

**REPORT  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON CONTRIBUTIONS**

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

**OFFICIAL RECORDS: FORTY-THIRD SESSION**

**SUPPLEMENT No. 11 (A/43/11)**



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**New York, 1988**

## **NOTE**

**Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.**

[19 July 1988]

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## I. ORGANIZATION AND ATTENDANCE

1. The forty-eighth session of the Committee on Contributions was held at United Nations Headquarters from 6 June to 1 July 1988. The following members were present:

Mr. Andrzej ABRASZEWSKI

Mr. Kenshiro AKIMOTO

Syed Amjad ALI

Mr. Ernesto BATTISTI

Mr. Carlos Antonio BIVERO GARCIA

Mr. Alain CATTI

Mr. Yuri A. CHULKOV

Mr. Mauro Sergio da Fonseca Costa COUTO

Mr. John D. FOX

Mr. Peter GREGG

Mr. Elias M. C. KAZEMBE

Mr. Atilio Norberto MOLTENI

Mr. Dimitri RALLIS

Mr. Umar SIRRY

Mr. WANG Liansheng

Mr. Adnan YONIS

Mr. Assen Iliev ZLATANOV

Mr. BAGBENI Adeito Nsengeya was not able to attend.

2. The Committee elected Syed Amjad Ali as Chairman and Mr. Andrzej Abraszewski as Vice Chairman.

## II. CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 42/208

3. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/208 of 11 December 1987, which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling all its previous resolutions on the scale of assessments, particularly resolution 39/247 B of 12 April 1985,

"Having considered the report of the Committee on Contributions, 1/ and noting with appreciation the efforts of the Committee,

"Taking note of the views expressed in the Fifth Committee at its forty-second session,

"1. Requests the Committee on Contributions:

"(a) To recommend to the General Assembly, at its forty-third session, a scale of assessments for the period 1989-1991, prepared on the basis of the methodology and criteria used to prepare the current scale;

"(b) In this connection, to review the limits in the scheme to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales;

"2. Also requests the Committee on Contributions to continue to undertake studies in pursuance of its work on the improvement of the methodology for drawing up future scales of assessment, in the light of views expressed in the Fifth Committee during the forty-second and previous sessions, and to submit a progress report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Contributions with the facilities it requires to carry out its work, including supplementary assistance if necessary.

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"1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 11 and addendum (A/42/11 and Add.1)."

4. The Committee carefully considered the resolution and discussed, in particular, paragraph 1 on the basis of the relevant summary records of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/42/SR.3-7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 49, 51 and 52), the report of the Fifth Committee (A/42/852) and a note by the Secretariat summarizing the discussion on the scheme of limits during the informal consultations of the Fifth Committee on the scale of assessments.

5. In applying certain elements of the methodology that were used to prepare the current scale, as called for in paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 42/208, no elaboration by the Committee was required. These elements include a statistical base period of 10 years, a low per capita income allowance formula, ceiling and

floor rates of 25 per cent and 0.01 per cent, respectively, and no increase in assessment rates for the least developed countries. Application of other elements of the current methodology did require some elaboration by the Committee, as a result of the ad hoc treatment of them in the preparation of the current scale. These elements include the manner for taking into account both high levels of external indebtedness and anomalies resulting from exchange rates used for converting local currencies to United States dollars to reflect relative capacity to pay in different countries. In accordance with paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 42/208, the Committee also reviewed the limits in the scheme to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales.



### III. CURRENT METHODOLOGY

#### A. Components of the current methodology and criteria

6. The fundamental criterion of the current methodology is the capacity to pay. Continuing the practice for the current scale of using a 10-year statistical base period, the Committee measured capacity to pay in terms of the average national income of Member States for the period 1977-1986. In order to take into account "comparative income per head of population", as called for in the original terms of reference of the Committee, average national incomes were modified by a low per capita income allowance based on the same parameters used for the current scale, i.e., an upper per capita income limit of \$2,200 and a relief gradient of 85 per cent. This means that the average national income for a Member State with a per capita income below \$2,200 was reduced by a percentage resulting from taking 85 per cent of the percentage difference between the Member State's per capita income and \$2,200. For example, for a Member State with an average per capita income of \$1,600, the average total national income would be reduced by 23.2 per cent ( $\$2,200 - \$1,600 = \$600$ ;  $\$600 = 27.3$  per cent of  $\$2,200$ ;  $85$  per cent of  $27.3$  per cent =  $23.2$  per cent). Two further elements of the present methodology are the ceiling and floor rates of 25 per cent and 0.01 per cent, respectively. There is also a provision for not increasing the assessment rates of the least developed countries, as called for by the General Assembly in its resolutions 36/231 A of 18 December 1981 and 39/247 B of 12 April 1985.

7. In its resolution 42/208 the General Assembly called for a review by the Committee of the limits in the scheme to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales. As shown below, the scheme of limits used for the 1986-1988 scale consists of rate brackets and two limits, namely, percentage limits and index point limits.

#### Combination of percentage limits and index point limits with eight rate brackets

<u>If the present official scale is</u>	<u>the percentage change in the new machine scale should not be more than the lesser of:</u>	
	<u>Percentage limits</u>	<u>Index point limits</u>
Above 5.00 per cent	5.0	75 points
2.50 - 4.99 per cent	7.5	30 points
1.00 - 2.49 per cent	10.0	20 points
0.76 - 0.99 per cent	12.5	11 points
0.51 - 0.75 per cent	15.0	10 points
0.25 - 0.50 per cent	17.5	6 points
0.05 - 0.24 per cent	20.0	2 points
0.01 - 0.04 per cent	-	1 point

Application of the same limits of the scheme of limits to the 1986-1988 scale would specify the maximum possible individual rate increases or decreases between the current scale and the 1989-1991 scale. The level of the maximum increase or decrease is determined by the limit with the lesser value. For

instance, the rate of a country that was assessed at 3.21 under the 1986-1988 scale can increase or decrease by a maximum of 0.24 points for the 1989-1991 scale ( $3.21 \times 0.075 = 0.24$ ); similarly, a 1986-1988 rate of 2.31 can increase or decrease by a maximum of 0.20 points ( $2.31 \times 0.1 = 0.23$ ). Paragraph 40 below deals with the review of the limits.

8. The methodology also provides for the adjustment of the national income of highly indebted countries. However, because of the lack of comprehensive and systematic information on external debt, the Committee on Contributions, at its forty-fifth session, did not establish a definitive formula for this adjustment. For the 1986-1988 scale, it applied a pragmatic formula without prejudice to the future position it might adopt on the basis of better information. The issue is discussed in detail in paragraphs 11 to 21.

9. The 1986-1988 scale of assessments furthermore included an ad hoc adjustment for exchange rate anomalies. This issue is discussed in paragraphs 22 to 31 below.

10. The application of the above in the process of preparing the new scale is discussed in paragraphs 32 to 39.

## B. Methodology to take into account the high levels of external indebtedness

### 1. Materials presented

11. The Committee considered a Secretariat document that presented data on total and public external debt and offered suggestions on how to utilize this information for the adjustment of the national income of countries with a heavy debt burden. The data in this document were restricted to developing countries, following the spirit of General Assembly resolution 39/247 B.

12. The document suggested that the use of public external debt was preferable to the use of total external debt for two reasons. First, data on private external debt, which is included in total debt, does not cover all private debt. Secondly, private debt does not constitute the same burden as public debt. Public debt has to be repaid from the government budget, which also includes contributions to the United Nations, and private debt can be defaulted on through bankruptcy of private enterprises while non-payment of public debt is the result of a political decision.

13. The document also suggested that the ratio between actual debt service repayments (of the principal) and national income should be used to arrive at percentage reductions of the national income data used by the Committee for the new scale. In other words, it suggested that the Committee use a new income concept in arriving at assessable income. The use of actual payments was suggested because of the better data availability.

14. It was pointed out that the method suggested in the document differed from the method used by the Committee in 1985 to adjust national income values through deductions for debt relief. The 1985 method implemented the deductions in two stages: the first was a selection of the countries with heavy debt burden on the basis of a weighted debt ratio of more than 100 per cent. The weighted debt ratio is obtained by applying weights of 0.8 and 0.2 for the ratios of debt to exports and national income, respectively. The next step consisted of percentage

deductions from national income based on the degree of debt burden, i.e., deductions of 10 per cent deduction for countries with the heaviest debt burden, 7.5 per cent for the next group, 5 per cent for the third group, and 2.5 per cent deduction for countries with the least debt burden. These percentages were determined in an ad hoc manner and were not based on the relationship between debt, debt service and national income.

