Preparing for the 2014 Development Cooperation Forum
DCF GERMANY HIGH-LEVEL SYMPOSIUM

Accountable and effective development cooperation in a post-2015 era

Background Study 1
Quality of Development Cooperation: Accountability, Impact and Results

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prepared by UNDESA

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Executive Summary

Background and purpose of the study

The changing landscape of development cooperation and global development challenges implies a greater diversity of practices and policies to deliver sustainable development results. The effectiveness with which different actors provide assistance takes new shapes and forms.

Mutual accountability, as a principle framed in the early 2000s, gained increasing importance in reviewing progress on ODA effectiveness in recent years. Greater conceptual clarity on how greater accountability for development cooperation commitments – quantitative ODA commitments, and the full range of qualitative practices devised by different actors – can support the realization of a vision for an effective multi-layered accountability architecture for development cooperation in the post-2015 era.

Against this backdrop, this background paper:

a) identifies how different actors promote sustainable development results through effective development cooperation;

b) shows how mutual accountability for development cooperation, and efforts to strengthen transparency and capacity building, have contributed to the enhancement of effective ODA delivery;

c) assesses how different actors will strengthen their monitoring and accountability to support implementation of a unified and universal development agenda that addresses poverty eradication and sustainable development and applies to all countries.

The paper complements other background readings and serves to inform participants in particular for the first two sessions of the symposium.

Effectiveness of development cooperation

ODA effectiveness is a critical pillar of the development cooperation agenda today. It takes shape in tandem with continued calls for delivery on promises made on the quantity of ODA flows.

A large number of quality issues have been addressed and unpacked. They include:

a) effectiveness of the allocation and delivery of ODA flows: transparency in aid allocation (between sectors and countries); level of aid concessionali ty; alignment to country priorities; disbursement flexibility; delivery instruments responsive to country needs; providing aid on budget and ensuring parliamentary engagement; predictability; alignment to national frameworks; harmonization of disbursement; coordination; targeting to the poor; effective institutions.

b) country ownership of ODA use: existence of national development strategy; context specific approaches; policy and procedural conditionalities; untying of aid; enabling environment for civil society,
global funds, private sector and other stakeholders; deepening engagement with parliamentarians; gender equality and the empowerment of women.

c) **impact of ODA:** use of reliable country systems and avoid Parallel Implementation Units; measurement of results through country results frameworks; accountability as overarching framework for development results; harmonization of operational procedures and division of labour; joint donor missions and analysis; leveraging ODA for other financing for development; greater exchange and transparency of information on development cooperation;

Negotiations for the 2015 or 2016 review conference on financing for development will show which aspects of development cooperation effectiveness will be considered as common concerns of all UN Member States. It will provide an ideal entry point for a discussion on how ODA effectiveness can be featured in a post-2015 development agenda. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation can make an important contribution to this discussion.

The narrow “aid effectiveness” discussion, while still of great relevance to many recipient countries, is considered inadequate for some providers who have developed their own approaches to delivering effective assistance to the poor. Different non-DAC providers reiterate key aspects of the effectiveness with which they are trying to deliver their assistance:

a) **South-South development cooperation:** Southern partners follow a multi-dimensional approach that implies different forms of partnership that are based on: horizontality and equal distribution of benefits among equals; their voluntary nature; a focus on the demand by recipient countries; non-conditionality and flexibility; a long-term results orientation and cost-effectiveness; timely and speedy delivery; emphasis on projects; and the importance of providing disbursement information.

b) **Private sector:** There is great need for research on the effectiveness and development impact of businesses. Evidence from research on using aid as a catalyst concludes that the private sector engagement should be based on: the impact and identified outcomes; alignment; engaging donors; use aid only if no private sources are available; ensure a poverty focus and maximize the catalytic effect.

c) **Private philanthropic organizations:** While reliable information on their effectiveness is also scarce, foundations tend to be largely motivated by their social impact. They apply different instruments, partially derived from the corporate sector, and seem to concentrate on their ability to: respond quickly to demand; harness the advantages of their proximity to recipients and ability to engage local partners; and deliver with limited conditionalities. Yet, they may deliver off budget and use parallel systems,
increasing fragmentation and transaction costs. Their support can also be supply-driven and they may not be active in low-income countries.

d) Civil society organizations: As advocates and implementing partners, CSOs have committed to demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their international operations, and to transparent relationships with CSOs and other actors. Their ability to deliver effectively depends on an enabling environment for development as well as an effective process to monitor their voluntary commitments better. Their proximity, speed and flexibility of delivery make them unique partners. They are facing challenges as they are rarely engaged in national development planning, and have difficulties in aligning and harmonizing with others, delivering transparently and handling donors’ conditionalities or prerogatives for tying of aid monies channelled through them.

e) Local and regional governments: Development cooperation at local level, and through decentralized development cooperation – between LRGs –, is characterized by a strong sense of genuineness and shared responsibility for sustainability. LRGs focus on effective delivery of services and ownership and accountability for results. More evidence is needed on how they can address the challenges underpinning their effectiveness.

f) Multilateral organizations: The example of the United Nations system illustrates the challenges multilaterals are facing in strengthening the effectiveness of their operational activities for development. The UN is following up through the Quadriennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) to implement recommendations. The assessment of the quality of funding for operational activities shows the implications it has on the effectiveness with which services can be provided.

Progress in implementing mutual accountability

Progress on mutual accountability and transparency has generally been slow and patchy. However, where strong national MA and transparency processes have developed, supported in part by strong global processes, they have had a major impact on changing programme country and provider behaviour, and on improving the results achieved by development cooperation. It is therefore vital for the international community to accelerate its efforts to promote MA and transparency in order to advance development.

Mutual accountability (MA) is a framework to help analyse the practices of holding each other to account for promises made on ODA commitments, geared towards greater cost-effectiveness and freeing of funds for development operations. It is increasingly accepted as the conceptual framework to promote sustainable development results, through development cooperation, by instilling trust and learning, helping to balance the onus of monitoring and reporting to free up capacities in developing countries and by making better use of cost-effective modalities and predictable funding.
National and global MA mechanisms, supported by efforts to promote transparency of information on development cooperation, need to be more mutual (reciprocal by monitoring more closely providers); inclusive (more open to ensure full consultation of all actors); and evidence-based (based on information of different providers). With the shifting focus of the global development agenda, there is a lack of clarity on the type of commitments to be reviewed.

**National-level mutual accountability**

There is a multiplicity of forums at national level in most programme countries for dialogue with providers on issues related to development and the funding needs of the national development programme. The challenge is making these into effective MA mechanisms. Programme countries also often have multiple performance frameworks established by providers.

Analysis of the enablers of MA (national aid policies, frameworks with annual targets for individual provider, high-level dialogue structures, etc.), conducted in 2011, revealed that there has been some progress in strengthening them, and in analysing aspects of the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, in most countries this is confined to designing aid policies, with limited progress on assessing providers based on individually-monitored targets. Progress in formal MA processes varied and non-executive stakeholder engagement remained limited.

**National-level transparency**

Transparency varied sharply across different types of aid information, and different providers and in some key areas it remained weak. Major challenges in making information accessible were registered, even though some programme countries were making greater efforts at accessibility.

**International mutual accountability and transparency**

A number of persisting knowledge gaps continues to hinder the consolidation of the many global and regional mutual accountability mechanisms and initiatives. Regional initiatives are critical to exchange experiences and build capacity, including by non-executive stakeholders.

While the influence of the DCF has been growing by establishing best practices and identifying standards in the functioning of MA mechanisms to produce behaviour change, the Paris Declaration has been the most significant influence (in 2011).

**Impact of national level mutual accountability on behaviour change**

Strong mutual accountability mechanisms have had a major effect on programme government and provider behaviour and enhance development results. There is greater awareness of the factors most influencing change and evidence of such change at country level. *(A separate policy brief provides an update on the impact of global and regional MA mechanisms).*
Supporting implementation of the post-2015 development agenda

The move to a universal and unified development agenda will require an accountability architecture that is comprehensive, flexible with respect to specific mandates, yet robust, holding different actors to account according to their differing responsibilities.

Based on analysis conducted for the DCF, and stakeholder views, three next steps could help to ensure existing efforts for monitoring and accountability at all levels are addressing key priorities of Member States and other stakeholders:

a) Strengthen the current MA architecture for ODA effectiveness by making progress on setting up, or strengthening existing MA enablers to show the impact MA can have on stakeholder behaviour, and to overcome major challenges;

b) Invest in independent analysis of how MA as a concept can support the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda, including by reviewing existing efforts and positions by all actors and in support of progress on development cooperation commitments that may be captured in a renewed global partnership for development;

c) Jointly work towards an independent and regular global assessment of the effectiveness of development cooperation, taking into account aspects of importance to all actors, building on the vast range of respective strengths and addressing cost-saving opportunities for all partners and the “unfinished aid effectiveness business”.
1 Purpose and Rationale of the Background Paper

This background paper will document best practices by different actors to improve accountability and effectiveness of development cooperation; define what is meant by results; analyse progress in implementing MA; demonstrate the impact of strong MA on development cooperation results; and assess the way forward on MA as part of the post-2015 UN development agenda.

It will serve three main purposes:

Demonstrating that development cooperation is maximizing its impact on progress towards internationally agreed development goals (IADGs), including the MDGs and the future post-2015 goals, is and will continue to be a joint concern of all development actors. These global development goals provide the basis for MA; the paper will therefore, as a first priority, identify how different actors in development cooperation intend to achieve sustainable development results through effective development cooperation. The paper will also address, as a second priority, the question of how inclusive reviews of progress on development cooperation commitments, through national mutual accountability (MA) mechanisms, can impact behaviour of relevant actors towards more effective development cooperation.

The paper will, as a third priority, provide initial thinking and raise questions on how mutual accountability mechanisms will have to adapt to support a renewed global partnership for development to meet development goals and actions in a post-2015 era. Given its scope, the post-2015 development agenda will have major implications for development cooperation and requires robust global monitoring and accountability that builds on existing MA initiatives at local, national, regional and global levels, reflecting the growing diversity of actors and approaches of development cooperation.

Greater conceptual clarity on how MA needs to be advanced as a technical tool and overarching principle will be addressed at the DCF Germany High-level Symposium on accountable and effective development cooperation in the post-2015 era, for which this paper serves as background reading. It complements initial findings of the 3rd global mutual accountability survey (see background study 2); a paper on the global monitoring and accountability framework for development cooperation post-2015 (see background study 3); and a brief on regional and global accountability mechanisms (see policy brief).

As such, the paper will provide an overview of how accountability and effectiveness of development cooperation can be improved based on analysis; define what is meant by development results; analyse progress in implementing MA; demonstrate the impact of strong MA on development cooperation results;
and begin to assess the way forward on MA as part of the post-2015 UN development agenda.

In response to the increased call by United Nations Member States and other stakeholders for improved MA of development cooperation, the paper contributes to ongoing analytical work and policy debate at the ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) on this issue. This work is led by UNDESA to support the DCF-led policy debate on development cooperation in the post-2015 context. Mandated to act as UN focal point for the review of trends in international development cooperation, the DCF serves as authoritative source of information on mutual accountability trends at all levels and as an independent and inclusive global platform to review progress on development cooperation commitments. The 2014 DCF is expected to make a tangible contribution to the elaboration of a renewed global partnership for development and continue to serve as vibrant and inclusive space for deliberations on international development cooperation in future.

