Excellency,

The High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security that will take place Tuesday and Wednesday this week has raised considerable interest within the General Assembly and beyond.

In addition to the short outline annexed to my letter of 11 March 2016, the detailed concept note annexed to my letter of 19 April, the provisional program, the guidance note and a logistical note annexed to my letter of 4 May, I have the honour to bring to your attention today the final version of the program of the High-Level Thematic Debate as well as two background documents aimed at informing the interactive sessions.

Given the high number of speakers inscribed for the high-level plenary of the morning of Tuesday 10 May, this session will be continued on Wednesday 11 May from 1:15 until 5:55pm. Speakers other than Ministers are kindly invited to limit their statements to no more than 3 minutes in order to give an opportunity to all those inscribed on the list to deliver their statements.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mogens Lykketoft
Challenge Paper

The UN at 70—Celebration, or Commemoration?
Or: The Case for Re-Tooling the UN’s Conflict Management Capacity

By Bruce D. Jones

As the UN turns 70, should we be celebrating or commemorating? Two and a half decades of important progress since the end of the Cold War suggest the former; great power deadlock in Ukraine and Syria (with its attendant humanitarian catastrophe) suggest the latter. The balance arguably lies in whether the UN can initiate the kind of re-tooling that adapted the UN for the post-Cold War era. Then the challenge was to meet new geopolitical opportunities and take on new roles in internal conflict; now the challenge is to confront complex crises unfolding on a fraught geopolitical landscape.

Since its founding the UN has played a range of conflict management roles in different settings. In conflicts with low geopolitical salience, the UN has been a supportive actor in mediation, the leading actor in peacekeeping and humanitarian response, and a participant in peacebuilding. In conflict with higher geopolitical salience, the UN has also contributed to conflict management, often combining forces both figuratively and literally with NATO, the EU, and coalitions who are willing to invest the manpower and resources to produce peace and security outcomes. And in proxy wars or conflicts where the largest military powers are closely engaged, those powers have sometimes turned to the UN to help freeze the conflicts or de-escalate proxy tensions. Will the UN be able to perform these functions in the years ahead? Or will it lapse back into the kind of paralysis that characterized much of the Cold War?

This question arises during important shifts in the nature and location of conflict. During the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s violence and insecurity was concentrated in internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the peripheries of the major continents—in the Balkans, Haiti, Timor Leste, etc. In all of these regions conflict has declined substantially, though the challenges that remain are large and enduring (e.g. in D.R. Congo and Sudan). They are also costly, at a moment when resources for the UN are shrinking. In one region of the world, the Middle East, violence and insecurity are rising: the region confronts internal war but also inter-state conflict, as well as sub-state and trans-national violence. And most conflicts in the Middle East (and North Africa) have terrorist entities as combatants, which poses challenges to the UN.

The second form of rising insecurity is geopolitical. Already we have seen a form of attenuated proxy war in the Ukraine and direct support to war-fighting in Syria by both the great powers and regional powers. The deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations and rising tensions between the China, the U.S. and other east Asian powers, especially in maritime Asia, bode ill for international security. Of course, there are some issues on which there are underlying shared interests, like aspects of proliferation and terrorism. Even here, though, shared interests do not necessarily translate into shared approaches, as has been brutally evident in Syria.

Against these difficulties there is a silver lining for the UN, in the form of a growing number of states with the capacity to make effective contributions to peace and security. Many of these are states that have grown economically but are still far from having the military capacity to act beyond their neighborhoods. Their diplomatic reach exceeds their military grasp. Because this is so, and for reasons of status, these states have a strong interest in working through the UN, often the only tool accessible for them to project capacity beyond their neighborhoods (within their neighborhoods, some of these states have access to effective regional organizations). These states are a resource and the question of whether the UN is an effective source of peace and security in the coming period will depend heavily on how these countries engage the UN and whether the UN learns how to mobilize their capacity.

In short: If the UN is going to be useful in conflict management and peace and security in the coming period, it has to pull off a multi-part retooling:
- Increase the efficiency of its operational capacity to sustain large field operations for peacekeeping and humanitarian response;
- Streamline its bureaucracy to aid in more integrated policy and operations between preventive, peacekeeping and peacebuilding work;
- Create new platforms that allow a wider set of states to contribute more, both operationally and in the political and diplomatic management of conflicts;
- Increase its ability to contribute to conflict management in the Middle East, including in cases where terrorist actors are present, either by building its own operational capacity, through deeper partnerships with more capable organizations (though there are few of these), or by more consistently utilizing multi-national arrangements;
- Position itself diplomatically to be useful to the great powers when they seek to de-conflict themselves from proxy entanglements or from escalating tensions.

The efficacy and efficiency of UN-led peacekeeping

An international audience reading about the UN in early 2016 will have predominant in their minds the blockages in UN Security Council over Syria and Ukraine; and may scoff the notion of strengthening or reforming UN conflict management functions. However, P5 tensions over those two geopolitically significant conflicts obscure the fact that the United Nations still has 138,000 personnel on the field in 39 missions, an all-time high. Unfortunately, new security challenges and new resource constraints mean that both resources available for such operations and political support for UN roles is likely to shrink, putting a premium on the efficacy and efficiency of UN operations.

On the question low geopolitical conflicts, the recent High-level Panel on Peace Operations provides the essential guide; the challenge is implementation. Gains are likely to come most quickly in four areas: in improving planning, in reinforcing the political frameworks for peace keeping, in rapid deployment of field headquarters, and in augmenting the efficiency of management tools.

The UN needs no new authorities, no new capacities, and no new budgets to augment civilian planning; it simply needs creativity and will on the part of its most senior leadership. Similarly, for reinforcing the political framework for operations: it's a matter of vital policy that peacekeeping operations should be conducted in support of a political framework, or a political agreement, or in pursuit of one. The two most important variables here are the attitudes of the P5/regional powers, and the quality and the creativity of the special representatives that the SG deploys to lead UN missions. This is another area where gender issues will be particularly important, as leadership from the top will help ensure that gender issues are prioritized throughout the UN response.

It will take more political will by member states to return to an earlier situation of the UN having available to it a rapidly deployable headquarters and planning tool. In Ethiopia/Eritrea, and other contexts, the UN made very effective use of such a mechanism in the form of the European-supported Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). A revived capacity could be broadened to include a wider set of aspiring powers.

The UN can also do more with regional organizations, where they are effective, and with the World Bank; and this may be particularly important for prevention. A theme that should run throughout the preventive work is inclusion; everything we know about conflict suggests that inclusive governance and inclusive economies are essential to conflict avoidance.

A fourth step, and one extremely important for efficiency, but requiring more political negotiation among member states, entails a greater flexibility for the Department of Field Support (DFS), and greater flexibility in its interaction with the more bureaucratic, headquarters-focused Department of Management (DM). As will streamlining the bureaucratic arrangements between DPA, DPKO, and UNDP, and - finally - forging an effective relationship with the World Bank, to make for more integrated peacebuilding efforts at all parts of the conflict cycle. It may require substantial changes to Secretariat arrangements and even more so to the hard divisions between various UN budgets. This will not be an easy lift, but incoming Secretaries-General
have a honeymoon period in which, historically, they have been able to execute important bureaucratic changes with tacit support from the membership.

That is a lot to take on. But if we think about how the UN can contribute to conflict management in more complex, more geopolitically fraught settings, then we have to look more deeply at two other issues: the question of operating in settings (of which there will be a growing number) where terrorist entities are operating; and the involvement and participation of rising powers in policy and mandate making functions.

**Contributing to Conflict Management in Higher Geopolitical Settings**

If the UN is going to meet contemporary security challenges, it will have to have access to the capability of the widest possible range of actors: the major African and South Asian states that have become the bedrock contributors of the large, but relatively low-capability forces that the UN now fields; high-end and enabling capabilities from European contributors; and an increasingly sophisticated set of force capabilities and enabling capabilities from states that have not historically used the UN to project power status or force.

The High-Level Report touches on this issue but in a modest way, as have the members of the P5, who, when they've opened up to light consultations, haven't seen much impact and thus resist further reform. That is not a way to drive political change. The UN is going to have to go much deeper on reform of its machinery to seriously involve aspiring countries if the latter are to take up new roles and put serious resources into the organization and its operations. That's an important agenda for the coming Secretary General, who confronts now a set of activist states who want to do more, who can do are, and who are frustrated by a lack of reform at the UN.

Of course, the broader question of Security Council reform is germane to this; but there is much the UN can do short of Charter reform to meet the appetite of rising powers for more engagement. The first and most obvious is for the new incoming Secretary-General to use senior positions in the UN Secretariat for political and diplomatic figures from the non-European, non-P5 powers. That may create some tensions with OECD states who frequently claim such roles, but that is a balance that the new secretary general will have to strike.

The second way a wider set of states can participate in a more serious manner is through their own contributions to peacekeeping. This is a decision in their hands. Brazil has been providing force commanders in Haiti, using its own region as a testing ground, but then going farther afield and putting a force commander in the eastern Congo, even in the context of a controversial and complicated mission with a stabilization presence. This is an important part of how Brazil will build influence in the UN. The other aspiring powers will simply have to take this step themselves if they want to see more influence.

A third step, and one that lies in the hands of the P5, is to engage the aspiring powers on policy. Here, one option would be to revive the Brazilian concept of responsibilities while protecting—an argument that when the Security Council authorizes other actors to use force, it should do so under a policy framework where the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) is embedded in a wider concept of the responsible use of force. Re-engagement on this issue would go some distance to creating a legitimate political framework around UN Security Council authorization decisions, which would enable a far wider set of capabilities to be deployed under a political framework. It would helpfully create a more legitimate framework for the authorization of multinational forces, which may be crucial to confront today's complex conflicts.

**Tackling more complex conflicts and conflicts involving terrorist entities**

Indeed, the debate around UN conflict management tends to focus on the traditional “blue helmet” operations, that is, operations managed centrally by the UN Secretariat. There’s a powerful alternative in the UN’s toolkit, namely UN-mandated multi-national forces (MNF). These are operations that fly under a UN banner but are led and commanded by an individual state, rather than the UN Secretariat. As the UN conflicts more complex conflicts with stronger armies, stronger rebel forces and sophisticated terrorist entities, it may be necessary to put more emphasis on using this option, and some of its variants.

Friends of the UN should undertake a detailed examination of the range of alternatives available to the UN—from blue helmet operations to multi-national forces to so-called hybrid operations (where the UN
and a regional organization fuse their forces into a single structure). Such a study would enable the member states to better support and more firmly encourage the UN to explore a variety of options when confronted with an emerging conflict.

Another tool in the UN’s potential quiver is to ask the most capable military powers to provide over-the-horizon guarantees to more traditional UN operations. This would add confidence to potential contributors. And to anticipate the criticism that this is an unrealistic ask of the top-powers: the United States did exactly this in the early days of the Kosovo crisis, mounting an over-the-horizon extraction force that provided guarantees to the unarmed Kosovo Verification Mission established by the OSCE. Over-the-horizon guarantees would be eminently feasible in a context like Libya, for example.

Finally, the UN will have to engage in a deeper examination of its current high degree of conservatism in its role in confronting trans-national terrorist organizations in the conflict theatres in which it’s deployed. The High-level Panel tackled this issue, and rightly insisted that the current UN is not the right mechanism to undertake counter-terrorism operations. That’s surely true of the present: currently configured, currently managed, currently mandated peacekeeping missions are not particularly well suited to taking robust counter-terrorism operations, or even really robust counter-insurgency operations.