## 2. Decisions

15. The Committee decided to proceed by identifying those countries which should benefit from debt relief deduction and then making the appropriate deduction from the national income estimates.

16. Eligibility for debt relief was determined for all developing and centrally planned economy countries for which data on total debt were available. Total debt rather than public debt was taken into consideration because of the greater availability of data and the lack of distinction between public and private debt in the data available from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concerning countries receiving development aid. In this manner, 118 countries were identified as compared to 37 in 1985.

17. Deductions for the 118 countries identified were made on the basis of the repayment of principal only, because interest payments are already reflected in national income estimates. In order to achieve the best possible reflection of debt burden, and thus capacity to pay, through the deductions, the Committee considered basing the repayment of principal on debt service due rather than on the actual repayment of principal since actual payments may be substantially lower than obligations. However, as reliable data on debt service due are not available, the Committee decided to approximate debt service due by using a working hypothesis on the ratio of debt service due to total external debt accumulated. After a thorough debate in which alternative ratios of 5, 10, 15 and 20 per cent were considered, it settled on 12 per cent. This 12 per cent debt service ratio to total external debt was then used to calculate the amount of debt service due to be deducted from national income (see annex I). The relevance of this ratio was determined in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, IMF suggested that the Committee should refine this methodology in the future on the basis of a study of the length of repayment periods, which would distinguish between different groups of countries with different types of loans.

18. One member expressed a dissenting view. He stated that the Committee should have applied the methodology and criteria for high indebtedness relief adopted in 1985 because, in his view, no better method had been devised yet. He argued that the methodology adopted by the Committee distorted and blunted the original objectives of the high indebtedness relief exercise.

19. Another member of the Committee indicated that the application of the formula did not have major practical effects; the results were more apparent than real. It was clear that developing countries with large indebtedness did not see their assessments reduced, as the points theoretically deducted from them for debt relief were eliminated by the application of the scheme of limits. As this question had not been resolved in an appropriate manner, it should be reconsidered in the future.

20. Some other members observed that the problem referred to in the preceding paragraph was largely a consequence of the application of the scheme of limits

subsequent to all prior adjustments to national income. They noted that successive applications of the scheme of limits introduced progressive distortions in the assessments of certain Member States, which would be even further amplified if the adjustments were made after the application of the scheme of limits (see also para. 38). For this and related reasons, they suggested that further review of the scheme of limits would be appropriate.

21. Some other members expressed the view that the limits in the scheme should be strengthened in such a way as to take care of problems of developing countries, including the problem referred to in paragraph 19.

C. Appropriate exchange rates for the conversion of local currencies to United States dollars

1. Materials presented

22. The Statistical Office of the United Nations Secretariat also presented a document on price-adjusted rates of exchange (PARE) in order to provide to the Committee an alternative for the ad hoc method applied in 1985. At that time, the existing PARE methodology was used only to identify countries requiring exchange rate adjustment. Instead, the Committee handled the actual adjustments by replacing for selected countries and years Statistical Office data by data from the World Bank's World Atlas. The PARE methodology in existence in 1985 has been reconsidered by the Committee in the intervening years. The document considered by the Committee at its present session represents a further step in the efforts to make the PARE methodology applicable for use by the Committee in the future.

23. In line with previous presentations of PARE application to the Committee, the document included data on changes in prices and exchange rates in individual Member States. These data would enable the Committee to make adjustments to national income data in United States dollars for countries where changes in exchange rates do not reflect changes in domestic prices and where per capita national income thus provides a distorted measure of the capacity to pay. The use of discrepancies between price and exchange rate developments in the application of PARE is based on the assumption that exchange rates to be used by the Committee should be as close as possible to the price relatives between countries.

24. The document presented to the Committee at its current session focused in particular on the effects of price - exchange rate distortions on per capita income expressed in United States dollars.

25. An analysis of several countries showed that nominal growth of per capita income in United States dollars in many instances did not reflect the generally modest real growth rates of per capita income. The fluctuations of per capita income of the countries studied furthermore resulted in frequent changes over time in the ranking of countries based on their per capita income, a phenomenon that misrepresents reality in view of the modest real growth rates of per capita income in most countries.

26. Given that per capita income is an important element in the assessment scale formula, which determines the relief deduction for countries with a per capita income of less than \$2,200, the Committee's attention was drawn to these fluctuations in per capita income in United States dollars, as these irregular movements of per capita income result in distortions of the level of assessable



income. Based on the findings of its study, the Statistical Office suggested that PARE adjustments be made to national and per capita income prior to processing the national income data in the assessment scale formula.

## 2. Discussion

27. A detailed discussion took place on the merits and disadvantages of the PARE method. Some members accepted the principle underlying the proposed PARE adjustments to national and per capita income in United States dollars. They pointed out that such adjustments were in line with similar ones made by other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which make PARE-type adjustments to the actual exchange rates in order to use the data as a key element in determining the distribution of development aid to member countries. Proponents furthermore pointed out that the use of the proposed PARE methodology would be more systematic than the ad hoc practice of the Committee followed during its forty-fifth session when it decided to replace Statistical Office data by World Bank data.

28. Other members, however, questioned the validity of the basic assumption of PARE that the exchange rates used by the Committee should be as close as possible to price relatives between countries. They argued that actual exchange rates should be used by the Committee in order to reflect not only price relatives but also other more important elements effecting exchange rates such as explicit government policies regarding exchange rates, government budget deficits, differences in interest rates between countries, and balance-of-payment issues. These issues are of particular relevance to countries with centrally planned economies.

29. In spite of the two divergent views on PARE, the Committee decided to test it for a selected group of countries whose national and per capita incomes clearly reflected anomalies resulting from unco-ordinated changes in prices and exchange rates.

30. To select the appropriate countries the Statistical Office calculated PARE-adjusted rates of exchange by extrapolating for all countries the average exchange rates in the previous base period 1974-1983 by price indices representing inflation in each country since then. Also presented were simple and weighted averages of actual and PARE rates. Subsequently, it compared for each country actual exchange rates for each year and the average for the period 1977-1986 with PARE-adjusted rates. On the basis of this information, it selected those countries where the average discrepancy between the actual and PARE-adjusted rates for the period 1977-1986 was larger than the difference between one United States dollar and the average value of the PARE-adjusted United States dollar for domestic inflation in the United States. In this manner, 32 countries with exchange rate anomalies were identified.

31. PARE adjustments were tested for these selected countries based on the ratio between the actual exchange rate and the PARE-adjusted rate. As these adjustments would result in considerable transfer of points between countries with PARE-adjusted rates and other countries, the Committee proceeded to reduce the effect of PARE uniformly for the selected countries. In order to implement such a reduction, it did not apply the PARE rate of exchange in the exact form proposed in the document before the Committee but experimented by weighting PARE with the actual exchange rate.

**D. Application of adjustments in the proposed 1989-1991 scale of assessments**

32. In general, the Committee agreed on the selection of the countries for which adjustments for debt and PARE should be considered. However, disagreements arose about the redistribution of the points of relief from the countries with anomalies to the remaining countries.

33. To illustrate the effects of PARE and debt adjustments, the Statistical Office applied the adjustments in succession directly to the national income data and used the adjusted national income data in the calculation of the assessment scale for the selected countries. As all countries with PARE adjustments were also in the group of countries with debt adjustments, some of the countries' national incomes were adjusted twice, once for debt and once for PARE. As a result of the application of the adjustments to national income, the incomes of the countries not adjusted for PARE or debt remained the same in absolute amounts but increased relative to the levels of national income of the countries to which adjustments were applied. In studying the effects of the subsequent mechanical application of the assessment methodology to the adjusted national income data of all Member States, several anomalies were detected by members of the Committee with regard to the effects of the adjustments on the assessments of countries not receiving PARE or debt relief.

34. One of the effects of both adjustments was that countries whose unadjusted national income resulted in assessment rates at the lower limit of the scheme of limits adopted during the 1985 session of the Committee experienced an increase in their assessment rates. These increases were a consequence of the proportionate redistribution of the relief points to all countries, including those receiving relief to the extent permitted by the scheme of limits and excluding those that are already at the upper limit prior to adjustment and, therefore, cannot be increased further. Several members felt that this redistribution was unacceptable and urged that these adjustments should not be assigned to countries in a mechanical manner but on a voluntary basis.

