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POPULATION AGEING AND POPULATION DECLINE**

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**POLICY RESPONSES TO POPULATION AGEING AND
POPULATION DECLINE IN GERMANY ***

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A. POPULATION PROSPECTS

1. Comparing the assumptions of two recent German population prospects with the UN population prospects

Recently the German Federal Statistical Office published its 9th co-ordinated population prospects (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000) and the German Federal Ministry of Interior a new set of model calculations of population (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2000), both up to 2050. While the assumptions of the first are co-ordinated between the Federal Statistical Office and the 16 State Statistical Offices, the latter are agreed upon by a ministerial working group on population matters under the competence of the Ministry of Interior with the advice of the Federal Statistical Office and the Federal Institute for Population Research.

a. Sub-populations

The two sets of recent German population prospects differentiate between the populations in East and West Germany, those of the Federal Ministry of Interior also between foreigners and Germans since there are still enormous differences in demographic behaviour, in age structure and regional distribution of these sub-populations. East Germany displays lower fertility, life expectancy and immigration than West Germany. Foreigners live mainly in West Germany and there in urban areas, they have a higher fertility, life expectancy and immigration surplus than Germans.

One major criticism of the UN-study on Replacement Migration is the neglect of distinguishing native and immigrant population both in the basis population and in the assumptions on their respective demographic behaviour. Of course, this would increase data needs. But the results would be much more instructive because the stock of immigrants matters in the debate as well as adaptations in demographic behaviour and the trends in naturalisations. Here is room for improvement of further UN studies in this field.

Both German population prospects are based on the population as of 1.1.1998.

b. Fertility

Both German population prospects assume a constantly low fertility. The Federal Statistical Office assumes 1.4 births per woman, a level which will be reached by East Germans in 2005 increasing from 1.1 in 1998. The Federal Ministry of Interior assumes for West Germans a small fall from 1.4 to 1.35 until 2000, an increase for East Germans from 1.1 to 1.35 in 2005, and for foreigners a constant level of 1.5, which is indeed remarkably low in Germany.

The assumption of our distinguished UN colleagues in the medium variant of the 1998 revision to increase fertility in Germany up to 1.64 are already much more modest than in earlier revisions, and have been criticised *inter alia* by Höhn and Dorbritz (2000). German demographers do not share this optimism. As a matter of fact, the two German official projections discussed here are the first without differing fertility assumptions. The constant low fertility level in West Germany since nearly 30 years is a purely demographic, though strong argument. Theoretical and empirical, survey-based deliberations do not leave room for assuming an increasing fertility in Germany.

c. Mortality

Both German population prospects assume an increase of life expectancy. The 9. co-ordinated population projection assumes life expectancy to increase from 74.4/80.5 years in West Germany and 71.8/79.6 years in East Germany (1998) to 78.1/84.5 years in Germany in 2050. Also it adds a variant with an additional increase of life expectancy up to 80.1/86.4 years in 2050. In the population prospects of the Federal Ministry of Interior life expectancy increases from 73.6/80.5 years in 1998 to 78.1/84.5 years (West Germans), for the East Germans from 71.8/79.6 years in 1998 also to 78.1/84.5 years in 2050. Foreigners have a higher life expectancy (81.5/87.6 years) which is hold constant.

The main mortality assumption of the German population prospects are quite well in line with those of the 1998 revision of the UN: 78.9/84.5 years in 2040/50.

d. Migration

Both German population prospects assume several variants to reflect uncertainty about the dimension of international migration and to show the impact of migration on the age structure. Therefore there is a variant without any migration. The immigration of Germans (ethnic Germans in the main) is expected to level out from 80 000 in 1998 to reach 0 in 2040. For foreigners the 9. co-ordinated population projection assumes 2 variants: starting from minus 50 000 in 1998 (!) over (assumed) 20 000 in 1999 immigration increases to plus 100 000 to be reached in 2003 respectively to plus 200 000 to be reached in 2008 remaining constant up to 2050. The model calculation of the Federal Ministry of Interior adds a third variant with an increase of immigration to 300 000 to be reached in 2013, then remaining constant. Also the population prospects of the Federal Ministry of Interior assume naturalisation taking into consideration the new legislation and the levels of immigration.

