

# ECOSOC Dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system in the context of the post-2015 development agenda

## Background Note

## Workshop 3 - Governance

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## 1. Introduction

The aim of this background note for the third workshop in the ECOSOC Dialogue series is twofold: *firstly*, to provide a brief overview of the evolution of governance of the United Nations development system and, *secondly*, to look at the lessons learned so far.

The UN development system is composed of the 34 entities that receive contributions for operational activities for development (see list of entities in Box 1).

Deliberations on reform of the UN development system are a regular occurrence. In the last 70 years, Member States and other stakeholders have commissioned a large number of studies and reports on options for strengthening the effectiveness of the UN development system, many of which have been discussed at the intergovernmental level. Box 2 provides a brief synthesis of key governance-related messages of some of those reports.

In July 2014, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) decided to launch an inclusive and transparent process on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system with governance as one of the focus areas.

The post-2015 development agenda, to be adopted in September 2015, is expected to impact the role, functioning and shape of the UN development system. The expectations are that the post-2015 development agenda will bring to the fore the importance of achieving alignment between the emerging functions and governance structures of the UN development system.

This suggests that deliberations on governance of the UN development system should start with a clear articulation of the *functions* or the “public value” that Member States want the Organization to fulfil in the post-2015 era. This is because the form of the governance arrangements will inevitably have to respond to those functions or “public value” expectations of Member States. The need to forge alignment between the expectations of Member States, the emerging functions of the UN development system and the governance capacity required to realize the new mission of the Organization, is further elaborated in Annex 1.

### Definition of governance of the UN development system

The governance of the UN development system is unique when compared to other organizations due to its double-layered structure consisting of both agency-specific and system-wide governing bodies. The term “governance” relates to the complex array of governing bodies at both agency and system-wide levels used by Member States to steer and oversee UN operational activities for development.

The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Executive Boards of the operational funds and programmes and the governing bodies of the specialized agencies and other entities reporting to the GA or ECOSOC, in accordance with their respective mandates, constitute a two-tiered intergovernmental policy-making and oversight system for the UN development system. In addition to the two-tiered formal policy-making and oversight system for UN development operations, governance also takes place at the country level through various policy coordination mechanisms involving the respective Government and heads of UN entities, as well as NGOs through the UN’s humanitarian engagement, where, inter alia, country priorities are determined

and implementation assessed (see Annex 2 for brief description of governance of the UN development system).

At the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, Member States also decided to create a High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development of the GA to ensure policy coordination and coherence of the sustainable development agenda. More recently, the role of ECOSOC has been strengthened at the intergovernmental level, leading, inter alia, to the establishment of an Integration Segment charged with fostering integration of the three pillars of sustainable development in the work of the UN and beyond.

Collaboration and coordination among UN entities, moreover, is facilitated through the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and its subsidiary bodies, the UN Development Group (UNDG), High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), High-level Committee on Management (HLCM), as well as the Interagency Standing Committee for humanitarian assistance.

. In the area of humanitarian assistance, the Inter-agency Standing Committee serves as a forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making, involving both key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.

## Box 1: UN Development System

United Nations development system is defined as the entities that receive contributions for operational activities for development.

In 2013, the following 34 entities engaged in operational activities for development.

*Funds and programmes:* UNDP (incl. UNCDF, UNV), UN-Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNAIDS, UNCTAD (incl. ITC), UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNODC, UNRWA

*Specialized agencies:* FAO, IAEA, UNESCO, ICAO, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNIDO, UPU, WIPO, WHO, WMO, UNWTO

*Regional commissions:* ECA, ECE, ECLAC, ESCAP, ESCWA

*Secretariat departments:* OCHA, DESA

*Other entities:* IFAD, OHCHR

Legislative mandates established in the *QCPR resolution* of the GA on operational activities for development are formally binding for those entities that report to the Assembly and ECOSOC. In 2012, these were 27 entities (30 if UNCDF, UNV (part of UNDP) and ITC (part of UNCTAD) are counted as specific entities):

- 12 funds and programmes: UNDP (including UNCDF, UNV), UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, UNHCR, UNODC, UNCTAD1 (including ITC), UNRWA, UN-Women, UNEP, UN Habitat, UNAIDS;
- 6 research and training institutions: UNICRI, UNIDIR, UNITAR, UNRISD, UNSSC, UNU (although none of them is involved in operational activities);
- 5 regional commissions which formally report to ECOSOC: ECLAC, ESCWA, ESCAP, ECA and ECE;
- 2 Secretariat departments: OCHA and UNDESA, and
- 2 other entities: UNISDR and UNOPS (UNISDR doesn't engage in operational activities and UNOPS only implements operational activities initiated by other entities).

Of the above 27 entities, 19 engaged in operational activities in 2013. The 8 entities that did not engage in such activities were: 6 above research and training institutions and UNISDR and UNOPS. Together, the 19 entities accounted for some 75 per cent of total operational activities for development in 2012 and the specialized agencies for the remaining 25 per cent.

## 2. Brief review of evolution of governance of the UN development system

### The early years to 1980s

In the early years, the technical assistance priorities of programme countries were determined by the specialized agencies of the UN system, which also executed the respective country cooperation programmes. The Governing Council of the Expanded Programme on Technical Assistance (EPTA), which had been established in 1949, was responsible for reviewing and approving projects as well as allocating funds to the specialized agencies. A Technical Assistance Board, composed of the Secretary-General and the Heads of the specialized agencies, was charged with coordinating the technical assistance to developing countries under the authority of a standing Technical Assistance Committee of ECOSOC. At the country-level, the post of Resident Representative of TAB was established in a few major programme countries in the 1950s to coordinate the technical assistance provided by the various agencies.

In 1958, the UN General Assembly agreed to broaden the scope of UN technical assistance to include large-scale pre-investment surveys and feasibility studies on major national development projects that would lay the groundwork for subsequent investment of capital. Thus the Special Fund, including a Governing Council, was established to act as a multilateral channel for voluntary contributions for the work of various UN agencies.<sup>1</sup>

The 1960s were marked by several major changes. Governments in the newly emerging states increasingly demanded to set technical assistance priorities themselves. EPTA and the Special Fund were also merged in 1965 in a new organization, UNDP, which became operational the following year. The advantages to be derived from the merger of EPTA and the Special Fund and the creation of UNDP were the following: pooling of resources, simplification of procedures, improvements in overall planning, elimination of duplication, reduction in administrative costs, and general strengthening of UN development aid.<sup>2</sup>

With the establishment of UNDP, inter-agency coordination was shifted from the Technical Assistance Board to an Inter-agency Consultative Board, chaired by the Administrator of UNDP and including the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the specialized agencies and of the IAEA (or their representatives). By the end of the 1960s, UNDP had field representatives in most programme countries. Country programmes had also become the main instrument for coordinating operational activities at the national level and the primary unit for allocating funding. These changes meant that UNDP became the central coordination and funding mechanism for operational activities of the UN system, an arrangement that lasted till the late 1980s, and formally came to a close in 1995.

Several other measures were adopted in the 1970s to strengthen the system-wide character of operational activities, including the establishment of: (a) the post of Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, (b) a single pledging conference and (c) the comprehensive policy review, which was first conducted in 1980. The Director General's post, which was given wide ranging responsibilities relating to development and international

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<sup>1</sup> The Special Fund began operations in 1959; within 3 years, 86 governments had pledged over \$110 million.

<sup>2</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations, Technical Cooperation Programmes – Evolution of UNDP.

economic cooperation, however, was not given sufficient authority to coordinate all operational activities of the UN system and was therefore primarily limited to those delivered by the Secretariat. The post was abolished in 1992.

The UNDP Governing Council took over the responsibilities of the governing bodies of EPTA and the Special Fund to review and approve projects and programmes for the UNDP as a whole and for UN regular programmes of technical cooperation, with the Inter-agency Consultative Board providing inter-agency coordination of programme delivery at the global level and the UNDP Resident Representatives at the country level. The technical capacities of the specialized agencies were now aligned with a development cooperation vision defined through a country programming process and subsequently approved by the Governing Council of UNDP. The central role played by the UNDP Governing Council in the governance of operational activities also facilitated the implementation of system-wide mandates. Operational activities were also almost all core funded and subject to formal governance review at the intergovernmental level.

### [The end of the Cold War, global conferences and the MDGs \(1990 – 2015\)](#)

Significant changes took place in the area of governance of the UN development system in the early 1990s. This included the creation of the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes in 1993 and by the end of the decade a Joint Meeting of the Executive Boards, an informal gathering to discuss issues of mutual concern.

UNAIDS was also established in 1994 through ECOSOC resolution 1994/24 as a co-sponsored, joint programme of the UN and with a governance structure incorporating Member States, co-sponsor organizations and non-state actors. Formally launched with six UN co-sponsored organizations and a Secretariat in 1996, UNAIDS has since expanded to include five additional UN system organizations, bringing the total to 11.

The practice of executing development cooperation projects by the specialized agencies came finally to an end in 1995 when UNDP redefined itself as a knowledge organization. This also brought to a close the role played by UNDP since 1966 as the central coordination and funding mechanism of the UN development system.

In 1997, the Secretary-General introduced a number of important steps to strengthen coordination within the UN development system. This included the establishment of UNDG, including an Executive Committee composed of the Heads of the major funds and programmes;<sup>3</sup> the introduction of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and Common Country Assessment, One UN House, the post of Deputy Secretary-General and further strengthening of the role of the UN resident coordinator.

In 2010, following the outcome of a three-year long consultative process on UN system-wide coherence under the auspices of the General Assembly, UN-Women was established. UN-Women introduced an important innovation in governance by linking selected seats on the Entity's Executive Board to contribution level based on transparent criteria.

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<sup>3</sup> The Executive Committee of UNDG is no longer operational and has been superseded by an Advisory Group composed of representatives at the Assistant Secretary-General level.

## Box 2: Selected messages from earlier reports on reform of UN Development

Starting in the 1960s, a series of external and internal reports and studies have addressed governance reform of the UN development system (see also Annex 3 for more details).