2 EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: WHAT DO DIFFERENT ACTORS MEAN?

The landscape of international development cooperation is changing, diversifying its sources, with increased importance and scope of South-South cooperation, more development-related activities by international philanthropy and local and regional governments, greater expectations vis-à-vis the private sector and the call for clarity on the impact of blended sources of financing. At the same time, development solutions are being provided through more networks of actors, through a diverse set of relationships of providers with governments and other stakeholders in developing countries, such as parliaments, civil society and local and regional governments, including public-private partnerships.

As discussions on development goals for the post-2015 era are underway, there is a strong logic for a better understanding of what effectiveness of development cooperation means for all the key actors.1 At the same time, a continued emphasis on existing quantity and quality commitments on ODA, and other sources of development finance, need to be upheld or sharpened.

This section will: (i) provide an overview of how effectiveness of development cooperation is conceived by different actors and the lessons they have learned; (ii) how the effectiveness of their assistance is addressed in policy debates in different contexts; and (iii) where further research is needed to support greater division of labour and cooperation among different stakeholders.

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1 A background study for the 2008 DCF (ECOSOC 2008: “Towards a strengthened framework for aid effectiveness”, p. 2, here) already raised this point.
2.1 ODA effectiveness and beyond: a short history

The inter-governmentally negotiated United Nations Monterrey Consensus concluded in 2002 that the effectiveness and poverty reduction impact of ODA is critical and depends on effective partnerships among donors and recipients, based on the recognition of national leadership and ownership of development plans and, within that framework sound policies and good governance at all levels. It explicitly agrees on a way forward on the following aspects of ODA effectiveness: harmonization of operational procedures; flexibility of ODA disbursement; untying aid; use of delivery instruments that are responsive to country needs; predictability; alignment to country-owned development frameworks and poverty reduction strategies; national ownership of technical assistance programmes; leveraging ODA for other financing for development; triangular cooperation; ODA targeting to the poor; coordination of aid; and measurement of results

In follow up to Monterrey, the United Nations has actively addressed selected aspects of the effective use of ODA in the context of the Financing for Development follow-up process, as well as through ECOSOC’s Development Cooperation Forum. A major emphasis in both processes was to encourage providers to abide by commonly agreed commitments (notably on aid volumes) and principles applicable to all actors in development cooperation, albeit without a structured technical review process, similar to the one developed by the OECD-DAC and the post-Busan process.

Since 2008, the ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum has explored trends in the quantity, quality and effectiveness of development cooperation – in addition to other development trends – and encouraged inclusive debate on an enlarged and strengthened framework for “aid quality” with programme country priorities (with “aid quality” being more broadly defined than “aid effectiveness” and including the full range of issues actors in development cooperation wish to include in this category, such as the ones mentioned above). These included: meeting aid commitments and ensuring balanced and transparent aid allocation between countries and sectors; policy and procedural conditionalities; accountability as overarching framework for development results; greater exchange of information among Southern partners in development cooperation, and providing an enabling environment for development-related activities by civil society, global funds, private sector and other actors in development cooperation, among others.

2 Monterrey Consensus, paragraph 40.
3 Monterrey Consensus, paragraph 43.
4 See background study for 2008 DCF here.
5 See Summaries of the President of ECOSOC, e.g. 2008 here.
Monterrey also served as the substantive framework for the successful unfolding of a well-structured “aid effectiveness” agenda. From 2003 to 2012 the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) pursued an effort to build a greater international consensus on the better use of aid resources for more inclusive development. The WP-EFF, hosted by the OECD-DAC, supported four high level fora on aid effectiveness and conducted the monitoring of a set of 12 indicators (the Paris Declaration commitments) agreed by DAC donors and participating recipient countries. The Paris High-level Forum was not a UN event and the Declaration has no formal international status.

The process encountered three main caveats: a) progress on “aid effectiveness” is limited; b) engagement on aid effectiveness is waning, or at least shifting due to broader global challenges; and c) not all actors in development cooperation subscribe to principles agreed in the process.

The evaluation of the monitoring framework and the impact of the process has shown that DAC donors demonstrated less commitment than partner countries to making the necessary changes in their own systems. While progress is varied, only one indicator has been met in 2011, performance has barely improved since 2005 in a number of areas and some indicators have been criticized for being too simplistic. Driven by concerns of limited impact of “aid effectiveness” on results and growing transaction costs, the Fourth and last High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 broadened the scope to “development effectiveness”.

Participating governments have signalled support to the “Busan partnership” document through a small group of Sherpas and it was assumed that all delegations lend their support for the outcomes set out in the partnership document. The so-called “Post-Busan Interim Group” subsequently led a process to reach agreement on the working arrangements of the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in 2012, supported

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6 The twelve indicators are: Existence of a national development strategy (recipients); reliable public financial management systems (recipients); reliable procurement systems (recipients); alignment of aid flows on national priorities (donors); capacity through coordinated support (donors); use of country systems (donors); avoiding parallel implementation units (donors); predictability (donors); use of common arrangements/procedures (donors); joint missions (donors); joint country analytical work (donors); results-oriented frameworks (recipients); mutual accountability (set out for recipients).


8 The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2 - Final Report. One interesting observation is that Indicator 12, on mutual accountability, assessed the existence of “mutual assessment reviews” in developing countries without reference to corresponding systems on the side of DAC donors.

9 The outcome document did not take the form of a binding agreement or international treaty. It is not signed, and does not give rise to legal obligations. Rather, it is a statement of consensus that a wide range of governments and organizations have expressed their support for, offering a framework for continued dialogue and efforts to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation. (see: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49732200.pdf).
by a Steering Committee led by three co-chairs. Main emphasis of the process was on country level implementation and a global light structure.

Initial findings of the first (voluntary) global monitoring report on Busan commitments (forthcoming, March 2014) suggest that approximately one third of country programmable aid has been reviewed against ten indicators, and targets for 2015, and that progress on most indicators is limited or mixed. The indicators, agreed by the Post-Busan interim group\(^{10}\), are: country results frameworks; enabling environment for civil society; engagement of the private sector; transparency of information on development cooperation; predictability; aid on budget and parliamentary scrutiny; mutual accountability; gender equality and the empowerment of women; effective institutions and untiring aid.

It is encouraging to see that key areas of concern of recipient countries, including untiring and predictability, have been included in this important effort. However, many of the priorities identified in the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda for Action and other aid effectiveness issues of concern to developing countries, such as policy conditionality, allocation, concessionality and flexibility or responsiveness of development cooperation, as well as country-led division of labour have not been included.\(^{11}\)

The United Nations Doha Review Conference on Financing for Development in 2008 welcomed the efforts of the DCF – and those of the “aid effectiveness” process and the countries which have committed to it – to improve the quality of ODA and to increase its development impact. It reiterated the importance of broad-based participation; national ownership and leadership; and – with regard to the quality of development cooperation – programme based approaches, use of country systems, reduced transaction costs, improved mutual accountability and transparency, untiring of aid, predictability, deepening engagement with parliamentarians and civil society, and a context-specific approach. The “Doha Declaration” also emphasizes implications of a changing development landscape and the interplay of development assistance with other flows. It called for advanced dialogue and cooperation among the increasingly diverse community of development partners to ensure maximum effectiveness.

Negotiations for the 2015 or 2016 review conference on financing for development will show which aspects of development cooperation effectiveness will be considered as common concerns and where a nuanced approach will need to be taken as regards the responsibilities and capabilities of different

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\(^{10}\) The “PBIG” worked under the chairmanship of the WP-EFF to finalize proposals on the working arrangements of the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. See here for composition of the group (23 members, of which 6 LDCs and 2 CSOs) and its TORs and here for more details on the proposal of indicators.

**\(^{11}\)** For more information why some of them are of great relevance, please refer to ECOSOC 2008, pp. 4 ff.
actors. Depending on its timing, this may provide an ideal entry point for a discussion on how ODA effectiveness can be featured in a post-2015 development agenda. An independent and systematic survey of the criteria for ODA effectiveness that all ODA recipient countries and their providers are keen to see regularly reviewed would be useful to inform this debate.

While the messages from the “aid effectiveness” and “development effectiveness” processes to follow through on commitments to change policies and practices and the emphasis on results orientation in public sector management are increasingly agreed by different actors, the respective contributions and alignment to “aid effectiveness” principles are considered narrow and inadequate for some actors who have developed their own approaches to delivering effective assistance to the poor. The next sub-sections attempt to produce clarity on which aspects of effectiveness are of relevance to stakeholders beyond DAC donors and their recipients. They emanate from the discussions held at the DCF and its preparatory meetings, especially in the 2012 to 2014 DCF cycle.

2.2 South-South development cooperation

While DAC donors have a common definition of ODA for statistical purposes, based on concessionality and the primary development purpose of flows, Southern partners have no such broadly accepted definition, or a shared set of definitions, about how they delineate South-South cooperation (SSC) from purely commercial, market-driven transactions. This can partially be explained by development cooperation principles that blend commercial and development goals under which many Southern partners operate. DAC categories (ODA, other official flows etc.) are unable to accurately capture this alternative model of development cooperation. The outcome document of the UN Conference on South-South cooperation held in 2009 in Nairobi states that South-South cooperation takes different and evolving forms, including, inter alia, the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions.

South-South cooperation – and triangular cooperation – is a rich collection of a variety of approaches and modalities. Southern partners share some common aspirations and characteristics, which are conducive to effective development cooperation. These include, among others:

- **Diversity**: Southern partners are different in terms of size, scale and modalities of their cooperation. This enables a multi-dimensional approach and implies different forms of partnerships ranging from knowledge exchange to trade and investment with an emphasis on mutual benefits.
- **Horizontality and equal distribution of benefits**: South-South cooperation is a voluntary process and a mutually agreed relationship among equals, instead of a donor-recipient engagement where knowledge and wisdom is transferred downward. It offers opportunities to collaborate
with each other on an equal footing. Benefits must be implemented in a way that they are distributed fairly among all participants.

- **Emphasis on demand**: Southern partners have had a relatively balanced focus on all sectors, in response to the expressed needs of beneficiary countries. Southern countries are more alike in terms of challenges, capacity and stages of development, and therefore more likely to provide relevant policy and technical solutions;

- **Non Conditionality and flexibility**: South-South cooperation establishes no economic or political conditions and respects the development strategy of each country involved according to its history, culture and political establishments and vision. The focus on mutual learning and exchange on good practices without promoting a certain model of development and imposing a set of policy recommendations has been particularly appreciated by developing countries. Partners also value SSC for its flexibility to fund changing priorities in their own national development programmes.

- **Long-term results orientation and cost effectiveness**: South-South cooperation cultivates the capacity for longer-term sustained development and yielded very visible development results in response to concrete development needs, enhancing mutual benefits and promoting win-win outcomes and complementarities. It is also seen by many as a cost-effective modality as a result of less expensive financing, lower labour costs, higher productivity and cheaper procurement of materials.

- **Timely and speedy delivery**: There is evidence that 80% of SSC is disbursed on schedule with many Southern partners are willing to sign multi-year agreements.

