



TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT OF MIGRATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS LINKS:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND NEW
STRATEGIC INDICATORS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The public discourse and decision-making on migration policies is largely shaped by a reductionist perspective that ignores many of the causes and impacts of international migration on sending and receiving countries, overrates the developmental role of remittances, and neglects the cost of migration to the migrants and their families. Further, human rights are off the radar screen. Overall, there is a bias towards the interests of the major receiving countries in the North.

This document aims to initiate a discussion about a policy-oriented information system and a new set of strategic indicators to assess the links among migration, development and human rights based upon a more comprehensive and balanced perspective, considering cost and benefits to all parties involved, including the migrants. It is expected that the system will facilitate a more reasoned, and objective dialogue, and will provide a new framework of analysis to be introduced within the process of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, aiming at the UN's High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013.

The conceptual framework that support the proposed information system identifies four analytical dimensions: (1) causes of migration, (2) impacts of migration on sending countries, (3) impacts of migration on receiving countries, and (4) impacts of migrations in migrants and their families. A set of strategic indicators is proposed for each of these dimensions. The most common unit of analysis will be a migration corridor (usually a country of origin and a country of destination). The final outcome of the assessment will be a graphical representation portraying causes and impacts of migration in that corridor, including costs and benefits for the countries involved, and for migrants and their families as well. The integration of the four dimensions could lead to an overall index. The graphic representations and the indices will allow comparisons across corridors as well as the analysis of the evolution of the migration – development– human rights nexus along a period of time for a specific corridor. These products will be useful tools in policy planning processes.

To demonstrate the potential of the system, the document presents a selected set of strategic indicators for Latin American countries and, particularly, for the Mexico – US corridor. Although a partial assessment (just a few indicators for each dimension are included), the analysis shows an overall worrying situation, with costs offsetting benefits for all parties. The migrants and their families may be the most negatively affected. As the root causes of migration are not being addressed, chances that the situation will improve in the future are weak.

Finally, the document outlines a set of recommendations to move the information system project forward, including alternatives for implementation involving key agencies from the UN system, academic institutions, regional expert groups, and representatives from civil society in general, and from migrant organizations in particular.

I. INTRODUCTION

This document aims to initiate a discussion about an information system to assess the links among migration, development, and human rights, and to introduce a set of strategic indicators as examples, exploring a participatory process to create a multidimensional global index and graphical representations portraying the status of different migration corridors, worldwide.

The rationale for the proposal is that public discourse and decision-making on migration policies are largely shaped by a reductionist perspective that ignores many of the causes and impacts of international migration concerning countries of origin, transit and destination. Impacts on migrants and their families are also neglected. There are two main reasons for this: first the dominance of destination country scholars in research work on migration; second the way that statistical indicators and datasets have been constructed, to essentially reflect issues arising for destination countries

In “*Reframing the Debate*”, Delgado, Márquez y Puentes (2010) discuss the bias of the dominant agenda, and provide empirical and theoretical evidence supporting a more balanced and comprehensive approach. Four key limitations of the current discourse are identified:

- **Overrating remittances.** Although there is no consensus about the real social and economic impacts of remittances (de Haas, 2007), an optimistic position dominates, highlighting positive impacts in the economies of emigration countries, to the point that some suggest a new development paradigm with migration and remittances assuming a central role, replacing the role played by either the State or the market in the past (Kapur, 2004).
- **Costs and benefits ignored.** While overrating the supposed developmental impacts of remittances, the dominant, one-sided discourse ignores the social and economic costs that migration has on sending countries. Similarly, there are economic, demographic and social benefits of migration for destination countries that are also ignored while migrants are presented as a problem for the receiving society. Finally, the costs of “forced migration” for the migrants and their families are also neglected.
- **Human rights off the radar screen.** With a debate dominated by economic issues, and with migrants portrayed as a burden for receiving societies, and even as criminals, the issue of human rights is also neglected. This disregard is particularly acute when migration is considered as a part of the national security agenda, and when referring to those migrants who have crossed the border through irregular channels.

- **The causes of migration left out of the debate.** Finally, with a debate focused on costs and benefits of migration for the countries involved, migrants downgraded to the roles of cheap labor or remittance senders, and their human rights ignored, the root causes of the phenomenon are seldom addressed. This is a serious weakness considering that the right to stay and enjoy a decent livelihood in the country of origin, with migration as an option and not a necessity, is a fundamental right.

“*Reframing the Debate*” concludes by highlighting the need for a policy-oriented information system that provides evidence to move the discourse out of this conundrum, leading towards a more comprehensive agenda that goes beyond the reductionist and linear **REMITTANCES → DEVELOPMENT** equation and pursues a multidimensional view of the dynamics of international migration and its links with development and human rights. This paper addresses this recommendation, aiming at (a) outlining preliminary ideas about an overall evaluation framework to assess different migration situations, and (b) to introduce a much broader set of indicators, based on a comprehensive analysis of the causes and impacts of international migration for all countries and social actors involved. These indicators could be eventually aggregated into a global index and graphically portrayed to allow comparisons between migration corridors and longitudinal analysis. Specific objectives of the proposed information system are:

1. To move the debate away from reductionist views, fill knowledge gaps and address misinterpretations related to the nexus between development, migration, and human rights.
2. To allow a comprehensive and more balanced view of the causes, costs, and benefits of migration for all countries and social actors involved.
3. To show that considerable variation exists in terms of impacts of migration on sending and receiving countries, as well as on migrants and their families, across different migration situations, worldwide.
4. To facilitate monitoring of developments and possible impacts as a result of policy changes by sending and receiving countries.
5. To identify opportunities for policy improvement and serve as a policy planning tool, allowing comparisons of costs and benefits of migration over time.
6. To serve as a tool for oversight studies about migration and development.

In summary, the proposed information system should facilitate a reasoned, objective dialogue on migration, development, and human rights across sending and receiving countries and with civil society and migrants' organizations, as well as with other stakeholders involved. More specifically, it will provide a new framework of analysis to be introduced within the process of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, aiming at the UN's High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013.

II. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

The multifaceted nature of the migration phenomenon, the heterogeneity of migration situations, the need to transcend the dominant, reductionist model, and the sometimes conflicting interests and perspectives about costs and impacts, make the development of new information and evaluation system a complex task. There are conceptual as well as methodological challenges, from the establishment of an overall framework that defines the dimensions of the analysis, the identification of actors, agreements on criteria for judging cost and benefits, to selecting indicators, sources of data, and final data integration (see below).