Many reports have called for stronger *leadership and policy guidance* from the General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Proposals to achieve this objective range widely: some calling for more efficient working methods, e.g. through streamlining of agenda-setting in order to avoid overlap in the work of GA and ECOSOC (Brandt (1980); Bertrand (1985); Beattie (2004)), or through more frequent and better prepared ECOSOC sessions (Group of Experts (1975), UNGA (1977)). Other proposals suggest a substantial restructuring of ECOSOC's subsidiary machinery, giving the Council greater authority under the Charter (UNGA (1997)), larger membership or closer involvement of technical experts from Member States or UN organizations. Some reports have even gone as far as to propose an entirely new body, such as, an 'Economic Security Council' to replace ECOSOC (The Commission on Global Governance (1995)). Others have called for a complementary high-level forum, such as, a 'Summit of Leaders', 'International Development Council' or 'Global Leaders Forum' to review and provide guidance to the United Nations development system (Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues / Nyerere (1990); Nordic UN Project (1991); High-level Panel (2006)).

Concerning *substantive coordination*, a single governing body to consolidate control and management of all operational activities has been proposed repeatedly (e.g. UNGA (1977); Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts "The Group of 18" (1986); UNGA (1997)). As early as 1975, the Gardner Report called for a single *Operations Board* to replace the existing boards of operational funds. Other reports envision one unified development agency (Bertrand (1985)) or a consolidated governing body with regional subsidiary bodies (Childers / Urquhart (1996)).

Many reports have also addressed the question of who should participate in governing bodies. There have been repeated calls for closer involvement of the Executive Heads of UN entities as well as Heads of States and ministers in ECOSOC to improve coordination (Bertrand (1985)). Moreover, some reports have also argued for more inclusiveness, for example greater participation of policy-makers from developing countries in ECOSOC and the governing bodies of the specialized agencies (Group of Experts (1975); UNGA (1997)) or using voting groups to include more countries in decision-making in the Executive Boards of the operational funds and programmes without increasing the number of seats (The Commission on Global Governance (1995)). Reports have also suggested a greater role for experts and non-state stakeholders in governance, for example through an advisory board that could provide information for other governing bodies as well as periodic policy review (Group of Experts (1975); Brandt (1980); UNGA (1997)).

### 3. Lessons learned

This section aims to identify some lessons learned from the evolution of governance of the UN development system using the analytical framework introduced in Section 2. Some key messages that emerge include the following:

1. The ability of agency-specific governing bodies to provide regular, detailed guidance on operational activities is affected by the significant variation in their size and meeting frequency. Some governing bodies only meet every two years, while others report to policy-making bodies, not designed to provide guidance on operational activities (see Annex 4);
2. There are important variations in the representation of the five regional groupings in governing bodies of UN Development entities with limited membership when compared to the share of each Group of the overall UN membership (see Annex 5);
3. The exponential growth in non-core (earmarked) (see also footnote 20) funding in the past decade has changed the role of governing bodies in providing strategic direction and oversight of operational activities. The guidance and oversight role of governing bodies of non-core funding, which now constitutes some 75 per cent of total operational activities, is indirect at best;
4. No direct link can be observed between the share of regional groupings of seats on governing bodies of UN development system entities with limited membership and growth in contributions in the past decade (see Annex 6);<sup>4</sup>
5. Governing bodies of UN Development entities generally operate in isolation from each other. Decisions and policies of entities in one area are generally not known to, or seen as important by those operating in another;<sup>5</sup>
6. The participation in central governing bodies is seldom by officials from capitals in charge of operational activities at the country level, which weakens the ability of such bodies to provide strategic system-wide guidance to the UN development system;
7. Central governing bodies have limited capacity to further policy coherence and interoperability in programming and operations across UN development system entities, which weakens their legitimacy in the governance process;
8. The coverage and quality of system-wide statistics, analysis and reporting to facilitate governance review by central bodies needs further improvement in order to strengthen horizontal coordination and accountability.

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<sup>4</sup> Other factors such as the perceived importance of the issue dealt with by an organization and reputation of management, for example, may better explain different growth rates in contributions to entities.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the Programme Coordination Board of UNAIDS has requested the co-sponsoring UN organizations to take forward decisions made by the PCB, in their respective governing bodies.

#### 4. Changing functions of the UN development system

A universal post-2015 development agenda is expected to mark a major departure in the work of the UN development system. Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals shortly thereafter, both the capacity of many programme countries and the nature of development challenges have evolved significantly. The development needs of countries have also become more diversified, including with emerging and middle-income countries gaining significant domestic resources and capacities. While the core challenges of alleviating poverty, addressing inequality and leaving no one behind, remain at the centre of development cooperation efforts, others, including those resulting from increasing interdependence among countries, have grown in importance.

The proposed sustainable development goals imply a shift to a transformative sustainable development agenda. The SDGs also reflect significant broadening of the global development agenda and, as a result, will impact the functions of the UN development system in the post-2015 era. The proposed SDGs and targets are also characterized by significant inter-linkages and mutual dependency, which will require the UN development system to develop capacity to balance agency-specific and system-wide efficiency and accountability in the post-2015 era compared to the MDGs era where primary focus was on the former.

The realization of the post-2015 development agenda, therefore, constitutes a more complex undertaking compared to the MDGs. An important question is how will the emerging functions of the UN development system in the post-2015 era affect the principles and capacities that underpin the effectiveness of governance of UN operational activities.

#### 5. Emerging governance requirements

##### Governance of the UN development system in the post-2015 era

Deliberations on strengthening of the governance system of the UN development system could begin with questions such as the following (see also Annex 1):

Firstly, what “public value” is the governance system expected to provide (*the mission*)?

Secondly, what sources of legitimacy or support would be relied upon to authorize the governance system to take action and provide the necessary resources to sustain the efforts to create that value (*the authorizing environment*)? and


Thirdly, what operational capabilities would the governance system rely on to deliver the desired results (*the governance capacity*)?

The challenge is to bring these three dimensions into alignment in order to ensure well-functioning governance of UN operational activities. This means, for example, that if Member States desire to see the UN development system operate in a more coherent manner, certain governance capacities will need to be developed, which can only happen if there is sufficient political support for making the necessary changes at the intergovernmental level.

Figure 2 examines the likely evolution of the expectations of the authorizing environment, the mission and the governance capacity of the UN development system in a post-2015 era with focus on poverty eradication, equity and sustainable development at both country and global levels.

The *authorizing environment* of the UN development system in the post-2015 era is likely to be different than during the implementation of the MDGs. The post-2015 development agenda, for example, is expected to reflect growing concern of Member States about the impact of global development challenges. The new authorizing environment will also be influenced by the rise of the emerging economies, the increasing diversification of both the development needs of developing countries and funding sources, increasing disaster risks, and greater emphasis on management of interdependence of countries, requiring better balancing of the country and global perspective in intergovernmental decision-making.

Figure 2: Governance of the UN development system in post-2015 era



<sup>6</sup> According to some reviewers, the mission includes elements that may be intended more as means of implementation than a mission per se.

The post-2015 development agenda composed, in particular, of universal sustainable development goals and targets will constitute the *new mission* of the UN development system. The new agenda, compared to the MDGs, will place stronger emphasis on an integrated approach to addressing national, regional and global development challenges, including through greater interconnectedness of country, regional and global action. This will require enhanced system-wide capacity for pooling of knowledge, resources and expertise and cross-sector collaboration in the UN development system.

The proposed SDGs and targets, as mentioned earlier, are also characterized by significant inter-linkages and mutual dependency. This would require the UN development system to better balance agency-specific and system-wide efficiency and accountability in the post-2015 era compared to the MDGs era where primary focus was on the former.

A post-2015 development agenda with focus on sustainable development therefore signals new expectations from Member States for the UN development system to deliver greater public value through complex set of development services in a world that is increasingly characterized by more mutually dependent development challenges as well as accelerating pace of globalization and greater interconnectedness of countries.

The integration requirements of the post-2015 development agenda will necessitate the UN development system to develop new *governance capacities* that are capable of: fostering policy coherence and interoperability in programming and operations across entities; crisis response systems, coordinating responses to national and global development challenges; balancing agency and system-wide interests, as well as the national and global perspective in decision-making. Such capability changes will require further strengthening of governance at both agency and system-wide levels in the UN development system.

A shift from a specialized, functional organizational model at present to one characterized by greater emphasis on integration in response to the demands of the post-2015 development agenda will therefore require the UN development system to develop stronger capacity for horizontal coordination at the intergovernmental and inter-agency levels. This means that the promotion of integration should build on the specialized expertise of different entities, with a view to creating synergy and complementarity among them.

#### [The need to make representation in governance more equitable](#)

The realization of the emerging mission of the UN development system in the post-2015 era, as highlighted in Figure 2, will require the development of new governance capacities, which in turn must be enabled by the authorizing environment, or Member States, at the intergovernmental level. The development of such capacities will require dialogue among Member States on what constitutes legitimacy in governance in the post-2015 era. Of particular importance in this regard will be revisiting the issue of legitimacy of representation.

For example, strengthening of policy cooperation<sup>7</sup> among governing bodies at the intergovernmental level to facilitate more effective implementation of the post-2015 development agenda as well as other system-wide mandates will require a governance system that has high degree of legitimacy of representation. Representation is critical for effective governance in at least two respects: firstly, the composition of governing bodies needs to be equitable, accountable and transparent in order to give legitimacy to policy decisions adopted at the intergovernmental level, and, secondly, participation has to be such as to ensure their effective functioning.

The issue of representation in governing bodies of UN entities is further complicated by the fact that development challenges are changing. The post-2015 agenda is likely to include greater commitment to global development challenges, requiring enhanced emphasis on collaborative action and a forward-looking, inter-generational perspective among Member States in decision-making. This emerging shift in the purpose of development cooperation requires corresponding broadening in the principles that underpin governance of UN operational activities and the adoption of more equitable and effective methods of selecting members in governing bodies.

For example, when addressing common challenges of great significance, Member States will need a governance system that fosters substantive debate, consensus-orientation and holistic review of issues. The method used to select members in governing bodies is particularly important in this regard. The need for improving policy coordination among governing bodies in the post-2015 era will also require Member States to reexamine the role of ECOSOC and General Assembly in providing guidance, coordination and oversight of the UN development system as a whole.

Another issue likely to influence the future debate on representation in governing bodies in the UN development system is the growing importance of partnerships with NGOs, foundations and other actors in the financing and delivery of development cooperation.

### Three main methods for constituting governing bodies

There are three main methods currently in use in the UN development system for selecting representatives in governing bodies. Each method reflects a different approach to the selection process: the first method, for example, uses UN regional groupings as the instrument for allocating seats in governing bodies of entities; the second one is based on definition of constituencies from which members are selected; and the third method is a combination of the other two.

