Launching the Implementation of the 2016 QCPR Resolution: New beginnings

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From coordinated to integrated implementation of the 2030 Agenda: the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding nexus

Formal Session
10:00 – 11:30am, 2 March 2017
UN Headquarters, New York, ECOSOC Chamber

INTRODUCTION

- 2012: Crisis erupts in Mali, and a UN Integrated Stabilization mission was deployed, covering 3 dimensions: political, military and civilian protection
- The humanitarian presence, already on the ground, greatly expanded to support IDPs, refugees, and local population
- What is the purpose of an integrated mission?
  - At the heart of an integrated mission is reinforcing the linkages between the HUM, DEV, Peacebuilding and Peace-keeping
  - This means Integrated Missions straddle mandates given by the Security Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC
- Integrated missions usually comprise an SRSG and two DRSGs, one covering the political dimension, and the other being the 4-hatted DRSG, UN RC, HC, and UNDP RR
- I am this 4-hatted UN representative in Mali
CONTEXT

Before I go any further, let me briefly touch on the current context in Mali

MINUSMA, that is the [Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization du Mali] finds itself in a hybrid situation:

- A peacekeeping operation in a setting of a persistent political crisis under the shadow of asymmetric and extremist threats – in other words, a “no war and no peace situation”; and
- A continuing humanitarian crisis linked to the failures of development, and a challenging security environment.

This situation is a good illustration of the complexities on the ground that the QPCR is trying to address through its mandates under OP 24 on the critical importance of:

- Enhancing coordination between development, humanitarian and Peacebuilding
- The need to engage in joint risk analysis, needs assessments, practice response in a coherent multi-year frame.

On his first day in office, Secretary General’s Guterres stated that “the 2030 Agenda and the Sustaining Peace Resolutions are our roadmap to a safer, more resilient and sustainable world”.

What I would like to share with you today are our hands-on experience in such complex situations as Mali’s, and offer a few words on how we hope you would support us to best deliver in the context of such integrated missions.

At the heart of the question is how to build resilience and deliver the 2030 development agenda, while facing a persistent humanitarian crisis and an severely insecure environment.

We believe in linking it short-term humanitarian interventions with long-term development needs, but, without a minimum of stability and social cohesion, we run the risk of institutionalizing humanitarian interventions. Equally, persistent instability continues to undermine the fragile national capacity, further reducing the prospects of supporting the government to put in place sound national development policies. This is further complicated by endemic short falls in funding, resulting in increasing competition between development and humanitarian needs, and the agencies delivering the response.

In my capacity as DSRSG/RC/HC, how do I work in such a context? How do I ensure that such a context is factored into the global picture and efforts to implement the 2030 agenda? How can DSRSG/RC/HC be better supported to work in similar context?

The key function of a DRSG/RC/HC/RR is, through his/her convening power, to encourage all UN actors to leverage the comparative advantages of the UN mission. The DSRSG/HC/RC/RR also guides the smooth transition from short-
term stabilization that include humanitarian and early recovery to peacebuilding and long-term development.

In Mali, we have an UNDAF + for 2015-2019 – in other words, One UN Framework with division of labour and complementary efforts between MINUSMA & the UNCT. In addition, we have an annual stand-alone Humanitarian Response Plan; we also have a Mission Concept for MINUSMA, which is a form of roadmap which covers the political, military, and civilian protection components; and we have the individual UNCT’s Country Plans.

What would help us in best delivering for people in Mali would be overcoming the following challenges:

1. **First, and foremost, a shift from coordinated to integrated response.** This requires a profound change in mindsets and approaches at the level of the system as well as its individual entities. For example, we would have to build an integrated framework like UNDAF+ (Including Minusma and UNCT). The UNDAF+ in Mali covering 2015-2019 was signed by the Government instead of the DSRSG/RC/HC/RR to illustrate the integrated approach dimension.

2. **Second, an integrated and well capacited office to support the DSRSG/RC/HC/RR functions.** The front office is supported by three forms of technical capacities provided respectively by DPKO for the DRSG function, by DOCO for the RC function, and by OCHA for the HC function. This is a total of 3 professional and 3 general service staff. The UNDP
functions are delegated to a Country Director, as per the firewall requirements. The good news is that they are co-located and this is a must. The not so good news is that each have different policies, standards, rules, procedures, practices and funding. The follow-up to the 2016 QPCR and the upcoming mandate review mission are a critical opportunity to improve the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN system in such contexts.

3. **Third, better defined areas of work and parameters between peace and security, peacebuilding, humanitarian and development, whether from the system or from Member States. This deficiency does not contribute to promoting integrated action or good coordination.** What would contribute to easing this challenge would be, on the one hand, better harmonized and integrated policy and technical capacity, rules, procedures, common back offices, and on the other hand, a donor community that has similarly better coordinated and integrated funding mechanisms. As a friend of mine says, one hand cannot clap alone.

4. **Fourth, actual authority over the system.** At present, we rely on good will – and there is a long distance between goodwill and authority in the field. Pushing for closer cooperation between security and the operations of MINUSMA and agencies – both humanitarian and development. The multiplicity of actors whose work is based on different standards, including humanitarian NGOs, poses serious challenges to coordination and promotes competition instead of incentives for collaboration. What we need is One UN framework, which is a multi-year joint plan and programme, based on
joint needs assessments, analyses, and supported by one pool or basket of funding.

5. Fifth, and finally, a common set of business practices, that allows us to bring more of what we do as a UN Country Team, and between UNCT and the UN Mission, would be most welcomed. We are working on common services, but we need to go much further. I understand that not everything can and needs to be integrated, but where it makes for efficiency gains and reduces transaction costs, we must.

In conclusion, while we can provide the analysis and the case for making the above happen, from the ground, all of the above needs the leadership support to make these changes happen and to support us from our respective HQs, across all the UN entities present in Mali. And that, we are eagerly waiting for.

It is evident that we face many challenges on the ground. This comes with the region, The Sahel, which has increasing humanitarian needs.

We face many asymmetric security threats, and we face challenges in the peacebuilding, human rights and sustainable development spheres, but the most critical dimension for us to consider is the population who need us. They expect our support more than ever.
Together, UN entities, Members States, civil society, private sector, human rights activists, we each have opportunities to collaborate and work together to make this happen.

Thanks for your attention