35. Another objection was raised by members who were reluctant to accept PARE and/or apply the PARE adjustments to specific countries. They pointed out that applying the PARE methodology to the selected countries and redistributing the resulting points in a mechanical way to all other countries represented an indirect application of the PARE methodology to countries where PARE adjustments were not justifiable given their price and exchange rate conditions. In this context, specific reference was made to countries with centrally planned economies.

36. Another anomalous effect of the PARE methodology noted by members of the Committee concerned Japan. By excluding this country from the group of PARE-adjusted countries, it was not only denied PARE relief but, through the mechanical redistribution of points, it would also have to shoulder some of the points given as relief to other countries. This effect was considered unacceptable by members of the Committee.

**Decision**

37. After having considered those anomalies, the Committee decided to adjust national income only for debt relief. Countries with significant exchange rate distortions, identified by the PARE analysis, were borne in mind in drawing up the final scale of assessments.

38. The machine assessment scale was prepared in accordance with the established methodology, as follows:

(a) National income data were taken as a point of departure;

(b) National income data were reduced for the countries identified for debt relief adjustments by the amounts agreed upon (see para. 17);

(c) Adjusted national incomes of countries with debt relief and unadjusted incomes of other countries were then further adjusted for low per capita income, resulting in assessable income;

(d) Subsequently, the assessment rate for each country was calculated on the basis of its assessable income as a percentage of total assessable income for all countries;

(e) A final adjustment to the individual assessment rates was made by applying the various limits, i.e., the 25 per cent ceiling and the 0.01 per cent floor rate, and the scheme of limits to avoid excessive variations of individual rates between successive scales. No further restrictions were applied.

39. The machine assessment scale resulting from the five steps described above was found to require mitigation in accordance with past practice.

E. The scheme to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales

40. As requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/208, the Committee reviewed the limits of the scheme to avoid excessive variations of individual rates of assessment between successive scales and agreed to apply the existing limits for the 1989-1991 scale. As mentioned in paragraph 4, the Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat summarizing the discussion on the scheme of limits during the informal consultations of the Fifth Committee on the scale of assessments during the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

#### IV. REVIEW OF THE SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

##### A. Statistical information

41. The Secretariat presented to the Committee a comprehensive data base for all Member States and non-member States on national income in local currency, population and exchange rates for the period 1977-1986, which is the basis for the Committee's deliberations of the scale of assessments for the period 1989-1991. The information presented also included derived data such as national income in United States dollars and average national and per capita incomes for the period 1977-1986, which were compared with the averages for the period 1974-1983 used as the basis of the present assessment scale.

42. The national income data presented were compiled in a manner different from previous years. As agreed by the Committee at its forty-seventh session, 1/ the Statistical Office used the official information provided by the statistical offices of Member States, which constitutes the data base of the United Nations Statistical Office. The separate questionnaire used in the past for purposes of the Committee was discontinued. However, as the Statistical Office data base lacks national income data for some countries, the Statistical Office made an extra effort to expand its data set beyond the coverage usually available for its data publication.

43. The total number of responses to requests from the Statistical Office covered 140 Member States and three non-member States. Included in these numbers are all countries that provided information for at least one year of the 10-year base period. Some countries indicated that the data provided should be used only for purposes of the Committee on Contributions and not published elsewhere. Most countries provided the data well ahead of the meeting of the Committee, which gave the Statistical Office ample time to process the data. In summary, the new policy regarding data collection did not have any detrimental effect on the availability of national income data to the Committee and in some instances even improved the data situation.

44. It should be noted that Italy's system of national accounts underwent a significant structural change since 1985, which resulted in an increase of reported national income of about 15 per cent per year for the years 1977 to 1983.

45. After examination of the data base, the Committee accepted the information presented by the Statistical Office without change. It stressed the importance of timely responses by countries to requests by the Statistical Office for data, i.e., at least two months before the Committee meets.

46. As in the past, population and exchange rate information was compiled on the basis of international data sources and not obtained by the Committee directly from the countries concerned. Population data were based on official data and estimates published in the United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Exchange rate data were based on the average market rates as published by IMF. As an increasing number of countries have become members of that organization, fewer difficulties were encountered in obtaining comparable exchange rate information. For countries that are not members of IMF - mainly centrally planned economies, United Nations operational rates were applied with the exception of Bulgaria. After a discussion on Bulgarian exchange rates, based on a representation to the Committee, it was



decided to apply again the Committee's former decision to use the rate with premium submitted by the Government of Bulgaria as the conversion factor. 2/

47. The Committee discussed various suggestions on how to adjust the national income concept for factors that are not taken into account in the present national income definition 3/ of the system of national accounts (SNA). During the present meeting, deductions were recommended for the repayment of principal in debt servicing. Questions were also raised on the treatment of large-scale transfers both of capital, which remains included in the national income of the transferring countries, and of the income of migrant resident workers to their home country, which is presently included in the national income of the host country. At past meetings, suggestions have been discussed to make deductions for major investments by developing countries to build their infrastructure or to make deductions for the exhaustion of mineral reserves to pay for investments that would generate income, thus replacing income from mineral reserves that are being exhausted by extraction activities. Other deductions suggested at past meetings were for capital losses due to natural disasters and war. As none of these elements mentioned are deducted from national income data, the question arose at the present meeting whether the national income concept used by the Committee is the most appropriate concept for the measurement of capacity to pay. Therefore, the Committee intends to revert to this matter at its next session.

#### B. Representations by Member States

48. The Committee had before it representations from some countries. It considered each of the representations carefully and bore them in mind in drawing up the scale.

## V. SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

49. The scale of assessments that the Committee agreed to recommend for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991 appears in section VIII below and in annex II to the present report, which also shows the unadjusted and adjusted machine scales used by the Committee in the establishment of the recommended scale for 1989-1991 and the results of the mitigation process. As in previous reports, annex III provides the United Nations scales of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for the years 1946 through 1988. It was also considered useful to make reference to the texts of the following General Assembly resolutions on the scale of assessments: 39/247 B, 40/248 and 41/178.

50. In the scale of assessments now recommended, 79 Member States are assessed at 0.01 per cent, 9 Member States at 0.02 per cent and 6 Member States at 0.03 per cent. Thus, a total of 94 Member States or 59 per cent of the membership of the Organization are assessed at or below 0.03 per cent. The assessment rates of the Group of 77 as a whole have increased from 9.67 to 10.01 per cent. The distribution of the assessment rates by groups of countries is shown below:

	<u>1980-1982</u>	<u>1983-1985</u>	<u>1986-1988</u>	<u>Proposed 1989-1991</u>
A. Group of 77 <sup>a/</sup> of which OPEC	8.98 2.89	9.34 3.30	9.67 3.63	10.01 3.77
B. OECD countries <sup>b/</sup>	71.81	73.66	74.00	74.10
C. Countries with centrally planned economies <sup>c/</sup>	16.91	15.51	14.87	14.44
D. China	1.62	0.88	0.79	0.79

<sup>a/</sup> Including Romania and Yugoslavia.

<sup>b/</sup> Excluding Yugoslavia.

<sup>c/</sup> Excluding Romania and Yugoslavia.

51. The reservations of two Committee members regarding the proposed scale of assessments, one in the form of a separate opinion and the other as an additional statement, are reflected in sections VIII and IX of this report, respectively.

## VI. ASSESSMENT OF NON-MEMBER STATES

52. In establishing the rates of assessment at which non-member States should contribute towards the expenses of the United Nations activities in which they participate during 1989, 1990 and 1991, the Committee applied the same methodology as for Member States. The proposed rates are as follows:

<u>Non-member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Democratic People's Republic of Korea .....	0.05
Holy See .....	0.01
Liechtenstein .....	0.01
Monaco .....	0.01
Nauru .....	0.01
Republic of Korea .....	0.30
San Marino .....	0.01
Switzerland .....	1.08
Tonga .....	0.01
Tuvalu .....	0.01

53. In accordance with the procedure established by the General Assembly, the rates of assessment for non-member States are subject to consultation with the Governments concerned.

