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TRANSNATIONAL SOLIDARITY: MIGRANT-HOMELAND COOPERATION FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA¹

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. The “return” of the migration-development nexus

The view of migration as the search for a better life has been a quintessential part of human experience. Captured in the popular imaginary as the search for greener pastures, this view was formalized in academic discourse with Ravenstein’s (1889) formulation of the “laws of migration.” While recognizing that migration stems from a range of motivations, Ravenstein stressed the paramount importance of the economic motive: “Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, ungenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing migration currents, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to ‘better’ themselves in material respects” (II, p. 286) (as cited in Lee, 1966:47). Subsequent elaboration of migration theories since Ravenstein – the push-pull framework, the neoclassical approach, the new economics of labor migration, structural analysis, and globalization and migration – continues to emphasize the economic causes of migration. Less-economically oriented frameworks, such as social networks and transnationalism, may point to non-economic factors as sustaining migration, but invariably, the root causes of migration boil down to economic inequalities. Thus, the migration-development nexus is implied and runs through the strands of various theoretical currents in migration.1

International migration policies, particularly those dealing with labor migration, are also framed in economic terms, of which the underlying dynamics is the lack of capital and excess labor in the origin and the abundance of capital and labor shortage in the destination. Migrant workers tend to be viewed mostly as economic actors, whose labor or talent circulates in the global labor market, subject to the rules and regulations of states of origin, transit and destination. In general, state-to-state, regional or multilateral discussions on migration tend to focus on regulating the movement of people whereas discussions on the human rights of migrants have been downplayed. The low ratification of international instruments concerning migrant workers reflects the difficulty of forging a consensus in the international community concerning the rights of migrant workers. To date, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families has been ratified by 40 states (as of 31 January 2009),2 all sending states. In general, states were not inclined to discuss the issue of migrants’ rights. In recent years, reports about remittances, brain gain and the contributions of transnational communities to the development of origin countries reframed migration from a problem into a catalyst of development. Cooperation to achieve the triple win – for migrants, countries of origin and countries of destination – paved the way to encourage the global community to discuss migration. This opening made possible the holding of the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development held at the United Nations headquarters in New York in 2006. The dialogue has continued via the Global Forum on Migration and Development, an annual yearly gathering of governments – with parallel civil society meetings – to discuss migration and development. The first meeting was convened in Brussels, Belgium in 2007, followed by a meeting in Manila in 2008, and the third meeting will be Athens, Greece in 2009.

2. Objectives of the article

The discovery of large amounts of remittances migrants send to developing countries uncovered the (potential) role of remittances in poverty alleviation and as a tool for development. In 1990, workers’ remittances totaled US$69 billion, climbing to US$132 billion in 2000 and to US$232.3 billion in 2005. More significantly, between 1995 and 2004, remittance growth has outpaced private capital flows and
official development assistance (ODA). By 2004, remittances were larger than official flows and private equity (non-foreign direct investments) flows (World Bank, 2005: 88). As a source of external funds, remittances are constant; as a tool for development, they go directly to the intended beneficiaries. The continuing rise in the volume of remittances and the large share that goes to developing countries - until the global financial crisis hit in September 2008 – was a welcome development and it provided an argument for the positive impacts of migration.

Accounts of migrant giving (i.e., collective remittances that were distinct from private remittance transfers), brain grain (i.e., the transfer of knowledge by migrants, the counter-flow to the brain drain that was much discussed in the 1960s and the 1970s) and migrants’ investments have also come to light, providing more evidence to the positive contributions of migration to developing countries and the vital role of migrants as agents of development. However, these developments are neither entirely novel nor unique to the current period. Migrants have always remitted money home and migrants have been known to participate in the life of their home societies. These behaviors are more observable now because of better reporting and monitoring. For example, better data collection has resulted in better capture of remittances. In the case of transnational practices, migrants today have more opportunities to be connected to their home societies because of easier, faster and cheaper communication and transportation. Thus, the prospects of more connectivity offer greater possibilities for transnational connections, including forging transnational solidarity to promote development in origin countries.

As a locus of “thick” international migration in the last four decades, this article focuses on Asia to examine the migration-development nexus, specifically by probing into migrants and homeland institutions as development partners. The article begins with a review of the place of Asia in current discussions on migration and development. Other than the migration transition of Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, and the recent success of India and China in attracting investments and transfer of knowledge from their overseas population, the paper articles suggests that the migration-development nexus has received marginal attention in the rest of the region. As a result, the state, especially in origin countries, has reinvented itself as a transnational actor as well. The second part of the article provides examples of cooperation for development between migrants and homeland institutions. Two types of transnational solidarity for development will be explored: those initiated by the state and those initiated by migrants and non-state actors. The third part presents the conclusions.

B. LOCATING ASIA IN THE MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

The literature on migration and development reveals a growing body of research on remittances and migrant giving focusing on Latin America. The attention to Latin America seems partly driven by the interest of institutions and academics based in the United States of America on the region. In Europe, on the other hand, the focus is more towards Africa, with a view towards promoting development as part of the approach to migration (van Naerussen, Spaan and Hillman, 2005).