UN entities that fall under each method are listed here below:

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<sup>7</sup> According to Kaul (2013), a post-2015 development agenda with significant focus on global development challenges, will require innovations in the application of the principles of sovereignty and global responsibility in governance, or what she refers to as '*smart sovereignty*'.<sup>7</sup> This principle recognizes that *policy cooperation* among countries (including governing bodies) is the best way to achieve the national interests in the global public domain. It also requires governments and states to be fully respectful of the sovereignty of other nations so as to fulfil agreed policy outcomes. '*Smart sovereignty*', according to Kaul, is necessary for the efficient response to global development challenges that are relevant for the management of interdependence and the achievement of global sustainable development.

(a) UN regional groupings [27 entities]

[UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF, WFP, UNCTAD, UNODC, UN-Habitat, UNEP, UNRWA, FAO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WIPO, WHO<sup>8</sup>, WMO, UNWTO, OHCHR]

The Regional Commissions (5) and OCHA and DESA, which are also part of the UN development system, report to central governing bodies (GA and ECOSOC). The composition of central governing bodies is also determined by regional groupings, but policies of the GA and ECOSOC are generally negotiated through political groupings.

(b) Constituency groupings [4 entities]

[ICAO, IFAD, IMO, UNHCR<sup>9</sup>]

(c) Mixed UN regional and constituency-based groupings [3 entities]

[UNAIDS, UN-Women, ILO]

The principle of *equitable geographical distribution* is the primary criteria for selecting members in governing bodies with limited membership in the first group of entities. According to this principle, the composition of governing bodies should reflect the share of regional groupings of the overall membership of the Organization. Of the 34 entities that compose the UN development system, 27 select representatives based on this principle. However, as shown in Annex 5 (and 5b), there are important variations in the representation of the five regional groupings in governing bodies with limited membership when compared to the share of each Group of the overall UN membership. The share of the Group of Western and Other States (WEOG), for example, in governing bodies in the UN development system with limited membership, is 26 per cent, compared to the Groups' 15 per cent share of the overall UN membership.

The composition of the Executive Boards of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF and WFP, also deviates from the principle of equitable geographical distribution with WEOG countries accounting for 12 out of 36 seats on each of the Boards. This allocation formula in the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes reflects a political agreement reached between Member States in 1993 as part of a broader governance reform process that culminated in the adoption of General Assembly resolution 48/162, which mandated, inter alia, the establishment of the EBs. One objective of the 1993 agreement as it relates to the composition of the EBs was to recognize the countries that provide the bulk of resources to the funds and programmes concerned.

However, the 1993 agreement was based on a funding architecture of the funds and programmes that was different from the present one. Almost all contributions of WEOG

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<sup>8</sup> WHO uses the following regional groupings: Africa, the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South-East Asia and Western Pacific.

<sup>9</sup> UNCHR governance is unique in a sense that when countries are elected to the Executive Committee, they become permanent members. UNCHR uses three criteria for electing members to the Executive Committee: (a) demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem, (b) widest possible geographical distribution, (c) membership of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. For the selection of rotational bureau members, the following four regional groupings are used: (a) Africa, (b) the Americas, (c) Asia and (d) Europe.

countries to the funds and programmes in 1993 and in prior years were in the form of core resources. However, over time, the funding architecture of the funds and programmes has become more diversified with high share of overall resources flows of WEOG countries to the same entities currently in the form of non-core contributions, which substantive focus and destination are determined by the donors directly and therefore not subject to formal review at the level of the Boards.

There are currently four entities in the UN development system that select representatives in governing bodies based on a constituency approach, namely ICAO, IFAD, IMO and UNCHR. The Global Environment Facility, a joint undertaking of the UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank, and the Committee on Global Food Security of the FAO, IFAD and WFP, have also adopted a constituency-based approach to selection of members in governing bodies.

A constituency-based approach to governance aims to further the objectives of equity and effectiveness in governance by establishing more precise criteria for selecting members in governing bodies. Constituency-based governance is seen to have a number of advantages. For example, it encourages those stakeholders that have most significant interest in the work of an entity to seek representation in the respective governing body, which may contribute to more pragmatic and consensus-oriented decision-making. Constituency-based form of governance also includes more countries in the decision-making process without increasing the number of seats on the governing body, thereby improving 'input' legitimacy in decision-making.

A constituency-based approach to governance recognizes that not all Member States have equal interest in operational activities of the UN system. By further refining the criteria for selecting members in governing bodies of UN development system entities, this approach attempts to reconcile the objectives of equity and effectiveness in governance.<sup>10</sup>

The Governing Council of ICAO is composed of members selected on the basis of constituency criteria. The Council is composed as follows: 11 states of chief importance to air transportation; 12 states that make the largest contribution to the provision of international civil air navigation; and 13 states ensuring geographical representation.

UNCHR uses the following criteria for the election of (permanent) members to the Executive Committee: (a) demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem, (b) widest possible geographical distribution, (c) membership of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. For the selection of rotational bureau members of the Executive Committee, the following four regional groupings are used: (a) Africa, (b) the Americas, (c) Asia and (d) Europe.

UNAIDS is an example of an entity that has adopted a mixed UN regional grouping and constituency-based criteria for selecting members on its Programme Coordination Board. UNAIDS is the only co-sponsored Joint Programme of the United Nations, which is reflected in

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<sup>10</sup> In the case of the UN development system, possible criteria sometimes mentioned for selecting members of governing bodies include: (a) income groupings (to better match the economic profile of Member States), (b) a region's share of total operational activities and (c) contribution level.

the entity's governance model. In addition to 22 Member States representatives, the Programme Coordination Board also includes as members, six co-sponsoring UN system organizations as well as five representatives of non-governmental organizations from the regions. Member States representatives in the PBC are elected for a three-year term. The selection of the civil society representatives is carried out by the non-governmental organizations themselves and they have the right to participate in all aspects of the Board's work, except voting. The PCB, which meets twice a year, submits a biennial report to ECOSOC. Inter-sessional processes are managed by the PCB Bureau, composed of the Chair, Vice-Chair and Rapporteur and representatives of the NGOs, the co-sponsors and the secretariat.

UN-Women is another entity that has recently adopted a mixed UN regional grouping and constituency-based governance model. In the case of UN-Women, Member States have recognized the importance of those countries that provide funding to an entity that relies exclusively on voluntary contributions for its operational activities in the design of specific criteria for the election of 'contributing countries' to the Executive Board.

The ILO's mixed UN regional grouping and constituency-based governance is unique to the UN system as it includes non-government members with voting rights. The ILO's tripartite governance ensures that the views of the social partners are closely reflected in labour standards and in shaping policies and programmes. The ILO governing body meets three times a year and is composed of 56 titular members (28 Governments, 14 Employers and 14 Workers) and 66 deputy members (28 Governments, 19 Employers and 19 Workers). Ten of the titular government seats are permanently held by States of chief industrial importance.<sup>11</sup> The other government members are elected by the International Labour Conference (ILC) every three years. The employer and worker representatives are elected in their individual capacity. At the annual ILC, delegations of each Member State are composed of two government representatives and one employer and one worker respectively, who vote on the adoption of labour standards, the ILO's budget and other decision items freely and individually.

#### The need for enhanced working methods and capacity in governance

In addition to the issue of representation, the working methods of governing bodies have significant bearing on the ability of Member States to participate effectively in the governance of UN entities. Most governing bodies of UN development system entities meet only once a year and some even more seldom. In a number of governing bodies, members are also often elected for one year only. This affects the ability of governing bodies to set policies and provide oversight of the operational activities of the entities concerned. The Executive Boards of the funds and programmes are an exception in this regard, meeting three times a year in formal sessions and also in many informal consultations. It is estimated that the four Executive Boards of the funds and programmes (UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF, WFP and UN-Women) meet some 140 days per year in total in formal sessions and informal consultations, which corresponds to nearly three meetings every week throughout the calendar year.

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<sup>11</sup> Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Some entities, such as WFP and ILO, have established working groups or special committees to examine the working methods of governing bodies. WFP, for example, established the Governance Group in 1999, which operated between 2000 and 2005 with a mandate to develop ideas for improved governance of the institution and to make the work of the Executive Board more strategic and efficient. The Group was also requested by the EB or the Bureau to examine ad hoc governance issues during this period. It also served as mechanism for informal consultations to achieve consensus among the membership in advance of formal Board sessions. Each of the Board's five regional electoral lists appointed a representative to the Governance Group. The Executive Board of WFP subsequently adopted an action plan to implement the recommendations of the Group.<sup>12</sup>

The ILO's Working Party on the functioning of its governing body and International Labour Conference, since its creation in 2009, has produced governance reform measures to encourage greater participation of smaller delegations in governing body discussions and to widen participation in agenda-setting.

## 6. Selected discussion questions

The below questions have been prepared to facilitate deliberations of Member States on the implications of the post-2015 development agenda on governance structures of the UN development system:

1. What changes in working methods of governing bodies, e.g. the funds and programmes, are required in order to strengthen the participation of Member States, particularly developing countries, in the governance process? What measures are needed to improve the representativeness and legitimacy of the governing bodies?
2. How can governing bodies of UN development system ensure that key institutional processes involved in the delivery of voluntarily-funded operational activities are regulated coherently across entities? What are the benefits of uniform regulation of voluntarily-funded operational activities across UN development system entities?
3. Do recent innovations in the method of selecting members of governing bodies such as in the cases of UNAIDS, UN-Women and ILO, which apply a combination of UN regional grouping and constituency-based criteria, provide a potential model for improving equity and effectiveness in the composition of other governing bodies of UN development system entities?
4. Will the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda and emerging global crisis risks require greater policy coordination among agency-specific and system-wide governing bodies? If so, how can such policy cooperation among governing bodies be fostered?

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<sup>12</sup> See final report of the governance project, WFP/EB.2/2005/4-C/Rev.1.

## Annex 1: Analytical framework

One way to analyze the evolution of the governance of UN operational activities is to use the concept of the '*strategic triangle*' developed by the Harvard Kennedy School Professor Mark Moore and discussed in a recent influential publication of Jenks and Jones.<sup>13</sup> According to this concept, a healthy political economy of an organization or system, is characterized by high degree of convergence between the expectations of an *authorizing environment*, the *mission* (or public value), motivated and legitimized by the authorizing environment, and the operational *capacity* to deliver on the mission.

The purpose of the strategic triangle is to focus the attention of decision-makers on these three dimensions before committing to a particular course of action, which if applied to governance of UN operational activities would involve responding to questions such as the following:

*Firstly*, what “public value” is the governance system expected to provide?

