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Chairman: Mr. Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez (Colombia).

5. The second part of the proposed declaration dealt with the control of atomic energy. The USSR delegation was aware that the General Assembly had already approved a plan (resolution 191 (III)) for the prohibition of the atomic weapon through the international management and inspection of atomic energy facilities. That plan would ban the atomic bomb by prohibiting the ownership, operation and management by individuals or nations of atomic energy facilities producing dangerous atomic materials, and would contain the "must" provision of effective and enforceable safeguards. The proposal of the USSR, on the other hand, as indicated by its past statements, meant the operation of plants on a national basis, with periodic inspection of declared facilities. It therefore did not contain the "must" provision of effective enforceable safeguards. For well-known technical reasons, the General Assembly had voted in favour of a plan calling for the actual management of atomic plants by an international authority.

6. Referring to the Stockholm Appeal, Mr. Austin said that it had been peddled as a peace petition, although the actual language of the petition contained no mention of the word "peace".

7. Moreover, that appeal was directed against only one type of military weapon and said nothing of aggression, direct or indirect, or of the tanks, planes, heavy artillery and fifth columns used to carry out aggression. The North Koreans had actually signed the appeal at the very time they were preparing their invasion of the Republic of Korea. Quoting from Pravda on the duties of those who signed the Stockholm Appeal, Mr. Austin remarked that it was more a call for a fifth column uprising than a peace appeal.

8. The United States representative added that the USSR draft resolution indicated continuing obsession with the atomic bomb and a marked indifference toward other weapons of aggression. The real crime, however, was waging aggressive war, whether with atomic bombs, armoured divisions or subversion.
9. Referring to the third part of the USSR draft proposal for a five-Power peace pact, Mr. Austin said that a similar Soviet proposal had been rejected by the General Assembly the preceding year. The United Nations Charter was itself the most solemn pact in history. If the USSR sincerely wanted to strengthen peace, it had only to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities under the Charter.

10. As regards the one-third cut in the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council, Mr. Austin declared that the USSR maintained the largest army in the world, amounting to approximately 4 million men, or 150 divisions. The Chinese Communists had more than 2.5 million men under arms, and hundreds of thousands had been conscripted into the satellite armies. In comparison, the armed forces of the Western Powers were very small, and to reduce them by one-third would strip the Atlantic Powers of much of their defensive strength, Mr. Austin wondered whether that was the real purpose of the USSR draft resolution.

11. Mr. Austin recalled that the General Assembly had called for a census of existing armed forces with verification by international inspection (resolution 192 (III)). The Commission for Conventional Armaments had endeavoured to act on the proposal but had been blocked by the USSR.

12. Mr. Austin considered that Soviet opposition to international inspection was in line with the officially imposed isolation of the USSR from the rest of the world. What prospect was there for the inspection of atomic energy facilities or of disarmament within the USSR if it constituted a walled fortress deliberately shut off from the outside world?

13. Citing the events in Korea, Mr. Austin maintained that the USSR had acted as spokesman for the aggressor. Generalissimo Stalin had sent a message to the Prime Minister of North Korea wishing him success. That was the historical background of the USSR proposal. Similarly, the delegation of the USSR had fought and voted against proposals designed to bring about the political unification and economic rehabilitation of Korea (A/1435) and to prevent future aggression (A/C.1/592). That attitude of the USSR raised the question of its stand on war and peace.

14. Mr. Austin then referred to a statement made to the First Committee on 13 October by the representative of the USSR (362nd meeting), a statement which had a direct bearing on the discussion.

15. The statement accused the United States of changing its policy from one of wartime co-operation to the present so-called tough policy towards the USSR. On the contrary, Mr. Austin maintained that the change had been due solely to a shift in the policy of the USSR itself. By February 1946, it had become clear that the USSR had decided that it was not the fascist Powers which had started the war, but the economic system of the Western world. One by one, the governments of Eastern Europe had been taken over by Communist parties acting under the direction of the USSR. The Berlin blockade had been imposed; there had been wholesale deportations from the Soviet border areas; obstacles had been put in the way of the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Japan; and, finally, there had been support of armed aggression itself.

