



## Kingdom of Morocco

### 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

#### Main Committee I / General Debate

Statement delivered by Mr. Bouchaib Eloumni  
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of Morocco to the United Nations in New York

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**Mr. Chairman,**

Let me first of all congratulate you for your election as Chair of the Main Committee I and assure you of our delegation support and full cooperation.

**Mr. President,**

I would like to reiterate that Morocco, a party to all instrument related to weapons of mass destruction, remains convinced that the security of all nations lies rather in the peaceful coexistence, dialogue and mutual trust and not military power and the accumulation of WMDs.

The NPT constitutes an important asset which allowed the international community to lay the foundations of a multilateral nuclear consensus, based on a delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty, in order to maintain international peace and security.

In this regard, we consider that the Conference should arrive at an outcome that reflects the following:

1. The Conference should underline that it is not acceptable any more that nuclear weapons remain the only WMDs that are not prohibited by an international instrument. The indiscriminate, devastating and irreversible

consequences of any use of nuclear weapons on the environment and human lives compel us more than ever to advance collectively towards the prohibition of those weapons.

2. The Conference should also recall that the ultimate objective of the NPT is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to underline that further efforts are required to achieve progress towards that objective. Beyond the compromise language used in the treaty, the underlying consensus was to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons in order to facilitate negotiation on nuclear disarmament to free the world from such devastating weapons.
3. The Conference should reaffirm that the starting point for any credible and sustainable nuclear disarmament remains the fulfillment of existing obligations and the implementation of agreed measures.
4. The Conference should acknowledge that very limited progress has been achieved in implementing the agreed disarmament measures in the 2010 review conference action plan.
5. The Conference should reaffirm that all previously agreed measures, including in 2010, remain valid and relevant and needs to be fully implemented.
6. The Conference should acknowledge the efforts made by nuclear weapon states while insisting that, for example, the reductions in nuclear arsenals should be more substantive and irreversible, and that they should be implemented as part of the package of all agreed disarmament measures.
7. The Conference should address the two following vital issues:

**The first one** is the time frame for implementing agreed measures. While we agree that disarmament can only be a gradual and phased process, we consider that the conference should envisage an indicative time frame that would allow for assessment of progress. Without a time frame, the limited measures agreed in 2010 would never constitute real steps or building blocks.

**The second issue** that the conference should address is the need for verification. While welcoming transparency measures and information provided by nuclear weapon state, the Conference should reaffirm the importance of verification for disarmament to increase confidence, ensure irreversibility and enhance the credibility of the process and the Treaty as a whole.

No one has a magic solution for verification and we realize how sensitive and complex this could be. However, it is importance to agree on the need for verification and to start addressing this gap. As matter of fact, the non-

proliferation pillar comes with transparency and verification obligations. The inalienable right to peaceful uses is subject to safeguards obligations. The Safeguards regime of the IAEA and its Technical cooperation Program both include financial obligations as well as verification and accountability for non nuclear weapon states. There is no reason why Disarmament obligations and commitments should not be verifiable.

There are different options before this conference. One of them could be to form an open-ended working group to consider “measures of transparency and verification in nuclear disarmament”.

We hope that the Conference will launch a constructive dialogue on these issues to which we remain willing to contribute.

I thank you.