

General Assembly Thematic Debate

UN Peacekeeping: looking into the future¹

Tuesday, 22 June 2010

ECOSOC Chambers, Temporary North Lawn Building, UN Secretariat, New York

Program

09:30 – 10:00 Opening

- H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, *President of the General Assembly*
- H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, *Secretary-General*

Keynote speaker

- Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, *Former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan* [participating via videoconference from Paris]

"UN Peacekeeping: Overview of Challenges and Opportunities since the Brahimi Report of 2000"

10:00 – 11:00 Special Session on Building Partnerships and Securing Capabilities

Partnerships are crucial in securing the required capabilities for peacekeeping missions commensurate with their mandates. In this Special Session, Troop Contributing Countries will share their experience and expertise on, *inter alia*, the best ways to establish a meaningful partnership between those who authorize, those who implement and those who receive peacekeeping operations.

Special Presentations

- H.E. Mr. Luis Almagro, *Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay*
- Major General (Rtd.) Tarique Ahmed Siddique, *Cabinet Minister, Bangladesh*
- Pakistan
- India
- Nigeria

Remarks

- Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- Mr. Anthony Banbury, *Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Field Support*

¹ Letter dated 22 April 2010 from the President of the General Assembly

11:00 – 12:00 Panel One: Political dimensions of UN Peacekeeping

This panel will focus on the political dimensions of peacekeeping including questions of political will and support for peacekeeping operations and the interlinkages and mutual impact of peacekeeping missions and political processes. It will address the centrality of political processes in multidimensional and complex operations, their evolving nature, from the signing of a peace process, to the launching, quite often, of a democratic process, the fostering of national reconciliation and the building of national capacity to sustain political processes after the end of the conflict. This panel will also consider the role of international and regional actors in the successful conduct of peacekeeping missions.

Panelists

- President Martti Ahtisaari, *Former President of the Republic of Finland, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008*
- H.E. Ambassador Álvaro de Soto, *Senior Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process*
- H.E. Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, *Joint Special Representative for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

Moderator

- Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen, *President of the International Peace Institute*

Focus of Discussion

The importance of sustained political will and engagement throughout the life cycle of a mission, strategies for leveraging support for a peacekeeping operation and the responsibility of the international community in this regard

- How to maintain political engagement and support not just in the early phases of a mission but throughout its life cycle?
- How to ensure that missions' resources and capabilities match their mandates?
- How should a peacekeeping mission ensure continued consensus around its objectives?
- How to manage expectations and overcome obstacles?

The political challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations

- How to ensure that the presence of a peacekeeping operation contributes to moving the political process forward?
- Does the current conduct of complex missions ensure the extension of State authority?
- How should UN missions deal with “spoilers”?
- How to manage the high expectations associated with the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the face of limited success in achieving long-term settlement?
- How can peacekeeping support and foster national reconciliation as part of the peace process?

The critical role of partnerships with and engagement of regional stakeholders

- How do UN peacekeeping operations work with regional and other partners to maximize their effectiveness?
- What is the role of neighboring countries in supporting political processes and responding to challenges to peace?

12:00 – 13:00 Discussion and Q&A with Member States

15:00- 16:00 Panel two: Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Towards sustainable peace, peacebuilding and the nexus between security and development

This panel will focus on peacebuilding perspectives in the design of complex and multidimensional operations and how early peacebuilding tasks feed into and reinforce medium and long-term peacebuilding and development. In particular, this panel will emphasize the links between the security and economic aspects of sustainable peace, and address how UN peacekeeping operations can be rooted in dynamic and early partnership with all relevant actors in the field.

Panelists

- President John Agyekum Kufuor, *Former President of Ghana, Former Chairperson of the African Union, Chairman of Interpeace*
- Dr. Ashraf Ghani, *Chairman of the Institute of State Effectiveness, Former Minister of Finance, Afghanistan* [participating via videoconference from Kabul]
- Mr. Justin Yifu Lin, *World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, Development Economics*
- Ms Ellen Margrethe Løj, *Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia (UNMIL)*

Moderator

- Dr. Jamal Benomar, *Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President of the General Assembly*

Focus of Discussion

- To what extent have the multidimensional peacekeeping missions been successful in promoting a comprehensive approach for sustainable peace and development?
- How can peacekeeping mandates facilitate the sequencing and prioritization of early peacebuilding tasks, including but not limited to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while avoiding a linear approach that relegates other critical tasks such as national capacity development, economic revitalization and employment-generation to second priority?
- How can peacekeeping missions help initiate and facilitate the coherence of critical peacebuilding efforts which are undertaken by a number of UN and non-UN actors throughout the transition and consolidation phases (e.g. *inter alia* support for economic revitalization and provision of basic services, safe and sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and restoring core government functions)?
- To ensure the coherence of efforts, how can multidimensional peacekeeping operations enable and provide legitimate frameworks for the integration of strategies and the exchange of information among all actors in the planning and delivery of peacebuilding activities at the country level?
- In view of the political and fluctuating nature of peacebuilding challenges and processes, how can national and international actors promote a shared and long-term vision for peacebuilding from the early stages of peacekeeping?

16:00 - 18:00 Discussion and Q&A with Member States

Concluding Remarks

- Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, *President of the General Assembly*

22 June 2010

**Statement of H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki,
President of the 64th Session of the General Assembly,
at the Thematic Debate of the General Assembly
"UN Peacekeeping: Looking into the Future"**

Mr. Secretary General
Distinguished Guests, Excellencies
Ladies and gentlemen

I am pleased to welcome you to this first ever thematic debate of the General Assembly on UN peacekeeping.

Let me thank the Secretary General for his presence and for the efforts deployed by the Secretariat to strengthen the UN peacekeeping capacity.

On behalf of the General Assembly, I would like to express special thanks and appreciation to our honourable guests, President John Kufuor and President Martti Ahtisaari, Ministers, and other distinguished panelists and participants, who have kindly accepted to be with us and to share with the entire membership their views and insights stemming from their outstanding experience and contributions in this field. Such high level participation is a strong manifestation of the interest and importance attached to this debate in the General Assembly.

Peacekeeping is a collective undertaking. Its success requires full support and political backing of all Member States, who are also called upon to provide the resources – human, material and financial – which are essential for smooth and effective functioning of peacekeeping operations. It is therefore right that the General Assembly holds this thematic debate, not only to provide its guidance on the policy and strategic direction of peacekeeping, but also to galvanize the full engagement, participation and commitment of Member States behind this common objective.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

From a modest beginning in 1948, peacekeeping has evolved into a major activity of the United Nations, a vital tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping has played an important part in some of the well known achievements of the United Nations in managing conflicts, maintaining peace and stability, and helping create the conditions for building durable peace and development in countries emerging from conflict. I strongly believe that the international community should fully utilize the unique role and legitimacy of the United Nations to which is also owed the success and credibility of its peacekeeping efforts.

Together we must also be willing and able to cope with the diverse and daunting challenges of planning and effective management of peacekeeping operations - challenges which result from increased expectations, the extraordinary surge in demand and the growing complexity of peacekeeping mandates, especially in multi-dimensional missions. While on the operational side, we have to address the question of resources and the overstretch in capacity, we should also be cognizant that the larger objective of peacefully resolving conflicts and achieving durable settlements can best be achieved only through a more comprehensive approach also comprising political and other tracks including a more serious investment in prevention, political facilitation and mediation.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

Evolution in peacekeeping has also entailed reform. It is important to recall here that some of the major adaptation and reshaping of peacekeeping has resulted from the landmark report of August 2000 by the panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. The report identified serious shortcomings in the UN's ability to tackle conflicts and helped launch an effort for institutional change that continues today. I am very grateful that Mr. Brahimi will join us today from Paris to share his thoughts on the evolving challenges and opportunities for peacekeeping since this report.

Beyond the conceptual discussion on all aspects of peacekeeping that takes place in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, this interactive debate offers a unique opportunity and political space for a thorough consideration of some of the core issues outlined in today's programme, namely the political dimensions of peacekeeping; and peacebuilding and the nexus between security and development. Recent developments in some operations make this debate even more relevant and timely. It is indeed crucial to address issues such as the mutual impact and inter-linkage between peacekeeping missions and political processes. The military means and political goals of the mission should complement each other, as the Brahimi Report also highlighted the need for the right combination of the two. To avoid failure, the missions must be provided the resources commensurate with their mandates. The UN must pay attention to the underlying issues and root causes of conflict, and challenges to state sovereignty. Also, the United Nations efforts cannot be isolated from the regional dimension, and in this regard I highlight the importance of positive engagement and support of the regional stakeholders, including neighboring countries.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

The bulk of UN peacekeeping presence today is in integrated missions, mostly deployed in complex crises and conflicts often having military, political, humanitarian and other dimensions. To build and sustain peace in such complex and fragile situations, we require a broader, holistic strategy that synergizes the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts to address the interlinked issues of security and development in a comprehensive manner. Beyond improving coordination and securing necessary resources, it is also important to ensure sustainable national capacities that can assume ownership and responsibility for peacebuilding and national development. In this regard, there is a need to reassess the ways in which the United Nations and other partners engage in assisting countries emerging from conflict. The record of the UN and the international community is mixed and we are all struggling over how to get it right. We must uphold the principle of "do no harm". We must candidly review how we

operate in these situations, to ensure that our actions and support do not undermine the national authorities. One size fits all approaches do not work. We must do better in catering to the specific requirements of individual situations keeping the national priorities and perspectives in the forefront.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen

This is also the occasion to pay special tribute to the tens of thousands of blue helmets who over the years have served the cause of peace under the United Nations banner. We laud their professionalism, dedication, courage and sacrifice which have been instrumental in transforming the mandates into tangible results on ground, bringing peace, stability and hope for a better future to millions of people affected by conflict. Troop Contributing Countries have also an important role to play in building a renewed global partnership for UN peacekeeping advocated by the Organization. They shoulder the burden in the field; they also possess relevant experience and expertise that should be harnessed and fully utilized including through participation in decision making and meaningful interaction and cooperation with the Security Council and the Secretariat. You would also agree that contribution of personnel for peacekeeping missions is the responsibility of all Member States especially those possessing the required capacities. Let us therefore all join hands and pool our resources for the success of this endeavour.

I hope that this debate and interaction will advance our common vision of peacekeeping and its noble objectives and principles and will further our efforts to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. I am confident that in doing so the Member States will renew our collective commitment to the cause of world peace.

Thank you.

**Statement by
Mr Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
General Assembly Thematic debate: "UN Peacekeeping - looking into the future"
22 June 2010**

Mr President, distinguished members of the General Assembly,

I wish to thank the President of the General Assembly for arranging this interactive debate on peacekeeping providing an opportunity to exchange views on the future of United Nations peacekeeping. It is an extremely valuable and timely debate marking the 10th anniversary of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations led by Mr Brahimi.

Since the panel published its landmark report ten years ago UN peacekeeping has undergone remarkable changes. In 2000 the level of deployment was 20,000. Today, UN peacekeeping deploys over 124,000 peacekeepers in 16 missions around the world, making it one of the most dynamic and challenging collective endeavours to promote international peace and security.

Without the so-called Brahimi report we would not have been able to sustain this unprecedented surge. Building on the report's recommendations and Member States' support the peacekeeping machinery was strengthened, both in the field and at headquarters. The Report was extremely farsighted and many of the issues which it identified remain with us today.

Fundamentally it reminded us that UN peacekeeping depended upon a partnership between the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, Troop and Police contributors and the host governments.

It laid the foundation for policy consensus among peacekeeping stakeholders regarding the use and application of UN peacekeeping. It underlined that peacekeeping missions should deploy only when there is a peace to keep. It reaffirmed the three basic principles of UN peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self defense – while providing guidance on the implementation of these principles in complex post-conflict settings.

Conceptually the Brahimi report also recognized that peacekeeping missions have become multidimensional and engaged in assisting the parties on a range of fronts including rule of law and what has become known as early peacebuilding. Each of these fundamental conceptual points remains relevant today.

The General Assembly also took the Brahimi report as the basis for strengthening peacekeeping operationally in the areas of identifying and building human and material peacekeeping capacities and mission support allowing rapid deployment of new, complex operations. A stronger emphasis on training and leadership sought to ensure peacekeepers were prepared to support growing peacekeeping requirements.

The report also made recommendations to strengthen the staffing of DPKO and regarding field personnel. It fundamentally pointed out the need for a professionalization of peacekeeping staff. We continue to work with the Member States in this field and reforms are ongoing.

