The Permanent Representatives of Malaysia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations present their compliments to the President of the General Assembly and have the honour to inform the President of the General Assembly of the following.

We have the honour of addressing you regarding the three workshops on the question if, and how, the United Nations could increase its support for Defense Sector Reform. The three events were co-hosted by the Permanent Missions of Malaysia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations on 3 December 2010, 14 January 2011 and 18 February 2011.

We consider that these workshops were a very good opportunity to encourage an open, broad and constructive dialogue among all stakeholders, including the troop- and police contributing countries, on the findings and recommendations of the discussion paper entitled - Rethinking the UN Role in Defense Sector Reform: Examining Options for an Increased UN Role - promulgated by the Center on International Cooperation. The workshops also provided opportunities for Member States to engage in a discussion with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, to lend their perspectives to the draft UN policy on Defense Sector Reform, and contributed directly to the search for a common framework for UN support to Member States in Defense Sector Reform.

The final policy paper, edited for all the findings and recommendations of the workshops, is attached (see annex). It describes, briefly and objectively, the merits of more explicit engagement by the United Nations in Defense Sector Reform, as well as the main concerns, challenges and understandings raised by the diverse participants in the events.
We hope that this document may be helpful in discussions of these issues that could eventually take place in the General Assembly or its specialized body, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. We request that this letter and its annex be circulated to all Member States as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33.

As the Permanent Representatives of Malaysia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations we avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of our highest consideration.

New York, 14 June 2011

H.E. Mr. Saiful Azam Abdullah
Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Herman Schaper
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

To:
President of the General Assembly
H.E. Mr. Joseph Deiss
NLB – 02080
United Nations, New York
Rethinking the UN’s Role in Defense Sector Reform: Examining Options for an Increased UN Role

Policy Paper

Executive Summary

Effective, accountable, efficient, professional, and sustainable national security forces and oversight institutions are recognized as a vital part of securing sustainable peace and stability, and are essential benchmarks for the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Defense sector reform (DSR) has traditionally not been a core competency for the United Nations, largely for political reasons. Where it has done so, DSR engagement has been ad hoc. Nonetheless, a growing number of UN peace operations are being mandated to support national governments with professionalization or development of armed forces and oversight institutions. In this context, this paper – requested by the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the UN and the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN – examines the merits of more explicit engagement by the UN in defense sector reform, the possible forms that such engagement might take, and the resources and capacities that this might require.

There are three levels at which the UN could target its engagement:

i) **Strategic level** – for example, assisting with needs and threat assessments, defense sector reviews, supporting the development of a national security strategy, assisting national militaries with the design of force structures, development of other policy, doctrine, and legislation;

ii) **Operational level** – including establishing institutions and/or supporting systems for planning, payroll, procurement, logistics, non-offensive training, strengthening oversight and accountability mechanisms, and supporting other essential functions, such as building barracks and military training centers;

iii) **Tactical level** – including providing training and mentoring to uniformed and/or civilian defense sector personnel, e.g., protection of civilians, humanitarian response, or other skills.

With respect to this typology, the following points are relevant: first, these **three levels are not mutually exclusive**; they are interconnected. Second, what is appropriate or politically feasible in one environment may not be in another – in other words, engagement must be context-specific. Third, each context itself is dynamic, so that the **emphasis on strategic, operational, or tactical level will vary over time**, requiring different capacity and resource levels.

If Member States opted to develop UN capabilities for DSR, possible, overlapping configurations, include:

i) **Headquarters-based civilian and/or uniformed advisory capacity** that provides strategic-level advice to the field (e.g., based in the DPKO SSR Unit, with linkages to OMA);

ii) **Standing, deployable civilian and/or uniformed advisory capacity** (modeled on the Standing Police Capacity);

iii) **Field-based civilian and/or seconded uniformed strategic/operational advisory capacity** (e.g., the SSR Support Unit in UNMIT);

iv) **TCC-provided national contingent military advisory, training, and mentoring teams**.

Each model has advantages and disadvantages. The type(s) of models used will depend on what Member States decide is the most appropriate form of DSR engagement for the UN, and on the specific context in which it is applied. Given political and financial realities, however, the UN is best placed to engage on the strategic level to advise and assist national authorities to create, reform and/or reconstitute core defense sector institutions.

