Note by the President of the General Assembly

The present document contains my work plan of February 2009 for the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in informal plenary of the General Assembly as mandated by the Assembly in decision 62/557, as well as the letters circulated to Member States during the sixty-third session by the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan, Ambassador Zahir Tanin, in his capacity as Chair on my behalf of those negotiations, which, in accordance with decision 62/557, revolve around Member States’ positions and oral and written proposals, all of which remain on the table.
I have the honour to recall decision 62/557 adopted on 15 September 2008 by the General Assembly under agenda item 122, entitled “Question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”, in particular its paragraphs (d) and (e), which state:

(d) Also decided, taking into consideration the results achieved so far in the Open-ended Working Group, and building on the progress achieved thus far, in particular during its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions, as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member States, to commence intergovernmental negotiations in informal plenary of the General Assembly during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, but not later than 28 February 2009, based on proposals by Member States, in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council, seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States;

(e) Further decided that the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations would be the following:

(i) The positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other groupings of Member States;

(ii) The five key issues: categories of membership, the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly;

(iii) The following documents: report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly (A/61/47); Assembly decision 61/561; and the report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-second session of the Assembly (A/62/47).

In undertaking my responsibility as President of the General Assembly to take the implementation of General Assembly decision 62/557 forward, my sole concern rests with the integrity of the process and the attainment of decisive progress. Accordingly, I am herewith, ahead of the next meeting of the informal plenary on 19 February 2009, outlining the work plan as already announced during our successful first meeting of the informal plenary on 29 January 2009. As also announced to Member States on that occasion, the first round of the intergovernmental negotiations will consist of meetings on the five key issues, in strict conformity with subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557. While Member States are free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant, through this work plan I am inviting Member States to focus in a comprehensive fashion on specific parts of our mandate, so as to maximize the chances of success. Also in strict conformity with paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, subparagraphs (i) and (iii) will constitute the substantive underpinning of the meetings. Let me remind Member States that document A/62/47, designated in subparagraph (iii) as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations, contains, in summary format, the
options presented by regional groups and major interest groups, as well as new inputs and reaffirmed views. The meetings as scheduled below, following the exact order found in decision 62/557, will provide Member States with the opportunity to flesh out the substantive underpinning and show the necessary flexibility. The Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Zahir Tanin, who will chair the intergovernmental negotiations on my behalf, will use all means at his disposal, including oral statements and letters concerning the individual meetings, to guide Member States along this path. Also, if Member States so wish, in the absence of an official record, he will provide an overview under my auspices. When the time comes to take action, we will move to a formal meeting of the General Assembly, whereupon the rules of procedure of the General Assembly will take effect. I strongly urge Member States to use the current window of opportunity to make decisive progress, through intergovernmental negotiations “in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner [...] seeking a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States”, towards achieving the objective set by our leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1):

We support early reform of the Security Council — an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations — in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.

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(Signed) Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann
Letters circulated by the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
2 March 2009

In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Starting on 4 March, the membership will within two months conduct the first round of the intergovernmental negotiations in a comprehensive fashion along the lines of the five key issues as enumerated in General Assembly decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as categories of membership, the key issue to be dealt with on 4 March, is concerned, through an excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations:

Categories of membership

The issue of categories of membership proved to be one of the key issues in the entire process. One of the main purposes of the facilitation was to explore whether innovative ideas heard during consultations could help to reconcile existing positions, with a view of advancing the process. The following views were expressed during consultations:

• A large group of States continued to call for the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership (permanent and non-permanent seats).

• A group of States, while defending an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories, is proposing that any new permanent seats holders enjoy all prerogatives of permanent members, including the veto right in the event that it is maintained.

• Another group of States reiterated its position of seeking the creation of a category of membership that is of a permanent character but, at least initially, without exercising the veto. Addition of new non-permanent seats is also proposed by this group.

• A group of States reiterated its position of accepting enlargement only in the category of non-permanent seats, while considering that no initial positions should be pre-empted for any future discussions of the issue. The creation of only non-permanent seats is also considered by a group of States as a possible fallback position in case no other satisfactory solution is found.

• Some Member States encouraged the exploration of a sort of an “interim” or “transitional solution” based on a longer-term renewability of seats. Likewise, other Member States expressed their readiness to explore a solution that would move the process ahead while enjoying broad acceptance.
• Some delegations, especially from small States, expressed the view that any solution should enhance their aspiration to serve on the Security Council.

• A large number of delegations expressed the view that in any expansion there is a need for ensuring a strengthened representation of developing countries and small States. A number of delegations stressed the need to take into account the wide cultural diversity within the international community.

• Some delegations expressed their wish to have the question of categories and the other issue-areas ascertained through a “questionnaire” addressed to Member States.

• The notion of accountability, both at the time of election (Article 23.2 of the Charter of the United Nations) and while serving in the Council (Article 24.2 of the Charter) has been addressed by delegations in relation with categories of membership:
  - A group belonging to a specific region is of the view that that region would be responsible for the selection of its representative States in an enlarged Council, which would be accountable to it.
  - Other Member States expressed the view that accountability could be ensured through a process of “challenge” within a review mechanism.

Signals of flexibility were shown during the consultations: despite the reiteration of initial positions, readiness for some flexibility was expressed by the main groups, especially on the question of permanency:

• Delegations defending permanency would accept to submit the status of any new permanent seats to challenge.

• Delegations contesting permanency would admit the possibility for a number of States to be members of the Council for a longer period of time than that initially envisaged in the Charter.

• Members of a group of States, although remaining firm in their initial positions, expressed readiness to refer any new proposed elements regarding Security Council reform to their highest political authorities at the earliest possible opportunity.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Through his work plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. That is to say filling in any as of yet missing details of your position of first preference on the key issue under discussion, categories of membership in the case of our 4 March meeting, as well as sketching the contours of your position of second preference, should the former prove unrealizable in full at this stage. In that regard,
I welcome recent and future new proposals and invite delegations to highlight the aspects of their proposals which relate to the key issue under discussion.

By giving off signals of flexibility, Member States can inject new life blood into the intergovernmental negotiations, which I strive to set up so as to facilitate a productive exchange among Member States. To that end, I encourage Member States to in their interventions react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, and I am prepared to give delegations the floor for a second time, particularly in case the speaking order has prevented them from reacting and reciprocating at their first opportunity to speak. To make this interaction possible, Member States are urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

I am confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our 19 February meeting will take us very far very fast. For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress, inter alia, by having a similar letter precede each meeting on each individual key issue. As I already stated in my 19 February closing remarks, the treatment of each individual key issue could go on for more than a day, without however disrupting the time schedule as laid out in the President’s work plan. Also in strict conformity with that plan, I will provide Member States with an overview after they finish the first round before the end of April. This comprehensive paper will then serve as a point of departure for the second round immediately thereafter, during which Member States can close in on compromise.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 4 and 5 March exchange on categories of membership, Member States on 16 March will address the question of the veto, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in General Assembly decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the question of the veto is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations:

The question of the veto

Given the sui generis character of the veto the extent of Member States’ flexibility and the scope of possible veto reform were explored through extensive bilateral consultations with a cross-regional sample incorporating small, medium-sized and large States, States having items on the agenda of the Security Council and the States currently holding the veto. Member States addressed the issue on two levels: ideal and attainable reform. The veto was criticized on various grounds by a significant majority of Member States, many of which also relayed a perception that its elimination is not realistic at this stage. Trends regarding the veto included the restriction of its use, prevention of its extension, resignation from its reform at this stage and extension of it to all permanent members so long as it exists.

In terms of restricting the veto, suggestions included limiting the instances where it can be used (for example to exclude instances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), establishing criteria for when and in which situations the veto can be used, formalizing explanations for the use of veto, limiting the scope of application of the veto (either restricting it to Chapter VII decisions or disallowing its use in Chapter VI decisions), restricting its use to only vital issues, barring the veto where a permanent member is a party to a conflict, changing its weight (for example requiring two negative votes to reject a draft resolution), overruling it and placing a cap on the total number of negative votes that can be cast by a permanent member.

Member States considered that extension of the veto presupposes agreement on the addition of new permanent members. Permanent members themselves did not rule out extending the veto, depending on the number of prospective new permanent members and which those would be. Their position ranged from offering qualified support to the draft resolution of the Group of Four (G-4) to being ready to add one or two new members to the group of five permanent members (P-5) and extending the veto to a representative from a region currently without it.
Among States in support of expansion in permanent and non-permanent members, three tendencies were identifiable: (a) the veto is a tool for inaction that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the Council and should not be extended to new permanent members; (b) extension of the veto, in principle, accompanied by a commitment not to use it until a future review; and (c) automatic extension of the veto to new permanent members. The second option gathered the most support, inter alia, because it was also expressed as a fallback position by many States supporting options one and three. For those supporting extension of the veto at this stage, the second option would provide future prospect to that end, while for those supporting non-extension of the veto the second option would satisfy their position now without pre-empting the eventual settlement of the issue.

The general perception of the permanent members regarding the veto, despite nuances regarding certain aspects of the issue, is that the veto is at the core and is the sustaining force of the system of collective security. It is considered to be inherently different from other elements discussed in the reform process as it is the result of a political understanding that pre-dates the Charter and thus could not be reformed by the wider membership. Its reform could only be governed by the same historical rationale that initially brought it into being as a tool of restricting the scope of the collective security system according to their major policy considerations.

Permanent members recognized that the wider membership had concerns regarding the veto but did not consider that it was misused; rather they insisted that the veto is exercised with restraint. However, they did not exclude the prospect of finding ways among themselves to appease those concerns, including, for most of them, through: (a) a voluntary commitment in this respect; or (b) an oral understanding that permanent members would agree to a non-legally binding statement once the reform process has been agreed upon.

Despite nuances, permanent members alluded to the limits of what could be agreed vis-à-vis the veto. The abolition or modification of the veto would not be ratifiable through a Charter amendment. This includes legally binding regulation of the veto or General Assembly guidelines on how to exercise it. The involvement of the Assembly in matters falling within what permanent members consider to be exclusive competence of the Security Council is not amenable, nor is explanation of the use of veto before the Assembly (the P-5 consider that the two organs stand on an equal footing). Most permanent members based their acceptance of enlargement and other reform of the Council on preserving the essence of their veto power.

The limited span between what the current holders of the veto could accept and what the wider membership is seeking prompted Member States to contemplate the option of bypassing substantial veto reform at this stage while maintaining strong preference for the veto to be explicitly included on the agenda of a possible future review. The latter requires further exploration, as there does not seem to be across-the-board agreement on it. The assessment of the facilitators is that, although desirable for the majority of Member States, veto reform alone might not be the single factor that will seal or break the reform deal at this stage, provided that the rest of the reform package will be substantial.
States that have thus far insisted on new permanent members obtaining the same rights and privileges as the incumbents, including the veto, were frequently mentioned as key to the process of Security Council reform. Such States, when consulted, reiterated their official collective position but appeared to be willing to consider alternatives on condition that those would be concrete and sufficiently attractive. While these States did not rule out the prospect of a provisional solution, it was quite clear that no definitive views could be provided by them on this level of consultation at this stage.

Member States which addressed the use of the veto as a source of non-action on the part of the United Nations expressed varying views on whether and how this could be remedied. The mechanism created through General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 was accepted as an alternative by some but deemed either ineffective and/or undesirable by others. No concrete suggestions were suggested on how the Assembly might exercise a subsidiary role in those instances where the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is not exercised because of a veto. Member States did, however, stress that the Assembly should do more to fully exercise its competencies under Articles 10 to 12 of the Charter, including by examining matters of peace and security, and calling on the Council to take relevant action. This could exhort the Council to take action on a situation, provide the viewpoint of the wider membership to the Council on a particular issue and contain the veto through input that would deter its use. The awareness by the Council of the pronouncement of the Assembly on a certain issue would make it difficult for the Council to subsequently ignore the collective will of the international community and be silent on account of a veto.

In the above consultations it transpired that one pragmatic option concerning veto reform at this stage is the possibility of a pledge by the permanent members to exercise the veto with restraint. While this would not amount to a legally binding measure, some Member States have indicated that this would have an impact in practical terms. It was reasoned that indirect limitation/regulation of the veto and the influence of permanent members could be achieved to some degree through the cumulative impact of reform. It was also suggested that enlargement itself amounts to a de facto limitation of the power of the veto because permanent members will constitute less than 25 per cent of the Security Council and the responsibility to block action through veto will be substantially heavier. As the veto is viewed as synonymous with the influence of the permanent five members, it is particularly pertinent to note that the enhanced presence and voting might of members other than the permanent five is believed by many to limit the influence of permanent members on decision-making, including decision-making that is exclusively power balance-driven. Lastly, it was suggested that the power stemming from possession of the veto (implicit veto) would diminish if the Council operated in a manner that allowed for less pressure to be exerted on non-permanent members.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Through
his work plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, on 4 and 5 March, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings, just as I did on 4 and 5 March. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, this time by means of a list of speakers, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
20 March 2009

In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 16 and 17 March exchange on the question of the veto, Member States on 24 March will address regional representation, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in General Assembly decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as regional representation is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations:

**Question of regional representation**

There seemed to be a common understanding that the Security Council in its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical realities and thus needs to be adequately rebalanced:

- The majority of delegations were of the view that the rebalancing of the Security Council needs to be based on “the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization”, as well as on equitable geographical representation, as stipulated in Article 23 of the Charter.

- Nevertheless, some delegations pointed out that additional objectives and measurable criteria had yet to be worked out to define the necessary capabilities of States relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. Proposals included the level of financial contribution to the United Nations, population, regional role and standing, size of military forces and contributions to peacekeeping operations.

In the course of the discussion there seemed to be a twofold understanding of the term “regional representation”:

- Some delegations identified the term “regional representation” as identical to the “equitable geographical distribution” as contained in Article 23.1 of the Charter.

- Other delegations expressed the view that the term “regional representation” should be understood as the regional seat leading to regional accountability. They argued that the notion of regional representation, in the sense of Member States representing regional views, could be explored further. Different options were suggested, such as candidatures to be proposed directly by Member States or through regional consensus, it being understood that the final decision is to be taken by the General Assembly through the election process as set out in the Charter. Another suggestion was that members of the Council should be deemed, if they so wish, to also represent the views of regional groups.
to which they belong while continuing to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

- However, a wide number of delegations felt that, at this stage, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, although proposed on a regional basis, could not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of the Council, they should have a global accountability and an obligation to the international community as a whole.

- In addition, many delegations were of the view that the concept of regional seats, given the different character of each regional group as well as the existing differences in their internal working procedures, was not feasible at this stage.

Although the composition of the existing regional groups was challenged as not accurately reflecting geopolitical realities, there seems to be a wide understanding that the restructuring of the current system is not realistic. The majority is thus still of the view that the principle of the equitable geographic distribution should be exercised through the existing structures. Nevertheless, opinions varied on how to amend the situation, in particular with respect to defining the underrepresented.

The discussion brought out several interpretations within the category of the underrepresented. Accordingly, the underrepresented were classified in the following manner:

- Within the existing group arrangements, there was a general feeling that Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented. Some opined that the Group of Eastern European States was also underrepresented.

- There was also a broad understanding that small and developing countries are underrepresented as a general rule. In addition, some delegations pointed out that small and developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented in particular.