The Brahimi report articulated the importance of bringing together the various elements of a UN mission. More integrated structures at Headquarters and in the Field have subsequently been put in place and integrated planning systems have been designed. The Report was certainly critical of the Secretariat regarding achieving a “one-UN” effect. In response to that criticism we have built an operational culture and a system for learning lessons, best practices, developing guidance and training.

One should recall also, that not all of the proposals the report put forward to address capacity requirements for peacekeeping were in fact realized. The establishment of strategic deployment stocks and a peacekeeping logistics base provided a partial solution to growing needs, but the Report’s recommendation that the Security Council leave in draft resolutions authorizing sizeable troop levels until firm commitments of troops and other critical mission elements had been identified remains unfulfilled to this day. Then, as now, rapid deployment remains subject to resources which Member States have such as strategic lift and ultimately a sufficient pool of Troop Contributors willing and able to move fast. Similarly, the hope of a comprehensive, dependable strategic reserve envisioned by Brahimi has yet to become reality.

Measures proposed to strengthen the Secretariat’s decision-making capacity through an integrated information management and strategic analysis capacity were not approved, though integrated planning processes did emerge from the Report to provide for greater coherence and strategy development.

The implementation of many of the recommendations put forward in the Brahimi Report has been influenced greatly by an evolving strategic environment and new demands. Many of the proposals have been realized, though others remain unfulfilled or have been overtaken by changing requirements and challenges that could not have been foreseen at the time. Subsequent reform initiatives have helped address some of these new dimensions and dynamics and have served to reflect the continuously evolving nature of UN peacekeeping.

In 2007, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was restructured and augmented and the Department for Field Support was created. Based on these reforms, we were able to respond to the considerable increase in both the size and complexity of UN peacekeeping, including in terms of integrated missions and planning processes. The result has been an enhanced quality in our response to requirements and greater synergies within the UN family. We have developed a new and greater understanding of the range of assistance needed to keep and build peace.

After a decade of considerable surge, it appears that UN peacekeeping may now be headed toward a period of consolidation and perhaps even contraction. This does not mean that our task will be an easy one. The challenges we are facing today in many ways remain daunting. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed to environments that are inhospitable, remote and dangerous, sometimes with inadequate logistical support and resources. The diversity of our missions is likely to continue to grow, as are the expectations in terms of what UN peacekeeping should deliver. Missions' mandates are increasingly more complex and multidimensional. While we still have traditional missions supporting a ceasefire agreement between two or more parties, we also manage multi-dimensional missions, supporting a peace process and national authorities after civil conflict, on the other end of the spectrum. These missions cover vast territories, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, and have complex mandates ranging from supporting elections and state capacity, to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and improving the management of the security sector. Other missions provide security and protection in response to a conflict. Increasingly, UN peacekeepers are called upon to take a more robust approach to implement complex mission mandates, and to deter spoilers to a peace process, to the mandate, and to mission personnel. They are called upon to protect civilians, including from sexual violence in conflict. This carries significant policy and operational challenges.

Some of our missions are extending initial security and stability gains into longer-term peacebuilding. More and more frequently peacekeeping operations are expected to initiate early peacebuilding activities in the immediate aftermath of conflict and carefully designed transitions to ensure that sufficient resources and expertise are maintained to consolidate the peacebuilding efforts. Last but not least, we are cooperating with and supporting other peace and security actors, in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and in other places, including through capacity-building provided to the African Union.

Many of these challenges were identified already ten years ago by the Brahimi panel. Nevertheless, with the expansion of the number of missions and deployed personnel, as well as the increasingly complex mission mandates and environments, the challenges have become more acute. To address these challenges, my colleague, USG Susana Malcorra, and I launched the so-called New Horizon process last July. The aim was to strengthen the peacekeeping partnership, that the Brahimi report itself highlighted, creating a greater consensus around how to tackle new challenges.

We identified some central challenges that required urgent attention. We saw an eroding consensus among Member States on the role of UN peacekeeping. Many times the political process accompanying a peacekeeping mission was weak or non-existent. In recent years we have experienced an increasing conditionality of consent. And we have had difficulties to deliver transition and exit strategies in the absence of political or peacebuilding solutions to sustain the process when the peacekeepers leave.

The priority agenda for 2010-2011 under the New Horizon was presented by the Secretary-General in his report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping in January this

year. It reflects the priorities that emerged from extensive exchanges with members of the peacekeeping partnership during 2009.

The priority agenda comprises four principal building blocks aimed at bolstering the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and which are indeed a continuation of the Brahimi legacy: i) **Policy Development**: developing practical guidance on critical roles for modern United Nations peacekeeping; ii) **Capability Development**: developing and sustaining the required capabilities to support peacekeeping now and into the future; iii) **Field Support Strategy**: developing stronger United Nations field support arrangements; and iv) **Planning and Oversight**: ensuring more effective arrangements for planning, management and oversight.

We are pleased that Member States expressed general support for this agenda in the Fourth Committee in October last year as well as in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping in February-March this year, and most recently in the Fifth Committee.

As part of the New Horizon agenda we have improved **planning and oversight**, strengthening the cooperation and consultation between Security Council-Secretariat-troop and police contributing countries. We have achieved greater consensus around crucial **policy areas**, including on the protection of civilians in peacekeeping. We have initiated an intensified dialogue with Member States on themes central to the concept of a robust approach to peacekeeping, including deterrence, and addressing threats to missions through actions and posture. As part of the effort to improve coherent and predictable delivery in the field, we are in the process of identifying the critical early peacebuilding tasks that peacekeepers should undertake in the area of security and stabilization, with a specific focus on the areas of rule of law, SSR, DDR and mine action. We are also moving forward with developing a comprehensive **capability development** strategy aimed at filling critical capability gaps in a sustainable manner and ensuring that peacekeepers are better prepared, equipped and enabled to deliver against reasonable performance expectations. We have to move from quantity to quality and take advantage of what appears to be a time of consolidation to make real and lasting improvements to our capacity to fulfil the mandates we have been given. Underpinning all this, the Department for Field Support has developed a new **Global Field Support Strategy** that will provide a global delivery model better suited to meet today's peacekeeping challenges.

All of these initiatives have roots in the Brahimi report. The debate today is a valuable contribution to what is an ongoing dialogue on the future of United Nations peacekeeping. Indeed, the two topics chosen for the panel discussions are key to the success of modern peacekeeping. Sustained political support is essential throughout the lifetime of a mission. Peacekeeping can not be the substitute for a political process for resolution of conflict, but must instead be an accompaniment and part of a wider political strategy. For the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus to be calibrated in the right way it is essential to have the end goal in mind from its inception. Good initial assessment and planning will pave the way for a successful exit strategy.

With peacekeeping having seemingly reached a peak and now a plateau, we have now an opportunity to take further steps towards finding solutions to these challenges, and to consolidate what we have already achieved in terms of strengthening UN peacekeeping building on the Brahimi report.

Let me end by paying tribute to the 115 current troop and police contributing countries that make peacekeeping a truly unique global partnership. Without your contributions peacekeeping would not be possible

I am looking forward to today's debate as an important contribution to further strengthening the truly global and collective endeavour that UN peacekeeping is.

Thank you.

22nd June 2010

Lakhdar Brahimi:

Contribution to the General Assembly debate on Peace Keeping

Made via Satellite, from Paris.

Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary General,
Ambassadors, Representatives of Member States,
UN Staff Members,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honour and a pleasure to join you and participate in today's event at the General Assembly through the magic of modern technology and I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. President for inviting me. I wish you and all participants a successful and productive debate.

Allow me, Mr. President to recall briefly how the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations which I had the great privilege to chair ten years ago was produced. In doing so, my first and very pleasant duty is to record again the names of my colleagues on that Panel, all nine of them:

Brian Atwood, from the United States,
Ambassador Colin Granderson from Trinidad and Tobago,
Dame Ann Hercus from New Zealand,
Police Commissioner Richard Monk, from the United Kingdom
General Klaus Naumann, from Germany,
Ms. Hisako Shimura from Japan,
Ambassador Vladimir Shustov from the Russian Federation,
General Philip Sibanda from Zimbabwe, *and*
Cornelio Somaroga from Switzerland.

Together, these distinguished personalities represented a vast and diverse experience in the fields of conflict resolution, mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian work, human rights, economic and social development, peace-building and state-building in general. Each of them had worked for, or closely with, the United Nations, in various capacities and in different missions and in all parts of the world and we all cared deeply for this Organisation.

Our Panel was also fortunate to benefit from the cooperation of **Dr. William Durch** from the Stimson Center in Washington and **Salman Ahmed** who was then on the DPKO Staff and is now part of the US Mission to the United Nations. The Report owes immensely to the mix of their complementary skills, experience, hard work and dedication. It gives me particular pleasure to recognize, in this August Assembly their huge contribution to our collective endeavour.

Let me add that the 11 people I have just named and I did not work alone or in a vacuum. We did our very best to reach out to all who, inside and outside the United Nations System, could help us fulfill the mandate given us by the then Secretary General Kofi Annan who asked us to give him a series of ambitious, yet realistic recommendations to submit to the Millennium Summit on how to improve the capacity of the United Nations to rise up to the demands of a new generation of peace operations and put behind itself the terrible failures of the 1990s, in Rwanda, Srebrenica and elsewhere.

If our recommendations were well received, it was not because they were particularly profound and original, but because they closely echoed fair justified criticism leveled at some UN action or lack thereof and suggestions that were commonly heard in this Building and elsewhere across the United Nations, amongst Member States, Secretariat officials and practitioners on the

ground as well as in Academia, the NGO community and the media.

Depending on whether people prefer to see the half empty glass or the one that is half full, they would say the implementation of the Report's recommendations were disappointing or on the contrary, remarkably effective. I for one was happy they were endorsed by the Millennium Summit and widely discussed including amongst permanent missions and by the much feared Fifth Committee of your Assembly, Mr. President.

Even before I left the United Nations more than four years ago, I joined those who were already calling for another review of how UN was acquitting itself when faced with conflict and its consequences. I am delighted the New Horizon Project is doing just that.

The best contribution I can make to your discussion today, Mr. President is to look back at our Report of ten years ago and discuss some of those observations and recommendations which remain relevant today...

First, the Panel members said in the introduction that UN peacekeepers cannot do everything and go everywhere. One of the reasons UN missions had failed in the past, is that they were sent into situations that were not, or not yet suitable for peacekeeping treatment. But the Panel also stressed that operations, once deployed, needed to be mandated and equipped to do the job properly. We believed then, and I believe even more strongly now, that whatever the UN does, it should do it well. If it says it is going to provide a secure environment, then it must do so. If it says it is going to protect civilians from imminent threat, then it has to do so. And, if it can't, then it should think twice about making such commitments. In essence, we called for an end to the half-measures that had been the hallmark of past tragedies.

Second, the Panel bluntly pointed out that the UN is often taking very serious decisions about how to respond to crises it does not know enough about. We stressed the importance of seriously upgrading the UN's regional-expertise and its general analytical capacities. Part of that upgrade envisaged more staff and different ones. The General Assembly did agree too many of the additional staff we suggested but firmly refused to give the Secretary General the quality analytical capacity he needs.

Experience has taught everyone that even if capacity does exist, it is not advisable to rush into a new mission or face new developments in exiting ones without taking the time to assess properly how a crisis is evolving. Far too often, critical decisions are taken, even mandatory resolutions adopted when information is just trickling in, and then it takes years to undo the damage. My maxim was and still is a very common French expression: *il ne faut pas confondre vitesse et précipitation*.

Third, the Panel urged the Secretariat to tell the Security Council "what it needs to know and not what it wants to hear." That's easy to say, but harder to do, when faced with pressures to propose troop numbers, budgets and objectives according to what public opinion or rather the media clamours for, or what the market will bear rather than what the tasks require. If the Organisation wants to avoid the failures of the past, such pressures need to be relaxed and resisted.

Fourth, once decisions have been taken on troop and police levels, those personnel need to be deployed in force, quickly. It dooms a mission's credibility for uniformed personnel to trickle in over the course of several months, when the host community and the ground realities are begging for a modicum of security to be restored, immediately. In Afghanistan in early 2002, we were refused maybe no more than 10,000 troops to be deployed outside

of Kabul. I am certain that did we get them and taken some political initiatives that were also on the table, the situation in that unhappy country would have evolved much more positively than it did. And we saw in the summer of 2006, that, when the will is there, thousands of peacekeepers from Western countries can be deployed under Blue Helmets in a matter of weeks, as was the case with UNIFIL. Such will and capacity needs to be summoned more predictably, especially to respond to crises in Africa. And it is a burden that needs to be shouldered by the entire membership, and not just countries from the developing world. Another slogan of mine here is that it is not an acceptable division of responsibility that the rich contribute money and the poor contribute blood to the common cause of maintaining peace and security.

