Let me begin by thanking the organizers of this important meeting for inviting the 1540 Committee to participate: the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) and its Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP) and the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS). I also thank the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) for its support of this program.

I believe that the fundamental idea behind the project – that the experience gained by the Russian Federation and the United States, in the spirit of cooperation and with full respect for the multilateral system, is the kind of approach needed for meeting the new threats to international peace and security that led the United Nations Security Council to adopt resolution 1540 (2004) seven years ago.

The unanimous adoption of resolution 1977 (2011) by the Council, further signified the commitment of the international community to develop a strong *multilateral approach*, with the support and participation of all States, in preventing non-state actors from acquiring materials that could be used for the development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as their means of delivery.
The Security Council recognised that the threats to international peace and security of today require a new perspective. Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security; however, the threat that non-state actors may be able to use related materials for illicit purposes has emerged as an area of concern. The risk that non-state actors seek and will use materials related to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery is a real one, as the data collected by CNS on several hundred confirmed threats of or actual use of such weapons by non-state actors in recent decades demonstrates.

With rapid economic growth in the region, many South East Asia nations regard nuclear power as a shield against current trends of an energy crisis in meeting their long-term energy needs. At the same time, the increased economic globalization and national policy reforms that fostered the rapid economic growth in the region also widened the availability and application of “dual-use” materials for legitimate commercial purposes. The ever-present threat in this situation is that non-state actors will continue to try to exploit these trends for illicit purposes.

As most of you know, resolution 1540 (2004) requires States to take measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring, developing, trafficking in or using nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. It further obliges States to establish and enforce appropriate effective means to account for, secure, and physically protect related
materials, and to take measures to control borders as well as the export, transit, transhipment and re-export of such materials. For these purposes, the resolution recommends that States use relevant control lists for such materials.

The Security Council placed resolution 1540 (2004) squarely within the context of the broader international non-proliferation regimes. The Council states definitively that none of the provisions of the resolution “shall conflict with or alter the rights and obligations” of States Parties to multilateral non-proliferation treaties, nor change the responsibilities of international organisations implementing those instruments. The overwhelming majority of States are responsible adherents to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have made an invaluable contribution through their commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution also calls upon all States to promote universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral non-proliferation treaties to which they are parties, and even strengthen them if necessary. If anything, many measures to implement these treaty obligations make direct contributions to the implementation of resolution 1540 and vice versa.

Almost every State, including each in South East Asia, has voted in favour of supporting full implementation of resolution 1540 in the context of a regional or sub-regional organization. In other words, high-level political commitments have been made to implement the resolution. Now States will face the task of taking practical measures to fulfil the objectives and obligations of the
resolution. To that end, every State in the region has reported to the 1540 Committee on steps that they have taken or will take related to these obligations. Accordingly, South East Asian States also have forged partnerships to obtain technical assistance related to implementation of the resolution, a topic discussed most recently at a workshop on resolution 1540 hosted by Viet Nam in the fall of 2010.

Recognising that a longer-term approach may be needed to assist States in fulfilment of their obligations under resolution 1540, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1977 (2011). This has extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for 10 years. Resolution 1977 re-emphasizes that international and regional cooperation, assistance, and sharing of effective practices and relevant experiences provide important added value to national efforts to implement resolution 1540. In addition, resolution 1977 specifically recognised that international cooperation between States, in accordance with international law, is required to counter the illicit trafficking by non-State actors in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials.

The relative importance of securing nuclear materials also appears in resolution 1540 itself, which points to measures to implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources as “effective” means to accounting for, securing, and physically protecting sensitive materials. From my perspective, these goals of
this project coincide closely with those of resolutions 1540 and 1977. We have strived, in all our efforts, to uphold the multilateral approach, consistent with what each State may require in their own unique circumstances.

The project under discussion today directly relates to at least two other important non-proliferation objectives noted in resolution 1977. In it, the Security Council recognises the need for enhanced regional and sub-regional coordination to support the global response to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, particularly by non-state actors. Exploring the opportunities for co-operation on nuclear security in South East Asia that is at the heart of this project certainly matches with this objective.

Resolution 1977 also calls on the 1540 Committee to draw upon the expertise of civil society and the private sector, with the consent of States, to identify effective practices for specific concerns. Working with civil society and the private sector to link nuclear expertise in South East Asia with the experience of those involved in the Russian Federation – US long-term joint projects on nuclear security may be a positive example for the 1540 Committee to consider in promoting nuclear security. I look forward to hearing from the Russian Federation, the United States, and the South East Asia States on their efforts to promote nuclear security in the region, and on how they might view the recommendations and lessons learned through this project.

I have noted that this project makes use of the national reports and matrices available on the 1540 Committee web site. The 1540 Committee seeks
transparency in its work for many reasons. It is gratifying to see that this kind of project, where the purposes are to enhance cooperation, assistance, and sharing of experiences, can benefit from the work of the Committee and its efforts at transparency. In that regard, I encourage all of us to continue to build appropriate levels of transparency, consistent with national priorities. I hope that all States, international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, as well as civil society, may share suitable information such as that contained in the 1540 Committee matrices or in its reports to the Security Council, with the Committee. The 1540 Committee could then consider making that information available to the international non-proliferation community with a view to providing reliable information on implementation of the resolution.

Let me give two small but recent examples relayed to the 1540 Committee in the course of its dialogue with States that relate to the positive impact implementation of non-proliferation measures can have on other national development objectives. Having a means to detect radioactive materials at a port of entry allowed one South East Asian State to identify, assess, and swiftly mitigate the risk of radiological contamination posed by several of its citizens returning from work at the Fukushima nuclear facility, as well as other travellers exposed to radiation in the aftermath of the events at Fukushima. That same State, however, by not having a process to check its exports for radioactivity, found that a shipment went from its major port to one of its major trading partners, only to be denied entry and returned when the trading partner determined the shipment was abnormally radioactive. The exporter and the exporting State sustained substantial economic costs as a result,
having to pay return transportation, storage, disposal and other unnecessary costs, not even counting the potential costs and the personal risks associated with exposing of its own Customs officers and citizenry to additional radiation.

In closing, perhaps the most difficult issue in implementation of resolution 1540 is making sure that non-proliferation policies and programs do not hamper legitimate international cooperation in the nuclear, chemical, biological fields or in programs relevant to means of delivery. Certainly, the point of the resolution is to promote international peace and security, which will benefit from peaceful development in these various sectors. Fortunately, non-proliferation and development objectives are not mutually exclusive. Building the capacity to ensure secure use or facilitate legitimate trade in nuclear or radioactive materials, for example, can help States promote safety for its people, environment, and economy and avoid supply chain disruptions.

I look forward to hearing more from the experts here today and to see the results of your report, which I trust will be shared with the 1540 Committee in the future. Again, I give my thanks to the organizers and supporters of this workshop for inviting me and for sharing their views.