This policy paper is the culmination of a six-month project conducted by the Center on International
Cooperation (CIC) at New York University in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands and Malaysia. Three meetings were held under Chatham house rule with Member States in 2010 and 2011: two expert-level consultations and one high-level. At these meetings, the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions’ (OROLSI) SSR-Unit briefed Member States about their ongoing work toward developing a UN DSR policy. An initial version of this paper was circulated to participants. This revised paper now incorporates input from those meetings.

This CIC authored paper surveys the merits of more explicit engagement by the UN in defense sector reform (DSR), the possible forms that such engagement might take, and the resources and capacities that this might require. It is organized into the following sections: (i) an overview of why UN defense reform engagement is increasingly relevant; (ii) examples of different forms of international engagement on DSR; (iii) a comparative assessment of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of UN engagement; (iv) modes of potential support; (v) issues that emerged from consultations with Member States; and (vi) a conclusion.

I. The United Nations and Defense Sector Reform

The UN has been assisting Member States to develop, maintain, enhance, and reform their security sectors for nearly two decades. Yet, defense sector reform (DSR)2 – a subsector of broader security sector reform (SSR) – has traditionally not been among its core competencies. Governments acting on a bilateral basis and other multilateral organizations have instead taken the lead role in reforming national armed forces and defense institutions; the UN has historically focused predominantly on the police and justice sectors. This has been due to three reason reasons:

- First, DSR and the wider SSR framework have neither been fully developed conceptually nor universally understood and applied by Member States; indeed, there remains a wide policy-practice gap. The Secretary-General’s report on SSR noted that Member States – with their first-hand experience and knowledge of provisioning security – and other international and regional organizations will continue to play lead roles in providing direct defense and security-related assistance. According to the report, the role of the UN is to create an enabling environment; conduct needs assessments and strategic planning; facilitate national dialogue; provide technical advice and support components of the security sector; coordinate and mobilize resources; build capacity of oversight mechanisms; monitor, evaluate, and review; and formulate policies and guidelines.3

- Second, there has been reluctance among Member States to involve the UN in reform activities that affect one of the most intrinsic manifestations of state sovereignty: the military. But although UN Member States are typically sensitive to challenges to their sovereignty, attitudes and willingness to discuss the UN’s role in security sector reform are changing. At the 2009 “High-level Forum on African Perspectives on SSR,” several key African countries argued for SSR to be approached less as an exit strategy for peacekeepers and more as an entrance strategy to help post-conflict

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1 The draft DSR policy is being prepared by DPKO within the framework of the inter-agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTTF). In 2007, Member States tasked the SSR-U with the “development of strategic policy and guidance in the area of defence sector reform within the overall framework of security sector reform.” (A/61/858) The review is ongoing and began in September 2008.

2 The defense sector can be understood as broadly operating in three categories: (i) the ministries and departments, including the executive, that develop and implement defense policy and manage administrative and support systems; (ii) the legislative and oversight bodies authorized to control, audit, and oversee defense-related activities; and (iii) the operational services, such as the army, navy, and air force (among many others) who execute defense policy. Non-statutory forces, such as militias and rebel groups can also be understood as being part of the defense sector. These groups are especially relevant in post-conflict environments – whether spoilers outside a peace agreement or ex-combatants integrated into statutory forces through demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs and military integration processes.

3 See the Secretary-General’s report Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform S/2008/39
states develop effective and accountable security sectors over time.\textsuperscript{4} Guinea’s request for peacebuilding support for its security sector in early 2011 is also indicative of this changing attitude.

- Third, the two main UN actors engaged in SSR – DPKO and UNDP – both face institutional barriers to implementation of defense reform. UNDP is restricted from using voluntary development funds for defense-related activities; DPKO operates under Security Council mandates for limited periods, posing two challenges. This leaves no clear avenue for Member States to seek UN assistance on DSR without being on the Council agenda\textsuperscript{5} and, second, sustainable reform is often a long-term process. DPKO is further limited in its access to programmatic funds.\textsuperscript{6} Within DPKO, the SSR Unit undertakes policy development and provides strategic guidance to field missions, but its engagement in the area of DSR – for example, in support of MONUSCO – remains ad hoc. DPKO’s Police Division, by contrast, has a long (if mixed) history of supporting policy development for professionalization and training of national police forces by UNPOL. The Office of Military Affairs, a separate organizational pillar within DPKO, has had no equivalent function.

Nonetheless, UN peace operations often operate in contexts where defense sector reform is acknowledged as central to securing sustainable peace and stability. For peacekeeping missions, professional national security forces are often a benchmark for the eventual handover, drawdown, and withdrawal of peacekeepers – even if UN personnel are not themselves tasked with defense sector reform.