Fifth, the Panel recommended that the Secretariat and the Security Council needed to do a better job of consulting troop and police contributing countries in a meaningful way, especially on decisions that would affect their personnel's safety and security. I am happy to see that the strengthening of this "triangular" cooperation – involving the Security Council members, the Secretariat, and Member States, TCCs in particular – has been a main theme of the "New Horizons" agenda and the deliberations of this past year. In fact, I understand President Obama, on his first trip to the UN as President, convened a meeting with the leaders of the top troop and police contributing countries to exchange views on how to strengthen the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. That is a very welcome and encouraging development. Such progress needs to be sustained and deepened.

Sixth, the Panel called for the exit of UN forces to be determined on the basis of a broad and carefully studied range of peacebuilding and institution-building requirements being met. We said that elections were not a panacea. I think there has been movement in the right direction over the past decade, but there still is some way to go to better understand how and when to conduct

elections to the maximum benefit of a peace process. More work needs to be done to better understand what conditions are required for peacekeepers to exit responsibly, and how all concerned can work together to help bring about those conditions sooner.

Seventh, the Panel stressed that the activities undertaken by the military, police, political, humanitarian, human rights and development actors affected and were affected by one another. If they pulled together in the same direction, a lot could be achieved. But the integrated approach we recommended was resisted and I suppose it continues to be resisted. Yet, the integrated approach is nothing but a call to know the needs of the country or communities being helped and to collectively and harmoniously cater for those needs. I remain convinced that if all the different actors within and outside the UN system are primarily motivated by what is in the best interests of the people of the host country concerned, then they will end up working in an integrated fashion. This of course requires resisting temptations to be primarily guided by bureaucratic rivalries, institutional profile or fund-raising considerations.

Eighth, the Panel also spoke for the need of a light-foot print. This also was resisted, misunderstood, or intentionally distorted. It was really a call to go for quality rather than quantity as far as foreign staff is concerned. It went together with a call to invest in systems to attract the best and brightest mission leadership and civilian expertise for field service. There is no substitute for getting the right people, into the right jobs, at the right time and only for the time that is necessary. Many peacekeeping veterans told us that the civilian personnel system was failing the missions, as well as the personnel themselves. If there were only one problem to fix, they said, it would be this one. Ten years later, I fear many of them might say the same. Why does this problem persist? I don't know enough to say. I have never been an expert on the subject and I am

not part of the system anymore. But it does strike me that the question deserves serious attention and debate.

Ninth, while most of the Panel's report was focused on the UN, it did call on the Organisation to open itself up more to collaboration with non-UN actors: regional organisations, NGOs, academia, and civil society more generally. There is tremendous expertise and knowledge resident outside the UN, often in ways that far exceeds the UN's own capacity. I believe this is true even more so today than it was ten years ago.

Tenth the Panel recommended that the UN should accept peacekeeping as a permanent and indispensable activity of the Organisation and cautioned against treating it as a temporary phenomenon. I believe this still holds true. Sadly, as much as you can and must pay far more attention to conflict prevention, it won't always succeed. There will continue to be outbreaks of new conflicts and evolutions in old ones, giving rise to the need for peacekeepers to help preserve a fragile peace. The capacity of regional organisations should be built to meet some of the need. But, the reality remains that none can and will likely develop the same capacity as the UN to field multiple, multidisciplinary peacekeeping operations, concurrently, in all quarters of the globe.

When it seems that UN peacekeeping is overstretched and nearing a breaking point, then all need to do what they can to lessen the load and preserve this indispensable tool. When there is a lull in activity, then take advantage of the opportunity to invest and retool it and prepare for the future. Rest assured, the future holds new and unexpected demands in store. Ten years ago, when we worked on the Panel's report, we never envisaged that just a little more than one year later we would be facing the consequences of 9/11. In Afghanistan, neither the initial successes after the Bonn Conference nor the dire situation that exists today were on anyone's radar screen. No one anticipated that western European

troops would accept to go back under Blue Helmets in Southern Lebanon. Nor did anyone imagine that there would be a three-fold increase in UN peacekeeping activity, with approximately 100,000 uniformed personnel deployed around the globe, under the UN flag.

There will be plenty of surprises over the next decade. I am fairly certain that one thing will remain constant though and that is that UN peacekeeping shall continue to be in high demand.

In all this, the General Assembly has a key role to play, of course. Allow me therefore to address to you Mr. President, and through you to all the members of the Organisation the appeal my colleagues and I directed to the Millennium Summit ten years ago. I quote: *"We, the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitments to the ideals of the United Nations,, to commit as well to strengthen the capacity of the United nations to fully accomplish the mission which is indeed, its very **raison d'être**: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace"*.

I thank you again, Mr. President and wish all of you every success in meeting the challenges along the way.



URUGUAY

General Assembly thematic Debate

United Nations Peacekeeping: looking into the future

- Special Session on Building Partnerships and Securing Capabilities -

Statement by

**H.E. Mr. Luis Almagro
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay**

64th Session of the General Assembly

United Nations

**New York, 22 June, 2010
(Check against delivery)**

Mr. President

Before getting into the matter of this session, allow me to congratulate you for this initiative which we consider especially relevant and that goes along with an idea that my country has been insisting: the necessary approach between the Security Council and the General Assembly on peacekeeping issues, because, the greater the distance between the bigger will be the difficulties for the PKOs fulfill their goals.

That is why we believe that, although we recognize that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, we should look for the broadest possible understandings, especially in the sensitive matters. The importance of having a broad base of support among member states for the mandates approved by the Council (especially among TCCs which share the responsibility of the implementation), shouldn't be underestimated. This is particularly important considering the features of the complex mandated tasks incorporated such as the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. This would not only lead to greater legitimacy and lesser resistance in the completion of these tasks, but also it would generate greater commitment between the different actors involved in the implementation.

The General Assembly and its subsidiary body the Special Committee on PKOs constitute the adequate set to reach this approach. We are pleased for this year C-34's substantive session and we are confident that this debate will contribute on bridging the differences.

Mr. President, regarding the cooperation with troop and police contributing countries, in the last 18 months we have witnessed positive signs of an approach in the sense mentioned. More consultations between the Security Council and T/PCCs; greater interaction between the Secretariat and the C-34; TCCs actively involved and with concrete proposals in the different instances of consultations in HQs and showing enormous flexibility on the field to adapt to complex scenarios and mandated tasks.

Yet, although what was said before represents an improvement with respect to the not so long ago reality, this is not enough to build a genuine and sustainable global alliance, necessary to provide comprehensive and effective answers to the challenges that peacekeeping faces.

We understand more spaces for substantive discussions should be generated, in particular trying to reach common ground about the most sensitive issues. For this, we consider pertinent that the C-34 becomes more proactive than reactive. A truly partnership spirit cannot be built through a simple acceptance or rejection of ideas or proposals without discussion, but as a result of the participation in the construction of understandings.

In this sense, we promote the intensification and consolidation of actions such as the early convening of the TCCs before mandates renewals take place in accordance with SC Resolution 1353/2001 (based on the recommendations of the Brahimi Report),

however, we believe that there is ample room for improvement in NY as well as at the Mission level.

Our experience tells us that informal mechanisms have proven to be much more productive. Firstly, we would like to highlight MINUSTAH's case, as the existence of an active informal coalition of countries strongly involved and committed to the Mission's success, contributes in a decisive way to the direct and substantive participation of the main TCCs in the most relevant discussions of the development of this Mission, including its mandate's renewal. The experience of the Group of Friends of Haiti - which my country has the honor to coordinate - constitutes a very good example of how productive and enriching a close cooperation with TCCs could be. If this example could be applicable to other Missions is a question that we should ask not only rhetorically but in practice.

Secondly, from a practical point of view, we find very productive the triangular exchange between T/PCCs, the Council and the Secretariat in the framework of the SC Working Group on peacekeeping operations. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Delegation of Japan for its leadership and commitment by encouraging these meetings, addressing issues so relevant for TCCs such as the capabilities' gap. If this interaction wants to remain useful, it must be done in an open and frank way, not as an opportunity to distill discrepancies, but as a constructive exercise to acknowledge threats, correct weaknesses, promote strengths and take advantage of opportunities.

On the field, we consider the presence of TCCs in the Mission's Staff to be important. This could be arranged through a liaison officer. This should have a positive effect in the improvement of mandates' implementation and should not affect negatively the unity of command.

Mr. President,

Regarding the capabilities issue, we are convinced that there is no possible sustainability of complex missions -such as the ones that today calls most of our attention-, without a serious consideration of the resources needed for an adequate performance and an update of the conditions in place to put into UN service the much needed human and material resources. This issue affects in particular developing countries (which provide the majority of the troops) as it may put at risk, the feasibility of their participation in PKOs.

In this sense, the case of the military utility helicopters is paradigmatic, representing probably one of the clearest examples of the current capabilities' gap and the limitations of the system. There are many countries which could be providing these vital assets for several UN PKOs, however, for different reasons; they appear to be not in a position to do so. We must tackle the causes that hinder this contribution. In our case, Uruguay is one of the few States -only 13 currently- that is providing these assets. We have deployed air units in MONUC and MINUSTAH and though we would like to contribute with more, we are restricted by financial constraints.

I'm sure that as well as Uruguay, there are other countries which would be more than willing to cooperate with the UN with these resources if the conditions improved, if they were updated considering the evolution of the complexities and risks of current PKOs.

Apart from the equipment just mentioned, there are needs in a wide variety of capabilities, such as training, hospitals and the resources necessary for information gathering and processing, which are crucial not only for the Mission's success and the implementation of critical tasks as the protection of civilians, but also for the security of our troops a critical issue for us. It's important to undertake the issue of the capabilities gap with the most truthfulness and constructiveness so that the correlation between mandates and resources could become a reality.

In this way, we consider necessary and timely the initiative of restructuring the field support system. The complexities of today's Missions require a better quality, efficiency and effectiveness in deployments, logistical support, mobility and information. A change is necessary, that's why we should congratulate ourselves for the recent approval of the Global Field Support Strategy, which we supported from the beginning. We especially appreciate the inclusive approach of this initiative, as its implementation will be done in close consultation with TCCs and PCCs. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate all of you who have worked so hard in reaching this objective, in particular to USG Susana Malcorra for her efforts and dedication.

Finally Mr. President, Uruguay hopes that in all and each of the instances in which the capabilities issue will be considered in a substantial way – including during the next session of the C.O.E working group – we Member States should be consistent and do something tangible for reducing this gap and strengthen a system which poses an unequalled legitimacy.

We shouldn't forget that each UN PKO is a demonstration of the international community's collective commitment with the defense of international peace and security; the respect to the principles of the UN Charter and of international law; and a clear interest for strengthening multilateralism.



THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22 April 2010

Excellency,

I am pleased to convene a thematic debate of the General Assembly entitled “UN Peacekeeping-looking into the future” on Tuesday, 22 June 2010.

Peacekeeping is today a major activity of the United Nations - a vital tool in the hands of the world body for the maintenance of international peace and security. Tens of thousands of blue helmets deployed around the world are bringing stability and hope for a better future for millions of people affected by conflict. The unique role and legitimacy of the United Nations brings added credibility and acceptance for its peacekeeping activities.

Ensuring the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping is a collective objective of the entire membership, whose political will and full backing are fundamental for the success of this endeavour. The evolving nature and scope of peacekeeping mandates also require a continuous effort for reform and strengthening of the UN peacekeeping capacity.

Success of peacekeeping in recent years, particularly in Africa, has also led to high expectations and a surge in demand. This poses significant challenges in terms of policy and decision making, planning, force generation, deployment and management of peacekeeping missions. Available resources are often stretched beyond capacity, impacting the efficiency and effectiveness of missions. That peacekeeping must be accompanied by parallel efforts on the political track, with credible peace processes, is evident for its success. In complex crises, often in intra-state conflicts, peacekeeping and the wider peace-building efforts must go hand in hand in order to achieve successful transitions towards comprehensive and durable peace and development.