Basic steps for the development of an information system to assess migration, development, and human rights

1. Agree on goals and unit of the analysis
2. Set up an analytical framework consistent with these goals
3. Identify the actors to be involved and avenues for participation
4. Describe the main dimensions of the evaluation
5. Select indicators (key variables, proxies, etc.) for each dimension
6. Gathering data on indicators - measuring or selecting secondary data
7. Weighting and integration of indicators within and across analytical dimensions
8. Making meaning from the analysis (comparative and longitudinal analysis, etc.)
9. Organizing results (graphic representation, etc.) for different constituencies and objectives (advocacy, policy making, etc.)

The need for a new information system, as discussed, emerges as a response to the dominant and narrow view that often leads to inadequate policies, exacerbates tensions, and fails to address the root causes of the problem. While the “win-win-win potential” of migration is frequently mentioned -- meaning that all the parties will be benefited -- the reality is that the current situations differ from this ideal. On the contrary, migratory policies by receiving countries, which criminalize migrants while simultaneously allowing labor exploitation, coupled with the absence of development policies that create employment and livelihoods in sending countries, perpetuate a vicious cycle of poverty, marginalization, and discrimination at both ends of almost all migration corridors.


The proposed system will confront this unsustainable situation with hard data, providing a common language and analytical categories, thus allowing all parties involved to interact and contribute to better public policies that optimize costs / benefits ratios and address root causes. Further, the proposed system should be useful at various levels. That means that the unit of analysis could be either individual countries (sending, transit or receiving), migration corridors (linking a sending and a receiving country), or even whole migration systems (including some cases of internal migrations). A migration corridor appears as the most useful unit for the evaluation.

To achieve these objectives, the analytical approach should be comprehensive and systemic, including a much wider range of indicators than is usual, and pertaining to different analytical dimensions, seemingly disconnected, but in fact closely linked, as summarized in “*Elements to Reframe the Debate*”. That means addressing both causes and impacts in a systemic way for each target situation.

Causal analysis in these complex systems is always complex but cannot be left out. The challenge is to include those more intractable issues that are rooted in the processes of unequal development that are behind international migration. This will require situating migration flows as part of global economic and social relationships, and placing questions of development and underdevelopment in an historical perspective that includes past patterns of colonialism as well as current processes of neo-liberal integration of global commodity chains and a global labor market (Delgado, Márquez and Puentes, 2010).

In terms of impacts, the analysis must include both costs and benefits to sending and receiving countries but must not leave out those impacts on migrants and their families, including those who did not migrate but are directly affected by the migration. Figure 1 illustrates the four major dimension of the assessment.

Figure 1. The four dimensions of the assessment.



With these four analytical dimensions defined, the next challenge is to identify relevant indicators for each one. This is a complex but crucial task. A first challenge is to work out what indicators are relevant and potentially functional to different countries and corridors. For a balanced view, good indicators should encapsulate the views and perspectives about costs and benefits by the different parties involved.

As the goal is to go deep into the nexus between development, migration, and human rights, there should be an effort to define and integrate a minimum set of indicators of economic income and distribution, social and economic transformation, human development, human rights, human security, etc. As that requires a combination of quantitative as well as qualitative indicators; their integration will not be easy (Munda, 2004).

Some of these indicators already exist and have been measured for certain countries, while others have not. Data availability will be a serious restriction to expand the use of the system to migration corridors where information is scarce. However, there is always the possibility of selecting proxy indicators. Data from different sources will be also a problem for integration and comparative analysis. One of the outcomes of this project will be a recommendation for collecting data that is relevant and urgently needed for a more balanced assessment of the impacts of migration in both sending and receiving countries as well as on migrants.

These challenges show how difficult the task of preparing such an information system and indices will be. This is no reason, however, to abandon the project. Even in an imperfect and provisional form, the proposed system and global index to assess causes and impacts within a migration, development, and human rights perspective, would provide a crucial corrective to today's skewed and biased debate, which focuses on the perceived interests of destination states and largely ignores the interests of the other states and social actors involved in international migration. The UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) helps to assess the feasibility and value of creating the proposed information system. Although sometimes criticized, the HDI has done much to change public and political perceptions of international development issues and North-South disparities. Interestingly, many of the indicators needed for this project are already to be found in the HDI. However, other indicators will need to be elaborated and added, such as those on asymmetries and structural change related to the causes of migration, on demographic shifts, and on links between migration and social transformation processes. The HDI is essentially cross-sectional, although its existence over many years now allows some longitudinal analysis. A system addressing the migration – development – human rights nexus would definitely have to include longitudinal data (where available) to make visible the long-term significance of migration for societies. The HDI is also a good example that highlights the need for a strong involvement of UN agencies, including regional agencies such as ECLAC, ESCAP, and UNECA¹, in order to expand the impact of this information system and adapt it to different migration corridors and systems.

¹ ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean); ESCAP (UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific); and UNECA (UN Economic Commission for Africa).

III. PROPOSED STRATEGIC INDICATORS

This section elaborates further on a set of possible strategic indicators in each of the four dimensions described in the previous section. This is a preliminary list emerging from a series of meetings with researchers and civil society leaders with long experience, particularly in the Mexico / Latin America – USA migration corridors. It is presented for discussion and as a background for further developments in other regions and with a wider group of stakeholders. The nature of this document does not allow an in-depth discussion on each indicator. A following section expands on a few that have been already measured for the Mexico / Latin America – USA corridors.

A. CAUSES OF MIGRATION

The analysis of causes, frequently sidestepped or oversimplified, is crucial for a more balanced view of the dynamics of migration in each corridor. When this issue is addressed in the current debate, the focus is frequently on the conditions in places of origin that induce individuals, and even whole families, to migrate (commonly described as “push factors”). In many cases, these conditions literally force people to migrate, as analyzed in *“Reframing the Debate”*. What is frequently missing is the complementary analysis of those conditions in receiving countries that contribute to the migration dynamics in each corridor. This does not mean an oversimplification of causality through the traditional “push-pull model”. It does stress, however, the need for a more balanced view, focusing on structural issues, both in sending and receiving countries, which jointly contribute to trigger and expand migration flows, and that should be considered equally relevant. In fact, these two set of systemic conditions are not independent but closely linked and part of a process of unequal development that connects the economies at both ends of the corridor. In summary, the big picture of a migration corridor should not neglect the root causes of migration and how they are addressed (or neglected) by sending and receiving countries. This dimension of the assessment should look at two main categories: economic asymmetries and social inequalities.

a. Economic asymmetries between sending and receiving countries

Migration is fueled by deep asymmetries between sending and receiving countries that should not be neglected in public policies. The analysis, however, should move beyond independent measurements at each end of the corridor, and must address how these economies are interconnected and belong to a global system characterized by processes of unequal development that contribute to making these asymmetries even deeper.