The migration assumption of the 1998 revision is hence rather close to the “200 000” variant in the two German population prospects. The temporal distribution is different, however, since the UN assumes 240 000 per annum up to 2005 then going to 200 000.

2. Comparing the results of two recent German population prospects with the UN population prospects

a. The medium variant

In table 1 we have compiled the German variants with a migration assumption close to the medium variant of the 1998 revision. The German “200 000” migration assumptions are identical. From the 9th co-ordinated population projections we added the variant assuming a stronger increase of life expectancy (“ e_0+2 ”).

The (small) differences in population size and the potential support ratio (PSR) in 2050 between the 9th co-ordinated population prospect 2 and the Federal Ministry of Interior’s population projection B emanate from structural effects since the 9th co-ordinated prospect is the sum of 16 states’ results, the Federal Ministry of Interior’s is a direct calculation. Assuming a bigger increase in life expectancy yields 1.8 million inhabitants more but lowers the PSR since it increases the number of the elderly.

UN Scenario I adds more immigrants mainly in the first years of calculation when the real migration surpluses were much smaller in Germany. Here we have an age structure and migration effect. PSR was 3.93 in Germany in 1999, so already less favourable than in 1995 (4.41)¹. In the last three decades UN Scenario I allows fertility to increase, so there is also a fertility-induced positive effect on population size and PSR. In any case PSR falls to more than half its value:

- 43.5 % 9th co-ordinated population prospect, variant 2
- 40.8 % 9th co-ordinated population prospect, variant 2 with e_0+2
- 42.4 % Federal Ministry of Interior population prospect, variant B
- 46.5 % UN Scenario I.

This dramatic deterioration of the age structure is the main message.

The small difference in the percent of post-1995 migrants and their descendants (UN Scenario I) and of foreign population (Federal Ministry of Interior) should not give room to complacency. The calculation of the Federal Ministry of Interior considers not only the stock of foreigners (8.9 % in 1999), but also naturalisation.

b. The variant with zero migration

Table 2 shows the rather similar results of projecting population in Germany without any international migration. Population declines and ages much more rapidly. Without immigration the percentage of

foreigners in Germany would fall from 8.9 to 5.4 percent but not to nil. What is even more important: the percentage of foreigners aged 65+ would rise from modest 4.1 % to 53.2 %, while the percentage of Germans aged 65+ would rise from 17.1 % to 31 %.

The PSR would fall to

- 38.3 % 9th co-ordinated population prospect, variant K
- 37.2 % Federal Ministry of Interior, variant K
- 39.7 % UN Scenario II.

The differences in decline of PSR without or with migration are not negligible, but not spectacular. The loss in population, however, is much stronger as compared to the “medium” variants.

c. The impact of migration

In table 3 we bring together the three migration variants in the Federal Ministry of Interior’s population prospects with Scenarios I, III, IV and V. The main message is that the ageing process is inevitable unless one would let Germany’s population grow to 300 million inhabitants (Scenario V).

These are the impacts of immigration on the PSR:

- 39.7 % with “100” thousands net migration p.a. (Federal Ministry of Interior, variant A)
- 42.4 % with “200” thousands net migration p.a. (Federal Ministry of Interior, variant B)
- 44.4 % with “300” thousands net migration p.a. (Federal Ministry of Interior, variant C)
- 46.5 % with 207 thousands net migration p.a. (Scenario I)
- 51.2 % with 324 thousands net migration p.a. (Scenario III)
- 55.3 % with 458 thousands net migration p.a. (Scenario IV)
- 100 % with 3.427 millions net migration p.a. (Scenario V)

Immigration can mitigate the ageing process, but it is no realistic solution to stop it.

B. CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION DECLINE AND POPULATION AGEING

1. The issue of population decline

There is no fear of population decline in Germany. In their national reports for the European Population Conference in Geneva 1993 and for the ICPD in Cairo 1994 Germany never considered its imminent population decline a problem. Likewise in answering the United Nations Population Inquiries among Governments Germany never expressed concern about its growth rate (which was negative in most years of the 70s and 80s in West Germany).

