15. Recommendations

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So what should you do?

You have now heard all of our presentations. What remains are our recommendations of what might be undertaken to improve the present situation. Here are a few central points that we would like you to consider. A much more comprehensive list of recommendations is included in the set of documents that we have distributed here.

Go back and look at the basic promise contained in the treaty before you. All states promised to renounce possession of nuclear weapons. In exchange for non-proliferation, the five nuclear weapons states promised disarmament. Non-proliferation and disarmament cannot, therefore, be treated separately. But while non-proliferation is - or should be - a permanent state, there is a time constraint on disarmament. It must reach its conclusion -- the abolition of nuclear weapons - without further delay and prevarication. Whatever the difficulties, continued possession of nuclear weapons by some increases the likelihood of proliferation, just as much as an increase in proliferation decreases the chances of disarmament taking place.

1. Make commitments in good faith
   Without credible commitments to abolition, there can be no confidence in the treaty and, therefore, the danger of clandestine nuclear programmes increases as the perception of danger grows. The question of "good faith" is central to the credibility of negotiating partners. Many question the credibility of negotiating states when they start to go back on consensual agreements. This applies to both nuclear and, as-yet-non-nuclear weapons states. The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995 rested on the commitment to strengthen the review process as well as the Principles and Objectives. The 13 steps represent a first attempt to strengthen the process. Both the 13 steps and the "unequivocal undertaking" stand as the basis for forward movement on NPT compliance. They are not to be debated further at this Review; rather, your task is to devise and enhance the means for their implementation.

2. Transition from nuclear energy to renewables
   There is an inherent flaw in the treaty and it is to be found in Article IV. The AchesonLilienthal Committee saw this as far back as 1946. Free trade in nuclear technology and materials and abuse of the system go hand in hand. Safeguarding only works up to a point. It is impossible to account for all of the material in, for instance, a reprocessing plant like Sellafield, Le Hague or Rokkasho. Some of that material may have already been diverted for military use.

   But the cat is now out of the bag. The only way to get it under control is to put all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multilateral control. In the meantime we support recommendations for a complete moratorium on the enrichment of uranium and separation of plutonium. Moreover, the IAEA should not be promoting the use of nuclear energy. The nuclear industry does that quite well enough by themselves, to the detriment of everyone. The IAEA should be controlling nuclear energy, putting restrictions on it, not pushing it. The IAEA's
conflict of interests is reflected in the fact that so many countries believe the possession of a nuclear programme is a sign of development or even a status symbol.

Truly developed countries, on the contrary, are investing in cleaner and renewable sources of energy. Global energy security, not a slavish dependence on the most dangerous energy source on Earth, is the goal for which we should strive. That is why we need an International Agency for Renewable Energy that assists countries in building up an energy supply that does not rely on nuclear energy or fossil fuels. To address the challenge nuclear weapons pose to human survival requires us to also address these challenges posed by nuclear energy.

3. Make a good example
To lead and to educate is to live by example. Do not offer encouragement to anyone possessing nuclear weapons. Alliance partners who agree to the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, or who even take part in nuclear sharing and planning arrangements, are like co-dependents. They should be the first to stop and show others that they have no need for these obsolete weapons.

States should also pass anti-nuclear weapons laws. UN SC Res. 1540 calls upon all states to criminalize WMD activities undertaken by non-state actors. National parliaments - supported by their governments - should go even further and adopt national laws prohibiting and penalising all forms of nuclear weapons activities, expanding the scope of such legislation to state actors. Nuclear weapons activities are immoral and illegal*, and the perpetrators of these activities must be held accountable.

4. Start negotiating abolition
We believe that an abolition framework is the only way forward. Abolition goes further than the simple physical destruction of the weapons - which is disarmament - and also encompasses non-proliferation. A Nuclear Weapons Convention would regulate the phasing out of all aspects of the nuclear weapons complex from the development and testing to deployment and use or threat of use. Verifiably. It would also provide the legal basis for the universal criminalization of nuclear weapons activities, thus helping to prevent breakout. Such a Convention has been written and is possible. It does not replace a step-by-step approach; it is a step-by-step approach. It does not compete with the NPT; it completes the NPT, which foreshadows such a Convention in its Article VI. Without the commencement of negotiations on a Convention we can never achieve the goals of the NPT. Whether to do this should no longer be an issue. There has to be a negotiated agreement on HOW to abolish nuclear weapons safely and forever; on HOW to deal with breakout or non-compliance; and on HOW to verify a nuclear weapon-free world.

The goal of abolishing nuclear weapons may seem unrealistic to you now, given the difficulties you are facing in these negotiations. But it is equally unrealistic to believe that we can go on like we are for any length of time without the NPT collapsing. It is vital that you save it by making mature decisions about the future of this world and courageously stepping forward to meet this challenge. My generation should not have to deal with this problem because your generation has failed to do so.
We would be very willing to answer any of your questions on any of the presentations you have heard.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

*While we acknowledge that their illegality remains to be formalised under a treaty that prohibits their possession, testing, manufacture, transport and use, nuclear weapons have characteristics and effects - to an even more catastrophic degree - of weapons of mass destruction that have already been declared illegal under international law. Therefore we assert that nuclear weapons are, by their nature, already outside the norms of international law and that ratification of their illegality in a formal agreement is not only rational but obligatory. The International Court of Justice came to the same conclusion in its 1996 advisory opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons.*