16. Mr. Austin then quoted from statements of Lenin and Generalissimo Stalin and from the Moscow Literary Gazette to show that, in the view of the Soviet leaders, wars which extended the Soviet system were "legitimate and holy". Thus, despite the statements of the representative of the USSR professing the desire of his country for peace, there was no evidence of any basic change of heart on the part of those who fashioned Soviet policy. Yet, the action of the United Nations in Korea had perhaps given pause to those who encouraged aggression. If that were so, one step closer would have been taken to the establishment of those objective conditions which would make genuine peaceful co-existence the standard of international behaviour for the future.

17. In conclusion, Mr. Austin appealed for the Committee's support of the joint draft resolution (A/51/597) sponsored by the United States and five other Powers. He considered that the USSR, if it was sincere in its desire for peace, would also support that proposal.

18. Mr. Tsiang (China) stated that the present debate was in fact a continuation of the discussion on the item "United action for peace" which in turn had arisen out of the experience of the United Nations in Korea. Those discussions demonstrated the increasing interest of the whole world in peace or, in other words, in the threat of a new war.

19. In his view, the source of the threat was not to be found in the non-communist States. There were differences among them, it was true, but they did not threaten peace. The real source of the threat was, on the one hand, the relationship between the USSR and the non-communist States, and, on the other hand, the relationship between the USSR and communist Yugoslavia. The solution of that problem was the major task confronting the United Nations.

20. There were several approaches to it. Some advocated new pacts, new negotiations and compromises. For China, its relationship with the USSR was of the utmost importance, indeed a matter of life and death. That was an established fact, and had been recognized by the political leaders of all parties for a long time. The Russo-Chinese frontier was the longest common frontier in the world. China had always hoped and worked for peaceful relations with the USSR.

21. To that end, China had made many sacrifices. It had avoided stirring up irredentist sentiments in regard to the Central Asian and Far Eastern parts of the USSR which had been Chinese territory not long ago. By the terms of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, China had accepted the arrangements agreed to at Yalta, which entailed sharing Dairen, Port Arthur and the trunk railway in Manchuria with the USSR. That was the price paid for friendly relations with the USSR. On its part, the USSR had promised to respect China's sovereignty in Manchuria and over the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Soviet Union had also promised to give economic and military aid to China after the war with Japan.

22. The USSR, declared Mr. Tsang, had enjoyed all the fruits of that treaty but had not fulfilled any of
its obligations. It had prevented Chinese use of Dairen and had made Manchuria almost into a Soviet province. Instead of helping the Government of China, the USSR had given aid to the Chinese Communists and, finally, it had declared that the treaty was abrogated.

23. In the light of the above facts, Mr. Tsaiqiang did not see that a new peace pact would do any good. He thought that the effective prohibition of the atomic bomb could only be realized through effective international control. It would be an illusion on the part of the United Nations to accept a paper prohibition of the atomic bomb without a system of effective international control. Similarly, Mr. Tsaiqiang considered that immediate disarmament by one-third on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council would be a most unrealistic proposal.

24. For these reasons, Mr. Tsaiqiang concluded, the delegation of China would vote against the USSR proposal (A/C.1/595) and would support the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/397). He considered, however, that the Bolivian proposal (A/C.1/596) contained some valuable provisions, particularly the one regarding intervention in the domestic affairs of a State. He therefore hoped that the sponsors of the Bolivian draft resolution and of the joint draft resolution would get together and agree on a revised joint text.

25. Mr. MORA (Uruguay) expressed support of the six-Power joint draft resolution. He stated that to reaffirm the principles of the Charter, aggression must be condemned in all its forms. He added that it would be contradictory to establish, on the one hand, machinery to strengthen the United Nations for taking action against aggression and, on the other hand, to support proposals which aimed at weakening the co-ordination of the forces of the Western Powers put at the service of peace and security. The General Assembly was acquiring a position of vital importance in that respect and, as its President had pointed out (295th plenary meeting), it had succeeded during the present session in instilling energy and vigour into the collective security system.