With regard to triangular cooperation, Southern implementing countries have expertise which is more relevant or appropriate to the beneficiary country’s needs. With the third-party support, the credibility and potential for the scaling up of cooperation extended by pivotal countries is perceived to be one of the most important benefits.

While the OECD-DAC initiated process on aid effectiveness has emphasized the value of program and budget support, there seems to be a clear preference of Southern partners towards projects in South-South cooperation. Little is known about the extent to which project funding by Southern partners is integrated into public budgets at the recipient side to allow for parliamentary oversight and public transparency (alignment).

It is not known to which extent Southern partners include non-state actors in the design and implementation of SSC. Variations are assumed in how individual countries deal with this aspect, which could be worth exploring further. Documenting such information and making it accessible to all stakeholders would allow for the identification of good practices and mutual learning.
Little information is publicly available on the strategic objectives and sectoral priorities of SSC from the side of the providers. There is growing recognition of the need to better measure and evaluate South-South cooperation to improve cooperation among countries involved and have better knowledge of the needed institutional design, management and planning for effective south-south cooperation. Measuring South-South cooperation and quantification in monetary terms may not be adequate to fully serve this purpose and more analysis is needed on scope, tools and instruments that suit the development cooperation among Southern partners.

To ensure that the advantages of their cooperation are maximised, Southern partners are already improving disbursement data and results evaluation, often as part of a process of creating and reinforcing their national development cooperation agencies. They are also beginning to develop their own key indicators, to demonstrate their respective strengths and lessons to partners, their own citizens and the international community.

A dialogue has started, under the aegis of the ECOSOC DCF, among Southern partners and Southern based academics/think tanks to initiate work towards shared principles of SSC and better understanding of its policy, practices and impact, with a view to further improving the quality of their development cooperation through peer learning.

2.3 Private sector engagement in development cooperation: a big unknown

There is broad consensus that a flourishing private sector contributes directly to development as it increases productivity and job creation and delivers services, including through public-private partnerships. As the Millennium Project notes, companies can also support the MDGs more broadly, by contributing to MDG-based policy design, by advocating publicly for the Goals, and by pursuing various models of corporate philanthropy (see next section for philanthropy), engaging them “as reliable and consistent partners in the development process.” The United Nations Global Compact has come a long way in supporting the private sector engagement in development and calls on companies to conduct business in a responsible manner that is aligned with fundamental environmental and social values. Yet, it remains clear that there is no commonly accepted conceptual framework available to assess and interpret the contribution and potential of the private sector to the post-2015 development agenda.

The DCF Switzerland High-level Symposium (October 2013) concluded that incentives for the private sector to engage in global policy debate on development and customized partnerships will be critical to the implementation

of a post-2015 development agenda. Such efforts come on the heels of large and growing investment needs associated with sustainable development.

Private sector financing for funding progress to the MDGs has indeed increased rapidly in recent years, and to some extent overshadowed public resources. Yet, there is limited authoritative research available on best practices and effectiveness principles the private sector uses in the context of its development cooperation. There is, however, anecdotal evidence that some companies have gone beyond Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to include development objectives in their core business strategies.

Concerns about using public aid as a catalyst for development finance remain, and need to be addressed by authoritative research on the development impact of such activities. A study in preparation for the DCF High-level Symposium in Switzerland clearly showed that donors’ support to private activities, through equity investment, public private partnerships or grants and loans to financial and business services, constituted a share of 10 per cent of total ODA. It concluded that the official reporting system of ODA is not fit to report on the public aid supporting, complementing and catalysing private investment – an area where private sector behaviour towards more development-related activities could be incentivized. This would also need to be linked to the existing commitments related to untying of aid to ensure national companies are being procured to support the implementation of national development strategies.

The study also provides the following conclusions that can guide governments in their engagement with the private sector:

- **Development impact**: Focus on achieving identified outcomes and building on specific evidence to positively influence the design of development strategies on a larger scale;
- **Alignment**: Ensure donors align private sector development programmes to national development strategies and include clear guidelines for international donors;
- **Engagement**: Ensure donors support adoption of such programmes by national authorities;
- **Additionality**: Only detract public aid if no private resources are available;
- **Pro-poor**: Leveraging other resources with aid must not reduce its poverty focus;
- **Maximize catalytic effects**: e.g. by removing constraints for business development and demonstrating investment impact.

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13 Olivie, I. and A. Perez (2013), Public Aid as Driver for Private Investment, for the DCF Switzerland Symposium, [here](#), p. 46.
This demonstrates that private sector engagement in development cooperation has the highest need for systematic research on effectiveness and development impact. It should particularly assess how public aid can trigger the sorts of investments that would have the greatest impact on development. Such knowledge entails going beyond business-environment policies, to a more targeted approach to private sector development. The next sub-section, focusing on philanthropic organizations, may also contain some lessons and entry points for the private sector to further improve its direct contribution to the development impact of its activities.

2.4 Effective philanthropic engagement in development cooperation

Private philanthropic organizations have increased in size and impact in recent years. It is hard to assess their contribution to development due to a lack of reliable information and data on the “how” of their development practices. The amount of evidence-based analysis or publicly available information on the volume, type and quality of assistance provided by philanthropic organizations also remains limited. Authoritative assessments on these issues, including by think tanks and networks, would help to better define the roles of philanthropic organizations.

A commonly discussed advantage of philanthropic organizations is their focus on innovation, driven by financial independence and the ability to take risks. Increasingly motivated by a focus on results and social impact, philanthropic organizations continue to be willing to invest in projects using new approaches and technologies, and support scientific research. Some philanthropic organizations have also experimented with providing seed money to leverage additional financing from other sources, for example, to encourage donors to assume responsibility in the long-term for projects supported by philanthropic organizations. Many apply principles and methods from the corporate sector (“venture philanthropy”), driven by the belief that under-utilized philanthropic capital could be made available for development. A broad range of instruments, including loans, credit enhancements, equity investments, and social bonds are being deployed, copying techniques from venture capital finance to reach under-served markets with great willingness to experiment. In addition to “impact investments”, so-called “crowd funding” by individuals to ventures that blend return and purpose is also growing.

Because they function outside official government channels and have been able to take greater risks than traditional donors, philanthropic organizations can sometimes respond more quickly to emergencies and urgent demand. Moreover, they can be less susceptible to misappropriation, as they deliver directly to civil society organizations and their aid is usually free from policy conditionalities. They often tailor support to beneficiaries and engage local and sub-national partners, in a “bottom up” approach that supports local decision-making and priority setting. Such a partnership approach also
contributes to the sustainability of interventions, often with a well-defined exit strategy in place.

Yet, being “off budget” may also mean that their funding may use systems parallel to those of governments. This may increase fragmentation and transaction costs. Their support can also be supply-driven and not fully aligned with national development strategies. Lastly, the majority of philanthropic organizations in development cooperation are not active in low-income countries, especially those emerging from conflict, where a low return on investment keeps risk-averse actors from engaging.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that many philanthropic organizations tend to work independently from other donors and do not frequently engage in joint programming. The participation of large philanthropic organizations in multi-stakeholder dialogue and coordination structures at country level seems to be welcomed, even though it has also been said that integrating philanthropic organizations in such structures may compromise their flexibility. At global level, large international philanthropic organizations have made strides in accounting for their activities. Yet, as a recent policy dialogue for the 2014 DCF has shown, it is important to make their engagement in global policy dialogue on shaping a post-2015 development agenda more attractive and strategically relevant, harnessing their innovative experiences and with a stronger focus on accountability, transparency and data sharing. This will depend on adequate global fora with tailored agendas that allow for issues-based discussions that can help create and improve sustainable, functional partnerships that enhance the impact of the efforts of foundations on the ground.

2.5 Civil society organizations: advocates and implementing partners

Civil society organizations (CSOs) have an increasingly important role to play in their dual function as advocates for greater policy space and an enabling environment for development, and as implementing partners bridging efforts by providers and citizens. As advocates, CSOs are not only calling for space and resources for their engagement in development planning at national level, they also author high-quality and independent reviews of donor performance on aid commitments and campaign for their engagement in the design and monitoring of progress of the global development agenda, post-2015.

Extensive thematic consultations on various aspects of the global agenda, including the SDGs, under the auspices of the United Nations Development Group include civil society organizations. Their positions include strong calls for

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14 The role of philanthropic organizations in the post-2015 setting (April 2013), in preparation for the 2014 DCF, see here.
democratic and multi-stakeholder mechanisms to ensure development cooperation commitments are being met.

The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness has supported an extensive consultation among CSOs on their role in development. The Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness reiterate the effectiveness of CSOs around their key strengths, including advocating for human rights and gender equality; democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives; and promoting environmental sustainability.

The Istanbul principles outline that CSOs are only effective as development actors when they “demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations” (para 5) and “commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship” (para 6). The principles clearly call for full accountability over CSO’s own development practices and emphasis on sustainable development results.

The implementation of this CSO compact depends on a common understanding of agreed principles and what needs to be in place – internally and in terms of the enabling environment – to make progress, as well as an effective process to monitor these voluntary commitments. It would be useful to conduct structured independent analysis of CSOs operational effectiveness as implementing agents and discuss tracking progress against agreed commitments through a fully consultative and independent CSO global monitoring process that complements and builds on existing efforts. Any such review should build on specific CSO strengths, such as the proximity to citizens, speed and flexibility of delivery, and assess challenges, such as limited engagement in national development planning, alignment and harmonization with other non-state actors, transparent delivery, handling of donors’ conditionalities or prerogatives for tying of aid monies channelled through CSOs, etc.

2.6 Local and regional governments: a critical dimension for post-2015

Local governments, regions, provinces, districts, cities and other local entities and their associations also play an increasingly important role in dealing with developmental challenges. Development cooperation among these actors has been an important modality of international cooperation for many decades. Several factors have led to a marked increase of activities and greater

15 One example is the INGO Accountability Charter which, among others, attempts to assess and improve CSO operational and programme effectiveness, for example to avoid duplication of efforts, ensure strong M&E mechanisms in place, hire and procuring locally, engage target groups, and ensure budget transparency.
involvement of local authorities in the planning and delivery of development assistance more recently: rapid urbanization; emergence of more decentralized forms of governance; and positive experiences of local and regional actors as key partners in international development cooperation.

A draft study prepared for the DCF by UNDESA (forthcoming) finds that their proximity to citizens and a strong sense of shared responsibility for sustainable development in an interrelated global economy, make local and regional governments (LRGs) champions of genuine partnerships that engage equals around a common, substantive agenda and with all parties cooperating to ensure a positive development impact on the side of the provider and the recipient. It notes that such cooperation, decentralized development cooperation (DDC), has gone through a remarkable transformation from a vertical model based on a donor-recipient logic to a much more structured, horizontal and multi-purpose and -stakeholder type of cooperation, that works through bi- and multilateral relationships between LRGs, LRG associations, or networks of LRGs, their associations and multilateral actors.

The study indicates that DDC has clearly shown the ability to facilitate cost-effective and targeted delivery of services to communities, directly responding to the challenges that affect the lives of citizens. It effectively promotes ownership and accountability for results and transparency vis-à-vis taxpayers and donors at the most subsidiary level, though monitoring systems are home grown and still in their infancy. More research is needed to assess what enables effective performance assessment at local level.