At the same time, a growing number of UN political and peacekeeping missions are being mandated to support national governments with professionalization or development of armed forces and oversight institutions. Of the twenty-seven current UN field operations (peacekeeping missions, political missions, and peacebuilding support offices), eight have mandates for supporting defense reform.\textsuperscript{7} These experiences have not always been positive, as the experience of MONUC with the FARDC illustrates.\textsuperscript{8} The UN is generally under-resourced, under-equipped, and unprepared to tackle large-scale defense sector reforms and does not have an overarching policy for engagement. The UN’s current DSR activities are ad hoc exercises carried out by peace operations in accordance with specific Security Council mandates and concept of operations.

Whereas the armed forces (in theory) should be a source of security, they are often a potential source of instability and predation in weak and crisis-affected states. State armed forces have been implicated in the repression of certain groups of citizens, the protection of factional political, ethnic, or social interests, the facilitation of drug trafficking, and the overthrow of governments. In post-conflict contexts, the military often takes control of domestic security and exerts enormous influence on politics, if not economics and other social spheres. As typically the most powerful security institution with enormous political and economic influence and resources, the armed forces, particularly the army, can positively or negatively impact reforms in other sectors (the police and the judiciary for example). DSR is therefore an essential component of SSR; defense and military actors’ role in broader SSR must be considered.

Defense sector reform provides an opportunity – one often explicitly called for by peace agreements – to reorient armed forces to existing threats, to initiate or strengthen civilian oversight, to reduce oversized bureaucracies and ranks, and to improve the legitimacy of and public trust in uniformed services.

\textsuperscript{4} Nigeria, South Africa press for more leadership positions at the UN, May 14 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/NewsStory/Source/2010/may/14/808.html
\textsuperscript{5} The placement of Guinea on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda after it requested such support is historic. It is the first time that the PBC has placed a country on its agenda without a referral from the Security Council. See PBC/78
\textsuperscript{6} It should be noted that these institutional restrictions pose challenges beyond UN engagement in defense sector reform.
\textsuperscript{7} MONUSCO, UNOCI, UNMIL, UNMIT (all peacekeeping operations), UNPOS, BINUB, UNIOGBIS, and UNICIL (all political missions).
\textsuperscript{8} As of 1 July 2010, MONUC has been replaced by MONUSCO. The new mission has a mandate to support the training of national military forces.
Nonetheless, political power and sovereignty are at the core of defense sector reform. As the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) states, "[b]ecause control over the military is central to the exercise of political power, particular challenges arise with regard to democratic governance and oversight." Any outside intervention must be measured against this reality.

II. Country-Specific Cases of DSR

This section explores four different country-specific cases of DSR. The cases – Guinea Bissau, DR Congo, Afghanistan, and Timor-Leste – were chosen to demonstrate a wide range of engagement by different multilateral and bilateral stakeholders. The type of intervention is largely determined by the in-country and international context. What emerges from these cases is that DSR engagement has varied depending on the context, and there are many levels at which DSR can be targeted. As the cases suggest, the UN will rarely, if ever, be the sole actor supporting DSR.

**Guinea-Bissau: UNIOGBIS – light UN presence; strategic level**

Guinea-Bissau is a case of UN engagement on DSR at an almost wholly strategic level. The UN’s involvement has comprised a small group of experts in the peacebuilding mission, UNIOGBIS, to engage national stakeholders on strategic level reforms. The SSR section of the mission has two dedicated advisers assisting the Government with the planning, evaluation, review, and implementation of a holistic SSR program and DPKO’s SSR Unit is assisting in the preparation of a strategic workplan for security sector management. On coordination, the mission has developed a matrix that provides data on donor technical and financial support and helps identify technical and financial gaps in SSR. UNIOGBIS is able to advise, consult and assist national actors develop their defense reform priorities with a light footprint. A major benefit to this approach is that it encourages (and is almost entirely dependent on) national ownership. A related drawback with this light footprint and strategic approach is that implementation, follow-through, and oversight to stem political manipulation may difficult to ensure.