26. While he agreed that propaganda in favour of a new war should be condemned, he wondered whether this provision in the USSR proposal also applied to "class war". For propaganda in favour of "class war" also made impossible the peaceful co-existence of States.

27. Mr. Mora was of the opinion that the United Nations should not limit its condemnation to the use of the atomic bomb. It should likewise condemn the use of all arms when employed for aggressive purposes as defined in the Statute of the Nürnberg Tribunal. He favoured an effective international control of atomic energy, in order to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. As regards the question of disarmament, Mr. Mora thought that the first step in that direction would be to publish authentic statistics so that the world could determine where the threat to peace originated. A disarmament system which offered advantages to one group of States would be a sure invitation to aggression.

28. Mr. Mora also expressed the hope that some of the ideas set forth in the Bolivian draft resolution could be used to formulate a proposal which the Committee could accept.

29. GHALEB Bey (Egypt) declared that the Committee was resuming, under a new heading, the discussion of three much-discussed topics: the condemnation of war propaganda; the control and prohibition of the atomic weapon; and the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. To consider the present item objectively, the Committee must focus attention on some facts which were of tremendous importance to the world, particularly to Egypt which had a special interest in world peace and security not only because it was peace loving, but also because of its geographical position. Any other attempt by the United Nations, in the precarious international situation, to seek refuge in platitudes and rhetorical affirmations was bound to yield no fruitful results.

30. Ghaleb Bey recalled that war propaganda had been, condemned by the General Assembly in 1947 (resolution 110 (II)). His delegation would not hesitate to reaffirm that condemnation if no accusation, direct or indirect, were made.

31. The other two topics under discussion—the control and prohibition of the atomic weapon and the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces—presented a most vital issue. The view of the Egyptian delegation had been, and still was, that the two questions were interrelated and closely connected in their basic issues. The failure so far to arrive at any agreement on each or both questions could not be ascribed to any small Power.

32. By virtue of its membership in the Security Council, Egypt had been in intimate contact with the discussions of both subjects and had participated in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The Egyptian people, along with those of other Member States, had weighed, not without anxiety and regret, the inevitable consequences of the divergence between the views of those capable of unleashing the forces of unprecedented mass destruction. Actually, that divergence had arisen from the controversial accompaniments to each basic issue in regard to either atomic or the non-atomic weapons. Appeals by the General Assembly, the Security Council and humanity at large had been rendered abortive, not so much through the absence of agreement between the Powers concerned on fundamental principles as through the lack of mutual trust and confidence. That accounted for the regrettable impasse reached in the work of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

33. The representative of Egypt observed that, throughout the discussions of those vital questions, his delegation had followed its traditional policy of conciliatory co-operation and impartial consideration of the basic issues. While endeavouring, along with other delegations, to open new avenues for agreement by supporting resolutions which sometimes had fallen short of expectations, Egypt had made clear its stand on both issues, a stand that had not been entirely welcomed and was, perhaps, criticized by both sides. His delegation, however, had been pleased to note, in the address of the President of the United States to the General Assembly on 24 October (295th plenary meeting), a major and far-reaching re-statement of policy in proposing the establishment of one disarmament commis-
sion to replace both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. His delegation believed that such an important statement of policy, which clearly meant that atomic and non-atomic weapons were closely connected was a hopeful augury and went far toward opening a new avenue for agreement. That statement constituted also a proof of the correctness and impartiality of one major aspect of the stand taken by the Egyptian delegation.

34. The representative of Egypt declared that the consistent stand taken by his delegation had derived from the correct conception and impartial interpretation of the General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 192 (III), which stated that the aim of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces could only be attained in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international relations, which implied in particular the control of atomic energy, involving the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Such clear language had not been used haphazardly in that resolution since it was rooted in another resolution, adopted on 12 August 1948 by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which had outlined the principles that should govern the formulation of practical proposals, including the existence of an atmosphere of international confidence and security.¹