DDC has an intrinsic capacity to engage different actors – including civil society, private sector, academia and cultural institutions – at community level. It also serves as an important source of resources and significant expertise, know-how and knowledge for local and regional actors with similar challenges, through North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation and other forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships. Finally, it also complements activities of national governments by adapting policy-making to the local level in an inimitable way.

DDC is also facing specific challenges, only partially similar to those faced by national governments. The absence of a consensus on the definition of DDC, with CSOs sometimes being counted as decentralized actors, makes it hard to measure and collect DDC information. The total share of ODA destined to local governments remains small. While there is growing interest to quantify DDC, it is unclear whether there is a danger of double counting. In an effort to assess trends and to recognize the role of LRGs, independent surveys of the scale and impact of DDC would be a useful complement to existing anecdotal evidence. While existing modalities for disbursement and absorption of financial contributions channelled through DDC differ widely.
While LRGs’ efforts to be more strategically oriented and to respond to real needs are increasing, there is a perceived lack of coordination with other actors, with sufficient attention to scaling up, impact and results. There are indications that LRGs are opting out from programmes or projects if a duplication of efforts is detected. Evidence of their capacity to align to partner strategies and development needs is patchy. Some initiatives also lack capacities to support: adequate project management and technical skills; and effective monitoring and evaluation systems of progress on development cooperation and effectiveness principles. Strong political leadership and institutional commitment to effective development cooperation are therefore increasingly critical at local government level.

2.7 Development effectiveness of multilaterals: The case of the UN system

With the development landscape changing and the shift of the majority of the world’s poor to middle income countries, conventional thinking about development and the role of the UN post-2015 will undoubtedly change. Multilateral organizations, including some UN funds and programmes, and specialized agencies, have made great strides to advance their operational effectiveness, including by reporting on “aid effectiveness” principles set out by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This section will focus on efforts and challenges the UN system is facing to strengthen the effectiveness of its operational activities for development.

With US$ 24b in operational activities for development, the United Nations remains the largest multilateral partner in development cooperation. With the UN Quadriennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR), adopted in 2012, the organization has its own process to assess the effectiveness and impact of UN operational activities for development. The QCPR is supported by a monitoring and reporting framework, developed through a system-wide consultative process. By late 2013, 14 of 22 UN entities have aligned their strategic planning cycle with the QCPR. The effective follow up to the QCPR needs to be situated in the context of the evolving post-2015 development agenda and the global challenges it is expected to address.

The effort for greater development effectiveness is driven by a broad recognition of a need for more simplified and strategic planning and results-oriented frameworks for country level programming. The UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) are critical instruments to reflect the value added and comparative advantages of individual UN entities as part of a coherent UN development system and to simplify and harmonize agency-specific programming instruments. A number of new strategic plans already include clearer and more robust results frameworks with complete results chains and indicators.

Efforts to strengthen the System of Resident Coordinators (RC) include the adoption of a centralized funding modality. The System has also advanced in
implementing the **Management and Accountability system**, including the “functional firewall” for the RC system (with clear accountability lines for all, and managed by one entity). A number of other far-reaching and time bound reforms to **simplify and harmonize UN business practices** is also on its way. UN agencies have also stepped up their efforts to **mainstream South-South and triangular cooperation** and to provide more integrated support combining both relief and development assistance in a coherent manner in countries that are in transition or emerging from crisis. A UN system-wide **action plan for gender equality** is being implemented.

An assessment of the **quality of funding for UN operational activities** shows the implications it has on the effectiveness with which services can be provided. For example, the large share of **non-core contributions**, which are mostly earmarked and thus restricted in their use and application, can lead to **risks of fragmentation**, competition and overlap among entities. It makes it difficult to deliver on multilateral mandates, to provide continued programmatic **leadership** and to ensure the United Nations development system’s **independence, neutrality and role as a trusted partner** in a rapidly changing development cooperation landscape. This trend is aggravated by the stagnation of overall funding for operational activities for development.

While the funding base for development-related operational activities has broadened in recent years, the **predictability, reliability and stability** of funding is decreasing and funding from individual sources fluctuate considerably. This is more pronounced in non-core contributions, which are predominantly **project or programme** specific and supported by single donors. In an effort to promote aid effectiveness and to **counterbalance high fragmentation as a result of the predominantly single-donor and single-programme and project specific nature of non-core resource flows**, two forms of pooled resources have been established: **thematic trust funds**, which are specific to and administered by an individual entity, and **multi-donor trust funds** (MDTFs) which are administered by the dedicated fund administration services of the UNDP Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) on behalf of the UN development system. **One UN Funds** have been established to support the Delivering as One pilot initiatives by providing principally un-earmarked resources to cover funding gaps in One UN programmes. Efforts are under way to promote the greater use and management of **joint programming** and funding mechanisms in order to improve the quality of non-core resources.

Building on these experiences, the next two sections will explore how selected mutual accountability mechanisms for development cooperation commitments have strengthened in recent years to change behaviour of different actors, and how such mechanisms may have to evolve in the near future to be able to support the review of progress by all the stakeholders assessed above in implementing development cooperation commitments that will be enshrined in the post-2015 development agenda.
4 Progress in Implementing Mutual Accountability for Development Cooperation: Achieving Commitments and results

4.1 Mutual accountability of qualitative development: definition, history, purpose

One principle increasingly shared by all actors in development cooperation is mutual accountability (MA) for the results of their cooperation. However, actors do not necessarily share a common vision of the results they would like to see or how their inputs translate into desired development outcomes. In a context of stagnant or declining ODA flows and volatility of other development-related flows, and of increasing scrutiny over spending on development cooperation when other budgets are being cut, some providers have increasingly come to emphasize value for money. This can sometimes mean maximizing quantifiable short-term development outcomes which can be ascribed to their cooperation, and which are popular with their own domestic stakeholders. The discussion has focused on how to improve the way development cooperation resources are managed and delivered to maximize long-term sustainable development outcomes. This is referred to as improving the quality of development cooperation.

As a result, targets set by global and national MA mechanisms have revolved around such quality issues as outlined under chapter 3, ranging from predictability of flows, transparency, speed of delivery, reducing conditionality and enhancing capacity-building. Their main objective is to promote the delivery on specific commitments related to these aspects, based on the recognition of national leadership that ensures effectiveness and poverty reduction impact.16

There is broad consensus that strong MA can improve the quality and impact of development cooperation by bringing all partners together on an equal footing to instil trust and learning; by helping to balance the onus of monitoring and reporting to free up capacities in developing countries; and by making better use of cost-effective modalities and predictable funding with limited conditionalities.

Accountability and transparency have long been at the heart of outcomes of United Nations summits and conferences, as key ways to maximise the results of international development cooperation17.

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16 The Monterrey Consensus in 2002 first established mutual accountability as a truly global commitment to enhance the effectiveness of international development cooperation.
Through the extensive “aid effectiveness” process, MA has been tailored to support traditional donor-recipient relationships, defined as accountability between providers and recipients of development cooperation, through a process where they agree to be held responsible for development cooperation commitments made to each other. At global, regional and national level this has meant establishing structures and processes to ensure that accountability is more:

a) “mutual”, i.e. reciprocal by monitoring more closely how providers deliver cooperation to achieve results more effectively, and thereby giving developing countries more leadership of the partnership.

b) “inclusive”, i.e. more open to ensure the full range of development cooperation actors are adequately consulted, including at parliamentarians in their role as oversight bodies, civil society as advocates for government accountability and implementers of development cooperation, local and regional governments, as well as other stakeholders increasingly active in development cooperation.

c) “evidence based”, i.e. more based on information of different providers on their activities, reflecting their diversity and shaped by their respective understanding of principles of engagement and what they are being held accountable for.

MA describes a framework to help analyse the practices of holding each other to account for promises made. The actual commitments can differ by context. For example, review of MA on “aid effectiveness” commitments does not cover quantitative ODA commitments. Rather, it captures sets of quality commitments that can include (as outlined in 3.1.), for example, on the traditional donor side, using recipient country systems; aligning aid to national priorities; better coordination of support; avoiding parallel implementation units; promoting joint missions and analysis etc., and for recipients, the strengthening of reliable country systems and the use of results-oriented frameworks.

17The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002 committed signatories to “global and national economic systems based on….accountability, transparency and inclusion” and called on donors and recipients to build development partnerships that “maximize the poverty reduction impact of ODA.” The Doha follow-up conference in 2008 encouraged all stakeholders to “improve mutual accountability and transparency”. Equally, partners in South-South cooperation acknowledged in Nairobi in 2009 the need to “enhance the development effectiveness of South-South cooperation by continuing to increase its mutual accountability and transparency.” The MDG Summit in 2010 reiterated the importance of “greater transparency and accountability in international development cooperation, in both donor and developing countries, focusing on adequate and predictable financial resources as well as their improved quality and targeting.” Most recently the Rio+20 summit welcomed efforts to improve the quality and impact of ODA and stressed the “importance of improved transparency and accountability” in development cooperation.

18For a much more detailed discussion of definitions of mutual accountability, see the 2010 International Development cooperation report, pages 29-31.
MA for “aid effectiveness” is geared towards greater cost-effectiveness and freeing of funds for development operations. There are considerable cost-saving opportunities associated with reforms in aid management, as follows:

- Technical assistance which does not build capacity because it is not part of coordinated government-led capacity-building programmes often means that the same sums need to be spent repeatedly. It is also often tied and therefore overpriced, with insufficient use of (usually much cheaper) local or South-South skills. Action Aid 2011 estimates that this reduces its value by more than 60%.
- Parallel project units, and public financial management or procurement systems, are estimated to add 10-20% to the cost of projects (Action Aid 2011);
- Unpredictability/volatility of aid reduces its value by 13-17% (Kharas 2008);
- Tying increases project costs by 15-40%. Action Aid finds that costs of projects can fall by as much as 40% when aid is untied, and 60% when local procurement is allowed.
- Programme-based approaches can save massively on the time of provider and programme country officials (European Commission 2009 estimates this to be 3-6% of aid), as well as all the costs mentioned above of parallel project units and systems. In addition, there is a wealth of evidence showing that budget support provides greater efficiency and value for money, and stronger results (UKAN 2011).
- Coordinated missions and analysis can free 5% or more of a project budget if they reduce the number of participants or consultants.

In addition, greater focus on effectiveness of development cooperation can have two other key impacts on improving results:

- Increasing speed of delivery has allowed projects to begin producing returns earlier, increasing their value for money by 15-20% per year of acceleration (Action Aid 2011). A study for the UN DCF (2008) has indicated that rapid implementation is a particular strength of many major Southern partners.
- Implementation of the International Aid Transparency Initiative by all DAC donors could increase the value of aid by 2.3% (AidInfo 2009).

The shift from “aid effectiveness” to “development effectiveness” has led to a marked change of the criteria that are assessed by the Busan follow-up process, with only a small number of cost saving opportunities covered. Other regional and global mechanisms focus on different aspects, with no structured approach or effective monitoring process to review the “unfinished aid effectiveness business”. In the absence of a globally negotiated agreement on effectiveness criteria that apply across the board, or to different stakeholder groups in a more nuanced fashion, this has led to some lack of clarity on the
type of commitments to be reviewed and the linkages between national, regional and global mechanisms (more on this in the concluding chapter of this paper).

