



EU Statement by

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**2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

Main Committee II

**United Nations
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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

Mr. Chairman,

1. The European Union remains fully committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
2. With the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, State Parties reaffirmed their shared commitment to comply with their obligations, and to fulfil the goals of the NPT and work towards its universality. Ensuring the implementation of the 64 actions in the Action Plan is a collective responsibility shared by all State Parties to the NPT without exception. The European Union calls on all State Parties to implement, without delay and in a balanced manner, these actions designed to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty.
3. The EU emphasizes the importance of universalizing the NPT and calls on States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.
4. The EU stresses the importance of strengthening the common understanding of State Parties on how to respond effectively to a State Party's withdrawal from the NPT, including by drawing attention to the potential implications for international peace and security of such a withdrawal and stressing the undertaking by the UN Security Council to address without delay any State Party's notice of withdrawal from the NPT. Any withdrawing State is still liable for violations of the Treaty perpetrated prior to withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman,

5. The world continues to face major proliferation threats to international peace and security. They must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. In this context, we underline the primary

* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

6. The EU has repeatedly condemned in the strongest terms all DPRK nuclear tests and satellite launches using ballistic missile technology in blatant violation of its international obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094. We remain seriously concerned about the latest developments in the DPRK's nuclear programme, in particular the DPRK's uranium enrichment programme and the ongoing activities within the Yongbyon site including the ongoing construction of a Light Water Reactor. The EU stresses once again that the DPRK is bound by its international obligations, as set out in several UN Security Council resolutions and by its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT, and urges the DPRK to comply with them fully, unconditionally and without delay. The EU condemns the continued and recent provocative launches of Short Range Missiles. We call on the DPRK to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to refrain from any further provocative actions and statements, including trade in related technologies. Further, the EU urges the DPRK to return to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards at an early date and to sign and ratify the CTBT.

7. The EU welcomes the fact that on 2 April in Lausanne, the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran reached agreement on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as announced in the Joint Statement by the EU High Representative and the Iranian Foreign Minister. We fully support the ongoing diplomatic efforts between the parties concerned to reach by 30 June a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (including its technical annexes) that will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. With regard to the discussions between Iran and the IAEA, in November 2013 the EU welcomed the conclusion of the Framework of Cooperation. However, it has not yet produced the clarification of the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD). We urge Iran to cooperate fully and without delay with the Agency on all outstanding issues.

8. The EU deeply regrets that, despite the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of 9 June 2011, the Syrian pledge to the Director General to respond positively and without delay to the Agency's request to resolve all outstanding questions, and in addition the renewed calls by the Director General, Syria has yet to provide the necessary cooperation. Syria remains responsible for urgently remedying its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

9. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We continue to strongly

support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East – the first concrete steps to be agreed by State Parties for implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. We regret that it has not been possible so far to convene a Conference on the establishment of such a zone to be attended by all States of the region. We commend the facilitator and his team for their tireless efforts in this regard, the co-conveners, as well as the States of the region for their active engagement, including in five meetings in Switzerland. The EU calls on all States in the region, supported by the facilitator and the co-conveners, to urgently undertake consultations with the aim of enabling the Conference to be convened as soon as possible, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the region. Maintaining dialogue and thus building confidence among the States of the Middle East contribute to the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution.

Mr. Chairman,

10. The European Union recognizes the importance of appropriate effective export controls, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011) and in recognition of UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009). In this context, we fully support the activities of the international export control regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the full participation of the EU Member States therein. The Zangger Committee and the NSG continue to be important fora in this field to share experience and expertise on export control and work effectively towards efficient export controls, including by keeping their guidelines and control lists up to date, thus contributing concretely to fighting proliferation. In the period 2010-2015, the EU assisted third countries with around €7million with a view to improve their legal framework and institutional capacities for the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls.

11. The EU strongly believes that the proliferation of missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious concern to us all and a threat to international peace and security. A number of tests conducted in recent years outside all existing transparency and pre-notification schemes and in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, especially by the DPRK and Iran, deepen our concern. We believe that a multilateral response and international norms are the most adequate and effective way to address this issue. In this regard, the EU strongly supports the MTCR. Moreover, as the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the EU continues to pursue the objectives of, and support financially, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) in three aspects: universality, implementation, and enhanced and improved functioning.

12. The IAEA's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. The measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol form an integral part of the IAEA Safeguards system. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with Additional Protocols constitute the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT. The EU calls for their universalisation without delay. The EU notes that at the end of 2014 there were 42 States with operative Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) still to be amended. The EU urges those remaining States which have not yet amended their SQP to accelerate their efforts. From the beginning, the EU has firmly supported the evolution of safeguards as exemplified by the development of the State Level Concept (SLC), the implementation of which will further strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System.

13. The EU reiterates its full support for the work of the IAEA in applying safeguards through the EURATOM Safeguards System, and in providing technical assistance through the EC Support Programme and through the Support Programmes of some of its Member States. The close cooperation between the EURATOM Safeguards System and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and allows the EU's Member States to demonstrate continuing respect for their international non-proliferation obligations. The EU, including through individual contributions of some of its Member States, has contributed more than € 18.5 million for the modernisation of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). The EU has also provided the Agency with technology and expertise from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and its Institutes.

Mr. Chairman,

14. The risk of non-state actors getting access to weapons of mass destruction represents a most serious threat to international security. In that respect, the EU and its Member States stress the need for compliance with obligations under UN Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011). The EU also underlines the importance of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encourages all States to become party to this Convention and comply fully with its provisions. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States also call for improved security for high activity radioactive sources to reduce the risk of misappropriation and malicious uses of such material.

Mr. Chairman,

15. In the framework of its strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU is actively supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and UN

Security Council Resolution 1887 as well as other international activities, such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Nuclear Security Summits, which contribute to strengthening nuclear security.

16. The EU strongly supports IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and is, together with its Member States, among the main contributors to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, having committed around € 40 million to date, assisting in strengthening Nuclear Security in more than 100 countries. This is in addition to technical support provided by the EU to the IAEA in the field of nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and trainings as well as for improving the use of the IAEA illicit trafficking data base. We intend to continue to support the IAEA's work in that respect. The EU fully recognizes the central role played by the IAEA in the global nuclear security architecture. The EU looks forward to the next high-level IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security to take place in December 2016.

17. Effective Physical Protection is of the utmost importance to prevent nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists and proliferators, and to protect nuclear facilities against malicious acts. The EU therefore calls on all States that have not done yet so, to become party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and to adhere to its 2005 amendment, so that it enters into force as soon as possible.

18. The EU underlines the importance of ensuring the security of information relating to nuclear and other radioactive materials, and welcomes the recent publication of the IAEA guidance on the Security of Nuclear Information.

19. The European Union remains firmly convinced of the benefits of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. We welcome the efforts of the IAEA Secretariat to set up a LEU Bank in Kazakhstan placed under the control of the Agency, and we are looking forward to the early conclusion of the Host State Agreement and Transit Agreement. The EU has contributed € 20 million and pledged up to another €5 million to this project.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.