But looking forward, we need a deeper answer to the question: if not the UN, who? The risk of the Security Council not taking this on is that of unrestrained unilateral action by states, with seriously destabilizing consequences. There is no consensus on this issue in the Secretariat; in member state missions to the UN; or in the international community. But the simple fact of the matter is that we confront a growing number of conflicts where terrorism is a central part of the reality and there are few organizations other than the UN with the operational or legal authority to mount peacekeeping operations. How we grapple with this thorny challenge will be as consequential for the UN’s next twenty years as was the decision in the early 1990s to enter into internal wars, breaking with the long UN tradition of limiting itself to inter-positional roles.

De-confliction of Great Power Tensions

Finally, how then can the UN be relevant to the management of tensions between the top military powers? How can it serve as a mechanism for de-confliction or mitigation when the top powers find themselves butting up against one another or risking conflict?

If the UN evolved in the way detailed above, with more capable machinery built on a wider political coalition comprised by both European states and aspirational powers, then there is a greater chance that the top powers will be able to identify their interests in, and have confidence using, this tool to deescalate tensions. The participation of both the European and the aspiring powers is important because the top military powers have important bilateral interests with all those actors. Where a UN mechanism has the confidence and participation of such states the top powers will be more hesitant to ignore it than they would a device primarily confined to lower geopolitical contexts. This may matter a great deal for the period we are entering.

An important silver lining is the shared P5+ consensus on limiting nuclear proliferation. This has led to critically important major power cooperation through the UN on Iran, and increasingly on North Korea. Such P5+ diplomatic mechanisms are an important part of how the UN can contribute to peace and security in today’s environment.

Are there other parts of geopolitical challenge where the UNSC could, in principle, help slow the upwards spiral of tensions? Let’s first acknowledge that the most important issues—China’s strategic perspective and economic/resource claims in the East and South China Seas, Russia’s search for a security architecture that limits Western influence on its border, America’s sustained naval role in the Pacific and its sustained political/economic/military roles in Russia’s backyard—are ones that fall squarely into the realm of bilateral relations and perhaps bilateral arms control regimes, as aspects of the Soviet-American relationship did during the Cold War. But specific crises or incidents within this challenges, incidents that could generate unwanted escalation of tensions, could be the subject of UN contribution. There could be value added, for
example, if there were a standing incident review mechanism, established under the UNSC, on which an aggrieved country could call in the case of a maritime accident or incident to give an impartial assessment of the facts of the case, to push solutions towards diplomacy and arbitration, rather than military escalation. The search for ad hoc mechanisms is an alternative but one that leaves tense states scrambling for diplomatic options at a moment of crisis. Standing mechanisms established under UNSC authority would give the major powers tools for de-confliction, time for diplomacy.

Of course, another aspect of rising geopolitical tensions is the concern that P5 tensions will restrict UN action, including in cases of high levels of violence. On this, the French have introduced their proposal that the P5 should voluntarily restrict their use of the veto when the UN seeks to confront instances of mass atrocity crimes or humanitarian crises. Were such incidents to occur only in low geopolitical settings, perhaps the P5 would agree; the problem is that such situations also occur in places where the P5 have high geopolitical stakes, and are highly unlikely to agree to unfetter the UN. But what if we narrowed this proposal to the question of the establishment of UN operations? In other words, each P5 nation would agree to voluntarily restrict its use of the veto in circumstances where we confront the risk of mass atrocity and (the combination is critical) the Secretary General proposes to establish a UN operation—not handing the operation off to a coalition, NATO or to a unilateral actor. Why is this different? Because UN missions report back to the UNSC and that body holds the power to renew the operations; and so in restricting veto use in the establishment of a mission, the P5 are not giving up their ability to shape policy or manage the UN’s engagement in that situation. Instead, they would retain that capacity on a continuing basis. Even this suggestion is ambitious, but by contrast to the wider proposal it may have a slim chance of being considered.

Of course, it is evident that it will not be the Secretary General her or himself that will determine the position of the UN in the coming period. The top powers, the major economies, and the aspiring powers will either choose to craft the UN into an effective tool and use it to manage their tensions, or not.

But there is an important interaction between the Secretary-General and these powers. And at present, the Secretary-General has only a limited ability to understand and interact with that wider set of powers, beyond the New York missions. Over the Cold War period, successive Secretaries-General have understood the need to maintain a more direct relationship to Washington and to have an Assistant-Secretary-General level official in his office assisting in that function. As the number of decisive powers grows, replicating that model is not an option. But the Secretary-General could establish an (informal) International Affairs Advisory Board comprised of former senior officials or prominent policy scholars to assist her (or just possibly him...) in tracking both the evolution of conflict and security but also the dynamics of the relationship between the major powers, a dynamic that will shape the options available to the UN.

Taken together, these four sets of issues—increasing the efficiency of existing operations; preparing for more complex roles, perhaps through multilateral arrangements; more directly engaging a wider set of states; and re-positioning the UN for the new realities of geopolitics—could help re-tool the UN for the coming era. There is no doubt that we will need an effective UN; whether we will have one is the challenge in front of us.
# HIGH LEVEL THEMATIC DEBATE

## IN A WORLD OF RISKS:
**A NEW COMMITMENT FOR PEACE**

**UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY | NEW YORK | 10 - 11 MAY 2016**

Trusteeship Council Chamber, UN
Programme

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**Future of peace and security: Interlinkages in a complex world**

- by Espen Barth Eide, Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum

**Keynote speakers**

- H.E. Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, former President of Indonesia
- Ms. Leymah Gbowee, Liberia, 2011 Nobel Peace Laureate, SDG Advocate
- H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and former Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

| 10:35 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. | **High-Level Plenary: In a World of Risks:** |
| | **Today's threats to international peace and security** |
| | What are the unique international peace and security challenges of our time? How can the UN respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? |
| | Statements by high-level representatives. In light of time constrains, the length of the statements should not exceed five minutes. |

| 1:10 p.m. – 2:50 p.m. | **Ministerial-level lunch (by invitation only):** |
The Next Secretary-General in a World of Risks: Expectations vs. Realities.

During lunch, a discussion moderated by Mr. Ian Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report, will start with an informal panel discussion among eminent personalities and continue at individual tables. The moderator will conclude by summarizing main points and key insights.

**AFTERNOON SESSION**

| 3.00 p.m. – 6.00 p.m. | **Session 1: Sustainable Peace in a World of Risks: Is the UN effective in preventing and resolving conflicts?**
|                       | Moderator: Dr Bruce Jones, Vice-President and Director, Brookings Institution
|                       | The session will ask how the UN can remain the preeminent relevant actor and credibly respond to these threats, in particular those emanating from non-state and transnational actors? Are the means, instruments and policies available within a UN-context adequate to tackle today's threats to international peace and security? Do they effectively motivate confidence in UN peace operations – and do they sufficiently incentivize coherence and consistency in support of the UN? What is needed for the UN peace and security architecture to engage new and emerging actors?
|                       | The moderator will engage all participating Ministers, starting with Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Ethiopia, Mali and Norway, in an interactive dialogue.
|                       | This dialogue will further be informed by interspersed interventions by eminent experts, civil society and private sector representatives, using visual demonstration of current empirical evidence and trends in peace and security and outlining the key conclusions from a series of regional workshops organised in advance of the high-level thematic debate.
|                       | **Interventions by:** Ms. Sigrid Kaag, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Mr. Alexandre Marc, Chief Technical Specialist, Fragility, Conflict and Violence World Bank Group, Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute, Ms. Saba Ismail, Executive Director, Aware Girls, Pakistan, Ms Sarah Cliffe, Director, NYU Center on International Cooperation.
|                       | **Inputs from the field – key conclusions from regional workshops:** Mr. Cedric de Coning (NUPI/ACCORD), Mr. Ashraf Swelam (CCCPA), Ms. Adriana Abdenur (Igarapé).

| 10:00 a.m. – 11:20 a.m. | **Session 2: Leading by Example: Innovative partnerships and responses**
|                       | Moderator: H.E. Ms. Susana Malcorra, Foreign Relations Minister, Argentina
|                       | The session will focus on examples from the field looking above and beyond the most widely applied approaches, exploring examples of cross UN-system approaches to anchor peace and reconciliation.
|                       | The moderator will engage all participating Ministers, after introductory remarks by H.E. Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, former President of Sri Lanka, Chairperson of the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation and H.E. Dr Abdusalam H.
Omer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia.
Following these remarks, the moderator will engage participating Ministers and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.

*Interventions by:* H.E. Mr. Gert Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 review of the peacebuilding architecture, Mr. Magdy Martinez-Solimán, Assistant Administrator and Director, UNDP, as well as Ms. Asma Mansour, Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship.

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| 11:20 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. | *Message from the FAO-Nobel Peace Laureates Alliance for Food Security and Peace:*  
Mr David Nabarro, Special Adviser on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition, will introduce brief remarks by FAO Director-General Mr Graziano da Silva and 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate Mr Muhammad Yunus (live streamed from Rome). |
| 11:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m. | *Session 3: Responsibility for Implementation: Beyond the current conundrum*  
Moderator: Mr. Espen Barth Eide, Member of the Managing Board, World Economic Forum  
The session will focus on implementation, partnerships and accountability for delivering on commitments. It will reflect on the role of all stakeholders their specific relations with the UN institutional under existing frameworks and ways to enhance the level of effectiveness.  
The moderator will engage all participating Ministers starting with Mr. Alain Le Roy, Secretary-General, External Action Service, European Union  
*Interventions by:* H.E. Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta, Chair, High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, as well as Mr. Alvaro Estaban Pop, Chair, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. |
| 1:15 p.m. – 5:55 p.m. | *Continuation of the plenary*  
Speakers are encouraged to limit statements to no more than 3 minutes to allow all those who inscribed on the speakers' list to deliver statements. |
| 5:55 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. | *Closing Remarks:*  
H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the United Nations General Assembly |
Working Together for Peace: Synergies and Connectors for Implementing the 2015 UN Reviews
Cover Photo: Projections on UN headquarters in New York on the organization’s seventieth anniversary, September 22, 2015. UN Photo/Cia Pak.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

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Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor

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IPI would like to thank the following individuals for their participation in a collaborative brainstorming to inform this research: Rahul Chandran, Francesc Claret, Felicia Gordon, Michele Griffin, Navid Hanif, Steen Malthe Hansen, Lisa Moore, Madalene O’Donnell, Minh-Thu Pham, and Gizem Sucuoglu.

In addition, the research benefitted from dialogue and insights from the following events: a conference on “The High-level Independent Panel Report on Peace Operations: What’s Next?” hosted by IPI and the Republic of Korea at UN headquarters on July 15, 2015; a discussion on “The Future of Global Governance: A Commitment to Action” hosted at IPI on October 23, 2015; a writers’ workshop on the review of the peacebuilding architecture hosted by DHF in Uppsala from October 15 to 16, 2015; a meeting on peacebuilding financing hosted by DHF in New York from January 28 to 29, 2016; a consultation on “Integration and Fragmentation in Transitions from Conflict” organized by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), NUPI, and DHF and hosted by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Government of Liberia in Monrovia on March 31, 2016; and a consultation on “UN Peace Operations Review: Taking Stock, Leveraging Opportunities, and Charting the Way Forward” hosted by Ethiopia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and IPI at UN headquarters on April 11, 2016.

The production of this report was also informed by a series of expert meetings and regional workshops organized from February to April 2016 in all regions of the world by an informal group of stakeholders, think tanks, and civil society organizations with the objective of submitting recommendations to the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016. (For a list of these events and their outcome documents, see www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/views-from-the-field-and-civil-society.)