35. The Egyptian people, while sharing with others the fears and concerns resulting from the absence of that most essential prerequisite, had special reasons for added anxiety. The existing international tension had resulted in the interplay of power politics, which had relegated to obscurity the issue of the presence of foreign troops on the territories of Member States. Since the General Assembly on 13 December 1946 had made specific recommendations on the withdrawal of foreign troops (resolution 41 (I)), power politics had found it extremely convenient to omit any further reference to that subject in subsequent resolutions. The delegation of Egypt believed that a corollary, if not a prerequisite for the establishment of peace through disarmament, or for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, was the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of Member States, a policy which would, at least, eliminate a cause of friction and keep forces with contending aims as far apart as possible. Power politics had not only conveniently disregarded that aspect but had also rendered inoperative Articles 43 and 106 of the Charter, which constituted the cornerstone of the Organization. Small nations seeking a ray of hope were offered, instead, oratory, charges and counter-charges resulting in a lack of confidence and failure to implement the essential provisions of the Charter dealing with peace and security.

36. Ghaaleb Bey reminded the Committee that, at San Francisco, the small Powers had been advised time and again to confide in the wisdom of the great Powers and to leave the fate of the world in the hands of the permanent members of the Security Council. Today, it was the duty of those small Powers to demand a proof of that invaluable wisdom, a wisdom which derived from greatness and not from bigness. The representative of Egypt concluded that, without going into the details of the four draft resolutions submitted to the Committee, and while reserving his delegation's right to comment on each of them in due course, he would vote on each of those draft resolutions in the light of the views he had outlined. Those views were consistent with the Egyptian position concerning those two vital issues.

37. Sir Benegal RAU (India), referring to the draft resolutions before the Committee, remarked that debate on draft resolutions of that nature had become an annual event. The General Assembly usually spent a good part of its time discussing them, adopting some and rejecting others; then, nothing substantial happened until the next session, when the same process would be repeated. In those circumstances, the delegation of India felt it worth while to attempt to stimulate thought along somewhat different but more fruitful lines. Accordingly, Sir Benegal outlined briefly a plan about which his delegation had been thinking for some time. The greatest danger and the root-cause of all other dangers, the representative of India continued, were hunger and subhuman living standards to which large masses of the world's population were subjected. Since the Committee had recently approved various proposals for improving the machinery of the United Nations to meet aggression, it should now supplement them by proposals for strengthening the Organization to cope with what the people of India regarded as the greatest enemy to world peace. His delegation had attempted to embody these ideas on the subject in a draft resolution (A/C.1/598) which linked disarmament with the creation of a United Nations Peace Fund for the development of under-developed areas, the proposed fund to be fed from savings effected by the reduction of armaments and from other sources.²

38. The representative of India said that it was hardly necessary for him to call attention to the fact that the reduction of armaments was one of the aims of the United Nations. The General Assembly might not only make recommendations regarding the principles of disarmament and the regulation of armaments, but, under Article 26 of the Charter, "in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", the Security Council was required to formulate definite plans for the regulation of armaments. The Indian draft resolution offered an incentive for that purpose by linking up the reduction of armaments with the creation of a development fund. Since astronomical sums were being spent on destructive arms, it was obvious that a very small part of those enormous sums could, if directed to constructive purposes in the under-developed areas in the world, serve to wipe out the root-causes of all disorder. Should the Committee wish to have more time to discuss the details of the draft resolution, his delegation would carefully listen to comments and would decide upon its future course in the light of suggestions and criticisms.

39. The delegation of India was of the opinion that the problems dealt with in the other three draft resolutions before the Committee might well form the subject of discussion between the great Powers under the Syrian-Iraqi resolution (A/C.1/585/Rev.2) which had recently been approved by the Committee. It was very doubtful whether, in the absence of agreement among

the great Powers on those matters, any proposal approved by the Committee would serve any useful purpose. Of those three draft resolutions, however, his delegation decidedly preferred the six-Power joint draft (A/C.1/597); but since it appeared probable that some of the drafts might be combined and modified in the process, his delegation would defer further comment. In conclusion, the representative of India expressed the hope that it would be possible to incorporate in the final text of the joint draft resolution some of the ideas underlying the Indian draft resolution.

40. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said that his delegation had made a very close study of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) and had found out that each of the four ideas contained therein had already been proposed in the course of previous sessions and often in scarcely different terms. The fact that those same ideas were presented in a single draft resolution did not change their substance since each of them had already been rejected by the Committee.

41. The representative of France said that it should not pass unnoticed that the Committee had been asked anew to condemn and prohibit “propaganda in favour of a new war now being conducted in a number of countries”. Mr. Vyshinsky had been more explicit in the previous year since he had specifically referred to both the United Kingdom and the United States. His draft resolution on that matter had been rejected on 3 December 1949 by 51 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.2 The Committee certainly should be grateful to the USSR representative for his present moderate language. One wondered, however, if that moderation was not intended to give a larger scope for accusation or to cover other propaganda. To condemn propaganda in favour of a new war seemed rather obvious; but one must know exactly what was meant by those words. If, under the pretext of fighting such propaganda one would fight against efforts to make a new war impossible; and if, under the pretext of peace propaganda, one would aim at the mobilization of public opinion against those efforts, with a view to paralysing all attempts either to resolve problems which had been unsolved for the past five years or to put the entire community of the United Nations in a position to face all threats which might arise from such paralysis, then the language used in the USSR draft resolution would indeed be inappropriate. One must find another language which would take account of real intentions and actual facts.

42. It should also not pass unnoticed, the representative of France continued, that the Committee had been requested once more to condemn the use of the atomic weapon as an instrument of aggression, to forbid unconditionally the use of such weapons and to establish strict international control. Such a plan had also been proposed the preceding year and had been rejected by 39 votes to 5, with 15 abstentions.3 The exhaustive discussions, both in the Committee and the General Assembly, on the question of atomic energy, had made it clear that prohibition and control were closely linked. In those circumstances, one would find it difficult to believe in the existence of an unconditional prohibition, since the difference of opinion was neither on the principle of prohibition nor on the principle of control, but on the methods of such control, on which the Powers concerned had not yet reached agreement. The Committee was also aware of the fact that the General Assembly, on 4 November 1948 (resolution 191 (III)), had invited the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to explore the possibility of such an agreement and that those six members had been obliged to interrupt their work on 19 January 1950 owing to the refusal of the USSR representative to sit at the same table as the representative of China.

43. It should not pass unnoticed that the Committee was also being asked to recommend the conclusion of a pact among the five great Powers. That same proposal, which had been presented by the USSR at the preceding session, had been rejected on 1 December 1949 by 41 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.4 It had been observed, in the course of discussion on that matter, that the question of substance could not be automatically settled by means of procedure and that the Powers concerned possessed the means to meet together and deal with their problems. But no means would be effective as long as some Powers would not subordinate the pursuit of their particular interests to general conditions of peace and security. Nothing had happened in the past year to invalidate those conditions nor to bring any evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to stop the pursuit of its own interests.

44. Finally, Mr. Chauvel stated that it should not go unnoticed that the USSR representative had called once more on the five great Powers to reduce their armed forces by one-third. That proposal had not been submitted since the General Assembly’s third session when the proposal had been rejected, on 19 November 1948, by 36 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions.5 Since then, it had constantly hung over the Commission for Conventional Armaments and paralysed its work. The proposal would continue to paralyse the Commission’s work as long as it represented the thesis of the USSR in the field of disarmament. Everyone knew that the lack of security which existed in the world was due to the lack of equilibrium between the armaments of the great Powers. Any formula, the result of which would maintain such a disequilibrium, would maintain that menace. Those four proposals, the fallacious character of which had been already recognized by the General Assembly, were presented by the delegation of the USSR with a view to convincing the world of its pacific intentions since the delegation had not been able to offer anything else.

45. The arguments which had been advanced in favour of those proposals merited some attention. It should be noted that the country whose delegation preached disarmament had not disarmed; and that that same country, whose representative spoke of the possibility of the co-existence of capitalism and socialism, still continued the struggle against capitalism.