At the same time, the shifting focus of the global development agenda will place an even greater premium on how MA will need to be designed to review progress on development cooperation commitments that may be captured in the renewed global partnership for development. The increased recognition of MA as a critical underlying principle to maximise the results of international development cooperation has paved the ground for a systematic reflection on how MA can serve to advance this debate in a post-2015 era. It could, for example, address how global challenges with development impact and sources and modalities of development financing from different state and non-state actors can be reflected, or how results frameworks can become a more integral part of MA.

4.2 Progress on national-level Mutual Accountability mechanisms

This section summarizes key findings of the analysis of national-level MA mechanisms, based on two surveys (2009 and 2011) and a status update (2012, see Annex 1). It addresses challenges to strengthen national mutual accountability to monitor progress and hold actors effectively answerable to their commitments.

There is a multiplicity of forums at national level in most programme countries for dialogue with providers on issues related to development and the funding needs of the national development programme. The challenge is making these into effective MA mechanisms. In addition, programme countries often have multiple performance frameworks established by providers. Analysis has shown that large numbers of frameworks are counter-productive and lead to high transaction costs.

Previous analysis and discussion under the aegis of the DCF have identified key components of national MA mechanisms, which are successful in changing provider behaviour, and can therefore provide a basis for defining criteria to assess mechanisms. These should not form a blueprint or a “one size fits all” recipe for promoting change in behaviour, but can inform countries intending to establish or improve MA mechanisms about which steps will be most effective. These “enablers” of mutual accountability include:

- Clear programme country leadership through a detailed national aid or partnership policy, covering all aspects of effectiveness of development cooperation;
- Locally-driven aid quality and results monitoring frameworks, including annual targets for individual providers, as well as for the recipient government;
- Annual analysis of progress towards these results by individual providers and recipient, and high-level discussion at a national top-level meeting.

This section will assess the degree to which national MA mechanisms met these standards in the past.19

4.2.1 National Mutual Accountability

Programme country aid policies, which set targets for providers, are crucial to setting nationally-driven standards to which providers can be held accountable. These, and regular assessment of progress towards them through monitoring, analysis and discussion in a high-level government-provider forum, are the primary drivers of progress on mutual accountability and effectiveness of development cooperation20.

- How many countries have aid policies? As of 2011, the 39 countries listed in Table 1 below had an aid policy or agreed document outlining aims for provider behaviour21. Only four countries have adopted new policies between 2010 and 2011, so progress has been slow. No other countries with new policies have been identified in 2012 (see Annex 1). On the positive side, 11 countries were drafting policies: but this will still leave more than half of programme countries without an aid policy.

- Do the policies set targets for providers? In 2011, of the countries with a policy, 28 (72%) contained targets for providers. This represents only 27% of programme countries. An increase from 11 in 2010 mostly reflected wider survey coverage, though four new countries did set targets in 2011. However, most importantly, given that these have much more impact on provider behaviour, only four countries (Benin, Malawi, Mozambique and Rwanda) were setting and publicly analysing individual providers’ progress, though another nine (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Sierra

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19 The analysis in this section is based on the 2011 mutual accountability survey (see here) and supplemented by information from the 2012 status update, where indicated (for details, see Annex). The 2011 survey included the analysis of 90 responses, which were supplemented by desk analysis of 25 countries. The 2012 status update encompasses information from 105 countries, which have either completed the 2011 mutual accountability survey or have been the subject of desk analysis for other UNDESA mutual accountability reports. A separate background study analyses findings of the 3rd global survey in 2013.

20 Please refer to Annex 1, for a detailed overview of findings from the 2011 survey on aid policies, provider targets and assessments and a venn diagram to aid the visualization of priority countries identified in the 2012 status update based on their status, aid dependency and commitment to mutual accountability

21 It looks like a sharp increase from 18 countries (26%) in 2010. However, the widening of country coverage in 2011 (particularly in relation to Pacific Island countries) accounts for 17 of the additional countries.
Leone, Uganda and Zambia) were in the process of designing individual targets. The same four countries have been confirmed in 2012 to have functional individual provider targets in place.

- **What is the content of the targets?** As shown in Table 1, of 32 countries with provider targets, the vast majority of countries with targets (22) contained the complete set of Paris Declaration indicators, and two had only a sub-set of Paris indicators. However, the most advanced eight went beyond Paris to include key aspects such as division of labour, multi-year predictability and transparency, as well as issues of concern to the programme countries such as conditionality, capacity-building, and quiet periods during which providers should not send missions to the country.

- **How helpful is mutual accountability around budget support?** Of the countries with provider targets, in six these apply only to budget support providers. Many countries began their mutual accountability processes with multi-donor budget support agreements, and then went on to wider agreements in terms of covering all types of development cooperation flows or providers. However, programme countries indicate that there is a high risk of the mutual accountability dialogue focusing entirely on budget and budget support policies, excluding other providers and flows, and there is an urgent need to reinforce efforts to broaden mutual accountability.

- **Is there a regular assessment of progress towards the targets?** For accountability to be genuinely “mutual”, monitoring and analysis should be balanced, with programme countries and providers being equally treated (i.e. assessed individually for their performance through regular (annual) assessments of progress so concrete dialogue can develop). However, while 85% of programme countries have some form of annual meeting between them and providers in 2011, and 62% discuss performance frameworks and targets for the programme country government, only 26 (25%) have regular assessments of providers and only three countries assess individual providers (Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda). These figures show how unbalanced “mutual” accountability is, reflecting provider reluctance to be monitored, reticence by programme country governments in insisting on regular monitoring and lack of capacity to do so. They also show that almost a third of annual meetings hold neither programme countries nor providers accountable.

- **Independent monitoring of providers** (by groups not associated with the programme country government or providers) was undertaken in only four countries – Cambodia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Vietnam. It has helped to facilitate dialogue between providers and programme countries but is not enough on its own to bring behaviour change. It also can be expensive in terms of relying on consultants.

- **Regional provider monitoring** has been undertaken by 14 Pacific countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) as reported by the previous survey. This has provided a useful basis for
comparing results and experiences across programme countries, and analysing why provider behaviour varies in different countries, but is weakened by the lack of a systematic structured assessment of individual provider performance (Cairns Compact 2010/2011).

- **Analysis by country categories and geographical regions** reveals the following trends:
  - more aid-dependent countries (those receiving aid of at least 5% of GNI) are far more likely to have an aid policy and provider targets in place.
  - Sub-Saharan African countries perform worse than average on overall mutual accountability, while Asia and Pacific countries are notably over-represented in the best performing group on overall mutual accountability (largely because of the many countries covered by the Pacific Forum)
  - fragile states perform much worse than other countries on mutual accountability, but Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Land-Locked Developing Countries (LLDCs) have average performance, and the small sample of Small Island Developing Countries (SIDS) perform better on MA than average (see text box 1 below and UNDESA analysis on mutual accountability in LDCs here).

Overall, there has been some progress in key pillars of national-level mutual accountability on some aspects of the effectiveness of development cooperation. However, in most countries this is confined to designing aid policies. Progress on including clear (especially individually-monitored) targets for provider behaviour, and on regularly assessing provider progress, has been much slower. However, this progress remains fragile and limited. It needs to accelerate in future years, especially in fragile states and in Sub-Saharan Africa, to give credibility to any future assessment of provider progress and of increased effectiveness of development cooperation in achieving results.

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**Text box 1. Mutual accountability frameworks in transitional contexts**

The development challenges in countries affected by conflict and fragility has received growing attention in recent years. In 2011, a group of fragile states, the g7+, issued a statement, ‘the New Deal’, in cooperation with donors and international organizations at the Busan High Level Forum that recommends that these countries engage international partners in transition compacts to ensure stronger coherence and focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. The new report from the Secretary General on ‘Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict’ also recommends that the UN and international partners support transition compacts in peacebuilding contexts. The UN already has extensive experience with leading work on a number of compacts in conflict affected countries, including in Afghanistan, DRC and Liberia, and has learned a number of important lessons that need to be applied in future compacts.

Transition compacts need a strong focus on building targeted capacities for ownership, including for aid coordination and aid tracking. They will often be relevant in situations where governments are emerging from conflict and crisis with limited ability to use country systems, and a compact can be useful in mapping out the trajectory towards gradually stronger national capacities and growing use of country systems, moving
towards direct budget support, with the active support of both national and international partners. A recent study by IPI shows that compacts in the past have often not emphasized this issue enough. The GEMAP in Liberia is a positive example of focus on capacity development for ownership in a situation where government initially lacked sufficient capacities for receiving budget support.

Transition compacts also need to support transitional political and security arrangements and peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, and this will require highly focused results frameworks with indicators and benchmarks focused on inclusive politics, justice, security, employment creation and building national systems for service delivery. The often short-term nature of transitional planning and governance arrangements needs to be reflected in compacts. An annual cycle of review and revision has proven useful in some cases, for instance in Timor-Leste. Some compacts in the past have been too extensive and unrealistic in their goals and have lost relevance because of that.

They will also need to engage and commit a broad set of actors, including the special political or peacekeeping missions of the UN as well as other political and security actors and humanitarian agencies when relevant. Lack of buy-in from national as well as international actors has been an important impediment to the relevance of compacts in the past. The former Afghanistan Compact and the new mutual accountability framework in Afghanistan involves security and justice related goals and actors.

Finally, transition compacts need to reflect that countries emerging from conflict and crisis often present high risks but also significant opportunities to prevent a relapse into conflict. Sound conflict analysis should be the basis for conflict sensitive planning, and assessments of risks can help mitigate these through mechanisms for risk sharing such as pooled funds, and to balance risks against opportunities. They should recognize that the risk of inaction is often greater than the risk of engagement. An example of joint risk management is the risk management unit in the RC’s Office in Somalia that supports the UNCT with risk information, analysis and risk treatment.

### 4.2.2 Content of Aid Policies

For the countries with aid policies in place, these:

- Were seen as focussing attention more on recipient than provider performance;
- Were highly consistent with national development strategies;
- Gave strong guidance to central and local government agencies, but only limited guidance to non-executive actors (parliaments, CSOs etc), in terms of their roles and responsibilities in managing aid; and
- Focused very little on gender issues.
4.2.3 Progress in formal mutual accountability processes - monitoring and analysis

There were myriad forums in which providers and recipients discussed development results and cooperation, but the performance of these forums on accountability varies:

- Almost without exception these forums were chaired by programme country officials, supported by country institutions and utilised national programme country government analysis. However, stronger mechanisms based on clear policies and targets use national analysis much more, and therefore achieved more impact.
- More than 40 countries had in place a comprehensive system of sector working groups and reviews; and almost all had programme country-provider forums for key sectors such as health and education. Virtually none had specific targets for providers, and most of these focus on whether they fill sectoral financing gaps. There was also relatively little transmission of lessons from these groups to the wider national processes.

Many of these forums have potential for leveraging mutual behaviour change, but major change has been achieved only in those which bring together providers and recipients at the highest level, to discuss aid policies and targets, review progress based on concrete monitoring and analysis, and agree on future approaches.