Finally, the authors are grateful to the many member states who encouraged them to pursue this research, in particular Denmark, Ethiopia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the Republic of Korea.
Abbreviations

AGE  Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture
AU   African Union
CEB  Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DPA  Department of Political Affairs
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
ERSG Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
GA   General Assembly
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBC  Peacebuilding Commission
PGA  President of the UN General Assembly
QCPR Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
SC   Security Council
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SG   Secretary-General
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN   United Nations
UNDG UN Development Group
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNMEER UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response
UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia
Executive Summary

The United Nations carried out three major reviews in 2015 on peace operations, the peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. Like the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the World Humanitarian Summit, the reviews were inspired by the need to strengthen the effectiveness, coherence, and relevance of the seventy-year-old UN peace and security architecture to make it better “fit for purpose” and able to respond more effectively to today’s complex and interconnected crises.

In preparation for the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, this report aims to help member states and other stakeholders “make sense of it all” by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies emerging from these reviews, particularly in four areas: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women’s participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches.

It also aims to identify and analyze key enablers for operationalizing the reviews’ policy recommendations in three areas: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance.

While recognizing the limitations imposed by the silos entrenched in the UN Charter’s three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights), this report points to a number of existing connectors and processes through which member states and the UN Secretariat have worked across these silos to bridge policy differences and address pressing challenges. Recent examples include the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the response to the Ebola emergency.

At the operational level, the UN system has also developed new cross-cutting policies and capacities, such as peace and development advisers, that enable its entities to work differently across systemic divides. There is hope that the newly minted Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which coin “sustaining peace” as a new unifying framework, could enable the Peacebuilding Commission to engage in prevention and realize its bridging potential. This report argues that the UN as a whole should build on past best practices and successful precedents, acknowledge and make full use of existing connectors, and create new connectors to help energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world’s interconnected problems.

This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently in the field and at headquarters under the leadership of the next secretary-general. It will also require member states to change the way they engage with and incentivize UN bodies, structures, and mechanisms in order to build on and consolidate emerging policy consensus and bring about incremental, practical changes (both political and financial) on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights. Building on the momentum the three peace and security reviews achieved in engaging member states, the next secretary-general could put forward a limited number of very concrete proposals during her first eighteen months in office. Member states or groups of member states could champion these proposals as they try to deliver holistically on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.

Introduction

In recent years, the world has faced a series of crises that have challenged global peace and security and raised questions about the United Nations’ capacity to respond. While the first decade of the twenty-first century brought a decline in the number of violent conflicts, the last few years have witnessed a wave of new conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine. At the same time, old conflicts have rekindled and sparked new violence in the Central Africa Republic, Mali, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen. The rise of extremist groups such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Boko Haram and the spread of transnational criminal networks have placed civilians at greater risk and challenged existing response mechanisms and policies. In 2014, nearly 60 million people were forcibly displaced, a four-fold increase in four years.¹ In 2014 and 2015, the number of displaced people globally reached 60 million, a stark reminder of the persistence of mass displacement.

the spread of Ebola in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the resurgence of great and regional power rivalries, and new complex forms of conflict placed further stress on the international system.

Yet in 2015, amidst these crises, the UN system came together to achieve landmark outcomes. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate change were adopted with an unprecedented sense of ownership by member states and their people, which accounts for their now accepted universal standing.2 The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), moreover, demonstrated that the system can work together across silos to deliver an effective operational partnership in the face of emergencies. However, these examples of collective response remain the exception rather than the norm. The nature of crises today demands a multilateral system that can respond to transnational threats and regional spillovers, prioritize prevention—including national- and local-level prevention and peacebuilding capacities—and effectively partner with a greater diversity of actors both at headquarters and in the field. How, then, can the UN remain relevant and credible and contribute to effective multilateralism in matters of peace and security?

In 2015, on the occasion of its seventieth year of existence, the UN undertook a comprehensive assessment of its peace and security work. Three major policy reviews were completed on peace operations (the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations), peacebuilding (the Advisory Group of Experts), and the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda (the Global Study). (See Figure 1 for an overview of the milestones and outcome documents produced by each review, as well as other key multilateral processes, Box 1 for an overview of the genesis and mandate of each of the three reviews, and the Appendix for a table summarizing key recommendations from the three reviews.)

Box 1. Genesis and mandates of the three reviews

Peace operations: On October 31, 2014, the secretary-general announced the establishment of a sixteen-member High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) to address the perceived need to reform peace operations and make them fit to address contemporary challenges. This exercise built on the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine. Chaired by former President of Timor-Leste José Ramos-Horta and vice-chaired by Ameerah Haq of Bangladesh, the panel presented its report on June 16, 2015.

Peacebuilding: On December 15, 2014, the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council asked the secretary-general to nominate up to seven experts to form an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) to review the UN peacebuilding architecture, ten years after its creation. Chaired by Ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala, the group was tasked with conducting a policy and institutional review of the peacebuilding architecture and developing recommendations based on this work. The AGE submitted its report on June 30, 2015, for the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider through an intergovernmental process.

Women, peace, and security: On October 18, 2013, in Resolution 2122, the Security Council invited the secretary-general to commission a study on the implementation of Resolution 1325 to inform a high-level review that would coincide with the resolution’s fifteenth anniversary in October 2015. In response, the secretary-general appointed a high-level advisory group of seventeen experts led by former UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka. Following a series of global consultations, the Global Study was launched on October 14, 2015.

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Figure 1. Timeline of review processes and outcomes

Reports of High-Level Panels
- Reports of the Secretary-General
- Processes led by Member States

Three Reviews
- High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO)
- Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) on the UN Peacebuilding Architecture
- Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325

Agenda for Sustainable Development
- Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325

Counterterrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)
- Counterterrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE)

Humanitarian Agenda
- Humanitarian Agenda

Selection Process for the Next UN Secretary General (SG)
- Selection Process for the Next UN Secretary General (SG)

UN General Assembly (GA)
- UN General Assembly (GA)

Three Processes
- June 2014
- January 2015
- June 2015
- January 2016
- June 2016
- January 2017

- June 16: Report of the AGF
- September 2: SG Report A/70/357 – 5/2015/482
- The Future of United Nations Peace Operations
- June 29: Report of the AGF
- April 27: Intergovernmental Process Results in Joint SC-GA Resolution
- October 13: SG Resolution 2242
- October 2: Global Study on the Implementation of SC Resolution 1325
- June 25: Selection Process for the Next UN Secretary General (SG)
- June 16: "HIPPO Report"
- May 23–24: World Humanitarian Summit
- September 13: High-Level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants

Other Related Processes
- June 2014: Adoption of 2030 Agenda Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- December 12: Adoption of the Paris Agreement
- April 22: Paris Climate Agreement Signing Ceremony
- 2016 Comprehensive Policy Review (CPR) of UN Operational Activities for Development
- December 24: SG Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
- April 7–8: Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism
- June: 10-Year Review of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy
- May 23–24: World Humanitarian Summit
- September 13: High-Level Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants

- September 11: GA Resolution 69/321 on the Revitalization of the Work of the GA
- December 15: Joint Letter of the President of the General Assembly (PGA) and President of the Security Council Selecting Candidates
- April 12–14: PGA Internal Dialogue with Candidates for SG
- April 19–21: GA Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS)
- April 21: PGA High-Level Debate on Sustainable Development, Climate Change, and Financing
- May 10–11: PGA High-Level Debate on Peace and Security
- July: 12–13: PGA High-Level Debate on Human Rights

Thang Nguyen
The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released its report, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnerships and People*, in June 2015. This was followed by the secretary-general’s report on the future of peace operations, outlining his agenda and “priorities and key actions” to move forward the panel’s recommendations by the end of 2016. ¹ The UN General Assembly adopted a procedural resolution taking note with appreciation of the secretary-general’s initiative to strengthen the UN system. ² It has also begun examining recommendations from the HIPPO and the secretary-general’s reports within its various committees, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Meanwhile, on November 20, 2015, the secretary-general briefed the Security Council on his action plan for taking forward the recommendations in the HIPPO report. The Security Council subsequently took note of those recommendations and, following a wide-ranging debate, issued a presidential statement. ³

The Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (AGE) also released its report, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, in June 2015. ⁴ The report was followed by intergovernmental negotiations co-facilitated by Angola and Australia and was discussed in an open debate in the Security Council on February 23, 2016. This resulted in identical Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, adopted on April 27, 2016 (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, respectively). ⁵


These three reviews offer ideas for the future global governance of the UN’s peace and security work and beyond, together producing nearly 600 pages of analysis and over 300 recommendations. As these review processes were conducted on separate but related tracks, it is critical to reflect on linkages and highlight synergies between them so that their combined effect stimulates the multilateral system to organize its peace and security architecture differently and to address the twenty-first century’s urgent and interconnected threats more holistically.

To that end, President of the General Assembly (PGA) Mogens Lykketoft is convening a High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, to encourage member states and other actors to consider key messages from the reviews on the overall effectiveness of the UN’s work in these areas. The PGA’s objective is to help the UN move beyond the vaguely defined “need for change” and focus instead on concrete steps to realize change within a reasonable timeframe.

In referring to this high-level thematic debate, the PGA indicated that “ensuring synergy and coherence between these three reviews will promote a holistic reflection on matters that are clearly interconnected.” ⁸ The three reviews, coupled with the process for selecting and appointing the next UN secretary-general, provide genuine opportunities to revitalize the role of the UN in matters of peace and security.

In analyzing the linkages and potential synergies between the reviews, this report’s text is not meant to

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⁴ General Assembly Resolution 70/6 (November 12, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/6.


¹⁰ Mogens Lykketoft, opening remarks at the General Assembly plenary debate on strengthening of the UN system, New York, October 12, 2015.
preempt the outcomes of the PGA’s high-level debate, nor the agenda of the next secretary-general. Instead, it is essentially a primer, providing a number of guideposts to help process the reviews and suggesting possible ways forward. It first presents common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. It then suggests key enablers for operationalizing the reviews’ shared recommendations and points to existing connectors through which member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in at least some instances—to work across silos, as well as precedents for doing so. It concludes that the UN as a whole—including both member states and the Secretariat—should build on these best practices, leverage emerging policy consensus, and create new connectors that will energize the organization to work across silos and provide integrated responses to the world’s interconnected problems.

**Common Themes and Interlinkages across the Three Reviews**

This report identifies four common themes that have emerged from the three reviews: (1) sustaining peace and prevention; (2) gender equality and women’s participation; (3) collaborative and strategic partnerships; and (4) people-centered approaches. These four areas may provide the foundation for a more effective and less fragmented UN system and energize member states to transact business differently across the three UN pillars.

**SUSTAINING PEACE AND PREVENTION**

“Sustaining peace” is a new term embraced by the reviews as an overarching framework to guide the wide spectrum of UN peace and security work. Sustaining peace means putting member states and their populations in the lead, putting politics and political solutions front and center, giving prevention an uncontested home, and leveraging the UN’s three foundational pillars in a mutually reinforcing way. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262, both passed on April 27, 2016, define sustaining peace as including “activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.” Sustaining peace is an inherently political process that spans prevention, mediation, conflict management and resolution, and integrated approaches to peacebuilding. It aims to ensure national ownership through inclusivity while sustaining international attention and assistance.