*Secondly*, “what sources of legitimacy or support” would be relied upon to authorize the governance system to take action and provide the resources necessary to sustain the effort to create that value?

*Thirdly*, what “operational capabilities” (including new investments, innovations and alliances) would the governance system rely on to deliver the desired results?

The challenge is to bring these three dimensions into alignment in order to ensure well-functioning governance of UN operational activities. The mission should be an effective response to the challenges found in the authorizing environment. The operational capacities should be adapted to the proposed mission to ensure its effective realization. The authorizing environment, in turn, must enable the necessary changes in the operational capacities.

The strategic triangle concept is further explained in Figure 1.


The debate on governance of the UN development system should therefore start with a clear articulation of the *functions* or the “public value” that Member States want the Organization to fulfil in the post-2015 era. This is because the form of the governance arrangements will inevitably have to respond to those functions or “public value” expectations of Member States.

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<sup>13</sup> Jenks and Jones (2013).

**FIGURE 1: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK - THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE CONCEPT**

According to Harvard Kennedy School Professor Mark Moore, the term ‘public value’ constitutes the “combined value of the public of what they regard as valuable”. In the context of the UN development system, the mission would reflect what Member States collectively consider to be the desired public value of the Organization. The model suggests that Member States should not look at the governance of the UN development system in isolation, but rather in conjunction with the mission (or functions) of the Organization as well as the broader political context that legitimizes the mission. The model suggests that the mission needs to be substantially valuable in the sense that it responds to the expectations of Member States, which means that the UN development system must continually generate legitimacy and funding for its operations. Inherent to the model in the context of governance is the notion of both ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy of governing bodies. In the case of agency-specific governing bodies, lack of participation of Member States in the governance process would be considered to undermine their ‘input’ legitimacy.



## Annex 2: An overview of current governance arrangements of UN development system

This chapter describes the role of both system-wide and agency-specific governing bodies in the current governance system of UN Development. It also identifies key challenges facing the governance system at both agency-specific and system-wide levels.

The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Executive Boards of the operational funds and programmes and the governing bodies of the specialized agencies and other entities reporting to the GA or ECOSOC, in accordance with their respective mandates, constitute a two-tiered intergovernmental policy-making and oversight system for UN Development.

At the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, Member States also decided to create a High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development of the GA to ensure policy coordination and coherence of the sustainable development agenda. More recently, the role of ECOSOC has been reviewed at the intergovernmental level, leading, inter alia, to the establishment of an Integration Segment charged with fostering integration of the three pillars of sustainable development in the work of the UN and beyond.

In addition to the two-tiered formal policy-making and oversight system for UN development operations, governance also takes place at the country level through various policy coordination mechanisms involving the respective Government and heads of UN entities, where, inter alia, country priorities are determined and implementation assessed.

### System-wide

#### General Assembly

The GA, through the *quadrennial comprehensive policy review* (QCPR) establishes key system-wide policy orientations for the development cooperation and country-level modalities of the UN system. The QCPR focuses, in particular, on crosscutting and coordination issues on the operational side of UN Development. The QCPR is applicable to all funds and programmes and other entities that are under the direct mandate of the GA (see Box 1). The GA has also requested the funds and programmes and encouraged the specialized agencies to align the respective strategic planning cycles to the timing of the QCPR.<sup>14</sup>

The GA also provides policy guidance to the UN system in a range of substantive areas, from macroeconomic and financing for development issues to social development and the advancement of women, including follow-up to the outcomes of major UN conferences.

#### High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development

The High-level Political Forum will play a key role in setting normative policies for UN Development. The mandate of the HLPF is to: provide political leadership and recommendations for sustainable development, follow-up and review progress in implementing sustainable development commitments, enhance the integration of economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, have a focused, dynamic and action-oriented agenda, consider new and emerging sustainable development challenges. The HLPF meets: every four years at the level of Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the General Assembly, every year under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council - for eight days, including a three-day ministerial segment. The forum adopts negotiated declarations. It replaces

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<sup>14</sup> UNGA (2009).

the Commission on Sustainable Development.

### Economic and Social Council

ECOSOC is mandated to provide *coordination* and guidance to the UN system, including monitoring of QCPR implementation. As specified in the UN Charter “the Council may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to Member States of the United Nations”.

### Operational Activities for Development Segment

The role of ECOSOC in coordinating and monitoring the implementation of policy guidance established by the GA is primarily discharged through its Operational Activities for Development Segment. The key functions of the OAS are the following<sup>15</sup>:

- Provide the UN system with cross-sector coordination and overall guidance on a system-wide basis, including objectives, priorities and strategies, in the implementation of the policies formulated by the GA in the field of operational activities for development;
- Monitor the division of labour between and cooperation within the bodies of the UN system, in particular the development funds and programmes, to include the conduct of field-level coordination, and make appropriate recommendations to the GA, as well as to provide guidance, where appropriate, to the system;
- Review and evaluate the reports on the work of the development funds and programmes, including the assessment of their overall impact, with a view of enhancing the operational activities of the UN on a system-wide basis;
- Undertake preparatory work for the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities by the GA;
- Review the operationally relevant recommendations of the subsidiary bodies of ECOSOC and other relevant bodies in the light of policies established by the GA, in order to incorporate them, as appropriate, into the operational activities of the UN;
- Provide orientations and recommendations to the relevant inter-agency coordination mechanisms and to support and enhance their role.

### Integration Segment

ECOSOC has been tasked to promote the integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development both within the UN system and beyond. To this end, the Integration Segment will serve as a platform to:

- Consolidate the inputs of Member States, the subsidiary bodies of the Council, the UN system and other relevant stakeholders;
- Promote the balanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development by engaging policy makers from various ministries;
- Bring together the key messages from the Council system on the main theme and develop action-oriented recommendations for follow up.

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<sup>15</sup> UNGA (1993)

The segment will address the interplay of the three dimensions of sustainable development and crosscutting issues such as gender, science and technology, trade and finance, particularly in relation to policy options and their implications. The work of the segment will also facilitate the transmission and incorporation of policy guidance by governing bodies of the United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies.

### Agency-specific<sup>16</sup>

#### Executive boards of funds and programmes

The Executive Boards of the major operational funds and programmes (UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNICEF, WFP, UN-Women) are responsible, inter alia, for providing intergovernmental oversight of the respective entities in accordance with the overall policy guidance of the GA and ECOSOC, and for ensuring that they are responsive to the needs and priorities of recipient countries.<sup>17</sup> Box 3 provides further details on the specific functions of the EBs of the major operational funds and programmes.

Members of the EBs are elected by ECOSOC. The Executive Heads of the funds and programmes are appointed by the Secretary-General, following consultation with the respective EB, and confirmed by the GA. The EBs are subject to the authority of ECOSOC and expected to bring to the Council's attention issues requiring its guidance.<sup>18</sup> GA resolution 48/162 of 1994 states that "Boards are subject to the authority of the Council" (Article 21) but are mandated "to implement the policies formulated by the Assembly and the coordination and guidance received from the Council" (Article 22).

Since 1998, the EBs of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS, UNICEF, WFP, and now UN-Women, have convened an informal joint meeting of the boards once a year to discuss selected priority issues of common concern.

#### Governing bodies of specialized agencies

The specialized agencies are separate, legally autonomous organizations with their own policy-making and executive organs, secretariats and budgets. The executive heads of the specialized agencies are elected by the membership of the respective entity. The detailed functioning of the relationship of the specialized agencies with the UN is defined by the terms of special agreements established with ECOSOC and subsequently approved by the GA.

Article 63 of the UN Charter stipulates that the Council may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the GA and to Members of the UN. In Article 64, ECOSOC is authorized to take appropriate action to obtain regular reports from the SAs. ECOSOC may also make arrangements with the Members of the UN and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to the Council's recommendations and to recommendations falling within its competence as established by the GA.

To complement the review of the existing governance system, Box 4 provides a brief historical overview of the establishment of important system-wide coordination mechanisms in the UN system, with Box 5 describing the key functions of the main inter-agency bodies.

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<sup>16</sup> The governance arrangements of UN-Women and UNAIDS are also discussed earlier in this document.

<sup>17</sup> UNGA (1993)

<sup>18</sup> UNGA (1996)

## Country-level

Over the years, the funding architecture of UN Development has changed significantly, with contributions to entities increasingly shifting from core to non-core (earmarked).<sup>19</sup> Today, almost three-fourths of all contributions for operational activities are earmarked, where the destination and substantive focus are largely determined by donors and therefore only indirectly managed and overseen by the respective governing body. As a result, an Executive Board of a fund or programme now only has direct control over a relatively small share of the overall resource envelope, of which a significant part is already earmarked to cover the core institutional costs of the respective entity.

Programme priorities are also primarily determined at the country level through consultations between the respective Government and UN entities, particularly in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework process. Country programmes of the funds and programmes, derived from priorities established in the UNDAF process, are subsequently formally approved by the respective Executive Board. In the approval of a country programme document, an Executive Board only takes note of the planned non-core resources mobilization target of the respective fund or programme. For the specialized agencies, on the other hand, there are generally no requirements for a country programme document being tabled for governing body review. Projects funded from extra-budgetary resources are therefore only subject to review by the management of the respective specialized agency.

A significant part of non-core resources for development-related activities are now mobilized by UN entities from donors directly at the country level in support of national development priorities and in close consultation with the respective Government. The substantive focus and financing of country programme documents are therefore largely determined at the country level with minimum involvement of the respective governing body. The management and oversight role of governing bodies of funds, programmes and agencies, as a result, has significantly changed over the years.

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<sup>19</sup> UN operational activities are funded by a combination of so-called core and non-core resources. Core resources are those that are commingled without restrictions and whose use and application are directly linked to the entities' multilateral mandates and strategic plans that are approved by the respective governing bodies as part of an established intergovernmental process. In contrast, and as determined by the contributors, non-core resources are mostly earmarked and thus restricted with regard to their use and application. There is therefore not necessarily a direct link between activities financed by non-core resources and the multilateral mandates and strategic plans approved by governing bodies. In some instances governing bodies formally approve the use of core resources while "taking note" of the use of non-core resources.