Methodologically, the challenge is to identify indicators that allow quantification of these asymmetries while characterising their trends: either evolution towards decreasing or increasing gaps. The following indicators are proposed:

1. Relative economic productivity between sending and receiving countries	Indicators to assess asymmetries in productivity could be measured at different levels of aggregation: overall economy, by economic sectors (agriculture, industry, etc.) or even for subsectors.
2. Differences in economic growth	The gap in economic growth (GDP gap) can be also measured for specific sectors of the economy, or in aggregate. A sectoral analysis is more meaningful because it makes visible the asymmetries that are at the root of the process of transformation of the economic structures at both ends of a migration corridor.
3. Wage differentials	Salary gaps are frequently mentioned as causes of migration and a major factor when individuals decide to migrate. It is important to describe its evolution in time for different sectors of the economy.
4. Labor precariousness in sending and receiving countries.	Several countries are developing integrated indicators that estimate the precariousness of employment based on the degree of informality of the economy, level of regulation of labor relations, increased vulnerability, etc. (Goldring and Landolt, 2009; Cranford et al, 2003).
5. Deficit or surplus in labor force	This indicator measures the capacity of the labor market to absorb the growth of active native population in each country (considering the natural population growth). Such indicator will estimate surplus or deficit of employment in sending and receiving countries.
6. Gaps in research and development (R&D) investments	Asymmetries in R&D investments could trigger highly qualified migration. These gaps could be accessed through a combination of different indicators such as R&D investments as part of the national GDP, R&D investment per scientist, or similar ratios. UNCTAD has developed a composite Innovation Capability Index (UNICI) that integrates different factors (UNCTAD, 2005).

b. Social inequalities between sending and receiving countries

Migration is also triggered by social inequalities (sometimes huge) between sending and receiving societies. While these inequalities remained hidden in the past, the communication revolution now allows poor households in the South to discover a different reality across borders -- an affluent world that may offer opportunities for better livelihoods. Methodologically, the challenges are similar to those when assessing economic asymmetries: to identify indicators that are relevant and allow the monitoring of trends toward decreasing or increasing gaps. The following indicators are proposed:

1. Human development index (HDI)	This well known composite index integrates a set of very relevant indicators of the population's socioeconomic conditions. As UNDP has been measuring the HDI for
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	most countries since 1990, it allows cross-country comparisons as trends and changes with time.
2. GINI coefficient	This is an indicator of income inequalities. Many countries are computing this index based on households surveys allowing cross-country comparisons. Time series allow longitudinal analysis, measuring the impact of policy changes, etc.
3. Gender inequalities	The evaluation must consider gender inequalities, which often affect migration processes. Several indices are already available that estimate social and economic inequalities based on gender. The SIGI (Social Institutions and Gender Index), developed by OECD and the Development Centre, is a good example of a composite measure of gender discrimination used for cross-country comparative studies (OECD, 2009).

c. Other casual factors for migration

Economic asymmetries and social inequalities are not enough to explain migration in many corridors. There are other factors that contribute, and even determine the origin, nature, evolution, and size of different migration systems (Castles, 2000; Castles and Miller, 2008; Massey et al, 2002).

1. Historical and geopolitical contexts	Each migration corridor has its own history, and there are systems that have been active for more than a century (i.e., the Mexico – US corridor). Colonial history and geopolitical circumstances cannot be ignored. There are cases of national borders crossing the territory of a single ethnic group for example.
2. Internal inequalities and size of countries	The size of the countries and their internal inequalities matter. Economic asymmetries and social inequalities can be as large within countries as they are with neighboring nations (i.e., Brazil or China). In these cases, tensions emerging from these gaps could be resolved within national borders, through internal migration from poor to wealthier regions, with higher labor demand (Skeldon, 2003). This can explain why sometimes international migration is not as high as could be expected based on asymmetries, etc. An indicator showing the ratio of international to internal migrants could be interesting in these situations.
3. Environmental degradation	A third important factor behind certain migration flows is the degradation of the natural environment that includes but goes beyond climate change. Land degradation and desertification, mostly caused by human activities, are gradual processes with catastrophic consequences on the livelihoods of poor population worldwide. Climate change adds an additional pressure, both in the long term

	(global warming, changes in sea level, etc.) and short term (increasing frequency of extreme events such as droughts, floods, hurricanes, etc.) (Castles, 2002).
4. Forced migration caused by violence, conflict, human trafficking, etc, etc.	These are special modalities of forced migration that, although they could be indirectly related to development, they are not considered in the proposed framework.
5. Policy initiatives of the countries involved	There may be unilateral or bilateral policies that directly affect the dynamics of migration corridors. Some of them may address root causes while others just attempt to “manage” migration flows. As they may impact development and human rights, they should be included in the analysis. Examples are temporary working programs, codevelopment, etc. (Pastore, 2003).

B. IMPACTS ON SENDING COUNTRIES

The dominant discourse prioritizes the development potential of remittances (Ratha, 2007); a more comprehensive view should include both their positive and negative impacts, as well as other factors that may be equally relevant for the societies of origin: demographic, social, cultural, behavioural and political impacts, as well as the effects of return migration.