Many of these critical questions and challenges relate to several of the current peacekeeping operations and are also the focus of a growing political debate over the future of peacekeeping. Several initiatives from the Secretariat and Member States have sought to advance this discussion aimed at adapting and enhancing the peacekeeping capacities. Mostly rooted in the landmark “Brahimi Report”, the ongoing reform efforts bring out the lessons learned from the implementation of its key recommendations and the need to continue to address the “unfinished business”.


All Permanent Representatives
and Permanent Observers
to the United Nations
New York

The thematic debate, with high level participation of member states, leading experts, academics and practitioners, will provide an inclusive setting for a strategic discussion on the major issues concerning peacekeeping. Panels will focus on themes ranging from the centrality of the political commitment; to the importance of a sustained and meaningful engagement of all stakeholders particularly the troop contributing countries; the provision of capabilities commensurate with the mission mandates; and the crucial inter-linkages with peace-building especially in the context of integrated missions. (detailed programme will follow).

I believe the thematic debate will be an excellent opportunity to advance a common vision of peacekeeping and to muster the political support of all Member States, key elements in timely and effective mobilization of the required resources for peacekeeping. Doing so would also be an important manifestation of our acknowledgment and tribute to the tremendous service and sacrifice of our peacekeepers, and of our collective will to make peacekeeping deliver even better.

I look forward to your support and active participation for the success of this debate.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Ali Abdussalam Treki

UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY



الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك
مكتب رئيس الجمعية العامة

17 June 2010

The Office of the President of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions and Permanent Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to attach the draft programme of the thematic debate entitled “UN Peacekeeping-looking into the future” to be held on Tuesday, 22 June 2010.

The Office of the President would like to encourage Member States to engage in an interactive manner with the panelists without formal statements in order to have productive discussions.

The Office of the President of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate to all Permanent Missions and Permanent Observers to the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'S' shape with a loop at the end.

New York
17 June 2010

All Permanent Missions and
Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

United Nations Nations Unies

General Assembly Thematic Debate

UN Peacekeeping: looking into the future¹

Tuesday, 22 June 2010

ECOSOC Chambers, Temporary North Lawn Building, UN Secretariat, New York

Draft Program

09:30 – 10:00 Opening

- H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, *President of the General Assembly*
- H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, *Secretary-General*

Keynote speaker

- Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, *Former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan*
"UN Peacekeeping: Overview of Challenges and Opportunities since the Brahimi Report of 2000"

10:00 – 11:00 Special Session on Building Partnerships and Securing Capabilities

Partnerships are crucial in securing the required capabilities for peacekeeping missions commensurate with their mandates. In this Special Session, Troop Contributing Countries will share their experience and expertise on, *inter alia*, the best ways to establish a meaningful partnership between those who authorize, those who implement and those who receive peacekeeping operations.

Special Presentations

- H.E. Mr. Henry Odein Ajumogobia, *Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria*
- H.E. Mr. Luis Almagro, *Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay*
- Major General (Rtd.) Tarique Ahmed Siddique, *Cabinet Minister, Bangladesh*
- Pakistan
- India

Remarks

- Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- Mr. Anthony Banbury, *Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Field Support*

¹ Letter dated 22 April 2010 from the President of the General Assembly

11:00 – 12:00 Panel One: Political dimensions of UN Peacekeeping

This panel will focus on the political dimensions of peacekeeping including questions of political will and support for peacekeeping operations and the interlinkages and mutual impact of peacekeeping missions and political processes. It will address the centrality of political processes in multidimensional and complex operations, their evolving nature, from the signing of a peace process, to the launching, quite often, of a democratic process, the fostering of national reconciliation and the building of national capacity to sustain political processes after the end of the conflict. This panel will also consider the role of international and regional actors in the successful conduct of peacekeeping missions.

Panelists

- President Martti Ahtisaari, *Former President of the Republic of Finland, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008*
- H.E. Ambassador Álvaro de Soto, *Senior Fellow, Ralph Bunche Institute, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process*
- H.E. Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, *Joint Special Representative for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

Moderator

- Mr. Terje Rød-Larsen, *President of the International Peace Institute*

Focus of Discussion

The importance of sustained political will and engagement throughout the life cycle of a mission, strategies for leveraging support for a peacekeeping operation and the responsibility of the international community in this regard

- How to maintain political engagement and support not just in the early phases of a mission but throughout its life cycle?
- How to ensure that missions' resources and capabilities match their mandates?
- How should a peacekeeping mission ensure continued consensus around its objectives?
- How to manage expectations and overcome obstacles?

The political challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations

- How to ensure that the presence of a peacekeeping operation contributes to moving the political process forward?
- Does the current conduct of complex missions ensure the extension of State authority?
- How should UN missions deal with "spoilers"?
- How to manage the high expectations associated with the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the face of limited success in achieving long-term settlement?
- How can peacekeeping support and foster national reconciliation as part of the peace process?

The critical role of partnerships with and engagement of regional stakeholders

- How do UN peacekeeping operations work with regional and other partners to maximize their effectiveness?
- What is the role of neighboring countries in supporting political processes and responding to challenges to peace?

12:00 – 13:00 Discussion and Q&A with Member States

15:00- 16:00 Panel two: Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Towards sustainable peace, peacebuilding and the nexus between security and development

This panel will focus on peacebuilding perspectives in the design of complex and multidimensional operations and how early peacebuilding tasks feed into and reinforce medium and long-term peacebuilding and development. In particular, this panel will emphasize the links between the security and economic aspects of sustainable peace, and address how UN peacekeeping operations can be rooted in dynamic and early partnership with all relevant actors in the field.

Panelists

- President John Agyekum Kufuor, *Former President of Ghana, Former Chairperson of the African Union, Chairman of Interpeace*
- Dr. Ashraf Ghani, *Chairman of the Institute of State Effectiveness, Former Minister of Finance, Afghanistan*
- Mr. Justin Yifu Lin, *World Bank Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, Development Economics*
- Ms Ellen Margrethe Loej, *Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia (UNMIL)*

Focus of Discussion

- To what extent have the multidimensional peacekeeping missions been successful in promoting a comprehensive approach for sustainable peace and development?
- How can peacekeeping mandates facilitate the sequencing and prioritization of early peacebuilding tasks, including but not limited to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while avoiding a linear approach that relegates other critical tasks such as national capacity development, economic revitalization and employment-generation to second priority?
- How can peacekeeping missions help initiate and facilitate the coherence of critical peacebuilding efforts which are undertaken by a number of UN and non-UN actors throughout the transition and consolidation phases (e.g. *inter alia* support for economic revitalization and provision of basic services, safe and sustainable return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, and restoring core government functions)?
- To ensure the coherence of efforts, how can multidimensional peacekeeping operations enable and provide legitimate frameworks for the integration of strategies and the exchange of information among all actors in the planning and delivery of peacebuilding activities at the country level?
- In view of the political and fluctuating nature of peacebuilding challenges and processes, how can national and international actors promote a shared and long-term vision for peacebuilding from the early stages of peacekeeping?

16:00 - 18:00 Discussion and Q&A with Member States

Concluding Remarks

- Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, *President of the General Assembly*

UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY



الأمم المتحدة

نيويورك

مكتب رئيس الجمعية العامة

The Office of the President of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly presents its compliments to the Permanent Missions and Permanent Observers to the United Nations and has the honour **to attach the final programme** of the thematic debate entitled “UN Peacekeeping-looking into the future” to be held tomorrow, Tuesday, 22 June 2010.

The Office of the President of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate to all Permanent Missions and Permanent Observers to the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York
21 June 2010

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'O' followed by a long, sweeping line.

All Permanent Missions and
Permanent Observers to the United Nations
New York

General Assembly Thematic Debate

UN Peacekeeping: looking into the future¹

Tuesday, 22 June 2010

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Keynote speaker

- Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, *Former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan* [participating via videoconference from Paris]

"UN Peacekeeping: Overview of Challenges and Opportunities since the Brahimi Report of 2000"

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- Ms Ellen Margrethe Løj, *Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia (UNMIL)*

Moderator

- Dr. Jamal Benomar, *Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President of the General Assembly*

Focus of Discussion

- To what extent have the multidimensional peacekeeping missions been successful in promoting a comprehensive approach for sustainable peace and development?
- How can peacekeeping mandates facilitate the sequencing and prioritization of early peacebuilding tasks, including but not limited to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while avoiding a linear approach that relegates other critical tasks such as national capacity development, economic revitalization and employment-generation to second priority?
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- Mr. Alain Le Roy, *Under-Secretary-General, Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
- H.E. Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, *President of the General Assembly*

**UN PEACEKEEPING: "BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS
AND SECURING CAPABILITIES"**

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished Audience, good morning

(Mr. Secretary General)

Let me begin by thanking the President of the General Assembly for organizing this thoughtful and timely thematic debate. We are at a critical juncture of integrating peacekeeping operations into a multidimensional approach from traditional approach.

Mr. President,

In the recent time, peace missions have become increasingly complex as the nature and characteristics of conflict have changed.

Stabilization and normalization of countries, and a full recuperation of their sovereignty, like Sierra Leone or Haiti could take more time than anticipated. During such a long period of engagements the mission cannot sustain unless there is strong partnership bondage and secured capability.

Mr. President, now about

Building Partnerships

As we know, UN has to work with other global institutions, regional organizations, donor countries, NGOs and host governments in order to accomplish its mission. Besides, UN also has to do lot of coordination within its system. So, in case of building partnership – it is not only with the outside organizations but also amongst the UN system's institutional machineries – especially when it comes to meeting the challenges of current and future complex Integrated Missions effectively.

The success of peacekeeping mission largely depends on the political support it receives and also on the adequate and timely provision of financial, logistical and human resources. In this regard, we reiterate the importance of closer and active involvement with Troops Contributing Countries when deciding on new peacekeeping missions or extending or amending the mandates of the current Missions.

UN uniformed peacekeepers have to build a strong partnership with the military and the wide range of civilian actors, including those in the humanitarian community. The controversial issues of humanitarian space, human rights as well as development cannot be effectively managed without partnership.

In addition to maintaining peace and security, peacekeepers are increasingly charged with assisting in political processes, reforming justice systems, training law-enforcement and security forces, and disarming former combatants – all these can only be done through building effective partnership with the respective agencies, institutions, groups etc.

It has been observed that lack of two-way communication between mission and host country's society may cause minor incidents to flare up to cause major impact to upset the mission.

Mr. President,

We emphasize on the following specific measures for building effective partnership at decision making and implementation level for future successful operations of peacekeeping missions:

1. Broader political partnership must be made between UN and the host government to ensure political support for the peacekeeping operations;
2. TCCs' views must be reflected while deciding mission start up and bringing any change in the mandate of existing missions; Initial mandate should be crafted giving full reflection of potential TCC;
3. Fair representation of TCCs in the decision making process of Secretariat and in the process of their implementation must be ensured;

4. Doctrine needs to be developed to guide the activities of UN uniformed peacekeepers in relation to a wide range of civilian actors, including those in the humanitarian community.
5. Sufficient political partnership must be made between the UN and the host authority to ensure minimum peace to restore by the peacekeepers;
6. Formulation of communications strategy to ensure clarity within the mission and amongst the population in general.

Securing Capabilities

Building partnership and securing mission capabilities go side by side.

While effective partnership will give impetus to the successful operations of peacekeeping missions, the whole exercise may prove futile if we fail to ensure necessary capability of Peacekeepers.

In Feb 2009, as Commander in Chief of Mission in Congo (MONUC), General Villegas of Spain believed that the UN capacities were inadequate to confront the great risk to local civilians and UN forces. He explained that MONUC had neither the military infrastructure nor a correct assessment, based on serious intelligence, of the dangerous and complex situation in the country. Later on this was found to be mostly true. There are few more

examples like this that emphasizes the need for securing the capability of the mission.

Moreover, there will be "spoilers" trying to undermine the transitional process.

There will be key players or former warlords, now in Government, may not always be interested in good governance or transparent economic system.

In the Integrated Mission scenario, to be a good peacekeeper one has to be more than a good soldier. In other words, he needs all the training of the professional soldier and at the same time have the political acumen required to deal with a very sensitive situation.

Common training is a valuable tool for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organizational cultures.