4.2.4 Non-executive stakeholder engagement

Wider stakeholder participation in mutual accountability was the least progressed of all the key elements of mutual accountability for development cooperation. There was evidence that this is changing in some countries because of the emphasis given to it at the global and regional level. Yet, civil society and parliamentarians, as well as other stakeholders, were often only marginally engaged in terms of both the ability to gain access to fora, and their input of analysis into performance assessments:

- CSOs participated in around 60% of the forums and were the best involved of stakeholder groups. They remained limited in providing their own analytical inputs to mutual accountability processes. There were some notable exceptions to this picture, such as in Cambodia where the NGO Forum made regular high-quality inputs to the national aid effectiveness forums (for example, NGO Forum on Cambodia 2009).
- Parliamentarians had relatively low participation and analytical input, despite increased efforts by parliaments to take advantage of the space for participation.
- Local governments, the private sector and, in particular, women’s groups were often marginally involved and local communities and trade unions have the lowest level of participation.
According to the surveys, the level of independent analytical input from all non-executive stakeholders was low.
TABLE 1: PROGRESS ON NATIONAL-LEVEL MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY – 2011 SURVEY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>AID POLICY</th>
<th>PROVIDER TARGETS</th>
<th>REGULAR ANALYSIS OF PROVIDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>YES: Afghanistan National Aid Management Policy</td>
<td>YES – Paris indicators; collective</td>
<td>YES - collective analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>YES: National Action Plan for AE (revised 2010)</td>
<td>YES – Paris indicators; collective</td>
<td>YES – joint reviews involving all providers +CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>YES: Harmonisation, Alignment, Results Action Plan</td>
<td>YES - Paris indicators; collective</td>
<td>YES – mainly collective; also independent reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>YES: Aid Effectiveness Action Plan</td>
<td>YES – group targets – Paris + others</td>
<td>NO – no formal progress assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>YES: Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy</td>
<td>NO – but targets being finalised</td>
<td>NO – DP-PAF since 2010 but not for full aid policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>YES: Jakarta Commitments (2009)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>YES: Vientiane Declaration on AE</td>
<td>YES - PD indicators</td>
<td>YES - collective analysis not individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>YES: Liberia Aid Policy</td>
<td>NO – Targets being designed</td>
<td>NO – annual review planned from 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>YES: Development Assistance Strategy</td>
<td>YES - Paris indicators; individual</td>
<td>NO – individual assessment pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>YES: Action Plan updated in 2011 (from 2007-09)</td>
<td>YES - group targets – PD + others</td>
<td>NO – but intended for new plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>YES: International Cooperation Policy (2011)</td>
<td>YES - Paris + others; individual</td>
<td>YES – individual assessment; independent input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>YES: National Aid Policy 2008 - being updated</td>
<td>NO – expected once policy updated</td>
<td>NO – but expected once targets designed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>YES: AE Action Plan</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands22</td>
<td>YES: Cairns Compact - Regional principles. PNG and Samoa also have national policies</td>
<td>YES - annual report on PD indicators, collective only</td>
<td>YES – Two rounds of monitoring completed PNG also has local meetings + AE Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>YES: Rwanda Aid Policy</td>
<td>YES – PD + others, individual</td>
<td>YES – extensive annual individual assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>YES: Politique Nationale de l’Aide Extérieure (2010)</td>
<td>YES – PD indicators, collective</td>
<td>NO - has been one review, but not regular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>YES: Sierra Leone Aid Policy (2009)</td>
<td>NO - being finalised</td>
<td>NO – intended once targets finalised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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22 Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>YES: Guidelines on Foreign Aid Mobilisation</th>
<th>YES – group targets</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Policy/Action Plan</td>
<td>PD Indicators</td>
<td>Frequency/Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>YES: Joint Assistance Strategy</td>
<td>YES – PD indicators + others; collective</td>
<td>YES – but only independent report every 3-4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>YES: Partnership Policy (2011)</td>
<td>NO, but being finalized 2011</td>
<td>NO, but intended once targets finalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>YES: Hanoi Core Statement and AAA Action Plan</td>
<td>YES – Paris indicators</td>
<td>YES – independent; mainly collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>YES: Joint Assistance Strategy (being updated 2011)</td>
<td>YES – sub-set of Paris indicators</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.5 Capacity for mutual accountability

One frequent conclusion of analysis of MA was that it can work well only when programmes exist to build capacity for mutual accountability and transparency among programme country stakeholders. All groups indicated that they had major capacity-building needs, especially on MA. This has two main implications. Firstly, much more priority must be given to parliamentarians, local governments and CSOs (including women’s groups, community groups and trade unions) in order to increase their analytical capacity and participation in MA processes; this is essential to create broad based ownership and pressure on stakeholders to promote compliance. Secondly, equal priority should be given to MA (analysing data and together identifying ways to improve the results of development cooperation), compared to transparency (publication of and access to data on development cooperation and its results).

4.2.6 Provider coverage

MA mechanisms covered OECD providers much more effectively, though non-OECD providers did participate in some countries. The programme countries with strongest MA processes have much better coverage of providers than other countries. Even for major OECD and multilateral providers, the number of mechanisms they participate in varied greatly. There is a strong relationship for many providers between the scale of their cooperation programme with a country and whether they participate in national MA mechanisms.

With the context of MA differing from country to country, Text Box 2 serves to illustrate specific practices and challenges countries are facing today.

Text Box 2. Good practice examples to strengthen national mutual accountability

1. Zambia. Dealing with multiple providers

The government is working on a new external assistance policy that could serve as inspiration for many other African countries. It shifts the focus from aid effectiveness to broader effectiveness of development cooperation, complementing it with South-South cooperation, catalytic aid, private sector engagement and increasing domestic revenue. The government is making innovative reforms to its development dialogue architecture, which now incorporates an annual policy dialogue with middle income countries including China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The government also holds an annual policy dialogue with civil society and private sector. The government has also requested the United Nations to introduce "Delivering as One". The UN is simplifying procedures for joint analytical work and put in place a joint communication strategy. The UN has already developed a UN division of labour, a UN code of conduct, a system for inter-agency performance appraisals and principles for UN participation in sector groups.

2. Kenya. Bringing NGO’s and Civil Society into the Aid Effectiveness Fold
At the initiative of the government-led Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG), an umbrella organization (KEPSA) representing the private sector, and a rotating civil society member, actively participate in monthly AEG meetings with all development partners under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance, at the biennial Development Partners Forums and at annual retreats. KEPSA and the relevant NGO contribute to agenda items.

3. Cambodia – going beyond Busan

Mutual accountability in Cambodia looks beyond the broadly understood Paris/Accra/Busan framework to consider the wider-ranging policies and actions that promote the conditions for sustainable and longer-term mutual accountability. This has three implications: (i) The government’s public sector reform programmes are the strategic focus for efforts to promote resource transparency and development results as well as to develop capacity; (ii) There is a need to develop dialogue and monitoring arrangements that establish and strengthen both individual and collective partnership arrangements with a broader range of development actors; and (iii) The approaches need to be flexible enough to respond to new opportunities and priorities that include expanding the social protection network and mitigating climate change. The over-arching objective of the government is to ensure that all resources are directed to achieving Cambodia’s development goals.

The principal mutual accountability mechanism is the ‘Joint Monitoring Indicators’, a set of 20 indicators jointly agreed by government and donors that apply results-based methodologies to achieving high-priority development outcomes in key sectors. The increased adoption of robust results frameworks across Government – and the dialogue and application that their use entails – makes mutual accountability both meaningful and operational as responsibilities and activities can be defined within a multi-actor framework under the overall leadership of Government.

Of particular importance is the link between these indicators and the sector budgets and monitoring frameworks that allow the individual contributions and actions of each partner to be incorporated into a comprehensive resourcing and monitoring framework. The net result is intended to be improved policy coherence, greater resource impact and informed dialogue that allows each individual actor to be held accountable for their actions.

While good progress has been made, challenges include strengthening the national systems and work processes that link policy to budgeting and monitoring as well as to changing donor mindsets and their attitudes to effectively managing – and sharing – risk. Somewhat donor-centric arrangements for dialogue also need to evolve so that, without becoming burdensome, they are representative and effective means of engaging a wider set of development actors – civil society, Southern partners, regional non-DAC donors - in a constructive and productive partnership that is characterized by effectiveness and accountability.

4.3 Progress on National-Level Transparency in Programme Countries

Aid information is critical for budgeting and monitoring and evaluation of sector results and individual programmes and projects. According to the surveys, many stakeholders (especially those from civil society and parliaments) felt poor transparency is one of the main explanations for their inability to play a stronger role in national MA processes. Progress on national-level transparency in programme countries is therefore important to support effective MA.
Overall, transparency varied sharply across different types of aid information, and different providers, and in some key areas – especially in relation to supplying documents which would allow greater interpretation of data and understanding of provider and programme government policies and procedures – transparency remained weak.

As of 2011, 37 countries had an **aid information system** in place, with half of them being country specific, eleven of the systems were Development Assistance Databases, and eight were Aid Management Platforms. 19 of the systems monitored provider and recipient progress on aid effectiveness targets, often only focusing on narrow subsets of Paris Declaration indicators. Much more work remains to be done to ensure that systems monitor all aspects of effectiveness of development cooperation automatically, thereby reducing the workload from surveys.

It is striking how many countries were using their **own systems**, and discussions with country officials indicated that this was because they preferred to have full ownership of the system and to be able to re-programme or adapt it to their own needs.

Major challenges in making information **accessible**, especially for non-executive actors, were registered through the survey process, even though some programme countries were making greater efforts at accessibility. Accessibility and usability of information by non-executive actors was generally higher in the better performing countries, although this relationship was not very strong.

The adoption of the **global common standard on aid transparency**, which merges the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), the Creditor Reporting System and the Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans, was expected to ensure more complete reporting of a larger number of donors and greater accessibility of information to stakeholders.

The **type of information** that seemed to have the highest transparency includes current and projected disbursements. The types with least transparency included off-budget aid, commitments of future aid, progress on project/programme execution, funding gaps, progress on the IADGs and gender disaggregated data. The transparency of commitments of future development cooperation has increased, reflecting greater efforts by providers and programme countries, putting this as a target in several national MA agreements. On the other hand, transparency of gender-disaggregated expenditures fell, and transparency of untying and policy conditionalities remained very low.