This new terminology takes “peacebuilding” out of the erroneous time horizon constraints it has been subject to since the 1990s, when it was considered a “post-conflict” exercise to be implemented by outsiders. “Prevention is not something to be turned on and off,” said UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the Security Council’s first High-Level Debate on Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict in November 2015. The reviews emphasize that building peace is an ongoing undertaking—before, during, and after conflict—a concept endorsed in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture and echoing previous agreements, such as Security Council Resolution 2171 on conflict prevention.

In addition to moving beyond this sequential approach, sustaining peace means breaking out of sectoral approaches to peace and conflict and better integrating the UN’s three foundational pillars (peace and security, development, and human rights) and their respective governance structures. Both the HIPPO and the AGE reports underscore the importance of creating the conditions for sustainable peace and sustainable development, with pointed references to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—in particular Goal 16 calling for the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for durable development. This also explains the emphasis that all three reviews place on the role of UN country teams in helping member states deliver on their commitment to sustaining peace as a function of inclusive governance and equitable development.

Regarding human rights, the HIPPO report recommends ensuring coherence between the UN’s human rights and protection functions. This

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11 Security Council Resolution 2282; General Assembly Resolution 70/262.
recommendation illustrates the tendency to view human rights as primarily civil and political in the context of peace operations, when they should also be economic and social, as well as the tendency for human rights work to focus on protection, when it should also focus on prevention. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has increasingly been seeking to integrate human rights with peace and security by considering how violations of economic, social, and cultural rights may serve as early-warning indicators for conflict and how grievances from non-enjoyment of such rights can be triggers of conflict.

For sustaining peace to gain traction as a conceptual, strategic, and practical approach, the UN needs to address a number of long-identified deficits.13 These include the need to avoid technical and supply-driven approaches, to respect nationally identified priorities, and to interact inclusively with local actors—particularly women and youth beyond capital cities and elite groups. Sustaining peace encompasses supporting inclusive national and local mechanisms for conflict prevention and institutions that address drivers of violence and build resilience. Where development and exclusion have left people behind and sowed the seeds of violence, well-targeted assistance can address risk factors, such as inequality and marginalization, at the most critical moments.14 However, the increasingly dangerous asymmetric environments where peace operations are deployed make the above tasks hard to implement, particularly when extremist groups scorn compromise and have vested interests in fanning conflict.

Perhaps the most crucial lesson the UN has learned and needs to implement is the necessity of prevention. In recent years, international crisis management has overwhelmingly emphasized reaction rather than prevention, and responses have been largely military rather than political. Military engagements or technical solutions, while necessary to protect civilians, will not restore and sustain peace; missions should be guided primarily by politics. Implementation of the reviews must involve tangibly shifting efforts and resources toward prevention.

GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION

The importance of the women, peace, and security agenda for the UN’s work as a whole is a cornerstone of the 2015 reviews. The reviews consider this agenda critical to the success of peace programs, the durability of peace and political change, and equality (see Box 2). For the UN, increasing women’s participation is also a prerequisite to realizing the HIPPO report’s call for a people-centered approach. Already, inclusive mechanisms created by Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions—such as procedures for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to speak in the Security Council—have been used by a broad range of civil society actors, male and female, on many issues.

The Global Study on Resolution 1325 calls on member states to empower women throughout peace and transition processes “to bring the benefits of inclusiveness, representativeness, and diversity.”15 It also emphasizes that localizing approaches to inclusive and participatory processes is crucial to the success of national and international peace efforts.

At UN headquarters, the women, peace, and security agenda may have a unique role to play as a strategic connector because of its cross-cutting nature. The agenda has achieved both normative and operational targets across the fragmented organs and departments of the UN system; it is meant to inform staffing and analysis in peace operations, human rights investigations and accountability, and strategies to prevent violent extremism, as well as to lay the foundations for sustainable development. Yet for its potential to be realized, greater commitment in planning and budgeting is required; out of all funding for peace and security, only 2 percent is allocated to gender issues.16

Currently, whether a UN program or mission takes an inclusive approach is largely dependent on the leadership appointed and their personal commitment to engage women and non-state

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14 Youssef Mahmoud, “A Ripe Moment for Change at the UN?” Global Observatory, March 9, 2016.
16 Ibid.
Box 2. Women and sustaining peace
The positive impact of gender equality on peace, security, and development was often cited in all three reviews, despite the lagging implementation of Resolution 1325 in many areas. In recent years, there is mounting evidence that women’s participation is not only a right but is necessary to sustain peace and political solutions after conflict. Countries with higher gender equality indicators are less likely to go to war with their neighbors, to be in poor standing in the international community, or to face crime and violence at home. Gender equality is a better indicator of a state’s peacefulness than other factors like democracy, religion, or gross domestic product (GDP).17 Women’s decision-making power is directly related to the likelihood of violence, and one comparative analysis found that an increased percentage of women in parliament reduces the risk of civil war. Moreover, a number of empirical studies highlight that gender inequality can serve as a predictor of armed conflict—both between and within states.18

When it comes to mediation and peace processes, inclusion of a range of actors—especially pro-peace and nonviolent women’s groups—can generate political will and increase the chance of reaching a sustainable agreement. Peace agreements that include women as negotiators or mediators have been 20 percent more likely to last at least two years and 35 percent more likely to last 15 years.19 Despite increasing calls for women’s participation, progress has been slow, and only 2 percent of mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in official peace talks between 1992 and 2011 were women.20

peacebuilders or to coordinate with regional actors. All three reviews pointed to the need for mandates more specifically calling for inclusive approaches and for both the UN and its member states to be held accountable for their commitments in this area.

The latest Security Council resolution on women, peace, and security (Resolution 2242), which takes into account the findings of the Global Study and the HIPPO report, urges the secretary-general to put forth a new strategy to double the number of women in peacekeeping in the next five years. It also, once again, calls on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to scale up and roll out their gender analysis and technical gender expertise across the mission cycle, from mandate to drawdown.21 As recommended in the AGE report, the Peacebuilding Commission is developing a gender strategy aimed at identifying entry points to strengthen its emphasis on women’s participation and gender equality in its country-specific engagement.22

COLLABORATIVE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
The three reviews highlight the need to develop strong global and regional partnerships for peace and security, to promote regionally led and legitimate approaches to peacebuilding, and to implement commitments related to women, peace, and security. While the UN is a state membership body, it functions in an international ecosystem that includes states, international and regional organizations, private sector actors, and international and local civil society organizations. In many conflict settings, civil society is more present than the state or intergovernmental organizations. In others, terrorists, traffickers, and organized criminal networks operate across borders, in some cases redefining them. In this multi-stakeholder global governance network, the UN can catalyze, convene, and coordinate increasingly diverse partners inside the UN system (across sectors) and beyond (with civil society and private sector actors)

to respond to crises.  

Although the UN cannot single-handedly address all peace and security challenges, it can facilitate partnerships that lead to more coherent international action in support of inclusive national and local peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction initiatives. In particular, a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is needed. Regional organizations increasingly have improved sector-specific guidance and strategic planning tools that integrate gender perspectives, including tools for early warning, mediation, security sector reform, transitional justice, and preventing violent extremism. These tools can enable global, regional, and national cooperation and collaboration. The UN and regional organizations must achieve a better division of labor under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to enable the Security Council to call upon a more resilient and capable network of actors to respond to future threats. As every regional organization is different, such partnerships will also be different in nature.

The African Union (AU) is a key partner for the UN, and fostering a strategic relationship between the UN Security Council, the AU Peace and Security Council, and African regional economic communities is an important step toward developing a common vision. Such collaboration should go beyond operational coordination and support and beyond peace operations; it should establish avenues to share learning and exchange information—such as on gender-sensitive analysis, planning, and programming—and to develop a shared understanding of issues. The UN has sought to bolster its regional approach through regional political offices and envoys, from Africa to Central Asia (see Box 3). Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture also call on the Peacebuilding Support Office and the AU Commission to engage in regular desk-to-desk exchanges and joint initiatives.

Other important partners for the UN include international financial institutions (explored below) and research institutions and think tanks—especially those in the Global South. The latter, in particular, can help develop more comprehensive analysis and new thinking. Strategic, collaborative, and financial partnerships will thus be an essential feature of international governance in the future and will be critical to successful prevention, peace operations, and peacebuilding.

**PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACHES**

To understand how to prevent conflict and sustain peace in each unique context, the UN must engage with local people already working against violence and for peace in their communities. While a “people-centered approach” was a main feature of the HIPPO report and was present in all three reviews, it is not a new idea; engaging with “we the peoples” is as old as the UN Charter. Still, the reviews consider inclusive engagement to be one of the fundamental shifts the organization must undertake to make its field missions fit for purpose. At the same time, both the AGE report and the Global Study caution that inclusivity should not be reduced to a box-ticking exercise. This call for inclusivity is echoed in several current UN agendas—most recently and visibly in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which pledges to “leave no one behind.”

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24 The term “countering violent extremism” (CVE) is also used, but the UN secretary-general opted for the term “preventing violent extremism” (PVE) in his December 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (UN Doc. A/70/674–A/70/675), which the General Assembly adopted by consensus on February 12, 2016 in Resolution 70/254. In this resolution, member states stressed that “it is essential to address the threat posed by violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism” and recognized that “violent extremism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.” They welcomed the secretary-general’s initiative, took note of his plan of action, and decided to consider it further, including at the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June. UN General Assembly Resolution 70/254 (February 12, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/254.
28 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 19; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 19.
32 UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 (September 25, 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/1.
There are a number of reasons for this renewed attention to people-centered approaches to peace operations and peacebuilding. First, in a multi-stakeholder world, most threats to peace and security are driven from below and cannot be solved by governments alone. The state is a necessary but not a sufficient partner in this endeavor, particularly if it is weak, absent from certain parts of its territory, captured by elites, or not trusted by its people. State-centric, prescriptive peacebuilding focused on building state capacity has shown its limitations in places like the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

Elite peace deals have also revealed their weaknesses, and Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture highlight the importance of broad and inclusive national ownership of peace agreements and transition processes “to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account.”

In practice, working closely with local communities enables missions to monitor how local people experience and perceive the impact of peace operations and ensures that these operations do not unwittingly harm those they are deployed to serve and protect. These actors have a critical role to play in improving the UN’s conflict analysis and in mapping peace resources that can help prevent violence and resolve conflict before it becomes entrenched. For peace to be sustainable, those on the receiving end need to lead the way. The reviews

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Box 3. Regional integration through UN regional offices and envoys

In recent years, the addition of UN regional offices and the creation of regional envoy posts have come in response to the need to respond to conflict through global-regional partnerships. UN regional offices have increasingly been recognized as an important and cost-effective operational tool (their annual budgets range from $3 to $10 million) not only to carry out the organization’s prevention mandate but also to develop collective longer-term responses to transnational challenges. UN regional offices have made singular contributions to mediation efforts, particularly in Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, and Mauritania, where they worked collaboratively and effectively with regional and subregional organizations. Establishing additional UN regional offices could help maintain a focus on conflict prevention across borders through better analysis and support to dialogue and reconciliation processes.

As the secretary-general puts it, “transforming peace operations into instruments that can address regional dimensions of conflict requires a mind-set change across the Organization.” UN engagement in countries such as Mali and Somalia and in regions like the Sahel and the Great Lakes has taken on multiple forms: peacekeeping operations; regional offices and special envoys; and agencies, funds, and programs. These all plan and operate alongside one another, requiring significant efforts to maintain coherence. In a welcome step, in January 2016 the Security Council approved the merger of the UN Office for West Africa with the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. This merger expands the duties of the renamed UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), building on a mandate that already cut across peace and security, human rights, and governance in the region.

