


**STATEMENT TO THE
MAIN COMMITTEE II OF THE
2015 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)**

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Geoffrey Shaw

**Representative of the Director General
to the United Nations and Director of the New York Office**



INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Mr Chair,

In his address to this Conference on the opening day, the IAEA Director General recalled the text of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. It had referred to IAEA safeguards as a “fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime” that play “an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT”. Five years on, that statement remains just as true today.

The IAEA now applies safeguards to over 1,250 facilities in 180 States. The amount of nuclear material under safeguards has risen by around 15 per cent over the past five years and at the start of the year stood at 193,500 significant quantities. With many more nuclear facilities being built and placed under IAEA safeguards, this global trend looks set to continue.

That is the scale of the challenge facing the IAEA. Last year, our inspectors were required to spend nearly 13,000 calendar-days in the field. While the IAEA’s verification workload continues to rise, its resources have not increased commensurately. It should be noted that the IAEA’s obligation to apply safeguards is determined by legal agreements; it is not a matter of discretion. In that context, in order to uphold the credibility of the safeguards conclusions it draws, the IAEA needs to become more productive - in other words, more efficient in the implementation of safeguards, without compromising effectiveness.

One of the ways in which the IAEA has sought to optimise safeguards implementation is through the application of the State-level concept. This refers to the general notion of implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, rather than on a facility basis.

For the past two years, the Secretariat has been engaged in an intensive and open dialogue with IAEA Member States on this subject. This has led to improved understanding and clarification of safeguards implementation. We have reassured Member States that safeguards implementation in the context of the State-level concept does not, and will not, entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of States or the IAEA. Nor does it involve any change or modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations.

What the State-level concept does enable the IAEA to do is to better focus on the attainment of technical objectives instead of mechanistically carrying out safeguards activities. This also results in a better use of resources by helping the IAEA to avoid conducting more activities than are needed for effective safeguards.

On the basis of the State-level concept, we are now updating existing State-level safeguards approaches, and plan to proceed with the progressive development of State-level safeguards approaches for other States in the future. In developing and implementing SLAs, the IAEA will consult with the State and/or regional authority concerned, particularly on the implementation of in-field safeguards measures.

I reiterate the Director General’s call on all remaining NPT non-nuclear-weapon States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements, and bring them into force, as soon as possible. I would also reiterate his encouragement to all States that have not yet done so, to bring additional protocols into force as soon as possible. Because the implementation of an additional protocol significantly increases the IAEA's ability to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities, it is a vital tool for effective verification. All States with small quantities protocols are also called on to amend or rescind them as soon as possible.

In this regard, I am pleased to inform the Conference of the positive progress that has been made. Since the last Review Conference, six States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements; 24 States have brought into force additional protocols; and 17 States have accepted the revised small quantities protocol text. This positive trend should be sustained in the next NPT review cycle.

I am also pleased to inform the Conference of another significant achievement since the last Review Conference. In a major undertaking that is now nearing completion - on time and within budget, we have completely modernized our analytical laboratories. This will greatly enhance our ability to analyse nuclear material and environmental samples. The centrepiece of this effort – the construction of a new Nuclear Material Laboratory - was completed last year.

Mr Chair,

The IAEA remains seriously concerned about the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and calls upon that country to comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the IAEA in implementing its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and to resolve all outstanding issues. The IAEA maintains its readiness to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme, as and when requested to do so.

With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic, the IAEA concluded in June 2011 that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007 was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the IAEA. The Director General calls on Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA in connection with unresolved issues related to this site and other locations.

Mr Chair,

Let me now turn to safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. However, the IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

Nevertheless, there have been important new developments over the past 18 months.

First, in November 2013 the IAEA and Iran agreed to cooperate further to resolve all present and past issues under a Framework for Cooperation. This has involved the implementation by Iran of a series of agreed practical measures. The initial measures saw Iran give IAEA inspectors access to uranium mines and other locations, which helped to improve the IAEA's understanding of Iran's nuclear programme. Since the IAEA moved on to seek clarification of issues with possible military dimensions, however, progress has been limited.

Nevertheless, the IAEA continues to engage Iran and - as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council - will do all it can to clarify these issues. We will then present an objective, impartial report to our Board of Governors.

The second important development, which also took place in November 2013, was the Joint Plan of Action, agreed between Iran and the so-called E3+3 countries: China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The aim was to reach a "mutually-

agreed, long-term comprehensive solution” that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.

The parties asked the IAEA to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures contained in the Joint Plan of Action. This has involved an approximate doubling of IAEA verification effort in Iran. With the endorsement of our Board of Governors, and the receipt of additional extra-budgetary funds from Member States, the IAEA has been undertaking this work effectively for the past fifteen months.

The IAEA welcomes the recent announcement by the E3+3 countries and Iran on key parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We all hope that an agreement can be reached in due course and the IAEA stands ready to play an essential verification and monitoring role.

Implementation by Iran of the additional protocol would enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country.

Mr Chair,

The IAEA will continue its effort to live up to the expectation of the international community by verifying the peaceful use of nuclear energy, thereby contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Continued success requires the cooperation of States and regional authorities with the IAEA in the implementation of safeguards. States’ political, technical and financial support to IAEA safeguards is essential.

Thank you.