Compared to Latin America and Africa, migration and development questions seem to be less discussed in Asia. Migration as such and development as such has received their own share of research and policy attention, but the subject of migration and development has not come under close scrutiny. Although migration research in East, Southeast and South Asia has explored migration and development questions (Asis and Piper, 2008: 431), an examination of the development impacts of migration beyond remittances is oddly missing. Interestingly, in the 1990s Asia witnessed the turnaround of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China from emigration to immigration societies. Also by the 1990s, even as emigration continued, China and India started to attract investments and transfer of knowledge from their overseas populations. All four economies had to contend with underdevelopment and brain drain in an earlier period, and as was characteristic of the discourse in the 1960s and the 1970s, the departure of
professionals and the highly trained was presumed to contribute to their underdevelopment. The transformation of these countries is described briefly below.

- The Republic of South Korea was a sending country of international migrants, including workers, up until the 1990s. Its turnaround and subsequent rise as the world’s eleventh largest economy transpired between the 1970s and 1990s. The deployment of workers and the generation of remittances, however, were not major factors in its turnaround; in fact, labor migration was not actively pursued by the state as a strategy for development. Apart from temporary migration, emigration was significant partly because of economic reasons, and partly because of political reasons (the country was under martial law from 1961 to 1987). Among those who left was the middle-class whose departure was perceived as “betrayal” by those who remained. By virtue of the strong ties between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, many Koreans in the fields of engineering and the sciences availed of scholarships for post-graduate education in the United States of America (Kim, 2006). Prior to the 1970s, many of the Koreans who received PhDs in the sciences and engineering opted not to return home, a period of brain drain. Kim (2006), however, suggests that it was not a classic brain drain because the Korean government did not invest in the post-graduate training of its nationals in the United States of America. The government embarked on industrialization, launched land reform, supported agriculture and rural development, invested in education, and implemented a population program as part of a concerted strategy to achieve development. It also invested in research and development and worked towards value-added production. International migration contributed to development via the leading role played by overseas-based scientists, managers and entrepreneurs in moving the country into higher level production. Thanks to incentives offered by the government, many scientific talents returned (some returned temporarily) to lend their expertise. The founding of science parks supported research and development and also served to entice the return of scientific talents. Aside from industries, returning scientists were also recruited as faculty members in Korean universities. The return of many PhD holders contributed to the expansion of tertiary education in the country. While it may be advanced that the return and/or expertise of Korean scientific talents between 1980 and 1997 boosted the country’s development, economic development itself was a factor in the return of scientists and engineers (Song, 1997). Later, political reforms – the return of electoral democracy in 1987 and the election of Kim Dae Jung as president in 1992, the first civilian president since 1961 – advanced the democratization process, which invited more return migration, visits and engagement of overseas Koreans. Following the Asian financial crisis in 1998, emigration trends picked up and a resurgence of brain drain has been noted (Kim, 2006).

• Taiwan Province of China has been described as a “classic case” of brain drain at one time (e.g., O’Neill, 2003). During the 1970s and 1980, some twenty percent of college graduates left to pursue advanced studies abroad. Prior to its economic takeoff, the government prioritized basic education, which limited the number of institutions offering higher education, resulting in the migration of young Taiwanese to pursue further studies abroad. By the late 1980s, a rising economy and with the end of martial law, many migrants returned home armed with training and/or business expertise gained abroad. The government saw the potential contributions of involving the returnees and the expatriate population as sources of expertise and as links to the international community. The government involved migrants and its overseas population in the formulation of migration policies; it provided incentives to returnees; and it supported research and development. The government developed the Hsinchu Industrial Science Park, the equivalent of Silicon Valley, which helped launch Taiwan’s technological development (O’Neill, 2003; see also Saxenian, 2002). Here, the role of the government in involving the migrant population and investing resources to facilitate their contributions cannot be overemphasized. In addition, political reforms were also part of the change that encouraged the return of migrants and the
participation of overseas Taiwanese in contributing to (and benefiting) from Taiwan’s ruse as an economic success story.

- Throughout most of its history, Chinese society did not regard emigration in a positive light (Le Bail and Shen, 2008). It was only in the early 20th century when a more positive view of migrants came about brought about by the support given by overseas Chinese to the nationalist movement. When China adopted communism in 1949, migration (both internal and international) was restricted until the introduction of reforms in 1979. The government then sought to reestablish links with the overseas Chinese by inviting them to invest in China. The growth of the Pearl River Delta region was fuelled by investments from overseas Chinese. It has been suggested that in the early years of the reforms, lacking knowledge about the outside world, the overseas-based Chinese were an important social capital for China (Leung, 2008). International migration resumed, tentatively at first, but gaining popularity over the years. Among those who were allowed to leave were students, many of whom were supported by the government, for the purpose of gaining expertise to help China catch up with the rest of the world. Student migration became worrisome when many did not return. Fears of repression in the wake of the Tiananmen uprising in 1989 discouraged scholars from returning to China. From the 1990s, the government introduced various measures to encourage return migration (for details, see Zweig and Fung, 2004). The government reoriented its regard for its national abroad, viewing them as resources instead of losses, and redirected its efforts to maintaining links with them (Wescott, 2006; Zweig and Fung, 2004). In 2001, several ministries came up with a major policy document encouraging overseas-based Chinese to “serve the nation” (wei guo fuwu) even if “they don’t return to the nation” (hui guo fuwu). The interest of Chinese scientists and professionals to contribute to the development of the home country cannot be solely attributed to patriotism but is also inspired by China’s emergent economy. To promote high technology industries, the government set up 53 nationally recognized science or industrial parks and offered incentives for such ventures (Smart and Hsu, 2005: 53). Smart and Hsu (2005) suggest that China’s aspiration to develop high technology industries is not only aided by its links with Mainland-born scientists and engineers overseas but also the links with scientific talent and entrepreneurs in Taiwan Province of China. They also maintain that the role and style of networks have changed – in early reform China, kinship and hometown ties were important in attracting labor intensive industries; in the current context, ties among classmates and professional/technological associations are the new bases for social networks in high technology industries.

- India has a sizable migrant worker population overseas (mostly in the Middle East), whose labor migration dates back to the 1970s. In general, the role of the central government in international labor migration has been minimal; it is only in recent years when it has taken a more active role in addressing protection issues. The State of Kerala has been a dominant player in international labor migration, although recently, other states have also taken the same path. The development impacts of this migration are seen largely through remittances and the use of remittances by recipient households. Although the economic benefits of overseas employment are considerable, concerns over the social impacts of labor migration point to social costs. Despite India’s long experience in international labor migration, part of the story of India’s rise as an emerging economy is attributed to the development of the ICT sector by the investments and talents of overseas Indians and returning Indian nationals. In the 1960s and 1970s, India can also be posited as a classic case of brain drain, when many scientists, engineers, doctors and professionals left; by the 1990s, it became a classic case of brain gain, when ICT experts reproduced Silicon Valley in Indian shores. The government has recently taken an interest in linking with the “Indian diaspora,” estimated at 25 million, seeing it as a partner in advancing India’s march to development.
The transnational connections in the transformation of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China into migrant-receiving societies and the examples of investments and brain gain recently experienced by China and India suggest that migration does not bode a total loss for origin societies. Even in cases of permanent settlement, as long as the links to the origin societies are nurtured those who left can continue to be part of their origin societies. Migrants can, in fact, have a distinct role as bridges between the origin societies and the outside world. In distilling lessons from these four cases for the origin countries in the region, several details must be borne in mind. In all four cases, the state pursued development as the main goal. Thus, even when brain drain was underway, this did not detract them from pursuing needed reforms to achieve their development goals. The deployment of workers was not a centerpiece policy of their development strategies. In all four cases, the acknowledged gains from migration were mostly from the “elite migrants” – scientists, ICT experts, managerial gurus, entrepreneurs and investors – who participated in the transfer of knowledge and/or invested in key industries. The close interface between the transfer of knowledge schemes and industry is also notable, a match that was guided by a policy framework aimed at promoting development. The gains from migration in these cases were not inevitable. Patriotism or giving back may have motivated migrants to contribute to the development of their home countries, but it can be argued that the promise of development holds its own attractions. All the case studies also highlight the importance of political reforms. Economic reforms and development plans were pursued in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China under martial law. In the case of China, although market reforms had been underway from 1979, it has not abandoned central planning. The government had to open up more democratic spaces. The reform of the hukou system (which controlled internal migration in the country by tying rights to residence, employment and services according to urban or rural residence) and granting protection to migrant workers in China’s urban areas are among the notable changes in China in recent years.

C. TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXAMPLES FROM ASIA

1. International migration as a factor supporting development

The template for temporary labor migration in Asia was drawn up when the oil-rich Gulf countries started to formally source workers from the region in the 1970s. To keep labor migration temporary, the recruitment of workers specifies the following conditions: limited stay for employment in the receiving countries (usually two years, with the option to renew upon the expiration of the contract); employment in a specific sector; and no family reunification. The same policy was adopted by emerging receiving countries in East and Southeast Asia when they embarked on importing workers from the 1980s. Japan and the Republic of Korea were reluctant to recruit less skilled migrant workers, thus they introduced a trainee program instead. Observers, however, see the scheme as a way of bringing in workers without altering the official policy; it was also cost-saving because trainees were given allowances instead of salaries. The system bred unauthorized migration as trainees ran away to search for better conditions or wages as workers (although in an unauthorized condition) in other sectors or industries. Due to the sustained lobbying of civil society, the Republic of Korea enacted a law in 2003 to bring in migrant workers; this was implemented in 2004. Thus far, Japan remains the only industrialized country in the region which maintains a policy of keeping its doors closed to less skilled migrant workers.

The ideal of keeping labor migration temporary is indeed an ideal because in reality, none of the oil-rich Gulf countries or the new industrialized countries in East and Southeast Asia stopped recruiting migrant workers to address their labor shortage. As shown in Table 1, migrant workers are a sizable percentage of the workforce in some destination countries. In addition, from around the 1990s, receiving countries also started to recruit professional and highly skilled migrants, but the policies towards these sought after professionals, however, are less restricted. Similarly, countries of origin which embarked on a labor migration program in the 1970s envisioned it as a stopgap measure, expecting migration to halt when
their economies improve. Some four decades later, only the Republic of Korea has made the transition while the rest continue to deploy their nationals for overseas employment. Among the origin countries, the Philippines has the largest annual deployment of workers (Table 1). Moreover, from a temporary measure, the program has been redefined as part of development strategies. All countries of origin are uniformly seeking to increase their labor deployment and all are aspiring to send more highly skilled workers. Should this materialize, the future implies higher deployment levels. The importance of remittances in the economies of origin countries cannot be overstated. Other than the magnitude of remittances, the share accounted by remittances in the gross domestic product is important for many origin countries (Table 1). While realities indicate that international labor migration is a structural reality in the region, the policy remains wedded to the goal of keeping less skilled labor migration strictly temporary. At the least, there is now some acknowledgment of the contributions of migration in the region’s development. In the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (12th ASEAN Summit, 13 January 2007, Cebu, Philippines), “the contributions of migrant workers to the society and economy [italics added] of both receiving states and sending states of ASEAN” is mentioned. Moreover, the contributions of migrant workers are not limited to the economy but to society in general.

2. States as transactional actors: extending the boundaries of the “nation”

As mentioned earlier, the renewed appreciation of migration as a catalyst for development also comes in the heels of a growing literature on transnationalism. The phenomenon of brain gain or brain circulation, the contributions of migrants’ associations to the development of their hometowns, and the development of ethnic entrepreneurs are some of the manifestations of the development dimensions of migration, or conversely, the migration dimensions of development. There is a tendency in the literature to emphasize the role of non-state actors as transnational actors, and less mention about the state as engaging in transnational activities. As the arbiter and guardian of “national interests,” the state may seem to be an unlikely participant in transnationalism. Although states continue to hold on to the principle of national sovereignty concerning migration issues, migrant-sending states in particular have adopted a transnational outlook as regards their overseas-based populations.

The transnational turn has been in progress among countries of origin in East, Southeast and South Asian countries as migration continues. Following their experience with labor migration and the economic benefits they have reaped from labor export, countries of origin have undertaken various steps in extending the nation towards their overseas-based populations (Table 2). Initially, structures, legislations and policies were aimed at organizing and promoting labor migration. Countries with relatively longer experience in labor migration – the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – have established offices dedicated to oversee the labor migration process. Later, they created additional offices or charged existing structures to promote the protection of their workers abroad. More recently, efforts have been extended to renew and sustain ties with permanent settlers.

Across the region there has been a remarkable shift towards a more positive regard for migrants by states and the attempt to include overseas nationals as members who have a role to play in the nation’s life. In most cases, a large part of the countries’ call to their nationals abroad is to gain their support in the development project. In Vietnam, for example, the Vietnamese who left after the takeover of the Communist government in 1975, used to be regarded by the government as “cowardly traitors.” Likewise, those who left had a negative view of the government. It was only in the 2000s when both parties reached a rapprochement. The change on the part of the Vietnamese government has been very palpable, starting with the use of friendlier language, and more substantively, engaging with the overseas Vietnamese population. The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a specific section devoted to “Overseas Vietnamese” (see http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/doi_quantam/). In 2008, the Vietnam government revised...
its nationality law to allow for some flexibility in the recognition of dual citizenship. Up until the passage of the Law on Nationality of Vietnam (Revised) was passed in the National Assembly on 13 November 2008, under Article 3 of the Law on Nationality, a Vietnamese citizen could hold only one nationality, i.e., Vietnamese. The revision added the phrase, “except for cases that are otherwise stipulated by this law,” thereby extending the scope of Vietnamese citizens to have a dual citizenship (Vietnam MOFA, 2008).13

Countries of destination of migrant workers in the region have also taken steps to reconnect with their overseas communities. Malaysia has called on Malaysians abroad, especially the professionals and the highly skilled, to return home and to contribute to national development efforts (Kanapathy, 2008). Singapore has created the Overseas Singaporean Unit as part of the government’s initiatives to engage its citizens overseas (see www.overseassingaporean.sg). The city-state of four million has been losing its some 4-5 percent of its top 30 percent of the population, a situation that Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew described as “pretty serious.” He said that 1,000 Singaporeans at the top end are giving up their citizenship and moreover, the numbers are growing (Ng, 2008). Although Singapore is attracting foreign talent (Yeoh, 2007), there are concerns that the Chinese and Indians coming to Singapore eventually move on to other countries such as the United States of America. Similarly, with the recent surge in emigration from the Republic of Korea, which includes university students leaving to pursue further studies abroad, questions about a possible brain drain have also surfaced in recent years. In view of the internationalization of education, global recruitment strategies, and immigration policies receptive to the highly skilled, brain drain now also affects the more developed economies.

The examples of the Philippines and India are highlighted below to provide a comparison of state-led interventions to extend the boundaries of the nation to their nationals abroad and to involve them in the development project. As a case study, the Philippines represents state-led efforts to promote labor migration and to protect the rights of its migrant workers, but other than general statements linking migration to development, the migration-development nexus has been rather loosely defined in the Philippines. In an earlier discussion, India was profiled as an exemplar of a country of origin that has benefitted from brain gain. India presents a contrast to the Philippines in its more proactive engagement with its diverse overseas population.

a. The Philippines: beyond international labor migration?