### Annex 3: Key recommendations of earlier reports on improving the functioning of governing bodies of UN Development<sup>20</sup>

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
<p>1. Commission on International Development: partners in development – <b>Pearson Report</b> (1969)</p> <p>CID (1969)</p>		<p>Improve review of whole-of-United Nations system issues, including Bretton Woods institutions</p> <p>Institutionalize coordination among United Nations agencies, Bretton Woods institutions, multilateral agencies, regional development banks and coordinating bodies in order to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further linkages between aid and development policies and those dealing with trade, monetary policy and private capital movements</li> <li>• Move towards standardized performance assessments across United Nations system, including Bretton Woods institutions</li> <li>• Establish authoritative estimates of development objectives and aid requirements</li> <li>• Provide balanced and impartial review of donor aid policies and programmes</li> </ul>
<p>2. Report of Group of Experts on the Structure of United Nations system – <b>Gardner Report</b> (1975)</p> <p>Group of Experts (1975)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b></p> <p>Convene well-prepared sessions of General Assembly or proposed Development Committee, rather than ad-hoc world conferences</p> <p>Organize Economic and Social Council work programme on biennial basis, with short and frequent subject-oriented sessions spread throughout year, in New York, Geneva or other cities such as Nairobi, depending on topic and secretariat location</p> <p>Devote initial substantive session of Economic and Social Council (presumably in January) to identification of themes and issues to be included in biennial work programme</p> <p>Design Economic and Social Council work programme so that all issues currently addressed by subsidiary bodies are discussed over two-year cycle, with one-week ministerial session (e.g. last week of June) devoted to overall policy review, followed by separate discussions, two weeks each, first, on programme budgets and medium-term plans of entire United Nations system, and, secondly, to review operational activities</p>	<p><b>General Assembly</b></p> <p>Strengthen central role of General Assembly in global policy-making</p> <p>Rename Second Committee to <b>Development Committee</b> charged with establishing overall global development policies</p> <p><b>Economic and Social Council</b></p> <p>Prepare meetings of proposed Development Committee</p> <p>Coordinate policy-making within United Nations system on development issues and operational activities for development, including monitoring of implementation</p> <p>Assume direct responsibility for work performed by subsidiary bodies except regional commissions and others of highly specialized nature (e.g. Statistical Commission)<sup>21</sup></p> <p>Establish small negotiation groups to facilitate consensus-building on priority issues</p>

<sup>20</sup> Many of the reports and studies examined in this annex resulted in adoption of GA resolutions with significant implications for functioning of intergovernmental bodies governing UN development operations. The following GA resolutions are particularly relevant in this context: 45/204, 46/182, 50/227, 62/208 and 63/311. Additional reports that may be of interest include those submitted earlier by the Secretary-General to facilitate intergovernmental deliberations on such issues, including the most recent one entitled “strengthening governance of operational activities for development of UN system for enhanced system-wide coherence” (Apr. ’09).

<sup>21</sup> With most subsidiary bodies discontinued, the report makes several proposals to make rules governing participation in work of ECOSOC more flexible.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
	<p><b>Representation</b> Officials from capitals having the required expertise, flexible instructions and capacity to follow-up directly on implementation of agreed decisions would attend Economic and Social Council sessions, with travel support provided to developing country participants</p> <p>Promote active participation of specialized agencies in work of Economic and Social Council</p> <p><b>Preparations</b> Restructure and strengthen central Secretariat so as to be able to provide intellectual direction on issues of system-wide concern</p>	<p>Review programme budgets and medium-term plans in economic and social fields with support of revitalized Committee on Programme Coordination<sup>22</sup></p> <p><b>Governing boards of funds and programmes</b> Consolidate governing boards of operational funds administered by United Nations into single <b>Operations Board</b>, reporting to Economic and Social Council, with membership small (18-27 countries)<sup>23</sup></p> <p><b>Evaluation</b> Create small full-time body of independent experts to provide intergovernmental organs with information on programme management &amp; execution and progress in achieving policy goals, with Joint Inspection Unit alternatively transformed into this entity</p>
<p>3. <b>Ad-hoc Committee</b> on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations system (1977)</p> <p>UNGA (1977)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b> Rationalize General Assembly working methods and procedures Improve coordination of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Committees with 5<sup>th</sup> Committee</p> <p>Organize Economic and Social Council work on biennial basis through shorter but more frequent subject-oriented sessions spread throughout the year</p> <p>Convene periodic Economic and Social Council meetings at ministerial-level to review major issues</p> <p><b>Preparations</b> Prepare concise and action-oriented documentation for General Assembly and Economic and Social Council sessions</p>	<p><b>General Assembly</b> Serve as principal forum for global policy-making</p> <p><b>Economic and Social Council</b> Act as central forum for discussion of international economic and social issues of interdisciplinary nature</p> <p>Formulate policy recommendations addressed to Member States and United Nations system</p> <p>Monitor and evaluate implementation of General Assembly policy guidance</p> <p>Ensure overall coordination of activities of United Nations system</p> <p>Undertake comprehensive policy reviews of United Nations operational activities for development</p> <p>Assume, to maximum extent possible, functions of subsidiary bodies</p> <p>Improve consultative relationships with non-governmental organizations</p> <p>Consolidate planning, programming and coordination responsibilities in Committee for Programme Coordination</p> <p><b>Governing boards of funds and programmes</b> Consider establishing <b>single governing body</b> responsible for management &amp; control of United Nations operational activities for development, replacing existing governing bodies</p>
<p>4. North-South: A Programme for Survival – <b>Brandt</b></p>	<p><b>Working methods</b> Make agendas more purposeful and results-oriented, with better time management and more economical documentation</p>	<p>Create high-level <b>Independent Advisory Body</b> composed of 12 members, with one-third from developing and developed countries and individual experts respectively, serving in individual capacity and appointed by SG to:</p>

<sup>22</sup> Based on draft plans prepared by an inter-agency planning unit.

<sup>23</sup> With operational funds maintaining fund-raising identity.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
<p><b>Report (1979)</b></p> <p>Brandt (1980)</p>	<p>Review present system of negotiations to see whether more flexible, expeditious and results-oriented procedures can be introduced without detracting from cooperation within existing groups<sup>24</sup></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advise Member States, General Assembly and its organs with a view to improving the effectiveness of United Nations and other international institutions engaged in development and international economic cooperation in achieving their global objectives<sup>25</sup></li> </ul> <p>Establish small negotiation groups on priority issues composed of countries of which respective issue is of most interest to facilitate consensus-building</p> <p>Convene occasionally summits of limited number of countries to forge commitment and advance consensus on high-priority issues as precursor for discussions in universal forums such as General Assembly</p>
<p>5. Some reflections on reform of United Nations – <b>Maurice Bertrand</b> - Joint Inspection Unit (1985)</p> <p>Bertrand (1985)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b> Reduce overlap in agenda of intergovernmental bodies</p> <p><b>Representation</b> Involve technical ministries in intergovernmental deliberations on development issues with a view of influencing national policy-making</p> <p>Appoint Economic Ambassador, coming from Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, part of each delegation in NY, to participate in Economic Security Council</p> <p><b>Preparations</b> Set-up inter-disciplinary secretariat to service Economic Security Council with team of economists, sociologists and other specialists of high qualifications</p>	<p>Establish <b>Economic Security Council</b> composed of 23 members, replacing Economic and Social Council and Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD</p> <p>Economic Security Council would play similar role as Security Council in area of peace and security</p> <p>Establish <b>single governing body</b> (and single development agency) for United Nations operational activities for development at regional-level</p> <p>Adopt constituency-based intergovernmental negotiations based on definition of interest groups whose composition and dimensions vary according to subject dealt with, and method of representation of these groups<sup>26</sup></p> <p><b>National level</b> Enhance policy coherence of Member States in intergovernmental bodies</p>
<p>6. Report of Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review Efficiency of Administrative and Financial Functioning of United Nations – <b>The Group of 18</b></p>	<p><b>Working methods</b> Undertake comparative analysis of agenda, calendars and programme of work of General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and related subsidiary bodies</p> <p>Rationalize agenda-setting, procedures and methods of work of General Assembly and Economic and Social Council in order to reduce number of meetings and documentation</p> <p>Improve system of reporting from subsidiary bodies to principal organs</p>	<p>Consider establishing <b>single governing body</b> responsible for management and control, at intergovernmental-level, of United Nations operational activities for development</p> <p>Improve intergovernmental review of reports of Joint Inspection United Nations</p> <p>Strengthen independent evaluation of United Nations operational activities for development</p>

<sup>24</sup> The Commission on Global Governance (discussed later) also proposed establishing constituency-based system in executive boards of UN development agencies so as to facilitate more pragmatic decision-making.

<sup>25</sup> The reports of the proposed Advisory Group would be made available to the public.

<sup>26</sup> In order for negotiations to improve or alter world consensus, all participants need to agree on negotiation structures at the outset.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
<p>(1986)</p> <p>The Group of the High-Level Intergovernmental Experts "The Group of 18" (1986)</p>	<p>with a view to reducing and minimizing duplication in documentation</p> <p>Adopt fewer and more strategic resolutions</p>	
<p>7. Report of <b>Special Economic and Social Council Commission</b> on In-depth Study of United Nations Intergovernmental Structures and Functions in Economic and Social Fields (1988)<sup>27</sup></p> <p>The Special Commission of the Economic and Social Council (1988)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b></p> <p>Rationalize method of work of General Assembly in economic and social fields</p> <p>Improve prioritization of policy issues to be discussed in General Assembly each year</p> <p>Make representation in Economic and Social Council universal<sup>28</sup></p> <p>Eliminate overlap in General Assembly and Economic and Social Council agenda<sup>29</sup></p> <p>Convene 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Committees for four weeks each year</p> <p>Hold 4-5 weeks annual session of Council in July/August each year, with high-level segment undertaking in-depth review of selected programme areas</p> <p>Convene subject-oriented sessions of Council, as appropriate<sup>30</sup></p> <p><b>Representation</b></p> <p>Strengthen participation of executive heads of United Nations organizations in Economic and Social Council deliberations</p> <p><b>Preparations</b></p> <p>Improve and rationalize system of reporting to General Assembly and Economic and Social Council</p>	<p><b>General Assembly</b></p> <p>Establish overall strategies, policies and priorities for United Nations system in respect of international cooperation, including operational activities for development</p> <p>Serve as principal forum for policy-making and provision of policy guidance to United Nations operational activities for development</p> <p><b>Economic and Social Council</b></p> <p>Serve as central forum for substantive coordination of international economic and social issues of global and interdisciplinary nature and for formulation of recommendations to Member States and United Nations system</p> <p>Provide coordination of activities of United Nations system</p> <p>Monitor and evaluate implementation of General Assembly policies</p> <p>Recommend to General Assembly overall priorities and policy guidance on operational activities for development – the Third (Programme and Coordination) Committee of Council would devote its deliberations to operational activities<sup>31</sup></p> <p>Discuss each year limited number of operational issues requiring coordination and harmonization of action among relevant United Nations system organizations</p> <p>Undertake comprehensive policy review of operational activities every three</p>

<sup>27</sup> Chairman's text dated 4 May 1988 on the draft conclusions and recommendations of Special Commission.

