Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honour to participate in this important workshop. It is most gratifying to see the commitment made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last March at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit come to fruition. I was informed that this commitment by India was aptly represented by the Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai in his opening remarks.

Noting the distinguished gathering here today I can see that one of the important objectives of the meeting has already been achieved: that is, to bring together the key stakeholders to brainstorm in order to help build synergies to contribute to the overall objective of advancing the cause of nuclear security. I am particularly glad to see representatives from the incoming members of the Security Council, as well as the current members represented. This will greatly assist in the continuity of the effort. Similarly the presence of representatives from the countries representing the chairs of the Nuclear Security Summit meetings will also help strengthen and sustain this important endeavor. I would like to acknowledge the collaboration in support of this Workshop given by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. My thanks go to the High Representative for Disarmament, Ms. Angela Kane, and her staff for helping bring together the key players to take up the very important challenge that lies before us, namely that of advancing nuclear security.
As Chairman of the Committee charged by the Security Council with promoting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), I particularly welcomed the statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his national statement at the Seoul Summit in which he said, I quote, “Nuclear security is primarily a national responsibility but there are benefits to be gained by supplementing responsible national actions through sustained and effective international cooperation.” This is what Resolution 1540 is all about. The obligation to prevent nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery from getting into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists, has to be implemented at the national level, but the issue is one of global concern. International cooperation and assistance to facilitate implementation of our objectives are vital ingredients in assuring the success of our mandate under Resolution 1540. The sustained commitment of the international community to the obligations was further demonstrated by Security Council Resolution 1977 (2011) that authorized a ten-year extension of the 1540 Committee.

This workshop is very much in the spirit of the Seoul Summit’s final communiqué, which called for efforts to increase international cooperation and to provide assistance, upon request, to countries in need on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral level.¹

Resolution 1540 requires States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials in the areas of accounting/securing, physical protection, border and law enforcement, export and transshipment. As part of our commitment to ensuring that States are able to fulfil their obligations, the members of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts are particularly devoted to facilitating the delivery of assistance wherever it is requested. Naturally this support can be only truly successful if it is carefully harmonised

¹ NSS, Seoul 2012 Communiqué, paragraph 13.
with the efforts of the other key players, including with those active in the nuclear security field. This encompasses efforts by States Parties to the multilateral instruments that address nuclear security, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), along with the 2005 amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). These instruments will be all the more effective once there is universal adherence to them.

Naturally, in seeking to develop productive and effective synergies, a key actor is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Their support to Member States is vital to countering nuclear terrorism. Such actions as the national implementation of the IAEA Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities document (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other related Nuclear Security Series documents are essential elements in our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and preventing terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials for weapons purposes. In view of central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework, the contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, including that given by our host country,² India, are all the more welcome.

I look forward to hearing ideas from the individual countries represented here to develop novel approaches to enhance the synergies that already exist between the various stakeholders. I also welcome the efforts of groups of countries such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and encouraged by the work done by the 85 participating countries. Their experience will undoubtedly be an important contribution to our joint efforts.

The daunting range of activities that needs to be embraced in order to advance nuclear security is a true challenge. I will not attempt to list all those involved but would like to draw attention to other important IGOs in the areas of transportation

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² At the 2012 NSS in Seoul India announced a contribution of $1m to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund.
and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials such as INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization.

In our efforts to seek new synergies the path has been made much easier by the evolution of a better understanding of the nexus between nuclear safety and nuclear security. This has enabled much needed deeper connections between the safety and security communities both nationally and internationally. At the Seoul Summit there was a call, at the respective national levels, for more robust communications between government, regulatory bodies, industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations and the media, to fully commit to enhancing nuclear security culture. In this regard reaching out to international civil society organisations such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the more recently established World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and others, has brought important benefits. These organisations are making important contributions to nuclear safety and security globally. There may be ways that we can enhance even further the synergies, where appropriate, that already exist with civil society organisations.

A further example of an outreach event is the Conference of International, Regional, and Sub-Regional Industry Associations on UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), organized by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), in cooperation with the Government of Germany with funding from the Governments of Norway, the United States and the European Union, which was held on 23 - 25 April 2012, Wiesbaden, Germany, attended by 1540 Committee members and 1540 experts. I believe that this proved to be an invaluable awareness raising activity for private industry. Careful coordination with these organisations and other national entities should, in my view, be included in our considerations. They could make an important contribution to enhancing nuclear security culture and the coordination of activities with them could help, in particular, to promote human resource development through education and training.
Dear participants, I have been informed that discussions yesterday were robust and engaging, focused on examining all possibilities for enhancing our abilities to try to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, from getting into the hands of terrorists. This task is one that requires sustained engagement. To quote once again from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s national statement in Seoul last March: “Nuclear terrorism will remain a potent threat as long as there are terrorists seeking to gain access to nuclear material and technologies for malicious purposes...”. We have before us a long term challenge that requires innovative approaches to help assure success over the years to come. Our hosts, by making this meeting possible, have given us an excellent opportunity to make progress.

Thank you for your attention.