Mr. President,

In this regard, we believe that the following ^{*Suggestions*} must be reflected in the process of Mission start up, operation and expansion for successful peacekeeping operations:

1. Mandates must be clear, specific and well defined – supported by sufficient resources both financial and human;
2. At the field level, mission planning must engage the UN Country Team and relevant local partners from the beginning of the planning process.
3. The rule of law and capacity building for the host country (where missions is deployed) may start concurrently or shortly after the peacekeepers are deployed.
4. Collection, collation, and dissemination of intelligence regarding the host country to be continuously done.
5. Strategic policy and operational plans need to be subjected to periodic and systematic real time reviews and updates.
6. A clearly defined exit strategy needs to be formulated at an early stage which would be in conformity to the benchmarks and end state.
7. To ensure proper mission accountability, an independent oversight capacity should be established to review and evaluate the mission's progress against clear benchmarks.

Now, Mr. President, I shall not be doing justice if I do not speak a few words for my country, Bangladesh

Bangladesh Part

Bangladesh has played a cardinal role in maintenance of international peace and security, and endured many sacrifices in the process.

In the Preamble to our Constitution reads (and I quote) *".... We may prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind."*

Our Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina reiterated during her speech to UN General Assembly. "Bangladesh is proud of its outstanding role as a major troop contributing country serving the United Nations in maintaining peace and security worldwide."

Over a short span of time our "Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training", in short, BIPSOT, has emerged as a globally recognized Peacekeeping training institution.

It may be mentioned that Bangladesh will host the Annual Conference of *"International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers"* (IAPTC) in November this year and BIPSOT has been tasked to organize this important event. Meanwhile BIPSOT has also been selected as the Interim Secretariat of *"Association of Asia-Pacific Peace-Operation Training Centers"* (AAPTC).

In future if a Regional Support Centre is thought of in Asia, Bangladesh would be keen in providing the required facility.

Mr. President,

In Bangladesh, we have expertise in the field of women empowerment, microcredit financing, non-formal education, community health programs, non-government or NGO activities, gender mainstreaming, organizing civil society leadership, organize electoral processes, arranging voter and national IDs, disaster management, community development and agricultural productivity.

We are ever ready to share these expertises for sustainable peacekeeping - anywhere in the world.

Conclusions

Mr. President,

In conclusion, I would reiterate that the UN peacekeeping is a must; not an option for maintaining future peace and security throughout the world. Because, the resulting benefits from peacekeeping are immense in terms of any financial or other resource standards.

Because of complex and changing circumstances, change is needed. But, we should be very sensible in bringing that change.

The processes must be inclusive, decision making must be representative and burden sharing must be proportionate in accordance with the established criteria.

At the end, I hope, there will be fair representation of TCCs in the Secretariat particularly in DPKO and DFS.

Thank you, Mr. President, Thank you Excellencies & distinguished audience.



PAKISTAN

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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**Statement by
Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon,
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
in the
General Assembly's thematic debate
on
“UN Peacekeeping – Looking into the future”**

New York
22 June 2010

Statement by Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon,
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN,
in the General Assembly's Thematic Debate on Peacekeeping
(22 June 2010)

Mr. President,

I extend our delegation's warm felicitations for conceiving and arranging the thematic debate on **"UN Peacekeeping – Looking into the future"**. Under your dynamic leadership, thematic debates held in the last two months have prompted a renewed international focus on global disarmament and maritime piracy. We hope that today's debate will also help the Member States and the relevant experts to engage in fruitful discussion on the major issues concerning peacekeeping.

I also convey you and all participants, the personal best wishes of our Foreign Minister for successful deliberations today.

Mr. President,

I completely share your views that peacekeeping today is a vital tool in the hands of the UN for the maintenance of peace and security. As much as the UN's unique role brings acceptance to its peacekeeping activity, the success of peacekeeping operations have in turn brought credibility to the World body.

Peacekeeping today is a flagship activity of the UN. For the suffering humanity in a conflict zone, sight of a blue helmet is a beacon of hope. Across the globe, this beacon has illuminated the lives of millions by igniting the flames of peace and alleviating their pains and sorrows.

Pakistan supports the objectives of the UN peacekeeping. We consider the UN peacekeeping, a noble activity and greatly value our association with it. This association is nearly as old as our independence. In 1948, the first UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), played a key role in maintaining peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Our belief in the UN peacekeeping cause has not faded ever since. For the last five decades, we have been in its forefront. The current number of our uniformed personnel wearing blue helmets is almost 11,000. Our peacekeepers have valiantly served in Missions that are operationally demanding and geographically difficult. 114 Pakistani peacekeepers have sacrificed their lives in the fields, including Engineer-Soldier Gulsher, who died in Cote d'Ivoire -- barely two days ago.

Mr. President,

We understand that UN Peacekeeping operations of today are faced with three sets of challenges:

Firstly, expectations are high to maintain the trajectory of past successes, together with a perceptible surge in demand for peacekeeping, in diverse conflict situations.

In the second set, lie the imperatives of forging a coherent and coordinated response to a conflict situation, based on objective analysis of ground realities as well as formulation of clear, realistic and achievable mandates with provision of commensurate resources.

Finally, there are omnipresent challenges of conceiving a seamless transition from peacekeeping environment to an exit phase, focusing particularly on peacebuilding strategies.

The basic inspiration to meet these challenges and ensuring long-term success of peacekeeping must be derived from the UN Charter. The Charter provides an edifice of legitimacy to our peacekeeping effort. Respect of the Charter is, therefore, essential to maintain the credibility and neutrality of the peacekeeping operations. This cannot and must not be compromised at the altar of political expediency.

Mr. President,

A UN peacekeeping mission, in strict conformity with Charter provisions, must be guided by a clear, realistic and achievable mandate. For this, greater understanding is required between the sanitized corridors of the Security Council, where these mandates are written – to the dusty fields of a conflict-zone, where these mandates are implemented. This understanding can only be achieved by close and regular consultations among the Security Council, the Troops and Police Contributing countries as well as the Secretariat. A greater emphasis on inclusiveness is essential in all stages of a peacekeeping mission, including in the formulation and review of peacekeeping mandates. The Presidential Statement of 5 August 2009 (PRST/2009/24) provides parameters of such inclusiveness and must be implemented -- in letter and spirit. Proper representation of the TCCs in the operational as well as managerial positions within the Secretariat will only improve the level of cohesion and coordination.

Mr. President,

A peacekeeping mission can only be as effective and ambitious as the resources on its disposal. Accordingly, resources must be commensurate with respective mandates. Ability to deploy well-trained and well-equipped troops, with tactical and strategic reserve capabilities and requisite logistic support must be optimized within the UN peacekeeping architecture. Here, lack of surface and aerial assets for rapid mobility that has undermined efficiency of a number of missions, merit a special mention.

Pakistan appreciates the objectives of the Global Field Support Strategy in bringing about improvements in the service delivery to the peacekeeping missions in their start up and expansion phase. The realization of these objectives hinges on significant changes and

modifications in current procedures for approval of resources and delivery of services. We only hope that the new strategy will simplify and **not** complicate the procedures. We will encourage the Secretariat to further develop the idea, based on rational analysis of the problems of the UN support system.

Mr. President,

The life span of a peacekeeping mission is related to accomplishment of its objectives. It should not be expected to stay longer than required or withdraw prematurely. This can be ensured only if transition modalities are preconceived by an anticipatory approach. In this regard, we recognize the important inputs of the Brahimi Report and are privileged to have listened to its eminent author today. Success of a transition from the peacekeeping environment to the possible closure of the Mission must be conceived by a rational analysis of the interconnectivity of planning, execution and achievements; under the overarching rubric of a mission's main objectives. Early investment in the national institution-building, together with pacific settlement of underlying disputes on the political plain, would only facilitate this transition into sustainable peace. This is where the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts interface with each others. Success of peacebuilding would ensure seamless and successful exit of peacekeeping missions. The Peacebuilding Commission, with its unique composition is ideally positioned to contribute in developing such cross-sectional synergies.

Mr. President,

The reform of peacekeeping is a continuing exercise. As we are nearing completion of a decade since Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi authored his report; it is time to examine our current strategies in light of the landmark document. Similarly, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support's non-paper titled "New Horizon" needs to be thoroughly analyzed with a view to ensuring continuum in the reform process. Such continuum is essential to address the future challenges of peacekeeping in a logical and coherent method.

Mr. President,

I am certain that today's thematic debate will enrich the global discourse on the UN peacekeeping. I will conclude by paying my respect to all brave men and women, who have lost their lives in the cause of the UN peacekeeping and offer heart-felt condolences to their bereaved families.

Thank you.



INDIA भारत

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STATEMENT

BY

AMBASSADOR HARDEEP SINGH PURI
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ON THE

THEMATIC DEBATE ON
“UN PEACEKEEPING: LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE”

AT THE

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

NEW YORK

22 June 2010

Mr President,

Let me begin by congratulating you for organizing this thematic debate in the General Assembly. Your decision to convene a debate on peacekeeping addresses a long-standing gap. It is a strong political signal about the importance that all Member States attach to this activity. It also signals their intent to engage constructively and substantively. It would be pertinent, in this regard, to note that the Security Council has, during the past year, organized at least four debates under four different Presidencies on peacekeeping and on related thematic issues.

We have heard with interest the remarks of their Excellencies the Ministers and those of the Secretary General and Mr Brahimi.

Mr President,

The subject of this special session, that of "Building Partnerships and Securing Capabilities" captures the essence of the challenge that peacekeeping now faces. It signifies, among other things, that much has changed since 1956, the year in which the first major peacekeeping operation was launched.

To begin with, the formula of 1945 is obsolete. Global capacities, be they economic, military or in other areas, are distributed in a significantly different pattern. The talk of partnership and capabilities reflects the changes that have occurred and the need for these changes to be accommodated in the global division of labour in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr President,

Under the current formula, those member states that are not represented in the Security Council, are supposed to get their say in peacekeeping through the Fourth and Fifth Committees. Troop Contributing Countries, in addition, are statutorily consulted through the triangular meetings convened by the Security Council.

The productive deliberations of the last C-34 notwithstanding, my delegation is pained to point out that attempts are often made to by-pass the C-34 on substantive matters. Recent efforts to fundamentally alter the peacekeeping support structure without entering into a substantive engagement with the C-34 and TCCs are a case in point.

My delegation acknowledges that improvements have been made in the timing of triangular meetings. We have suggested a number of simple changes to make these meetings more useful and relevant. Predictability in terms of timing and circulation of agendas are two of these measures. The system of consultations must also be extended to cover all stages of the mission cycle.

Peacekeeping, in our assessment, will remain the major UN activity for the next few years. It will need more partners, not less; more capabilities, not less. The tendency in some quarters, in the name of expediency, to avoid intergovernmental discussions is counter-productive. There is no shortage of capacities in today's world. The challenge that the United Nations faces is in its efforts to harness these capacities. My delegation submits that greater involvement of member states, not lesser, is the best way of obtaining these capacities for the common benefit of all.

Mr President,

Two-thirds of UN peacekeeping resources are presently devoted to operations that are at least five years old. The international community must find the capabilities that are required to ensure that the gains that have been painfully accrued by peacekeepers in these mature operations are not squandered while facing the challenges of an altered operating environment.

My delegation would like to stress that Peacebuilding is a far more complicated endeavour than peacekeeping. The number of stakeholders is higher. The requirement for resources is also higher. It requires much greater coordination and joint activity with national authorities than is currently the norm. National needs, not priorities driven by external and donor interests, should be the yardstick used to approach peacebuilding.

DPKO, which is currently a military-driven organization, will have to transform itself in the face of these challenges. It will need more policemen and more rule of law and development administration personnel in future. Member states will need to focus on the division of responsibilities between DPKO and UN Country Teams in order to prevent duplication and waste.

80% of peacekeeping resources are devoted to areas with a legacy of colonialism. Peacebuilding must take into account the experience and insights of countries that have undergone successful post-colonial national building exercises. Failure to do so would lead to sub-optimal results.

Mr President,

A debate on peacekeeping must address legislative issues. Indian troops have been at the forefront in protecting civilians and human rights on the ground. We have and continue to work assiduously to strengthen the international regimes relating to human rights and humanitarian law.

The Charter, with good reason, distinguishes between the actions of the Council under Chapters VI and VII. We, as members of the General Assembly, have the responsibility of being vigilant against back-door methods to obliterate the Council's responsibility to attempt peaceful settlement of disputes.

Mr President,

India strongly favours a greater female presence in peacekeeping. The effectiveness of a female Indian Formed Police Unit in Liberia is testimony to the power of an example in empowering the weak and the vulnerable.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate our position that we are in favour of a policy of zero tolerance in respect of disciplinary and conduct issues.

