



**CHAIR OF
THE COORDINATING BUREAU
OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT**



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**Statement by
H.E. Ambassador Reza Najafi
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna**

On Behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties

**before
Main Committee II
Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York, 4 May 2015**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I am very pleased to speak on behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties to the NPT. Let me congratulate your chairmanship and assure you the full cooperation of NAM states parties to the Treaty

1. The Group reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

2. In that regard, the Group also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful

**Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran
622 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, Tel. (212) 687 2020, Fax: (212) 867 8076
e-mail: nam.iran@un.int, Website: <http://namiran.org>**

nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty”.

3. The Group fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfillment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

4. The Group, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

5. In that connection, the Group, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(58)/RES/14, paragraph 34, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

6. The Group stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

7. The Group emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

8. The Group calls upon the nuclear weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute,

for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of: (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty; (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfillment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

9. The Group, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

10. The Group stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

11. The Group strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

13. The Group recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the

supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfillment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

14. The Group also calls for the establishment by the Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.

15. The Group expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

16. The Group stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.

17. The Group emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.

18. The Group calls upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

19. The Group confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

20. The Group emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

21. With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, The Group believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

22. The Group underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.

23. The Group underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and its relevant regime pertaining to the protection of confidential information needs to be further strengthened. Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

24. In this context, The Group calls for the implementation of resolution GC(54)/RES/11 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its fifty-fourth session, in which the General Conference, "stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of

confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged "the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information", accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information" and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information".

25. The Group underlines the necessity of reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards being factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

26 The Group stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.

27. The Group expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing".

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

28. The Group on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

29. The Group welcomes the establishment of the Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), Pelindaba

(African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) nuclear-weapon-free zones and consider them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

30. In this context, The Group strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

31. The 2010 Review Conference also reaffirmed the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called on all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date. The Group expresses its serious concern that no progress has been achieved with regard to Israel's accession to the Treaty, and placing all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

32. The Group expresses deep concern over the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. While appreciating the efforts made by the facilitator of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Jaakko Laajava, the Group expresses profound disappointment over the lack of progress in the implementation of the plan of action on the Middle East adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, in particular over the failure of the conveners to convene the conference in 2012 as scheduled. This failure contradicts and violates the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty, contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group also expresses deep concern, in this context, that Israel continues to undermine the convening of the Conference by not declaring its intention to participate in it. The Group urges the three co-sponsors of the Resolution to fulfil their responsibility in taking all necessary measures to fully implement it without any further delay.

33. The Group reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and

concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

34. The Group emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.

33. The Group urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

35. The Group, while noting with satisfaction the convening of the third preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which was held in New York on 7 May 2014, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States. The Group stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

36. As a contribution to the work of the Conference, the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty has presented several working papers, which contain its positions and substantive recommendations. Among them, I wish to refer to working papers on Safeguards and Verification, as well as a paper containing the "Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons". I urge the Committee to consider all of the related recommendations in order to incorporate them into the final report of the Committee.

37. While all such recommendations are submitted to the Conference in advance, in order to save the time, I will only read some of them. At the same time, the Group reserves its right to present further recommendations during the work of the Committee.

Recommendations of the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, inter alia, are as follows:

- To reaffirm that safeguards are accepted for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and accordingly, they shall be implemented without affecting the inalienable rights under article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.

- To stress the importance of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards and to call upon all States parties that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards and, in this context, to urge all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible in order to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

- To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings should not be considered as legal safeguard obligations.

- To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear materials and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation and that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA, and in this context to reject attempts by any IAEA member State to use the technical cooperation programme of the Agency as a tool for political purposes in violation of its statute and to call upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

- To confirm that article III of the Treaty on verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV and, therefore, States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

- To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

- To underscore that the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities, needs to be strictly observed and that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility.
- To underline the importance of and the need for strict observance by IAEA of its statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities and the necessity of IAEA reporting on the implementation of safeguards being factual, technically based and reflecting appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.
- To reiterate the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements and the need for the regime for the protection of such confidential information to be significantly strengthened; and to urge, in this regard, the IAEA Director General to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.
- To support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to stress the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons; to recognize, in this context, the Agency capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements; and to call for the full implementation of action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapon-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of the Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the use of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.
- To call upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in order to ensure, inter alia, preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty without exception.
- To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities and resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.
- To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards to ensure full compliance with their obligations assumed under Article I of the Treaty.