**Timor-Leste: International Stabilisation Force – bilateral (with UN mission cooperation); medium footprint; tactical level**

The Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) has a current size of around 460 personnel from the Australian and New Zealand Defense Forces. ISF is engaged in training and professionalizing the PNTL and the Vílênti-Fórças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) as part of a much larger bilateral effort to build the governance capacity of the Timorese Government and maintain stability and security in the country. As such, ISF is engaged primarily on tactical level with specialists training the army. UNMIT and its SSR Support Unit focus on the strategic level, through a security sector review project and assistance to the government to develop a legislative and policy framework for the security sector. ISF can only operate with such a limited scope because of the presence of UNMIT; ISF is a piece of a larger effort. The benefit of this approach is that it is, comparatively, resource-light. A drawback of this type of intervention is inconsistent coordination. Without sustained strategic level engagement it may be difficult to harmonize specific trainings with national goals – a crucial component for sustainability.

**The Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUSCO – heavy UN footprint; strategic, operational, and tactical levels**

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10 The examples intentionally look at the actions of one actor. In all the cases additional bilateral and multilateral actors are simultaneously involved in DSR or SSR. Therefore, judging the merits of each type of intervention based on one international actor’s actions alone is insufficient, as many factors (political will to pursue reform for example) can negatively impact outcomes. Furthermore, each context is vastly different in terms of the stage of the conflict and the physical environment.

11 S/2010/106. The Government of Guinea Bissau has also approved the development of the UN’s “SSR Synchronization” concept for prioritization and sequencing of reform.
The UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, is mandated to both integrate the national defense forces and provide short term basic training to the members and units of the FARDC integrated brigades. As such MONUSCO troops and mission staff are engaged on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. MONUSCO has been encouraging the Congolese government to develop a national security sector reform strategy. Gearing its engagement toward more specific guidance in the absence of a national strategy, the mission, in coordination with bilateral partners, has assisted Congolese policy makers in drafting three laws on army reform. MONUSCO trainers continue to provide training to FARDC and engineering companies have helped build and refurbish FARDC barracks. A benefit of this multi-pronged, all-encompassing approach is that specific projects may be seen to completion. However, a related drawback is that in doing so, locally-driven national capacity may suffer. One of the major obstacles to coherent effective defense reform, however, rests on the Congolese government’s unwillingness to lead the process and pursue holistic reform. Notably, the three draft laws on army reform have still not been passed by parliament.

Afghanistan: NATO Training Mission – heavy multilateral footprint; strategic, operational, and tactical levels

The NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was created in June 2009 to oversee a more robust training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. NTM-A unified the NATO Directorate for Afghan National Army Training and Equipment and the US Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). The current effort, requiring immense resources and thousands military trainers, is largely focused on the tactical and operational levels. The NATO trainers, which currently form a ratio of one trainer to 29 trainees, engage in basic infantry, combat, and marksmanship skills, among other activities. Nonetheless, a benefit of a heavy footprint approach is that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ranks have swelled quickly and the force may soon be able to operationally and tactically provide security, though it is unclear whether or not this swift buildup has come at the expense of sustainability. UNAMA, meanwhile, has taken the lead on many of the governance issues and political objectives.

III. Levels of Potential Engagement on DSR

As the cases reinforce, defense sector reform is a dynamic, context-specific, and on-going process that must be nationally owned and led. Too often, overly technical or supply-driven approaches have failed to achieve the expected result. The aim is not merely to “train and equip”, but to situate the armed forces in a broader context of security and justice actors under civilian, if not democratic, oversight. Indeed, the civilian, non-uniformed, components of the defense sector – ministries, national parliaments, executive bodies – must also be considered, since those responsible for administering and overseeing the armed forces should do so in a manner that does not manipulate the military for personal, factional, economic or political gain.

Taking into account the experiences of DSR initiatives from bilateral, regional and other multilateral organizations, as well as the UN itself, there are three levels at which the UN could target its engagement:

i) Strategic level – for example, assisting with needs and threat assessments, defense sector reviews, supporting the development of a national security strategy, assisting national militaries with the design of force structures, development of other policy, doctrine, and legislation;

ii) Operational level – including establishing institutions and/or supporting systems for planning, payroll, procurement, logistics, non-offensive training, strengthening oversight and accountability

12 S/RES/1756
13 NATO troops are also engaged on the strategic level. For more information see; “NATO, SSR and Afghanistan” by Candace Karp and Richard Ponzio in Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform ed. David M. 1aw published by Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 2007.
mechanisms, and supporting other essential functions, such as building barracks and military training centers;

iii) **Tactical level** – including providing training and mentoring to uniformed and/or civilian defense sector personnel, e.g., protection of civilians, humanitarian response, or other skills.