46. The representative of France could not refrain from pointing out a particularly audacious statement wherein the USSR representative had alleged that west-

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, 163rd meeting.
ern Germany possessed 450,000 men equipped with tanks and cannons. If the delegation of the USSR had taken the trouble to read the newspapers during the last few days, it would have known, probably, of the discussions in the French Parliament concerning the principle of German rearmament. Those discussions would be difficult to explain if western Germany had at its disposal an army of 450,000 fully equipped men.

47. It was not sufficient for the representative of the USSR to make general declarations of a warm-hearted character. He would like to see an act which would make possible the solution of one of those questions which, due to Soviet obstructionism, had been pending for the last few years. In the meantime, however, those members of the Committee who were attached to the principles of the Charter should reaffirm their attachment to those principles, as expressed in the six-Power draft resolution. Since that joint draft resolution had merely reaffirmed the principles contained in the Charter, nothing could prevent the USSR representative from supporting it because he had proclaimed the adherence of his government to those same principles. In conclusion, the representative of France stated that he would vote against the USSR draft resolution and would study carefully both the Bolivian and the Indian draft resolutions.

48. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that it was an indubitable fact that the people of the world yearned for a lasting peace and a tested war. In reflecting those ideas, the delegation of the USSR had taken the lead in the United Nations in the struggle for peace and security among nations. Beginning at the San Francisco Conference and as recently as the fourth session of the General Assembly, the USSR delegation had submitted a number of proposals on the necessity of prohibiting the use of atomic energy for war purposes and of establishing international control for the implementation of such a prohibition, on principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, on measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war, on the condemnation of preparations for a new war, and on the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace, as well as a number of other proposals concerning the maintenance of peace and international co-operation. Those proposals had stirred a rousing and sympathetic response from the masses, who had seen in them the reflection of their own vital interests and long-cherished dreams.

49. The Soviet Union had always stood, as it now did, for the strengthening of friendly relations and co-operation among all peoples. In so doing, it had conducted a consistent struggle against all warlike adventures and threats to peace and international security. Moreover, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR had always felt that, given a sincere desire for co-operation, the United Nations could, despite all difficulties, discharge its duties before progressive mankind; in fact, it must do so.

50. Mr. Kiselev recalled the statement made by Mr. Spender, representative of Australia, on 25 October 1950 (374th meeting). That statement gave the impression that Mr. Spender had almost literally copied the anti-Soviet tirades of Dr. Goebbels and had been inspired by the nazi speeches made at the Nürnberg congresses. Apparently, Mr. Spender must have forgotten that he had been addressing the First Committee of the United Nations. In distorting the sense of the USSR proposal, Mr. Spender had charged that the peace proposal had been submitted by the representative of the USSR in order to cover up aggressive acts of the Soviet Union. To that end, the Australian representative had referred to the 1949 budget of the USSR and had alleged that the great part of that budget had been allocated to military expenditures. The Byelorussian SSR representative compared the 1950 military expenditures of both the USSR and the United States of America, and concluded that, whereas military expenditures constituted only 18.5 per cent of the USSR budget, those of the United States amounted to 78.7 per cent. Those figures should make it clear that Mr. Spender had deliberately distorted the true state of affairs and had wilfully slandered the Soviet Union. Moreover, the representative of Australia had contended that the USSR had never been sincere, had always been engaged in obstructive tactics and had kept the world under a threat of war. On the contrary, the USSR had consistently and unwaveringly fought for peace and co-operation among all nations and had gained, in so doing, the profound respect and the warm support of hundreds of millions of peoples throughout the world.

51. Furthermore, Mr. Spender had charged that the USSR proposal was submitted for purposes of propaganda, and had rudely assailed the Stockholm Appeal. Evidently, the mass movement of 500 million partisans of peace had aroused the mad wrath and hatred of Mr. Spender. The Australian representative had wholly defended the United States and had characterized that country as not guilty of any aggressive intentions. Mr. Spender ought to be aware of a certain overtly aggressive speech made by Mr. Truman at San Francisco on 17 October 1950.