<sup>28</sup> In an informal paper presented by G-77 on 1 September 1987, six reasons were identified for the inability of ECOSOC to fulfil its mandate: (a) restricted membership, (b) expansion of its subsidiary machinery, (c) short duration of meetings, (d) inadequate secretariat support structure and (e) lack of recognition of Council's authority by other intergovernmental and inter-secretarial bodies of UN system.

<sup>29</sup> The Special Commission proposed that GA and ECOSOC should establish a process of periodic review and evaluation of United Nations intergovernmental structure and functions in economic and social fields.

<sup>30</sup> In an informal discussion paper presented by Canada, universal membership of ECOSOC was proposed as well as organization of work programme along five main sectoral lines, which would be served by three Committees of the Council, with one focusing on UN operational activities for development.

<sup>31</sup> In an informal discussion paper, Japan proposed the creation of sessional committee of Council to deal solely with coordination of operational activities for development.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
	Perform periodic evaluation and appraisal of quality and content of reports prepared for Economic and Social Council Strengthen Secretariat support	years Obtain regular reports from specialized agencies on steps taken to give effect to relevant recommendations of General Assembly and Council <b>Governing boards of funds and programmes</b> Exercise responsibility for formulation, appraisal, approval, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects
8. Challenge to the South – The Report of the <b>South Commission</b> (1990)  Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues / Nyerere (1990)		<b>Summit of Leaders</b> Establish representative group of leaders of developed and developing countries under auspices of United Nations to periodically review world economic situation, prospects for development and environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recommend guidelines for action by specialized agencies of United Nations and other major actors on the global scene</li> </ul>
9. The United Nations in Development: <i>reform issues in the economic and social fields – A Nordic Perspective</i> (1991)  Nordic UN Project (1991)	<b>Working methods</b> Systematize General Assembly and Economic and Social Council agenda-setting Make greater use of groups with limited membership to deal with specific issues or sectors Minimize overlaps in General Assembly and Economic and Social Council mandates <b>Preparations</b> Streamline reporting to Economic and Social Council	Establish <b>International Development Council</b> , as high-level forum to discuss development issues and provide overall guidance to United Nations operational activities for development: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focusing on normative aspects of development, delegating administrative and managerial issues to system of Executive Boards</li> <li>• Absorbing policy functions of five boards (United Nations DP, United Nations ICEF, United Nations FPA, WFP and IFAD), while Executive Boards, composed of no more than 20 representatives, provide policy guidance to senior management on continuous basis</li> <li>• Replacing either Second or Third Committee of General Assembly, ensuring universal participation, or constituted as one segment of Economic and Social Council, with 54 members</li> </ul> IDC role would resemble that of Development Committee of World Bank
10. United Nations DP <b>Human Development Report</b> (1992)		Create <b>Development Security Council</b> , composed of 11 permanent members and 11 on basis of rotational election to <sup>32</sup> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Design broad policy for all development issues, ranging from food security to ecological security, from humanitarian assistance to development assistance, from debt relief to social development, from drug control to international migration</li> </ul>

<sup>32</sup> The report argued that size of ECOSOC makes it difficult for Council to exercise its coordination role.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
UNDP (1992)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare global revolving five-year budget of development resources flows</li> <li>• Provide policy coordination framework for smooth functioning of international development and financial institutions</li> </ul>
<p>11. Renewing the United Nations System – <b>Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart</b> (1994)</p> <p>Childers / Urquhart (1994)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b>  Extend working periods of General Assembly and Economic and Social Council</p> <p>Explore ways to enhance negotiation and decision-making capacities of poorer countries in General Assembly and Economic and Social Council</p> <p>Improve traditions and timings of debate, traditional composition of resolutions and discipline in requesting reports including proscribing their length</p> <p>Introduce “Question time” in General Assembly</p> <p><b>Representation</b>  Promote more strategic composition of participants in Economic and Social Council deliberations</p> <p><b>Preparations</b>  Improve Economic and Social Council documentation, and make more strategic, in order to attract ministerial attendance</p> <p>Designate one focal point within Secretariat to plan, marshal and monitor quality, coherence and volume of socio-economic documentation</p> <p>Undertake business process review of legislative support services</p>	<p>Establish <b>United Nations System Consultative Board</b>, reporting to General Assembly, through Economic and Social Council, comprising Economic and Social Council bureau members, bureaus of executive governing bodies of major agencies, and one representative of each other agency to formulate common policy-approaches on all matters requiring system-wide effort</p> <p>Convene Board biennially to review progress in system-wide implementation of selected policies and programmes, including United Nations-wide reform efforts</p> <p>Establish <b>General Committee</b>, as standing capacity of General Assembly, to monitor &amp; evaluate its discharge of responsibilities for coordination of policies and activities of agencies under Article 58 of United Nations Charter</p> <p>Establish <b>single governing body</b> for United Nations operational activities for development at regional-level, under auspices of respective Regional Commission</p> <p>Examine reports of regional governing entities in <b>single global governing body</b> for United Nations operational activities for development, providing overall global policy guidance and accountability, with report submitted to Economic and Social Council</p> <p>General Assembly to review and debate every five years overall, global, inter-regional, regional and country policies in operational development programmes</p>
<p>12. Our Global Neighbourhood – Report of <b>Commission on Global Governance</b> (1995)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b>  Make modus operandi of Economic Security Council practical and efficient</p> <p>Promote informal exchanges in Economic Security Council among national leaders</p> <p>Streamline and modernize procedures of General Assembly and its committees</p> <p>Reduce and rationalize General Assembly agenda</p> <p>Make General Assembly work more focused and results-oriented</p> <p>Convene General Assembly theme session in first half of each year on major priority issue</p> <p>Merge 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> committees of General Assembly</p> <p>Enhance opportunity for intellectual dialogue among leaders in General</p>	<p>Create an <b>Economic Security Council</b> composed of no more than 23 members</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess overall state of world economy and interaction between major policy areas</li> <li>• Provide long-term strategic policy framework for stable, balanced and sustainable development</li> <li>• Secure consistency between policy goals of major international institutions</li> <li>• Promote consensus-building for evolution of international economic system</li> </ul> <p>Retire Economic and Social Council</p> <p>Submit major recommendations of Economic and Social Council subsidiary bodies to Economic Security Council, others to merged 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> committees, with NGO accreditation shifted to General Assembly</p>

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
The Commission on Global Governance (1995)	<p>Assembly</p> <p>Reduce overlapping agendas of Economic and Social Council and 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> committees</p> <p><b>Representation</b></p> <p>Heads-of-State and finance ministers to participate in Economic Security Council</p> <p><b>Preparations</b></p> <p>Imaginative and unconventional approach required to service Economic Security Council</p> <p>Secretariat staff and research capacity of high-quality with ability for strategic thinking on economic, social and environmental issues</p> <p>Consider inviting competitive bidding from United Nations and private agencies for any significant piece of work done on behalf of Economic Security Council</p> <p>Foster substantive collaboration between staff of Economic Security Council and Bretton Woods institutions, WTO, ILO and others</p>	<p><b>Governing boards of funds and programmes</b></p> <p>Provide operational governance of respective entities</p> <p>Establish <b>constituency-based system</b> so that all countries have voice on executive boards</p>
13. A world in need of leadership: tomorrow's United Nations - A Fresh Appraisal – <b>Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart</b> (1996)  Childers / Urquhart (1996)	<p><b>Representation</b></p> <p>Enhance strategy-negotiating and coordinating role of Economic and Social Council through more strategic composition of participants in Council's deliberations</p>	<p>Establish <b>United Nations System Consultative Board</b> comprising Economic and Social Council bureau members, bureaus of executive governing bodies of major agencies, and one representative of each other agency to formulate common policy-approaches on all matters requiring system-wide effort</p> <p>Establish <b>single governing body</b> for United Nations operational activities for development, with regional governing bodies for programmes in each region</p> <p><b>National level</b></p> <p>Enhance policy coherence of Member States in intergovernmental bodies</p>
14. The United Nations in Development- Strengthening the United Nations through change: <i>fulfilling its economic and social mandate</i> – <b>The Nordic United Nations Reform Project</b> (1996)	<p><b>Working methods</b></p> <p>Consolidate agendas of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> committees of General Assembly</p> <p>Convene Economic and Social Council whenever necessary to address urgent developments in economic, social &amp; related fields requiring guidance and coordination by Council</p> <p>Review subsidiary structure of Economic and Social Council in order to assess whether tasks can be absorbed by Council and other forums</p> <p><b>Preparations</b></p> <p>Improve preparations for substantive meetings of Economic and Social Council, with higher-quality reporting, focused agenda, and more active</p>	<p>Establish functionally-integrated governance system:</p> <p><b>General Assembly, United Nations conferences and treaty-making bodies</b></p> <p>Perform agenda, norm and standard-setting through dialogue and negotiations; policy-making; and oversight of subordinate bodies of United Nations system</p> <p><b>Economic and Social Council</b></p> <p>Provide policy guidance to all parts of United Nations system, including specialized agencies and regional commissions; coordination of intergovernmental, inter-agency and operational activities, particularly with respect to implementation of comprehensive policy review of General Assembly and integrated follow-up to United Nations conferences including</p>

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
Nordic UN Project (1996)	bureau Compile sectoral, operational and agency-oriented reports into consolidated Economic and Social Council report on development	assessment of analyses and data collection; priority-setting as regards resources and activities; and consolidation of medium-term plans and budgets Strengthen Economic and Social Council guidance of functional commissions and expert bodies <b>Governing bodies of funds, programmes and agencies</b> Undertake policy interpretation, preparation and application; strategy development; approval of programmes and budgets; oversight of operations management; and monitoring and evaluation <b>Long-term vision</b> <b>Unified governance arrangement</b> for consolidated United Nations development system