## VII. OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE

### A. Collection of contributions

54. The Committee took note of the report of the Secretary-General which indicated that, at the conclusion of the current session, the following four Member States were in arrears in the payment of their assessed contributions to the expenses of the United Nations under the terms of Article 19 of the Charter: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Romania and South Africa. In this regard, the Committee reaffirmed its previous decision to authorize its Chairman to issue an addendum to the current report if necessary.

### B. Payment of contributions in currencies other than United States dollars

55. Under the provisions of paragraph 3 of its resolution 40/248 of 18 December 1985, the General Assembly empowered the Secretary-General to accept, at his discretion and after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee on Contributions, a portion of the contributions of Member States for the calendar years 1986, 1987 and 1988 in currencies other than United States dollars.

56. The Committee considered a report of the Secretary-General on the arrangements made for payments by Member States of their 1988 contributions in currencies other than United States dollars. The Committee noted that an estimated 12 Member States were planning to avail themselves of the opportunity of paying the estimated equivalent of \$US 4.7 million in 10 non-United States dollar currencies acceptable to the Organization.

57. One member of the Committee expressed the need for the reconsideration of General Assembly resolution 40/248, citing the potential losses to the Organization as a result of currency exchange rate differentials.

58. Another member of the Committee wished to put on record the discrepancy that exists for some Member States between the exchange rate used by the United Nations Statistical Office for the conversion to United States dollars of national income in local currency and the exchange rate applied for the conversion of payments by Member States to the United Nations in local currencies. The Secretariat indicated that, for the former purpose, in accordance with the conventions governing national accounting, IMF exchange rates are used for all its members and the United Nations operational rate for the remaining countries, whereas for the latter purpose the United Nations operational rate is applied universally.

### C. Collection of contributions from non-member States

#### 1. Materials presented

59. The Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat that described the existing procedures for the billing of non-member States for the United Nations activities in which they participate and for the collection of their contributions. The note also contained proposals for the Committee's consideration for the modification of these procedures. The Committee was informed that the

final draft of the note had been sent to non-member States with an invitation to convey their views on it to the Committee if desired. In this regard, the Committee had before it representations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Holy See, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

60. Under the current procedures, non-member States are charged, on the basis of the rates of assessment proposed by the Committee on Contributions (see para. 52 above) and approved by the General Assembly, for the United Nations activities in which they participate with full voting rights; participation as observer is free of charge. As the pattern of participation of non-member States is subject to continual change, complete information on participation is not available until after the end of each calendar year. As a result of this and of the lengthy process of compilation and calculation involved, non-member States are generally assessed a year and a half after the beginning of the calendar year to which the assessment relates. Typical payment patterns indicate that payment from non-member States is generally received about two years after participation took place. Thus, these complex and time-consuming procedures deprive the Organization of the timely utilization of the income from non-member States. In relation to the income generated, they also involve disproportionately high staff resource requirements.

61. With a view to improving the current procedures, the Committee considered the following measures for possible recommendation to the General Assembly:

(a) To replace the post facto assessment of non-member States based on the activities in which they participate with a flat annual fee based on the assessment rate determined by the Committee on Contributions and on the regular budget net assessment base. The flat annual fee would be charged in advance, i.e., at the end of the year preceding that to which the fee relates. It would be established as follows:

- (i) For non-member States that, between 1975 and 1986, participated in an average of three or more activities per year, at the full rate of assessment established by the Committee on Contributions. This flat annual fee would entitle the non-member State to unlimited participation in United Nations activities within the parameters outlined in regulation 5.9 of the Financial Regulations of the United Nations;
- (ii) For non-member States that, between 1975 and 1986, participated in an average of less than three activities per year, at an adjusted rate of assessment that reflects the average level of participation between 1975 and 1986. The 1975-1986 level of participation of a non-member State would be expressed as the ratio between the average actual annual assessment and the average hypothetical annual assessment based on the regular budget assessment base. The resulting flat annual fee could be charged either with adjustment after the end of the year based on the actual participation or without subsequent adjustment, assuming that future levels of participation would be similar to those between 1975 and 1986;

(b) To exclude from participation in United Nations activities those non-member States whose arrears exceed the amount of the contributions due from them for the preceding two full years.



62. In their representations to the Committee on Contributions, the non-member States implicitly or explicitly expressed their basic support for streamlining current procedures through the introduction of a flat annual fee. At the same time, they voiced caution or concern regarding the modalities. In determining the level of the flat fee, non-member States requested consideration of the difference in the rights and obligations between Member and non-member States; the flat fee should be set at a realistic level reflecting empirical levels of participation and ensuring their future flexibility, and taking into account the varying economic realities of non-member States. Beyond these generally held views, the Government of Switzerland highlighted its willingness "to contribute towards all expenses arising directly out of its participation as an observer in the work of United Nations bodies, but acknowledges that such a calculation would scarcely be possible with current methods".

## 2. Discussion

63. In general terms, the Committee supported the effort to streamline the current procedures, although a question arose about its role or competence in this process. Some members underlined the need for arriving at realistic solutions that would take into account the views expressed by the non-member States. Specific proposals by members of the Committee included the introduction of a sliding scale for flat annual fees that would reflect both empirical levels of participation and economic realities in the countries concerned and perhaps provide for periodic adjustment, the institution of an accreditation fee for observer participation without voting rights to cover the cost of conference services and the establishment of a revolving advance fund. Some members requested the Secretariat to provide information on the manner in which the United Nations specialized agencies handled non-payment of assessed contributions by non-member States.

## 3. Decisions

64. The Committee decided that the Secretariat should examine these questions and proposals and prepare a follow-up note for consideration by the Committee at its forty-ninth session. In the interim, and with immediate effect, the Committee proposes that non-member States should pay at the beginning of each calendar year an amount equivalent to their average annual contribution during the past 10 years with an adjustment to be made after the end of the year on the basis of their actual level of participation during that year following current procedures.

### D. Communications from specialized agencies

65. The Committee took note of a letter dated 12 January 1988 from the Comptroller a.i. of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and one dated 17 December 1987 from the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Both requested the Committee to take into consideration the repercussions on the financial contributions of Member States of currency fluctuations stemming from the international exchange rate situation and to take into account the various opinions expressed by the UNESCO Executive Board and the IMO Assembly on dual currency budgeting and change of currency for budget and assessment purposes, respectively, on the effects of currency fluctuation on Member States' relative capacity to pay when establishing the 1989-1991 scale of assessments.

65. Some members of the Committee pointed out that the question of the denomination of budgets was outside its competence. Therefore, it might be more appropriate to suggest to the two agencies to bring this matter to the attention of such bodies as might be competent, such as the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, the International Civil Service Commission and the Joint Inspection Unit.

E. Date of the next session of the Committee

67. The Committee decided to hold its forty-ninth session in New York from 12 to 30 June 1989. The fiftieth session is tentatively scheduled for three weeks in June 1990 in New York.

VIII. RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE

68. The Committee on Contributions recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of  
the expenses of the United Nations

The General Assembly

Resolves that:

1. The scale of assessments for the contributions of Member States to the United Nations budget for the financial years 1989, 1990 and 1991 shall be as follows:

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Afghanistan .....	0.01
Albania .....	0.01
Algeria .....	0.15
Angola .....	0.01
Antigua and Barbuda .....	0.01
Argentina .....	0.66
Australia .....	1.57
Austria .....	0.74
Bahamas .....	0.02
Bahrain .....	0.02
Bangladesh .....	0.01
Barbados .....	0.01
Belgium .....	1.17
Belize .....	0.01
Benin .....	0.01
Bhutan .....	0.01
Bolivia .....	0.01
Botswana .....	0.01
Brazil .....	1.45
Brunei Darussalam .....	0.04
Bulgaria .....	0.15
Burkina Faso .....	0.01
Burma .....	0.01
Burundi .....	0.01
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic .....	0.33
Cameroon .....	0.01
Canada .....	3.09
Cape Verde .....	0.01
Central African Republic .....	0.01
Chad .....	0.01
Chile .....	0.08
China .....	0.79
Colombia .....	0.14
Comoros .....	0.01
Congo .....	0.01
Costa Rica .....	0.02