In future, it will be critical to assess how different systems to collect and analyse information on external development financing can be combined or coordinated to support mutual accountability mechanisms that address the broader set of commitments on development cooperation that the post-2015 development agenda will contain.
4.4. Progress on international mutual accountability and transparency

Many international and regional mechanisms and initiatives exist to promote MA and transparency. They include official mechanisms, peer review mechanisms and independent mechanisms by civil society. These have very different scope, focus, agendas and sources of information. Regular review of their performance and impact is important to provide an independent assessment of their contribution to development results. Earlier studies conducted for the Development Cooperation Forum (2009, 2010a and b) have found that:

- On mutual accountability:
  - The effectiveness of each global and regional mechanism depends on the quality, independence and transparency of its evidence; the ownership of each mechanism by all stakeholders; the degree to which it provokes debate and explanation of programme country and provider performance; and the extent to which it motivates behaviour change.
  - Recipients have generally made much more progress in implementing commitments made to these mechanisms than providers.
  - Providers are virtually the only source of information used by global mechanisms. In most of them, programme country governments are woefully under-represented and other stakeholders have even less voice, making a case for stronger reflection of the “multiplicity” of accountabilities in analysis and policy dialogue;
  - The content of assessments is therefore dominated by the concerns of providers; and on the other hand, virtually no mechanisms publish analysis on the performance of individual providers in individual recipient countries.
  - Cooperation and exchange of data among mechanisms is growing.
  - The impact of mechanisms on provider behaviour varies widely, partly because most assessments are not used to support national-level dialogues or tailored to the needs of stakeholders. There is need for greater consolidation of mechanisms to fulfil stakeholder needs more clearly.
  - Virtually no providers have established mechanisms through which they are systematically held accountable by all their recipient programme country governments and other stakeholders.
  - Regional mutual accountability mechanisms on development cooperation, though increasing their importance and quality, are in many cases virtually ignored in global and national discussions, mainly due to lack of: client focus; consolidation among mechanisms; or authority to influence inter-governmental processes.

- On transparency
  - Most current initiatives focus on publishing disbursements and data rather than aid effectiveness, results or analytical documents on aspects such as conditionalities
  - Data must be more timely and more closely aligned with classification systems used in programme countries

\[23\] A policy brief with a 2014 mapping update of regional and global mutual accountability mechanisms also serves as background document for the DCF Germany High-level Symposium.
Users see the data produced as relatively inaccessible and not very user-friendly. Most data and documents published come from providers, and much more emphasis needs to be placed on publishing programme country documents/data. Actual users of data are mainly OECD-based academics and CSOs, and most data are used only for analysis of trends and comparisons among providers. There has recently been some progress towards overcoming these problems, thanks to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and the Make Aid Transparent/Publish What You Fund campaign. However, transparency will have an impact on results only if accompanied by analysis and capacity-building (including of stakeholders in programme countries) to enhance accountability.

The crucial role of **regional initiatives** to exchange experiences and build capacity on MA through South-South learning should be recognized. Such initiatives should be expanded and more fully funded, so that they can move to the stage of actively assisting progress at national level and contribute to progress in the area of mutual accountability and results including through possible “national-level accountability compacts”. To keep the momentum, there is a strong case for bringing these together through a global network which can exchange experiences of best practices in MA mechanisms and provider performance, and provide readily accessible web- or hotline-based information to stakeholders. The ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) is adequately placed to facilitate such a brokering role, building on its analytical work on MA at all levels and the engagement of all actors in development cooperation in its policy dialogues and reviews.

An essential contribution has also been made by initiatives taken by **global or regional groups of non-executive stakeholders** such as Better Aid for CSOs, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) for parliamentarians, and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) for trade unions, to build the capacity of their member organisations to engage in national MA. It has been repeatedly stressed at national level, in the South-South Learning Initiative, and at DCF symposiums, that the coordinating agencies for these initiatives need to be better resourced so that they can learn and share best practices at international and national level, and provide training and capacity-building materials and support to their member stakeholders – as well as ensuring that national parliaments and other stakeholder coalitions are sufficiently resourced.

The influence of the **Development Cooperation Forum** has been growing by establishing best practices and identifying standards in the functioning of MA mechanisms to produce behaviour change. The DCF good practice standards are now being disseminated and adapted to stakeholder needs both through regional and national dialogue, and through global and regional dialogue among stakeholder groups (especially parliamentarians and CSOs). The DCF has also become the key forum where
progress on international and national MA is discussed among all stakeholders. This regular monitoring needs to continue and be deepened, with more input from all countries and non-executive stakeholders, as the basis for refining analysis of best practices and of how to track progress.

The most significant influence has been from the fifth process – the Paris Declaration indicators and their monitoring survey. Most countries relied extensively on the Paris Declaration indicators to define their indicators. They also used the Paris Declaration to set baseline standards for 2005 and targets for 2010, and to help analyse ongoing provider performance. Other countries relied (too) extensively on the Paris survey, falling back on using its results to monitor progress, rather than developing home-grown or more regular (eg annual) processes (in large part due to lack of political will, time and capacity). However, those that did develop strong national-level mutual accountability ascribed this in part to the existence of a strong global process. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC) of December 2011 therefore committed to continuing a global process, and agreed by June 2012 on a set of indicators and targets through which to monitor progress. The 3rd DCF Global Accountability Survey will assess the degree to which the Busan Partnership is continuing to assist progress in national-level MA. The Busan Partnership’s own global monitoring report, to be published in March 2014, will assess progress on its indicators.

Initiatives in particular areas by major providers (or groups of providers) have also had an influence. This has been seen through the prominence of the “division of labour” initiative, especially sponsored by EU donors, in the first DCF survey of programme countries, and that of transparency initiatives including IATI in the second DCF survey. Major providers are now placing more emphasis on MA – with the EU and US indicating that they will support national level compacts. This gives strong reason to believe that progress in programme country-led MA could accelerate in the coming years, especially if there is demand at global level to report on progress and challenges.

Neither MA, nor transparency at international level, focus sufficiently on gender issues, in terms of either inclusion of indicators tracking the focus of development cooperation on gender, or participation of women’s organisations in initiatives. A dialogue on this issue was therefore held under the DCF auspices which led to recommendations on the need for strong capacity-building for women’s organisations, high quality information on gender issues, more comprehensive policy design, and a set of indicators which might be proposed for gender-focused MA (DCF 2010b, p.69, see conclusions of the Vienna Policy Dialogue on gender equality and mutual accountability here).

5 THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL LEVEL MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY ON BEHAVIOUR CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Strong mutual accountability mechanisms have had a major effect on programme government and provider behaviour. The results of the surveys show that: a) Behaviour change among programme countries is generally higher than among providers, with higher levels of change within Sub-Saharan African countries; and b) Programme countries with advanced MA “enablers” show higher behaviour change by providers than countries where limited progress has been made. Countries with provider targets show even higher provider change. At the same time, programme
countries where MA is most advanced have changed their behaviour broadly in line with the average, whereas countries in the middle group have performed better.

These findings appear to reflect the following characteristics:

1. **Low-progress**: when there is no mutual accountability, there is less behaviour change (especially by providers), and stakeholders find it less easy to ascribe change to the mutual accountability process;
2. **Middle-progress**: as mutual accountability becomes formalized with agreements and discussion fora, there is a much stronger impact on programme country behaviour than on that of providers, and a mutual accountability process without provider targets facilitates this;
3. **High-progress**: only when mutual accountability reaches an advanced stage (with provider targets and regular reviews) does it produce significant change in provider behaviour.

Survey analysis indicates that the following factors best explain why behavioural change to achieve effectiveness targets happens, or major barriers to change persist:

- According to survey analysis, the factors most influencing **change by programme country governments** are: increased political commitment and vision, resulting from cumulative lesson-learning due to earlier reforms, and investments in building capacity to manage aid, design development strategies and deliver results. External pressure provided by international agreements such as the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and internal pressure for accountability from civil society, are also important.
- The **evidence of change** centred on governments’ increased use of results-based planning, monitoring and evaluation; improved quality of national development strategies; leadership in reforming country Public Financial Management and procurement systems, prioritization of spending needs, and management of financial resources (spreading beyond aid to domestically-mobilised revenue). There was also a notable increase in reporting of aid and results data, and in publishing and disseminating documents.
- Only a few countries reported **barriers to change**. These included insufficient capacity building; and external factors such as the financial crisis, which shifted provider priorities away from aid effectiveness, removing incentives for programme country governments. These deserve more authoritative analysis and policy dialogue.
- The improved planning, delivery and efficiency of activities within governments, as well as the improved alignment of providers with national priorities, and harmonisation among them, were among the most critical **factors influencing the achievement of development results**. These contributed to reduced transaction costs and made major contributions to freeing development cooperation to increase service provision and improve MDG performance.
The factors most influencing change among providers are demand from recipients at national level, as well as external leverage provided by commitments made under international agreements such as Paris Declaration/Accra Agenda for Action, and pressure from international NGOs and the general public.

The evidence for change centres on providers’ increased alignment with recipient priorities, including higher amounts of general and sectoral budget support, greater use of programme country systems, and abolition of project implementation units. There is also major progress on harmonisation and coordination, especially in division of labour, reduced numbers of missions, and respect for “quiet periods” when missions are avoided due to peak programme country workloads (e.g., on budgets).

There is little mention of barriers to reform. Those mentioned are insufficient internalisation of aid effectiveness practices into provider working procedures and incentives as established by headquarters and implemented in field offices, inflexibility in provider HQ policies and practices, insufficient decentralisation to local offices, provider staff turnover, and the failure of programme governments to hold providers individually rather than collectively responsible. Yet, even though they are not mentioned frequently, they require much more analysis and policy dialogue.

As for how behavioural change influences development results, the survey suggests that the increased alignment and harmonization has led to considerable cost savings by reducing administrative and bureaucratic tasks (by abolishing parallel financial management and procurement procedures). It has also reduced duplication and proliferation of projects, and provided more predictable results delivery for providers. All these elements have freed greater resources for spending on development goals.

One conclusion of previous surveys – that strong national level mutual accountability mechanisms have had a major effect on programme government and provider behavior and that this in turn enhances results by freeing resources for spending on national development goals – is confirmed by analysis of behaviour by the same providers in different countries compared to the average (see Text Box 2 and Table 2).

Text Box 2. Provider behaviour change in Mozambique and Rwanda

In Mozambique and Rwanda, where targets have been set for individual providers over a period of several years, behaviour change by providers has been much more dramatic. As can be seen in Table 2 below, Rwanda has made much more progress than the PD country average on every indicator applying to providers, whether measured in absolute numbers or by the degree of change. Mozambique has made more progress than average on 7 indicators (absolutely) and 6 (in terms of change). Interestingly, both countries have also met the PD targets for improving their development strategies and PFM systems, though not for results-based performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) for their development strategies.

In addition, even underperforming providers appear to make greater efforts in countries with individual provider targets – due to a study by ActionAid Italy (2011) which concludes that Italy, with a relatively poor global record of living up to its aid effectiveness commitments, performs much better in Mozambique where there is strong national MA.
Individual targets are therefore an important factor improving performance by providers. They are by no means the only factor: their existence in certain countries in turn reflects a broadly stronger MA process where there is a relationship of trust between programme country and providers, and where some providers are prepared to exert “peer pressure” on others to improve their performance. However, where they have been introduced, according to programme countries and providers, they have had a very significant impact on accelerating behaviour change by providers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paris Declaration Indicator</th>
<th>Grades/percentages</th>
<th>Changes in grades/percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paris Declaration Indicator Average</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Quality of Development Strategy</td>
<td>37% ≥B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a: Public Financial Management (PFM) Systems</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Development Cooperation On Budget</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Coordinated Technical Assistance</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a: Use of PFM Systems</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b: Use of Procurement Systems</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Project Implementation Units (PIUs)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Predictability</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survey finding that strong national mutual accountability enhances results - by freeing resources for spending on national development goals - is timely given the debate about the need to focus more on results in assessing the “development effectiveness” of aid. The primary reason for choosing the Paris Declaration “aid effectiveness” indicators was precisely that they were intended to reduce costs and ensure that the maximum amount was spent on reaching the MDGs. The Paris Declaration implementation report (OECD 2011) as well as many independent analysts have produced findings that confirm this, and many participants in the DCF have also emphasized this point.