- To reaffirm that the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, is essential in the realization of the objectives of treaties establishing such zones.
- To stress the importance of the early ratification of the existing treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, by all States whose ratification is required for the entry into force of such treaties, as well as the early ratification, by all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territories of parties to such treaties, as envisaged in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- To urge the nuclear-weapon States that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, have done so with reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties and affect the denuclearization status of that zone, to withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations and to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.
- To call for further efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the regions where they do not exist, in particular in the Middle East.
- To reaffirm the longstanding strong global support for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without any further delay, as it would greatly enhance international peace and security and contribute to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and, in this context, to reaffirm once again the determination of the State parties to the Treaty to extend fullest cooperation and to exert utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment of such a zone.
- To reaffirm that the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East is an essential element and integral part of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended, without a vote, as well as that the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution and emphasized that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.
- To express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and the fact that Israel continues to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals, and to reaffirm that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allows one party to threaten its neighbours and the region, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security; as well as to stress also that the adoption, by the IAEA General Conference, of resolution GC(57)/RES/15 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities is another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and that Israeli nuclear capabilities remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

- To reaffirm the call, by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, on Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards; and, while expressing deep concern that Israel has not yet acceded to the Treaty, to underscore the necessity of the immediate and unconditional accession of Israel to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, which remains an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

- To demand that Israel renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without any precondition or further delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and conduct all its nuclear-related activities in full conformity with the non-proliferation Treaty, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty, in particular in the Middle East

- To stress the need for an unequivocal commitment by each State party to the Treaty to strictly abide by its legal obligations to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

To reaffirm that the nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their legal obligations under article I of the Treaty, shall solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

-To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2015 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, and to submit its reports thereon to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

To underscores that efforts, by the United Nations Secretary-General related to the Conference should be undertaken in accordance with the following elements, and should be focused on convening the Conference within 180 days from the adoption of the 2015 Review Conference Final Document, aimed at launching a process to negotiate and conclude a legally binding Treaty to establish a Middle East Zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, with the following mandate, and in doing so, he shall exert all efforts and take all necessary measures with a view to ensuring the success of the conference:

- a. The United Nations Secretary-General shall invite States of the Middle East region¹ to attend the Conference;
- b. The United Nations Secretary-General shall also invite the five nuclear-weapon-States, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the League of Arab States to attend the Conference, as observers;
- c. The Middle East Resolution, adopted at 1995 Review and Extension Conference, shall be the terms of reference of the Conference;
- d. The Conference shall establish two working groups as follows:
 - (a) Working Group I to deal with the scope, geographic demarcation of the zone, prohibitions, interim measures, and
 - (b) Working Group II to deal with verification measures and implementation mechanisms.
- e. The Conference shall meet annually in its plenary format and working groups;
- f. When the draft of the treaty is agreed among all states of the region, the United Nations Secretary-General shall reconvene the Conference for its adoption;
- g. The United Nations Secretary-General shall report to the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory committees on progress made and the status of the implementation of the 1995 Resolution;
- h. The five nuclear-weapon States should provide all necessary support for the implementation of this mandate, and should present reports on their actions in this regard to the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory committees;
- i. The United Nations Secretary-General shall exert all efforts to secure the required funds, including through a voluntary fund that he could establish to support the implementation of this mandate;
- j. The conference shall not be postponed. In case the States that announced their participation in the Conference decide to postpone the convening of the conference, it should be held within 90 days.

¹ Report by the Director General of the IAEA on the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East 2013, GOV/2013/33/Add.1-GC(57)/10/Add.1