<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Côte d'Ivoire .....	0.02
Cuba .....	0.09
Cyprus .....	0.02
Czechoslovakia .....	0.66
Democratic Kampuchea .....	0.01
Democratic Yemen .....	0.01
Denmark .....	0.69
Djibouti .....	0.01
Dominica .....	0.01
Dominican Republic .....	0.03
Ecuador .....	0.03
Egypt .....	0.07
El Salvador .....	0.01
Equatorial Guinea .....	0.01
Ethiopia .....	0.01
Fiji .....	0.01
Finland .....	0.51
France .....	6.25
Gabon .....	0.03
Gambia .....	0.01
German Democratic Republic .....	1.28
Germany, Federal Republic of .....	8.08
Ghana .....	0.01
Greece .....	0.40
Grenada .....	0.01
Guatemala .....	0.02
Guinea .....	0.01
Guinea-Bissau .....	0.01
Guyana .....	0.01
Haiti .....	0.01
Honduras .....	0.01
Hungary .....	0.21
Iceland .....	0.03
India .....	0.37
Indonesia .....	0.15
Iran (Islamic Republic of) .....	0.69
Iraq .....	0.12
Ireland .....	0.18
Israel .....	0.21
Italy .....	3.99
Jamaica .....	0.01
Japan .....	11.38
Jordan .....	0.01
Kenya .....	0.01
Kuwait .....	0.29
Lao People's Democratic Republic .....	0.01
Lebanon .....	0.01
Lesotho .....	0.01
Liberia .....	0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya .....	0.28
Luxembourg .....	0.06
Madagascar .....	0.01
Malawi .....	0.01

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Malaysia .....	0.11
Maldives .....	0.01
Mali .....	0.01
Malta .....	0.01
Mauritania .....	0.01
Mauritius .....	0.01
Mexico .....	0.94
Mongolia .....	0.01
Morocco .....	0.04
Mozambique .....	0.01
Nepal .....	0.01
Netherlands .....	1.65
New Zealand .....	0.24
Nicaragua .....	0.01
Niger .....	0.01
Nigeria .....	0.20
Norway .....	0.55
Oman .....	0.02
Pakistan .....	0.06
Panama .....	0.02
Papua New Guinea .....	0.01
Paraguay .....	0.03
Peru .....	0.06
Philippines .....	0.09
Poland .....	0.56
Portugal .....	0.18
Qatar .....	0.05
Romania .....	0.19
Rwanda .....	0.01
Saint Kitts and Nevis .....	0.01
Saint Lucia .....	0.01
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines .....	0.01
Samoa .....	0.01
Sao Tome and Principe .....	0.01
Saudi Arabia ..	1.02
Senegal .....	0.01
Seychelles .....	0.01
Sierra Leone .....	0.01
Singapore .....	0.11
Solomon Islands .....	0.01
Somalia .....	0.01
South Africa .....	0.45
Spain .....	1.95
Sri Lanka .....	0.01
Sudan .....	0.01
Suriname .....	0.01
Swasiland .....	0.01
Sweden .....	1.21
Syrian Arab Republic .....	0.04
Thailand .....	0.10
Togo .....	0.01
Trinidad and Tobago .....	0.05
Tunisia .....	0.03

<u>Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Turkey .....	0.32
Uganda .....	0.01
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic .....	1.25
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics .....	9.99
United Arab Emirates .....	0.19
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .	4.86
United Republic of Tanzania .....	0.01
United States of America .....	25.00
Uruguay .....	0.04
Vanuatu .....	0.01
Venezuela .....	0.57
Viet Nam .....	0.01
Yemen .....	0.01
Yugoslavia .....	0.46
Zaire .....	0.01
Zambia .....	0.01
Zimbabwe .....	<u>0.02</u>
 Grand total	 100.00

2. In accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the scale of assessments given in paragraph 1 above shall be reviewed by the Committee on Contributions in 1991, when a report shall be submitted to the Assembly for its consideration at its forty-sixth session;

3. Notwithstanding the terms of regulation 5.5 of the Financial Regulations of the United Nations, the Secretary-General shall be empowered to accept, at his discretion and after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee on Contributions, a portion of the contributions of Member States for the calendar years 1989, 1990 and 1991 in currencies other than United States dollars;

4. In accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, States which are not members of the United Nations but which participate in certain of its activities shall be called upon to contribute towards the 1989, 1990 and 1998 expenses of such activities on the basis of the following rates:

<u>Non-Member State</u>	<u>Per cent</u>
Democratic People's Republic of Korea .....	0.05
Holy See .....	0.01
Liechtenstein .....	0.01
Monaco .....	0.01
Nauru .....	0.01
Republic of Korea .....	0.30
San Marino .....	0.01
Switzerland .....	1.08
Tonga .....	0.01
Tuvalu .....	0.01

## IX. SEPARATE OPINION

69. Mr. Mauro Sergio Couto stated his strong reservations to the recommended scale as follows:

"(a) Contrasting with the growing gap between developed and developing countries and the increasingly lower capacity to pay of developing countries, the recommended scale for the next triennium increases the contributions of developing countries by 56 points and decreases those of developed countries by 22 points. This is a politically unacceptable characteristic as well as unrealistic and pointless from the financial point of view.

"(b) The Committee did not fulfill resolution 42/208 of the General Assembly when it acted in such a way as not to give any effective relief to highly indebted countries. The methodology adopted by the Committee distorted and blunted the original objectives of such an exercise.

"(c) Even during the last phase of the negotiations, no coherent and objective criteria, like lower per capita income, high indebtedness or natural or man-made disasters were used to provide mitigation to developing countries.

"Due to these circumstances, the proposed scale will certainly be submitted to strong criticism and substantial amendments during the next session of the General Assembly. This will be my advice if and when consulted by Member States."

## X. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT

70. Mr. Atilio N. Molteni made the following statement:

"1. The scale of assessments should reflect the general trend in the world economy, which is at present one of growing disparity between a small number of developed countries and the great majority of nations. The scale of assessments submitted to the General Assembly does not accomplish this objective in the case of the Latin American countries, whose assessed contributions have, overall, increased considerably, in contrast to the actual deterioration in their economies. On the other hand, developed countries have been awarded large reductions in the contributions they are required to make to the Organization.

"2. Although the Committee on Contributions was guided by the methodology approved by resolution 42/208 of 11 December 1987, it failed to take sufficient account of some of the criteria which ought to be given considerable weight, including those arising out of General Assembly resolution 39/247 B, which directs that a limit should apply to the burden borne by Member States to take into account their developmental status and developmental requirements, and that the Committee on Contributions should take into account the problem of the serious economic and financial situation in the world.

"3. In this regard, the debt-relief factor for developing countries has been applied using a formula whose practical effects bear no relation to the impact of the debt on those Member States' capacity to pay. The points theoretically deducted from them have been largely offset by the application of the scheme of limits, and only a very few developing countries have ultimately benefited.

"4. Despite efforts by the Committee to take account of the inflation which distorts the true picture of national income in a considerable number of countries, no agreement was reached on the adoption of the PARE system. Thus a very suitable means of correcting the distortions which result from the relationships between national exchange rates when converted into United States dollars was set aside. The capacity to pay of many countries, accordingly, is not fairly reflected.

"5. I believe that the General Assembly ought to take these problems into consideration, using, as regards the methodology to be applied, short-term economic indicators, reducing the statistical base period and revising the per capita income limit."

### Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/42/11), para. 10.

2/ Ibid., Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/40/11), paras. 48 and 49.

3/ National income (net after depreciation) is equal to total income received by resident individuals of a country and income retained by enterprises or parts of enterprises operating in a country. Resident individuals include persons who reside in a country for more than one year.