- Some delegations were of the opinion that there was a need for an enlarged Security Council to represent all cultures, religions and civilizations. In that respect, although various political organizations were mentioned as candidates for a Council seat, the majority of delegations argued it would contradict the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations and therefore proposed that their legitimate concerns should be accommodated through other means.

Bearing in mind the inseparable links between the “regional representation” cluster and those of “Size” and “Categories of membership”, it might prove to be very difficult to devise any workable solution prior to the agreement on the number of seats to be distributed. However, since it can be argued that the notions of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution constitute the fundamental elements of any future fair and just solution, they should be taken into account as a general principle during deliberations as well as at the early stages of the eventual future negotiations on size and categories.
The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Through his work plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion have clarified their original position where necessary and have not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast. As I already announced in my 17 March closing remarks, on 9 April we will focus on the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, followed on 21 April by a meeting on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to the United Nations

Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 24 and 31 March exchange on the question of regional representation, Member States on 7 April will address the size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in General Assembly decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations:

Size of an enlarged Security Council

During consultations, Member States agreed with an enlargement in the size of the Security Council. No Member State opposed expansion. Below, are some of the main opinions expressed by Member States in the consultations:

- The size of an enlarged Security Council cannot be judged in isolation from other conditioning issues, such as equitable regional representation and the categories of membership. Determining the size of an enlarged Council was guided, for example, by the aspirations of regions to be satisfied with their representation, rather than a theoretical number decided a priori.

- Opinions as to the size of an enlarged Security Council vary. Many Member States gave specific preferred numbers, while others expressed the view that they are open to suggestions, some of them provided that additional considerations are taken into account.

- Some Member States expressed that among the main criteria that ought to be considered in determining the size of an expanded Security Council are equitable geographical distribution, enhanced credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. A number of delegations added criteria such as the financial and diplomatic contributions to the United Nations and respect for democracy and human rights. Others preferred to adhere solely to the criteria enunciated in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, i.e. “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.

- The “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of an enlarged Security Council were considered by some delegations, in particular, but not only, permanent members of the Council, as paramount elements for a Council that is supposed to act swiftly in the face of crises. Other delegations
argued that efficiency does not necessarily result from a reduced size and that efficiency (or efficacy) could ultimately improve by enlargement in more representative higher numbers.

- Some Member States lamented the current configuration of regional groups, as not representative of like-minded States, but agreed, as most members did, that it would not be advisable to revisit existing regional groups, notwithstanding the wish expressed by some that an expanded Security Council should consider seats for small States or States of particular cultures and civilizations.

- A significant number of Member States, both developed and developing, from different regions, believe that the size of an expanded Security Council should remedy the underrepresentation of developing countries, particularly from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

- A number of delegations, while stressing that the Security Council should properly represent current world reality, expressed their desire to see an adequate correlation between the number of members in the Council and the membership of the General Assembly. They pointed out that the ratio between the Council and the general membership of the United Nations was 21 per cent in 1945 (a ratio of 1:5), 13 per cent in 1965 (a ratio of 1:8) and less than 8 per cent (a ratio of 1:13) at the present time.

- A limited expansion of seats has been advocated by Member States on grounds of efficiency and agility of the Security Council to confront crises. Other Member States favour a larger expansion of seats based on the representativity of the Council.

- In the view of some Member States, an increase in the number of seats, even if solely in the non-permanent category, would entail a rebalancing of the power structure within the Security Council. More members would require new higher proportions of votes to approve resolutions, as the weight percentage of permanent members would decline.

- While some Member States addressed the question of size from the perspective of a one-time expansion, some Member States felt that a review conference should revisit the issue of size in the context of a transitional approach.

- Despite the fact that views on the exact size of an expanded Security Council differ among Member States, they do not seem irreconcilable.


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not be
attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

- Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

- Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of “security”. Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

- As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2006/507). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

- With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but would also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:
  - Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.
  - More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.
  - Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

- On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:
A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.

Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.

As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:

The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of “international peace and security”.

In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adopted by the Security Council itself, and could not be “imposed” by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.

During the 20 April meeting, we will focus particularly on the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and so we kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 7 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the size of an enlarged Security Council and the working methods of the Council.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Through his work plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote
the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 7 and 8 April exchange on size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, Member States on 20 April will address the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues as enumerated in General Assembly decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations:


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not to be attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

- Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

- Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of “security”. Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

- As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and
Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2009/507). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

• With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but would also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:
  - Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.
  - More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.
  - Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

• On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:
  - A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.
  - Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.

• As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:
  - The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of “international peace and security”.
  - In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue
should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adopted by the Security Council itself, and could not be “imposed” by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.

Since the working methods of the Council were already addressed during our productive 7 and 8 April exchange, I kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 20 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Through his work plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

In strict conformity with the work plan, the consideration of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly will conclude the first round, with the second round to commence in May. While Member States have been generating considerable momentum, new steps forward will be necessary in the second round to sustain it. On my continued efforts to implement the work plan and to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress I will inform the membership well in advance.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
18 May 2009

In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing an overview of the first round. Meant to catalyse, not circumscribe, this overview shall serve as a point of departure and reference for the second round, which will consist of the following exchanges as defined in the overview itself:

- 22 May 2009  Exchange 1
- 11 June 2009  Exchange 2
- 23 June 2009  Exchange 3

As Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of the first round will take us very far very fast in the second round.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Attachment

Overview

The first round of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council

1. It is in strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during the successful 19 February 2009 launch of the intergovernmental negotiations in the informal General Assembly plenary on Security Council reform, that the Chair, under the auspices of the President, provides this overview of the first round.

2. In no way does the present overview supplant the substantive underpinning of the intergovernmental negotiations, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of General Assembly decision 62/557:

(i) The positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States groupings;

(iii) The following documents: report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly; General Assembly decision 61/561 and the report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly.

3. The first round of the intergovernmental negotiations consisted of 15 meetings on the five key issues as defined in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557.

4. Over the course of all these meetings, Member States implemented decision 62/557 and the work plan by, with regard to the key issue under discussion, clarifying their original position where necessary and by not seldom demonstrating flexibility on it, including through new oral and written proposals. For his part, the Chair throughout the first round actively promoted interaction, particularly by giving Member States the opportunity to intervene twice, so they could react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. In addition to interaction, the exchanges were characterized by an intense interest among Member States, with more than three quarters of the membership engaging — a substantial increase in comparison with the level of engagement in the Open-ended Working Group of late.

5. On 4 and 5 March, Member States took advantage of the 4th, 5th and 6th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on categories of membership. The first cycle saw no less than 80 interventions, followed by 10 interventions in the second.

6. On 16 and 17 March, Member States took advantage of the 7th, 8th and 9th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on the question of the veto. The first cycle saw no less than 74 interventions, followed by 8 interventions in the second.

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7. On 24 and 31 March, Member States took advantage of the 10th, 11th and 12th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on regional representation. The first cycle saw no less than 67 interventions, followed by 9 interventions in the second.

8. On 7 and 8 April, Member States took advantage of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council. The first cycle saw no less than 79 interventions, followed by 11 interventions in the second.

9. Finally, on 20 April, Member States took advantage of the 17th and 18th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. The first cycle saw no less than 51 interventions, followed by 2 interventions in the second.

10. The first round of the negotiations, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, has evinced the membership-wide political will to make decisive progress during this General Assembly session towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome:3

We support early reform of the Security Council — an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations — in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.

11. On their way to decisive progress, Member States during the first round received guidance from the Chair, in particular through letters preceding each exchange on a key issue. These letters, welcomed by the membership as an important impetus to the process, contained literal and integral excerpts from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. Since overall the first round bore out and built on the content in general and the reform options in particular of those excerpts, the Chair’s letters, attached herewith, should be considered an integral part of the present overview.

12. The principal options have been laid out below in paragraphs 14 to 17, incorporating the main thrust of the productive exchanges of the first round. This point of departure and reference for the second round should catalyse yet never circumscribe the forthcoming exchanges between Member States. After all, as also stated in paragraph 2 of the present overview, the substantive underpinning for the negotiations will continue to be constituted by documents A/61/47 (quoted in the Chair’s letters) and A/62/47, General Assembly decision 61/561, and by the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States groupings, including new positions and proposals, oral and written, introduced in the first round.

13. All throughout the first round, the membership repeatedly and insistently professed its aspiration to move on towards an ever more comprehensive consideration of Security Council reform. For this purpose, guided by and based on the supreme authority and logic of our organization’s constitution, the five key issues have been placed under the headings of Chapter V of the Charter of the

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3 Resolution 60/1.
United Nations on the Security Council: composition; functions and powers; voting; and procedure.

14. Composition

(a) Size
   (i) Low-twenties
   (ii) Mid-twenties

(b) Categories of membership
   (i) Enlargement in both current categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; nature of review or challenge).
   (ii) Enlargement in a new category of extended seats and in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; length of terms [3-15] of extended seats; possibility of re-election to extended seats; nature of review or challenge; provisions to prevent “flip-flopping”\(^4\)).
   (iii) Enlargement only in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; possibility of re-election; nature of review or challenge).

(c) Regional representation
   (i) Addition of seats to current regional groups, giving due consideration to the criterion of equitable geographical distribution through an emphasis on the underrepresented regional groups, particularly Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States and, also, on the Group of Eastern European States (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups).
   (ii) Addition of seats to current regional groups specifically with a view to ensuring the representation of small and medium-sized States and of all cultures, religions and civilizations (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups).

15. Functions and powers

Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly

(i) Strict adherence to the functions and powers of, respectively, the Security Council and the General Assembly as set out in the Charter.

(ii) Submission by the Security Council to the General Assembly of a more substantive and analytical annual report, including on the implementation of Council decisions (and the organization of an informal and interactive debate on the report), and of special reports as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Charter.

(iii) Regular consultations between the President of the Security Council and the Presidents of other principal organs.

\(^4\) Provisions to prevent countries from presenting candidatures for both the new category and the current non-permanent category at the same time or in short intervals.
16. Voting
   Veto
   (i) Reform of the current veto (negotiable: formalizing explanations for the use of the veto; limiting the instances where it is used).
   (ii) Extension of the veto to any new permanent members (negotiable: commitment not to use the veto until a future review).
   (iii) No extension of the veto to any new permanent members.

17. Procedure
   Working methods
   (i) Better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies through transparency and information (negotiable: the adoption of formal rules of procedure; more public meetings, especially when United Nations officials brief the Council; more frequent substantive and detailed briefings on the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and early distribution of relevant documents, particularly draft resolutions and presidential statements).
   (ii) Better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies through consultation (negotiable: rigorous implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter; timely and regular consultations with countries contributing human or financial resources to a peacekeeping operation; regular consultations with relevant regional arrangements and agencies, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter).

18. In order to sustain the considerable momentum generated by Member States over the course of the first round, new steps forward are imperative in the second round. As an overwhelming number of Member States have emphasized, within a more comprehensive consideration of Security Council reform, the achievement of decisive progress demands an explicit exploration of the connections between the key issues, with a view to further unlocking convergence potential. A nexus connecting both the five key issues to each other and, in the same vein, connecting a substantial mass of positions and proposals to each other, is the concept of review or challenge. The widely raised prospect of a reassessment of any arrangement by means of a review or challenge puts each and every component and the entirety of the reform in a different light.

19. Therefore, this nexus constitutes a logical entry point into the second round. Exchange 1 on the general nature, agenda, timing and frequency of any review or challenge will be followed by exchange 2 on the key issues under composition (paragraph 14) and exchange 3 on the key issues of paragraphs 15, 16 and 17. This act of scheduling by the Chair, who will continue to promote interaction as in the first round and to assist Member States in accordance with the President’s work plan, shall enable the membership to advance in more in-depth and more comprehensive negotiations, before, in strict conformity with decision 62/557, continuing during the third round to seek a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.
8 June 2009

In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

Following our productive 22 and 26 May exchange on review or challenge, Member States on 11 June, during the second exchange of the second round, will address the composition of the Security Council, comprising the key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation. Questions like how many seats to add, what kind of seats and how to distribute them among the membership are intertwined and this exchange offers an opportunity to explore such connections, along with relevant negotiables.

While, as part of my responsibility as Chair, impartial to any of the positions but partial to progress, to take the implementation of decision 62/557 forward, I have added structure and, by the request of the membership, comprehensiveness to the exchanges, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant, including the veto.

During the first round, Member States implemented decision 62/557, our brightly shining lodestar, and the President’s work plan by fleshing out the substantive underpinning of the negotiations, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and also by showing the necessary flexibility. During the remainder of the second round, the achievement of decisive progress requires Member States to focus less on the former and more on the latter, inspired by my Overview, in the case of our 11 June exchange especially its paragraph 14.

For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast, in an entirely open process revolving around the positions and proposals of Member States and moving towards a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

Following our productive 11 and 12 June exchange on the composition of the Security Council, Member States on 22 June, during the third and final exchange of the second round, will address the functions and powers of the Security Council, voting in the Security Council, and procedure in the Security Council, comprising the key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the question of the veto, and working methods. These issues are all intertwined and this exchange offers an opportunity to explore such connections, along with relevant negotiables.

While, as part of my responsibility as Chair, impartial to any of the positions but partial to progress, to take the implementation of decision 62/557 forward, I have added structure and, by the request of the membership, comprehensiveness to the exchanges, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant.

During the first round, Member States implemented decision 62/557, our brightly shining lodestar, and the President’s work plan by fleshing out the substantive underpinning of the negotiations, defined in subparagraphs (i) and (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557, and also by showing the necessary flexibility. During the remainder of the second round, the achievement of decisive progress requires Member States to focus less on the former and more on the latter, inspired by my Overview, in the case of our 22 June exchange especially its paragraphs 15, 16 and 17.

For my part, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast, in an entirely open process revolving around the positions and proposals of Member States and moving towards a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to the United Nations

Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith, after the second round’s conclusion, providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

The second round consisted of 8 meetings as defined in paragraph 19 of the Overview. On 22 and 26 May, Member States took advantage of the 19th and 20th meetings of the informal plenary to address the general nature, agenda, timing and frequency of any review or challenge. The first cycle saw no less than 51 interventions, followed by 1 in the second. On 11 and 12 June, Member States took advantage of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd meetings of the informal plenary to address the composition of the Security Council, comprising the intertwined key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation. The first cycle saw no less than 51 interventions, followed by 9 in the second. On 22 and 23 June, Member States took advantage of the 24th, 25th and 26th meetings of the informal plenary to address the Council’s functions and powers, voting and procedure, comprising the intertwined key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, veto and working methods. The first cycle saw no less than 54 interventions, followed by 6 in the second.

This round, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, has evinced the potential for further decisive progress during this General Assembly session towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1):

We support early reform of the Security Council — an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations — in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.

At the present stage, Member States are encouraged to undertake their unique responsibility for fully unlocking that potential and to take advantage of the reflection period of the summer hiatus by reaching conclusions about their own positions and by reaching out informally to both their likeminded and non-concurrent peers at both the New York and the capital level. The Overview, which, with the well-known caveat of its paragraph 2, through its paragraphs 14-17 continues to reflect the principal options for reform, can serve as a source of inspiration for much-needed further concreteness and convergence, building on the current oral and written proposals.