During the past 25 years that I have been asked to advise our government some wanted to know whether population decline would not be beneficial ecologically. But consumption and production patterns have the decisive impact on ecology, not population size, in an industrialised country like Germany.

So Scenario III was not debated at all in Germany.

2. The issue of population ageing

Population ageing is the issue debated in (West) Germany since the mid-seventies. When the 4th co-ordinated population prospects (published in 1974) revealed the future ageing of population an inter-ministerial working group on population issues was founded under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Interior. This interministerial working group prepared population prospects with different fertility assumptions, fertility being rightly considered the main determinant of ageing. It did not foresee an increase of life expectancy, the second determinant of ageing. And it was cautious as to immigration of foreigners in the years after the recruitment stop in 1973; the three migration assumptions were: zero, 20 000 annual net immigration and 55 000 annual net immigration.

As to the fertility assumptions a constant NRR for Germans of 0.627 and for foreigners of 0.84 was the medium variant. For the German population a fall of NRR to 0.5 and a rise to 0.8 was also considered. The results were sobering: The percentage of Germans aged 60+ would rise from 21 % in 1982 to 34 % in 2030, to 40 % with lower fertility and to 31 % with higher fertility (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1984, pp. 135-139). For comparison: The most recent population prospects of the Federal Ministry of Interior show an increase of the percentage of Germans aged 60+ from 23.9 % in 1999 to 35.7-36 % in 2030 and 36.5-37.6 % in 2050, variable with the amount of immigration and related naturalisation of foreigners (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2000, p. 39). The persistence of the issue is remarkable. In addition, the percentage of the foreign population aged 60+ would rise from 7.2 % in 1999 to 41 % (variant A), 34 % (variant B) or 31.4 % (variant C) in 2050 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2000, p. 41), a small demonstration that migrants age too.

The interministerial working group published its first projections in 1984 together with a comprehensive report on the consequences of population change on the various sectors of state and economyⁱⁱ (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1984). The report deals with consequences of population change/ageing on

- family and youth (with a number of interesting remarks on single children, but also on familial support and care of the elderly),
- foreigners (maintain recruitment stop, support integration, improve education and vocational training of youth)
- the economy (the economic trends and structures, e.g. increased productivity and lifelong learning, are considered more decisive than demographic change; the assessment did not go beyond the year 2000),
- the labour market (here unemployment is foreseen for the 1980s to disappear gradually in the 1990s!; the assessment did not go beyond the year 2000),
- the pension system (a major problem to be studied by a commission; a study by the council of social economists to the Federal Minister of Labour found that in order to maintain the pay-as-you-go system either the contribution rate would have to be doubled or the pension level halved, two extremes to be avoided)
- health insurance and provision (the increase of health costs is driven much more by medical progress than by ageing, an assessment partly due to the assumption of constant life expectancy),
- education (small cohorts of students follow big cohorts at different times, less teachers are needed),
- infrastructure and public finance (no major problems).

The report does not suggest any options for political action, it “only” assessed possible consequences of population ageing.

The report of the interministerial working group was presented to the German parliament and initiated a debate. The main problem of population ageing was seen in the maintenance of the pension system, but other issues were also analysed. Teitelbaum and Winter correctly summarise the situation: “Apart from German sangfroid regarding economic issues, there has been some discussion of the implications for the social security system of changes in the age structure” (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985, p.125). And indeed a pension reform law passed Parliament in 1989. In 1992, the first part of the pension reform law became effective: the annual adaptation of the pension level to the development of net incomes (instead of to gross incomes). The demographically more important part, the gradual extension of age at retirement to 65 years, will become effective as of 2001.

