more difficult. The Council should deplore the attack on the town of Nugub and call upon the United Arab Republic and Yemeni authorities to ensure that further attacks of this nature did not occur. He suggested that some form of United Nations observation might assist the maintenance of peace and security and this possibility might be explored through the good offices of the Secretary-General.

At the same meeting, the representative of the United Arab Republic denied that planes belonging to the United Arab Republic Air Force had undertaken any kind of operations in Beihan. Neither had there been any planes of the Arab-Yemeni Joint Command airborne on 30 July 1966. He further maintained that the only aircraft flying the skies of Aden and the Aden Protectorates were British. The allegations against the United Arab Republic were attempts to cover up the British oppression of the peoples of Aden and the Aden Protectorates. Mindful of its obligations under the Charter and of the