1. Economic impacts of remittances	
a. Contribution to economic growth	These are indicators to assess the multiplier effects of remittances and their impact on the GDP. This potential contribution could be measured with economic models (social accounting matrices and multiplier analysis) (Pyatt and Round, 1985). A useful indicator is the elasticity of GDP with respect to remittances, that allows estimations of how fast remittances should increase in order to maintain a certain GDP growth rate.
b. Contributions to poverty reduction	At the national level, this could be estimated by computing the elasticity of poverty with respect to remittances (Taylor et al, 2005).
c. Impacts on socio-economic inequalities	It is possible to estimate the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient with respect to remittances at the national level (Stark et al, 1988). A positive impact on poverty reduction may (but not necessarily) be coupled with a reduction of inequalities. However, impacts at the local level could have a different sign as not all households in a community or region are remittances receivers.
d. Impacts on inflation	Remittances may have inflationary impacts, which may be high at the local level, particularly when a high proportion is spent in consumption. Economic models can be used to estimate these effects on consumer

	prices at national, regional or local level (Balderas and Nath, 2005).
e. Contributions to macroeconomic stability	Remittances could be an important influx of foreign currency to the economies of sending countries (Loser et al, 2005; Chami et al, 2008). There are several indicators to estimate this contribution: (a) remittances as a percentage of national income, (b) remittances as a proportion of total exports, or (c) remittances as a proportion of foreign direct investment.
f. Fiscal contributions	A significant proportion of remittances is used for consumption and, consequently, generates VAT (value added tax) -- a fiscal contribution that can be measured.
g. Dependency	Indicators of dependency identify whether or not the macroeconomic stability of the national economy depends on remittances (Loser et al, 2005). A high level of dependency implies that the national economy relies on a continuous and sustained flow of remittances.
h. Productive impacts	These indicators measure the direct contribution of remittances when they are invested in productive activities. They may include the nature of the activities supported by migrants' investments as well as the nature of the remittance (familiar or collective).
i. Investments in infrastructure	These are indicators that measure the impact of collective remittances invested in social infrastructure (as in 3X1 programs) (Garcia Zamora, 2007). The indicator should quantify the counterparts to the migrants' investments (state or central government, etc.). Even if marginal at the national level, these investments may be significant at the local and community level.
2. Social costs of reproduction (human capital)	These are indicators that measure the cost of social reproduction of migrants. These investments by the sending country are lost if migrants remain in the receiving country during most of their working life.
a. Health investments	This indicator quantifies how much the sending country has invested in the health of its migrants before they leave the country.
b. Education investments	This indicator quantifies how much the sending country has invested in the education of its migrants before they leave the country.
c. Costs of upbringing to families	It is possible to compute the average costs of upbringing of a person up to working age in a given community – a cost mainly borne by families, but also relevant for a society as a whole.
3. Demographic impacts	

<p>a. Transfer of demographic dividend</p>	<p>Many sending countries are late in their demographic transitions; that is a “demographic window” with a high share of working age people in the population and low demographic dependency. The “dependency ratio” shows the relationship between the number of persons outside the economically active population and the number of persons available to support them (people of working age). The indicator should estimate the cost of losing this dividend as a result of emigration.</p>
<p>b. Population decline</p>	<p>This indicator must quantify severe cases of depopulation in high migration regions within a country, or in the country as a whole. One way to do it is computing rates of emigration vs. natural population growth rates (which could be disaggregated by regions).</p>
<p>4. Impacts of return migration</p>	<p>The relevance of the various impacts of return migration calls for more attention to this issue, frequently neglected (including disaggregation of this category by gender, age, etc.) (Diatta and Mbow, 1999).</p>
<p>a. Financial contributions to the economy</p>	<p>This indicator quantifies the financial contributions of migrants who return with capital to invest in the home country economy.</p>
<p>b. Contribution of human capital</p>	<p>This indicator estimates the human capital contribution (education, etc.) of migrants when they return. The indicator must consider the migrants’ age at re-entry (Schiff, 2005).</p>
<p>c. Technology transfer</p>	<p>This indicator estimates migrants’ contributions upon return in terms of new technologies that may be useful for sending countries.</p>
<p>d. Organization and entrepreneurial capacity</p>	<p>This indicator estimates migrants’ contributions upon return in terms of organization and entrepreneurial capacity. (McCormick and Wahba, 2001). The indicator must consider the migrants’ age at re-entry.</p>
<p>5. Social and cultural impacts</p>	
<p>a. Health impacts</p>	<p>This indicator looks at impacts on the epidemiological profile of the sending country as affected by migration flows -- HIV/AIDS for example (Hernandez et al, 2004).</p>
<p>b. Behavioral impacts</p>	<p>Migration flows prompt behavioral changes in the sending country’s society (consumerism, gender attitudes, criminal behavior, etc.). Remittances may create conspicuous consumption that generates imitative demand by other members of the society. Indicators are needed to estimate the impact of these “social remittances”, which are often uncritically considered as being all positive to sending countries (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2010).</p>

6. Political impacts	Many diasporas have become powerful political actors in national and local politics. Migrants' organizations are acting as transnational "change agents". Sending countries are recognizing this influence, sometimes institutionalized through the right to vote in national elections, representation in the congress, etc. Indicators are needed to estimate these political impacts (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001).
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C. IMPACTS ON RECEIVING COUNTRIES

The dominant discourse tends to ignore the positive contributions of migrants to the receiving societies and even portray migrants as a burden to the economy, and to the host society in general. The following list of indicators is an attempt to create a more balanced view.

1. Economic impacts	
a. Contributions to the GDP and its growth	This is an indicator that measures migrants' contribution to the GDP of the host country and its growth. One indicator is the ratio between percentage of migrants in the total population and their contribution as percentage of the GDP (Nadadur, 2009; RIMD, 2008).
b. Salary transfer	This indicator measures the difference between contributions to the GDP by different workers groups, and total salaries received. If migrants receive less than native workers, while performing similar work, there is a transfer of wages from the migrants to other sectors of the host society.
c. Fiscal contributions	These are indicators that measure migrants' contributions to the national accounts through various taxes: income tax, VAT, social security, etc. These fiscal contributions can be measured as: (a) the percentage of social security revenues from migrants, (b) the ratio of social benefits received by migrants (through various social programs) vs. their contributions to the system; (c) the value of the contributions by irregular migrant workers to the SS system that is not claimed at the end of the fiscal year; and (d) the value of these unclaimed contributions as a percentage of the SS budget; that is how many pensions are financed by the contributions of these irregular migrants (Schumacher-Matos 2010).
d. Savings in costs of preparation and training of the labor force	This indicator estimates the savings for the host countries when they receive migrants who have been already educated and trained in sending countries. It can