The interministerial working group is still active, but after 1984 only updated population prospects were published (the most recent one was presented in section A). Neither a review of the possible consequences, nor an effort to provide recommendations for action were made. So in 1992, German parliament installed an ad hoc study committee (Enquete-Kommission) “Demographic Change” composed of parliamentarians and experts to investigate the “challenge of our ageing society to the individual and the policy”(to translate the subtitle of the committee). The committee published an interim report at the end of legislative period in 1994 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1994). This interim report of 630 pages covers

- the demographic situation including population prospects
- the family and social networks
- the income situation
- active ageing
- housing
- health and medical situation

With the exception of the demographic processes each chapter (most of them on the micro level) provides options for political action. We will comment some of them in the next section. The committee recommended to install a new committee in the next legislative period to approach fields not yet studied, namely the demographic change in the EU, elderly foreigners, migration and integration of migrants, and social security system and macro-level aspects of ageing.

So another ad hoc study committee "Demographic change" started its work in 1995. The report was to assess the following themes

- demographic trends in Germany and in the EU
- the economy and the labour market
- the pension system
- the health and care insurance system
- the family and social networks
- social services
- migration and integration

As it proved impossible to discuss policy options (except concerning the family and social networksⁱⁱⁱ and on migration and integration) the ad hoc committee decided to publish a second interim report of 830 pages in 1998. In the meantime a third ad hoc committee is grappling with the task to come to recommendations on political action.

C. POLICY OPTIONS

1. Demographic options

a. Fertility

None of the West German respectively Federal governments have any intention to influence fertility. While they agree that fertility is too low, they state to take no interventions when responding the UN Population Inquiries.

Already in 1983 Alison McIntosh summarised the attitude of the German government: "On the basis of interviews conducted in 1978, it appeared that the Federal government lacked convincing evidence that population decline constitutes a serious threat to economic growth. The government was also aware that expert opinion is doubtful of the lasting effect of traditional pronatalist incentives. Under these circumstances the Federal government was reluctant to embark on a costly program of incentives to childbearing, the more so since such a program violates the ruling parties' ideological belief about the family and the individual and might be interpreted as an infringement of civil liberties" (McIntosh 1983, pp. 211-212). Alison McIntosh quite ingeniously labels West Germany a "Prisoner of the Past" in that respect. Indeed, the legacy of the racist pronatalist policy of the Nazis still is an additional and unspoken rationale to refrain from any pronatalist measure.

The assessment of Alison McIntosh does not only correctly capture the situation in the seventies under the social-liberal governments, but still characterises the attitude of the christian-liberal governments from 1982 to 1998 and the present social-green government. That does not exclude an interest to develop a family policy which in the meantime is a rather broad and generous one. In their National Report for the ICPD we read: "For the German Government family policy in general and family-relevant political measures have a significance of their own which need not be justified through population-relevant considerations; nevertheless, side-effects considered demographically desirable might occur" (Report of the Government, 1994). Such "side-effects", however, did not occur - and this small sentence was never repeated.

It is therefore typical and according to expectations in Germany that the two ad hoc study committees on Demographic Change unanimously agreed not to add any policy options to influence demographic trends or more precisely fertility. Also the recommendations concerning the family and social networks do not mention any measure to influence fertility. They aim at the further improvement of living conditions of children and parents without any preference for the family form, and at measures to reconcile job and family both for mothers and fathers.

Finally, it is fair to remember that the Population Division prepared their study on Replacement Migration because “the recent experience of low-fertility countries suggests that there is no reason to assume that their fertility will return anytime soon to the above-replacement level” (Population Division, 2000, p. 9)^v

b. Immigration

In (West) Germany, immigration was never regarded as a measure to shape the size or age structure of population. Though Germany so far has never pursued any immigration policy in the strict sense there are three main reasons for immigration

- constitutional (Germans and ethnic Germans)
- humanitarian (asylum seekers)
- economic (foreign workers)

After World War II millions of German refugees and displaced persons came to West Germany. In the 1950s until 1961 Germans from East Germany followed until “the wall” stopped this immigration. In the 1960s, labour force needs led to the recruitment of foreign workers (called “guest worker” at that time); the recruitment stop was launched in 1973 and is, in principle, still in force. Exceptions relate to family members and to members of EU-countries. Recently, a new type of immigration for a limited number of IT-specialists has been introduced. It is called the “green card”- or (in Bavaria) “blue card”-initiative. Chancellor Schröder had announced such a measure at the opening of the Hannover fair in March 2000 to overcome the apparent shortage of computer specialists. Whether Chancellor Schröder was also inspired by the UN study on replacement migration is difficult to say. The discussion of this measure of temporary immigration of highly qualified foreigners, however, took a much higher profile in Germany than the discussion of the UN study.