## ANNEX I

Machine scale for 1989-1991 incorporating debt relief

Member State	1989-1991 machine scale			
	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted (without limits)	Adjusted for debt relief without limits	Adjusted for debt relief and limits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Afghanistan	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Albania	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Algeria	0.14	0.37	0.35	0.16
Angola	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Antigua and Barbuda	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Argentina	0.62	0.92	0.85	0.71
Australia	1.66	1.48	1.50	1.53
Austria	0.74	0.71	0.72	0.73
Bahamas	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Bahrain	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bangladesh	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Barbados	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Belgium	1.18	1.12	1.14	1.16
Belize	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Benin	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bhutan	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Bolivia	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02
Botswana	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Brazil	1.40	1.74	1.59	1.54
Brunei Darussalam	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
Bulgaria	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.14
Burkina Faso	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Burma	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Burundi	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Cameroon	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02
Canada	3.06	2.98	3.02	3.07
Cape Verde	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Central African Republic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Chad	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Chile	0.07	0.13	0.10	0.08
China	0.79	0.77	0.77	0.78
Colombia	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.15
Comoros	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Congo	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Costa Rica	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Côte d'Ivoire	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Cuba	0.09	0.12	0.11	0.11
Cyprus	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Czechoslovakia	0.70	0.54	0.55	0.61

## 1989-1991 machine scale

Member State	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted without limits	Adjusted for debt relief without limits	Adjusted for debt relief and limits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democratic Kampuchea	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Democratic Yemen	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Denmark	0.72	0.64	0.65	0.66
Djibouti	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Dominica	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Dominican Republic	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Ecuador	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.04
Egypt	0.07	0.15	0.14	0.08
El Salvador	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Equatorial Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Fiji	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Finland	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.51
France	6.37	5.89	5.99	6.17
Gabon	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Gambia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
German Democratic Republic	1.33	1.17	1.19	1.22
Germany, Federal Republic of	8.26	7.32	7.44	7.98
Ghana	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Greece	0.44	0.40	0.38	0.39
Grenada	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Guatemala	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.03
Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Guinea-Bissau	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Guyana	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Haiti	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Honduras	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Hungary	0.22	0.14	0.12	0.21
Iceland	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
India	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.37
Indonesia	0.14	0.22	0.21	0.16
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.63	1.38	1.39	0.73
Iraq	0.12	0.42	0.42	0.14
Ireland	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18
Israel	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.21
Italy	3.79	4.34	4.40	4.06
Jamaica	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Japan	10.84	12.22	12.42	11.38
Jordan	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Kenya	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Kuwait	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.30



## 1989-1991 machine scale

Member State	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted without limits	Adjusted for debt relief without limits	Adjusted for debt relief and limits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Lebanon	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Lesotho	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Liberia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.30
Luxembourg	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
Madagascar	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Malawi	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	0.10	0.18	0.15	0.12
Maldives	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Mali	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Malta	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Mauritania	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Mauritius	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Mexico	0.89	1.26	1.09	1.00
Mongolia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Morocco	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04
Mozambique	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Nepal	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Netherlands	1.74	1.54	1.57	1.60
New Zealand	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24
Nicaragua	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Niger	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Nigeria	0.19	0.31	0.29	0.21
Norway	0.54	0.53	0.54	0.55
Oman	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.03
Pakistan	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.07
Panama	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Papua New Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Paraguay	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02
Peru	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
Philippines	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.09
Poland	0.64	0.52	0.47	0.55
Portugal	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.18
Qatar	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.05
Romania	0.19	0.31	0.30	0.21
Rwanda	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Saint Lucia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Samoa	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Sao Tome and Principe	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Saudi Arabia	0.97	1.16	1.16	1.00



Member State	1989-1991 machine scale			
	1986-1998 official scale	Unadjusted without limits	Adjusted for debt relief without limits	Adjusted for debt relief and limits
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Senegal	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Seychelles	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Sierra Leone	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Singapore	0.10	0.15	0.14	0.12
Solomon Islands	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Somalia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
South Africa	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.45
Spain	2.03	1.85	1.88	1.91
Sri Lanka	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Sudan	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
Suriname	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Swaziland	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Sweden	1.25	1.09	1.11	1.15
Syrian Arab Republic	0.04	0.12	0.12	0.05
Thailand	0.09	0.13	0.12	0.11
Togo	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Trinidad and Tobago	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.05
Tunisia	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
Turkey	0.34	0.33	0.30	0.31
Uganda	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics <sup>a/</sup>	11.82	9.15	9.29	11.42
United Arab Emirates	0.18	0.26	0.25	0.20
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.86	4.70	4.78	4.86
United Republic of Tanzania	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
United States of America	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
Uruguay	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.05
Vanuatu	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Venezuela	0.60	0.59	0.55	0.56
Viet Nam	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Yemen	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Yugoslavia	0.46	0.64	0.61	0.52
Zaire	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Zambia	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Zimbabwe	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

<sup>a/</sup> Includes rates of assessment for the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

## ANNEX II

Unadjusted and adjusted machine scales, mitigation and  
recommended scale for 1989-1991

Member State	1989-1991 scale				
	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted machine scale (without limits)	Machine scale including debt relief and limits	Mitigation	Recommended scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Afghanistan	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Albania	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Algeria	0.14	0.37	0.16	-0.01	0.15
Angola	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Antigua and Barbuda	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Argentina	0.62	0.92	0.71	-0.05	0.66
Australia	1.66	1.48	1.53	0.04	1.57
Austria	0.74	0.71	0.73	0.01	0.74
Bahamas	0.01	0.02	0.02		0.02
Bahrain	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Bangladesh	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.01
Barbados	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Belgium	1.18	1.12	1.16	0.01	1.17
Belize	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Benin	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Bhutan	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Bolivia	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Botswana	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Brazil	1.40	1.74	1.54	-0.09	1.45
Brunei Darussalam	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04
Bulgaria	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.01	0.15
Burkina Faso	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Burma	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Burundi	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Cameroon	0.01	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Canada	3.06	2.98	3.07	0.02	3.09
Cape Verde	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Central African Republic	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Chad	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Chile	0.07	0.13	0.08		0.08
China	0.79	0.77	0.78	0.01	0.79
Colombia	0.13	0.17	0.15	-0.01	0.14
Comoros	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Congo	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Costa Rica	0.02	0.02	0.02		0.02
Côte d'Ivoire	0.02	0.03	0.02		0.02

## 1989-1991 scale

Member State	1986-1988	Unadjusted	Machine scale	Mitigation	Recommended
	official	machine scale	including		
	scale	(without limits)	debt relief		scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cuba	0.09	0.12	0.11	-0.02	0.09
Cyprus	0.02	0.02	0.02		0.02
Czechoslovakia	0.70	0.54	0.61	0.05	0.66
Democratic					
Kampuchea	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Democratic Yemen	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Denmark	0.72	0.64	0.66	0.03	0.69
Djibouti	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Dominica	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Dominican					
Republic	0.03	0.03	0.03		0.03
Ecuador	0.03	0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.03
Egypt	0.07	0.15	0.08	-0.01	0.07
El Salvador	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Equatorial					
Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Ethiopia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Fiji	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Finland	0.50	0.49	0.51		0.51
France	6.37	5.89	6.17		6.25
Gabon	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.03
Gambia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
German Democratic					
Republic	1.33	1.17	1.22	0.06	1.28
Germany, Federal					
Republic of	8.26	7.32	7.98	0.10	8.08
Ghana	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Greece	0.44	0.40	0.39	0.01	0.40
Grenada	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Guatemala	0.02	0.05	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Guinea-Bissau	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Guyana	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Haiti	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Honduras	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Hungary	0.22	0.14	0.21		0.21
Iceland	0.03	0.03	0.03		0.03
India	0.35	0.36	0.37		0.37
Indonesia	0.14	0.22	0.16	-0.01	0.15
Iran (Islamic					
Republic of)	0.63	1.38	0.73	-0.04	0.69
Iraq	0.12	0.42	0.14	-0.02	0.12
Ireland	0.18	0.18	0.18		0.18
Israel	0.22	0.22	0.21		0.21

## 1984-1991 scale

Member State	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted machine scale (without limits)	Machine scale		Recommended scale
			including debt relief and limits	Mitigation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Italy	3.79	4.34	4.06	-0.07	3.99
Jamaica	0.02	0.01	0.01		0.01
Japan	10.84	12.22	11.38		11.38
Jordan	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Kenya	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.01
Kuwait	0.29	0.30	0.30	-0.01	0.29
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Lebanon	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Lesotho	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Liberia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.26	0.29	0.30	-0.02	0.28
Luxembourg	0.05	0.05	0.06		0.05
Madagascar	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Malawi	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Malaysia	0.10	0.18	0.12	-0.01	0.11
Maldives	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Mali	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Malta	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Mauritania	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Mauritius	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Mexico	0.89	1.26	1.00	-0.06	0.94
Mongolia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Morocco	0.05	0.05	0.04		0.04
Mozambique	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Nepal	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Netherlands	1.74	1.54	1.60	0.05	1.65
New Zealand	0.24	0.23	0.24		0.24
Nicaragua	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.01
Niger	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Nigeria	0.19	0.31	0.21	-0.01	0.20
Norway	0.54	0.53	0.55		0.55
Oman	0.02	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Pakistan	0.06	0.08	0.07	-0.01	0.06
Panama	0.02	0.03	0.02		0.02
Papua New Guinea	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Paraguay	0.02	0.03	0.03		0.03
Peru	0.07	0.07	0.06		0.06
Philippines	0.10	0.11	0.09		0.09
Poland	0.64	0.52	0.55	0.01	0.56
Portugal	0.18	0.19	0.18		0.18
Qatar	0.04	0.06	0.05		0.05