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
<p>15. Renewing the United Nations: programme for reform – <b>Report of the Secretary-General</b> (1997)</p> <p>UNGA (1997)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b>            Conceptualize &amp; organize General Assembly agenda around priorities of United Nations medium-term plan</p> <p>Consider holding Economic and Social Council segments at different pre-established periods during year, without affecting totality of Council meetings</p> <p>Extend duration of Operational Activities Segment to enable Council to provide effective policy guidance to work of different programmes and funds</p> <p>Adopt ex-ante, rather than ex-post, review by Council of work programme of functional commissions</p> <p>Convene meetings of Executive Boards of United Nations DP/United Nations FPA and United Nations ICEF back-to-back, with joint meetings, as appropriate, and with joint committees comprising members of both boards to review issues and matters of common concern</p> <p><b>Representation</b>            Economic and Social Council segments attended by ministers directly concerned with respective themes. Active participation of LDCs, beneficiaries of operational activities, is especially important in order to render dialogue more meaningful</p> <p>Establish trust fund to facilitate participation of ministers and/or high-level officials of LDCs in Operational Activities Segment</p> <p><b>Preparations</b>            Improve preparations for Operational Activities Segment so that policy issues arising from reports of Executive Boards of funds and programmes are effectively identified, and level of participation in Council that can give necessary political weight to policy prescriptions emanating from it, is promoted</p>	<p><b>Economic and Social Council</b>            Rethink role of Economic and Social Council, possibly providing it with greater authority under Charter</p> <p>Consolidate and re-configure Economic and Social Council subsidiary machinery</p> <p>Replace Committee on Development Policy by panel of experts on relevant policy issues set-up by Economic and Social Council on ad-hoc basis, with members appointed on recommendation of Secretary-General</p> <p>Promote closer integration of governance oversight of United Nations DP/United Nations FPA and United Nations ICEF, with consecutive and/or joint meetings of Executive Boards, and convene joint committees to review issues and matters of common concern</p>
<p>16. The role of the Annual Joint Meeting<sup>33</sup> of Executive Boards of funds and</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b>            Adopt more strategic approach to agenda-setting, planning 2-3 years in advance</p> <p>Improve quality of debate</p>	

<sup>33</sup> The Annual Joint Meeting of Executive Boards of the four funds and programmes (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP) originates in GA resolution 52/12 of December 1997. The resolution “accepts that management of funds and programmes would be enhanced by greater integration of intergovernmental oversight, and requests ECOSOC, in the context of the next TCPR, during its Operational Activities Segment of 1998, to consider arrangements for closer integration of the governance oversight of UNDP/UNFPA and UNICEF, with consecutive and/or joint meetings of the existing executive boards, bearing in mind the respective mandates of the Executive Boards of the funds and programmes.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
<p>programmes – Informal note by <b>Anthony Beattie</b>, President of Executive Board of WFP (2004)</p> <p>Beattie (2004)</p>	<p>Aim to achieve operationally useful conclusions</p> <p>Encourage discussions on outcome of Annual Joint Meeting, in the Executive Boards</p> <p>Invite Executive Boards to report back on implementation of conclusions of Annual Joint Meeting of Boards</p> <p>Exploit synergies by reflecting objectives and current concerns of Annual Joint Meeting of Boards in terms of reference for joint field visits</p>	
<p>17. Assessment of value-added of joint meetings of the executive boards of United Nations DP/United Nations FPA, United Nations ICEF and WFP – <b>Report of Secretary-General</b> (E/2004/60:2004)</p> <p>UNSG (2004)</p>		<p>Consider adopting more formal approach to Annual Joint Meeting of Boards, e.g. granting of decision-making authority</p> <p>Examine how empowered Annual Joint Meeting of Boards would advance system-wide coherence and agreed development goals, including recommendations of QCPR<sup>34</sup></p> <p>Conduct periodic reviews of relevance and effectiveness of Annual Joint Meeting of Boards, including complementarity with Operational Activities Segment of Economic and Social Council</p>
<p>18. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations – An Issues Paper – <b>Gert Rosenthal</b> (2005)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b></p> <p>Organize Economic and Social Council segments at different intervals throughout year</p> <p>Strengthen focus on Economic and Social Council core functions</p> <p>Reduce formality in Economic and Social Council proceedings</p> <p><b>Representation</b></p> <p>Assume present disconnect between Economic and Social Council natural constituency and national economic policy-making at country-level as “given”</p> <p><b>Preparations</b></p> <p>Improve technical quality of inputs to Economic and Social Council meetings</p>	<p><b>Economic and Social Council</b></p> <p>Reduce Economic and Social Council membership to 36 countries</p> <p>Achieve consensus on Economic and Social Council subsidiary status to General Assembly</p> <p>Serve as Council of Ministers for Economic and Social Affairs with authority to review medium-term plans, or equivalent, of all United Nations system organizations</p> <p>Coordinate follow-up to outcomes of United Nations conferences and summits</p> <p>Undertake in-depth policy debates in Council with decisions adopted by General Assembly</p> <p>Establish closer relationship with Security Council</p> <p>Strengthen partnership with Bretton Woods institutions and WTO in order to</p>

<sup>34</sup> Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of General Assembly.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
Rosenthal (2005)		<p>give Council better access to ministries of finance, trade and development Bring non-governmental and private sectors more fully into work of Council</p>
<p>19. Report of the Secretary-General's <b>High-level Panel</b> on United Nations System-wide Coherence – <i>Delivering-as-One</i> (2006)</p> <p>UN (2006)</p>	<p><b>Working methods</b> Establish clear lines of accountability among different governance mechanisms in order to promote robust oversight of United Nations system performance and results</p> <p><b>Representation</b> Comprise Sustainable Development Board with senior officials from development, planning, finance and foreign ministries, with appropriate skills and competence</p> <p><b>Preparations</b> Establish Development Policy and Operations Group, supported by Development Finance and Performance Unit, composed of talented officials from all parts of United Nations system to provide high-quality support to Sustainable Development Board</p>	<p>Establish <b>Global Leaders Forum</b> comprised of leaders of 27 countries rotating on basis of geographical representation, with participation of executive heads of major international economic and financial institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide leadership on development and global public goods-related issues</li> <li>• Develop long-term strategic policy framework to secure consistency in policy goals of major international institutions</li> <li>• Promote consensus-building among governments on integrated solutions for global economic, social and environmental issues</li> </ul> <p>Create <b>Sustainable Development Board</b>, superseding Annual Joint Meeting of Executive Boards of funds and programmes<sup>35</sup> and meeting at ministerial-level, when required. The main tasks of SDB would be to<sup>36</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Endorse One Country programmes and approve related allocations</li> <li>• Maintain strategic overview of system</li> <li>• Review implementation of global normative and analytical work of United Nations in relation to One United Nations at country-level</li> <li>• Oversee management of funding mechanism for Millennium Development Goals</li> <li>• Review performance of Resident Coordinator System</li> <li>• Consider and comment on strategic plans of funds, programmes and specialized agencies</li> <li>• Commission periodic strategic reviews of One Country Programmes</li> <li>• Consider and act on independent evaluation, risk management and audit findings</li> </ul> <p><b>Governing bodies of funds and programmes</b> Consider issues requiring particular agency focus including those relating to multi-year funding frameworks</p>

<sup>35</sup> ECOSOC would establish the Board and determine its membership in line with experience gained from the composition of the Executive Boards of funds and programmes. The Board would comprise a subset of Member States on basis of equitable geographical distribution. Major NGOs with key role in international development cooperation architecture would be enabled to participate in meetings of Board.

<sup>36</sup> After three years, the effectiveness of Sustainable Development Board would be assessed. This assessment would also include consideration of scope for integrating boards of UNDP/UNFPA and UNICEF as segments of the Sustainable Development Board, rather than maintaining them as stand-alone boards.

Study/report	Working methods, representation, preparations	Intergovernmental governance
		<p><b>National level</b>  Establish <b>all-of-government</b> approach in Member States to international development to ensure coordination in positions taken by their representatives in decision-making structures of all relevant organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions</p>
<p>20. Bruce Jenks and Bruce Jones, <b>United Nations Development at Crossroads</b>, 2013</p> <p>Jenks / Jones (2013)</p>	<p><b>Working Methods</b>  Avoid internally driven and duplicative processes  Maintain and strengthen the variety of different arrangements and legal instruments for decision-making processes  Expand capacities to measure results in order to give more credibility to goal-oriented development agendas</p> <p><b>Representation</b>  Include non-state actors more extensively in consultations and decision-making processes</p> <p><b>Preparation</b>  Facilitators prepare outcome documents for UN conferences, so as to leave more room for consultation rather than negotiation</p> <p>Provide more system-wide data and analysis</p>	<p>Focus on structural reforms that align functions of entities and form of governance, rather than on creating intricate coordination mechanisms aimed at promoting internal coherence</p>

#### Annex 4: Entities reporting to GA/ECOSOC and engaged in UN-OAD in 2012

Entity	UN-OAD (2012)	Governing body	#Members	Annual meeting frequency
<b>Funds and programmes</b>				
UNDP (incl. UNCDF, UNV)		UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Executive Board	36	3 sessions per year, 20 days
UNFPA				
UN-Women		Executive Board	41	EB – 3 sessions per year, 8 days
		Commission on Status of Women	45	CSW – 10 days
UNICEF		Executive Board	36	3 sessions per year, 12 days
WFP <sup>37</sup>		Executive Board	36	3 sessions per year, 10 days
UNHCR <sup>38</sup>		General Assembly	192	Ex-Com, annual session, 5 days
		ECOSOC	54	
		Executive Committee - Standing Committee	98	Standing Committee, 3 sessions per year, 9 days
UNAIDS		Programme Coordination Board	22 Member States 6 UN Systemcosponsoring organizations 5 NGOs	PCB, 2 sessions per year, 3 days each ECOSOC, biennial reporting on the Joint Programme Annual report of the Secretary General to the UN General Assembly on HIV/AIDS
UNCTAD (incl. ITC)		Trade and Development Board 3 Commissions 1 Working Party	194	TCB, one session per year, 10 days WP, 3 sessions per year, 9 days TDC, one session, 5 days IEDC, one session, 5 days STD (ECOSOC), one session, 5 days
UNEP		United Nations Environmental Assembly Committee of Permanent Representatives	All Member States	UNEA, biennial session, 5 days

<sup>37</sup> The Executive Board of WFP reports to both the FAO Council and the UN General Assembly. The Executive Director of WFP also reports to both the Secretary-General and the Director-General of FAO, who is consulted on the appointment.