With Gorbachev's glasnost policy the influx of ethnic Germans from central and eastern Europe started in 1987. These ethnic Germans had settled in those regions (mainly in Russia, Poland and Romania) 200 years ago and now wished to return to the country of their forefathers. A peak of this immigration of ethnic Germans coincided with the hasty east-west migration of East Germans after the opening of the “wall” which was increased by a high number of asylum seekers. This constitutional right of asylum of political refugees was limited in 1993 to those not arriving from “safe third countries”. Also ethnic Germans had to apply with the German embassies in their country of origin to enter Germany. Once in Germany they receive the German passport; children born to foreigners in Germany (second and third generation), however, are still foreigners. As of 2000 they, however, have the option of the German nationality in addition to their foreign nationality, and they have to decide after reaching the age of majority.

Germany also accepted large numbers of refugees of civil war in ex-Yugoslavia who are supposed to return once there is peace again in their region of origin. Finally one should know that only a small fraction of asylum seekers are granted asylum, but many of the refused are nevertheless tolerated to stay as de-facto refugees.

To sum up the variety of situations of migrants in Germany is very complex. The present Government intends to launch an immigration law. The Minister of Interior has established an independent immigration committee who will submit their proposals until mid 2001. The big problem will be how to reconcile economic, humanitarian and constitutional reasons of immigration. There is no controversy neither that immigration will continue, nor that immigration must be regulated.

2. Options of adaptation and reform policies

a. Options to adapt to the decline in working-age population

As I said in the previous section Germany does not pursue any direct population policies, neither to raise fertility, nor to use immigration to prevent the decline in the total population size or the size of the population of active age.

The fact that the number of persons in working age between 20 and 65 years would decline strongly after 2010/15 was already noticed by the interministerial working group when preparing their report on the consequences of demographic change at the beginning of the 1980s. The representatives of the Ministry of Labour, however, convinced the working group that not the demographic change was decisive but the economic constellations. And since it would be extremely difficult to project economic trends longer than 20 years they stopped their analysis with the year 2000 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1984). It should be noted that they expected a shortage of apprentices in the 1990s. But the true and sad fact is that youth unemployment is appallingly high in Germany. And this structural unemployment.

The first ad hoc study committee on Demographic Change of the German Parliament looked into the labour market up to 2030 under status quo-assumptions of economic behaviour^v and stated an increasing imbalance with a shortage of labour after 2010. The ad hoc study committee came up with five options of adaptation:

- increase of labour productivity (use the benefits of computerisation and lean production)
- flexibility of working time (start working earlier, sabbatical years in the family phase, part time work for the elderly)
- increase age at retirement (also of advantage for the social security system)
- promotion of labour force participation of women (a positive trend anyway)
- controlled immigration

These five options are reported in the order they were given (Deutscher Bundestag, 1994). Qualification and lifelong learning were considered of great importance for the ageing labour force as well as for the foreign population in Germany. It also felt that more differentiated models of the labour market with an array of possible economic developments should be studied, a task it transmitted to the next ad hoc study committee.

The second ad hoc study committee on Demographic Change of the German Parliament availed itself of more recent, and more sophisticated studies with plausible alternatives of the future labour market. The sobering common denominator was that unemployment would persist well beyond 2010. As to the non-economic trends, namely the demographic trends this study group saw the effect of demographic relief of the labour market after 2010 (Deutscher Bundestag 1998, p.291). There are no more concerns of a labour shortage in the shadow of structural unemployment. The ad hoc study group could not agree on options. this should be done by the third ad hoc study group.