## 1989-1991 scale

Member State	1986-1988	Machine scale			Recommended scale
	official scale	Unadjusted machine scale (without limits)	including debt relief and limits	Mitigation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Romania	0.19	0.31	0.21	-0.02	0.19
Rwanda	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Saint Lucia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Samoa	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Sao Tome and Principe	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Saudi Arabia	0.97	1.16	1.08	-0.06	1.02
Senegal	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Seychelles	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Sierra Leone	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Singapore	0.10	0.15	0.12	-0.01	0.11
Solomon Islands	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Somalia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
South Africa	0.44	0.43	0.45		0.45
Spain	2.03	1.85	1.91	0.04	1.95
Sri Lanka	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Sudan	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01
Suriname	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Swaziland	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Sweden	1.25	1.09	1.15	0.06	1.21
Syrian Arab Republic	0.04	0.12	0.05	-0.01	0.04
Thailand	0.09	0.13	0.11	-0.01	0.10
Togo	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Trinidad and Tobago	0.04	0.07	0.05		0.05
Tunisia	0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.03
Turkey	0.34	0.33	0.31	0.01	0.32
Uganda	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a/	11.82	9.15	11.42	0.15	11.57
United Arab Emirates	0.18	0.26	0.20	-0.01	0.19
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.86	4.70	4.86		4.86
United Republic of Tanzania	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01

**1989-1991 scale**

Member State	1986-1988 official scale	Unadjusted machine scale (without limits)	Machine scale including debt relief and limits	Mitigation	Recommended scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
United States of America	25.00	25.00	25.00		25.00
Uruguay	0.04	0.07	0.05	-0.01	0.04
Vanuatu	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Venezuela	0.60	0.59	0.56	0.01	0.57
Viet Nam	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Yemen	0.01	0.02	0.01		0.01
Yugoslavia	0.46	0.64	0.52	-0.06	0.46
Zaire	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Zambia	0.01	0.01	0.01		0.01
Zimbabwe	0.02	0.02	0.02		0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

a/ Includes rates of assessment for the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

## ANNEX III

United Nations scale of assessments for the years 1946-1958

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1958</u>
AFGHANISTAN	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06
ALBANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
ALGERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ANGOLA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ARGENTINA	1.94	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.62	1.45	1.40	1.32	1.17	1.14
AUSTRALIA	2.00	1.97	1.97	1.97	1.97	1.92	1.77	1.75	1.75	1.80	1.65	1.61
AUSTRIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.36	0.35
BAHAMAS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BAHRAIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BANGLADESH	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BARBADOS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BELGIUM	1.42	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.35	1.37	1.38	1.38	1.27	1.24
BELIZE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BENIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BHUTAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BOLIVIA	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05
BOTSWANA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BRASIL	1.94	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.62	1.45	1.40	1.32	1.09	1.06
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BULGARIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.14	0.14	0.14
BURKINA FASO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BURMA	-	-	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.10
BURUNDI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.34	0.43	0.50	0.53	0.48	0.47
CAMEROON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CANADA	3.35	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.30	3.35	3.30	3.30	3.63	3.15	3.09
CAPE VERDE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHAD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHILE	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.41	0.35	0.33	0.33	0.30	0.30	0.29
CHINA	6.30	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.62	5.62	5.62	5.14	5.01
COLOMBIA	0.39	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.41	0.41	0.37	0.36
COMOROS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CONGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
COSTA RICA	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
COTE D'IVOIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CUBA	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.30	0.27	0.25
CYPRUS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.05	1.05	1.05	0.94	0.84	0.82
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DENMARK	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.74	0.66	0.64
DJIBOUTI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DOMINICA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
ECUADOR	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
EGYPT	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.71	0.60	0.50	0.47	0.40	0.36	0.35
EL SALVADOR	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ETHIOPIA	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.11
FIJI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FINLAND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.37	0.37	0.36
FRANCE	6.30	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.90	5.70	5.56
GABON	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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1959	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974		1976	1980	1983	1986	
1960	1963	1966	1969	1972	1975		1978	1981	1984	1987	
1961	1964	1967	1970	1973	1976	1977	1979	1982	1985	1988	
0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	AFGHANISTAN
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	ALBANIA
-	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.14	ALGERIA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	ANGOLA
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
1.11	1.01	0.92	0.93	0.85	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.78	0.71	0.62	ARGENTINA
1.79	1.66	1.58	1.52	1.47	1.44	1.52	1.54	1.83	1.57	1.66	AUSTRALIA
0.43	0.45	0.53	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.63	0.64	0.71	0.75	0.74	AUSTRIA
-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BAHAMAS
-	-	-	-	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	BAHRAIN
-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02	BANGLADESH
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BARBADOS
1.30	1.20	1.15	1.10	1.05	1.05	1.07	1.08	1.22	1.28	1.18	BELGIUM
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	BRITISH
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BENIN
-	-	-	-	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BHUTAN
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BOLIVIA
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BOTSWANA
1.02	1.03	0.95	0.89	0.80	0.77	1.04	1.04	1.27	1.39	1.40	BRASIL
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.04	BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
0.16	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.16	BULGARIA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BURKINA FASO
0.08	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BURMA
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	BURUNDI
0.47	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.50	0.46	0.40	0.41	0.39	0.36	0.34	BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	CAMEROON
3.11	3.12	3.17	3.02	3.08	3.18	2.96	3.04	3.28	3.08	3.06	CANADA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	CAPE VERDE
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	CHAD
0.27	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.20	0.14	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.07	CHILE
5.01	4.57	4.25	4.00	4.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	1.62	0.88	0.79	CHINA
0.31	0.26	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	COLOMBIA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	COMOROS
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	CONGO
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	COSTA RICA
0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	COTE D'IVOIRE
0.25	0.22	0.20	0.19	0.16	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.09	CUBA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	CYPRUS
0.87	1.17	1.11	0.92	0.99	0.89	0.87	0.84	0.83	0.76	0.78	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	DEMOCRATIC YEMEN
0.60	0.58	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.74	0.75	0.72	DENMARK
-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	DJIBOUTI
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	DOMINICA
0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
0.06	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	ECUADOR
0.32	0.25	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	EGYPT
0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	EL SALVADOR
-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	EQUATORIAL GUINEA
0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	ETHIOPIA
-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	FIJI
0.36	0.37	0.43	0.49	0.45	0.42	0.41	0.44	0.48	0.48	0.50	FINLAND
6.40	5.94	6.09	6.00	6.00	5.86	5.66	5.82	6.26	6.51	6.37	FRANCE
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	GABON



## ANNEX III (continued)

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>
GAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GHANA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.07	0.07
GREECE	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.19
GRENADA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GUATEMALA	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04
GUINEA-BISSAU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GUYANA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HAITI	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
HONDURAS	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
HUNGARY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.46	0.46	0.39
ICELAND	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
INDIA	4.09	3.95	3.95	3.25	3.25	3.41	3.53	3.45	3.40	3.30	2.97	2.97	2.90
INDONESIA	-	-	-	-	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.56	0.51	0.51	0.50
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	0.47	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.40	0.33	0.28	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.26
IRAQ	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12
IRELAND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.19	0.19	0.18
ISRAEL	-	-	-	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16
ITALY	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.08	2.08	2.03
JAMAICA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
JAPAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.92	1.92
JORDAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
KENYA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KUWAIT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
LEBANON	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
LESOTHO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LIBERIA	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
LUXEMBOURG	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
MADAGASCAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALAWI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALAYSIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.22	0.22
MALDIVES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MALTA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MAURITANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MAURITIUS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MEXICO	0.66	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.65	0.70	0.75	0.80	0.70	0.70	0.68
MONGOLIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MOROCCO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.12
MOZAMBIQUE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NEPAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04
NETHERLANDS	1.47	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.35	1.27	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.15	1.15	1.12
NEW ZEALAND	0.52	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.43	0.43	0.42
NICARAGUA	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
NIGER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NIGERIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NORWAY	0.52	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.48
OMAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PAKISTAN	-	-	-	0.70	0.70	0.74	0.79	0.79	0.75	0.67	0.55	0.55	0.54
PANAMA	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