After consideration of the five key issues one by one during the first round and then through two exchanges on, respectively, the key issues under composition (paragraph 14 of the Overview) and on the key issues of paragraphs 15-17 of the Overview during the second, the logical entry-point into the third round is one exchange on all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview), scheduled to take place at the end of the reflection period on 27 August. Regarding the subsequent exchanges, it was argued on the one hand that the third round should revolve around what has commanded the most support from delegations speaking up during the meetings so far, namely the model with an expansion in both current
categories including its different varieties, and on the other hand around what needs to be further explored, namely the intermediate model including its different varieties. As a Chair impartial to any of the positions yet partial to progress, I am pleased to accommodate both these separate requests in light of their conduciveness to the process, with an exchange on the former model scheduled for 1 September and on the latter for 2 September. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat the outcome of previous exercises, with a view to our 2 September exchange I would like to draw your attention to annex IV of document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (e) of decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations. After these three exchanges, Member States can expect to receive another letter from the Chair outlining the membership-driven remainder of the third round, during which our lodestar 62/557 will continue to shine brightly.

As was the case during the first and the second round, as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

While, apart from interaction, both the first and the second round were characterized by an intense interest within the membership, I call for an even wider active participation during the third round. Security Council reform is everybody’s business and getting down to business with a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance requires the largest possible number of delegations to speak out. In the words of the President of the General Assembly: “Each and every one of us stands to gain. Peace and security cannot be maintained by a Security Council that is out of date and out of touch. Let our reform effort therefore not run out of time: a better Council cannot wait until tomorrow, if we want to have a better tomorrow”.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
12 August 2009

I have the honour to inform you that the three exchanges of the third round originally scheduled for 27 August, 1 September and 2 September have been rescheduled as follows:

- **Tuesday, 1 September**: Exchange 1 on all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview)
- **Wednesday, 2 September**: Exchange 2 on air expansion in both current categories including its different varieties
- **Thursday, 3 September**: Exchange 3 on the intermediate model including its different varieties

As Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings by, inter alia, giving States the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. States are, however, again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. In the event that all States wishing to speak during an exchange cannot be accommodated on the allotted day, we will hear any remaining speakers at the first opportunity available.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
10 September 2009

In strict conformity with the work plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith, as a Chair impartial to any of the positions yet partial to progress, after the third round’s conclusion, providing guidance to Member States on the path to further decisive progress.

After a period of reflection by Member States on their positions and their oral and written proposals so far, which are at the centre of these ongoing negotiations as mandated by General Assembly decision 62/557, the third round consisted of six meetings as defined in my 16 July and 12 August letters, during which the membership continued to participate both actively and interactively.

On 1 September, Member States took advantage of the 27th and 28th meetings of the informal plenary to address all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview), which was yet another opportunity to explore the interconnectedness between all of them. The first cycle saw 39 interventions, followed by none in the second. After consideration of the five key issues one by one during the first round and then through two exchanges on, respectively, the key issues under composition (paragraph 14 of the Overview) and on the key issues of paragraphs 15-17 of the Overview during the second, Member States over the course of three rounds of negotiations have now looked at the five key issues from virtually all possible different angles.

On 2 September, Member States took advantage of the 29th and 30th meetings of the informal plenary to zero in on the model with an expansion in both current categories including its different varieties. This model, which over the course of three rounds of negotiations has commanded the most support from delegations taking the floor, was discussed in light of all its advantages and disadvantages, all its different varieties and all the five key issues. The first cycle saw 51 interventions, followed by three in the second.

On 3 September, Member States took advantage of the 31st and 32nd meetings of the informal plenary to zero in on the so-called intermediate model including its different varieties. This model, which does not represent the first preference of any delegation, was discussed in light of all its advantages and disadvantages, all its different varieties and all the five key issues. The first cycle saw 43 interventions, followed by two in the second. Even though Member States further fleshed out this model through an elaboration of the main negotiables, it continued to raise questions.

Three rounds of negotiations, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, have evinced the potential for further decisive progress in the very near future towards finding a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States and towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (resolution 60/1):

5 Including inter alia the relevant negotiables mentioned in the Overview, such as the length of the terms [3-15] of extended seats, the possibility of re-election to extended seats, the nature of review [after 10-15 years] or challenge and provisions to prevent “flip-flopping”.
We support early reform of the Security Council — an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations — in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.

(Signed) Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Starting on 4 March, the membership will within two months conduct the first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in a comprehensive fashion along the lines of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as categories of membership, the key issue to be dealt with on 4 March, is concerned, through an excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"Categories of membership"

The issue of categories of membership proved to be one of the key issues in the entire process. One of the main purposes of the facilitation was to explore whether innovative ideas heard during consultations could help to reconcile existing positions, with a view of advancing the process. The following views were expressed during consultations:

- A large group of States continued to call for the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership (permanent and non-permanent seats).
- A group of States, while defending an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories, is proposing that any new permanent seats holders enjoy all prerogatives of permanent members, including the veto right in the event that it is maintained.
- Another group of States reiterated its position of seeking the creation of a category of membership that is of a permanent character but, at least initially, without exercising the veto. Addition of new non-permanent seats is also proposed by this group.
- A group of States reiterated its position of accepting enlargement only in the category of non-permanent seats, while considering that no initial positions should be pre-empted for any future discussions of the issue. The creation of only
non-permanent seats is also considered by a group of States as a possible fallback position in case no other satisfactory solution is found.

- Some Member States encouraged the exploration of a sort of an "interim" or "transitional solution" based on a longer-term renewability of seats. Likewise, other Member States expressed their readiness to explore a solution that would move the process ahead while enjoying broad acceptance.

- Some delegations, especially from small States, expressed the view that any solution should enhance their aspiration to serve on the Security Council.

- A large number of delegations expressed the view that in any expansion there is a need for ensuring a strengthened representation of developing countries and small States. A number of delegations stressed the need to take into account the wide cultural diversity within the international community.

- Some delegations expressed their wish to have the question of categories and the other issue-areas ascertained through a "questionnaire" addressed to Member States.

- The notion of accountability, both at the time of election (Article 23.2 of the Charter of the United Nations) and while serving in the Council (Article 24.2 of the Charter) has been addressed by delegations in relation with categories of membership:
  - A group belonging to a specific region is of the view that that region would be responsible for the selection of its representative States in an enlarged Council, which would be accountable to it.
  - Other Member States expressed the view that accountability could be ensured through a process of "challenge" within a review mechanism.

Signals of flexibility were shown during the consultations: despite the reiteration of initial positions, readiness for some flexibility was expressed by the main groups, especially on the question of permanency:

- Delegations defending permanency would accept to submit the status of any new permanent seats to challenge.

- Delegations contesting permanency would admit the possibility for a number of States to be members of the Council for a longer period of time than that initially envisaged in the Charter.

- Members of a group of States, although remaining firm in their initial positions, expressed readiness to refer any new proposed elements regarding Security Council reform to their highest political authorities at the earliest possible opportunity."
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan to the United Nations

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. That is to say filling in any as of yet missing details of your position of first preference on the key issue under discussion, categories of membership in the case of our 4 March meeting, as well as sketching the contours of your position of second preference, should the former prove unrealizable in full at this stage. In that regard, I welcome recent and future new proposals and invite delegations to highlight the aspects of their proposals which relate to the key issue under discussion.

By giving off signals of flexibility, Member States can inject new life blood into the Intergovernmental Negotiations, which I strive to set up so as to facilitate a productive exchange among Member States. To that end, I encourage Member States to in their interventions react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, and I am prepared to give delegations the floor for a second time, particularly in case the speaking order has prevented them from reacting and reciprocating at their first opportunity to speak. To make this interaction possible, Member States are urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

I am confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our 19 February meeting will take us very far very fast. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress, inter alia by having a similar letter precede each meeting on each individual key issue. As I already stated in my 19 February closing remarks, the treatment of each individual key issue could go on for more than a day, without however disrupting the time schedule as laid out in the President's Work Plan. Also in strict conformity with that plan, I will provide Member States with an overview after they finish the first round before the end of April. This comprehensive paper will then serve as a point of departure for the second round immediately thereafter, during which Member States can close in on compromise.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin,
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 4 and 5 March exchange on categories of membership, Member States on 16 March will address the question of the veto, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the question of the veto is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"The question of the veto

Given the sui generis character of the veto, the extent of Member States’ flexibility and the scope of possible veto reform were explored through extensive bilateral consultations with a cross-regional sample incorporating small, medium-sized and large States, States having items on the agenda of the Security Council and the States currently holding the veto. Member States addressed the issue on two levels: ideal and attainable reform. The veto was criticized on various grounds by a significant majority of Member States, many of which also relayed a perception that its elimination is not realistic at this stage. Trends regarding the veto included the restriction of its use, prevention of its extension, resignation from its reform at this stage and extension of it to all permanent members so long as it exists.

In terms of restricting the veto, suggestions included limiting the instances where it can be used (for example to exclude instances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), establishing criteria for when and in which situations the veto can be used, formalizing explanations for the use of veto, limiting the scope of
application of the veto (either restricting it to Chapter VII decisions or disallowing its use in Chapter VI decisions), restricting its use to only vital issues, barring the veto where a permanent member is a party to a conflict, changing its weight (for example requiring two negative votes to reject a draft resolution), overruling it and placing a cap on the total number of negative votes that can be cast by a permanent member.

Member States considered that extension of the veto presupposes agreement on the addition of new permanent members. Permanent members themselves did not rule out extending the veto, depending on the number of prospective new permanent members and which those would be. Their position ranged from offering qualified support to the draft resolution of the Group of Four (G-4) to being ready to add one or two new members to the group of five permanent members (P-5) and extending the veto to a representative from a region currently without it.

Among States in support of expansion in permanent and non-permanent members, three tendencies were identifiable: (a) the veto is a tool for inaction that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the Council and should not be extended to new permanent members; (b) extension of the veto, in principle, accompanied by a commitment not to use it until a future review; and (c) automatic extension of the veto to new permanent members. The second option gathered the most support, inter alia, because it was also expressed as a fallback position by many States supporting options one and three. For those supporting extension of the veto at this stage, the second option would provide future prospect to that end, while for those supporting non-extension of the veto the second option would satisfy their position now without pre-empting the eventual settlement of the issue.

The general perception of the permanent members regarding the veto, despite nuances regarding certain aspects of the issue, is that the veto is at the core and is the sustaining force of the system of collective security. It is considered to be inherently different from other elements discussed in the reform process as it is the result of a political understanding that pre-dates the Charter and thus could not be reformed by the wider membership. Its reform could only be governed by the same historical rationale that initially brought it into being as a tool of restricting the scope of the collective security system according to their major policy considerations.

Permanent members recognized that the wider membership had concerns regarding the veto but did not consider that it was misused; rather, they insisted that the veto is exercised with restraint. However, they did not exclude the prospect of finding ways among themselves to appease those concerns, including, for most of them, through: (a) a voluntary commitment in this respect; or (b) an oral understanding that
permanent members would agree to a non-legally binding statement once the reform process has been agreed upon.

Despite nuances, permanent members alluded to the limits of what could be agreed vis-à-vis the veto. The abolition or modification of the veto would not be ratifiable through a Charter amendment. This includes legally binding regulation of the veto or General Assembly guidelines on how to exercise it. The involvement of the Assembly in matters falling within what permanent members consider to be exclusive competence of the Security Council is not amenable, nor is explanation of the use of veto before the Assembly (the P-5 consider that the two organs stand on an equal footing). Most permanent members based their acceptance of enlargement and other reform of the Council on preserving the essence of their veto power.

The limited span between what the current holders of the veto could accept and what the wider membership is seeking prompted Member States to contemplate the option of bypassing substantial veto reform at this stage while maintaining strong preference for the veto to be explicitly included on the agenda of a possible future review. The latter requires further exploration, as there does not seem to be across-the-board agreement on it. The assessment of the facilitators is that, although desirable for the majority of Member States, veto reform alone might not be the single factor that will seal or break the reform deal at this stage, provided that the rest of the reform package will be substantial.

States that have thus far insisted on new permanent members obtaining the same rights and privileges as the incumbents, including the veto, were frequently mentioned as key to the process of Security Council reform. Such States, when consulted, reiterated their official collective position but appeared to be willing to consider alternatives on condition that those would be concrete and sufficiently attractive. While these States did not rule out the prospect of a provisional solution, it was quite clear that no definitive views could be provided by them on this level of consultation at this stage.

Member States which addressed the use of the veto as a source of non-action on the part of the United Nations expressed varying views on whether and how this could be remedied. The mechanism created through General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 was accepted as an alternative by some but deemed either ineffective and/or undesirable by others. No concrete suggestions were suggested on how the Assembly might exercise a subsidiary role in those instances where the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is not exercised because of a veto. Member States did, however, stress that the Assembly should do more to fully exercise its competencies under Articles 10 to 12 of...
the Charter, including by examining matters of peace and security, and calling on
the Council to take relevant action. This could exhort the Council to take action on a
situation, provide the viewpoint of the wider membership to the Council on a particular
issue and contain the veto through input that would deter its use. The awareness by the
Council of the pronouncement of the Assembly on a certain issue would make it difficult
for the Council to subsequently ignore the collective will of the international community
and be silent on account of a veto.

In the above consultations it transpired that one pragmatic option concerning veto
reform at this stage is the possibility of a pledge by the permanent members to exercise
the veto with restraint. While this would not amount to a legally binding measure, some
Member States have indicated that this would have an impact in practical terms. It was
reasoned that indirect limitation/regulation of the veto and the influence of permanent
members could be achieved to some degree through the cumulative impact of reform. It
was also suggested that enlargement itself amounts to a de facto limitation of the power
of the veto because permanent members will constitute less than 25 per cent of the
Security Council and the responsibility to block action through veto will be substantially
heavier. As the veto is viewed as synonymous with the influence, of the permanent five
members, it is particularly pertinent to note that the enhanced presence and voting
might of members other than the permanent five is believed by many to limit the
influence of permanent members on decision-making, including decision-making that is
exclusively power balance-driven. Lastly, it was suggested that the power stemming
from possession of the veto (implicit veto) would diminish if the Council operated in a
manner that allowed for less pressure to be exerted on non-permanent members."

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction
with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document
A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part
of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the
President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the
substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of
paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, on 4
and 5 March, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their
original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including
through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For
my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the
interactive nature of our meetings, just as I did on 4 and 5 March. Member States will
thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, this time by means of a list of speakers, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 16 and 17 March exchange on the question of the veto, Member States on 24 March will address regional representation, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as regional representation is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"Question of regional representation"

There seemed to be a common understanding that the Security Council in its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical realities and thus needs to be adequately rebalanced:

- The majority of delegations were of the view that the rebalancing of the Security Council needs to be based on "the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization", as well as on equitable geographical representation, as stipulated in Article 23 of the Charter.

- Nevertheless, some delegations pointed out that additional objectives and measurable criteria had yet to be worked out to define the necessary capabilities of States relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. Proposals included the level of financial contribution to the United Nations, population, regional role and standing, size of military forces and contributions to peacekeeping operations.
In the course of the discussion there seemed to be a twofold understanding of the term “regional representation”:

- Some delegations identified the term “regional representation” as identical to the “equitable geographical distribution” as contained in Article 23.1 of the Charter.

- Other delegations expressed the view that the term “regional representation” should be understood as the regional seat leading to regional accountability. They argued that the notion of regional representation, in the sense of Member States representing regional views, could be explored further. Different options were suggested, such as candidatures to be proposed directly by Member States or through regional consensus, it being understood that the final decision is to be taken by the General Assembly through the election process as set out in the Charter. Another suggestion was that members of the Council should be deemed, if they so wish, to also represent the views of regional groups to which they belong while continuing to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

- However, a wide number of delegations felt that, at this stage, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, although proposed on a regional basis, could not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of the Council, they should have a global accountability and an obligation to the international community as a whole.