As it seems we are back to the assessment of the early eighties that in respect of the size of working-age population economic determinants matter foremost, not the demographic decline. We demographers have to note that assessments in this field go beyond population numbers and take into account plausible economic developments as to employment and unemployment and to economic growth. The pure population numbers are only a first indicator of possible problems. We are back to what I summarised at the Expert Group Meeting on the International Transmission of Population Policy Experience in 1988: "The modern economies will need less (expensive) labour that can be (and is) replaced by capital-intensive technology" (Höhn, 1990, p. 157^{vi}). The reaction of German experts to the UN-study on replacement migration and in particular to our media's interpretation of imminent economic decay without immediate large-scale immigration to balance the shrinking working age population in Germany was therefore to dispel these fears (and requests) reminding of current and persistent unemployment (also of foreigners) and other options to overcome an eventual shortage of labour. The main arguments were economic, also what concerns the needed qualification of migrant workers.

b. Options to reform the pension system

The issue of population ageing cannot be solved by immigration. The undesired consequences of ageing on the social security system must be solved by reform of this system and hence by adaptation to population change. However, "a policy of adaptation requires a long period of launching and an observation of mechanisms so far unknown" (Höhn, 1990, p. 157).

This period of observation is now quite long in Germany, some 20 years. Already the interministerial working group considered the need to reform the German pay-as-you-go pension system as the biggest challenge. They considered the introduction of a capital accumulation system of old age income security as less promising (Bundesministerium des Innern, 1984). In Germany, "the existing social

security system is, however, so generous and so flexible that a reform policy with an objective of reducing the level of pensions and increasing contributions by the working population together with an increase in the age at retirement appears feasible. The theoretical alternative, either to halve the pensions or to double the social security contributions, is politically unacceptable" (Höhn, 1990, p. 156). Indeed, the age at retirement was to be raised starting, however, in 2001 only.

The first ad hoc study committee of German Parliament did not analyse the pension system, and the second did not provide any policy options. Their analysis, however, clearly shows that there are in principle several options, unfortunately none where the whole population would benefit financially. And here we come to the crucial problem of acceptance: politicians that take away instead of providing more risk not to be elected. Of course, if one had started reforms earlier the acceptance might have been easier.

The introduction of a "demographic factor"(concerning increase of life expectancy at age 60 with an effect of gradually decreasing the pension level of future pensioners) by the Kohl government in 1998 was immediately abolished by the new government. Some observers believe that Kohl and the christian-democrat lost the elections in 1998 among other reasons because of this pension reform which was called by the social-democrats a measure of "social chill". In the meantime (first in 2000), the pensions are no longer adjusted to the increase of net income but to the (lower) inflation rate. For the last two years, the socialdemocrat government and the trade unions discussed an age of retirement at age 60 (of course, with a view to decrease unemployment), and this idea is dropped now. The plans to reform the German pension system which are under discussion foresee a sizeable decrease of the pension level in order to keep the contribution rate at 20 percent of gross income, they also intend to make an additional private pension scheme compulsory (to be supported by income tax benefits). And there are rumours to extend the age at retirement beyond 65 years. The discussions within the government and between the parties are vivid and controversial. Nothing definite has been decided, but the conviction grows something must be decided. Strangely enough the media are still rather mute on the topic of pension reform. The German system of securing old age income is too complex to be easily understood in its repercussions on the different generations:

- the majority of the population is covered by the compulsory pay-as-you-go system. Half of the contributions of the active population is paid by the employer. A growing part of pensions is assured from federal taxes.
- a number of big corporations voluntarily pay pensions to their former employees.
- civil servants have their own system of pensions (from federal taxes).
- the self-employed acquire life insurances, investment funds, shares or contribute to pension funds
- many Germans own a house or a flat.

A shift from the pay-as-you-go system to a combination with a capital accumulation system is only relatively easy for the younger generations. Middle aged and older persons in the labour force already contributed to the pension system and acquired pension rights, and they would have less years for building up private pensions. The acquired pension rights are however related to future age structure imbalance between the elderly and the working-age population as well as to future level of employment and income.

c. Options to reform the health care system

Health insurance is compulsory for the employed and the pensioners; contributions are related to gross income. Hence contributions become smaller after retirement. The self-employed and the civil servants usually are in a private health insurance where the contribution rate depends of age at entering insurance, age and sex. Here insurance slightly increases with age.

In addition there is a compulsory long-term care insurance for everybody.