Still, much of the UN system is constrained to country-specific, state-centric mandates and programs. Developing a unified interface to bring together teams from the DPKO and DPA in the same regional groupings with their “clients”—the host countries and the UN field missions, whether peacekeeping missions, special political missions, or UN country teams—could help address these constraints.

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39 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 3; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 3.
40 See, for example, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping,” 2013.
make a number of recommendations to this end, mostly on processes and mechanisms to meaningfully engage local communities at various stages of the mission cycle (see Box 4). As the reviews highlight, in most fragile and conflict-affected states, youth make up half the population yet often have few or no avenues to participate in decision making.\(^{41}\) It is essential to engage young people as a key stakeholder group that has the potential to have a positive impact on peace and security rather than viewing them as a challenge or potential threat.\(^{42}\)

Compelling as these reasons may be, the implementation of people-centered approaches is not without challenges or risks. First, it is not always easy to identify civil society representatives who are outside of elite circles and genuinely speak on behalf of local people. Therefore, questions of who, when, and how to engage become central. Second, reaching out to communities associated with insurgents can put UN personnel at risk. Third, peace operations’ direct engagement with civil society organizations can raise concerns with the host government if it views the mission as interfering with its sovereign relationship with its people.\(^{43}\) Finally, it remains challenging to rigorously analyze local realities before planning engagement strategies.\(^{44}\)

However, the reviews made cogent recommendations on how best to overcome these obstacles, as many national and international NGOs have done in the past. The central challenge remains to ensure that local engagement is not treated merely as a box-ticking exercise or a technical indicator left to specialists but as a key component of political

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**Box 4. Supporting local knowledge for peace**

Multilateral policymakers and field officials are increasingly committed to civil society participation but often find they still do not have the tools or mechanisms required to make it happen in a regular, structured way.\(^{45}\) Many international NGOs have sought to provide this guidance, such as in the Local First approach from Peace Direct, the analytic tool Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts from World Vision, and the Better Peace Tool on inclusive mediation from the International Civil Society Action Network.\(^{46}\) These are just a few examples of the many tested approaches that organizations large and small have developed to make partnerships with local and national actors more consistent and effective.\(^{47}\) Supporting local knowledge and community-level peacebuilders is critical, not only to achieve broader participation but also to better analyze what is working locally in order to build on—rather than undermine—these initiatives, and ultimately to sustain peace.

The Secretariat and field missions have followed suit and embarked on a number of initiatives to standardize and systematize local engagement processes and practices, which are already in use in several missions. Civil affairs teams and programs are often the primary interface between the mission and local people, and their initiatives, such as community dialogues and local mediation programs, can play an important peacebuilding role at the local level. These initiatives should be supported in the long term rather than abandoned at the time of mission drawdown. In addition to commissioning surveys on local perceptions, each mission should have a broader community engagement strategy to inform its overall political strategy, including during transitions. This approach should be developed in cooperation and consultation with local civil society actors and regularly shared and reviewed with local communities.\(^{48}\)

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46 To access these tools, see www.actlocalfirst.org, www.participate-mstc.net, and www.betterpeacetool.org.


decision making in the field and in headquarters.

Operationalizing the Reviews: Key Areas for UN Action

The operational recommendations put forward by the reviews can be broadly grouped in three areas for action: (1) integration and coherence; (2) financing; and (3) accountability, leadership, and governance. Several key challenges and opportunities in each area are explored below, followed by the existing connectors and processes through which both member states and the UN Secretariat have been able—in some instances—to overcome fragmentation and work across silos to address today’s complex and interconnected global challenges.

INTEGRATION AND COHERENCE

At an open debate of the Security Council in February 2016 on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, a number of member states made the point that “unless we succeed in breaking the silos within our governments, between the UN principal organs, and between and within the UN Secretariat, agencies, funds and programs, we will fail the peoples that we are mandated to serve.”

The UN’s largest silos have their origins in the UN Charter, which entrenches the organization’s three founding pillars of work (see Figure 2). The charter tasks the Security Council with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” It tasks the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with making recommendations to the General Assembly, member states, and UN agencies on “international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters” and “for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights.”

Over time, the UN Secretariat developed within these silos and created new and further siloed institutions within each pillar, such as the DPKO and DPA. Specialized agencies, funds, and programs have also sometimes reinforced these silos in their own internal organization and structure, such as standalone units dealing with conflict.

Over the last twenty-five years, the UN has undertaken a series of institutional innovations to promote integration and greater coherence in engaging with realities on the ground. The UN has developed a comprehensive body of integration-related policies and planning tools and has experimented with many forms and levels of integration. Much of this drive for integration emerged from the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s and the realization that various parts of the UN were acting separately and, at times, at cross-purposes.

While member states and UN staff alike frequently discuss and use the term “integration” as a guiding principle, it encompasses different processes (e.g., within the Secretariat versus among the Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs), different levels (e.g., in the UN Secretariat versus in field missions and offices), and different outcomes. The UN has taken the integration agenda further than many other organizations and “whole-of-government” approaches, particularly in the field, including through its 2006 Delivering as One initiative in the development arena.

However, integration now faces a number of obstacles, ranging from persisting structural and financial impediments to the lack of incentives and rewards.

Looking ahead, the 2015 reviews have the potential to renew this drive for greater coherence. Two rhetorical shifts are critical markers of this push: (1) adopting the term “peace operations” to denote the full spectrum of responses, rather than perpetuating the bureaucratic turfs of and silos between peacekeeping, special political missions, and UN country teams; and (2) investing in “sustaining peace” as a shared responsibility across the organization before, during, and after conflict.

As described in the following section on financing, predictable and pooled funding could also greatly incentivize system coherence. The need to recognize the primacy of politics and better analyze and plan across the silos, as discussed below, are also important drivers.

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52 For a detailed study of UN Integration, see Boutellis, “Driving the System Apart? A Study of United Nations Integration and Integrated Strategic Planning.”
Figure 2. Silos in the UN system

Peace and Security

- General Assembly
- 5th and 6th Committees

Sustainable Development

- 2nd Committee

Human Rights

- 3rd Committee

Member States

- 1st and 4th Committees

Security Council

- Economic and Social Council

Human Rights Council

UN Secretariat

- Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)
- High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLP), High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM), and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) [see below]
- Executive Office of the Secretary General (EOSG)
- Policy Committee, Management Committee, and Senior Management Group (SCM)
- New Analysis & Planning Cell

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS)

Department of Political Affairs (DPA)

UNDG — UN Agencies, Funds, and Programs

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Field Level

- Peacekeeping Operations
- Special Political Missions
- Resident Coordinators and Country Teams
- Human Rights Components and Special Rapporteurs

Thong Nguyen
Looking ahead, the focus of the next secretary-general’s integration drive should be more at the strategic than the structural level. Strategic integration means following certain policy principles, such as analyzing and planning as one and integrating only where it matters and adds value. Structural changes are secondary and can take different forms to reflect evolving and contextual needs and circumstances. Simply put, “form follows function,” a guiding principle suggested by the June 2008 UN Policy Committee decision on integration.53 Future integration will also need to be field- and client-oriented rather than headquarters-focused and will need to recognize that the UN’s “clients” are not only host states but also the people.

The next secretary-general will therefore need to build a compelling narrative—accompanied by concrete incentives—on the value and relevance of UN integration and coherence that both the UN bureaucracy and member states can support. Reforms should go beyond headquarters structures to also focus on the coherence and quality of the UN response in the field. Such reforms would challenge established power structures and the risk-averse behaviors and mindsets of individuals, departments, and member states. The AGE report argues powerfully that the responsibility to realize integration lies with member states, which, some argue, tend to blame the system for its lack of coherence while helping to perpetuate siloed approaches and competition within the system through their funding practices and internal divisions.

**FINANCING**

The UN’s fragmentation is mirrored in, and arguably driven by, its financing arrangements. For instance, peace operations deployed with multidimensional mandates have large budgets dedicated almost entirely to running the mission itself, with little for programs to support the host government and communities. Earlier recommendations on civilian capacity deployment calling for more flexibility to use a mission’s budget to respond to crises and changing circumstances and for channeling budgets to fund short-term programmatic activities have not been acted upon.54 Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture recognize the importance of funding for the peacebuilding components of relevant UN missions, including during mission drawdown and transitions, when inadequate support can increase the risk of relapse (see Box 5).55 Inadequate financing perpetuates an expectations gap often detrimental to perceptions of UN missions on the ground.

To close this expectations gap, close cooperation between UN actors on the ground is urgently needed. Yet the UN Secretariat and UN agencies, funds, and programs face structural disincentives to working together and, in some cases, prohibitions against pooling their funding streams.56 Furthermore, they are not always ready or able to prioritize key aspects of building peace, particularly if their funding, which comes from voluntary donor contributions, is not in line with Security Council mandates.

Programming to sustain peace must receive more predictable funding, including from assessed contributions57 and from instruments such as the Peacebuilding Fund and multi-year pooled funding. The AGE report proposes that the Peacebuilding Fund receive core funding equivalent to 1 percent of the total UN peace operations budget.58 Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture only take note of this proposal while encouraging member states to continue making voluntary contributions to the fund. They do, however, call for a report from the next secretary-general with options for “increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, with a view to ensuring sustainable financing.”59 While changes in financing arrange-

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53 United Nations, Decision Number 2008/24 of the Secretary-General in the Policy Committee on Integration, June 25, 2008.
57 The original report of the Civilian Capacities initiative had already suggested channeling mission funds to national or local actors; UN agencies, funds and programs; or external partners based on the principle of comparative advantage.
59 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.
Box 5. Managing transitions

The UN Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown and Withdrawal, which the UN Integration Steering Group adopted on February 4, 2013, provides strategic guidance to improve planning and management of mission withdrawals. Yet transitions and gradual drawdowns of peacekeeping missions, special political missions, and UN country teams remain challenging for the UN system as a whole—whether in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. Gaps remain in the UN’s ability to sustain peace through “a continuum of response and smoother transitions” between different phases of missions, as called for by the HIPPO report. And without long-term planning or financing strategies, countries affected by conflict often face a “financial cliff,” where assistance and support drops off dramatically just as the peacekeeping mission exits.

While the involvement of the Peacebuilding Commission has, in some cases, helped to draw attention to countries during UN transitions—with some success in Sierra Leone, for instance—UN country teams often struggle to step up and mobilize voluntary funding to fill gaps as a mission withdraws. Part of the difficulty resides in agreeing jointly with the host country on the support needed to ensure that peace can sustain itself, possibly in the form of a compact between the UN and the host government, as suggested in the HIPPO report.

A recent consultation held in Monrovia, Liberia, on March 31, 2016, hosted by the Government of Liberia and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), warned that the upcoming UNMIL drawdown and exit from the Security Council’s agenda could leave some conflict drivers unaddressed, risking relapse. It further revealed that the multilateral political and funding architecture does not adequately reflect the cyclical nature of conflict and the need for sustained attention beyond the peacekeeping phase. The UN and the host country should devise a bridging strategy early enough in the exit planning process to ensure that mission withdrawal does not unwittingly weaken the fragile foundations of self-sustaining peace.

ments will inevitably face stiff challenges in the UN’s Fifth Committee budget negotiations, this request provides an important platform for the UN system to comprehensively analyze current funding constraints and encourage creative thinking on how to overcome them.

