



Mr. Chairman,

Progress in the area of nuclear proliferation and disarmament issues is essential for peace and security for all of us. We should remind ourselves time and again of our joint goal – a safer and more secure world with fewer and ultimately no nuclear weapons. How do we get there?

Nuclear non-proliferation:

A prime example of what diplomacy can achieve if all parties concerned demonstrate the necessary political will is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between Iran and the E3+3. Implementation Day was reached on 16 January, we are now in the midst of a long confidence-building period. Three IAEA reports have hitherto confirmed compliance by Iran with the Agreement. This is an encouraging development!

Unfortunately, one other proliferation crisis has become more intense over the past year: North Korea. Germany condemns in the strongest possible terms North Korea's latest nuclear and ballistic missile tests. North Korea's continuous provocations are in breach of international law and they are a grave threat to peace and stability in the region and beyond.

Nuclear Disarmament

Discussion of a ban treaty

This year's agenda on nuclear disarmament revolves around one question that is at the heart of an overwhelming majority of states: What is the right path to achieve a world without nuclear weapons?

Many of us share this goal. But there is considerable disagreement on the right way how to get to a world without nuclear weapons. The OEWG in Geneva by

majority voted for a report which contains a recommendation for negotiations to start in 2017 to create a legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons.

Inasmuch as we share the frustration over the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament in recent years, Germany does not agree with this recommendation. In our analysis, a ban treaty is no quick fix to achieve nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, a ban treaty could cause damage to the established NPT regime. Let me explain why Germany takes this view:

- Nuclear weapons will only disappear when nuclear weapon states will engage in the process. Negotiations of a ban treaty without involving possessor states will not lead to a reduction in worldwide nuclear arsenals.
- An immediate ban of nuclear weapons without verification mechanism and restrictions on the production of fissile material bears the risk of weakening the NPT – contrary the intentions of its proponents.
- There is an inherent risk that countries could select joining such a ban while possibly leaving or abandoning the NPT which could lead to new doubts and insecurities about such countries decisions.
- Nuclear disarmament does not take place in a security vacuum. The overall security situation must be taken into consideration for nuclear disarmament to be effective.

This is why Germany continues advocating, together with partners, for a pragmatic step-by-step approach.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

One important element of the step-by-step approach is the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. This treaty project has fallen victim to the stalled negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

Building upon the valuable work of the GGE last year we are seeking to instil additional momentum in this process. Together with Canada and the Netherlands we are proposing a process consisting of focused work upon concrete elements for a FMCT within a smaller High-level Preparatory Group closely linked to the CD in Geneva which is to seek input from the international community of states here in New York. We are convinced that this approach allows for the necessary intermediate step after the GGE und will lay the necessary foundation for future negotiations on a FMCT within the CD.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty

The CTBT is a treaty which belongs to both categories: nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

This year's ministerial meeting organised by the Friends of the CTBT on 21 September in New York provided another opportunity to call upon Annex II-States to ratify the treaty. With the exception of North Korea, no country has conducted a nuclear test in the 21st century – all other nuclear weapon holders have complied with their moratoria.

The CTBT resolution adopted by the Security Council on 23 September was an additional step towards strengthening the international norm against nuclear testing. We are not yet there but we are getting closer.

Nuclear Security

Besides our commitment to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament we need to keep our focus on the evolving threats emanating from terrorism, including nuclear terrorism. These threats are real and they need to be addressed.

We therefore need to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture - with the IAEA playing a central coordinating role. This was reaffirmed by the recent IAEA General Conference. The forthcoming IAEA Nuclear Security Conference in Vienna will be a timely and suitable opportunity to give further impetus on international efforts to mitigate radiological and nuclear security risks.

1540 Review

Germany welcomes multilateral efforts such as the review process on UNSCR Resolution 1540, which is a key part of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism. It is undisputable that substantial progress has been made. However, the risk of non-state actors acquiring, developing, trafficking in or using WMDs such as nuclear weapons remains high. While striving for the universal implementation of the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540, we are especially committed to enhance security of nuclear materials worldwide. We also need to involve all relevant stakeholders: In this context, the role of industry and the private sector remains an important concern of the German government. This is why we initiated the "Wiesbaden Process", which focuses on private sector engagement in the context of UNSC Resolution

1540. As we have explained during this year's review process, Germany stands ready to broaden the scope of this cooperation by addressing, i.a. chemical and nuclear security.