- In addition, many delegations were of the view that the concept of regional seats, given the different character of each regional group as well as the existing differences in their internal working procedures, was not feasible at this stage.

Although the composition of the existing regional groups was challenged as not accurately reflecting geopolitical realities, there seems to be a wide understanding that the restructuring of the current system is not realistic. The majority is thus still of the view that the principle of the equitable geographic distribution should be exercised through the existing structures. Nevertheless, opinions varied on how to amend the situation, in particular with respect to defining the underrepresented.

The discussion brought out several interpretations within the category of the underrepresented. Accordingly, the underrepresented were classified in the following manner:
• Within the existing group arrangements, there was a general feeling that Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented. Some opined that the Group of Eastern European States was also underrepresented.

• There was also a broad understanding that small and developing countries are underrepresented as a general rule. In addition, some delegations pointed out that small and developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented in particular.

• Some delegations were of the opinion that there was a need for an enlarged Security Council to represent all cultures, religions and civilizations. In that respect, although various political organizations were mentioned as candidates for a Council seat, the majority of delegations argued it would contradict the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations and therefore proposed that their legitimate concerns should be accommodated through other means.

Bearing in mind the inseparable links between the "regional representation" cluster and those of "Size" and "Categories of membership", it might prove to be very difficult to devise any workable solution prior to the agreement on the number of seats to be distributed. However, since it can be argued that the notions of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution constitute the fundamental elements of any future fair and just solution, they should be taken into account as a general principle during deliberations as well as at the early stages of the eventual future negotiations on size and categories."

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flush out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion have clarified their original position where necessary and have not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.
This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast. As I already announced in my 17 March closing remarks, on 9 April we will focus on the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, followed on 21 April by a meeting on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 24 and 31 March exchange on the question of regional representation, Member States on 7 April will address size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"Size of an enlarged Security Council"

During consultations, Member States agreed with an enlargement in the size of the Security Council. No Member State opposed expansion. Below, are some of the main opinions expressed by Member States in the consultations:

• The size of an enlarged Security Council cannot be judged in isolation from other conditioning issues, such as equitable regional representation and the categories of membership. Determining the size of an enlarged Council was guided, for example, by the aspirations of regions to be satisfied with their representation, rather than a theoretical number decided a priori.

• Opinions as to the size of an enlarged Security Council vary. Many Member States gave specific preferred numbers, while others expressed the view that they are open to suggestions, some of them provided that additional considerations are taken into account.

• Some Member States expressed that among the main criteria that ought to be considered in determining the size of an expanded Security Council are equitable geographical distribution, enhanced credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. A number of delegations added criteria such as the financial and diplomatic
contributions to the United Nations and respect for democracy and human rights. Others preferred to adhere solely to the criteria enunciated in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, i.e. "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution".

- The "efficiency" and "effectiveness" of an enlarged Security Council were considered by some delegations, in particular, but not only, permanent members of the Council, as paramount elements for a Council that is supposed to act swiftly in the face of crises. Other delegations argued that efficiency does not necessarily result from a reduced size and that efficiency (or efficacy) could ultimately improve by enlargement in more representative higher numbers.

- Some Member States lamented the current configuration of regional groups, as not representative of like-minded States, but agreed, as most members did, that it would not be advisable to revisit existing regional groups, notwithstanding the wish expressed by some that an expanded Security Council should consider seats for small States or States of particular cultures and civilizations.

- A significant number of Member States, both developed and developing, from different regions, believe that the size of an expanded Security Council should remedy the underrepresentation of developing countries, particularly from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

- A number of delegations, while stressing that the Security Council should properly represent current world reality, expressed their desire to see an adequate correlation between the number of members in the Council and the membership of the General Assembly. They pointed out that the ratio between the Council and the general membership of the United Nations was 21 per cent in 1945 (a ratio of 1:5), 13 per cent in 1965 (a ratio of 1:8) and less than 8 per cent (a ratio of 1:13) at the present time.

- A limited expansion of seats has been advocated by Member States on grounds of efficiency and agility of the Security Council to confront crises. Other Member States favour a larger expansion of seats based on the representativity of the Council.

- In the view of some Member States, an increase in the number of seats, even if solely in the non-permanent category, would entail a rebalancing of the power structure within the Security Council. More members would require new higher proportions of votes to approve resolutions, as the weight percentage of permanent members would decline.

- While some Member States addressed the question of size from the perspective of a one-time expansion, some Member States felt that a review conference should revisit the issue of size in the context of a transitional approach.
Despite the fact that views on the exact size of an expanded Security Council differ among Member States, they do not seem irreconcilable.


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not to be attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

- Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

- Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of "security". Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

- As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2006/507). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

- With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but would also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:
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- Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.
- More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairman of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.
- Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

* On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:

- A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.
- Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.

* As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:

- The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of “international peace and security”.
- In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adopted by the Security Council itself, and could not be “imposed” by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.”
During the 20 April meeting, we will focus particularly on the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and so we kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 7 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the size of an enlarged Security Council and the working methods of the Council.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations
Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council.
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 7 and 8 April exchange on size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, Member States on 20 April will address the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not to be attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

- Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

- Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment
of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of "security". Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

• As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2006/507). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

• With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:

  o Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.
  o More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.
  o Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

• On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council's decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:

  o A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.
  o Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.
As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:

- The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of “international peace and security”.
- In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adapted by the Security Council itself, and could not be “imposed” by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.

Since the working methods of the Council were already addressed during our productive 7 and 8 April exchange, I kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 20 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good
faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

In strict conformity with the Work Plan, the consideration of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly will conclude the first round, with the second round to commence in May. While Member States have been generating considerable momentum, new steps forward will be necessary in the second round to sustain it. On my continued efforts to implement the Work Plan and to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress I will inform the membership well in advance.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing an overview of the first round. Meant to catalyze, not circumscribe, this overview shall serve as a point of departure and reference for the second round, which will consist of the following exchanges as defined in the overview itself:

22 May 2009 Exchange 1
11 June 2009 Exchange 2
23 June 2009 Exchange 3

As Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of the first round will take us very far very fast in the second round.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council

Attached:
Overview of the first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council
Overview

The first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council

1. It is in strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during the successful 19 February 2009 launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in the informal GA plenary on Security Council reform, that the Chair, under the auspices of the President, provides this overview of the first round.

2. In no way does the present overview supplant the substantive underpinning of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of GA Decision 62/557:

   "(i) The positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States groupings;

   (iii) The following documents: report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly; General Assembly decision 61/681 and the report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly;"

3. The first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations consisted of 15 meetings on the five key issues as defined in subparagraph ii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557.

4. Over the course of all these meetings, Member States implemented Decision 62/557 and the Work Plan by, with regard to the key issue under discussion, clarifying their original position where necessary and by not seldom demonstrating flexibility on it, including through new oral and written proposals. For his part, the Chair throughout the first round actively promoted interaction, particularly by giving Member States the opportunity to intervene twice, so they could react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. In addition to interaction, the exchanges were characterized by an intense interest among Member States, with more than three quarters of the membership engaging – a substantial increase in comparison with the level of engagement in the Open-Ended Working Group of late.

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5. On 4 and 5 March, Member States took advantage of the 4th, 5th and 6th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on categories of membership. The first cycle saw no less than 80 interventions, followed by 10 interventions in the second.

6. On 16 and 17 March, Member States took advantage of the 7th, 8th and 9th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on the question of the veto. The first cycle saw no less than 74 interventions, followed by 8 interventions in the second.

7. On 24 and 31 March, Member States took advantage of the 10th, 11th and 12th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on regional representation. The first cycle saw no less than 67 interventions, followed by 9 interventions in the second.

8. On 7 and 8 April, Member States took advantage of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council. The first cycle saw no less than 79 interventions, followed by 11 interventions in the second.

9. Finally, on 20 April, Member States took advantage of the 17th and 18th meetings of the informal plenary to focus on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly. The first cycle saw no less than 51 interventions, followed by 2 interventions in the second.

10. The first round of the negotiations, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, has evinced the membership-wide political will to make decisive progress during this GA session towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome:

"We support early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions."

\[3\] A/RES/60/1.
11. On their way to decisive progress, Member States during the first round received guidance from the Chair, in particular through letters preceding each exchange on a key issue. These letters, welcomed by the membership as an important impetus to the process, contained literal and integral excerpts from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Since overall the first round bore out and built on the content in general and the reform options in particular of those excerpts, the Chair’s letters, attached herewith, should be considered an integral part of the present overview.

12. The principal options have been laid out below in paragraphs 14-17, incorporating the main thrust of the productive exchanges of the first round. This point of departure and reference for the second round should catalyze yet never circumscribe the forthcoming exchanges between Member States. After all, as also stated in paragraph 2 of the present overview, the substantive underpinning for the negotiations will continue to be constituted by documents A/61/47 (quoted in the Chair’s letters) and A/62/47, GA Decision 61/561, and by the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States groupings, including new positions and proposals, oral and written, introduced in the first round.

13. All throughout the first round, the membership repeatedly and insistently professed its aspiration to move on towards an ever more comprehensive consideration of Security Council reform. For this purpose, guided by and based on the supreme authority and logic of our organization’s constitution, the five key issues have been placed under the headings of Chapter V of the UN Charter on the Security Council: composition; functions and powers; voting; and procedure.
14. Composition

a. Size
   i. Low-twenties
   ii. Mid-twenties

b. Categories of membership
   i. Enlargement in both current categories of membership, permanent and non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; nature of review or challenge).
   ii. Enlargement in a new category of extended seats and in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; length of terms [3-15] of extended seats; possibility of re-election to extended seats; nature of review or challenge; provisions to prevent “flip-flopping”4).
   iii. Enlargement only in the current category of non-permanent two-year seats (negotiable: criteria for selection; possibility of re-election; nature of review or challenge).

c. Regional representation
   i. Addition of seats to current regional groups, giving due consideration to the criterion of equitable geographical distribution through an emphasis on the underrepresented regional groups, particularly Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States and, also, on the Group of Eastern European States (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups).
   ii. Addition of seats to current regional groups specifically with a view to ensuring the representation of small and medium-sized states and of all cultures, religions and civilizations (negotiable: arrangements for representation on the seats to be decided by the respective regional groups).

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4 Provisions to prevent countries from presenting candidatures for both the new category and the current non-permanent category at the same time or in short intervals.
15. Functions and powers
   a. Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly
      i. Strict adherence to the functions and powers of, respectively, the Security Council and the General Assembly as set out in the Charter.
      ii. Submission by the Security Council to the General Assembly of a more substantive and analytical annual report, including on the implementation of Council decisions (and the organization of an informal and interactive debate on the report), and of special reports as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Charter.
      iii. Regular consultations between the President of the Security Council and the Presidents of other principal organs.

16. Voting
   a. Veto
      i. Reform of the current veto (negotiable: formalizing explanations for the use of the veto; limiting the instances where it is used).
      ii. Extension of the veto to any new permanent members (negotiable: commitment not to use the veto until a future review).
      iii. No extension of the veto to any new permanent members.

17. Procedure
   a. Working methods
      i. Better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies through transparency and information (negotiable: the adoption of formal rules of procedure; more public meetings, especially when UN officials brief the Council; more frequent substantive and detailed briefings on the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and early distribution of relevant documents, particularly draft resolutions and presidential statements).
      ii. Better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies through consultation (negotiable: rigorous implementation of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter; timely and regular consultations with countries contributing human or financial resources to a peacekeeping operation; regular consultations with relevant regional arrangements and agencies, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter).
18. In order to sustain the considerable momentum generated by Member States over the course of the first round, new steps forward are imperative in the second round. As an overwhelming number of Member States have emphasized, within a more comprehensive consideration of Security Council reform, the achievement of decisive progress demands an explicit exploration of the connections between the key issues, with a view to further unlocking convergence potential. A nexus connecting both the five key issues to each other and, in the same vein, connecting a substantial mass of positions and proposals to each other, is the concept of review or challenge. The widely raised prospect of a reassessment of any arrangement by means of a review or challenge puts each and every component and the entirety of the reform in a different light.

19. Therefore, this nexus constitutes a logical entry point into the second round. Exchange 1 on the general nature, agenda, timing and frequency of any review or challenge will be followed by exchange 2 on the key issues under composition (paragraph 14) and exchange 3 on the key issues of paragraphs 15, 16 and 17. This act of scheduling by the Chair, who will continue to promote interaction as in the first round and to assist Member States in accordance with the President's Work Plan, shall enable the membership to advance in more in-depth and more comprehensive negotiations, before, in strict conformity with Decision 62/557, continuing during the third round to seek a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

Annex

A. Letter dated 2 March 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform
B. Letter dated 13 March 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform
C. Letter dated 20 March 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform
D. Letter dated 3 April 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform
E. Letter dated 16 April 2009 from the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Starting on 4 March, the membership will within two months conduct the first round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in a comprehensive fashion along the lines of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as categories of membership, the key issue to be dealt with on 4 March, is concerned, through an excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

“Categories of membership

The issue of categories of membership proved to be one of the key issues in the entire process. One of the main purposes of the facilitation was to explore whether innovative ideas heard during consultations could help to reconcile existing positions, with a view of advancing the process. The following views were expressed during consultations:

- A large group of States continued to call for the enlargement of the Security Council in both categories of membership (permanent and non-permanent seats).
- A group of States, while defending an enlargement of the Security Council in both categories, is proposing that any new permanent seats holders enjoy all prerogatives of permanent members, including the veto right in the event that it is maintained.
- Another group of States reiterated its position of seeking the creation of a category of membership that is of a permanent character but, at least initially, without exercising the veto. Addition of new non-permanent seats is also proposed by this group.
- A group of States reiterated its position of accepting enlargement only in the category of non-permanent seats, while considering that no initial positions should be pre-empted for any future discussions of the issue. The creation of only
non-permanent seats is also considered by a group of States as a possible fallback position in case no other satisfactory solution is found.

- Some Member States encouraged the exploration of a sort of an “interim” or “transitional solution” based on a longer-term renewability of seats. Likewise, other Member States expressed their readiness to explore a solution that would move the process ahead while enjoying broad acceptance.

- Some delegations, especially from small States, expressed the view that any solution should enhance their aspiration to serve on the Security Council.

- A large number of delegations expressed the view that in any expansion there is a need for ensuring a strengthened representation of developing countries and small States. A number of delegations stressed the need to take into account the wide cultural diversity within the international community.

- Some delegations expressed their wish to have the question of categories and the other issue-areas ascertained through a “questionnaire” addressed to Member States.

- The notion of accountability, both at the time of election (Article 23.2 of the Charter of the United Nations) and while serving in the Council (Article 24.2 of the Charter) has been addressed by delegations in relation with categories of membership:
  - A group belonging to a specific region is of the view that that region would be responsible for the selection of its representative States in an enlarged Council, which would be accountable to it.
  - Other Member States expressed the view that accountability could be ensured through a process of “challenge” within a review mechanism.

Signals of flexibility were shown during the consultations: despite the reiteration of initial positions, readiness for some flexibility was expressed by the main groups, especially on the question of permanency:

- Delegations defending permanency would accept to submit the status of any new permanent seats to challenge.

- Delegations contesting permanency would admit the possibility for a number of States to be members of the Council for a longer period of time than that initially envisaged in the Charter.