	be computed through measurements of how much receiving countries would have had to invest in order to train this number of foreign workers.
e. Contributions to innovations systems and technology development	The contributions of highly skilled migrants to receiving countries (Alarcón, 2000; Kerr and Lincoln, 2008) could be estimated combining three indicators: (a) the savings that emerge from those highly qualified migrants trained in receiving countries with scholarships from countries of origin, who do not return; (b) patents generated by immigrant scientists; and (c) the percentage of migrants in R&D in the receiving country.
f. Impacts on labor -- displacement / replacement	There are indicators that show whether migrant workers displace native workers from their positions (as the dominant discourse states), or replace them as a result of demographic shifts and social mobility of the native labor force (Borjas et al, 1996). This information could be obtained through estimates of the labor absorption capacity of countries of destination.
g. Impacts on poverty	These indicators assess the impact of a massive influx of poor migrants on poverty rates in receiving countries (Raphael and Smolensky, 2008).
2. Demographic impacts	In general, societies in receiving countries are going through a process of aging, with an unfavorable dependency ratio and serious economic, social and cultural disruptions, which may be offset by immigration (Passel and Cohn, 2008; Jackson and Howe, 2008; McDonald and Kippen, 2000).
a. Contributions to demographic growth	This indicator measures the impacts of immigration on the overall population growth of receiving countries. The indicator could also measure the “native population” growth as a result of children of migrants born in the host country (in many countries they are considered citizens) (U.N., 2001).
b. Impacts on the age structure	This indicator quantifies the contribution of migrants and their descendants in changing the age structure in receiving countries (generally offsetting aging processes).
c. Transfer of the demographic dividend	This indicator estimates how immigration contributes to reduce the “dependency ratio” in receiving countries.
3. Social and cultural impacts	Immigration almost often generates tensions and even social conflicts in the host society (discrimination, religious conflicts, racist movements, etc.). These indicators, which are not easy to construct, seek to assess these impacts.
a. Migration irregularity	In most well established migration corridors there is a percentage of migrants that are in irregular situation: have crossed the border through irregular channels, or

	have overstayed their visas, etc. (Ghosh, 1998). A high level of irregularity could become a serious problem to the host society and to migrants themselves.
b. Criminality	Irregular migration has been often associated with delinquency and even with criminality but the evidence needs to show a causal relation (Rumbaut, 2008). There are indicators that attempt to depict the impact of immigration on criminality rates, for example, through measuring incarceration rates among migrants vs. the rates in the native population.
c. Health impacts	This indicator looks at impacts on the epidemiological profile of the receiving country as affected by migration flows – TB rates for example (El Aouad et al, 2009; Gilbert et al, 2009).
d. Impacts on national security	In many receiving countries, migration policies have become part of the national security agenda, particularly after the 9/11 events (Rudolph, 2007). Another aspect of this conundrum is the possible link between migration and organized crime (drug traffic, human traffic, etc.). Indicators are needed to objectively assess whether or not these links are real.

D. IMPACTS ON MIGRANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES

Although there is no doubt about the profound impacts of migration on the life and livelihoods of migrants and their families, these are often neglected in the current debate, and when they become part of it, migrants are often portrayed as winners (better jobs, better salaries, etc.). A more balanced appraisal of costs and benefits requires a broader set of indicators than those usually used, including some to assess the impacts on the migrants' families – those that reside in the country of destination as well as the relatives who have been left behind in the country of origin. It is also important to disaggregate impacts by gender. In some corridors, this dimension should also consider the situation of migrants in countries of transit.

1. Economic impacts	
a. Impacts on poverty	These indicators elucidate the overall impacts of migration on the poverty status of migrants and their families. They should measure the impacts of the new jobs at destination as well as the impacts of remittances on the families left behind (Shroff, 2009; Taylor et al, 2005; Adams, 2004; Raphael and Smolensky, 2008). A common indicator is the percentage of migrants' families that will move out of poverty as a result of receiving remittances.


b. Impacts on families' wellbeing	These indicators go beyond impacts on poverty. Although remittances may not be enough to move households out of poverty, they may contribute to an overall improvement of livelihood conditions and living standards of recipient households.
c. Impacts on social mobility	These are indicators that evaluate the impacts on social mobility including migrants and second generation (Zhou et al, 2008; Borjas, 2006, Portes and Zhou, 1993). They should provide information to assess whether or not social mobility is affected by gender (Chen et al, 2007).
2. Impacts on labor conditions	
a. Salary discrimination	These indicators quantify differences in salaries between migrants and native workers with similar employment, and must address the influence of gender (Purkayastha, 2005).
b. Labor precariousness in the receiving country	Although immigrants may find jobs in the receiving country, the levels of labor precariousness may be high (Goldring and Landault, 2009; Cranford et al, 2003)
c. Occupational segregation	These indicators assess whether or not there is under- or overrepresentation of migrants in certain jobs, particularly, analyzing whether or not migratory condition leads to low quality jobs. The analysis should also address gender segregation in the labor market (Schrover and van der Leun, 2007).
3. Impacts on human rights	
a. Right to safe mobility	Indicators are needed to assess the impacts on these rights in different host and transit countries. A useful tool is the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, a composite index to present data on civic citizenship and inclusion policies in the EU in a way that allows for comparison between Member States. The index is computed assuming that immigrant inclusion requires: 1) labor market inclusion, 2) family reunion, 3) long term residence, 4) naturalization, and 5) anti-discrimination policies (Citron and Gowan, 2004).
b. Labor rights	
c. Access to residence and citizenship	
d. Right to family reunification	
e. Access to social services	
4. Social and cultural impacts	
a. Family disintegration and new family relationships	Indicators are needed to evaluate the impacts of migration on migrants' families functioning patterns. Influences on children must be particularly assessed. It is important in some corridors to evaluate the cost and benefits of the dynamics of transnational families.

b. Uprooting and identity loss	Indicators (mostly qualitative) to evaluate the impact on migrants and their families of the displacement to a very different environment (including different values, language, etc.). These indicators should consider the special case of minorities (indigenous migrants for example).
c. Impacts of social networks	It is important to assess the presence and impacts of migrants' networks in certain corridors as they contribute to protect migrants against human rights abuses, become safety nets in periods of crisis, etc.
d. Health impacts	Indicators that measure the impact of migration on the health status of migrants and their families. The indicators should consider the access to public health systems in the host countries.