<sup>38</sup> UNCHR governance is unique in a sense that when countries are elected to the Executive Committee, they become permanent members. UNCHR uses three criteria for electing members to the Executive Committee: (a) demonstrated interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem, (b) widest possible geographical distribution, (c) membership of the United Nations or its specialized agencies. For the selection of bureau members, the following four regional groupings are used: (a) Africa, (b) the Americas, (c) Asia and (d) Europe.

Entity	UN-OAD (2012)	Governing body	#Members	Annual meeting frequency
UN-Habitat		General Assembly ECOSOC Governing Council Committee of Permanent Representatives	192 54 58	Governing Council, biennial session, 5 days
UNODC		Commission on Narcotic Drugs - Normative Segment - Operational Segment (UNODC Governing Body) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNODC Governing body, approves budget of UNCPCJ Fund)	53  40	CND, one annual session, 5 days  CCPCJ, one annual session, 5 days
UNRWA		General Assembly Advisory Committee AC – Sub-committee	192 25	GA Fourth Committee Advisory Committee, two sessions per year AC-Sub-committee meets more regularly
<b>Regional commissions</b>				
ECA		ECOSOC	54	ECOSOC holds annual half-day dialogue with Executive Secretaries of regional commissions at the start of Council's substantive session
ECE		ECOSOC	54	
ECLAC		ECOSOC	54	
ESCAP		ECOSOC	54	
ESCWA		ECOSOC	54	
<b>Secretariat departments</b>				
OCHA		General Assembly	192	GA committees review programme of work and budget
DESA		General Assembly/ECOSOC	192	

Annex 5: Regional group representation in governing bodies<sup>39</sup>

Regional grouping	Countries	UN membership	Governing bodies
<b>African Group</b>	54	28%	24%
<b>Asia-Pacific Group</b>	53	28%	23%
<b>Eastern European Group</b>	23	12%	11%
<b>Latin American and Caribbean Group</b>	33	17%	16%
<b>Western European and Other States</b>	29	15%	26%
<b>Total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

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<sup>39</sup> The number has since increased by one to 193 UN Member States.

Annex 5(b): Composition of governing bodies of entities engaged in operational activities by regional grouping (2013)<sup>40</sup>

Entity	Governing body & size	African Group	Asia-Pacific Group	Eastern European Group	Latin American and Caribbean Group	Western European and Other States Group
<b>Funds and programmes</b>						
UNDP UNFPA UNOPS	Executive Board (36)	8	7	4	5	12
UNICEF	Executive Board (36)	8	7	4	5	12
WFP	Executive Board (36)	8	7	4	5	12
UN-Women	Executive Board (41) (35 seats for Member States; 6 for contributing countries)	10	10	4	6	5
	Commission on Status of Women (45)	13	11	4	9	8
UNHCR <sup>41</sup>	Executive Committee (93 Member States and the Holy See) Standing Committee (10)	28	15	17	10	23
UNAIDS	Programme Coordination Board (38) (22 Member States; 11 UNAIDS Co-sponsors; 5 NGOs)	5	5	2	3	7
UNCTAD (Incl. ITC)	Trade and Development Board (194, universal membership) 3 Commissions 1 Working Party	54	53	23	33	29

<sup>40</sup> For the purpose of calculating the average share of each regional grouping of the membership of governing bodies, this table focuses only on governing bodies with limited membership (not those with universal membership).

<sup>41</sup> The membership in the Executive Committee of UNHCR has since increased to 98. UNCHR uses criteria for selecting members to the Executive Committee. It also uses only four regional groupings for election of rotational bureau members of the Executive Committee. However, for the purpose of this table, the members of the Executive Committee are organized around the five above groups.

Entity	Governing body & size	African Group	Asia-Pacific Group	Eastern European Group	Latin American and Caribbean Group	Western European and Other States Group
UNEP	UN Environmental Assembly (universal membership)	54	53	23	33	29
UN-Habitat	Governing Council (58)	16	13	6	10	13
UNODC	Commission on Narcotic Drugs (53) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (40)	11	11	6	10	14
		12	9	4	8	7
UNRWA	General Assembly (192) Advisory Committee (25)	54	53	23	33	29
Average share in % <sup>42</sup>		24.6	21.2	11.8	15.0	27.5
<b>Specialized agencies</b>						
FAO	Council (49)	13	14	3	9	10
IAEA	Board of Governors (35)	6	8	4	6	11
ICAO	Council (36) <sup>43</sup>	8	8	2	8	10
ILO	Governing Body (56) (28 Member States; 14 employers; 14 workers)	7	5	3	6	7
IMO	Council (40)	5	10	1	8	16
ITU	Council (46)	13	11	5	6	11
UNESCO <sup>44</sup>	Executive Board (58)	18	14	7	10	9
UNIDO	Programme and Budget Committee (27)	6	6	3	4	8
UPU	Council of Administration (41)	12	12	3	6	8

<sup>42</sup> The averages only take into account governing bodies with limited membership. For entities with more than one governing body, only the principle body has been taken into account. Shares are calculated relative to the seats of other regional groups, not to non-state members.

<sup>43</sup> The composition of the ICAO Governing Council is criteria-based: (a) states of chief importance to air transportation (11); states that make the largest contribution to the provision of international civil air navigation (12); states ensuring geographic representation (13).

<sup>44</sup> The current UNESCO Executive Board includes 6 Arab States as one of its regional groupings. Those six countries have been distributed in accordance with GA groupings.

Entity	Governing body & size	African Group	Asia-Pacific Group	Eastern European Group	Latin American and Caribbean Group	Western European and Other States Group
WIPO	Coordination Committee (83)	19	19	8	15	22
WHO <sup>45</sup>	Executive Board (34)	9	10	5	5	5
WMO	Executive Council (37)	8	9	2	7	11
UNWTO	Executive Council (37)	10	7	5	5	4
Average share in %		24.4	24.3	9.5	17.4	24.4

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<sup>45</sup> WHO uses the following regional groupings: Africa, the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South-East Asia and Western Pacific. For the purpose of Table 5b, the membership of the Executive Board of WHO has been re-arranged according to the five above regional groupings.

## Annex 6: WEOG representation in governing bodies and growth in contribution level

Entity	#Seats on governing body	#WEOG seats	WEOG % share	Average Annual growth in funding (2002-2012)		Average Annual growth in funding (2002-2007)		Average Annual growth in funding (2007-2012)	
				Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
<b>Funds and programmes</b>									
UNAIDS-PCB <sup>46</sup>	22	7	32%	3.9	-3.3	11.8	-1.7	-3.4	-5.0
UNICEF-EB	36	12	33%	1.0	9.4	1.9	13.6	0.2	5.4
UNDP-EB	36	12	33%	-1.9	1.3	3.2	2.8	-6.7	-0.2
UNFPA-EB	36	12	33%	1.5	13.7	3.7	12.9	-0.7	14.5
WFP-EB <sup>47</sup>	36	12	33%	-2.8	4.0	-13.0	2.2	8.7	5.7
UNEP-GC	58	13	22%	-5.4	-7.1	-11.3	-22.7	0.9	11.7
UN Habitat	58	13	22%	11.4	15.7	38.6	31.0	-10.4	2.2
UNCTAD-TDB	193	29	15%	-3.6	-2.2	-21.6	-1.4	18.6	-3.1
UNODC-CND48	53	14	26%	-3.0	20.1	-2.3	36.4	-3.6	8.4
UNODC-CPJ	40	7	17.5%						
UNHCR-EC	93	23	25%	5.0	6.1	0.0	1.6	10.1	10.7
<b>Specialized agencies</b>									
FAO-Council	49	10	20%	0.3	11.1	-3.8	21.2	4.5	1.9
ICAO-Council	36	10	28%	N/A	7.4	N/A	23.4	N/A	-6.5
IFAD	36	16	53%	12.9	6.3	12.8	32.0	13.1	-14.3
ILO	28	7	25%	0.2	4.5	-1.1	6.1	1.6	2.9
IMO-Council	40	16	40%	N/A	-2.4	N/A	-8.7	N/A	4.4
ITU-Council	46	11	24%	N/A	2.8	N/A	-17.6	-3.0	28.4
UNIDO-P&B	27	8	30%	-0.8	3.5	-1.6	2.7	-0.1	4.2
UNESCO	58	9	15.5%	7.4	0.9	14.6	2.2	0.5	-0.3
WHO-EB	34	5	15%	-2.9	7.4	-10.6	18.8	5.6	-2.8
WIPO-CC	83	22	26.5%	N/A	5.9	N/A	6.1	24.2	5.7
WMO-EC	37	11	30%	N/A	3.5	N/A	-25.8	6.6	44.3
UNWTO-EC	31	4	13%	N/A	1.0	N/A	-8.2	N/A	11.2

<sup>46</sup> The Programme Coordination Board of UNAIDS has 33 members: 22 Member States; 6 UN system co-sponsoring organizations; 5 NGO representatives. However, the WEOG share is calculated of government seats only.

<sup>47</sup> WFP doesn't receive core resources. It's most flexible contributions are 'multilateral contributions', which are, for the most part, restricted to programme activities. In some instances, limited amounts, with donor agreement, have been used for programme support activities.

<sup>48</sup> Contributions to UNODC in 2002 are not available. Instead 2003 data was used.

Annex 7: UN membership by income grouping

Regional grouping	Income grouping			
	Low-income	Middle-income		High-income
		Lower	Upper	
<b>African Group</b>	27	16	10	1
<b>Asia-Pacific Group</b>	8	19	15	11
<b>Eastern European Group</b>	0	4	10	9
<b>Latin American and Caribbean Group</b>	1	7	18	7
<b>Western European and Other States</b>		0	1	28
<b>Total</b>	36 (19%)	46 (24%)	54 (28%)	56 (29%)

(Based on World Bank classification of income groups).

Annex 8: Regional grouping share of UN membership and development operations

Regional grouping	UN membership in %	Share of UN development operations in %						
		Total	Low-income		Middle-income			
			Core	Non-core	Lower		Upper	
					Core	Non-core	Core	Non-core
<b>African Group</b>	28	49	75	66	27	40	15	14
<b>Asia-Pacific Group</b>	28	36	23	29	65	50	56	20
<b>Eastern European Group</b>	12	3	0	0	3	3	9	11
<b>Latin American and Caribbean Group</b>	17	12	2	5	5	7	21	55
<b>Western European and Other States</b>	15	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
for the year 2011								