- Members of a group of States, although remaining firm in their initial positions, expressed readiness to refer any new proposed elements regarding Security Council reform to their highest political authorities at the earliest possible opportunity."
The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. That is to say filling in any as of yet missing details of your position of first preference on the key issue under discussion, categories of membership in the case of our 4 March meeting, as well as sketching the contours of your position of second preference, should the former prove unrealizable in full at this stage. In that regard, I welcome recent and future new proposals and invite delegations to highlight the aspects of their proposals which relate to the key issue under discussion.

By giving off signals of flexibility, Member States can inject new life blood into the Intergovernmental Negotiations, which I strive to set up so as to facilitate a productive exchange among Member States. To that end, I encourage Member States to in their interventions react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, and I am prepared to give delegations the floor for a second time, particularly in case the speaking order has prevented them from reacting and reciprocating at their first opportunity to speak. To make this interaction possible, Member States are urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

I am confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our 19 February meeting will take us very far very fast. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress, inter alia by having a similar letter precede each meeting on each individual key issue. As I already stated in my 19 February closing remarks, the treatment of each individual key issue could go on for more than a day, without however disrupting the time schedule as laid out in the President's Work Plan. Also in strict conformity with that plan, I will provide Member States with an overview after they finish the first round before the end of April. This comprehensive paper will then serve as a point of departure for the second round immediately thereafter, during which Member States can close in on compromise.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin,
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 4 and 5 March exchange on categories of membership, Member States on 16 March will address the question of the veto, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the question of the veto is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"The question of the veto

Given the sui generis character of the veto, the extent of Member States' flexibility and the scope of possible veto reform were explored through extensive bilateral consultations with a cross-regional sample incorporating small, medium-sized and large States, States having items on the agenda of the Security Council and the States currently holding the veto. Member States addressed the issue on two levels: ideal and attainable reform. The veto was criticized on various grounds by a significant majority of Member States, many of which also relayed a perception that its elimination is not realistic at this stage. Trends regarding the veto included the restriction of its use, prevention of its extension, resignation from its reform at this stage and extension of it to all permanent members so long as it exists.

In terms of restricting the veto, suggestions included limiting the instances where it can be used (for example to exclude instances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity), establishing criteria for when and in which situations the veto can be used, formalizing explanations for the use of veto, limiting the scope of
application of the veto (either restricting it to Chapter VII decisions or disallowing its use in Chapter VI decisions), restricting its use to only vital issues, barring the veto where a permanent member is a party to a conflict, changing its weight (for example requiring two negative votes to reject a draft resolution), overruling it and placing a cap on the total number of negative votes that can be cast by a permanent member.

Member States considered that extension of the veto presupposes agreement on the addition of new permanent members. Permanent members themselves did not rule out extending the veto, depending on the number of prospective new permanent members and which those would be. Their position ranged from offering qualified support to the draft resolution of the Group of Four (G-4) to being ready to add one or two new members to the group of five permanent members (P-5) and extending the veto to a representative from a region currently without it.

Among States in support of expansion in permanent and non-permanent members, three tendencies were identifiable: (a) the veto is a tool for inaction that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the Council and should not be extended to new permanent members; (b) extension of the veto, in principle, accompanied by a commitment not to use it until a future review; and (c) automatic extension of the veto to new permanent members. The second option gathered the most support, inter alia, because it was also expressed as a fallback position by many States supporting options one and three. For those supporting extension of the veto at this stage, the second option would provide future prospect to that end, while for those supporting non-extension of the veto the second option would satisfy their position now without pre-empting the eventual settlement of the issue.

The general perception of the permanent members regarding the veto, despite nuances regarding certain aspects of the issue, is that the veto is at the core and is the sustaining force of the system of collective security. It is considered to be inherently different from other elements discussed in the reform process as it is the result of a political understanding that pre-dates the Charter and thus could not be reformed by the wider membership. Its reform could only be governed by the same historical rationale that initially brought it into being as a tool of restricting the scope of the collective security system according to their major policy considerations.

Permanent members recognized that the wider membership had concerns regarding the veto but did not consider that it was misused; rather, they insisted that the veto is exercised with restraint. However, they did not exclude the prospect of finding ways among themselves to appease those concerns, including, for most of them, through: (a) a voluntary commitment in this respect; or (b) an oral understanding that
permanent members would agree to a non-legally binding statement once the reform process has been agreed upon.

Despite nuances, permanent members alluded to the limits of what could be agreed vis-à-vis the veto. The abolition or modification of the veto would not be retrievable through a Charter amendment. This includes legally binding regulation of the veto or General Assembly guidelines on how to exercise it. The involvement of the Assembly in matters falling within what permanent members consider to be exclusive competence of the Security Council is not amenable, nor is explanation of the use of veto before the Assembly (the P-5 consider that the two organs stand on an equal footing). Most permanent members based their acceptance of enlargement and other reform of the Council on preserving the essence of their veto power.

The limited span between what the current holders of the veto could accept and what the wider membership is seeking prompted Member States to contemplate the option of bypassing substantial veto reform at this stage while maintaining strong preference for the veto to be explicitly included on the agenda of a possible future review. The latter requires further exploration, as there does not seem to be across-the-board agreement on it. The assessment of the facilitators is that, although desirable for the majority of Member States, veto reform alone might not be the single factor that will seal or break the reform deal at this stage, provided that the rest of the reform package will be substantial.

States that have thus far insisted on new permanent members obtaining the same rights and privileges as the incumbents, including the veto, were frequently mentioned as key to the process of Security Council reform. Such States, when consulted, reiterated their official collective position but appeared to be willing to consider alternatives on condition that those would be concrete and sufficiently attractive. While these States did not rule out the prospect of a provisional solution, it was quite clear that no definitive views could be provided by them on this level of consultation at this stage.

Member States which addressed the use of the veto as a source of non-action on the part of the United Nations expressed varying views on whether and how this could be remedied. The mechanism created through General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 was accepted as an alternative by some but deemed either ineffective and/or undesirable by others. No concrete suggestions were suggested on how the Assembly might exercise a subsidiary role in those instances where the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is not exercised because of a veto. Member States did, however, stress that the Assembly should do more to fully exercise its competencies under Articles 10 to 12 of
the Charter, including by examining matters of peace and security, and calling on
the Council to take relevant action. This could exhort the Council to take action on a
situation, provide the viewpoint of the wider membership to the Council on a particular
issue and contain the veto through input that would deter its use. The awareness by the
Council of the pronouncement of the Assembly on a certain issue would make it difficult
for the Council to subsequently ignore the collective will of the international community
and be silent on account of a veto.

In the above consultations it transpired that one pragmatic option concerning veto
reform at this stage is the possibility of a pledge by the permanent members to exercise
the veto with restraint. While this would not amount to a legally binding measure, some
Member States have indicated that this would have an impact in practical terms. It was
reasoned that indirect limitation/regulation of the veto and the influence of permanent
members could be achieved to some degree through the cumulative impact of reform. It
was also suggested that enlargement itself amounts to a de facto limitation of the power
of the veto because permanent members will constitute less than 25 per cent of the
Security Council and the responsibility to block action through veto will be substantially
heavier. As the veto is viewed as synonymous with the influence, of the permanent five
members, it is particularly pertinent to note that the enhanced presence and voting
might of members other than the permanent five is believed by many to limit the
influence of permanent members on decision-making, including decision-making that is
exclusively power balance-driven. Lastly, it was suggested that the power stemming
from possession of the veto (implicit veto) would diminish if the Council operated in a
manner that allowed for less pressure to be exerted on non-permanent members.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction
with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document
A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part
of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the
President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the
substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of
paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, on 4
and 5 March, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their
original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including
through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For
my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the
interactive nature of our meetings, just as I did on 4 and 5 March. Member States will
thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, this time by means of a list
of speakers, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but
are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three
minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the
course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation
and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 16 and 17 March exchange on the question of the veto, Member States on 24 March will address regional representation, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as regional representation is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"Question of regional representation

There seemed to be a common understanding that the Security Council in its current composition does not reflect the geopolitical realities and thus needs to be adequately rebalanced:

- The majority of delegations were of the view that the rebalancing of the Security Council needs to be based on "the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization", as well as on equitable geographical representation, as stipulated in Article 23 of the Charter.

- Nevertheless, some delegations pointed out that additional objectives and measurable criteria had yet to be worked out to define the necessary capabilities of States relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. Proposals included the level of financial contribution to the United Nations, population, regional role and standing, size of military forces and contributions to peacekeeping operations.
In the course of the discussion there seemed to be a twofold understanding of the term "regional representation":

- Some delegations identified the term "regional representation" as identical to the "equitable geographical distribution" as contained in Article 23.1 of the Charter.

- Other delegations expressed the view that the term "regional representation" should be understood as the regional seat leading to regional accountability. They argued that the notion of regional representation, in the sense of Member States representing regional views, could be explored further. Different options were suggested, such as candidates to be proposed directly by Member States or through regional consensus, it being understood that the final decision is to be taken by the General Assembly through the election process as set out in the Charter. Another suggestion was that members of the Council should be deemed, if they so wish, to also represent the views of regional groups to which they belong while continuing to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

- However, a wide number of delegations felt that, at this stage, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, although proposed on a regional basis, could not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of the Council, they should have a global accountability and an obligation to the international community as a whole.

- In addition, many delegations were of the view that the concept of regional seats, given the different character of each regional group as well as the existing differences in their internal working procedures, was not feasible at this stage.

Although the composition of the existing regional groups was challenged as not accurately reflecting geopolitical realities, there seems to be a wide understanding that the restructuring of the current system is not realistic. The majority is thus still of the view that the principle of the equitable geographic distribution should be exercised through the existing structures. Nevertheless, opinions varied on how to amend the situation, in particular with respect to defining the underrepresented.

The discussion brought out several interpretations within the category of the underrepresented. Accordingly, the underrepresented were classified in the following manner:
• Within the existing group arrangements, there was a general feeling that Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented. Some opined that the Group of Eastern European States was also underrepresented.

• There was also a broad understanding that small and developing countries are underrepresented as a general rule. In addition, some delegations pointed out that small and developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States were underrepresented in particular.

• Some delegations were of the opinion that there was a need for an enlarged Security Council to represent all cultures, religions and civilizations. In that respect, although various political organizations were mentioned as candidates for a Council seat, the majority of delegations argued it would contradict the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations and therefore proposed that their legitimate concerns should be accommodated through other means.

Bear in mind the inseparable links between the “regional representation” cluster and those of “Size” and “Categories of membership”. It might prove to be very difficult to devise any workable solution prior to the agreement on the number of seats to be distributed. However, since it can be argued that the notions of contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and equitable geographical distribution constitute the fundamental elements of any future fair and just solution, they should be taken into account as a general principle during deliberations as well as at the early stages of the eventual future negotiations on size and categories.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion have clarified their original position where necessary and have not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.
This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast. As I already announced in my 17 March closing remarks, on 9 April we will focus on the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, followed on 21 April by a meeting on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 24 and 31 March exchange on the question of regional representation, Member States on 7 April will address size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council, the next of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:

"Size of an enlarged Security Council

During consultations, Member States agreed with an enlargement in the size of the Security Council. No Member State opposed expansion. Below, are some of the main opinions expressed by Member States in the consultations:

* The size of an enlarged Security Council cannot be judged in isolation from other conditioning issues, such as equitable regional representation and the categories of membership. Determining the size of an enlarged Council was guided, for example, by the aspirations of regions to be satisfied with their representation, rather than a theoretical number decided a priori.

* Opinions as to the size of an enlarged Security Council vary. Many Member States gave specific preferred numbers, while others expressed the view that they are open to suggestions, some of them provided that additional considerations are taken into account.

* Some Member States expressed that among the main criteria that ought to be considered in determining the size of an expanded Security Council are equitable geographical distribution, enhanced credibility, efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. A number of delegations added criteria such as the financial and diplomatic
contributions to the United Nations and respect for democracy and human rights. Others preferred to adhere solely to the criteria enunciated in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, i.e. “due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.

- The “efficiency” and “effectiveness” of an enlarged Security Council were considered by some delegations, in particular, but not only, permanent members of the Council, as paramount elements for a Council that is supposed to act swiftly in the face of crises. Other delegations argued that efficiency does not necessarily result from a reduced size and that efficiency (or efficacy) could ultimately improve by enlargement in more representative higher numbers.

- Some Member States lamented the current configuration of regional groups, as not representative of like-minded States, but agreed, as most members did, that it would not be advisable to revisit existing regional groups, notwithstanding the wish expressed by some that an expanded Security Council should consider seats for small States or States of particular cultures and civilizations.

- A significant number of Member States, both developed and developing, from different regions, believe that the size of an expanded Security Council should remedy the underrepresentation of developing countries, particularly from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

- A number of delegations, while stressing that the Security Council should properly represent current world reality, expressed their desire to see an adequate correlation between the number of members in the Council and the membership of the General Assembly. They pointed out that the ratio between the Council and the general membership of the United Nations was 21 per cent in 1945 (a ratio of 1:5), 13 per cent in 1965 (a ratio of 1:8) and less than 8 per cent (a ratio of 1:13) at the present time.

- A limited expansion of seats has been advocated by Member States on grounds of efficiency and agility of the Security Council to confront crises. Other Member States favour a larger expansion of seats based on the representativity of the Council.

- In the view of some Member States, an increase in the number of seats, even if solely in the non-permanent category, would entail a rebalancing of the power structure within the Security Council. More members would require new higher proportions of votes to approve resolutions, as the weight percentage of permanent members would decline.

- While some Member States addressed the question of size from the perspective of a one-time expansion, some Member States felt that a review conference should revisit the issue of size in the context of a transitional approach.
Despite the fact that views on the exact size of an expanded Security Council differ among Member States, they do not seem irreconcilable.


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not to be attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

- Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

- Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of “security”. Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

- As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2006/507). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

- With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but would also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:

Tel: (212) 972-1212
360 LEXINGTON AVENUE, 11th FLOOR
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
FAX: (212) 972-1316
Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.

More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.

Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:

A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.

Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.

As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:

The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of “international peace and security”.

In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adopted by the Security Council itself, and could not be “imposed” by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.
During the 20 April meeting, we will focus particularly on the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and so we kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 7 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the size of an enlarged Security Council and the working methods of the Council.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress. Following our productive 7 and 8 April exchange on size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, Member States on 20 April will address the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. During the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, the membership addressed Security Council reform along such lines, be it at an entirely different stage of the process and in an entirely different forum. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat, inter alia, the outcome of that previous exercise, let me for your convenience recite this outcome as far as the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly is concerned, through a literal and integral excerpt from document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations:


A wide majority of Member States felt that the working methods are an essential and integral part of Security Council reform. Some Member States were of the opinion that expansion and working methods should not be seen as inseparable. They argued that reform of the working methods, which would not require a Charter amendment, should be seen as a continuous process. Ultimately, a widely shared conclusion was that the working methods should be part of any reform package. If agreement on a package should prove not to be attainable, efforts to reform the working methods could and, in the eyes of many, should still be continued:

* Some Member States offered another perspective on the relationship between the working methods and expansion of the Security Council. Many (smaller) Member States serve relatively sporadically on the Council, and would do so even in the event that there is an expansion. For those Member States, improved working methods, and thus better access as non-Council members to the work of the Council, is of essential importance.

* Member States alluded to the relationship of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Most Member States put this issue in the context of the so-called encroachment
of the Council on the Assembly. It was argued that this had much to do with the broadening definition of "security". Working with this broad definition, the Council was increasingly discussing subjects that would, arguably, fall under the competence of the Assembly. Most however felt that it was difficult to address this issue in the context of Security Council reform.