With respect to this typology, the following points bear consideration: first, these **three levels are not mutually exclusive** and, in fact, are interconnected. Second, what is appropriate or politically feasible in one environment may not be in another – in other words, **engagement must be context-specific**. Third, each context itself is dynamic, so that the emphasis on strategic, operational, or tactical level will vary over time, requiring different capacity and resource levels. This layered framework for DSR takes into account the dynamism of statebuilding, recognizing that no single formula or template exists for all cases, while still allowing for international actors to assess their interventions against broad types of engagement.

IV. Modes for UN Support for DSR

In assessing the UN’s options for future support for DSR, this section explores existing and potential configurations of UN capacity for defense-related activities:

i) Headquarters-based civilian and/or uniformed advisory capacity that provides strategic-level advice to field missions (e.g., based in the DPKO SSR Unit, with linkages to OMA);

ii) Standing, deployable civilian and/or uniformed advisory capacity, modeled on DPKO’s existing Standing Police Capacity;

iii) Peace operation-based civilian and/or TCC-provided uniformed strategic/operational advisory capacity (e.g., the SSR Support Unit in UNMIT);

iv) TCC-provided national contingent advisory, training, or mentoring teams.

A **strategic level** advisory capacity model could be headquarters- or field-based, both of which currently exist. The SSR Unit in OROLSI provides strategic advice and guidance to field operations and has one DSR advisor; a number of field operations have their own SSR team within the mission itself, such as the SSR Team in UNMIT. Either, could be expanded to include greater civilian and seconded, uniformed DSR expertise. The **major benefit of using this model is that strengthening DSR capabilities would not require significant institutional restructuring**.

The **standing capacity model**, based on the UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC), would comprise a small, deployable group of specialized personnel ready to assist UN field operations. As the SPC has shown, these officers can respond quickly in emergency situations (as they did for MINUSTAH in Haiti after the earthquake) or deploy to provide long-term assistance to nascent institutions in a more strategic framework (as they did for MINURCAT in Chad/CAR).

The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) or the SSR Unit would be logical platforms for a “Standing Defense Capacity.” However, given that the SSR Unit is configured largely along judicial and police reform lines, and housed within OROLSI, its expertise is more developed toward the institutional, strategic side of DSR and less toward the operational and tactical levels of reform. The function of OMA, meanwhile, is to generate and deploy troops and backstop UN military operations, not to provide services to national militaries directly. The UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) could also be used, but since only four TCCs have pledged

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15 The three levels are not meant to imply that they involve separate, isolated, or stand-alone activities. Furthermore, the typology does not suggest that engagement on a certain level is, in and of itself, sufficient or appropriate.
resources, securing specialized defense reform capabilities in UNSAS remains remote. There are indications that the SSR Unit is moving in this direction: the SSR Roster, launched in early 2010, could be expanded to provide a standing defense advisory capacity.

Lastly, in addition to or in lieu of developing its own capacity, the UN could seek deployments of field-based advisory, training and mentoring contingents from Member States. This could take the form of current TCC arrangements, or partnerships with regional organizations with specialized capacity that could engage on the operational or tactical levels. DPKO’s Integrated Training Service (ITS) could provide guidelines and training materials for Member States and peacekeeping training institutions so that they can adequately provide pre-deployment education and training for TCCs on defense reform. The major drawback of these models is that because they rely on outside, external capacities there is no guarantee that the UN can generate these contributions in the first place, or sustain them over long periods.

V. Issues from Consultations with Member States

This study has surveyed the UN’s current and potential DSR capacities. An earlier version of this paper served as the basis of discussion for three meetings with UN Member States on 2 December 2010, 14 January 2011, and 18 February 2011. The following questions were posed to Member States:

- Given possible future demand, what role should the UN have in DSR activities?
- At what level(s) of engagement should the UN develop its expertise and focus its activities – strategic level advice, based on the existing model of the SSR Unit and field-based SSR teams and/or the model of UNPOL vis-à-vis training national police forces?
- What is the appropriate relationship between OROLSI and OMA for supporting DSR?
- Politically, what steps are necessary – e.g., ahead of the C-34 – to build political support for an increased UN role in DSR?