Current funding arrangements and budget processes also reduce the flexibility to design mandates that fit the specific needs of a country or context and to transition between various mission models and sizes. Because peacekeeping missions are funded through the peacekeeping support account, while political missions rely on the regular budget (both are also supported by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions from donors), peacekeeping responses are sometimes undertaken when alternative lighter or more gradual interventions would be more appropriate. Funding mechanisms should support use of a continuum or spectrum of tailored responses.

To facilitate more tailored responses, the HIPPO report calls for a single “peace operations account” to finance all peace operations (whether peacekeeping or special political missions) and their related activities. However, member states remain divided, and it was left to the next secretary-general to push for a decision on this critical issue. Existing recommendations on the funding and backstopping of special political missions, originally requested in General Assembly Resolution 259 in December 2010, have been mired in the Fifth Committee for several years.

Building on a strategic and collaborative approach to partnerships, the UN and the World Bank should cooperate in a more predictable and

60 Megan Price and Lina Titulaer, “Beyond Transitions: UNDP’s Role before, during and after UN Mission Withdrawal,” Clingendael Institute, September 2013.
institutionalized way and, as called for in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture, strengthen their collaboration in conflict-affected countries. Both entities, as well as regional development banks, could undertake joint public expenditure reviews in the security and justice sectors to enhance their effectiveness and transparency. They could also further reinforce their joint support to building the capacity of national institutions and local civil society networks to enable them, for instance, to sustainably assist women and girls affected by armed conflict and post-conflict situations.

Indeed, the three reviews contrast the long-term effects of gender equality on peacefulness with the dearth of funding for gender-focused initiatives. The AGE report and the Global Study stress the importance of attaining or, preferably, exceeding the goal of earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to projects promoting gender equality. While efforts to endorse this initiative did not make it through the peacebuilding negotiations, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 encourage the secretary-general to promote the gender dimensions of peacebuilding, including by delivering gender-sensitive and gender-targeted programming.

Beyond mobilization of resources, financing encompasses using financial instruments, risk management, and agreements between national and international partners (often discussed in the form of compacts) to articulate priorities and commitments. Effective financing will require policy communities to collectively recognize that building sustainable peace is a slow, iterative process with long time scales that is most likely to succeed when supported by vertical and horizontal coalitions with a shared vision. The reviews encourage using innovative approaches to financing at the country and regional levels and creating enlarged funding platforms that bring together diverse donors and actors to pool resources in order to share and mitigate risk and maximize impact.

ACCOUNTABILITY, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE

All three reviews directly link the overarching message on accountability and governance to leadership. Improving leadership, including by changing the process for selecting high-ranking UN officials, could help professionalize the organization, while a transparent recruitment system based on merit and expertise could help bring further accountability. Individuals leading peace operations should be held accountable for how effectively they implement achievable mandates. Heads of mission, in turn, should be liable for meeting performance indicators, in particular on gender equality and the protection of women from abuse by UN staff. Performance indicators should also center on efforts to promote the participation of women and the use of gender-sensitive analysis in designing and implementing programs.

Several recent developments have sent strong messages about accountability. In August 2015, the secretary-general ordered Babacar Gaye, his special representative in the Central African Republic, to resign following sexual abuse by peacekeepers. In March 2016, the Security Council adopted its first-ever resolution on sexual abuse by peacekeepers, including a decision to repatriate military or police units “where there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse.” The secretary-general and member states alike need to sustain and act upon these efforts.

The three peace and security reviews call for high-level structural changes to ensure greater accountability in the future. The HIPPO report points to a 2004 proposal by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security. However, the current secretary-general left it to his successor to

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64 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 20; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 20.
66 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 22; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 22.
consider this recommendation. The Global Study calls for considering a new assistant secretary-general position at UN Women to deal with crises, conflict, and emergencies, as well as a senior gender adviser in the office of every special representative. The latter recommendation was endorsed by the secretary-general and by the Security Council in Resolution 2242.

Past experience, however, shows that such high-level proposals can, in the end, produce new layers of bureaucracy and generate new turf battles instead of producing more accountability. The driving force behind any such decision should be its impact on the coherence and quality of UN responses in the field. It would be more advisable to leverage existing connectors and processes—at the level of member states, the Secretariat, and the field—to achieve greater coherence, energize the UN to transact business differently across silos whenever and wherever needed, and ultimately improve the UN’s overall governance and relevance.

**Leveraging Synergies: Connectors and Processes for Overcoming Silos**

Despite the UN’s well-documented and often lamented fragmentation, member states and the UN Secretariat have, at times, been able to work across silos. To leverage the synergies identified in the reviews, the UN can build on existing connectors, activate new ones the reviews recommend, and turn ad hoc precedents of overcoming silos into practice (see Figure 3). In some cases, connectors have been funded by extra-budgetary voluntary contributions; where these connectors have proven effective, core funding—even when voluntary—should be shifted to support them in a more sustainable and predictable way.

**CAPITALIZE ON EXISTING CONNECTORS**

The UN system can build upon the many connectors it already has across its three thematic pillars at the level of member states, the UN Secretariat, and the field. Although the UN Charter gives the primary responsibility for peace and security to the Security Council, the council does not have sole responsibility, and the work of the General Assembly reaches across all three pillars. In a sense, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Human Rights Council together constitute the UN peace and security architecture, and the peacebuilding architecture is meant to play a bridging role.

**Connectors at the Level of Member States**

In addition to giving the secretary-general a role to play in the area of peace and security under Article 99, the UN Charter gives the General Assembly a role by allowing it to make recommendations to the Security Council. Under Articles 11 and 12, the General Assembly may “consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,” “discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member,” and “call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.” Article 65 also foresees both a proactive and a reactive role for ECOSOC, as it “may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.”

Institutionally, although the General Assembly’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Committees fall within the thematic pillars, the powerful Fifth Committee cuts across the silos, with responsibility for administration and budgetary matters, including of specialized agencies. On the basis of the Fifth Committee’s reports, the General Assembly considers and approves the UN’s budget. This committee is therefore well placed to consider recommendations from the reviews on creating a single “peace operations account” and earmarking 15 percent of all peace and security funding to promoting gender equality. It is also well placed to consider the secretary-general’s forthcoming report on options to increase and improve funding for peacebuilding activities through assessed and voluntary contributions, as requested in Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture.

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72 Ibid., “Chapter X: The Economic and Social Council.”
Figure 3. Connectors across UN silos
Connectors at the Level of the UN Secretariat

At the level of the UN Secretariat, a number of connectors cut across the three pillars, including the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), the Policy Committee and Management Committee, and the Senior Management Group. The CEB is chaired by the secretary-general and reports to both ECOSOC and the General Assembly, providing broad guidance and strategic direction to the UN system as a whole. It is the UN’s highest-level coordination forum and includes the leadership of twenty-nine member organizations. It aims to develop and promote inter-agency priorities while maintaining its member organizations’ independent mandates. The CEB operates through three committees: the High-Level Committee on Programs, the High-Level Committee on Management, and the UN Development Group.

The Executive Office of the Secretary-General has a critical leadership role to play in setting priorities for the organization as a whole. The Policy Committee and Management Committee, both established in 2015, offer thematic and country-specific guidance for executive-level decisions and address internal reform issues, respectively. The Senior Management Group brings together the heads of departments, programs, funds, and offices at the UN to exchange information and share knowledge.73

Beyond these structures, a number of cross-cutting policies also serve as connectors within the UN system. For example, the secretary-general’s Human Rights Up Front initiative was launched in 2013 to inspire all parts of the UN system to adopt human rights and protection of civilians as core responsibilities and a way to strengthen prevention through early warning. This has been part of a positive trend of developing system-wide policies that cut across silos, which has also seen the development of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to Non-UN Security Forces, the Policy on Human Rights Screening of UN Personnel, the Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, and the UN Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.

Connectors at the Field Level

At the field level, the strongest connectors have been the executive representatives of the secretary-general (ERSGs)—until recently—and special representatives of the secretary-general (SRSGs), as well as “triple-hatted” deputy SRSGs. Deputy SRSGs have the authority of both a resident coordinator and a humanitarian coordinator and are responsible for coordinating between peace operations and UN country teams’ longer-term development work.

Effective integration—particularly in the field—often comes down to leadership and personalities within the UN mission and agencies, funds, and programs. The secretary-general therefore holds great responsibility in selecting leaders for headquarters and field posts who will foster such integration and the HIPPO’s proposed shift toward a more “field-focused and people-centered” organization. Another challenge is strengthening the resident coordinator’s role in fostering integration—particularly in areas related to sustaining peace—when there is no longer an ERSG with an explicitly political mandate from the Security Council. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture call on the secretary-general to strengthen the high-level leadership of UN country teams to absorb peacebuilding activities after mission transitions, which may open the door for resident coordinators to play a stronger role.74

Other important connectors include peace and development advisers, who provide policy advice to UN resident coordinators and country teams on political and institution-building issues while also reporting to DPA headquarters. The joint program between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and DPA on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, launched in 2004, supports national conflict prevention initiatives. Much of this support to date has gone toward deploying peace and development advisers to UN country teams in the field to help national authorities and provide them with seed funding for such prevention initiatives. Notably, many of these initiatives are funded through the Peacebuilding Fund and

73 Policy Committee of the Secretary-General, Manual, June 2008.
74 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 30.
extra-budgetary voluntary funding, and they have grown considerably over the years.

The DPA Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, which is available to peace operations, resident coordinators, and country teams, also plays a supporting role. So too does the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, which brings together DPKO (and its Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions), UNDP, OHCHR, UN Women, and other agencies to jointly support the rule of law and human rights. Although a headquarters structure, the UN Operations and Crisis Centre, created in 2013, brings together DPKO, DPA, UNDP, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to facilitate responses to crises in the field. Human rights officers have already been integrated into peace operations for some time (with a dual reporting line to the OHCHR),75 and the secretary-general’s recent decision to consolidate specialized functions relating to child protection and conflict-related sexual violence within mission human rights components is welcome.76 Nonetheless, human rights officers could, in many instances, benefit from greater political support from mission leadership.

**ACTIVATE NEW CONNECTORS**

**New System-Wide Analysis and Planning**

Beyond the above-mentioned existing connectors that should be built upon, the three reviews have led to the emergence of new connectors that will need to be activated. Following the HIPPO report, the secretary-general took the concrete action of establishing a small, centralized analysis and planning cell in his office. This cell can enhance the Secretariat’s capacity to conduct and draw on conflict analysis and strategic planning across the UN system to develop options for possible whole-of-UN responses.77 While not explicitly referencing the cell, Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture strongly endorse the need to strengthen system-wide analysis and planning and request the secretary-general to report back on these efforts.78

In order to act as a true connector, this cell will now need to respond to the three reviews’ call for conflict analysis to systematically consider human rights and threats to civilians in addition to the political, security, social, economic, gender, and regional dimensions of conflict. In order to be effective and to transcend silos and turfs, this cell will need the political backing of the secretary-general. It will also need the backing of member states, which do not always welcome being told what they need rather than what they want to hear, particularly in regards to deploying peace operations.

Moreover, the cell will have to be staffed properly, which requires the support of the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee for assessed funding, and the capacity and culture of planners from DPA, DPKO, and the UN Development Group will have to be upgraded. Parallel steps should also be taken to partner with international financial institutions, both to more strongly integrate economic analysis into UN assessments and to better factor local knowledge and community perspectives into analysis and planning (see Box 6).

**Connectors within the Peace and Security Pillar**

The two HIPPO recommendations this secretary-general left to his successor—to create an additional deputy secretary-general position responsible for peace and security and to have a single “peace operations account” to finance all peace operations and their related activities—also could become connectors, although primarily within the peace and security pillar. Indeed, without unified financing, governance, and decision-making structures, functions and entities with significant responsibility will likely see their authority contested from within the system.

Given the limited incentives DPKO and DPA currently have to work together, a single peace operations account could go a long way in promoting better tailored, more effective, and more accountable responses. More flexibility and interoperability between the regular assessed

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75 Initiated through a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding, this integration was strengthened by Policy Committee decision 2005/24 and formalized by the 2011 Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions.


77 Ibid., para. 54.

78 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 13, 30; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 13, 30.
budget and voluntary contributions, both in the field and in headquarters, would also be welcome. The focus on financing of peace operations should also not distract from the need for member states to prioritize development budgets to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

Connecting with the Development Pillar
At the headquarters level, DPA’s recent entry into the UN Development Group as an observer member is also a notable development in that it connects the peace and security and the sustainable development pillars moving forward. The secretary-general’s request that the “the United Nations Development Group...take forward a review of current capacities of agencies, funds and programmes” to strengthen preventive and peacebuilding work is also a major opportunity. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 on the peacebuilding architecture take note of this request and look forward to their findings “contributing to enhancing the United Nations’ capacities relating to sustaining peace.” The AGE report also emphasizes that the entire UN system, including development and humanitarian actors, has a responsibility, bestowed upon it by the charter, to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace.

While the General Assembly’s quadrennial comprehensive policy review (QCPR) on UN operational activities for development is not a new exercise, the upcoming QCPR provides an opportunity to rethink the traditional siloed approach and to integrate, or at least better connect, more UN entities and functional areas. The peacebuilding resolutions also call for better cooperation and coordination to strengthen the UN development system’s contribution to peacebuilding at headquarters and in the field and explicitly reference “the overarching framework of the United Nations operational activities for development.” This presents an opportunity to ensure that the governance arrangements for the UN development system explicitly focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including in the QCPR.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has the potential to become the most powerful connector between the UN’s pillars. The SDGs signal a commitment by member states to address some of the social, political, governance, and economic factors, such as exclusion and corruption, that impede sustainable development. They should, in turn, encourage the UN system to overcome silos. Indeed, the 2030 Agenda, with its

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79 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 17; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 17.
80 The QCPR is the mechanism through which the General Assembly assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and impact of UN operational activities for development and establishes system-wide policy orientations for development cooperation. See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/qcpr.shtml .
81 UN Security Council Resolution 2282, OP 16; UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262, OP 16.
82 One example is the Chief Executives Board’s (CEB) forthcoming process around the UN system’s engagement with the SDGs.
seventeen goals and 169 targets, integrates the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The SDGs build on the key lesson from the Millennium Development Goals: sustained systemic change and long-term development cannot be achieved through single-sector goals and approaches. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda therefore presents a unique opportunity for overcoming traditional silos and for more cross-sectoral decision making (see Box 7).

**BUILD ON PRECEDENTS**

Beyond existing and potential connectors, recent years have seen an increasing number of precedents of member states coming together to work across structural divides or enable the UN system to do so in response to specific challenges. Such positive precedents should be studied, built on, and turned into practice so that the next time the world organization faces a challenge that does not fall squarely within one of its pillars, a timely and effective response is not hampered by its very architecture. Member states, together with the UN Secretariat, should also nurture the emerging consensus on sustaining peace and on systemic coherence and integration. This could include, inter alia, discussing programmatic, administrative, and financial measures to enable the UN system at headquarters and in the field to work together differently in support of sustainable peace and development.

**Security Council**

In the Security Council, several debates and presidential statements have already married the three pillars. In February 2011, Brazil organized a Security Council debate on Interlinkages between Peace, Security and Development that attracted great attention. The background note stated that the “Security Council must take into account social and development issues in its deliberations in order to ensure an effective transition to peace.”

In 2014, the Security Council pledged, in Resolution 2171, to better use a system-wide approach to prevent conflict. It also reiterated the “need for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and sustainable peace, which comprises operational and structural measures for the prevention of armed conflict and addresses its root causes, including through...promoting sustained economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality and respect for, and protection of, human rights.”

In January 2015, Chile, as president of the Security Council, established another precedent by convening a day-long debate on inclusive development and peace and security. This debate resulted in a presidential statement reiterating that “in order to support a country to emerge sustainably...

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**Box 7. Saying no to silos in the SDG negotiations**

Throughout the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in September 2015, one of the main criteria for member states was integration and noncompetition with the other goals. Goals would not be considered in isolation from each other, and targets would not be adopted if they contradicted those in another area of work. While there are seventeen SDGs, the negotiators viewed them all as indivisible.

This approach guided negotiations toward an integrated framework—the outcome is a set of goals woven together into a holistic agenda. Individual goals are not viewed as falling in the domain of only one UN entity or department, and realizing them will require the UN to work across its charter. As the secretary-general has remarked, “No agency owns a goal.” Instead, each goal contains targets across the UN’s pillars and requires member states, the Secretariat, and the UN in the field to work as one. Because, in practice, UN agencies tend to focus on certain goals as their particular domain, new funding mechanisms could incentivize truly cooperative approaches across the UN system.

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from conflict, there is a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities.”

The resolution on youth, peace, and security adopted on December 9, 2015, is another example of the Security Council integrating development issues such as youth education and employment.

The push for this type of integration has not always received universal support, and some of these issues are tied to a bigger debate over Security Council reform. In November 2015, for example, the United Kingdom tried to organize a Security Council debate on “peaceful societies and conflict prevention” that made a direct connection between conflict prevention and SDG 16 on the promotion of peaceful societies, justice, and inclusive institutions for sustainable development. This effort received some pushback from member states wary of the Security Council encroaching upon areas they viewed as falling within the exclusive competence of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The majority of Security Council members nonetheless called for both integrating the development and conflict prevention agendas and cooperating with the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and other UN agencies and international institutions. In the end, the ministerial-level open debate on November 17, 2015, was renamed “Security, Development and the Root Causes of Conflict” to address such concerns, and it did not result in a presidential statement.

**Economic and Social Council**

A number of ECOSOC initiatives have also contributed to building bridges between the various pillars of the UN. Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau (created in 2002), Burundi (created in 2003), and Haiti (created in 1999 in response to a request by the Security Council under Article 65 of the UN Charter and reactivated in 2004) set out to help define long-term programs of support for these countries emerging from conflict. The mandates of the first two groups have been terminated, as these countries’ peacebuilding challenges are now being addressed by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). However, ECOSOC continues to provide advice on Haiti and has involved the ECOSOC president and the SRSG in Haiti in the group’s work. This work has demonstrated that ECOSOC can leverage attention and funding for conflict-affected countries—not only for peace operations but also for development, governance, and human rights initiatives.

**Peacebuilding Commission**

The PBC has held a number of joint meetings with ECOSOC on issues such as youth and conflict, as well as conversations on the need for a longer-term positioning of the UN development system and for a forum for citizen action. In Resolutions 60/180 and 61/16, the General Assembly supported such regular interactions and underlined the value of ECOSOC’s experience in post-conflict peacebuilding and its ability to increase coherence between the development and the peace and security pillars. The PBC is mandated to report to both the Security Council and the General Assembly (see Box 8).

The newly minted resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture, which establish “sustaining peace” as a new unifying framework, may enable the PBC to realize some of its bridging potential. As the incoming chair of the PBC in January 2016, Kenya expressed its intention to promote coordinated and sustained engagement with the General Assembly and ECOSOC around the SDGs and to analyze the PBC’s role as a bridge between the three principal organs of the UN (the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ECOSOC).

**Human Rights Council**

Better awareness of the PBC’s work among members of the Human Rights Council—particularly when passing resolutions on countries on the PBC and the Security Council’s agendas and

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89 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180; General Assembly Resolution 61/16 (January 9, 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/16.
Box 8. Resolutions 2282 and 70/262: Updating the mandate of the PBC

There is hope that the new “sustaining peace” resolutions may enable the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to take an overdue step. When the PBC was established in 2005, it set out to “bring together all relevant actors” to mobilize resources, sustain attention, and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. While the PBC’s founding resolution tasked it with helping to improve the coordination of all actors—within and outside the UN—on particular post-conflict countries, the PBC has yet to play this role effectively (as both its five-year and ten-year reviews found). As the latter report recommended, “The PBC should become the advisory ‘bridge’ between the relevant intergovernmental organs it was always intended to be.”

This issue is taken up in the new peacebuilding resolutions, which elaborate on the functions of the PBC set out in its original mandate. Much of the new language focuses on improving coordination and integration, noting the links between the UN’s three foundational pillars and stressing the PBC’s role as a bridge between the UN’s principal organs in each area. The two resolutions call on the PBC to realize this bridging role by sharing advice on coherence and priorities, broadening its strategic convening role, and working in greater cooperation with the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC.

The resolutions seek to elevate the responsibility for peacebuilding to include all parts of the UN and feature strong links to the development system and a strengthened role for the leadership of UN country teams to take on peacebuilding. Sustaining peace as a cross-cutting issue may also open opportunities for implementing the recommendations of the HIPPO report, including its recommendations to support peacebuilding and political programs during transitions and to recognize the peacebuilding roles of peacekeepers.

Looking ahead, the resolutions also task PBC members with revisiting and revising their working methods. Member states will need to continue coming together to interpret the resolutions in a progressive way, ensuring that the PBC translates these rhetorical gains into its daily practice. The PBC has recently benefitted from strong chairs (Brazil in 2014 and Sweden in 2015), with Kenya taking the helm this year. These member states are outspoken on the need for greater coherence and a stronger preventive role for the PBC. Given Kenya’s past co-chairmanship of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals, it is particularly well-placed to make concrete linkages between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the work of the PBC.

carrying out the Universal Periodic Review—could also help improve coherence between the UN pillars. Special procedures mandate-holders (including special rapporteurs, special representatives, working groups, and independent experts with either thematic or country-specific mandates) and commissions of inquiry should also be better integrated into discussions in New York beyond the Third Committee and their recommendations better factored into the work of the PBC and the UN peace and security organs, especially in discussions relating to economic, social, and cultural rights.

Transacting Business Differently

As member states have increasingly, out of necessity, started to transact business differently across silos on an ad hoc basis, the UN system itself will need to identify precedents of responding creatively to challenges not easily addressed by one part of the system alone. The UN system was not designed to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nor was it designed to implement the secretary general’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, should member states endorse it during the June 2016 Global Counter-

91 General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 30, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/60/180.
93 The Universal Periodic Review was established when the Human Rights Council was created on March 15, 2006, by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. This mandated the council to “undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States.”
Terrorism Strategy Review.

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) and the joint mission of the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons have demonstrated that the UN system can work together across silos to deliver effective operational partnerships in the midst of emergencies. In these instances, the UN, although not adequately configured or equipped, was viewed as the only option for leading an international response. It managed to leverage funding and technical expertise across silos and from different parts of the system (see Box 9). According to one UN expert reflecting on these cases, “Urgency assures flexibility.”

While UN reform is slow, parts of the system can be empowered to better manage crises in the interim. The UN Secretariat, together with member states, could therefore consider developing criteria for giving the secretary-general special authority to use assessed contributions and UN assets beyond peace operations in exceptional circumstances, as he did for the Ebola response.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

The three major reviews of UN peace operations, the UN peacebuilding architecture, and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security present clear opportunities to recommit the organization as a whole to making itself “fit for purpose” and able to respond to challenges and crises more effectively. As the secretary-general put it, “The various reviews and initiatives recognize that we cannot continue to address problems in separate or unrelated silos; we need to find the linkages among the reviews and work together so that the recommendations add up together to more than the sum of their parts.”