- As to the substance of the working methods, many Member States welcomed several initiatives that have recently been taken, such as the draft resolution by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland (S-5) and the recent note by the President of the Security Council on working methods (S/2006/307). Many Member States saw as the central aim of improved working methods to ensure better access for non-Council members to the work of the Council. The access seemed to have distinct components: information, consultation and cooperation.

- With regard to access through information, Member States felt that timely and substantive information on the work of the Security Council would lead to more transparency. This would not only enable them to better follow the proceedings, but would also allow Member States to informally exert influence on the decision-making process. Concrete suggestions that were made by Member States included:

  - Better notification to all Member States of all Council meetings, including unscheduled meetings, and early distribution of draft resolutions.
  - More frequent briefings by the President of the Security Council and by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. Distribution to all Member States of reports of the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.
  - Institutionalized periodic review of the implementation of Council mandates and decisions.

- On better access through consultations, Member States indicated an interest to have direct, real access to the Security Council in cases where their interests were specially affected and, in particular, when they have an item on the agenda (both in open and private meetings). It was widely felt that this would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s decisions without necessarily infringing on the prerogatives of the Council. The following suggestions were made:

  - A mechanism should be established to ensure that Member States whose interests are specially affected will be heard upon request at private meetings of the Council, as well as in the work of the subsidiary bodies.
  - Consistent consultations with potential troop-contributing countries in the early phase of a new operation, with the participation of the host country, where appropriate, and regular substantive meetings during ongoing operations.
As already stated, it was also argued that better access could be achieved by means of expanding on the mechanisms for interaction between United Nations bodies, most notably between the Security Council and General Assembly. The following suggestions were made:

- The Security Council should issue special subject-oriented reports (Article 24.3 of the Charter) for discussion in the General Assembly. This could include reports on the understanding of the mandate of the Council, for example what is the definition of "international peace and security".
- In addition to increased cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, a regularized, substantive dialogue should also be established with the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission (also on the implementation of the respective mandates).

As stated before, most Member States felt that measures described above should be part of a reform package that would eventually be voted on in the General Assembly. By and large, the permanent members indicated that they supported some level of reform of the working methods. Some of them stated that these measures should be adopted by the Security Council itself, and could not be "imposed" by the Assembly. This is a matter that would require further consultation.

Since the working methods of the Council were already addressed during our productive 7 and 8 April exchange, I kindly ask you to, to the extent possible, limit your remarks at the 20 April meeting to the issue under discussion, namely the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

The above excerpt from document A/61/47 should of course also be read in conjunction with, in particular, the new inputs and reaffirmed views as contained in document A/62/47, similarly defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Through his Work Plan, the President of the General Assembly has exhorted Member States to flesh out the substantive underpinning of the meetings, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and to show the necessary flexibility. Accordingly, during our meetings so far, Member States with regard to the key issue under discussion clarified their original position where necessary and not seldom demonstrated flexibility on it, including through new proposals.

This way, Member States are injecting new life blood into the negotiations. For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. I remain confident that the good
faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast.

In strict conformity with the Work Plan, the consideration of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly will conclude the first round, with the second round to commence in May. While Member States have been generating considerable momentum, new steps forward will be necessary in the second round to sustain it. On my continued efforts to implement the Work Plan and to facilitate the achievement of decisive progress I will inform the membership well in advance.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

Following our productive 22 and 26 May exchange on review or challenge, Member States on 11 June, during the second exchange of the second round, will address the composition of the Security Council, comprising the key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation. Questions like how many seats to add, what kind of seats and how to distribute them among the membership are intertwined and this exchange offers an opportunity to explore such connections, along with relevant negotiables.

While, as part of my responsibility as Chair, impartial to any of the positions but partial to progress, to take the implementation of Decision 62/557 forward, I have added structure and, by the request of the membership, comprehensiveness to the exchanges, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant, including the veto.

During the first round, Member States implemented Decision 62/557, our brightly shining lodestar, and the President's Work Plan by fleshing out the substantive underpinning of the negotiations, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and also by showing the necessary flexibility. During the remainder of the second round, the achievement of decisive progress requires Member States to focus less on the former and more on the latter, inspired by my Overview, in the case of our 11 June exchange especially its paragraph 14.

For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast, in an entirely open process revolving around the positions and proposals of Member States and moving towards a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

Following our productive 11 and 12 June exchange on the composition of the Security Council, Member States on 22 June, during the third and final exchange of the second round, will address the functions and powers of the Security Council, voting in the Security Council, and procedure in the Security Council, comprising the key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the question of the veto, and working methods. These issues are all intertwined and this exchange offers an opportunity to explore such connections, along with relevant negotiables.

While, as part of my responsibility as Chair, impartial to any of the positions but partial to progress, to take the implementation of Decision 62/557 forward, I have added structure and, by the request of the membership, comprehensiveness to the exchanges, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant.

During the first round, Member States implemented Decision 62/557, our brightly shining lodestar, and the President's Work Plan by fleshing out the substantive underpinning of the negotiations, defined in subparagraphs i and iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557, and also by showing the necessary flexibility. During the remainder of the second round, the achievement of decisive progress requires Member States to focus less on the former and more on the latter, inspired by my Overview, in the case of our 22 June exchange especially its paragraphs 15, 16 and 17.

For my part, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.
I remain confident that the good faith and mutual respect in full display over the course of our negotiations hitherto will take us very far very fast, in an entirely open process revolving around the positions and proposals of Member States and moving towards a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith, after the second round’s conclusion, providing guidance to Member States on the path to decisive progress.

The second round consisted of 8 meetings as defined in paragraph 19 of the Overview. On 22 and 26 May, Member States took advantage of the 19th and 20th meetings of the informal plenary to address the general nature, agenda, timing and frequency of any review or challenge. The first cycle saw no less than 51 interventions, followed by 1 in the second. On 11 and 12 June, Member States took advantage of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd meetings of the informal plenary to address the composition of the Security Council, comprising the intertwined key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation. The first cycle saw no less than 73 interventions, followed by 9 in the second. On 22 and 23 June, Member States took advantage of the 24th, 25th and 26th meetings of the informal plenary to address the Council’s functions and powers, voting and procedure, comprising the intertwined key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, veto and working methods. The first cycle saw no less than 54 interventions, followed by 6 in the second.

This round, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, has evinced the potential for further decisive progress during this GA session towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome:

"We support early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions."

\[1\] A/RES/60/1.
At the present stage, Member States are encouraged to undertake their unique responsibility for fully unlocking that potential and to take advantage of the reflection period of the summer hiatus by reaching conclusions about their own positions and by reaching out informally to both their likeminded and non-concurrent peers at both the New York and the capital level. The Overview, which, with the well-known caveat of its paragraph 2, through its paragraphs 14-17 continues to reflect the principal options for reform, can serve as a source of inspiration for much-needed further concreteness and convergence, building on the current oral and written proposals.

After consideration of the five key issues one by one during the first round and then through two exchanges on, respectively, the key issues under composition (paragraph 14 of the Overview) and on the key issues of paragraphs 15-17 of the Overview during the second, the logical entry-point into the third round is one exchange on all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview), scheduled to take place at the end of the reflection period on August 27. Regarding the subsequent exchanges, it was argued on the one hand that the third round should revolve around what has commanded the most support from delegations speaking up during the meetings so far, namely the model with an expansion in both current categories including its different varieties, and on the other hand around what needs to be further explored, namely the intermediate model including its different varieties. As a Chair impartial to any of the positions yet partial to progress, I am pleased to accommodate both these separate requests in light of their conduciveness to the process, with an exchange on the former model scheduled for September 1 and on the latter for September 2. Given our common purpose to, in an open process, build on rather than repeat the outcome of previous exercises, with a view to our September 2 exchange I would like to draw your attention to annex IV of document A/61/47, defined in subparagraph iii of paragraph e of Decision 62/557 as part of the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations. After these three exchanges, Member States can expect to receive another letter from the Chair outlining the Membership-driven remainder of the third round, during which our lodestar 62/557 will continue to shine brightly.

As was the case during the first and the second round, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings. Member States will thus again be given
the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers, but are also again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

While, apart from interaction, both the first and the second round were characterized by an intense interest within the membership, I call for an even wider active participation during the third round. Security Council reform is everybody's business and getting down to business with a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance requires the largest possible number of delegations to speak out. In the words of the President of the General Assembly: “Each and every one of us stands to gain. Peace and security cannot be maintained by a Security Council that is out of date and out of touch. Let our reform effort therefore not run out of time: a better Council cannot wait until tomorrow, if we want to have a better tomorrow.”

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin,

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council.
Excellency,

I have the honor to inform you that the three exchanges of the third round originally scheduled for 27 August, 1 September and 2 September have been rescheduled as follows:

- **Tuesday, 1 September:** Exchange 1 on all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview)
- **Wednesday, 2 September:** Exchange 2 on an expansion in both current categories including its different varieties
- **Thursday, 3 September:** Exchange 3 on the intermediate model including its different varieties

As Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, I will continue to promote the interactive nature of our meetings by, inter alia, giving States the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. States are, however, again urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. In the event that all States wishing to speak during an exchange cannot be accommodated on the allotted day, we will hear any remaining speakers at the first opportunity available.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council
Excellency,

In strict conformity with the Work Plan elaborated by the President of the General Assembly and embraced by Member States during our successful 19 February launch of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform, I am herewith, as a Chair impartial to any of the positions yet partial to progress, after the third round’s conclusion, providing guidance to Member States on the path to further decisive progress.

After a period of reflection by Member States on their positions and their oral and written proposals so far, which are at the center of these ongoing negotiations as mandated by GA Decision 62/557, the third round consisted of six meetings as defined in my 16 July and 12 August letters, during which the membership continued to participate both actively and interactively.

On 1 September, Member States took advantage of the 27th and 28th meetings of the informal plenary to address all the five key issues together (paragraphs 14-17 of the Overview), which was yet another opportunity to explore the interconnectedness between all of them. The first cycle saw 39 interventions, followed by none in the second. After consideration of the five key issues one by one during the first round and then through two exchanges on, respectively, the key issues under composition (paragraph 14 of the Overview) and on the key issues of paragraphs 15-17 of the Overview during the second, Member States over the course of three rounds of negotiations have now looked at the five key issues from virtually all possible different angles.

On 2 September, Member States took advantage of the 29th and 30th meetings of the informal plenary to zero in on the model with an expansion in both current categories including its different varieties. This model, which over the course of three rounds of negotiations has commanded the most support from delegations taking the floor, was discussed in light of all its advantages and disadvantages, all its different varieties and all the five key issues. The first cycle saw 51 interventions, followed by three in the second.
On 3 September, Member States took advantage of the 31st and 32nd meetings of the informal plenary to zero in on the so-called intermediate model including its different varieties. This model, which does not represent the first preference of any delegation, was discussed in light of all its advantages and disadvantages, all its different varieties and all the five key issues. The first cycle saw 43 interventions, followed by two in the second. Even though Member States further fleshed out this model through an elaboration of the main negotiables\(^1\), it continued to raise questions.

Three rounds of negotiations, conducted by Member States in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner, have evinced the potential for further decisive progress in the very near future towards finding a solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member States and towards achieving the objective set by world leaders in paragraph 153 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome\(^2\):

"We support early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions."

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration,

Zahir Tanin

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations

Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council.

\(^1\) Including inter alia the relevant negotiables mentioned in the Overview, such as the length of the terms [3-15] of extended seats, the possibility of re-election to extended seats, the nature of review [after 10-15 years] or challenge and provisions to prevent "flip-flopping".

\(^2\) A/RES/60/1.
STATEMENT BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO
THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

19 FEBRUARY 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. “The Untied Nations” – that is how the name of the newborn organization was spelled in one of the San Francisco documents. Accidentally misspelled, for the objective of the UN was exactly the opposite of untying nations. The world body was brought into the world in 1945 to strengthen the mutual ties between countries and to tie their behavior to international law. In order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the UN Charter endowed in particular the Security Council with sweeping powers. Yet it is said that its real impact derives not just from such legal provisions but to a large extent also from its perceived legitimacy. Let me quote for example Harvard professor Joseph Nye, who said: “What the UN can convey that is particularly important is legitimacy, an important part of soft power.” End of quote. For the UN Security Council, remaining relevant therefore requires retaining legitimacy. Yet it is here that we have a lot of work on our hands. Just look at the UN logo. It was approved back in 1946 and depicts the world surrounded by olive branches – by now, that world has changed so profoundly, that the profoundly unchanged organization’s ability to bear the olive branch of peace is severely at risk. Peace and security cannot be maintained by a Security Council that is out of date and out of touch. A young and charismatic American president led the way when he said, and I quote: “The United Nations cannot survive as a static organization. Its obligations are increasing as well as its size. Its Charter must be changed as well as its customs. The authors of that Charter did not intend that it be frozen in perpetuity.” End of quote. That was John F. Kennedy at the opening of the 18th GA session in 1963, the last and only time the Council’s composition was updated. Now we are in GA session number 63 and once more face the responsibility to reform.

2. This chance for change has been three decades in the making. It was India together with Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka that in 1979 planted the seed by asking the General Assembly to include a new item on its agenda: “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”. It was September 11 and its aftermath that laid bare the urgent need to adapt the Security Council to the come-back of international insecurity, propelling the item towards the top of the UN’s agenda. At the 2005 World Summit, our leaders rallied behind the objective of, and I quote, “early reform of the Security Council – an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations – in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions,” end of quote. Our leaders thus already spelled out what the objective of Security Council reform is. What they did not tell us, of course, was their definition of “early reform”. However, as the President of the General Assembly has asserted, it would seem safe to say, that they did not mean to see another World Summit pass us by with the status quo intact. There is no reason why we should fail them, for today we at long last leave the antechamber of reform and walk into the negotiation room. Landmark Decision
62/557 opened that door on 15 September 2008. On this historic day, we should be thankful to all who worked hard to create this opportunity and, at the same time, we should be mindful of the responsibility not to squander it. Outside the negotiation room, the world finds itself in a state of flux. With the economic dominoes falling, some even augur a new Great Depression. And as we all know, that crisis set the stage for a war that brought untold sorrow to mankind—a history the UN is supposed to stop us from repeating. In these dangerous days, we cannot stop at repairing our economic institutions, our system of collective security must be reformed along with it. We don’t have the luxury of leaving one of the two for another day. Coming from where I come from, I know first-hand how intimately peace and prosperity are related and that both deserve first-tier priority. Coming from where I come from, I know how crucial the Council’s work is to peace on Earth, to peace on the ground. Security Council reform forms a centerpiece of today’s Herculean effort to reshape global governance.