The growing expenditures in the health sector are driven by medical progress and a self-service mentality of patients, doctors, hospital and pharmaceutical industry. Numerous measures to limit and control expenditures have been tried in the past. Not long ago all medical services were reimbursed. In the meantime, flat rates have to be paid for medicine or per day in hospital. Doctors have fixed budgets for their services not to be exceeded. Dissatisfaction is growing among patients and doctors.

It seems that the problem to maintain general health provision is not only related to the ageing process but only and even predominantly to medical progress and the existing health care system. This analysis is contained in the second interim report of the ad hoc study committee which, however, does not offer any political options (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998).

ⁱ The question of an optimal PSR remains to be investigated. The assumption of the highest observed PSR is quite insufficient.

ⁱⁱ The recent population prospects of the Federal Ministry of Interior do not provide comments on the consequences.

ⁱⁱⁱ Recommendations already in the first interim report were slightly modified.

^{iv} This statement ends with a reference to the UN publication on Below-replacement fertility (UN, 2000 b) based on the Expert Group Meeting in 1997).

^v These assumptions were rather optimistic shortly after the economic boom due to reunification, and definitely underestimated structural unemployment.

^{vi} Where I also quote the same opinion of the Italian delegation to the ECE Meeting on Population and Development in Budapest 1987.

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TABLE 1 MEDIUM VARIANT POPULATION PROSPECTS FOR GERMANY

	Annual net migration in thousands	Total net migration 1995/8-2050 in millions.	Population 2050 in millions (1995:81.661)	Potential support ratio 2050 (1995: 4.41)	Foreign population 2050 in % (1999: 8.9)
9th co-ordinated, var. 2	90-200	10.360 (1998-2050)	70.381	1.92	n.a.
9th co-ordinated, var. 2, e ₀ +2	90-200	10.360 (1998-2050)	72.012	1.8	n.a.
Fed. Min. of Interior, var. B	90-200	10.360 (1998-2050)	70.265	1.87	17.1
Scenario I	207	11.400 (1995-2050)	73.303	2.05	20

Source: Bundesministerium des Innern (2000). *Modellrechnungen zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Jahr 2050*. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern

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TABLE 2 VARIANT WITH ZERO MIGRATION, POPULATION PROSPECTS FOR GERMANY

	Annual net migration in thousands	Total net migration 1995/8-2050 in millions.	Population 2050 in millions (1995:81.661)	Potential support ratio 2050 (1995: 4.41)	Foreign population 2050 in % (1999: 8.9)
9th co-ordinated, var. K	0	0 (1998-2050)	59.031	1.69	n.a.
Fed. Min. of Interior, var. K	0	0 (1998-2050)	58.624	1.64	5.4
Scenario II	0	0 (1995-2050)	58.812	1.75	-

Source: Bundesministerium des Innern (2000). *Modellrechnungen zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Jahr 2050*. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern

Statistisches Bundesamt (2000). *Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschlands bis zum Jahr 2050. Ergebnisse der 9. koordinierten Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung*. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt

TABLE 3 POPULATION PROSPECTS WITH SEVERAL MIGRATION VARIANTS FOR GERMANY

	Annual net migration in thousands	Total net migration 1995/8-2050 in millions.	Population 2050 in millions (1995:81.661)	Potential support ratio 2050 (1995: 4.41)	Foreign population 2050 in % (1999: 8.9)
Fed. Min. of Interior, var. A	90-100	5.960 (1998-2050)	64.791	1.75	12.2
Fed. Min. of Interior, var. B	90-200	10.360 (1998-2050)	70.265	1.87	17.1
Fed. Min. of Interior var. C	90-300	14.260 (1998-2050)	74.864	1.96	21.4
Scenario I	207	11.400	73.303	2.05	20
Scenario III	324	17.838	81.661	2.26	28
Scenario IV	458	25.209	92.022	2.44	36
Scenario V	3,427	188.497	299.272	4.41	80

Source: Bundesministerium des Innern (2000). *Modellrechnungen zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Jahr 2050*. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern

Statistisches Bundesamt (2000). *Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschlands bis zum Jahr 2050. Ergebnisse der 9. koordinierten Bevölkerungsvorausberechnung*. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt