**MDGs post 2015: Beacons in turbulent times or false lights?**

* A contribution to the discussion on a post 2015 Framework for Development

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**ABSTRACT**

Although the MDGs have, since their inception in 2001, played a positive role in drawing more attention to Development Aid, current socio-economic developments, notably increasing inequality, strong GDP growth in emerging countries and climate change, as well as current geopolitical changes call for a new approach to a post 2015 system. Such a post 2015 needs to be based on a global social contract, relevant to people in the South and the North, rather than being dominated by development aid professionals. The discussions leading to such a global social contract post 2015 are as important as the outcome itself.
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1. Introduction

An enthusiastic group in the secretariat of the UN created the MDGs in 2001. They were based on early conceptualization of development goals by the OECD and drew on the Millennium Declaration, accepted by all heads of state at the Millennium Summit of the UN in September 2000. The Declaration itself has a longer and higher set of aspirations, and should not be confused with the very specific and time-bound set of indicators which comprise the 8 MDGs and 21 targets through which progress towards the MDGs are measured (Melaned, 2012, p.4).

The MDGs reflected the wish of many development practitioners to have, at a global level, clear goals and measurable outcomes of a number of desirable development challenges, without proscribing a fixed sets of policies, as this would have led to great controversy and to a non-acceptance of an otherwise generally accepted policy document (Vandemoortele, 2011). They have led to a flurry of papers discussions and conferences especially over the last 10 years. Hits on Google searching for MDGs has grown exponentially and overtaken hits on the Human Development Index. The mere fact that a socioeconomic phenomenon has received so much attention is an indication of a certain impact Melaned (2012, p.5).

In assessing that impact of the MDGs one has to be aware of the somewhat ambivalent role the MDG’s are playing in the current development discourse. The MDG’s were designed to measure and set goals for some important aspects of development, without proscribing a concomitant development trajectory, in order that all countries could agree with the goals without being obliged to follow a unique set of policy prescriptions; something to which developing countries had become very wary of since the introduction of the structural adjustment policies in the 80’s and 90’s.

Yet, despite the intention of not having an underlying proscribing development theory, the emphasis many development practitioners, and especially the senior bureaucrats in the aid ministries, have given to the MDG’s led paradoxically to a situation where those issues that were not explicitly mentioned in the MDGs received consequently less attention from the development aid community (e.g. DFID 2011). A ‘perverse’ game developed that all development efforts had to be mapped on one or more MDGs and that development organizations jockeyed to get their specific concern tagged on to one or more MDGs or lobbied to have the indicators of the MDGs extended to get their concern explicitly mentioned as indicator in order to receive, or continue to receive, funding from development aid donors.

Various authors (e.g. Fisher, 2010; Saith, 2006) have therefore denounced the MDGs as setting the wrong or at least a too limited number of essential development priorities and as such neglecting necessary structural changes for growth and development both at the national and the international level. Architects of the MDGs argue that the neglect of attention to structural factors of underdevelopment is not so much the consequences of the MDGs themselves but more how these have been interpreted by western aid donors and governments, which often linked the MDGs to a western interpretation of development strategy (Vandemoortele, 2011).
A first conclusion for a post 2015 system therefore needs to be that the preparations and implementation of such a system needs to be less donor-driven and need to include many reflections of southern thinkers and activists (AIV, 2011; Easterly 2009; Severino and Ray, 2009).

2. Goals without a theory or a theory without Goals?

The MDGs have been distilled from the Millennium Declaration and influenced by the thinking on Human Development approach of the UNDP. So one could argue that there was a theory or some structured development thinking in the construction of the MDGs. But as reported by Vandemoortele there was also an effort not to concentrate overtly on different theories of development in order to achieve a broader consensus. Proscribing a certain development theory, as the IFIs did in the 1980s and 1990’s when they promoted their policy advice of structural adjustment and later that of the Washington Consensus would have certainly meant a rejection of the MDGs by many developing countries. But in the course of the implementation of the MDGs as much of the discussion was often dominated by development aid officials in the industrialised countries, the MDGs gradually became synonymous to a western approach to development. And the country specific interpretations of the Washington Consensus in the form of the Poverty Reduction Strategies and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers also dominated by the western aid landscape pulled the implementation of the MDGs in the same direction.

The question is thus would one want to base a post 2015 system of goals and targets again on a set of goals and targets without a theoretical base or would one try to push the international debate somewhat further? The extraordinary events of food crisis, financial crises and environment crisis (see Addisson et. al 2011) cannot but call for a more comprehensive and theoretically grounded development policy in post 2015 system. The UN World Economic and Social Survey of 2010 (WESS, 2010, *Retooling Global Development*) gives a wide range of options in that direction. One might object that basing the post 2015 system on more theoretical grounds might be a political impossible task. But, that need not to be the case. In effect when one studies the many suggestions and recommendations in the WESS 2010 one is struck of how many of these have been, perhaps somewhat differently, worded in the Millennium Declaration accepted by the heads of state in 2000. The political consensus achieved in the Millennium Declaration in 2000 does therefore form a good base for framing a more coherent and more theoretically as well as a politically underpinned post 2015 system.

A second conclusion would be that a post 2015 system should take the different elements of the Millennium Declaration, actualised where needed, as a starting point.

3. Living up to the promises of the MDGs?

A methodological point is that, in absence of any counterfactual, it is difficult to assess whether progress in development since 2000 has been the result of the MDGs. (Fukada-Parr 2010). However applying a ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ approach, as is frequently done, recent reviews report that some MDGs have reached their targets at a global level, especially the goal in reducing the proportion of poor by half and that substantial progress is made in others (Melaned, 2012). This global result is however
mainly due to the success in a limited number of large fast growing countries. For example, the decline of the world’s poor by 445 million people, from 1820 million people in 1990 to 1375 in 2005, is entirely due to the decline in the number of poor people in China by 475 million, from 685 million to 210 million. In effect, in various regions of the world the number of poor increased between 1990 and 2005. Countries that had lower than average economic or weak institutional characteristics at the onset of the MDGs in 2000 did perform worse than countries that had a better starting position. (World Bank 2011, Ch. 1). As to whether MDGs led to higher development aid, the picture is mixed. ODA in general increased (but partly due to huge expenses for the war in Iraq and spending on other countries in the Middle East). It also should be noted that DAC ODA increased much less than G8 countries had promised at the Glen Eagles summit, when, on the basis of calculations of the costs of the MDGs, promises of substantial increases in ODA were made (UN, 2011).

However, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a review of what the MDGs did achieve (for this see e.g. AIV, 2011; UN 2010 and 2011; Melaned, 2012; World Bank 2011). But it seems nevertheless appropriate to make the point that the question, whether MDGs contributed to substantial structural change for faster economic and social development cannot be answered satisfactorily.

What we can observe is that the MDGs had and have a strong emphasis on goals on social issues. Other issues, like environment (part of MDG7) and global governance (MDG8), were brought in at a later stage and have also the least concrete goals and indicators. It is not surprisingly therefore that the MDGs contributed to a (already existing) trend of an increasing share of DAC-ODA commitments for the social sector over the last two decades: from 16 per cent in 1990 to 34 per cent at the introduction of the MDGs in the year 2000 to over 40 per cent in 2008 (Fig 1). This was not only the case for ODA commitments in poorer countries: In all major groupings ODA commitments on social sectors were, in 2009, 42 per cent or higher (fig.2).

Figures 1 and 2
Source: OECD DAC secretariat online database
These ODA statistics relate to the traditional ODA DAC donors. New donors like China and India have most likely a higher share of their aid in infrastructure, transport, mining etc(Fig3). These aid flows and projects may at the long run add to new capacity and to larger demand for employment, although in the short run the employment effects might be quite limited or even offset domestic employment creation, as projects are often undertaken by contractors and even by temporary imported workers from these donor countries. These flows are currently still considerable smaller than the flows from the traditional DAC countries, but are increasing faster than traditional ODA and can therefore in the future change the current trend of ODA increasingly benefitting the social sectors.

Fig 3 Sectoral distribution of concessional loans from China
Source: Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2011 China's Foreign Aid, Fig.1 April 2011, Beijing
4. Can we measure what we want to measure?

The discussion on a post 2015 system has seen various authors arguing for better and more measurement of development and of social issues. A notable example is the Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi report (SSF report) on Measuring of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz et. al. 2010). It refers explicitly to earlier work of AmartyaSen on Human Development and on the Capabilities approach. It should also be noted that Sen’s ideas of measuring Human Development were a major determinant of the Human Development Index and that Sen’s ideas on Human Development and on the Capability approach did also influenced the Millennium Development Declaration in 2000 and as such also influenced the formulation of the MDGs. The SSF report, which was issued after the great recession of 2008, might provide therefore some useful pointers for the design and monitoring of a post 2015 system.

The SSF report makes suggestions for improvement in measuring 3 areas of development

1. An improvement of measuring GDP
2. An attempt to quantify the quality of life
3. Proposals for measuring sustainable development and environment

The report gives various reasons for the gap between the statistical measurements of socio-economic phenomena and citizen perception of the same phenomena: (p7-8)
The statistical concepts may be correct, but the measurement process may be imperfect.
In many cases, there are debates about what are the right concepts, and the appropriate use of different concepts.
When there are large changes in inequality (more generally a change in income distribution) gross domestic product (GDP), or any other aggregate computed per capita, may not provide an accurate assessment of the situation in which most people find themselves. If inequality increases enough relative to the increase in average per capital GDP, most people can be worse off even though average income is increasing.
The commonly used statistics may not be capturing some phenomena, which have an increasing impact on the well-being of citizens.
The way in which statistical figures are reported or used may provide a distorted view of the trends of economic phenomena. For example, much emphasis is usually put on GDP although net national product (which takes into account the effect of depreciation), or real household income (which focuses on the real income of households within the economy) may be more relevant. These numbers may differ markedly. Then, GDP is not wrong as such, but wrongly used. What is needed is a better understanding of the appropriate use of each measure.
Indeed, for a long time there have been concerns about the adequacy of current measures of economic performance, in particular those solely based on GDP. It has long been clear that GDP is an inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time particularly in its economic, environmental, and social dimensions, some aspects of which are often referred to as sustainability.

The SSF report is for various reasons relevant for the post 2015 discussions:

Correctly measuring inequality (section 8 in this paper)
Concepts of development (section 3 in this paper)
Measuring important phenomena affecting the quality of life especially wellbeing and sustainable development (section 10 in this paper)

With its recommendations the SSF commission aims to arrive at a better picture of contemporary distribution of income, access to social services and enjoyment of a quality of life, within countries and communities, between countries and communities and between present and future generations.

In some aid development circles the SSF report was interpreted to argue that economic growth is less, or even wholly unimportant, and that therefore development aid should be concentrated on social issues like education, health, income generating programmes for disadvantaged groups. This then resulted in a somewhat unfruitful debate on whether development aid should stimulate more economic or social development (see e.g. WRR. 2011). But, as we will argue, this is a totally wrong interpretation of both the MDGs and the SSF report.

5. Are the poor are always with us…., but where?

Sumner (2010) has shown that because of rapid economic growth in some very large emerging countries most of the World’s poor do not live any more in poor countries
but in middle-income countries. (See his table 4.2 from Sumner 2010.) This trend will be continuing into 2015.

A large percentage of the world’s poor (72 per cent!) live in middle-income countries, of which 61 per cent in stable countries and 11 per cent in fragile and conflict affected countries (FCAS). Thus only 28 per cent lives in low-income countries of which 12 per cent in FCAS and 16 per cent in stable countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2 Estimates of the change in global distribution of world’s $1.25/day poor (percentage) 1988 versus 2007–8</th>
<th>1988–90</th>
<th>2007–8</th>
<th>Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of world’s poor</td>
<td>1988–90</td>
<td>2007–8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-income country (MIC)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>120.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC minus China and India</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>120.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC FCAS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC NON-FCAS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income country (LIC)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,547.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC minus China and India</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>408.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC FCAS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>210.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIC NON-FCAS</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,337.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS = 43)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>228.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>223.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Development Countries (50)*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>241.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and India</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,138.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,668.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This has important consequences for the targets of poverty reduction and other targets of the MDGs. For most of the world’s poor ODA in the traditional sense will be less relevant. Poor households in middle income countries would benefit more from an improvement in income distribution, improved access to social services, good productive jobs, a well-functioning rights based system, that gives people access to government services and workers to exercising their labour rights etc. than from traditional ODA funded projects. The challenges is thus how to cast the development goals in a post 2015 system in such a way that the poor in middle income countries can benefit from the developments in their countries and can exercise their rights to a greater share of the proceeds from development.

It has also become clear that people in fragile and conflict-affected countries (23 per cent of the world’s poor) cannot be adequately reached through traditional development aid. Thus the system of the MDGs, as the development aid community had designed it, is relevant only 16 per cent of the World’s poor. A post 2015 system has thus to come to grips with issues as human (economic, social and cultural) and labour rights as well as with issues of inequality and redistribution.
6. Emerging or recurrent development concerns:

Developments since 2000 and especially the triple crisis of food, finance and environment (Addisson2011) have given rise to a number of development concerns which need to be part of a post 2015 system and may well influence the formulation of development goals post 2015.

An overall issue is how ensure sustained equitable and inclusive growth. This depends partly on how the international system is governed allowing developing countries to apply development oriented macro-economic policies and on such public goods as robust international financial system, agreement on climate adaptation and mitigation etc. as described also in AIV 2011 and in UN 2011.

In the remaining sections of this paper we single out some of the most pressing concerns and discuss how these could be part of a post 2015 system.

First and foremost we would underscore the need for more effective policies and clearer goals for employment, including youth employment (section 7). As we will argue the world is facing huge challenges in employment and a neglect of this has, can and will lead to increased social and political problems.

Closely related to the employment problem are the challenges to the poor caused by continuing or growing inequality in incomes and access to social services (section 8).

Another challenge is the so-called social floor (section 9). Some argue that MDGs constitute the beginning of a global social floor in terms of minimum levels of access to social services but to this should be added systems giving access to income in times of incapacity to earn income through work.

Concern for the environment has increased. The current MDGs have little concrete goals on environment. Section 10 reviews how, in the light of recent discussions on concepts and measurements, progress in policies for environment can be better captured with new indicators.

Another concern is that of human rights. With a situation where three quarters of the world’s poor now live in middle income countries (as we discussed in section 5), the challenge for most of the world’s poor is not so much how they would receive development aid to assist them in development but how they can be part of a sustainable and equitable growth process and how they can exercise their rights to receive a larger share of growing national incomes and access to essential government services (section 11).

In section 12 we discuss the changing geopolitical landscape and how this affects international policy making such as global governance and the provision of global public goods, while we discuss in section 13 what type of policies and targets should be included in a post 2015 system. One point which we will stress is that because only 16 per cent of the poor live in low-income stable countries, a post 2015 system should not emphasize so much anymore a limited development agenda for poor people and poor countries but should become a global contract with not only targets for poor and middle income countries but also targets for developed countries. There are two
reasons for this: Firstly, the growing globalization and greater interconnectedness is creating hardships also for different socio-economic groups in developed countries and it would be politically unwise to ignore this in a post 2015 system. Secondly, targets in a post 2015 system should also better express the responsibility of richer countries in a global world.

7. Employment

The on-going globalisation and especially the financial globalization have had huge influences on work and work security. The nature of work is changing: more flexible work in developed countries and continuing or even growing work in the informal sector in many developing countries. In more dynamic developing countries there is perhaps more work in the formal sector, but with increasing wage inequality and increasing insecurity.

Financial globalization started in the 1990’s with liberalisation of the banking system in many developed countries and a growing pressure by the Bretton woods organization for external capital market liberalization in developing countries. Since then we notice eight trends on the labour markets worldwide:

1. An increase in service employment,
2. Declining labour-force participation, especially male
3. A continuing high share of workers in the informal economy,
4. Continuing or increasing youth employment
5. A declining wageshare in the national income
6. Increasing wage and income inequality,
7. Growing importance of multinational enterprises and
8. The growing number of migrant workers in industrialised countries,

These paint a general picture of increased “precarisation” of many workers and their families in most countries in the world.

The crisis of 2008 had great repercussions on labourmarkets around the world. As in other crises employment did not recover as fast as did GDP growth, but special of this crisis was that most workers in the north and in the south did not benefit in the creation of the bubble.
Actually they were hurt trice (see table 1.1): firstly because they were left behind in the run up to the crisis, they were severely affected during the crisis and thirdly now suffering from reduced government expenditure as a consequence of increased public debt, which was to a large extent created to bail out banks and stimulate the economy during the crisis.

Governments did act during the 2008 crisis, much better than during the crisis of the 1930’s. The crisis of 2008 and the initial bold measures taken could have been a signal for an overhaul of financial globalization and of arresting the trend of growing inequality and precarisation at the labour market (van der Hoeven, 2010a). However that did not happen. Most governments shied away from special measures to attenuate the consequences of the crisis on labour. Governments, coordinated by the international organizations acted in the 2008 crisis as a banker of last resort but not as an employer of last resort or protecting workers and stimulating employment.

The current problems with public debt in Europe underscore that. Instead of aspiring higher growth, leading to more employment to reduce public debt-GDP ratios governments are slashing public expenditure so reducing growth and thus making it near impossible to reduces public debt-GDP ratios.

The consequences of the continuing process of current globalization and the ensuing crisis has resulted in the fact that concern for employment and especially for decent work and productive employment has gained in importance in the current discourses on development and development cooperation (Ocampo and Jomo, 2007; ILO, 2011).

Concern for employment has even gained more momentum since the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011. In a couple of only a few months various Arab regimes have been toppled by a population, not only wanting more democracy but perhaps even more importantly,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1 Effects on various socioeconomic groups in different countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre crisis Crisis stimulus Postcrisis fiscal austerity Back on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source Van Bergeijk, de Haan and van der Hoeven, 2011
especially by educated youth, wanting good jobs and the prospects of advancement in life. Yet this turmoil took place in countries which scored well on progress in the by aid donors much hailed Millennium Development Goals. See table 2

Table2: MDG progress ranks and other indicators, Selected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24.7 (2007)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30.6 (2005)</td>
<td>3903</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>3596</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8205</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.6 (2004)</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Jordan, are among the 8 best performing countries with respect to progress in the Millennium Development Goals. Their leaders belonged to the Socialist International and many researchers hailed the progress in Human Development in the Arab world. Youth unemployment was lower in other countries, such as Brazil, and Vietnam, with different levels of development but similar achievement in MDG progress as these Mediterranean countries.

After the change in regimes in various Arab countries in spring 2011, the leaders of UNDP and other development agencies quickly retorted that something must be done about employment. The Administrator of the UNDP, Helen Clark declared that ‘…Inclusive growth in the middle income countries in the Arab States region must also include strategies to generate decent jobs in higher value-added sectors, for which revamped tertiary education and skills training can educate people. The mismatch between the supply of university graduates and the type of jobs available is deeply dispiriting for those who cannot find suitable work...’.

However not only in the context of the events unravelling in the Arab world, voices became louder that employment had to become one of the major aims of development, if not the major aim. The recent events in Haiti after the devastating earthquake engendered a massive increase in development in Haiti. Yet in a review of developments in Haiti, Fukada-Parr argues that in delivery of aid to Haiti all efforts are concentrated on humanitarian aid and longer term provision of social services, but that the aid donors had little or no understanding of stimulating jobs and growth as a means for the population in general to advance.

It should be recalled that Employment issues were notable absent from the MDG’s when these were formulated in 2000. Mkandiwire (2011) and the late Amsden (2011) argue that the neglect of attention to employment issues in the 1990’s and the beginning of the third Millennium resulted from too much focus on poverty alleviation:

‘To slay the dragon of poverty, deliberate and determined investments in jobs above starvation wages must play a central role, whether for self-employment or paid-employment. The grass roots approach to solving poverty doesn’t go far enough,
because it aims only at improving the supply side of the labor market, making job seekers more capable, and not the demand side, making new jobs available for them. …Employment generation is different from poverty alleviation because it has a concept behind it, “capital.” This means that the labor market is influenced by, and influences, all flows through the savings-investment nexus, including accumulation, distribution and innovation. It is at the heart of political conflict. ’(Amsden 2011)

Mkandiwire (2011) concurs in observing that ‘Politically underpinning this, has been the social differentiation since independence and the accompanying ideological shifts that have contributed to the shift in focus of state policies away from social and employment policies.’

However 5 years after the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, the World Summit 2005 outcome document contains a reference (paragraph 47) to employment issues.9 This paragraph in the 2005 Summit Outcome document led in 2007 to the inclusion of a new sub-goal (under MDG1): ‘Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people’,10

But this leaves still many questions open as how to implement the goal for full employment. In recent writings (e.g. Melaned et al. 2011) there is a growing concern that, although the goal of full employment has now been established, too little coordinated effort has been undertaken. For example a recent review of the MDG’s, (UNDG, 2010) issued five years after the inclusion of the (sub) goal of employment in the MDG’s, reports indeed on the progress or regress in employment issues globally as well as in some countries by means of a number of employment indicators. It also gives 18 narratives of how certain development projects have contributed to more or better employment in individual countries. The varieties of examples mention successes of employment schemes, training schemes for entrepreneurs, training schemes for unemployed youth, improved collective bargaining, social security etc.

However looking at the different examples chosen in the UNDG 2010 review, it is not always clear how international support in general has contributed to more and or better employment since the introduction of full employment as a MDG. Most of the examples don’t make use of any counterfactual analysis or even mention whether other schemes mutatis mutandis have been contributing to employment creation also. Notably absent is any macro analysis of total volumes of aid on growth and its possible impact on employment. It remains thus difficult to distil from the UNDG 2010 outcome review how successful development and development aid efforts have been in respect of creating more and better employment.

A very disturbing development which started before the crisis but which is taking even more momentum now, is that of youth unemployment. Young people have suffered particularly heavily from the deterioration in labour market conditions. The rate of youth unemployment rose globally from 11.7 per cent in 2007 to 12.7 percent in 2011, the advanced economies being particularly hard hit, where this rate jumped from 12.5 per cent to 17.9 per cent over this period. In addition to the 74.7 million unemployed youth around the world in 2011 – a growing number of whom are in long-term unemployment – an estimated 6.4 million young people have given up hope of finding a job and have dropped out of the labour market altogether. Young people who are employed are increasingly likely to find themselves in part-time employment and often on temporary contracts. In developing countries, youth are
disproportionately among the working poor (ILO 2012). It is somewhat ironic to note that MDGs goals and targets exist for youth in terms of literacy rates and knowledge to HIV prevalence but not in terms of how these youths could obtaining a decent jobs and contribute actively to society.

A post 2015 system needs thus to develop a better approach and better indicators for Employment, Including Youth Employment.

8. Inequality

Various authors (Melaned, 2012, Vandemoortele, 2011, van der Hoeven, 2010c) have argued that the MDG, by emphasizing targets at a global level (and more and more also at national level), have ignored the inequalities that average figures conceal. They suggest therefore that attention to inequality should be a basic element of any MDGs and that targets for all MDGs should be broken down for different socioeconomic classes or for different income groups. This would then make explicit how much less (or more..) poorer incomes groups or excluded socio economic classes have gained access to social services or gained from increase in national income. These arguments for better monitoring the MDGs in respect to their distributional outcomes have been strengthened by recent analysis that conclude that greater equality and more equal access to government services will contribute to improved and sustained development in general (Wilkenson and Pickett, 2009).

However for a workable post 2015 system is not only necessary to make the various impact on poorer groups more visible and to suggest correctives in terms of public and development aid expenditure, but also to analyse what kind of economic or social processes are causing these enormous (often growing) inequalities and whether a post 2015 strategy should not incorporate explicit policies and targets for economic policies which are pro poor and reduce inequalities.

In analysing the growing income inequality in the context of different development strategies an important element of analysis is to question why the functional income distribution has changed substantially in the course of the last three decades. A recent report by Stockhammer (2012, p1-) for the ILO observes that, as part of a broader trend towards greater social inequality, wage shares in national income have declined in all OECD countries. In developing and emerging economies the picture is somewhat less homogenous, but in most of these countries wage shares have also declined. Stockhammer argues that financialisation emerges as the single most important cause for the decline in the wage share together with welfare state retrenchment and globalisation. He refutes two widely held views about income distribution. First, the view that changes in income distribution in advanced economies have mainly been driven by technological change. While technological change has had a negative effect on wage shares in developed economies, this effect is smaller than that of other factors and it is less robust. Second, the prediction that globalisation would benefit workers in developing and emerging economies does not hold and he finds an overall negative contribution of globalisation on wage shares in developing economies.

These findings have important implications for economic and social policy. They suggest that income distribution is not primarily determined by technological
progress, but rather depends on social institutions and on the structure of the financial system. Strengthening the welfare state, strengthening the bargaining power and greater inclusion of groups are at the bottom of the income distribution as well as financial regulation could help increase the wage share with little if any costs in terms of economic efficiency or growth.

A recent report of the OECD (OECD 2011) on growing inequalities provides for example a useful way of analysing the different causes and consequences and can provide an insight as how to monitor the growing inequality and where to locate the strongest corrective actions (see figure below)

![Analytical framework for the analysis of income inequality used in the report](image)

**Source:** OECD, 2011

*A post 2015 system should thus not only give more attention to inequalities but also be more explicit about the causes of substantial and growing inequality and incorporate goals and targets in relation to social and economic systems, which will lead to reducing inequality.*

**9. Social Floor**

The financial crisis has demonstrated clearly the need for a social floor in national economies. Although a global social floor is only one element of a broader socioeconomic strategy it has been shown that it can arrest growing trends of inequality and poverty in several circumstances (see WCSDG 2004; Van Ginneken, 2009). The need for a global social floor was recognized in the 2010 MDG outcome document and discussed in the WESS 2010, p.43-45

Most recently the Social Protection Advisory Group, 2011, argues that “With the Millennium Development Goals deadline fast approaching, it is important to intensify efforts to achieve existing commitments and to start discussing a new framework for coming decades. The social protection floor can be of help in this endeavour. By addressing multidimensional vulnerabilities in an integrated and interconnected way,
it complements the MDGs perspective and provides a coherent and consistent social policy tool to accelerate the achievement of the MDGs before 2015 and beyond. We recommend that the floor approach be taken into consideration in the design of future development commitments.” One of the members of the commission (Herfkens, 2011) observes that there has been substantial progress in achieving the MDGs. But observes also the progress in global averages masks the prevalence of continuous and, in many cases growing inequalities within countries—which make it difficult to achieve the MDGs for the very poor; inequality issues have neither been emphasized nor properly monitored in the MDG framework. Moreover, the sectoral focus of most MDGs has deemphasized integrated approaches to development, reduced attention to income poverty and created policy fragmentation in the pursuit of individual goals.

She argues that the establishment of a Social protection Floor (SPF) in developing countries can help in addressing these shortcomings in achieving the MDGs. Social protection floors are instrumental in ensuring that the very poor are not left behind; and provide enabling frameworks for comprehensive approaches to address income and non-income inequalities. She recalls that the major responsibility for achieving the MDGs rests in the developing country themselves. In particular, middle-income countries have the resources and capacities to establish their own SPF. Many are doing so using home-grown approaches that are more likely to be successful than adopting approaches from developed countries. Low-income developing countries need ODA to augment their resources in order to create effective SPF. She maintains that ODA funding for SPF has the potential of addressing the needs of the poor in developing countries, being effective, and satisfying the political requirements of donors.

Three observations would be relevant for a post 2015 system:
1. a greater attention within the MDG framework on setting and monitoring both income and non-income equality targets.
2. Developing countries and emerging countries should establish or further develop SPF as a means of reducing inequality and achieving the MDGs or their successors.
3. Donors should increase ODA to low income countries and place greater emphasis and resources on a SPF.

10. Environment

A post 2015 system needs to be more cognisant of challenges to the environment and energy consumption. In the discussions up to Rio plus 20 various proposals have been made. The High Level Panel on Global Sustainability, 2012, underscores for example the following issues:

1. The number of people living in poverty is declining, but the number hungry is rising
2. Inequality in wealth distribution is rising
3. Access to clean water is increasing, but 2.6 billion people lack access to modern sanitation
4. By 2030, demand for food will rise by 50%, for energy by 45% and for water by 30%
5. Women are too often excluded from economic opportunities
6. The financial crisis was partly caused by market rules that encourage short-
termism and do not reward sustainable investment
7. The current economic model is "pushing us inexorably towards the limits of natural resources and planetary life support systems"

The panel recommends that with UN support, governments would adopt indicators of economic performance that go beyond simple GDP, and measure the sustainability of countries' economies and also that governments would change the regulation of financial markets to promote longer-term, more stable and sustainable investment. It recommends that subsidies that damage environmental integrity would be phased out by 2020. Currently governments spend more than $400bn each year subsidizing fossil fuels, while OECD countries alone spend nearly the same amount on agricultural subsidies. The panel argues that in parallel to these more general recommendations, access to energy, clean water, sanitation and food should be increased and thus meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) but also going beyond them: New targets would be established of ensuring "universal access to affordable sustainable energy" by 2030. Governments "should consider establishing a global fund for education" in order to meet the existing MDG on universal access to primary education by 2015, and aim for universal access to secondary education by 2030. These and other targets, according to the Commission, should be incorporated into a new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to be drawn up in the next few years.  

Should such Sustainable Development Goals be conceived and what targets might one select for these goals in a post 2015 system?

The current MDGs have four goals and targets related to environment (MDG7) 13, where actually two relate to clean drinking water and people in slum dwellings. The Global Monitoring Report, 2011 (p 39) states: Goal 7 on environmental sustainability and biodiversity has no well-defined targets but it affects other MDGs, such as child health and human development more generally.

The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi (SSF) commission (Stiglitz 2010) offers four ways to measuresustainability: (1) large and eclectic dashboards, (2) composite indices, (3) indices that consist of correcting GDP in a more or less extensive way, and (4) indices that essentially focus on measuring how far we currently 'overconsume' our resources (including the ecological footprint). Each of these indicators has its limitations. The SSF commission argues therefore that it is, as yet, not possible to devise a single indicator for sustainability, because such an indicator comprises too many uncertainties.

The SSF commission gives various arguments why it is difficult to arrive at a single indicator for environmental sustainability: Measuring sustainability differs from standard statistical practice in a fundamental way (p. 263): for adequate measurement of sustainability one needs projections, not only observations. Some could argue that, in a world of perfect capital markets, all the relevant information on this future path of the economy is conveyed in the current valuation of assets or of the services that they currently provide. Recent events have shown how far well-established capital markets can be mistaken in their implicit predictions of future economic developments! But the SSF commission also warns of measuring sustainability by just questioning people about it -as one is sometimes inclined to do for the measurement of current well-
being. A second difficulty (p. 264) is that measuring sustainability also entails prior responses to normative questions: The coexistence of different appreciations of sustainability may reflect not only different predictions of what the future can be, but also different views about what will really matter tomorrow for us or our descendants. A third difficulty (p. 264) is that the question of sustainability is not exclusively to assess relative sustainabilities of each country separately. The problem is global. In that case, what is at stake is rather the contribution of each country to global sustainability or unsustainability.

The SSF report recommends therefore that a Sustainability assessment require a well-identified global dashboard and treating sustainability separately from other measurement issues of the monetary or non-monetary dimensions of current well-being. All components of such a global dashboard should be interpretable as variations of some “stocks”. However phrasing the issue of sustainability in terms of preservation of some stock or “capital” goods does not mean that one may consider that these stocks or goods must be managed or traded as ordinary capital goods. The question of sustainability is a question of knowing whether we pass enough of all this stock of wealth to future periods or future generations.

The SSF report argues that a monetary index of sustainability has certainly its place in a sustainability dashboard, but that it should remain essentially focused on economic aspects of sustainability. A stock-based approach to sustainability can look at variations in each stock separately with a view to doing whatever is necessary to keep it from declining or it could summarize all stock variations in synthetic figures. But because aggregation cannot be based on market values one has to turn to imputations, which raise both the normative and informational difficulties. All this suggests to the SSF commission for staying with a more modest approach, i.e. focusing the monetary aggregation on items for which reasonable valuation techniques exist, such as physical capital, human capital and fossil resources.

According to the SSF commission the stock/flow indicators that are the best suited is “the ecological footprint” as it essentially focuses on contributions to global non-sustainability, with the message that the main responsibility lies with the developed countries.

In conclusion the SSF commission argues for a small dashboard of sustainability indicators, firmly rooted in the logic of the “stock” approach to sustainability, which would combine:

- An indicator more or less derived from the extended wealth approach, “greened” as far as possible on the basis of currently available knowledge, but whose main function, however, would be to send warning messages concerning “economic” non-sustainability. This economic non-sustainability could be due to low savings or low investment in education, or to insufficient reinvestment of income generated by the extraction of fossil resources (for countries that strongly rely on this source of income).
- A set of well-chosen physical indicators, which would focus on dimensions of environmental sustainability that are either already important or could become so in the future, and that remain difficult to capture in monetary terms.

11. Human Rights
Chapter five of the Millennium Declaration refers specifically to the importance of respecting human rights and confirms principles of international equality and shared responsibility. The AIV (2011) report notes (p.64) that: “…although not formulated in terms of ‘rights’, the MDGs are an important milestone in achieving economic, social and cultural rights. Conversely, human rights strategies support achievement of the MDGs, because they address the discrimination, exclusion and accountability failures that often underlie poverty and development problems” (see also van Ginneken 2011). In the human rights approach, promoting development is not seen as charity. “Development is considered to be the right of every individual and it is the duty of the state to guarantee it. A human rights approach provides principles on which action should be based. They include non-discrimination, human dignity, participation and accountability”.

The AIV report reviews how human rights can strengthen the MDGs in a variety of areas. “Firstly, this approach focuses on vulnerable groups, and on people who are discriminated against or whose rights are violated and those who are responsible for this. At the moment, the MDGs are based on average progress by countries as a whole. Secondly, a human rights approach can provide working principles for achieving the MDGs; non-discrimination, participation and accountability can act as guidelines in implementing development policy. Thirdly, changing a goal into a right can encourage people to demand accountability from the state. The MDGs would then no longer be mere targets, but legal obligations to be fulfilled by the state. Specifying human rights in relation to the MDGs could result in improved monitoring mechanisms. Fourthly, a human rights approach could ensure that attention is devoted to the quality of services, and not only the quantity. Human rights treaties often prescribe minimum criteria, which could also be used to measure the MDGs.”

The AIV report stresses that “these rights will continue to be valid after 2015; in the long term, all rights must be achieved for all people. In this respect a human rights approach is more sustainable and focuses on overcoming structural causes of rights violations and underdevelopment”. Various international human rights lawyers (e.g. Allston, 2005) have argued that the lack a human rights basis of the MDGs is a serious omission as it has become obvious that with the growing globalization and increasing financialisation a rights based approach could support groups which are negatively affected by globalisation and financialisation in obtaining a greater share of national income or access to state provided social services and thus contributing to achieving the MDGs.

The Advisory council on International Affairs of the Netherlands (AIV, 2011), discusses therefore three options in which human rights approaches could play a greater role in a post 2015 system:
- One option is that countries add an extra goal, following the example of Mongolia that has drawn up a ninth national MDG on human rights and democracy.
- A second option is to indicate how each MDG relates to the existing human rights. Many countries already use their reporting obligations under international human rights conventions to report on progress on the MDGs.
- The third and preferred option by the AIV entails a general reference to the importance of the human rights approach in the post-2015 system through a differentiated measurement and incorporation of references. This would enable the underlying principles of human rights to be declared applicable to all stages in the MDG process. Goals and targets in a post 2015 system could thus make explicit links to broadly endorsed agreements from the past, through references to Beijing (MDG3),
Cairo (MDG5) and relevant articles from widely ratified UN human rights conventions. This would enable a difficult process of renegotiation to be avoided.

This third scenario suggested by the AIV report is the most pragmatic way of incorporating a human rights approach in the MDGs while preserving the international consensus. It is suggested that this would be applied in the current deliberations for the post 2015 agenda.

12. A changing geo-political landscape?

One of the most important trends that took place since the formulation of the MDGs is the rapid growth of some large developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. The figure below from the WESS, 2010 shows the growth the economic weight of these countries, especially over the last decade. The share of Western Europe and the US, the principal providers of ODA is less than 50 per cent of total world GDP in 2008. However not the greatly increased GDP of the emerging countries, but the 2008 financial crisis made the group of G8 countries willing to accept the G20 as an institute of global governance to fend off the crisis and to build a basis for an improved global financial structure.

![Figure 1.2: Shifting global economic power measured as shares of world gross product, 1950-2008](image)

Source: WESS, 2011

A post 2015 system of development cannot ignore such a changed geo-political landscape and thus cannot be driven anymore by traditional donors, as was the case in 2000. How difficult this might look, a post 2015 system for development should be the outcome of a global social contract of all partners. The best this social contract can be given form is a renewal and actualisation of the social contract with all countries concluded in 2000 through the Millennium Declaration. A new or reformulated social contract would then set the tone for goals and indicators in a post 2015 system, some of which may overlap with the current MDGs but some also not.

An important element of such a global social contract is better policy coherence in areas of economic, social and environmental policies at national and international level (WCSDG, 2004, van der Hoeven, 2010, WESS 2010). Although there is a notion of policy coherence in the current MDG8, all observers agree that in a post 2015 system a much greater attention to policy coherence needs to be given far beyond what is now formulated in MDG8.
However one needs to be aware of the risk that policy coherence could lead to a ganging up of major international players in the international institutions, dictating a certain development ideology and providing smaller actors less policy space as happened in the 1990’s with the Structural Adjustment Programs of the IFI’s. (van der Hoeven, 2010b) This fear was still expressed by World Commission of the Social Dimensions of Globalization in 2004, but has since become less, as major emerging and developing countries play, since the financial crisis of 2008, an increasingly bigger role in global governance, minimizing the risk of a dominant industrial countries development model (e.g.. See: G20, 2010).

There should therefore by now be a reasonable understanding of major and non controversial development trends which contribute to achieving the millennium development goals and which need to be made more explicit in a more coherent post 2015 development agenda. Nayyar, 2012, lists the following: Necessity of economic growth, institutional mechanisms to translate growth in meaningful development by improving conditions of people, importance of public action, employment as the only sustainable means of poverty reduction. This requires coherence between various aspects of economic policy (macro economics, trade, investment) social policy and environmental policies. The G20, born out of the 2008 financial crisis, might be seen as a first attempt of improved coherence at international level. But for various reasons it neither adequate nor sufficient. It is not adequate because the IMF mainly forms its secretariat and it is not sufficient as it lacks international legitimacy. Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2011, suggest therefore using the increased acknowledgment for improved policy coherence and momentum of support for a body like the G20 to strive for a Global Economic Coordination Council which would have more global political legitimacy.

A Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC), as suggested by Ocampo and Stiglitz, would be an ideal forum to foster the necessary policy coherence for a post 2015 system of development.

One important issue on the GECCs agenda must certainly be a global response to national and international financial crises and the inherent financial instability that characterizes the current financial system. Such an increased attention to crises and global financial instability is important in a post 2015 agenda for development. As argued above the global financial crisis in 2008 caused a majors setback in the achievements of the MDGs (World Bank 2101) and halted the upward trend in development assistance. A formulation of the post 2015 agenda should therefore refer to possible risks of future financial crises, should contain a statement how resources for achieving goals an targets to reduce poverty should be safeguarded in times of global financial crises and should indicate how policies for economic recovery should include special measures to reduce poverty and social deprivation. This could take the form of automatic stabilizers at a global level such as global social floor as discussed above.

Another challenge to global governance and of increased policy coherence is how national policy space still can be exercised under a system of increased global governance. Rodrik, 2011, argues for a system of global governance that respects as much as possible national policy space, allowing countries and people to choice their preferences in terms of e.g. social policies and social protection. The combination of improved global governance with ample room for exercising national social policies need to be a cornerstone of a post 2015 system of development.
MDGs were formulated in 2000 at the global level. Various authors have pointed out that it is therefore not appropriate to set these global targets at a regional or national level: this would be especially unfair to poorer countries (Easterly, 2009). However keeping the MDGs refined to the global level has also drawbacks, which have become now even more evident that when the MDs were formulated: When MDGs are interpreted to be of relevance only at the global level, the performance of a few large fast growing countries will determine any global outcome. For example, depending on exact definitions and interpretation of the time frame, the MDG 1 goal of halving poverty has been achieved long before 2015 because of the extra ordinary growth in China and in India and Brazil.

Another phenomenon is the fact that three quarters of the poor now live in middle income countries since large low-income countries in 2000 have been ‘graduated’ to the group of middle income countries (see section 5).

The need to strengthening national social policy, the fact that developing countries have become more diverse and the fact that poor live in countries of radically different development levels and development patterns all imply that a post 2015 development framework needs to give much more attention to development patterns, goals and targets at the national level.

A post 2015 system should acknowledge this diversity and but nevertheless contain indications how poverty and inequality can be reduced in least developed countries, emerging economies and also in developed countries themselves. The crisis of 2008 and the current challenges of the reduction of public and private debts caused by the financial crisis make it ample clear that protecting the poor and the socially disadvantaged in industrialised countries has also become a serious political and societal problem. An understanding should be reached that continuing poverty and growing inequality are not conducive to sustained economic growth and social stability.

A post 2015 development agenda could thus take the form of a global social contract in which the LDCs would be guaranteed concessional resources to achieve inclusion in the world economy and poverty reduction while families in LDCs, emerging and developed countries would have guarantees and ability to exercise economic, social and labour rights for a better share in the national development outcomes and at a minimum safeguards for social protection in times of economic downturns.

13 Whither Global Governance?

Although the Millennium Declaration had a special paragraph on strengthening the role of the United Nations and on improved global governance in general, the MDGs did not contain explicit references to global governance except some references in MDG8. Yet, with hindsight, one can well argue that a lack of global governance had a negative impact on implementation of the MDGs. Whether this was the major cause for missing some of the targets is open for debate; but it has been at least one of the major causes. The hike in food prices in 2007, and in the following years, the deterioration of the climate and the great recession in 2008 (Addison 2011) as well as the subsequent muddling with the debt overhang in especially Europe, were all the
consequence of failed global governance. Changes in Global governance, such as a greater role for the G20 have been the result of such crises rather than being a result of outcome of the MDGs.

An essential part of an improved system of global governance is the recognition of the importance of the provision of global public goods and how the provision of these goods is governed. Although the discussion on public goods is sensitive as it touches on matters of sovereignty, it cannot be ignored in a post 2015 system. The call for the provision of global public goods following the current financial crisis has even becoming stronger. For example the chief economist of the Financial Times, Martin Wolf (Wolf 2012) stated recently “A central element of the debate is how to avoid extreme financial instability. Such instability is a public bad. Avoiding it is a public good. Those acting inside the market system have no incentive to supply the good or avoid the bad”. “Our states cannot supply public goods on their own. They need to co-operate. Traditionally, the least bad way of securing such co-operation is through some sort of leadership. The leader acts despite free riders. ….But as we move again into a multipolar era, the ability of any country to supply such leadership will be limited. Even in the unipolar days, it only worked where the hegemon wanted to provide the particular public good in question” “Ours is an ever more global civilization that demands the provision of a wide range of public goods. The states on which humanity depends to provide these goods, from security to management of climate, are unpopular, overstretched and at odds. We need to think about how to manage such a world. It is going to take extraordinary creativity.”

A post 2015 agenda for development needs therefore to contain an articulation of the various sets of global public goods, how they are financed and which global institutions can be hold accountable for the provision of these global public goods.

14. A laundry list of good intentions or smart politics: what do we want in a post 2015 system?

The sections above reviewed emerging or recurrent development issues, such as employment, environment and human rights, alongside those, which the MDGs deal with. We argued that the global political landscape is very quickly changing, that we observe a growing differentiation of developing countries, that most of the world’s poor do not live in poor countries any more, all implying an improved system of global governance with greater attention to the provision of global public goods. One might see this as an overload of a post 2015 development framework, which would undo of the perceived strengths of the current MDGs: their simplicity. 17

We argued however that with the economic crisis and the changing geo-political landscape the traditional development aid interventions as formulated in the MDGs might not always be the most effective way to stimulate development or to allow the poor to grow out of poverty. New challenges need to be confronted, but should always be put in the context of answering the question of how families and poor households in developing countries can rely on a post 2015 development agenda in times of economic crises. 18 Above we sketched how a global social contract that acknowledges the special position of the least developed countries as well as the position of the poor in emerging and also industrialised economies could contribute to that.
A post 2015 system needs therefore to be the outcome of the negotiations on a renewed global social contract on the basis of the current trends and future expectations. In this process all concerns should be discussed; precluding certain issues or concerns beforehand, with the argument that these may make a future set of development goals too broad, is for the moment not relevant. If issues are kept off the table, a later future agreement on a post 2015 development framework might be seriously be compromised from the beginning.

The best way to start discussions on a global social contract for a post 2015 development framework would be to start from the Millennium Declaration of 2000 and to see whether and where this Declaration needs to be actualised. On this basis a (restricted) set of development goals and targets in a post 2015 era could then be formulated.

Framing the deliberations for a Post 2015 Development Framework on (an actualisation of) the Millennium Declaration would ground its preparations on a set of issues that carry a globally accepted political consensus and would thus avoid a laundry list of badly political formulated good intentions. The following table provides some elements that could be discussed in the leading up to a global post 2015 framework for development. This table is not exhaustive but is intended to guide discussions and deliberations for a post 2015 development framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDGs</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Post 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Secretariat, Donor Driven</td>
<td>Wider consultations civil society, government groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target group</td>
<td>Poor in developing countries</td>
<td>Poor in All countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle means to achieve goals</td>
<td>Development Aid National Public Expenditure</td>
<td>Changes in international system, National Public Expenditure, Development Aid for fragile and low income states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-economic Framework</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Sustainable and equitable growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Mainly absent</td>
<td>Inclusion of Sustainable development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Reemphasizing existing rights Global social floor Claims for redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global governance</td>
<td>More or less absent</td>
<td>Provision Global public Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global and link to National</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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A recent example is the way DFID has been analysing the ‘effectiveness’ of different UN organizations with respect to development. Organization dealing with normative issues received lower markings in terms of effectiveness, because activities of these Organizations could not fit the numerical targets and metrics designed by DFID experts to rate effectiveness! See DFID, 2011

OECD DAC online, consulted 15-01-2012)

For example, traffic jams may increase GDP as a result of the increased use of gasoline, but obviously not the quality of life. Moreover, if citizens are concerned about the quality of air, and air pollution is increasing, then statistical measures, which ignore air pollution, will provide an inaccurate estimate of what is happening to citizens’ well-being.

Questioned by the public whether economic growth should be given less emphasis in the context of a Human Development Strategy, AmartyaSen remarked that when the UNSG asked his opinion on the MDGs, he informed the SG that developing countries might have gotten a bad deal as there was little on growth and economic convergence in the MDGs. Sen also reminded the audience that in the wake of the great recession of 2008, and the subsequent debt crises, many countries needed more rather than less economic growth.(7th Meeting of the Human Development Association, 5 sept. 2011, The Hague).

Demand stimulus of 1.7% of world GDP took place. Banks were massively bailed out, costing Europe and the US an amount equal to one-sixth of world GDP.

see for example the blog of DaniRodrik ‘The unsung development miracles of our time’ Nov. 13 2010 which commends the educational policies and access to health which also empowered women.

Jobs, Equity and Voice: Why both Economic and Political Inclusion matter in the Arab world’ (Huffington Post, 7 April 2011)

While social investments are important, they are not sustainable without investment in the productive base of the economy. Social services are essential for the fulfilment of human rights to education, to healthcare, and social security and a massive investment in these sectors is still needed. But the current allocations are unbalanced; economic growth is needed for the fulfilment of the human rights to housing, to food, and productive work. The growth pillar of the national poverty reduction strategy (DSNCRP or PRSP) is only financed by 20% and is not included in the programs of major donors such as the UN system. . . Fukada-Parr, 2009

We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies as well as our national development strategies, including poverty reduction strategies, as part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. These measures should also encompass the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, as defined in International Labour Organization Convention No. 182, and forced labour. We also resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work’ . UN, 2005

with four indicators: 1 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 2 Employment-to-population ratio 3 Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per day and 4 Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment.

Paragraph (23) f Promoting universal access to public and social services and providing social protection floors . . (UN 2010)

Some of these recommendations run with parallel the initial draft agreement drawn up for the Rio+20 Summit.

Target 7.A Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources

Target 7.B Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in the rate of loss

Target 7.C Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

Target 7.D Have achieved a significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

For example by making use of information gathered and assessed as part of existing human rights procedures, e.g. under the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

This important discussion on quantifying the targets, setting the trajectory and the initial values, which is not only a technical one but which also has political ramifications will not be reproduced here: for a discussion see Fukada-Parr 2010.

This is actually already an on-going trend: since 2000 various countries have either reproduced or translated MDGs at their own national level.
The 8 points of the Millennium Declaration led to a much smaller number of MDG clusters (Development and Poverty Eradication and more limited: Protecting the Vulnerable and protecting our Common Environment).

A point made by Jan Pronk at a UNDESA working group on a post 2015 system, New York 27-29 February 2012