IV. INTEGRATION AND FINAL OUTCOMES

The list of possible indicators for each of the four dimensions of the analysis is necessarily long; this is to be expected considering the complexity of the migration – human rights – development nexus. There is no shortcut if the goal is a comprehensive assessment in response to the dominant reductionist view. Figure 2 illustrates the complexity of the assessment.

Figure 2. Only for one dimension -- “Impacts on Countries of Origin” – there are six areas of impact with several indicators in each. The situation is similar for the other four dimensions.



Integrating and weighting indicators within each analytical dimension is a methodological challenge; normalization and integration across the four dimensions, in order to comprehensively characterize the situation in each country or migration corridor, allowing comparative analysis, is an even more complex task.

Fortunately, these methodological problems have been already addressed by similar projects on multicriteria evaluations, such as those on environmental sustainability, citizenship and inclusion, etc. (Van Passel and Meul, 2010; Citron and Gowan, 2005; Giampietro, 2003; Giampietro et al, 2006). As migration is not a “hard system”, weighting and integration is not just a mathematical exercise; there is not a single solution (Checkland, 2001). The process must ensure that the perspectives of the various stakeholders are taken into account, without the bias of the current approach. Participatory methodologies have been used in similar situations (Lopez Ridaura et al, 2002).

Although the assessment will be complex, the final product must be easy to understand and use by non-experts while, at the same time, allowing deep analysis if needed. Using countries as the units of evaluation is cumbersome when there are countries of emigration and immigration, making comparisons meaningless. As previously discussed, the use of migration corridors as the unit of analysis is conceptually sound and appears as a more meaningful solution (Carling, 2010).

The goal of a single numerical index to characterize the migration – development – human right situation in each unit of analysis is attractive but difficult. This is the solution adopted with the HDI. Certainly, a single index facilitates cross-country comparisons and longitudinal analysis. But the HDI is applied to individual countries. It is well known that the final HDI for a country does not spell out which are the main factors behind a low or high index. In addition, there are methodological problems in defining a single index such as the normalization across dimensions that are conceptually different -- causes and impacts.

A graphical, multi-criteria pattern representation could provide a more appropriate, comprehensive, and easier to understand picture for the overall performance of each corridor (Gomiero and Giampietro, 2005; Munda, 2004). This will allow comparisons across corridors as well as analysis of the evolution of the corridors’ performance along a period of time. This graphical representation (that could be a “radar diagram” or a similar solution), requires first the analysis of each dimension separately. The outcome within each dimension, which involves several indicators, could be represented as a single index for this dimension; this index could be plotted in one of the radiuses in the radar diagram (Figure 3). The migration – development – human rights “picture” for each unit (corridor) will have four indices along the four radiuses (one for each dimension). Higher indices (+) mean “better situations”. Figure 3 shows a critical threshold (dotted red circle in the diagram) separating acceptable from unacceptable situations .

Figure 3. The diagram shows a situation in a migration corridor where there are slight net negative impacts on countries of origin, moderately positive impacts on countries of destination (high index), but the impacts on migrants and their families are quite negative (low index), unacceptable, and the root causes of migration are not addressed adequately (low index).





Figure 4 depicts a comparison between two corridors with very different migration – development – human rights “pictures”.

Figure 4. This diagram portray a much better condition for Corridor B, with a more balanced cost / benefit ratio between the sending and the receiving country. Corridor B also depicts a better situation for the migrants and their families. The condition of migrants and their families in Corridor A is unacceptable.



V. LESSONS FROM THE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA


A. EXAMPLE OF STRATEGIC INDICATORS FOR THESE CORRIDORS

Migration corridors from Latin America to the U.S. provide valuable insights into the nexus between migration, development and human rights, thus, they are good test cases for the proposed framework. This section introduces a set of indicators that apply to this case. This is a partial exercise and does not include all the indicators previously described. Obviously, the indicators used here cannot be consistently applied to other migration contexts, but they do exemplify the analytical potential of the system.

1. Causes of migration

Socioeconomic asymmetries in the region are closely linked with migratory dynamics. The relationship between the relative productivity of the economy between Latin America and the US, and emigration rates to the US is a good indicator. Graph 1 shows how these two variables evolved in opposite directions between 1970 and 2007.

Graph 1. Relative productivity index of Latin America vis-à-vis the United States (1970=100) and emigration rate to the U.S. (%) during same period (1970 – 2007).




Sources: SIMDE2, based on CEPALSTAT, *Estadísticas de América Latina y el Caribe*; CEPAL (2010), *Time for equality*; Census Bureau, US Population Census (1970 – 2000), and *Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2007*

² SIMDE is an information system being developed by the International Network on Migration and Development (INMD).

These asymmetries in productivity are related to the dynamics of labor markets in both sending and receiving countries. Opposite trends characterize these markets in Latin America and the US: surplus in the demand side in the latter and deficit in the former. The surplus in Latin America generates a rapid growth of the informal sector (more than 55% of the total employment) and a growing pressure to migrate (Graph 2). Surplus on one side and deficit in the other end complement each other.

Graph 2. Growth of job offer and workforce in the United State and Latin America, 2000 -2008 (in millions of people).



Source: SIMDE, based on *Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2000 y 2008* .

This inverse correlation between migration and productive and labor asymmetries becomes more evident when Latin American countries are grouped according to levels of development. Table 1 shows that those countries with higher development levels, which also exhibit better economic and wellbeing indicators, are the ones that show lower emigration rates.

Table 1. Selected wellbeing and international migration indicators based on development level for countries in Latin America (2008).

Indicator	Latin America	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
		Countries with higher development (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay)	Countries with moderate development (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela)	Countries with lower development (Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Dominican Republic)
Remittances per capita (USD, 2000)	81.6	35.6	90.0	177.5
Remittances as GDP percentage, 2008	2.0%	0.5%	1.7%	9.0%
Migrants as population percentage , 2008	3.7%	1.9%	4.8%	6.3%
Per capita GDP 2008 (USD at 2000 prices)	4074	6601	5320	1975
Demographic dependency rate 2005-2010	60.9	52.9	54.8	68.3
Poor population around 2008 (%)	38.4	19.7	35.1	52.1
Indigent population around 2008 (%)	18.1	6.7	14.7	26.8
Informal sector employed around 2008 (percentages of total employed population)	55.7	41.6	55.3	65.3
Tax burden including social contributions, 2007-2008 (percentage of GDP)	18.7	24.8	13.7	16.4
Public social spending 2007 - 2008 (USD at 2000 prices)	597	1209	619	181
Public social spending 2007-2008 (percentages of GDP)	13.3	18.6	11.8	10.2
Retirement pension coverage (percentages), urban areas	33	64.4	26.6	14.1
Percentage declaring out-of-pocket expenditure on health care	49.7	23.3	35.1	72.1

Sources: SIMDE based on CEPALSTAT, *Estadísticas de America Latina y el Caribe*, CEPAL (2010), Census Bureau, USA, and Current Population, March Supplement (1995 – 2007).