52. The representative of Australia, repeating Mr. Truman's speech, had asked the USSR to modify its policy. It would have been more fitting for the United States of America to modify its policy, since it was the United States itself that had created the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. It was that same United States which was building naval and air bases all over the world and prosecuting a bloodthirsty war against the Korean people. The aggressive policy of the United States was the fundamental reason for the tension now prevailing in international relations. Common people all over the world well understood that the settlement of USSR-United States relations constituted a central problem from the point of view of securing lasting peace.

53. In speaking of the USSR proposals concerning the problem of atomic energy, Mr. Spender had alleged that the USSR had placed the cart before the horse. On the other hand, Mr. Spender had described the United States atomic proposals as generous because they did not require the prior destruction of atomic bombs. Moreover, Mr. Spender had stated that he saw no reason why the atomic bomb should not be used as a weapon of defence. Such a statement constituted the first appeal that had been made within the United Nations for the use of that destructive weapon. That ap-
peal was echoed by the representative of Greece, who had stated (374th meeting) that an end must be put to war even, if necessary, by means of the atomic bomb. A common hatred of the USSR and of its peace-loving policy had been expressed also in the statements of the representatives of Belgium (374th meeting), Bolivia (375th meeting) and the Netherlands (375th meeting); but all those petulant slanders would be powerless to shake the faith of those millions of human beings who believed not only in the sincerity of the desires of the USSR, but in its final victory in the struggle for peace.

54. The representative of Greece had described the Stockholm Appeal as the recruitment of a fifth column for the Soviet Union. But those 500 million human beings, among them intellectuals, workers and peasants, constituted a column of fighters against the threat of a new war and demanded an end to the mad armaments race, the prohibition of the atomic bomb and the establishment of peace and security all over the world. The people of the Byelorussian SSR had signed the Stockholm Appeal by the millions, and that appeal had become a powerful movement of the peoples for the defence of peace and democracy. The government and the people of the Byelorussian SSR had instructed their delegation to demand the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon as an instrument of aggression and of the mass extermination of human beings, and also to demand the cessation of the propaganda of racial hatred. The Byelorussian SSR delegation considered that it was the duty of the First Committee to defend the cause of peace by all means. It was essential to put an end to police terror against partisans of peace, who were harshly prosecuted and whose statements and struggles for peace were in some countries regarded as crimes. Despite the persecution of these partisans of peace and the unbridled slanders raised by the warmongers, the Stockholm Appeal had stirred support among the broad popular masses all over the world and continued to gain more adherents.

55. Mr. Kiselev said that the USSR had repeatedly submitted proposals concretely indicating the means for the effective reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition and strict control of atomic weapons. Those proposals had been turned down repeatedly by the Anglo-American majority. As on previous occasions, the delegation of the USSR had now submitted a concrete programme for the strengthening of peace and co-operation among nations in the form of a declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations. Mr. Vyshinsky had correctly described that declaration as constituting the road to peace. The present USSR proposal stemmed from its policy of peace, and was designed to strengthen both the United Nations and international co-operation.

56. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that Mr. Tsiang had alleged that the purposes of the USSR draft resolution were similar to those espoused by Hitler. Mr. Kiselev did not think a reply necessary.

57. The proposal of the USSR was designed to facilitate the peaceful co-existence of various social and economic systems. That proposal represented the aspirations, the hopes and the desires of all the peoples of the world who detested war and who passionately yearned to live in peace. The Soviet proposal also pointed the road to be taken by the United Nations Organization if it wished to be the true centre of international co-operation. Finally, the proposal noted that the events taking place in Korea and in other areas of the Pacific had served to emphasize, with added force, the extreme importance and urgency, from the point of view of international peace and security, of unifying for that purpose the efforts of the five Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council and bore the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace.

58. In conclusion, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR called upon the members of the Committee to approve the USSR draft resolution in order to eliminate the threat of a new war and thereby to strengthen peace and security among nations. The adoption of that proposal would reflect the sincere desires of hundreds of millions of human beings for the maintenance and establishment of a lasting peace.

59. The CHAIRMAN urged the members of the Committee to signify their desire to speak as early as practical, in order to make full use of the time at the disposal of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.