Among the countries of origin in the region, the Philippine state has designed an elaborate infrastructure to incorporate its diverse overseas-based population. It has created distinct structures to deal with migrant workers, the chief ones being the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration and the Office of the Undersecretary of Migrant Workers Affairs, and it established the Commission on Filipinos to take care of permanent migrants, including Filipinos marrying foreign nationals. The Philippines is a forerunner in formulating a law to promote the protection of migrant workers and overseas Filipinos (Republic Act 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 - An act to institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes). In 2003, it enacted three additional laws pertaining to the overseas population – Republic Act 9208, the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; Republic Act 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003; and Republic Act 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. The last two legislations reflect an expansion in terms of content and coverage – from a concern for protection mostly for overseas Filipino workers to the extension of political rights to the larger community of overseas Filipinos, which also cover permanent settlers, including those who had acquired a foreign citizenship. Through the pronouncements of government officials (e.g., references to overseas Filipino workers as the country’s “new heroes”), the commemoration of various events honoring migrant workers and overseas Filipinos, and other symbolic practices (e.g., presidential welcome for overseas Filipinos returning home for the Christmas holidays), the Philippine state has played a central role in valorizing the contributions of overseas Filipinos. As the Philippines reaches out to its nationals
abroad, the emphasis is on services and the protection of migrants’ rights to overseas Filipino workers, while maintaining ties and implementing programs promoting Filipino culture are the main thrusts in relation to permanent migrants. The enactment of RA 9225 combined emotional and instrumentalist arguments – in part, the law recognizes and enables former Filipino citizens to keep their Filipino citizenship, and in part, the law aims to attract investments and reverse the brain drain of former Filipino citizens based abroad (Cariño, 2007). As of 31 December 2008, some five years after RA 9225 came into effect, 69,209 former Filipino citizens had applied for Filipino citizenship (Manila Bulletin, 2009). There has been no assessment yet on whether RA 9225 has in fact spurred investments or transfer of knowledge from dual citizens. As to RA 9189, although permanent migrants, particularly Filipinos in the United States of America had actively lobbied for its passage, the participation of Filipino Americans in the 2004 and 2007 elections has been negligible while the participation of overseas Filipino workers has been more evident. According to Aguilar (2007: 160-161), thus far, the ties that bind Filipinos to the homeland are familial – political ties expressed in absentee voting are limited and have thus far been embraced by workers who continue to be within the fold of Philippine nation-state.

The Philippines has been hailed as a model of migration managements because of how it has wedded the promotion and facilitation of labor migration with the protection of the rights of overseas Filipino workers (Asis, 2008; see also Agunias and Ruiz, 2007; Agunias, 2008). On the other hand, it is a success story that may have a downside by postponing the implementation of much-needed reforms to advance the development agenda (Asis, 2008). From the 1970s to the present, the thrust of the labor migration policy remains anchored on the deployment of workers. This was brought into sharper focus in the 2000s with the target to send a million workers every year. Globalization has provided a rationale for approaching overseas employment as part of the country’s development strategies (despite the statement in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that the state does not promote overseas employment). The onset of the global financial crisis in the last quarter of 2008 added justification to find alternative labor markets in view of shrinking labor markets in more affected countries. While more deployment may generate more remittances, none of the former emigration-turned-immigration countries developed on account of sending more of their nationals abroad; none achieved development on account of remittances alone. The Philippines will have to take a closer look at the various dimensions of international migration – not just labor migration – which bear on the development process. It also needs to tackle the social and cultural ramifications of international migration which could pose threats to the country’s development prospects Asis and Baggio, 2008; Baggio, 2008).

Apart from figuring among the top five recipients of remittances worldwide, the Philippines is less mentioned in the area of migration and development. In fact, a state-led initiative to encourage migrant giving has been underway for some time. Long before migrant giving or collective remittances received research and policy attention, a program called Lingkod sa Kapwa Filipino or Linkapil (in English, it translates to Service to Fellow Filipinos; it is also known in English as Link to Philippine Development) was launched by the Commission on Filipinos (CFO) in 1989 (see http://www.cfo.gov.ph/linkapil.htm). This initiative has a cultural basis, deriving from the Filipino values of bayanihan (cooperation), damayan (sharing another person’s burden) and pakikipagkapwa (charity to a fellow human being) (see Baggio and Asis, 2008). Perhaps because it involves permanent settlers, mostly Filipinos in the United States of America, it is less known compared to other good practices that originated in the Philippines concerning overseas Filipino workers. Under the Linkapil Program, the CFO facilitates the transfer of resources from overseas Filipinos, including those donated by Filipino associations overseas, to development projects in the Philippines. Over the years, the CFO developed a profile of needs in Philippine communities to improve the matching of resources with identified community needs. An assessment of the program reveals that health, education, and small infrastructure projects are the programs most commonly supported by overseas Filipinos, while livelihood and income generation projects tend to receive less support (Roma, 2008). Similar to findings on collective remittances elsewhere, the impact of migrant giving to local development is generally modest. The projects supported by migrant giving tend to be high
impact or short-term projects which address some of the needs of local communities, but which leave the basic problem of sustainable livelihoods unchanged.

A more recent state-led initiative that involved overseas Filipinos is the Classroom Galing sa Mamamayang Pilipino Abroad or CGMA (in English, it translates into “Classrooms from Filipinos Residing Abroad”), a build-a-classroom project launched in 2003 (see http://www.cgma.dole.gov.ph). The shortage of classrooms is a perennial problem faced by public schools in the Philippines. One strategy to solve the classroom shortage problem is to tap the cooperation of overseas Filipino communities throughout the world to fund the construction of classrooms. Spearheaded by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), it partnered with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of Education (DEP-ED) and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Inc. (FFCCCI) to implement the program. An estimated budget of US$4,000 is needed to build a classroom. Under the partnership, DOLE and DFA will solicit support from overseas Filipinos; DEP-ED will identify the schools which have classrooms shortage; and the FFCCCI and its networks will be responsible for the construction of the classrooms. As of 31 August 2008, the latest update available, there were 568 classrooms donated, which is way below the 10,000 classrooms the program had hoped to build by 2004 (see http://www.nrco.dole.gov.ph/Page.aspx?id=1, accessed on 15 March 2009). The renovation or building of classrooms is one of the projects that overseas Filipinos support through the Linkapil Program.