3. Fortunately, as the last couple of months have also shown, the fire in which Decision 62/557 was forged still burns. We must keep that fire of collective commitment going, because if we let narrow self-interest prevail, we might miss the narrow opportunity for decisive progress. While the onus is mostly on Member States, the President of the General Assembly and I, as Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on his behalf, will do everything in our power to prevent that from happening. At the successful first meeting of this informal plenary, the President vowed to very soon undertake his responsibility to take the process forward. That time has now come. Yesterday morning, delegations already received the work plan announced on January 29. The plan is the result of a painstaking and diligent exercise of deduction. From that exercise, while guided by the authoritative sources the President identified in his 29 January address, we concluded that this is the work plan that emanates from Decision 62/557. What is more, the plan, setting out how to negotiate and when to negotiate, also does justice to the overwhelming and across-the-board appetite among Member States to get started—not with negotiations on the negotiations, but with negotiations on the substance. For too long, we have been dipping our toes in the water. Now, at long last, we finally dive into these negotiations. If we rush the process and swim back to the surface too quickly, we might not survive because of decompression sickness. But on the other hand, if we stay under too long, we will run out of air and surely succumb. I don’t believe that either fate will befall us, because I believe that you will rise to the challenge. Let us now take a deep breath before we dive into the deep end on March 4, commencing the implementation of our work plan. Every day, every way possible, I will help you with that, as described in the letter of the President. We are of course impartial to any of the positions, but partial to progress.

Thank you.
Closing statement by H.E. Zahir Tanin,
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York,
Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations
on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the
Security Council and other matters related to the Council.

Informal plenary of the General Assembly,
UNHQ New York, 19 February 2009.

1. Let me close the meeting now by thanking all delegations for their support and for
their constructive participation. Our meeting today has only strengthened my
conviction that we will be able to achieve decisive progress without unnecessary
delay. Obviously I cannot prejudge the specifics of the process ahead. But I can
tell you that, whatever happens, for the President and me, from start to finish, our
lodestar will continue to be Decision 62/557, and that we will continue to be
guided by the UN Charter, the World Summit Outcome Document, the relevant
rules and procedures, legal advice, past practice and your input through the
Open-ended Working Group. I will carefully study the many suggestions brought
forward today, including the composition of a composite paper. In any case, as
indicated by the President of the General Assembly in his letter, I will use all
means at my disposal, including oral statements and letters concerning the
individual meetings, to guide Member States during the coming consecutive
negotiation meetings about the five key issues. It is on these issues that the
President of the General Assembly has invited you to focus in a comprehensive
fashion. For all five, it is about providing more detail and where possible showing
flexibility on your position, including through new proposals. We meet in an
informal setting. This should mean brief interventions and interaction. I will
certainly encourage that to the best of my abilities. Let me clarify, that an
individual meeting could go on for longer than one day, so that we do justice to
the scope of every single issue. We should not have any illusions: these are
complicated matters, in other words, we are on thin ice. However, as Ralph
Waldo Emerson once said: “In skating over thin ice, our safety is our speed.” So
let’s speedily continue with intergovernmental negotiations “in good faith, with
mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner [...] seeking a
solution that can garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member
States.”

Thank you, the meeting is closed.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO
THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

16 MARCH 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. It is my pleasure and privilege to open this meeting on the question of the veto, key issue number two. The veto, the “I forbid”, is certainly a challenging issue, but of course not forbiddingly so. After how you dealt with categories of membership – head-on but heartily – there is no question you can handle the question of the veto. Last week, Member States once more received a letter of straightforward content, firmly rooted in GA Decision 62/557 and the President’s Work Plan. A letter to help them prepare for this part of the negotiations.

2. As Chair, I will also continue to work my heart out to make these intergovernmental negotiations as interactive as possible. That is why I will again give Member States the opportunity to intervene a second time, and thereby react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. This is particularly relevant if the speaking order has prevented them from doing so at their first opportunity to speak. At the same time, Member States are again urged to be concise and limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes.

3. It is in your interest to speak, but perhaps even more to listen to others – our last meeting saw a wide diversity of delegations taking the floor, thereby broadening the floor, broadening our exchange. Making the intergovernmental negotiations not just interactive but also inclusive, this new breadth has definitely managed to breathe new life into the process.

4. The same can be said of the first signs of flexibility shown by different sides. No one ever said it was easy; it takes courage to open up and reach out to others rather than retreating into rigidity. As the author Alice Swaim said: “Courage is not the towering oak that sees storms come and go; it is the fragile blossom that opens in the snow.” We need a time of spring blossom not just outside but also inside the negotiation room. Everyone knows this time is always short – that is why we need to move expeditiously.

5. Before I quickly pass the floor, let me just inform you that, for reasons of scheduling, we will address the next key issue, regional representation, on March 24 rather than March 25. For now, my three minutes are up, so let us move on to the list of speakers.
Closing Remarks

Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. My expectations have been more than met – this has been an excellent exchange. I very much look forward to the next one. As I stated in my opening remarks, on March 24 the key issue of regional representation is to be addressed, with a letter circulated well in advance. Hereby I would also like to announce, that on 9 April we will focus on the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, followed on 21 April by a meeting on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, the last of the five key issues. The five fingers on the hand of Security Council reform – a hand that should subsequently be able to reach for decisive progress.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

24 MARCH 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. It is a pleasure to see you back for another session of our Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform. The topic at hand today is of course regional representation, key issue number three. Last week, Member States once more received a letter of straightforward content, firmly rooted in GA Decision 62/557 and the President’s Work Plan. A letter to help them prepare for this part of the negotiations, especially when it comes to the substance.

2. On the procedure, I don’t think I need to remind anyone of the three minutes or the second sequence of interventions – by now, you are all very familiar with how we go about these meetings.

3. But I will keep reminding you of the paramount importance of showing flexibility and of doing so sooner rather than later. Today already marks the halfway point of the first round of our negotiations. Between now and our next meeting on April 9, a score of world leaders will converge on London in an effort to revamp the
world economy. Our peace and security institutions cannot stay behind. The Security Council cannot stay behind. Today, the word instability most of all has an economic ring to it, summoning the image of stock prices jumping up and down. But tomorrow, depending on the way of the world, it could be associated with peace and security again. We need to be fully equipped at the international level to deal with not just incomes falling down but also with peace falling apart. That is why, in the words of the President of the General Assembly, a better Council cannot wait until tomorrow, if we want to have a better tomorrow.

Thank you.
CLOSING REMARKS

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

31 MARCH 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. I think I represent the views of all regions in stating that this has been an excellent exchange. I thank all delegations for making the debate more than the sum of its parts. Let us retain that synergy for our 9 April exchange on the fourth key issue as defined in GA Decision 62/557, namely size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council. For scheduling reasons, our subsequent meeting on the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly will take place on April 20 instead of April 21 as previously announced.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

7 April 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. “Everything will be all right - you know when? When people, just people, stop thinking of the United Nations as a weird Picasso abstraction and see it as a drawing they made themselves.”

2. Memorable words by Dag Hammarskjöld, appointed Secretary-General of the UN exactly 56 years ago today. After all this time, we are still trying to create a United Nations in which people, just people, can recognize themselves. Our current effort to redraw, to reform the Security Council so that it reflects today’s world, is a part of that endeavour. I would even say its centerpiece.

3. Now in April, these negotiations were successfully launched in February and gathered considerable momentum in March. After today, only one key issue will be left to discuss before we march on towards the second round, namely the relationship between the Council and the Assembly. Today’s discussion revolves around the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Security Council, the fourth key issue as enumerated in GA Decision 62/557. To help you prepare, I last week once again circulated a letter of straightforward content, firmly rooted in that same decision. Now I know that today’s subject matter is vast. But I also know that your ability to convey concise messages in three minutes is unlimited. Because while the UN itself should not resemble a Picasso painting, its working methods should, with discussions that abstract from less relevant details and highlight the essential – the common ground. If we conduct our work in that fashion, I am sure, everything will be all right.

Thank you.
CLOSING REMARKS

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

8 April 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. After productive exchanges on the first four key issues, only one is left for us to address. As I stated in my opening remarks, you have generated considerable momentum. To sustain it, new steps forward will be necessary in the second round. But first things first. Let us bring the current round to a successful conclusion by keeping our eye on the ball and by taking a good look at the relationship between the Council and the Assembly. I look forward to seeing you all back on April 20.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

20 April 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. Let me open today’s meeting with a couple of short remarks. With the first round of our Intergovernmental Negotiations drawing to a close, I want to offer a compliment to all delegations for their active and interactive participation. What is more, you have acted and reacted, as 62/557 prescribed, in good faith and with mutual respect, translating these words into works.

2. All this hard work has already laid a solid foundation for the second round. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. Not while an issue of such paramount importance remains to be dealt with, namely the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, two vital organs of our world body.

3. In May, well before the second round commences, you will receive another letter on our further implementation of Decision 62/557 and of the Work Plan, along with the overview prescribed therein.

4. But in the meantime, the adage remains: first things first, first round first. Successfully reaching the end of this round, while also reaching out across the aisle at every opportunity – that is the immediate challenge. Today, before further digesting the results of our productive exchanges and further investing in the relationships with your fellow delegations, you are to focus on another relationship. There seems to be very little that they cannot accomplish, if the Security Council and the General Assembly join forces as partners in peace and prosperity. Let’s see if we can give them some good relationship advice. The nineteenth-century French poet Marceline Desbordes-Valmore compared a good relationship to being like two chapters in the same book. If true, that’s good news, because at the very least the Council and the Assembly already are two chapters in the same book: the Charter.

Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. Thank you for all your wise words on the substance and for all your kind words directed towards the Chair. Facilitating this process has been a pleasure and a privilege so far and I look forward to continuing our partnership for reform in the second round.

2. As I said in my opening remarks, well before that round commences, you will receive another letter on our further implementation of Decision 62/557 and of the Work Plan, along with the overview prescribed therein.

3. According to an age-old saying about theatre pieces, the second act is always the best. It does not need to bother with introductory elements, setting up locations and characters, but can move straight into the meat of the story, before the resolution of its plot lines later on in the play. Let us during this second act, also referred to as “rising action”, rise to the occasion – just like we have done during the current stage. Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22 MAY 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies,
Distinguished delegates,

1. And so we start the middle chapter of our reform story. It’s good to see you all back here for the second round of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. As any author knows, the middle of a novel is the most challenging part to write. A transitional phase, where the excitement of the beginning threatens to seep away and a satisfying resolution to the story lines is not yet clearly in sight. Therefore, the middle is the place to raise the stakes. With the introduction of the main characters and themes out of the way, more character interaction and narrative action are needed to develop and deepen the plot.

2. Running out of creativity and courage, many novelists get bogged down in the middle. But not you, I am sure. I have faith in you, because you have been working together in good faith, with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent manner. I count on you to again put pen to paper and to constructively co-author the next chapter.

3. The primary source material for the remainder of your novel is not new: namely, the substantive underpinning of the negotiations as defined in paragraph e of Decision 62/557. As each and every one of us can read, this includes the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States Groupings. Old or new, oral or written – all of these positions and proposals are still very much on the table as part of that primary source material.

4. What I, as Chair of this process, have tabled at the beginning of this week is simply meant to serve as a source of inspiration. Nothing more, nothing less. It does not in any way supplant the substantive underpinning. Written in strict conformity with the President’s Work Plan, my overview has the solemn purpose not to circumscribe, but to catalyze. And if there is enough political will in this house to make decisive progress, the overview will indeed do just that, will indeed catalyze the process.

5. Since I was appointed, to catalyze has been my objective all along, and I sincerely thank the membership for welcoming and supporting my approach – both objective and steady – all this time. That same approach I brought to the difficult task of composing the first round’s overview – the result might not be perfect, but it is partial in only one way: partial to progress.

6. While the overview is comprehensive in the sense of dealing with all the five key issues and taking all the proceedings into account, it does not and cannot contain all the positions and proposals in all their detail. By its very nature, as the dictionary attests, an overview is a general outline. Although
the attached letters, an integral part of the document, do add a great amount of detail, it is especially as a general outline that the overview can concentrate the mind and focus the debate – as opposed to a verbatim account or a laundry list. A debate still firmly based on all your positions and proposals in all their detail.

7. A debate that today, as announced in paragraph 19 of the overview, revolves around the review, not the overview. Review or challenge, to be precise. Right after no less than fifteen meetings on the five key issues, this is the right time to really explore a concept that affects them all, namely a review or challenge mechanism – more specifically, its general nature, agenda, timing and frequency. Undeniably, the prospect of a future reassessment impacts what we decide in the present. Given that this impact could extend to each and every aspect of our reform decisions, the concept of review or challenge offers an opportunity to have a more comprehensive discussion – an important wish reiterated all throughout the first round and all throughout the membership. I am granting that wish.

8. Not only is addressing review or challenge a good way to usher out the first round, but also to usher in the second, to start the middle chapter. As I said, this is the chapter where novelists can only advance the story by raising the stakes. In the context of our process, raising the stakes means pushing the envelope on compromise. During the first round, we have seen the first gestures from different sides. Now it is time to follow-through towards a breakthrough. The accent has to move from fleshing out the positions to showing flexibility. Starting out exploring the concept of review or challenge, which cuts across a wide variety of positions and proposals, will help us do just that.

9. Comprehensiveness and compromise will be keywords of this second round. After viewing the five key issues all at once from the perspective of review or challenge, the remainder of the second round will also exhibit the much demanded comprehensive character. Over the course of two exchanges, we will examine the five key issues according to the logic with which the Charter puts them together. During each of these meetings, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant. It is however part of my responsibility as Chair to, in the interest of compromise, add some structure to the discussions – and what better inspiration for this than the Charter? By the end of June, after two rounds of negotiations, the five key issues will have been considered both separately and jointly. And all throughout this process, the five key issues as defined in decision 62/557 are still there – untouched, all in one piece, all important in their own right.

10. What I hope also carries over from the first into the second round is your active and interactive participation. As you will have read in my overview,
more than three quarters of the membership engaged in the negotiation process, and that is just one of the many interesting statistics at my disposal. I could have included, for example, factual data on which countries adhered to the three minute rule and which did not. Instead, I will merely renew my plea to be short and sweet – in the interest of interactive and active participation. There should be time for everyone who wants to speak and, in the second cycle of interventions, for everyone who wants to respond.

11. It is now time for me to cede the floor myself and listen to you attentively. I have and will continue to undertake my particular responsibility as Chair, discharging my mandate as always with Decision 62/557 as lodestar and guided by the UN Charter, the World Summit Outcome document, the relevant UN rules and procedures, legal advice and past practice. Now I am counting on you to undertake your own responsibility for the future of the process. Based on how far you have already come this session, I hold great expectations about how this story will unfold. It is yours to write. History is yours to write. In time, historians will surely judge this writing effort – judge whether you grasped and grabbed the great opportunity before us. But let this be a consolation: according to the American freethinker H.L. Menken, historians are only failed novelists themselves.

Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. It is a great pleasure to see you all back here for the continuation of Exchange 1 of the second round of our intergovernmental negotiations. Before giving the first speaker the floor, allow me to extend two invitations.

2. To begin with, I would like to invite the membership to take another good look at my opening remarks of May 22. During the debate, I listened carefully to all the interventions of Member States, including comments and concerns. Since I sincerely believe my word of welcome that day addressed a fair number of them, I ask Member States to carefully consider it. Copies are of course available in the room.

3. My second invitation concerns our topic for discussion, review or challenge. As a number of delegations already emphasized on Friday, this topic, relevant to all the five key issues as defined in Decision 62/557 and common to a substantial mass of positions and proposals, requires thorough analysis. That is why I would like to invite Member States to work towards reform by further working on that analysis today. After one and a half decade of debate, this is the time not for paralysis but for progress.

Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. And so we round out the first of the three exchanges making up the second round of our intergovernmental negotiations. I have listened carefully to all of you. At the outset, one delegation, speaking on behalf of a group of Member States, made a quite appropriate reference to Alice in Wonderland. Indeed, we should be careful not to move forward only to remain in one place, as Alice did. Fortunately, the Red Queen, one of the fantasy characters she meets, had some good advice for Alice, and for all of us, and I quote: “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!” End of quote.

2. Inspiring Member States to rise above themselves in that way and rise to the occasion – that constitutes my solemn duty as Chair of this process. In fulfilling that duty, my lodestar was, is and will continue to be decision 62/557. Its
paragraph e spells out the substantive underpinning of our intergovernmental negotiations, and I quote:

“i. The positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other Member States groupings;

iii. The following documents: report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly; General Assembly decision 61/561 and the report of the Open-ended Working Group on its work during the sixty-second session of the General Assembly;”

3. End of quote. There can be no debate or doubt about what these negotiations are based on. Decision 62/557 enshrines the positions and proposals, like they were explained in speech or in writing by Member States themselves, as the substantive basis of this process, along with the specified UN documents. In my May 22 opening remarks, I have called this the primary source material.

4. My overview as mandated through the President’s Work Plan, on the other hand, is simply meant to serve as a source
of inspiration. Nothing more, nothing less. Inspiration to run twice as fast as you can, in order to get somewhere. We are not dealing with a report or resolution to be adopted or to be changed or amended as was suggested, but with a sovereign contribution from the Chair.

5. There was some concern, that the paragraphs with the principal options do not contain all the positions in all their detail. That, however, was the point. By reflecting the main thrust of the first round and some but not all of the relevant negotiables, this part of the overview can concentrate the mind and focus the debate during the second round. Member States can benefit from this as they see fit. My overview is to catalyze, not circumscribe. The positions and proposals, as expressed by Member States themselves in speech or in writing, are still leading. I do want to point out, though, that my letters laid out said positions and proposals in a more detailed fashion and that these letters form an integral part of the overview.

6. While 62/557 will thus continue to be my lodestar, as always I will also be guided by the UN Charter, the World Summit Outcome document, the relevant UN rules and procedures,
legal advice and past practice. The supreme authority and logic of the Charter has inspired the exact implementation of Decision 62/557 during the second round, which should not repeat the first. Over the course of the two remaining exchanges, we will examine the five key issues as the Charter puts them together. This schedule responds to a membership-wide demand for more comprehensive discussions. In response to some concerns about this schedule I repeat: I am not out to circumscribe, but to catalyze. During each of the two meetings, Member States are free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant. For example, I can imagine that the first exchange on composition will feature some mention of the veto as well. I can also imagine that during both exchanges, the membership will address the topic of review or challenge. After all, as we have seen over the course of this first exchange, review or challenge is highly relevant to all of the five key issues as defined in Decision 62/557 and common to a substantial mass of positions and proposals. By the end of June, after two rounds of negotiations, the five key issues will have been considered both separately and jointly. And all throughout this process, the five key issues as defined in
decision 62/557 are still there – untouched, all in one piece, all important in their own right.

7. Comprehensiveness and compromise should be the keywords of this second round. In charting the path ahead, I have undertaken my responsibility to take the process forward, impartial to any of the positions but partial to progress. As I have elaborated while addressing comments and concerns both on Friday and today, I believe this is a road we can all travel down together, however bumpy in places. You know that has always been important to me. Along the road, I will continue to take your comments and concerns into account to the best of my abilities. For example, a number of delegations have asked me to indicate how many speakers supported which reform option – I am certainly willing to look into that in the future. In any case, I hope to see you all back for Exchange 2 on June 11.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
RELATED TO THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

11 JUNE 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. A warm welcome to the second exchange of the second round. It is as important now as it was at any stage of our Intergovernmental Negotiations to join hands. Join hands to further implement Decision 62/557. As I have stated, and so many with me, the further implementation of that decision during the second round requires comprehensiveness and compromise – two keywords.

2. First, comprehensiveness. Today’s exchange provides just that by revolving around the composition of the Security Council, comprising the key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation. Questions like how many seats to add, what kind of seats and how to distribute them among the membership are intertwined. This exchange offers an opportunity to explore such connections, along with relevant negotiables. Ultimately, you are the referees of relevance. That is, Member States are free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant. I am simply discharging my responsibility as Chair by adding
some structure and some comprehensiveness to the exchanges – all the while remaining impartial to any of the positions, but partial to progress.

3. The prime objective of progress brings me to the urgent necessity of compromise, which I have labelled the second keyword of this round. This time around, the accent has to move from fleshing out the positions to showing flexibility. That is the only way to take this negotiation process to the next level and only you can do it. But I will do everything in my power to inspire you to undertake your responsibility to reform – my Overview counts as a prime example of that.

4. And I am not just about inspiration, but also about interaction. Member States will thus again be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers. At the same time, Member States are urged to be concise and to limit their interventions to no longer than three minutes. As always, there will not be zero tolerance, but neither will tolerance be infinite. So let me also lead by example and conclude. Thank you.
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. Let me conclude by commending you all. This was another excellent exchange. In a both constructive and productive manner, Member States explored the connections between the issues. One delegation even submitted the text of a resolution. As I also stated in my Overview, without a doubt decisive progress is within reach. This is not optimism, but realism.

2. I urge you to bring the same kind of engagement and determination to the third exchange of the second round. The issues on the table deserve it. Exchange 3 was originally scheduled for June 23, but to give delegations more space and to be able to finish, we will already start the day before, on June 22. Member States can expect to receive another letter well in advance. In the meantime, I would encourage all Member States to step up their internal deliberative processes on Council reform. Don’t just ask what the negotiations can do for you, but also what you can do for the negotiations. From my part, I will carefully study all suggestions about the future of this process. Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS
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AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22 JUNE 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. This will be an auspicious week. Starting on Wednesday, the international community will gather to discuss an important issue: the global economic and financial crisis. But we begin the week today, with a different but equally significant task. Today, in accordance with 62/557, our basis and guide, we begin the final exchange of the Second Round of our intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council Reform.

2. In our last meeting, we looked at the composition of the Security Council. Today, we will look at its functions and powers, its voting, and its procedure, comprising the key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the question of the veto, and the working methods of the Council. This exchange will give you the opportunity to build on the first round and explore the many linkages between these issues, along with relevant negotiables.
3. Member states are, as always, free to express their views on any issue they deem relevant. However, I once again request that member states limit their interventions to three minutes, to allow everyone the opportunity to weigh in. And as has become customary, member states will be given the opportunity to intervene twice, so they can react to and reciprocate the flexibility shown by their peers.

4. Let me congratulate the membership on the energy and dedication to progress that has been in evidence in this round as in the first. In going forward with these negotiations, I urge you to continue to display the flexibility, compromise, and mutual understanding that will be a crucial part of any solution. As a well-known British writer once said, “If you can’t go around it, over it, or through it, you had better negotiate with it.” As I have said before, I am here to inspire and facilitate, as I did with my Overview; only you can take the process to the next level. On that note, I will turn the floor over to you.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN
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AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

23 June 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
Excellencies, distinguished delegates,

1. Let me conclude by stating that this was another excellent exchange. Building on Decision 62/557, you have carefully looked at the functions and powers of the Security Council, its voting, and its procedure, comprising the key issues of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the question of the veto, and the working methods of the Council. Earlier in this second round you already addressed the concept of review or challenge and the composition of the Council, comprising the key issues of size, categories of membership and regional representation.

2. Throughout the three exchanges, comprehensiveness and compromise became the keywords of this round. Inspired by my Overview, you explored the many connections between the key issues, along with relevant negotiables, and further unlocked convergence potential. Some resolution texts were even submitted.
3. Now, repetition is to be avoided. This is the sense of
the house. Common sense. Hopefully, during the third
round we can add concreteness as a keyword, next to
compromise and comprehensiveness. Only then can
we make decisive progress during this session. After
having carefully listened to the interventions of all of
you during this round, I continue to believe, that
decisive progress is within reach. As I said earlier, this
is not optimism. This is realism.

4. You can continue to count on your Chair, unflinchingly
impartial to any of the positions, but partial to progress.
As always, I will discharge my responsibilities with
Decision 62/557 as lodestar and guided by the UN
Charter, the World Summit Outcome document, the
relevant UN rules and procedures, legal advice and
past practice. In early July, right after a number of high-
level meetings both here in New York and abroad, you
can expect to receive another letter from the Chair on
the further implementation of Decision 62/557 during
this session.
5. Ultimately, the responsibility to implement it is yours. The responsibility to reform is yours. It’s not an easy task, but remember this. While the road to decisive progress may be laborious, as an Afghan proverb goes, there is a path to the top of even the highest mountain.

Thank you.
INTERVENTION BY

H.E. ZAHIR TANIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK

CHAIR OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN THE
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO
THE COUNCIL

AT AN INFORMAL PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1 SEPTEMBER 2009

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK
1. Welcome back. Today, we once again exchange our place under the burning sun for a seat in this negotiation room – the room where we deal with the burning issue of Security Council reform. Summer has come and gone, and I hope this period of reflection has strengthened your resolve to reform the Council. In the words of the American poet Wallace Stevens: “The summer night is like a perfection of thought.” I can’t wait to hear how you have perfected your thoughts over the many past summer nights. After all, through my July 16 letter, I asked you to take advantage of the hiatus by reaching conclusions about your own positions.

2. In addition to that, I also asked you to informally reach out to others – not just to the likeminded, but also across the aisle. We certainly have come a long way since February 19, but in the times ahead we need to go the extra mile by increasingly being compromise-driven and taking into consideration the logic of the other’s position and the level of support it enjoys.

3. We can’t stall now, after starting off so well. After clearing all the procedural hurdles on day one. After seeing a genuine surge of interest, with up to two-thirds of the membership actively and interactively engaged. After, inspired by the Overview, chewing over the main options and negotiables for reform.

4. Out of these, as always based on your guidance, we are for now going to zero in on two potential reform models, looking not just at all their different varieties but also at all their different pros and cons. During the meetings, Member States are of course free to express their views on any matter they deem relevant. I for one am just discharging my fundamental responsibility as Chair by slightly focusing the agenda as per your requests. It is my firm intention to help you move ahead, not go around in circles. What is more, I do so without any prejudice whatsoever to the particular solution you might arrive at in the end. I do not point my finger in any definite direction – I am simply the one who holds the gavel.

5. So, in accordance with your different requests, tomorrow will be all about the model featuring an expansion in both current categories, with the intermediate model at the center of attention come September 3. Needless to say, both models extend into all five dimensions of reform – known among Security Council reform aficionados as the five key issues.

6. Nevertheless, today we kick off this third round by explicitly putting the five of them at the forefront of our discussion. Considered one by one in the first round and more comprehensively during the second, the five key issues now feature on the agenda all at once. After this exchange, yet another opportunity to explore the interconnectedness of these issues, we will have looked at them from every possible different angle.

7. This way, we do justice to GA Decision 62/557, which will continue to be our brightly shining lodestar on the journey towards reform. Or, to be more precise, early reform, the overarching objective world leaders rallied around
back in 2005. When is early, one might ask. It is never too early in a world where the number of major conflicts last year went up instead of going down. It is never too early in a world where city streets are the new trenches and civilians the main casualties of war. It is never too early in a world where the next global emergency calling for a global response could be in foreign rather than financial affairs. The Wallace Stevens poem I quoted from at the outset bears the following title: “The house was quiet and the world was calm.” Yet the world is not calm, so this house cannot remain quiet. In these dangerous days, this house, this world organization, is called upon to pull together and pull off a long overdue reform of its peace and security organ. The challenge is to make it reflect the global realities of the 21st century, not the mid 20th century. The Security Council can become more effective, its resolutions more readily implemented, if it is widely perceived as a more representative and thus more legitimate body. Here, becoming more effective is really just jargon for saving more lives. That is why, in the words of the President of the General Assembly, a better Council cannot wait until tomorrow, if we want to have a better tomorrow.

8. As the third round gets underway, our collective efforts to boost the Council’s legitimacy and its effectiveness enter into a new phase – a decisive one. I urge you to make the most out of the little time we have left this session by being compromise driven, concrete and concise. Nobody, I presume, has forgotten about the three minute rule over the summer, although I won’t get tired of reminding delegations time and again if necessary. You have a lot of work on your hands and I am here to facilitate that work – as you have grown accustomed to, impartial to any of the positions, yet partial to progress.

Thank you.
Closing remarks by H.E. Zahir Tanin, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York, Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council.


Excellencies, distinguished delegates, dear friends,

1. Next week, it will be eight years since the day the world changed. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath also shook this building to its very foundations. As many, friends and foes of the UN alike, have stated ever since, in this brave new world we need a brave new UN. The term United Nations already bears in it the Latin verb “nasci” – to be born. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it has to become associated with another: “renasci” – to be reborn. This renaissance would not be complete without a new and improved Security Council, the world body’s heart muscle. Not when the number of major conflicts last year went up instead of going down. Not when city streets are the new trenches and civilians the main casualties of war. Not when the next global emergency calling for a global response could be in foreign rather than financial affairs.

2. That is why at the World Summit in 2005, our leaders entrusted us with the mission to reform the Council. But they rallied around “early reform”, not “reform whenever”. As the President of the General Assembly has concluded, it would seem safe to say, that world leaders did not mean to see another World Summit pass us by with the status quo intact. Fortunately, with the President’s leadership, this year we at long last left the antechamber of reform and walked into the negotiation room – a door opened by landmark decision 62/557.

3. There are those who say that we have failed, because after half a year of negotiations we did not reform the Council. But it is they who have failed. They have failed to see the decisive progress you achieved on the most sensitive of issues and under the most difficult of circumstances. In the twilight of the 62nd session, the process almost collapsed under the weight of acrimony. Since then, acrimony has given way to harmony. This spring, with a careful yet courageous work plan embraced by everyone, we cleared all the procedural hurdles on day one, avoiding negotiations on the negotiations and moving straight into the substance. From that first day on, there has been a genuine surge of interest, with up to two-thirds of the membership actively and interactively engaged. After previous reports had already recorded a wide range of views, you chewed over the main options and negotiables for reform, inspired by my Overview. During the third round, you zeroed in on two of the potential models. After three rounds, the five key issues from 557 have been examined from nearly all possible different angles. And also, over three
rounds, with the articulation of the positions, the board has been set – now hopefully the pieces can really start moving more towards a compromise.

4. So at this point in time we have ground to be proud. Much ground has been covered. The groundwork has been laid. The groundwork for a real give and take, for real reform. The groundwork for the realization of the President’s vision: a United Nations where every country counts. To humbly contribute to that vision, to serve under an immensely dedicated man like Miguel d’Escoto has been a great honor. It is now my responsibility to brief him and, upon his decision, get back to you briefly on the steps ahead. I will tell him that you are united in your desire to continue the process in a smooth and solid manner – no progress should be lost, no time should be wasted. In the meantime, I understand from the Office of the President, you will receive the report of the Open-ended Working Group – it will be in the mail right after Labor Day weekend, with its final meeting scheduled for Wednesday afternoon. Over that same Labor Day weekend, I will labor diligently to finish my already announced letter about the now finished third round. But before I put pen to paper, let me use this oral statement to sincerely thank all of you, the owners of this process. It has been a great journey so far – my Egyptian friend compared it to an airplane ride. An accurate comparison in my view. An airplane is a fast means of transportation – however, to avoid storms or airspace restrictions, it does not always take the fastest route, what matters is getting to the destination all in one piece. I for one can see the destination somewhere in the distance and I believe in time we will safely land this plane there – at a place called reform. That way, we will have finally accomplished the mission entrusted to us by world leaders, which, after all, was never meant to be a permanent mission.

Thank you.