In response to this need, this report is designed to help “make sense of it all” by identifying and analyzing common themes, interlinkages, and synergies across these reviews. Where warranted, the report offers suggestions for the way forward on the basis of findings and conclusions from recent empirical research.

This report argues that the UN as a whole should

Box 9. Lessons from UNMEER

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), established in September 2014, is an example of how, in the context of a rapidly developing and complex crisis, the UN can provide a whole-of-system response. An overarching approach to the Ebola crisis was required, and the mission was mandated “to develop and implement a comprehensive system-wide response framework.” As the situation in West Africa changed, UNMEER went through three distinct phases. First, it focused on responding rapidly to the crisis and meeting immediate needs. It subsequently consolidated its response by coordinating and further decentralizing. Finally, as Ebola cases became more dispersed, it aimed at more technical refinements to its response. This sequenced approach exemplifies the UN’s capacity to adapt as an emergency situation evolves and to deliver results when given the flexibility it needs.

The leadership structure of the mission also offers lessons for effective coordination and quick reaction. The secretary-general’s executive management ensured quick action, strong direction, and oversight; according to the secretary-general’s lessons learned report, mission leadership was empowered by “direct access and communication with the Secretary-General’s office to escalate issues for immediate political or operational intervention.” Mission leadership accessed guidance from the World Health Organization (WHO) and other technical agencies. Its work was complemented by that of Ebola crisis managers in each of the affected countries who interfaced with governments and served as representatives to donors. UNMEER’s flexibility, partnerships, and effective leadership (both executive and management) were key aspects of its response to unanticipated challenges that increased its impact, strategic action, and relevance.

97 Ibid., para. 20.
leverage synergies to capitalize on existing and new connectors and build on precedents in order to energize the organization to transact business differently and provide integrated responses to the world’s interconnected problems. This will require the UN to organize and present its work differently and member states to change the way they engage with UN bodies and structures on issues of peace and security, development, and human rights, building on past best practices and leveraging emerging policy consensus. Integration will need to go beyond rhetoric; bold integration within and across relevant UN pillars and entities, where and when it adds value, will be needed. Better incentive structures, financial approaches, and instruments, as well as strong and visionary leadership are key to success.

The UN General Assembly’s High-Level Thematic Debate on the UN, Peace and Security from May 10 to 11, 2016, together with two additional high-level debates on sustainable development and human rights, offer critical opportunities to harness the common narrative required to make change happen. Other upcoming events, such as the World Humanitarian Summit, can also contribute to solidifying the emerging message of sustaining peace across silos.

Past UN reform efforts teach us that change, however incremental, requires sustained engagement by a critical mass of member states. It also requires bold and catalytic leadership from the secretary-general and president of the General Assembly around a clear strategic vision linked to a limited number of very concrete proposals for the next secretary-general to carry forward during her first eighteen months in office. Finally, it requires member states or groups of member states to champion reform as they try to deliver on their commitments under these parallel but interlinked global agendas.98

## Appendix

### Interlinkages among the Three Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustaining peace and prevention</th>
<th>High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operation (HIPPO) report</th>
<th>Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) report</th>
<th>Global Study on Resolution 1325</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The separation between peace-keeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding is artificial. The timeline of a conflict cannot be split into neatly distinct phases, as conflicts are complex and cyclical in nature.</td>
<td>• Peacebuilding should be a principle that flows through all UN engagements—before, during, and after violent conflicts—rather than being marginalized.</td>
<td>• Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding need to be seen as part of a continuum, with transitions between them neither linear nor strictly sequential.</td>
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<td>• An inter-agency approach is needed for “inclusive and equitable development activities as an essential contribution to conflict prevention.”</td>
<td>• Local, participatory assessment is crucial to informing peacebuilding program design and giving a more holistic approach to assessing risks in a conflict environment.</td>
<td>• New evidence demonstrates the benefits of inclusive processes to the long-term sustainability of peace.</td>
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<td>• Conflict analysis must not be limited to security threats but take a more holistic, developmental approach (e.g., including dynamics and drivers of corruption in country analyses and addressing environmental threats).</td>
<td>• Joint conflict analysis should be gender-sensitive and map not only sources of violence but also peaceful actors (linking DPKO mission intelligence, civil affairs teams, local mediation programs, and peacebuilding planning).</td>
<td>• “Prevention of conflict must be the priority, not the use of force.”</td>
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<td>• Prevention and mediation need to be brought back to the fore of discussions on UN peace operations.</td>
<td>• “Building national leadership is an integral part of a reconciliation and nation-building agenda.”</td>
<td>• The participation of women at all levels is key to the operational effectiveness, success, and sustainability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts. Women are key agents in shoring up the resilience of local communities against the spread of conflict.</td>
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<td>• Member states have not sufficiently invested in addressing root causes of conflict, and the UN still lacks a “culture of prevention.”</td>
<td>• Greater emphasis must be put on prevention.</td>
<td>• The gap between humanitarian and development aid must be bridged with increased investment in “resilience, conflict resolution and peacebuilding that more firmly targets long-term development outcomes.”</td>
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<td>Gender equality and women’s participation</td>
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<td>The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance.</td>
<td>Efforts must be scaled up to surpass the secretary-general’s 15 percent “gender marker” for financing to peacbuilding approaches that promote gender equality.</td>
<td>Any reforms of peace operations and peacebuilding must include gender equality and women’s leadership as central ingredients.</td>
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<td>The Secretariat and missions must carry out gender-sensitive analysis, more women must be appointed to mission leadership positions, and a senior gender adviser must be located in the Office of the SRSG to make sure gender perspectives are integrated into mission activities. Structural factors that prevent women’s recruitment and professional advancement must be reviewed.</td>
<td>Women’s political participation and leadership must be expanded “beyond the peace table” to recognize women as active participants in society. Sexual and gender-based violence is not only a war strategy but a central tactic of terror used to displace refugees and internally displaced persons.</td>
<td>Women’s participation in leadership is crucial to ensure that initiatives are tailored to specific contexts, transformative, and sustainable in the long term.</td>
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<td>Partnerships with the AU should be improved, and support to AU peace support operations should be enabled when authorized by the Security Council—including through more predictable financing. “Partnerships will be essential to future success in the face of long-running and new crises.” A strong global and regional partnership for peace and security is needed to meet</td>
<td>Partnerships within the UN (outside of the formal entities of the peacebuilding architecture) and with other stakeholders must be formed, as “the territory in between crisis response and long-term development remains, for the most part, unchartered.” The UN must recognize the importance of regional approaches to peacebuilding as this relates to</td>
<td>An assistant secretary-general should be appointed at UN Women. There should be a senior gender adviser in the office of every SRSG, with hybrid technical gender experts in thematic units. “Across the board, 15% of all funding for peace and security [should] be earmarked for programmes impacting women.” Resolution 1325 is a human rights mandate.</td>
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**Collaborative and strategic partnerships**

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<td>Partnerships with bilateral, regional, and multilateral agencies can help successfully apply women, peace, and security resolutions at the national level through political and sometimes financial support.</td>
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<td>future challenges of emerging crises.</td>
<td>ownership and legitimacy. The UN and regional organizations should form intergovernmental partnerships.</td>
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<td>• “Partnerships with other actors, coordinated under strong and responsible national leadership, will be essential.”</td>
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<td>• Reporting structures must be developed between the UN and regional organizations.</td>
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<td>People-centered approaches</td>
<td>Inclusion is central to sustainable peace because of its link to long-term national ownership of peace processes: “Peace needs to emerge organically from within society, addressing the multiple concerns and aspirations of different sectors, and seeking common ground so that all feel invested in strategies, policies and mechanisms that offer the way forward.”</td>
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<td>• There should be a shift toward a people-centered approach, including through engagement with local actors and those affected by conflict. This is essential for peace to be sustainable, as “those on the receiving end” need to lead the way to recovery and peace. This can also improve proper conflict monitoring and local ownership of protection mechanisms.</td>
<td>• Inclusive national ownership “implies participation by community groups, women’s platforms and representatives, youth, labour organizations, political parties, the private sector and domestic civil society, including under-represented groups.”</td>
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<td>• More specific mandates are needed so that inclusive approaches in UN programs and missions do not remain dependent on individuals appointed and their personal commitment to such issues.</td>
<td>• Context-specific mandates are needed.</td>
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<td>• Leadership must take the approach of encouraging a sense of common purpose between elites and the</td>
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<td>• Dealing with “new wars/new threats” that disproportionately harm women requires inclusive approaches to sustainably resolve the challenges.</td>
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<td>• A people-centered approach should include the recognition of women’s leadership. Women’s participation is necessary to the success of peace programs and the durability of peace and political change.</td>
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<td>• Member states, the UN, and civil society must create partnerships to be able to build infrastructures for peace. Working with affected women and girls when designing strategies is key to harness their local knowledge and community-level networks for information sharing.</td>
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<td>Integration and coherence</td>
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<td>• To enhance strategic analysis of conflict dynamics on all levels, field actors must be empowered in relation to headquarters. A small analysis and planning cell in the office of the secretary-general could help with this.</td>
<td>• The UN system remains deeply fragmented. UN silos are a systemic challenge due to their enshrinement in the UN Charter. • Breaking silos means breaking out of a sequential or sectoral approach to peace and conflict. • Conversations in headquarters fail to consider operational, field-based mechanisms and lessons, running the risk of conflating peacebuilding with technical interventions. • The UN system should develop a common strategy for peacebuilding that integrates the strategic planning instruments of UN country teams.</td>
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<td>Financing</td>
<td>The financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, particularly of its fast-track procedures, must be scaled up. Early-alert systems must be strengthened through more reliable financing in the regular budget, such as financing of mediation and electoral support through the peacekeeping account. Missions and UN country teams need a better set of financing arrangements to help them deliver together and deliver more effectively. This should include scaled up support for the Peacebuilding Fund, better capital-ized pooled funds at the country level, and programming funding for mandated tasks in support of peace consolidation within mission budgets.</td>
<td>Funding should be more predictable, specifically through use of assessed contributions for programmatic activities. Strategic partnerships and pooling funding between the UN, World Bank, and other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions could maximize impact and share risk. The Peacebuilding Support Office can be reinforced by being sufficiently financed from the regular budget. More detailed and accurate country-by-country estimates of the overall funding needs for sustaining peace over the longer term must be prepared.</td>
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<td>Accountability and governance</td>
<td>Accountability in the selection of mission leadership must be strengthened, for instance by establishing an ad hoc advisory group composed of former senior field leaders. The inclusion of women in higher ranks is essential to improve accountability and governance. Leadership capacities and authority should be increased.</td>
<td>The secretary-general should ensure continuity in senior leadership and personnel through the different phases of engagement, from preventive action to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Leadership capacities and authority should be increased. Intergovernmental cooperation is an essential step toward strength-</td>
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| • Transparency in local procurement must be improved by “updating and revising the existing rules and regulations to prioritize local capacities.”  
• Accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse should be strengthened.  
• A victims-assistance program should be established to support victims and children born as a result of sexual exploitation and abuse. | • Enhancing the accountability of member states. | • Singular violations but the underlying inequalities that render women and girls vulnerable in times of conflict. Important tools include criminal justice proceedings, reparations, and truth and reconciliation processes. |
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