In view of the temporary nature of labor migration, return migration is a given. In the Philippines’ holistic approach to migrant worker services, the government has initiated fairly successful pre-departure and onsite programs, but the last component, reintegration, is the weakest (e.g., see Asis, 2008a). The government has developed and implemented reintegration services in the past, but these have had limited success. In 2007, it inaugurated the National Reintegration Center for Overseas Filipino Workers (NRCO). Unlike previous programs, the current one aims to combine providing support and assistance to return migrants and to tap the contributions of overseas Filipinos to contribute to development. The latter objective is directed at exploring the brain gain potentials from international migration. To date, based on information available on the NRCO website, there is little to suggest that the revitalized reintegration program has made some headways in meeting its objectives (see http://www.nrco.dole.gov.ph). The goal to establish a viable reintegration program is a challenge that confronts other origin countries as well.

Thus, while the Philippines has accumulated a vast experience in institutionalizing labor migration, it seems intent on maintaining the status quo, i.e., as provider of workers for the global labor market. This option poses threats to the development prospects of the Philippines (Asis and Baggio, 2008). In order to go beyond the deployment mode, the Philippines needs a fresh, more comprehensive approach to manage international migration realities – i.e, considering various possibilities to maximize the development potentials of the country’s international migration realities (Aldaba and Opiniano, 2008) and minimizing the risks to the country’s development prospects (Asis and Baggio, 2008).

b. India: marching towards the "diaspora option"? 

As mentioned earlier, India did not have an explicit policy to promote or facilitate international labor migration; rather it was more of a state initiative, with Kerala taking the lead in tapping the overseas labor market for its population. The central government became more involved with international migration in the last decade, driven by the interest to reconnect and engage with three branches of the vast Indian diaspora: the critical mass of scientists, ICT experts, engineers and magnates; migrant workers; and persons of Indian origin, which include up to the fourth-generation descendants of Indians who were deployed to other British colonies during the period of British rule in India. Although India’s central government may be a late player in forging cooperation with its overseas communities (Khadria, 2007), it adopted a comprehensive approach to migration management – better protection for Indian workers
overseas, closer links with Indian communities overseas, and streamlining the contributions of overseas Indian communities to development back home.

The yearly celebration of the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), held every January since 2003, provides a platform for promoting interaction between the government and the overseas Indian communities. The event honors and confers awards on outstanding overseas Indians and provides opportunities for networking for actors and institutions in India and overseas. In 2004, the Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs was established to strengthen the ties between India and the diverse Indian community overseas. The ministry’s mission aims to “drive policy and build partnerships with Diaspora” to realize “development through coalition sans borders” (MOIA, 2008: 5). The ministry’s four functional service divisions reflect the range of services it aims to cover: diaspora services, financial services, emigration services and social services (MOIA, 2008: 5). Several centers and not-for-profit structures were established over the years to help the ministry in its work. In May 2007, the ministry established the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre, a not-for-profit trust, in partnership with the Confederation of Indian Industry. The center’s objective is to be a “one stop shop” for all investment and business related services for potential overseas Indian investors” (MOIA, 2008: 7). In January 2008, at the inaugural of the PBD, the Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) was launched to serve the overseas Indian work force and potential emigrants. Among others, the center runs a multi-lingual help for overseas Indian workers and disseminates emigration-related information aimed at potential emigrants. At the same event, the Prime Minister announced the proposal to launch a not-for-profit trust, the India Development Foundation of Overseas Indians, envisioned to serve as a one stop shop “dedicated to leading Diaspora philanthropy into India’s development efforts” (IDFOI brochure). Through the IDFOI, the ministry aims to promote philanthropy by overseas Indians “through innovative projects and instruments, such as micro credit for rural entrepreneurs, self-help groups for economic empowerment of women, ‘best practice’ interventions in primary education and technology interventions in rural health care delivery (IDFOI brochure). The latest structure, launched at the inauguration of the January 2009 PBD, was the Global Indian Knowledge Network to promote better links between the economic and knowledge resources of the overseas Indian community and the development of India. Although India does not grant dual citizenship, it implemented the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) starting on 2 December 2005. This is extended to Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) of all countries who were citizens of India or eligible to become citizens of India on 26 January 1950 and are citizens of the countries (except Bangladesh and Pakistan). OCI facilitates life-long visa-free travel to India and offers economic, educational and cultural benefits to OCI holders (MOIA, 2009:13).

In summary, the central government has taken decisive steps in establishing links with the various Indian communities abroad, involving them in decision-making (through the Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council), and establishing institutions that will facilitate investments, donations and transfer of knowledge. Overall, the Indian government seems to be more focused on mobilizing the resources of the overseas Indian communities to contribute to India’s development.

3. Non-state actors as (local) development partners

a. Migrants’ associations
A range of non-state actors – migrants’ associations, non-government organizations and the private sector – have been involved in supporting homeland development initiatives, some of which had been in place even without state intervention or support. In the previous discussion, migrants as individuals and as members of migrants’ associations have been shown to respond to various state initiatives to engage with them. This section brings to light selected examples of transnational development projects started by non-migrant actors.
Among the non-state actors, migrants and migrants’ associations have been active in supporting development projects in their home countries. The collective remittances of Mexican hometown associations (HTAs) have been widely documented in the literature (e.g., Delgado Wise and Covarrubias, 2008; Garcia Zamora, 2008). Formed by migrants coming from the same or nearby communities, HTAs have evolved from loose self-help organizations to agents of development in their home communities. From a largely migrants’ initiative, the more organized HTAs formed partnerships and engaged with government and private sector institutions. Some Mexican HTAs have given rise to the so-called tres por uno model, wherein for every US$1 contributed by an HTA, there is a corresponding US$1 each contributed by the local, state and federal governments in Mexico, which underwrote various development projects in communities where migrants come from. Although the tres por uno model has weaknesses (see Zamora, 2008), the idea of a counterpart contribution from homeland institutions and formalizing such partnership is innovative. Among others, the counterparting scheme promotes a partnership between migrants and the recipient communities, wherein the latter also contributes to the project, thereby enhancing ownership by the beneficiaries.