Mr President,

In ending I salute Indian peacekeepers, as well as those from other countries, who have made the supreme sacrifice and laid down their lives while serving in UN Missions, most recently in Haiti.

Thank You.

General Assembly Thematic Debate
on
“UN Peacekeeping: looking into the future”
New York, 22 June 2010

Panel discussion on “The political dimensions of UN peacekeeping”
Speaking points of President Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman, Crisis Management Initiative

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this General Assembly debate on the future of the UN peacekeeping. We all know that the strength of the UN and regional organizations lies in its Member States and their commitment. This debate provides a useful opportunity to reflect on how to further improve our contribution to peace operations.

In the following I would like to reflect the political dimensions of UN peacekeeping particularly through my experience in the Namibian peace process and UNTAG operation.

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia was the UN's first attempt at engaging in multidimensional peacekeeping since the downfall of the Congo operation in 1964.

Its primary means and purpose were political in overseeing democratic transition after decades of liberation struggle and colonial rule. Therefore, UNTAG carried out a wide variety of tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by more traditional peacekeeping operations.

From the beginning it was clear to us that the operation needed to be linked to and supported by broader political mechanisms, at the Security Council and beyond, that reinforced its political role and brought weight and authority to bear on UN messages.

The complexity of the operation and the intense interest it aroused led the Secretary-General to establish at Headquarters in New York a high-level Namibia Task Force, which met daily under his chairmanship, to coordinate the Secretariat's role and to provide policy guidance and maximum support to the Special Representative in the field. The Task Force helped to maintain adequate political engagement and ensured continued consensus around mission objectives.

In current debate the host country consent is one of the key issues where we have to find a common understanding. Intrastate violence has become the major form of armed conflict in the world, with governments opposing non-government forces, or non-government factions opposing one another, in cases of state collapse. This change poses challenges to the principle of consent, since this principle has initially been based on a reality dominated mainly by interstate conflicts. To me the host country consent in the Namibia case suggests that the warring parties' consent for peace implementation is not always present but can be created and sustained through a continuous dialogue with the parties.

A key factor contributing to the success of the UNTAG was the proper planning and unified command structure where the military also reported through the SRSG. A credible military presence, multifunctional civilian team and political processes reinforce each other operationally.

The breadth and depth of the United Nations' political engagement with the process of change, and the integration of high-level Secretariat and UNTAG elements into this process, gave UNTAG its special character. At critical moments during the implementation of the peace accord, UNTAG took its cues from local circumstances and tried to respond to political needs of Namibian society.

In order to establish UNTAG as a legitimate authority with all Namibians our strategy was to have staff of the forty-two districts and regional offices to interact as much as possible with local population. The widely distributed field presence allowed for creativity and flexibility on the part of the staff in seeking contacts with the Namibians. We also wanted to raise public awareness of what UNTAG was doing and why through an information programme that was integral part of the operation. In retrospect I feel that we managed relatively well in engaging with the locals and creating local ownership of the transition process.

The UNTAG operation demonstrated also the critical role of partnerships with and engagement of regional stakeholders – front line states on behalf of OAU. Also the disposition of major global powers and the attitude of key actors and forces in the country enabled UN to succeed despite the numerous challenges.

The Namibian transition also had a positive impact on the regional situation, facilitating the peace process in Angola and providing an important stimulus for the reform process in South Africa.

Peacekeeping operations are often deployed in the aftermath of protracted violent conflict, in which all sides have committed grave human rights violations and other crimes. The rule of law and protection of human rights are the keystones in the creation of sustainable peace. In Namibia the concept for civilian policing was introduced for the first time. We learned the lesson that without sufficient police and civilian resources any peace operation is bound to leave behind it an unconsolidated peace.

I am fully aware that the favorable conditions and sometimes also the good luck we had in Namibia were exceptional and not necessarily present in most of the cases. After Namibia peacekeeping mandates have steadily become more complex and difficult to achieve, but the ability of the UN system and the political will of member states to adequately staff and equip those missions have not evolved with expectations.

Sometimes, I am afraid that we risk forgetting the central lesson of the Brahimi Report: peacekeeping is not a substitute for an effective political process. That lesson has been on vivid display over the past few years, as the collapse, failure or stasis of political processes in central Africa, Lebanon, Sudan, Chad and Haiti placed peacekeeping operations there under severe strain. Most alarming was the surge of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late Fall 2008 which saw MONUC - already overstretched and

under-supported - almost collapse on the ground before last-minute political negotiations led to a tenuous cease fire.

There is not a magic remedy to the challenges peacekeeping is facing but there are also things that Member States can do if there is a political will. Examples of practical things that would take us forward are for example reform of the budget process to increase preparedness and flexibility, better involvement of TCCs (troop contributing countries) and PCCs (police contributing countries) in the planning process, increased authority of the Secretariat and increased transparency of the Security Council's work.

In spite of the challenges, several peacekeeping missions have made good progress in providing security and stability, but they face obstacles in designing and implementing peacebuilding strategies that can facilitate responsible transition and exit.

Therefore, we need to look beyond peacekeeping. Ultimately the utility of peacekeeping operations correlates to the political progress they contribute to. The biggest lessons of all about the handling of conflict that we have learned in recent years is the critical necessity of effective post-conflict peacebuilding, to ensure that the conflict cycle does not begin again.

The integrated peacebuilding mission, such as the one in Sierra Leone, provide Member States with a less risky and less abrupt exit strategy for peacekeeping operations and provide an interim arrangement before the ultimate transition to the UN resident coordinator system.

UN peacebuilding missions, compared to the UN resident coordinator system have the advantage of a continued political mandate from the Security Council, giving the head of the mission the ability to intervene in political conflicts and promote conflict prevention measures. Such interventions are not possible for a UN resident coordinator, whose mandate is restricted to development issues. UNIPSIL's handling of political violence in the March of last year in helping to defuse a political conflict and to negotiate a political settlement would not have been possible without the political mandate from the Security Council.

The transition from a peacekeeping mission to a peacebuilding mission must not only represent a change in the number of staff but provide for a qualitative change as well. This requires a new approach. With the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the focus of UN interventions must also change from peace and security to peace and development.

I want to end by underlining the importance of conflict prevention. Peacekeeping and peace building are complex and costly substitutes for effective conflict prevention. Few could dispute that responding after a large-scale violent conflict has occurred is second best compared with preventing their occurrence—in moral, strategic, and financial terms. Institutional capacities for prevention continue to lag noticeably behind those for peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. Conflict prevention capacity does not

necessarily require new offices or institutions. In fact, mainstreaming conflict prevention into the foreign policy apparatus of governments and the operation of international organizations may ultimately be more effective and sustainable. Nevertheless, prevention strategies do require focused attention, resources, and a process to spur action in response to warning signs.

The UN, with its Charter responsibilities, global presence and broad institutional framework, is uniquely placed both to tackle root causes of conflict and to take short term preventive measures. The UN Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action is a useful coordination mechanism, but requires sustained support to have an impact on UN and national capacities.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The United Nations and its Member States carry enormous responsibility for global peace and human security. Only member states have the political, financial, and human resources needed to endow a UN mission with the components of success. We are responsible both for our citizens and the citizens of war-torn countries. It is our responsibility to act – to prevent violence, to resolve conflicts and to help rebuild. This responsibility means commitment – we cannot choose to come and go based on national interests or economic considerations. What we need is staying power – the ability to commit to and guide war-shattered countries in the long-term through the rebuilding and reconciliation process. This is particularly true with the most demanding peace operations that the UN is now involved.

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General Assembly Thematic Debate

Tuesday, 22 June 2010

UN Peacekeeping: looking into the future

Panel One: Political dimensions of UN Peacekeeping

Alvaro de Soto: notes for remarks

Various authoritative bodies, including the Brahimi Commission and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, not to mention the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and a myriad of scholars, have performed microsurgery on many if not most of the points suggested for discussion in this panel. I will spare you yet one more point-by-point commentary.

I never fancied myself a peacekeeping expert as such. This isn't to say that I didn't take a great interest in it during my UN career; it's just that I didn't dwell so much in the –admittedly fascinating– mechanics of peacekeeping. I was captivated by its potential as a tool at the service of peacemaking.

An example by way of illustration: in the late 1980s Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed me as his personal representative for the Central American Peace Process. At that time there wasn't much process and peace seemed rather distant. The UN's peacemaking was led by a small band operating out of the Secretary-General's office. The iron grip of the cold war made it very difficult to disentangle the various conflagrations and see them in their peculiar specificity. The Secretary-General gave me this assignment because we saw the makings of a strategy that

could work and he thought that the UN might be better able to gather and bring together the various elements needed, and we had competitive advantages both political and operational. One of these was the UN's ability to quickly deploy missions in the field.

The Central American Presidents had made a commitment to ensure that their territories were not used as launching pads for the destabilization of their neighbours, and agreed that their compliance with this commitment should be submitted to verification. To this end, they consented to the creation by the Security Council of the UN's first peacekeeping operation in the region, ONUCA, which patrolled the borders between the Central American countries. The presence of ONUCA accustomed Central Americans to the unprecedented sight, in the continental Americas of UN uniformed personnel in their territories.

This helped to open the possibility of dealing with the various conflicts each according to its requirements as part of a broader scheme. Thus the UN monitored the April 1990 elections in Nicaragua, the first time it had done this in a member state on a large scale. This was part of an arrangement that brought to an end what was then known as the 'Contra War.' Another part was the role played by a Venezuelan battalion under the UN flag which was deployed on very short notice to receive and decommission the weapons of the 'Contras.'

Starting almost simultaneously the UN conducted the 1990-1991 negotiations between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN –the insurgent coalition- which produced far reaching reforms that led to the end of the decade-long war in that country. A key part of that effort was the establishment of the first truly multidisciplinary field operation in a member State, ONUSAL, which saw through the implementation of the agreements under the direction of the Security Council. Negotiations led by the UN then assisted the Government of Guatemala and the URNG to reach

agreements that ended an insurrection which had started in the early 1960s.

Certainly the UN's ability to put together and deploy sizeable, complex operations quickly and to sustain them over the time necessary to complete their tasks was a comparative advantage. But this was part of a broader strategy which included the UN's capacity to draw into the effort outside players, including from outside the region, who could be of assistance, and also to speak to all the players including the insurgents and other irregular groups involved in the various conflicts. Of course we spoke to anyone who was a significant part of the problem so as to make them part of the solution – the UN's ability and willingness to do so was a critical asset. By not talking to a crucial party you are taking sides against it – not a desirable position to be in for a peacemaking agent. We could produce agile and innovative diplomacy and peacekeeping at the service of a political strategy.

The last few years of the cold war were a time of opportunity, and in several instances it was seized: the last 3 or 4 years of the decade in office of Mr Pérez de Cuéllar as the fifth Secretary-General saw a flurry of diplomatic and operational successes unparalleled in the twentieth century. There was a whiff of hubris in the air; unsurprisingly it infused the statement issued by the fifteen heads of government gathered for the first Security Council summit ever, on 31 January 1992.

The new collegiality among the five permanent members of the Security Council raised hopes that the UN's time had come at last after four fallow decades. At the request of the Council, Mr Boutros Ghali, the incoming sixth Secretary-General, produced his celebrated report, *An Agenda for Peace*, with concrete recommendations on how to enhance the capacity of the Organization for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In an early flash of insight, Mr Boutros Ghali

foresaw that the UN would be increasingly involved in tackling internal conflicts and that more far-reaching measures would be required to ensure the viability and durability of settlements between groups at war who had to cohabit in the same territory after bitter conflict – they could not simply disengage and withdraw to their own territories as is the case after international conflict. This insight led Mr Boutros Ghali to add recommendations on a fourth area which he called post-conflict peace-building – activities to avoid relapse of conflict.

The débâcles in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda swiftly punctured the newly awakened expectations regarding the arrival of the UN's hour. Serious questions arose regarding the ability of the United Nations to face the new crises that were emerging. At the heart of these questions was whether the political will and the resources to face them were available.

Mr Boutros Ghali often remarked that the end of the cold war was a turning point as important and transcendental as the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I and II, but that those events were followed, respectively, by the Congress of Vienna, the Versailles conference and the San Francisco conference which led to the creation of this Organization. He rightly predicted that in the absence of an equivalent high-level reckoning, reflection and resetting of priorities, the period to come was going to be extremely difficult to navigate.

The closest approximation to Vienna, Versailles and San Francisco after the cold war was the 2005 World Summit. Leaving aside other differences between the situation after the cold war and those that prevailed in 1815, 1919 and 1945 -and there are many- there is the overwhelming numerical fact that the international community today comprises close to 200 states, and that there is a corresponding unwillingness to accept a sort of global directorate, whether of 2, 5, 8 or 20 members.

Notwithstanding the Charter provision under which all Member States have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agreed that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf, the willingness of the many to leave major decisions affecting international security to the few is decidedly not on the increase. This explains some of the palpably uncomfortable compromises of 2005. It does not belittle the complexities involved nor what was achieved nor the talent or good will of any of the participants in the enormous effort leading up to the 2005 outcome document to say that the major questions that arose after the unwinding of the cold war remain largely unanswered.

Twenty years after the end of the cold war we still lack clarity regarding how, to what end and according to what criteria the international community wishes to use the set of tools that is available. While Security Council resolutions often have lengthy and detailed preambular sections, they provide little basis to predict whether and if so when and how the Council will choose to act, even though circumstances appear to be similar or analogous.

Firstly, as regards the 'how?' questions in the first cluster concerning the importance of sustained political will and engagement, let me say simply that political will must be the premise underpinning any decision by the Security Council to undertake a UN peacekeeping operation, together with the determination to see the operation through in a manner that substantially reduces the risk of relapse. A corollary is that the Council shouldn't initiate an operation unless the resources and capabilities exist and are available – a point forcefully made in the Brahimi report.

Maintaining continued consensus around an operation and its objectives is admittedly a challenge in a world composed of an

ever growing proportion of democratic states, for it is difficult to reconcile the exigencies of the electoral calendar with the strategic patience that is required to see an operation through: beware of fixed-calendar exit strategies that might be interpreted by less enthusiastic parties to a conflict that is approaching dénouement as indicating how long they must wait to reverse the process.

It is obvious that a 15-member body cannot micromanage operations. It follows that the Council must rely on the Secretary-General and his Special Representatives, particularly in identifying the resources and capabilities that will be required as well as in keeping track of the 'life cycle' of an operation.

The second cluster of questions refers to the political challenges facing peacekeeping operations. The best way to ensure that the presence of a peacekeeping operation contributes to moving the process forward is for the Council to stand behind it and make absolutely certain that the parties to the conflict know this. They can do this starting with the text of the Security Council's resolution mandating the operation and continuing with Council statements, and also through the prompt and effective deployment of the necessary personnel, civilian as well as military, and in continued political and diplomatic support for the efforts of the Secretary-General's envoys. Here again, the Secretary-General has an outsized responsibility, because –once again- a peacekeeping operation is but a tool to assist in the attainment of an overarching strategic goal.

The question "How should UN missions deal with 'spoilers'?" can lead us into choppy waters, absent an agreed definition of what we are talking about. It brings to mind a term familiar to everyone in this room whose definition, first proposed in the early 1970s, still defies agreement. Even scholarly work on the subject is still in its infancy. Professor Stephen John Stedman of Stanford University, well known in this house, wrote a seminal article on the subject a

full thirteen years ago. In search of a typology, he referred to “leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” This is an excellent intellectual platform on which to initiate a policy discussion. Of course it raises the question of the intentions of the leaders and parties concerned, not always easy to determine. More complicated is the fact that if indeed violence is being used to undermine attempts to achieve peace, do we really have an “emerging peace” at all? Moreover, there is a danger of manipulation: a leader or party who has managed to position himself in the mainstream of peace efforts might maneuver to keep out of the mainstream a rival, who may represent a significant current without which it will be difficult to bring about peace, by depicting him as a spoiler. One man’s spoiler may be another man’s candidate for inclusion in a doomed, narrow, exclusionary process – not a felicitous way of embarking on a peace process. If the UN lends itself to exclusionary policies it is not only unlikely to succeed, particularly over the medium to long term; in the age of instant global communication –the age of twitter- taking sides in one conflict can imperil the UN’s role in others. It also holds the potential of leading to an operation that would fall outside the normally accepted parameters of consent for UN peacekeeping. The leitmotiv of a UN-led peace strategy should be the broadest possible inclusion of groups or sectors who must learn to live in reasonable harmony within the framework of a given state.

I have sufficiently –excessively, you might say- emphasized that peacekeeping must be seen as a tool at the service of a broader political strategy, which essentially flows from the principal purpose of the Organization which is the maintenance of international peace and security. Let me conclude by elaborating for a moment on post-conflict peace-building, the concept coined by Mr Boutros Ghali. Unfortunately the lucidity of the coining of the concept was not matched by the necessary follow-up at the

United Nations, where it was allowed to drift for several years, during which various institutions competed for the leadership. There is a glaring need for conceptual clarity here: I don't wish to dispute the benign proposition that everyone who is working for health, education or development is making a contribution to peace. What I want to emphasize is that transitions from war to peace, which are frequently accompanied by a transition from authoritarian government to a more open or democratic system and adapting to globalization, are extremely fragile periods during which priorities may have to be rearranged in a manner which economists and other actors might abhor but which may be needed for the sake of avoiding recurrence of war.

Given that the purpose of post-conflict peacebuilding is to avoid the recurrence of fighting, there should be no doubt that the UN should be in the lead, and within the UN, the Security Council, the primary organ for the maintenance of international peace and security. What could be more germane to the maintenance of international peace and security than avoiding the relapse of conflict? My fear is that in the decisions taken at the 2005 summit something was lost, and that is the central responsibility of the Security Council in this field. Anything that detracts from that is to my mind a loss.

My greatest fear is the depoliticization and the technocratisation of peacekeeping.

Multi-dimensional Peace-keeping Operations

Towards Sustainable Peace, Peace-building and the Nexus between Security and Development.

June 22 2010, New York, General Assembly

Permit me, from the outset to state what may appear to be obvious that the United Nations exists primarily to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. And one critical instrument by which this is achieved is peace-keeping operations.

The underlying need for peace-keeping operations was born out of a universal quest for a world, in which all people and sovereign states would get the needed space to pursue their legitimate socio-economic development in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility.

In essence, the UN peace initiatives should cover a whole gamut of measures from preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace enforcement to peace building.

As a multilateral operation involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, designed to

achieve humanitarian goals of long-term political settlement, and conducted impartially in support of a UN mandate.

For a UN soldier operating under the traditional peacekeeping scenario therefore, his job involved the simple and mundane tasks of observing, patrolling reporting cording and controlling.

It's a well-known fact that Ghana has contributed immensely to UN efforts at peace keeping since the 1960s and is in fact rated as the fifth UN contributors to troops for UN operations.

But over the past two decades the peace keeping process has been changing rapidly due to the collapse of the Cold war because the world now is not only engaged in helping countries in terms of war but those that may be described as weak and failing states- unable to exercise effective sovereignty over their terroritores. This has led to conflicts centered on demands for greater political rights such as democratization, human rights, and good governance, ethnic and religious clashes.

There are also situations where conflicts have been caused because of rivalry desires to capture natural resources and in other situations where criminal networks subvert governments so as to create space for hard drug production.

All these assaults on peace and sovereignty have been made more complex and lethal by the easy access to cheap, highly destructive weapons which find their way into the hands of even child soldiers.

The prevailing information explosion with its instant coverage of world events has tremendously influenced public opinion. Television and the Internet have made the much-vaunted "global village" a virtual reality, and local politics have now become global. Humanitarian disasters are now literally brought into the living rooms of people, and this has had a tremendous impact on the moral conscience of the global community, leading to instigations for urgent action. However the so-called "CNN effect" has been all positive. In some cases, global media coverage has rather dramatized and hardened political conflicts and subjected peace keeping operations to unhelpful scrutiny.

Finally as the world's population continues to grow, demographic pressures tend to have a concomitant effect on security. For these and other reasons, the last two decades have seen a large increase in the number of peace-keeping operations. The range of operations has also expanded from the traditional peace keeping to much more "muscular peacekeeping" including use of sophisticated conventional weaponry as happened in Kosovo.

The UN therefore has no option but to adopt a more flexible response to meet new challenges. Such responses need not be only military functions but should cover diverse activities including conducting elections in countries with internal strife; humanitarian intervention assistance; land-mine clearance, post-conflict peace building; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Some of the future trends envisaged are as follows:

- a) UN Mandates: Mandates need to be clear, robust and unambiguous to enhance success, especially in joint peace keeping missions.
- b) Types of Force: the composition of the force will have to be done only after a thorough analysis of

each situation and may have to include human rights observers, legal advisers, political affairs officers, electoral staff etc.

c) Regional Arrangement. The UN Charter stresses that regional organizations-OAS,AU,EU- can help the UN with the maintained of peace in affected regions. Now such bodies should be prepared to augment the efforts of the UN by undertaking purposeful confidence building measures to pre-empt conflict. In this regard there is the need for free flow of information, the establishment of regional standby bridges and the formation of hybrid missions as and when necessary.

d) Problem of Information and Analysis- The capacity of the UN to collect and interpret information need to be enhanced to make operations more responsive. The best intelligence from states should be made available to the UN> the UN should have its own independent mechanisms to validate what it obtains from elsewhere. Ultimately what is required is a global watch mechanism to monitor likely crisis situations, rather than the old traditional role of responding when they occur.

e) Duration of Operation- Future peace keeping operations should be prepared to maintain a reasonably long presence as a confidence building measure in view of the complexity of contemporary conflicts.

f) Role of the Media: All strategic, operational and tactical plans should take full account of the critical role of the media.

To conclude, it is certain that in the present post-Cold war era peace keeping operations would require a comprehensive and integrated response from multidisciplinary agencies of which the military is only but one part. The paradigm has long shifted from the days of UNTSO to present day hybrid missions. The changed global go-political scenario and the unleashing of various national forces have made peace operations complex and fraught with challenges.

Under the circumstance, military activities in peace keeping should only be designed to create the conditions in which diplomatic, and humanitarian activities can take place. The end state should be a stable settlement of disputes so that an enabling environment can be created

for socio-economic development to flourish and mankind
saved from the scourge of war.

GA Thematic Debate on UN Peacekeeping: Looking into the Future

**Panel: Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations – toward sustainable peace, peacebuilding
and the nexus between security and development**

Speaking notes for Senior Vice President and Chief Economist Yifu Lin

22 June 2010

1. [Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen]. It is my honor to take part in this debate, and to reflect on the decade of experience in peacekeeping since the Brahimi Report was issued in 2000. It is a privilege to do so in the company of national and international leaders who have been on the frontlines of efforts to build sustainable peace in some of the world's most challenging political and security environments. Certainly our moderator Jamal Benomar, and my co-panelists, Ashraf Ghani, Andrew Mitchell and Ellen Margrethe Loej have committed their professional lives to the search for coherent strategies, partnerships, political will, and resources that accompanies the difficult work of promoting a lasting peace.
2. The challenge of peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict is a shared one. The impacts of conflict – from poverty and refugee flows, to the spread of epidemic disease and the rise of transnational criminal networks – reverberate across borders. No one is immune: the world's poorest, middle-income, and richest countries are all affected. Failure to consolidate peace, facilitate economic growth, and ensure social justice is not just a national concern. It has global repercussions.
4. It is in this context that we meet today and I would like to cover two themes in my remarks: First, how do we infuse peacekeeping efforts with attention to the longer-term work of promoting sustainable development and statebuilding? Second, what role can international actors play in reinforcing national efforts to marry security and development for progress?
5. But to begin I would like to explain the background to our interest in this set of issues. Much of the world has made rapid progress in building stability and reducing poverty in the past sixty years, but areas characterized by persistent violence and fragile institutions are being left far behind. Our research indicates that conflict is the central constraint to development. We have found striking findings that 22 out of the 34 countries furthest from reaching the MDGs are in or are

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emerging from conflict. Conflict-affected and post conflict populations account for between two out of three of all infants and children dying. These same war torn or post conflict countries account for three out of four of all mothers dying in childbirth. In the lead up to September's Millennium Development Review Conference, it is important to underline both that fragile and conflict-affected states represent the majority of the challenge of meeting the MDGs. On the positive side, in countries such as Mozambique where peace has been consolidated, social and economic conditions have improved very quickly.

6. As an institution, the World Bank is increasingly seized with the centrality of conflict to the development agenda. In his determination to address this complex set of issues, Mr. Zoellick asked me to focus the 2011 World Development Report on the inter-related themes of conflict, security and development. The report will be released in January next year.

7. In preparation for the 2011 WDR, we have sought to learn from the diverse experiences of many regions and from reformers in conflict-affected countries. There are three reasons for these extensive and early consultations. First, this subject is very fast-moving: we are all learning lessons in real time from the evolving situation in countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan. Second, and central to the topic of our panel, conflict merges issues of diplomacy, security and development: the World Bank represents only one side of this triangle, so we need to consult with those who have more expertise than us in the other areas. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this is an agenda where the OECD countries had traditionally dominated the policy debate. We felt that it was critical to expand the dialogue to ensure that the countries most directly affected by conflict - including middle income countries and regional organisations in the developing world that represent them - be involved in helping us to frame the questions addressed in the forthcoming WDR.

8. The Report's early consultations and analysis reveal three aspects of violence relevant to the role of early peacebuilding perspectives in the design of multi-dimensional peacekeeping.

9. The first is the non-linearity of conflict. WDR analysis demonstrates the rise in violence after formal peace settlements, up fivefold as a percentage of global deaths in battle since the mid-1990s. This confirms what many of us will know to be the case: that many countries which have been labelled as "post-conflict" cases are in fact experiencing on-going fighting and insecurity. The UN missions in Afghanistan and DRC and the UN and joint missions UN-AU missions in Sudan demonstrate the challenges that this poses. Peacekeeping missions, "early recovery" and

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humanitarian relief stretch on for years, and countries cycle through repeated violence. This challenges our current international architecture which attempts to neatly divide conflict into linear phases with associated agencies, timelines, goals and response mechanisms. It also points to the need to inject the principle of prevention into our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

10. Second, there is a link between different types of violence – in particular between political conflict, local conflicts over land, international ideological movements that often link in to localised grievances, gang activities, and organised crime and trafficking. Afghanistan is an obvious example, but we see the same linkages and blurring of lines in all regions. Several of the countries of Central America which had achieved successful peace settlements, for example, now face extremely high rates of violence linked to gang activity and drug trafficking. This is important because we tend to treat these forms of violent challenges separately, with different government ministries, different communities of experts and different international agencies dealing with each.

11. The third aspect which we think is under-emphasised is the transnational nature of violence today, including the spread of localized armed movements across borders, and illegal trafficking of drugs, arms, natural resources and human beings. This aspect is important because our international instruments still tend to be very much focused on individual national states.

12. What lessons have we learned about addressing the linkages between security and development, particularly in the peacekeeping phase?

13. First, our research suggests that peace-keeping offers significant economic benefits. In the first three years after conflict, the presence of a UN Peacekeeping force translates into growth rates that are 2.4 percent higher than in a post-conflict country without a UN peacekeeping force. Missions with multidimensional mandates are particularly effective in increasing growth which, in turn, lessens the likelihood of a relapse into conflict as economic development and reconciliation create the conditions for future prosperity.

14. Second, we know that approaches that rely on security alone have a poor track record of success. No matter how strong the law enforcement approach, without economic prospects, it is too difficult to persuade those who see opportunities to profit from violence that they and their families will prosper from following a legal, peaceful path. Growing youth unemployment around the world is a structural risk in this regard which needs urgent attention.

15. Yet economic growth will be insufficient if some groups are perceived to be excluded from access to power, opportunities and resources. Effective management of the political economy of development, of power relations and of expectations of justice, fairness and inclusion are also important: every politician knows this, but perhaps we are slow in catching up to it in the development world. In peacekeeping operations, early efforts to signal progress and inclusion across these three areas – promoting citizen security, increasing economic hope, and confidence in social justice – has been shown to be critical in taking advantage of windows of opportunity for progress.

16. Third, greater efforts are needed to sequence and tackle politically difficult reforms which, while potentially de-stabilizing in the short-term, are key to sustainable peace. These include anti-corruption efforts, security sector reform, political reform, economic and administrative restructuring, justice reform and transitional justice, and empowering disadvantaged groups. However, all too often, the international community pushes for national leadership to tackle all these issues at once, over two or three year timeframes: reform police, hold elections, set up an anti-corruption taskforce, disarm and reintegrate combatants, begin a truth and reconciliation process, draft a constitution. In the western world, with highly developed and well-resourced institutions, such ambition would be political suicide and undoubtedly destabilizing. In peacekeeping environments, national and international stakeholders need a better dialogue on a strategy for sequencing reform efforts, and building on a rhythm of repeated successes.

17. Fourth, and on a related point, we have to be realistic and make space for locally-adapted approaches. We have looked at the time it has taken in practice for developed and middle income countries to transition to peace. In all cases, we find that the countries which have achieved the fastest transformations have still typically taken a generation. Further, they have created approaches that suit their own local conditions –Portugal, South Korea or South Africa, to name three countries which made fast transitions in the 20th century, for example, did not purely mirror the existing institutions of the US or Europe. Rather, they came up with their own approaches to suit their circumstances.

18. These days, in hopes of quick fixes, the international community is less patient and tends to import detailed models that are applied regardless of country context –yet experience shows how imported models crowd out local innovation and often overwhelm nascent national and local institutions. This is not to diminish the role of cross-country learning – there is in particular a great

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potential for south-south learning and hybrid approaches which remains untapped – but we must avoid *one-western-model-fits-all* solutions. We also need to learn to be more realistic in our expectations of the timing of reform – our research, for example, indicates that the fastest 20 countries to achieve lasting institutional change in the areas of democratisation and security sector reform, corruption and the strength of bureaucratic institutions in the late 20th Century took a generation to do so, but our benchmarks for progress these days expect much faster change.

19. Finally, the WDR is assessing gaps in international strategy and financing to support efforts to prevent and recover from conflict. Complex conflict environments require communication across political, security, and development interventions as well as improvements in the speed, duration, and predictability of international assistance. We tend to use volume of aid as our only instrument to tackle the twin challenges of poverty and poor governance in conflict environments. Instead, we should explore diverse modalities of assistance based on country contexts, combining a consistent long-term commitment in the volume of aid with flexibility to change modalities.

20. Peacebuilding environments may be best served by high-risk, high-reward entrepreneurial forms of aid. However, our rigid aid architecture can sometimes thwart necessary innovation and speed of response. There is a challenge in targeting international assistance to fill key gaps, particularly in the areas of institution-building in the justice and police sectors and for job creation. There is also considerable untapped potential to improve regional and global approaches to minimise external stresses on fragile countries – from strengthened action against trafficking in drugs or natural commodities to protection against volatility in commodity markets and investment in cross-border infrastructure and trade.

21. Let me conclude by summarising my argument. I have suggested that insecurity and conflict constitute a global crisis, with significant national, regional and global consequences. I have argued economic prospects and security are now recognised as being interlinked and interdependent, and there is an important “third pillar” in addressing balancing of power relations, and perceptions of justice and inclusion. And I have sketched out some of the early questions, analysis and directions for action raised in the 2011 WDR based on a far-reaching consultative process over the past several months. I leave you then with several questions for our discussion:

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- With the challenge of repeated, interlinked, and cross-border forms of violence, how do we encourage regional strategies and apply a prevention lens in our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in the aftermath of conflict?
- How do work together as political, security, and development partners to better sequence and promote reforms that are key to long-term stability and peace but can create risks in the short-term? How should we best inject a sense of humility and realism over timings in our strategy development processes and financing mechanisms to support these reforms?
- And how do we move toward this more realistic approach that allows for local approaches while also recognizing international and regional standards and lessons learned?

I look forward to our discussion, and thank you for your kind attention.

**Remarks of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and Coordinator of UN Operations in Liberia
Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj**

**Thematic Debate of the General Assembly on Peacekeeping
22 June 2010**

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this important debate. My comments will draw on my engagement in the discussions on the follow-up to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats and Challenges from December 2004 that – relevant for the discussions today – led to the establishment of the Peace Building Commission. I will also draw on the experience gained during my more than two years as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Liberia.

As soon as hostilities cease and a country enters the post-conflict stage, it is important that the new peace is kept, a sustainable peace is built and long-term development promoted. That is a tall order for any post-conflict country, especially one with limited capacity and resources, but especially if it is also dealing with tremendous human and physical destruction. The international community's cooperation and support will often be indispensable to ensure just a glimmer of hope for success.

A peacekeeping mission, if deployed, will have its specific mandate to ensure that the peace is kept. How best to formulate such mandates has been and is being discussed often, but that is not the subject for today's discussion. Our discussion today is to focus on the interlinkages between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and long-term development.

Let me be quite clear – the Government with the support of the international community will have to pursue all three simultaneously: peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development. These are not linear or sequential processes. As has often been said – there is no development without security and no security without development.

It might be that an international peacekeeping force is deployed; but always with the expectation that it is an interim measure until national capacity to carry out such tasks has been built and/or until the underlying causes of the conflict have been addressed. Therefore the mandate of the peacekeeping mission often includes provisions regarding support for building national capacity in addition to other mandated functions related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector.

But even so, the challenges facing the Government of a post-conflict country usually includes return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, economic revitalization, income generation, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, provision of basic services and filling the gaps arising from the phasing out of humanitarian operations – just to name a few.

At the same time, the expectations from the population are very high: they want and need to feel that peace makes a difference in their daily life. They want a peace dividend. Deployment of a peacekeeping mission often gives the Government some space to begin to deliver on these demands.

But while all these demands have to be addressed simultaneously, even with the best of will, they can not be implemented with the same speed. The Government will have to establish priorities and the Government will have to decide what realistically can be and ~~needs to be achieved in the short and medium term and what will be longer term~~ objectives. It is in this process that we start to distinguish between peacebuilding activities and long-term development. But, I cannot tell you which is which. For me it is not so much the nature or the kind of activities undertaken that determines which is which. Rather, it is speed with which they have to be implemented. What comes first?

While the priorities may vary from country to country, in every post-conflict situation, the national ownership of these priorities is key to ensuring sustainability for international support and for the national resources invested.

This is not easy for any Government; certainly not for a post-conflict Government whose national human and institutional capacity has been severely reduced or destroyed.

I believe that was the reason why the High Level Panel in 2004, as a background for its proposal to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, talked about “the international obligations to assist States under stress and recovering from conflict in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.”

So while we all – especially the population in the post-conflict country – are eager to see concrete improvements on the ground, such improvements will be short-lived if the capacity challenge is not addressed early on and more importantly if national ownership is not exercised.

What does this mean for a peacekeeping mission and for the international community??

For me this simply means that our top priority after conflict must be to assist the Government with establishing capacity – even a minimum capacity – to perform its

functions and to set its priorities. And then most importantly, we have to respect these priorities and support the Government in implementing these priorities. Sometimes it is clear-cut and can be done quickly, and sometimes it takes time and patience. There is no quick-fix if sustainability is going to be achieved since sustainability and national ownership go hand in hand.

For the United Nations, this means not only that the peacekeeping mission needs to be an integrated mission, but also that the activities undertaken by the Mission and the UN Country Team must be closely coordinated and also go hand in hand. We must, as we are doing in Liberia, not only work together, but also try to deliver as one in support of national priorities. In theory nobody disagrees, but in practice it is not easy to implement. We have different governing bodies, different budget cycles and even different procurement rules and regulations. And the difference between assessed and voluntary contributions often is a challenge. Another challenge within the peacekeeping mission is successfully evolving staff functions during the mission's cycle so that the early phase 'doers' (who organize the disarmament program or patrol the streets, for instance) later become "mentors" to national counterparts who primarily focus on building and supporting national capacity.

For international partners at large it basically means the same thing. Close cooperation and coordination among international partners to ensure timely support for national priorities is crucial and must be increased. It is clear that some activities are "more attractive" to finance than others. But often such "unattractive" activities are a prerequisite for others to succeed. Normally I mention that training the police is not enough; trained police officers also need the means to function – transport, equipment, etc. And although building corrections facilities might be "less attractive" for bilateral partners to finance, I do not know a single country where the police and the entire rule of law sector can function effectively without corrections facilities. Furthermore there is the challenge of recurrent costs. All agree that recurrent costs are a national responsibility otherwise the activities cannot be sustainable. Yet, in a post-conflict country with limited financial resources struggling to get official structures and policies in place, its overall progress will simply be slower if the international community is not willing to entertain short-term, temporary financing of some or all recurrent costs.

These are just some of the challenges we are facing on the ground in relation to the nexus between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and long-term development in post-conflict countries. They are certainly some of the challenges we face daily in Liberia in our efforts to support the Government of Liberia – not only to maintain the peace, but also to sustain it and progress on the road towards a peaceful and prosperous Liberia. I look forward to your comments and questions.