1959	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974		1980	1983	1986		
1960	1963	1966	1969	1972	1975		1978	1981	1984	1987	
1961	1964	1967	1970	1973	1976	1977	1979	1982	1985	1988	
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	GAMBIA
-	-	-	-	1.22	1.22	1.35	1.33	1.39	1.39	1.33	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
-	-	-	-	7.10	7.10	7.74	7.70	8.31	8.54	8.26	GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
0.07	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	GHANA
0.23	0.23	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.32	0.39	0.35	0.35	0.40	0.44	GREECE
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	GRENADA
0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	GUATEMALA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	GUINEA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	GUINEA-BISSAU
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	GUYANA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	HAITI
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	HONDURAS
0.42	0.56	0.56	0.52	0.48	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.23	0.22	HUNGARY
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	ICELAND
2.46	2.03	1.85	1.74	1.55	1.20	0.70	0.68	0.60	0.36	0.35	INDIA
0.47	0.45	0.39	0.34	0.28	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.14	INDONESIA
0.21	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.43	0.40	0.65	0.58	0.63	IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)
0.09	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.12	IRAQ
0.16	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.19	IRELAND
0.14	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.22	ISRAEL
2.25	2.24	2.54	3.24	3.54	3.60	3.30	3.38	3.45	3.74	3.79	ITALY
-	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	JAMAICA
2.19	2.27	2.77	3.78	5.40	7.15	8.66	8.64	9.58	10.32	10.84	JAPAN
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	JORDAN
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	KENYA
-	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.29	KUWAIT
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	LEBANON
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	LESOTHO
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	LIBERIA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.17	0.16	0.23	0.26	0.26	LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05	LUXEMBOURG
0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MADAGASCAR
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MALAWI
0.17	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	MALAYSIA
-	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MALDIVES
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MALI
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MALTA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MAURITANIA
-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MAURITIUS
0.71	0.74	0.81	0.87	0.88	0.86	0.78	0.79	0.76	0.88	0.89	MEXICO
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	MONGOLIA
0.14	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	MOROCCO
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	MOZAMBIQUE
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	NEPAL
1.01	1.01	1.11	1.16	1.18	1.24	1.38	1.42	1.63	1.78	1.74	NETHERLANDS
0.42	0.41	0.38	0.36	0.32	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.24	NEW ZEALAND
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	NICARAGUA
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	NIGER
0.21	0.21	0.17	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.19	NIGERIA
0.49	0.45	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.54	NORWAY
-	-	-	-	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	OMAN
0.40	0.42	0.37	0.37	0.34	0.14	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	PAKISTAN
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	PANAMA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	PAPUA NEW GUINEA

## ANNEX III (continued)

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1958
PARAGUAY	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
PERU	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.15
PHILIPPINES	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.39	0.45	0.45	0.41	0.40
POLAND	1.00	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	1.05	1.36	1.56	1.73	1.73	1.56	1.52
PORTUGAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	0.25	0.24
QATAR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ROMANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.50	0.50	0.49
RWANDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAINT LUCIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAMOA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
SENEGAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SEYCHELLES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SERRA LEOE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SINGAPORE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SOLOMON ISLANDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SOMALIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SOUTH AFRICA	1.15	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.04	0.90	0.83	0.78	0.70	0.71	0.67
SPAIN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.14	1.14	1.11
SRI LANKA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.11	0.11	0.11
SUDAN	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.11	0.11
SURINAME	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SWAZILAND	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SWEDEN	2.35	2.35	2.04	2.00	1.98	1.85	1.73	1.65	1.65	1.52	1.46	1.43
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
THAILAND	-	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.24	0.21	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.16
TOGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TUNISIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.05	0.05
TURKEY	0.93	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.75	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.61
UGANDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	0.88	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.92	1.30	1.63	1.80	2.00	1.85	1.80
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	6.42	6.34	6.34	6.34	6.34	6.98	9.85	12.28	14.15	15.08	13.96	13.62
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	11.98	11.48	11.48	11.37	11.37	11.37	10.56	10.30	9.80	8.85	7.81	7.62
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	39.89	39.89	39.89	39.89	39.79	39.92	36.90	35.12	33.33	33.33	33.33	32.51
URUGUAY	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.16
VANUATU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
VENEZUELA	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.30	0.32	0.35	0.39	0.44	0.43	0.42
VIENTIANE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
YEMEN	-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
YUGOSLAVIA	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.36	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.36	0.35
ZAMBIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ZIMBABWE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>102.44</b>	<b>100.31</b>	<b>100.15</b>	<b>100.12</b>	<b>100.60</b>	<b>100.51</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>105.84</b>	<b>102.37</b>	<b>100.04</b>

1959	1962	1965	1968	1971	1974		1980	1983	1986		
1960	1963	1966	1969	1972	1975		1978	1981	1984	1987	
1961	1964	1967	1970	1973	1976	1977	1979	1982	1985	1988	
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	PARAGUAY
0.11	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	PERU
0.43	0.40	0.35	0.34	0.31	0.18	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	PHILIPPINES
1.37	1.28	1.45	1.47	1.41	1.26	1.40	1.39	1.24	0.72	0.64	POLAND
0.20	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	PORTUGAL
-	-	-	-	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	QATAR
0.34	0.32	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.19	ROMANIA
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	RWANDA
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SAINT LUCIA
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SAMOA
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SAO TOME AND PRINCE
0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.24	0.23	0.58	0.86	0.97	SAUDI ARABIA
0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SENEGAL
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SEYCHELLES
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SERRA LEOE
-	-	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10	SINGAPORE
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SOMON ISLANDS
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SOMALIA
0.56	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.50	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.44	SOUTH AFRICA
0.93	0.86	0.73	0.92	1.04	0.99	1.53	1.53	1.70	1.93	2.03	SPAIN
0.10	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	SRI LANKA
0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SUDAN
-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SURINAME
-	-	-	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	SWAZILAND
1.39	1.30	1.26	1.25	1.25	1.30	1.20	1.24	1.31	1.32	1.25	SWEDEN
b/	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
0.16	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.09	THAILAND
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	TOGO
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	TRINIDAD AND TORAGO
0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	TUNISIA
0.59	0.40	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.34	TURKEY
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	UGANDA
1.80	1.98	1.97	1.93	1.87	1.71	1.50	1.53	1.46	1.32	1.28	UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
13.62	14.97	14.92	14.61	14.18	12.97	11.33	11.60	11.10	10.54	10.20	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
-	-	-	-	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.16	0.18	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
7.78	7.58	7.21	6.62	5.90	5.31	4.44	4.52	4.46	4.67	4.86	UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
32.51	32.02	31.91	31.57	31.52	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
0.12	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	URUGUAY
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	VANUATU
0.50	0.52	0.50	0.45	0.41	0.32	0.40	0.39	0.50	0.55	0.60	VERNEKUELA
-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.01	VIET NAM
0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	YEMEN
0.35	0.38	0.36	0.40	0.38	0.34	0.38	0.39	0.42	0.46	0.46	YUGOSLAVIA
0.04	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	ZAMBIA
-	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	ZAMBIA
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.02	0.02	ZIMBABWE
<u>101.11</u>	<u>100.67</u>	<u>100.42</u>	<u>100.21</u>	<u>108.58</u>	<u>100.26</u>	<u>100.11</u>	<u>100.07</u>	<u>100.07</u>	<u>100.04</u>	<u>100.00</u>	TOTAL

## Notes

a/ The rates of assessment for Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the years 1962 and 1963 were retroactively decreased by General Assembly resolution 1927 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 to 1.04 and 0.51, respectively. These decreases were offset in 1964 against additional income arising from the admission of seven new Member States in 1962 and 1963.

b/ For the years 1959, 1960 and 1961, Egypt and Syria were assessed jointly as the United Arab Republic.

c/ Indonesia ceased to co-operate with the Organization with effect from 1 January 1965, resuming full participation on 28 September 1966.

d/ Singapore, which had formed part of Malaysia, became an independent State in August 1965.