The role of migrants’ associations as development partners has yet to be more adequately documented in Asia. In the first place, data on migrants’ associations are still sketchy. Indians in North America are said to have formed some 1,000 organizations (Khadria, 2008). Filipino migrants’ associations are estimated at 4,000 by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas while the Department of Labor and Employment claims there are some 12,000 migrants’ associations. HTAs have received the most attention among Latin American migrants. In Asia, other types of migrants’ associations have received some scrutiny. Saxenian (2002), for example, highlighted the importance of professional organizations among Taiwanese and Indian professional immigrants (this is also echoed in Smart and Hsu’s (2005) analysis of the Chinese diaspora). Khadria’s (2008) typology of ‘Indian diaspora associations of North America’ consists of six categories: religious/cultural, students/alumni association, support association, professional association, development association Similar to findings elsewhere, the projects supported by migrants’ associations in Asia, and general/umbrella network. A similar typology has been sketched for Filipino migrants’ associations, namely, HTAs, community-based groups, professional organizations, Filipino-run charity/nonprofit organizations, alumni associations and others (Opiniano, 2005). It is interesting to note that these different types of migrants’ associations have engaged in supporting development projects in the Philippines. It must be borne in mind that while some migrants’ associations may assume development work, they are not development agencies – rather, migrants’ associations are formed as social support organizations. Manuel Orozco remarked that even as migrants’ associations may serve development purposes, the nature of such organizations must be respected.

Based on a review of initiatives by migrants’ associations in Asia, Bevacqua concludes that “(F)unds remitted collectively on the initiative of migrants themselves, while well publicised, are quite rare (2008:16). He also goes on to say that while migrants’ associations can collect funds, they may not have the capacity to choose appropriate projects and work with community leaders in the origin communities. The facilitation provided by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas to donors in the Linkapil Program discussed earlier is one way to address this problem. Another option is working with non-government or non-profit organizations in the home country, as was documented by Opiniano (2005) for the Philippines. Other problems are organizational limitations (most members are volunteers, hence, they can only devote limited time to the association’s activities), leaders lack training in the development, implementation and assessment of projects, sustainability issues, and the potential to increase division in the origin communities. Research done among Filipinos in Italy (Baggio and Asis, 2008) and Canada (Silva, 2005) uncovered that while migrants may be interested to give back to their home communities, concerns over corruption and lack of trust in homeland institutions discouraged them from supporting development projects in the origin countries.16
Local governments, charitable organizations and religious organizations, non-government organizations and the private sector were also documented as cooperating with migrants’ associations (Bevacqua, 2008). Charitable and/or religious organizations may figure as donors or as intermediaries for migrant giving. Among Indian migrants in the United States of America, more than 200 temples and 500 Hindu religious movements collect funds to support service and welfare programs back home as well as extending support to rural development, income generation projects and women’s empowerment. One example is the Chinmaya Mission, which developed into the Chinmaya Organisation for Rural Development (CORD). CORD later entered into a partnership with the Canadian International Development Agency, which provides matching grants to the funds raised by Chinmaya Mission in Canada (Bevacqua, 2008:20-21). In the Philippines, several organizational developments emerged late to maximize the development potentials of migration. The Philippine Consortium for Development (Philcomdev) was formed by several non-government organizations in the fields of development and migration to promote cooperation. In October 2008, Philcomdev, several local governments and the Asian Institute of Management formed a multi-sectoral body to coordinate migration and development projects.

An example that involves migrant workers are the migrants’ savings groups that are formed by the Asian Migrant Centre, a non-government organization based in Hong Kong. The action is intended as part of preparing migrants for their return to their home countries. While they are still working and earning money overseas, migrants are encouraged to save and are provided training on entrepreneurship. In cooperation with migrant non-government organizations based in the Philippines, such as Unlad Kabayan (http://www.unladkabayan.org) and Atikha (http://www.atikha.org.ph), migrant savings groups can have the option to invest in local enterprises.

Aside from non-government organizations, migrants’ associations may partner with local government units and the private sector. An example is the Ayala Foundation USA, which works with Filipino migrants’ associations in the United States of America to facilitate their support for development projects in the Philippines (http://www.af-usa.org).