2. Impacts of migration to receiving countries

Economic contributions

Immigrant contributions to economic growth

To date, few studies have examined immigrant contributions to the GDP of receiving nations. Migrants' contribution to the GDP is a revealing indicator. Graph 3 shows contributions made by Latin American migrants to U.S GDP growth for the 2000 – 2007 period.

Graph 3. GDP growth contribution based on worker ethnicity and migratory condition (2000-2007).




Sources: SIMDE based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Gross Domestic Product by Industry Accounts* (1995 – 2007), and US Bureau of Census, *Current Population Survey, March Supplement* (1995 – 2007).

Salary transfer

Another indicator to estimate migrants' contribution to the host society is the difference between salaries actually received and the amount that they should have received according to their productivity and contributions to GDP (Graph 4). If this differential exists, it shows discrimination against migrant workers, and a net salary transfer appropriated by non-migrant laborers.

Graph 4. Estimated salary transfers among major ethnic groups in the US (2005 – 2007).




Sources: SIMDE, based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Gross Domestic Product by Industry Accounts (2000 to 2007)*, and US Bureau of Census, *Current Population Survey, March Supplement (2000 - 2007)*.

Fiscal contributions

Migrants also contribute to the US public finances through their taxes. Taxes paid can be compared against the cost of migrants' use of public services. Graph 5 shows this ratio for 2008. While the native white population receives 1.4 times the value of their taxable income through public programs, migrants only get 0.5 of their contribution. This is another transfer from migrants to other sectors of the host society.

Graph 5. Ratio between taxes to benefits received from public social services in the US (2008).




Source: US Bureau of Census, *Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2008*.

Demographic contributions

There is an important demographic contribution of migrants to the host societies, frequently aging, as in the case of the US. Graph 6 shows how migrants in general, and particularly those from Latin America and their descendents, become a first order compensatory factor for demographic disequilibria in the US.

Graph 6. Demographic growth rates of different ethnic groups in the US (2000 – 2008) (annual percentage)



Source: US Bureau of Census, *Current Population Survey, March Supplement* (2000 and 2008).

3. Impacts of migration on sending countries

Remittance contributions to the economy

The contributions of remittances -- to the GDP, to poverty reduction, and to maintain macroeconomic stability – cannot be neglected. Table 2 shows estimates for the three Latin American countries with higher migration to the US: Mexico, El Salvador, and Ecuador. Overall, the impacts on national poverty rates and levels of inequality are limited. It is revealing to see important differences across countries; the contribution of remittances is much more important to El Salvador than to Mexico, a country with a larger and more diversified economy, where the impact is diluted. Besides, in El Salvador, a large proportion of households are remittance receivers. From this data one could affirm that although remittances may contribute to maintain the macroeconomic stability of certain countries, they cannot be the engines of sustainable development processes.

Table 2. Economic impact of remittances in three selected countries (2001 – 2008).

Remittance contribution to GDP growth	Mexico	El Salvador	Ecuador
Remittances as a proportion of the GDP (2001-2008)	2.1%	16.8%	5.6%
Average annual remittance growth (%)	21.3%	7.1%	7.8%
Average annual GDP growth based on this remittance growth	1.3%	2.6%	2.0%
Required migration growth to maintain said GDP growth over 5 years	33.6%	24.6%	56.0%
Remittance contribution to poverty reduction			
Remittance-receiving households (ca 2002)	5.7%	17.2%	5.9%
Remittances as a proportion of receiving household income (ca 2002)	36%	34%	36%
Remittances per capita in receiving households, dollars per person (ca 2002)	80	45	76
Percentage of remittance-receiving households that overcome poverty	20%	26%	20%
Proportion of said households in relation to the total of poor households in the country	1.3%	4.5%	0.9%
Impact of remittances in inequality reduction (Gini)	1.3%	4.7%	1.0%
Remittance contribution to macroeconomic stability			
Remittances as a proportion of exports	8%	83%	18%
Remittances as a proportion of direct foreign investment (DFI)	82%	253%	335%


Sources: SIMDE, based on CEPAL (2005); CEPALSTAT, *Estadísticas de América Latina y el Caribe*; IMF, *World Economic Outlook Data Base*, April 2010; US Census Bureau, *Current Population Survey, March Supplement*, several years.

Finally, while remittances do not live up to their reputation in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction, their effect is quite different when we look at them as currency sources that contribute to basic macroeconomic stability, especially in terms of the external balance. In Mexico, although remittances are only 8% of exports, they represent a currency flow that almost equals that generated by direct foreign investment. These macroeconomic impacts of remittances are even more significant in El Salvador where remittances represent a currency flow that almost equals that of exports and is more than twice the amount of direct foreign investment.

Demographic impacts: the export of the demographic dividend

Emigration does not only lead to population loss; it also entails a drain of active population and, in that sense, a loss of the demographic dividend. This could have a high long term impact for sending countries, depending on the stage of their demographic transitions, as shown in Graph 7. In Mexico, practically half of those who joined the workforce during the period 2000 – 2008 left for the United States. Labor emigration to the US in this period represented a 21% drain of the Latin American workforce.

Graph 7. Demographic dividend export from Latin America to the US (loss in workforce growth due to emigration to the United States, in percentage of those entering into the labor force between 2000 and 2008. (% of total workforce).




Sources: SIMDE based on CEPALSTAT, *Estadísticas de América Latina y el Caribe*; US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March Supplement (2000 and 2008).

Social costs of reproduction

When the contributions of remittances are discussed, the cost of having migrants sending them is frequently ignored. Remittances are not a net contribution to the economy. From the standpoint of the sending country, there is a loss in human capital, as shown when the social investment in these workers that leave the country is computed: education, training, etc. Graph 8 shows an estimate of the investment in social reproduction in general, and education in particular, for migrant workers from Mexico that arrived in the US between 1994 and 2008. This only includes a basic cost of maintenance plus public education considering age and educational level at the time of arrival. The total investment from Mexico almost doubled the volume of remittances received during the same period.