6 SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The previous chapter shows that progress on MA and transparency has been slow and patchy. However, where strong national MA and transparency processes have developed, supported in part by strong global processes, they have had a major impact on changing programme country and provider behaviour, and thereby on improving the results achieved by development cooperation. It is therefore vital for the international community to accelerate its efforts to promote MA and transparency in order to advance development.

As mentioned earlier, this will be a common concern in the context of the evolving unified and universal development agenda for the post-2015 era. The move to a universal and unified development agenda will require an accountability architecture that is comprehensive, flexible with respect to specific mandates, yet robust, holding different actors to account according to their differing responsibilities. Such an architecture – multi-layered, and probably consisting of several frameworks – will need to be based on mutual respect and be inclusive and transparent. It will also need to promote mutual learning, contain feedback loops from the national to the global level, and tap the potential of data and technology.

Based on the findings of the survey, and discussions with key stakeholders, the following could be next steps to ensure existing efforts for monitoring and
accountability at all levels are addressing key priorities of Member States and other stakeholders:

a) **Strengthen the current MA architecture for ODA effectiveness** by making progress on setting up, or strengthening existing MA “enablers” (see chapter 4.2.) to show the impact MA can have on stakeholder behaviour, and to overcome the three major challenges mentioned in the beginning to ensure that MA remains an effective tool to support implementation;

b) Invest in **independent analysis of how MA as a concept can support the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda**, including by reviewing existing efforts and positions by all actors (see chapter 3) and in support of progress on development cooperation commitments that may be captured in a renewed global partnership for development; and

c) Jointly work towards an **independent and regular global assessment of the effectiveness of development cooperation**, taking into account aspects of importance to all actors (see chapter 3), building on the vast range of respective strengths and addressing cost-saving opportunities for all partners and the “unfinished aid effectiveness business”.

### 6.1 Strengthening the current MA architecture

The following are priorities derived from DCF MA surveys and previous analysis to strengthen the current MA architecture:

- Ensuring that as many recipient countries as possible **adopt aid or partnership policies**, and especially that they set **explicit targets for individual providers**, and monitor and discuss progress annually.
- Increasing **representation of non-executive stakeholders** (parliaments, civil society, local and regional governments and social partners) and providing capacity support to produce their own analysis of progress on MA, effectiveness and development results.
- Ensuring **stronger MA across all different types of countries** (rather than just for countries with a high proportion of “like-minded providers”) – especially for vulnerable and post-conflict states.
- **Reducing MA reporting burdens** by better linking them with national “aid information systems” so that providers report automatically at national level (and investing more in national-level aid transparency and reporting processes accordingly).
- Ensuring that **data from national reporting systems are much more easily accessible** to all domestic and external stakeholders, and much better linked to results tracking systems; and that documents on provider policies, programmes and intended outcomes are much more widely available.
- **Encouraging regional initiatives** (such as the current process to build a minimum African mutual accountability standard, the Cairns Compact) through which countries can promote peer learning and support one another through targeted
capacity-building, and other stakeholders, such as supreme audit institutions, to make use of their existing structures to support review of progress.

- Developing and further strengthening a strong global mutual accountability reporting mechanism, consisting of different frameworks as appropriate, with support by all relevant stakeholders, which provides support to recipient countries seeking to enhance their national MA processes.
- Ensuring that global transparency initiatives are more closely connected to national planning and budgeting processes and fully used to support country-level MA.
- Increasing the monitoring, analysis and discussion of gender and other inequality issues in MA processes.

6.2 Advancing the concept of accountability: monitoring of progress post-2015

Advancing the conceptual thinking on the purpose and effectiveness of MA to support implementation of the post-2015 development agenda – with its emphasis on poverty eradication and sustainable development – should be supported by authoritative analysis, based on high-quality evidence and informed by stakeholder views. Moving forward, the survey suggests at least three major challenges for MA that will have to be addressed:

- Establishing a holistic concept for accountability for commitments and development outcomes, based on mutual and domestic accountability. As parliaments, CSOs and citizens in developing countries strengthen their roles in designing and monitoring development strategies and budgets, best practice in MA is showing the importance to prioritise “domestic accountability” to these stakeholders, over “mutual accountability” to external partners. Country leadership is being emphasised to achieve national development priorities – so structures for domestic accountability are incorporating those for MA, rather than allowing MA to override national lines of responsibility. National MA mechanisms should thus be cognizant of principles of democratic ownership, and encourage a greater role of national groupings, including women, youth and others, as underpinning notion of effective development cooperation. Global initiatives to strengthen such engagement should guide progress. Some providers have also rethought their own domestic frameworks for accountability, making them simpler, more representative and more transparent.
- Broadening MA so that it covers more issues of relevance to development. Currently most developing country governments are held accountable for a wide range of policies and operational practices going beyond their budget spending and use and effectiveness of aid, through explicit treaties and agreements, e.g. on trade, investment or migration. OECD DAC countries are held only weakly accountable for their policies which impact on global development, especially those related to some aspects of international development cooperation, such as policy and procedural conditionalities, concessionality and allocation practices, or on the prospects for greater policy coherence for development. There will be a need, in particular, to

24 The international framework for CSO development effectiveness here can provide guidance.
monitor not only how developed countries are supporting developing countries in reaching internationally agreed goals on poverty eradication, but also how they are supporting developing countries’ efforts in addressing sustainable development challenges of global concern, such as climate change, inequality and vulnerability, and food security. Evidence on accountability of other non-executive providers is patchy, though there is evidence for the improved use of results frameworks. At the same time, it needs to be discussed how “unfinished aid effectiveness business” can be addressed in future.

Incentivizing broad stakeholder engagement in MA. The emergence of new channels used for delivery and sources of development finance comes with a varying degree of enforceability of development cooperation commitments. This will be a trend, which will continue as countries are moving up the development ladder, becoming less aid dependent and looking to other, possibly more flexible, forms of financing, and as the private sector plays an increasingly important role in development cooperation. At the same time, donors are increasingly using aid as a catalyst for other sources of development financing, resulting in some uncertainty as to how such blended resources should be monitored. If not addressed properly, both trends threaten to weaken accountability post-2015. Frameworks and processes will need to be revised to: encourage the participation of all these actors; and to ensure adequate inter-linkages and coherence between them for effective bottom-up reporting, taking into consideration the various types of mechanisms and different contexts.

As the United Nations development agenda is deepening and broadening, it is covering new challenges (such as climate change, food security, inequality and vulnerability), and dealing with existing challenges in more depth (such as quality of outcomes for health and education) or with more ambition (e.g., eradication of extreme poverty instead of halving it). The changes reflected in the global development goals for the post-2015 era will require related changes in the implementation of MA for development cooperation, for instance:

- Ensuring that national “development” and “sustainable development” (e.g., NSDS, NAPA) strategies are fully integrated in terms of monitoring systems and results frameworks;
- Finding ways to take into account development cooperation geared towards addressing global challenges, in global and national MA frameworks;
- Ensuring that all development cooperation is promoting an integrative approach to advance on all three (economic, social and environmental) pillars of sustainable development; and
- Designing indicators to track more closely the equity impact of development cooperation (both among and within countries), the degree to which it is reaching the poorest and most marginalised communities and individuals, and progress on human rights issues.

In the context of changing development cooperation flows, and with a broader range of providers, and increasing flows of development finance from other sources, MA has
significant potential to help all actors to deliver on development cooperation results, provided that:

- Global and national-level MA frameworks are designed to be as inclusive of all actors as possible, and like-minded groups of actors (South-South Cooperation partners, foundations) make much more progress in agreeing their own principles and standards to which they can be held accountable, potentially through separate arrangements, and building on priorities of their recipient countries.
- Accelerating progress on MA may depend heavily on the inclusion of quality and results of development cooperation, keeping in mind the priorities of different actors in development cooperation, as discussed in chapter 3.
- Adequate standards of accountability are applied to different channels of development cooperation – notably cooperation channelled via private sector intermediaries such as banks, equity funds etc. – as well as to funding “leveraged” or “catalysed” by cooperation.
- Maximum progress is made on holding providers of other types of development finance to account, through accountability standards for all official agencies (e.g., development financing institutions, export credit agencies) and enhanced standards for private investors beyond “corporate social responsibility”, to include decent work and paying tax;
- Global and national mutual accountability frameworks are broadened to hold countries accountable – to the extent this is practically feasible – for other policies for having stronger processes to ensure policy coherence to promote development, so that broader (non-aid) policies do not undermine the impact of development cooperation;
- MA is conceived and pursued as a global multi-faceted system, for use by all actors in development, with global accountability for development cooperation commitments building from the bottom-up and firmly rooted in strong national MA and domestic accountability, and as an integral part of the global framework for monitoring and accountability of the broader post-2015 development agenda.

It will become even more essential to adapt the design of MA for different country circumstances. The post-2015 development agenda will be universal, and thus applicable to all countries. It is expected to address also global challenges and, therefore, how to assess progress:

- At one end of the spectrum, there will be a need to enhance MA for vulnerable and post-conflict countries – broadening the definition of such countries to include vulnerability in relation as well to high levels of inequity. Particular challenges will include finding innovative ways to combat and overcome “risk” of poor results in such countries, and for resolving disputes over ad hoc corruption or rights issues which undermine or reverse overall MA progress. This will imply continuing levels of investment in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the LDC-IV recommendations on MA.
- At the other, it will be difficult to make progress on MA in middle-income countries (and any other countries where non-official providers play an important role).
role) in case there is more evidence that they are i) increasingly finding that ODA cuts make development cooperation marginal to their domestic accountability processes; and ii) having their development cooperation channelled via non-government (private sector and civil society) executing agencies. More analysis is needed of how MA will be of most use to middle-income countries in future.

6.3 Global review of progress on development cooperation and effectiveness

While working to advance MA conceptually, there is need to assess how a global review of progress on MA can look like in practice. It will be critical to work jointly towards such an arrangement (see also global accountability study) and to explore how independent and regular assessments by different stakeholders can be featured in global policy dialogue on development cooperation, taking into account the full history and mandates of different actors and the aspects of effectiveness, and quantity commitments, of greatest relevance to them.

Such dialogue may also, once the post-2015 development agenda is agreed, address how MA mechanisms can be designed to monitor the accountability for other types of flows and other policies vital for the global partnership for development, in particular, in any successor arrangement to MDG-8. Any global framework must provide adequate space for all stakeholders to follow their monitoring and review priorities and avoid “one-way accountability” with multiple deliverables for national development, and none for progress on the global partnership for development that is meant to promote an enabling international environment for such national development progress to take place. The DCF Germany High-level Symposium will address these questions and examine how such a global framework or frameworks for accountability in development cooperation can look like.
7  ANNEX 1: STATUS UPDATE ON MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN 2012

Aid Policies, Provider Targets and Assessments – 2011 survey
Priority countries identified – 2012 status update

Note: Guyana and Laos have moderate priority with three yellow scores, but have no green scores, so are not included in the diagram.
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