D. CONCLUDING NOTES

Based on available data, research on transnational solidarity involving migrants or migrants’ associations and homeland counterparts is still in its infancy. Available data suggest that the funds generated by migrants associations are rather modest, the impacts tend to be local or place specific, success stories are not that many, and the migrants or migrants’ associations that are heavily involved tend to be the permanent settlers. Examples of successful migrants’ investments and transfer of knowledge beyond the cases of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, China and India are rare or they have yet to emerge. In all four exemplars, the migrants who acted as agents of change, particularly as agents of development, were mostly scientific talents, investors and entrepreneurs. Moreover, the migrants-turned-agents of development were mostly permanent settlers who had privileged positions in the countries of destination. This contrasts with the profile of most migrant workers in the Asian context who are predominantly in less skilled occupations and whose working and living conditions are far from ideal. Under more favorable conditions, migrant workers can earn decent wages which enable them to send remittances that can uplift their families’ economic status. Under less favorable conditions, workers’ rights can be violated, their well-being jeopardized and their capacity to support their families is eroded. Under these circumstances, other than remittance transfers, the potentials for social remittances, investments and transfers of knowledge are rather remote. Migrants have formed various associations; some of these associations have developed into political actors that advocate for the promotion and protection of migrants’ rights. Until recently, migrant non-government organizations have been engrossed with advocating for migrants’ rights. The current discussions on migration and development in the global
community have added a new agenda for migrants’ associations and non-government organizations. There are concerns that the attention to migration and development issues might detract from the pursuit of migrants’ rights that has been the traditional work of migrant non-government organizations (e.g., Anonuevo, 2008). The reflections on migration and development may signal a new agenda and a new arena for advocacy on migrants’ issues in the region. The few examples of transnational solidarity for development in the region are important reference points for what can be possible avenues for development.

REFERENCES


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ENDNOTES

1 This argument applies mostly to more voluntary forms of migration. The root causes of forced migration can be due to political reasons, conflict, or environmental degradation, i.e., conditions over which individuals have no control over.


3 Table 4.2 – Recorded remittances have grown faster than private flows and ODA - show that in 1998, workers’ remittances, foreign direct investment, private debt and portfolio equity, and official development assistance amounted to (in US$ billions) 58, 107, 170 and 59, respectively. In 2005, these were estimated at (in US$ billions) 160, 166, 136 and 79 (World Bank, 2005:88).

4 Before the onset of large-scale international migration, these issues were discussed and debated in the context of internal migration. The current discussions on the migration-development nexus are not about migration in general but are very specific to international migration.
In earlier periods of their specific histories, Chinese, Japanese and Koreans had migrated, which are part of what these countries consider as their “diaspora.”

A counterargument was advanced by Pernia (1976) in the case of the Philippines. Rather than brain drain, he saw the migration of doctors, engineers and scientists as resulting from the inability of the Philippine economy to absorb these professionals.

Following the arrival of migrant workers, the country later received marriage migrants and other expatriates. The need for foreign workers, the phenomenon of international marriages and the formation of international families and the growing number of expatriates have resulted in the State’s acknowledgement of becoming a country of immigration. As of August 2007, the number of foreign residents breached the one million mark, about a three-fold increase from 380,000 in 1997 (Jeong, 2008). A significant development is the emerging discussion on multiculturalism, with the State playing a role in this regard by establishing institutions and policies to promote the making of a multicultural Korean society (for details, see Jeong, 2008).

The Korean model was a total package, which involved contracting projects for which Korean companies supplied workers, materials, technological know-how and management. This system had value added contributions (e.g., the export of Korea-made products) compared to the basic model of deploying workers. Also, the system facilitated the implementation of the government’s mandatory remittance policy, which helped migrant households generate savings (Lee, 2005). From a human rights perspective, the mandatory remittance policy was coercive.

To allay concerns by newly independent states in Southeast Asia over the loyalty of Chinese nationals, the Chinese government encouraged the overseas Chinese to apply for citizenship in their host countries.

China also deploys workers abroad in connection with the projects undertaken by state-owned companies. Also, particularly in recent years, Chinese seafarers have also found jobs in international seafaring. However, the numbers are minimal in relation to China’s total population.

In the face of the global financial crisis, one of the immediate responses of origin countries is to seek alternative labor markets for their nationals to offset the displacement of their workers in the more affected receiving countries (Abella and Ducanes, 2009).

The overseas Vietnamese consists of four major groups: those who left Vietnam following the establishment of the Communist government; those who were sent by the Vietnamese government to the former Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries; those who were deployed as workers since the late 1990s; and those who left Vietnam, mostly women, who married foreign nationals, mostly South Koreans and Taiwanese.

Among the countries of origin in Asia, Sri Lanka has not been as active as the others in its overtures to its overseas population, particularly its overseas communities in countries of settlement. Security concerns over the suspected support of overseas communities to the LTTE cause may have tempered the enthusiasm of the state to engage with its expatriate communities.

This is also one of the projects supported by overseas Filipinos in CFO’s Linkapil Program.

HTAs can also include cyber communities of migrants originating from one community who are based in other parts of the world. The Association of Bansalenos Worldwide is one such example (see Rispens Noel, 2008).

An on-going research-action project – Migrants’ Associations and Philippine Institutions for Development (MAPIID) – attempts to address capacity-building issues and to promote better links between two stakeholders, migrants’ associations and Philippine government institutions in the home country. With financial support from the
Aeneas Programme of the European Union, the MAPID Project aims to build the capacity of migrants’ associations in Italy and Spain as agents of change (including agents of development in relation to the Philippines), and to build the capacity of Philippine government institutions (especially local government units) to deal with transnational issues of local and national development prospects. The MAPID Project is coordinated by the Scalabrini Migration Center in partnership with the Initiative e Studi sulla Multietnicità (ISMU) in Milan, Italy, the University of Valencia in Spain, and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas in the Philippines. The research phase was undertaken and completed in 2008; the training programs will be implemented in 2009; and the dissemination of the project’s initiatives will be carried out in 2010. These parallel activities are conducted in Italy and Spain, and the Philippines.