Graph 8. México: Cost of education and social reproduction of immigrants who entered the US between 1994 and 2008 (billions of 2008 US dollars), and amount of remittances sent during the same period.




Sources: SIMDE based on Current Population Survey (1994-2008); CONEVAL, Poverty Lines in Mexico, and Educational Statistics Yearbook in Mexico (2008).

4. Impacts of migration on migrants and their families

Index of labor precariousness

In general, the migrant population risks higher levels of economic and social vulnerability than other social groups within the host society. Graph 9 portrays this vulnerability as an index of labor precariousness that integrates chances for unionization, lack of health insurances paid by employers, lack of pensions or retirement benefits, and part-time work. The differences between migrants (specially from Latin America) and native workers are clear.

Graph 9. Level of labor precariousness in the US for migrant and native workers (2007).




Sources: SIMDE based on *Current Population Survey, March Supplement (2007)*.

Occupational segregation

Labor precariousness is compounded by the occupational segregation that characterizes the labor insertion of Latin American immigrants in the United States. A way of measuring this is to look at the proportion of workers employed in jobs that require levels of qualification that are below the qualifications of the migrants (Graph 10).

Graph 10. Proportion of the population with higher education in the US working in manual or low qualification areas (in percentage).




Source: SIMDE based on *Current Population Survey, March Supplement* (2007).

Inter-generational social mobility

The conditions of high vulnerability and social segregation that characterize the life of Latin American immigrants in the US have direct impact on the possibilities for upward social mobility for them and for their descendants (when, presumably, the second generation has better opportunities to integrate into the receiving society). Graph 11 shows how the conditions of poverty and marginalization are reproduced across generations.

Graph 11. Latin-American immigrants and native population of Latin America origin living below poverty in the US (2007 – 2008) (in percentage).



Source: SIMDE based on *Current Population Survey, March Supplement (2007 – 2008)*.

B. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CORRIDORS IN LATIN AMERICA

This partial assessment³ of migration from Latin America to the US, especially the Mexico – US corridor, depicts a scenario that is far from a win-win-win situation. Overall, the analysis of the costs / benefits balance for sending and receiving countries, as well as migrants and their families, shows an overall worrisome situation, with costs offsetting most benefits for all parties involved.

For the migrants and their families, the key dimension of the analysis, migration represents an option to escape from conditions of high marginalization in their home countries, perhaps one of the few options. But although they receive some economic benefits from migration, the costs are high in most other accounts. Migrants confront serious violations of their human rights all along the migration journey, vulnerability is high at transit and destination and upon arrival, and working conditions are precarious. Labor degradation is widespread, with many migrants in jobs that are below their capacities. Opportunities for social mobility are low and poverty persists in the second generations.

³ Considering the approach outlined in previous sections, this assessment is far from complete. There are many gaps, and more indicators are needed for the four dimensions, in order to come out with a more comprehensive and accurate view. Even for the Mexico – US corridor, lack of relevant information is serious.


In terms of impacts on the countries of origin, a second analytical dimension, the situation is similar. The indicators do not support the claim of an overall positive impact. Remittances contribute to the GDP, poverty reduction, and to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. However, these benefits differ across countries, and seem to be really significant for small economies, when migration rates are high-- El Salvador for example. In these cases, however, national economies become highly dependent on remittances and, as a consequence very vulnerable to external crisis. The differences with Mexico in terms of contributions to the economy and poverty reduction at the national level are noteworthy. But the costs for sending countries are high, and often overlooked. Indicators show demographics impacts that may have serious long term consequences (i.e., transfer of the demographic dividend and depopulation in some cases). Finally, the data show that sending countries are investing highly in social reproduction of their migrants, and these costs are not recovered through remittances.

For the US, several indicators bring out benefits that are often neglected. Migrants make significant contributions to the US economy though their work is underpaid. There is salary discrimination -- another benefit for the US economy. The fiscal contributions of migrants are considerable, particularly to the US social security system. In terms of demography, the US is capturing the demographic dividend from the sending countries, which compensate the aging of the native population. Certainly, the high level of irregular migration is a serious problem for the host society; however, the cost / benefit balance is not as negative as usually described.

Finally, in term of root causes – the remaining dimension in the analysis -- the evidence shows strong structural factors that perpetuate asymmetries and social inequalities, and nurture a cycle of poverty and marginalization that will be difficult to break without a reorientation of public policies and development strategies. Differences in productivity are increasing. The salary gap is wide. Labor market structures in sending and receiving countries are complementary – surplus at one end, deficit at the other end -- generating strong migration pressures. As these root causes are not being addressed, chances that the situation will improve in the future are weak.

Although this partial assessment does not provide enough information as to assign “indices” to the four analytical dimensions (and this is not the objective of this exercise), it is possible to visualize the situation in the corridor and compare it to an ideal win-win-win situation (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Hypothetical comparison between the migration – development – human rights situation of Latin-American – US migration corridors, and an ideal win-win-win situation.



RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

The following list of recommendations emerges from the complex nature of the project and from the lessons learnt from the experience in Latin America discussed in the previous section:

- ❖ To bring this proposal to the UN, as its involvement is crucial for the overall project. More specifically, as an important global network of civil society organizations -- the PGA (People Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights) -- has endorsed the project, it could be introduced as a civil society initiative into the process of the IV Global Forum on Migration and Development in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico (November 2010), aiming at the UN's High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013. Actually, the idea has been well received by the Presidency of the IV GFMD -- the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Mexico.
- ❖ To involve several UN regional organizations such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), into the process to discuss strategies for regional implementation.

- ❖ To bring the proposal to the OECD as this organization, with several members that are major receiving countries, has a working group on international migration whose objective is to monitor migration movements and policies in member countries and outside the OECD area, and to promote an in-depth analysis of the economic and social aspects of migration.
- ❖ To organize a Steering Committee, with the purpose of moving the proposal forward, and with representation of key international organizations, representatives of the civil society, and selected academic institutions such as the International Network on Migration and Development among others.
- ❖ To organize a High Level Expert Group to continue refining the overall framework and selecting indicators that could be applicable to different migration corridors.

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