Participants of the meetings widely agreed that DSR is a key element in avoiding the relapse of conflict. During all the meetings, participants emphasized the fundamentally political nature of defense sector reform and, in this context, both the importance of local ownership and the challenge of altering established political, economic, and social power vested in the defense sector. Regarding the UN’s role in defense sector reform, participants generally supported a continued, if not increased UN role in DSR; however, there was no consensus on what form or scope UN support should take. In the first meeting several discreet roles for UN support for DSR were offered:

- first, providing strategic advice, including identification of national DSR priorities (this option could fall under configuration i) or iii) in section IV.);
- second, coordinating DSR engagement across bilateral and multilateral actors;
- third, matching Member States requiring specific capacities to Member States able to provide them (this option that the UN has less technical competency than bilateral actors);
- fourth, serving as a repository for best practices, standards, and guidance.

However, participants stressed that, in practice, the UN has little authority vis-à-vis Member States to coordinate bilateral defense sector reform programs. More agreement centered on the UN’s role as a facilitator to help national authorities articulate their national defense strategies and prioritize reform programs and projects for donors and bilateral actors.

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16 Audit Report Office of Military Affairs Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 28 May 2010. Assignment No. AP2009/600/02
17 Under the current policy, Support to Military and Police Pre-Deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2009.21). DPKO and DFS provide guidance and assistance to Member States and peacekeeping training institutions that provide pre-deployment training for peacekeeping personnel.
During all the consultations Member States largely agreed that if the UN were to continue and/or increase its role in DSR that OMA capacities should be bolstered. In particular, many underscored the need for key OMA involvement similar to the Police Division’s role in supporting rule-of-law and justice reform in peace operations.

More broadly, one recurring concern was the financial costs of certain DSR activities, specifically equipping, training, and resourcing the defense sector. While this did not preclude UN involvement altogether, it did draw attention to the merits of a UN role in advising national authorities, which is much less resource-intensive than other areas of engagement.

VI. Conclusion

Given the current political sensitivities, financial considerations, institutional and bureaucratic realities, and experiences in post-conflict DSR, the UN is best-placed to engage on the strategic-level to advise and assist national authorities to create, reform and/or reconstitute core defense sector institutions. As this paper has outlined, the UN has little “in house” capacity to train, mentor or equip a core defense sector actors and institutions. Moreover, a UN focus on this type of engagement recognizes that Member States will continue to provide the bulk of assistance for SSR, as the Secretary-General’s report on SSR outlines.¹⁸

¹⁸ A/62/659 - S/2008/39 “A holistic and coherent United Nations approach to security sector reform is vital. Such an approach would provide a basis for a transparent framework for reform and international principles consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws and standards. It would facilitate the provision of assistance to national authorities and their international partners engaged in security sector reform, while recognizing that Member States will provide the bulk of assistance in this area.” Pg. 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Engagement</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Who/What is involved</th>
<th>What is needed</th>
<th>End Goal</th>
<th>Examples of reforms</th>
<th>UN Capacities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Designing the defense forces, developing defense policy and legislation</td>
<td><strong>Oversight bodies:</strong> executive and legislative Management Institutions: ministries and departments Statutory and Non-statutory forces: state military, non-state armed groups, and rebels</td>
<td>Advisors with strategic national defense, policy, and doctrinal expertise; governance and legislative expertise; post-conflict DDR and SSR expertise; and financial expertise</td>
<td>Just, accountable, and effective defense forces</td>
<td>Conducting a threat assessment, development of national security strategy; development of defense policy, doctrine or legislation. Design of force structures, a country-wide DDR and/or integration program.</td>
<td>UN has much capacity here. DPKO, SSR Unit, DPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Equipping the defense sector with the resources for essential functions</td>
<td>Human, financial, and material resources for defense sector institutions and personnel</td>
<td>Human resource services, materials, and or trainers, instructors, or providers of these resources for the defense sector.</td>
<td>Just, accountable, and effective defense forces</td>
<td>Creating identification cards for soldiers. Updating payroll systems for timely disbursing of salaries for soldiers. Setting up procurement systems for military’s financial and materiel needs. Building barracks and other infrastructure.</td>
<td>UN has some capacity here. Member States – as the central providers of security – have the most expertise and capacity, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Training defense sector personnel on how to conduct duties</td>
<td>The uniformed defense personnel and their actions</td>
<td>Trainers, instructors, and mentors for defense personnel with expertise in training militaries in defensive skills, civilian protection, human rights, etc.</td>
<td>Just, accountable, and effective defense forces</td>
<td>Conducting training in non-offensive combat skills, human rights, international law. Implementing a country-wide DDR program and integrating ex-combatants into a unified army.</td>
<td>UN has some capacity here on training forces in human rights, gender, etc. However, Member States are better suited to provide training services because of their resources and expertise in preparing their own armed forces.</td>
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