Chairman’s Working Paper

The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair
balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the
nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the crucial role of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties
should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty regime is essential to the
maintenance of world peace and security.

The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitute
a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and
respected.

The States parties reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty as well as efforts
designed to promote the full realization and effective and indiscriminate
implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions and
resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
attending the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The States parties reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference.

The resolution on the Middle East

It should be noted that no progress has been achieved in the implementation
of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should follow up on the
implementation of the provisions of the resolution with a view to reporting to
the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard.

Since the adoption of the resolution, new realities have emerged in the
Middle East pertaining to adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. With the latest accession of the United Arab Emirates, Djibouti
and Oman, it is now a reality that all States of the Middle East have become
parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries are convinced that the implementation
of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing
the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In
this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest
accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further
delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA
safeguards.

Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee should recommend ways and means to get
all parties directly concerned to engage seriously in undertaking practical and
urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East, a zone which should be freely arrived at among regional States.

The depository States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the
draft resolution submitted for adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference, and as the resolution constitutes part and parcel of the package of
the outcome composed of three decisions and the resolution.

(i) Universality

The States parties welcome the eight recent accessions to the Treaty.
Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet
party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to it at the earliest date. The
States parties will make determined efforts to achieve this objective.

We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons which strengthen it and reaffirm the urgency of universal
adherence.

We invite all States not yet party to the Treaty to review and revisit their
positions, especially in view of the now near universal adherence to the
Treaty.

All States parties should strive for the achievement of the universality of
the Treaty.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
emphasize the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the
Treaty.

The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider
ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the
accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing
nuclear capabilities.

To be updated and further developed at the second session of the Preparatory
Committee.

Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of the universality of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The States parties
should unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to the Treaty to
accede to it as soon as possible. It would be useful to promote dialogue and
confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their
regional security environment.

Recognizing that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent requirement, the States parties recommend that
all States parties should make every effort to achieve this objective, and call
on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date,
particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded facilities.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
should redouble their efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty because
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are one of the
cornerstones of international peace and security.

Supporting efforts already made to achieve universality, the States parties
call for further measures to enhance opportunities to achieve universality, and
insist on a balance in the treatment of the universality issue.

(ii) Main Committee I issues

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to
play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.
The international community should make all possible efforts to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without
hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the
Treaty.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to
play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.
The States parties should pursue and agree on all possible and necessary
measures and efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices.

The States parties should continue to promote the full implementation of the
non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon States and of the
non-nuclear-weapon States.

The States parties should continue to take active measures to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technologies, material and equipment
that are used to produce those weapons, without hampering the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, especially by developing countries.

The States parties welcome the implementation of the Agreed Framework between
the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and
support the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions
and cooperation from Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The States parties welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an indispensable step forward on the
path to nuclear disarmament, and as the fulfilment of a principal component of
the decision of the 1995 Conference on principles and objectives. The Treaty
establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is reflected in its signature
by more than 140 States. All States parties aim to sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a
demonstration of the strength of international support for the Treaty and in
order to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.

The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate commencement and
early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally
applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of
the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate
contained therein.

We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki
on 21 March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III
agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish,
by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear
warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to
promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
expect these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.

We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not
increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations
among the five, in parallel with START III.

We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through all means
possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in
1999.

We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and
overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty.

We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization
of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their
unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its
entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear
explosions.

We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the
basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on
Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to
affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce
weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material
under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear
deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should further reduce
drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear
warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.

All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally
binding international instrument to that effect.

No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence
systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all
these weapons home.

The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
are urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to
achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty.

All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of
the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory,
universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the
Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should
be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.

The States parties would support the objective of increased transparency
regarding short-range nuclear weapons in the context of its recommendations on
nuclear disarmament.

The States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on
Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear
disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear
disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a
specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal
and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all
States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence
negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc
committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a
programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by
28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well
as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this
context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt a flexible approach, taking into
account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in
good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear
disarmament.

The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a
step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of
progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective
nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these
weapons.

The States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the
production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a
significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided
that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally
applicable.

Nuclear disarmament is further substantially facilitated by the continued
easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States
which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with
regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference should thus be fulfilled with determination and without
further delay. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their
commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament as well as their commitment
to the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

The States parties emphasize the importance of making every effort to promote
the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in
accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, despite its shortcomings and to
prepare the Treaty for implementation in a manner that prevents, to the maximum
extent possible, further qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

The States parties emphasize the need to pursue negotiations on a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in
accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on
Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

The States parties reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations on a
phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons and to continue to identify, negotiate and implement further
steps necessary to achieve this objective within the shortest possible framework
of time.

In the context of the “systematic and progressive efforts” which they have
agreed to pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective on
the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the
development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for
all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory
Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including
verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry
into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified
the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty
(FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that
negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament.
All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations
on FMCT.

Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to
reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization
and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President
of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at
the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START
process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further
encouraged. In the light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of
10 December 1996, entitled “Nuclear disarmament with a view to the
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons”, every nuclear-weapon State is invited
to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area
of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and
confidence-building.

The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile
materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further
encouraged.

The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as
gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from
delivery vehicles.

The States parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done
so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date

[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into
force:],in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the
Treaty depends.

The States parties call on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory
and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on
Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special
Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and
the mandate contained therein.

Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon
States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States parties call for further progress
towards global reductions of nuclear arsenals. The States parties urge the
nuclear-weapon States to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal
of eliminating those weapons, and all States to continue the determined pursuit
of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.

[If START II has not been ratified:]

The States parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified as soon as
possible and for an early start to negotiations on a START III treaty.

[If START III has not been concluded:]

The States parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations on a
START III treaty.

The States parties welcome efforts by the group of seven major industrialized
countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of management of
plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]

The States parties urge all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol is
not completed:]

The States parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to
complete as soon as possible a legally binding verification and compliance
regime for the Treaty.

The States parties recommend that all regions make major reductions in their
level of conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The advisory opinion tendered by the International Court of Justice on the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be recalled, by which
the Court recognized that all members of the international community have an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control. All States concerned, in particular the nuclear-weapon
States, are urged to engage seriously in meaningful negotiations with a view to
achieving early, further significant reductions of nuclear stockpiles as a step
towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Constructive engagement with the nuclear Powers towards the goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons is therefore needed. All delegations should take note of
the significant and encouraging statements coming from the recent Helsinki
summit meeting.

The need to assess current verification procedures with a view to making
these more stringent and effective must be further examined.

Accelerated work on a cut-off treaty on fissile materials is required.

Negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a nuclear-weapons convention
should commence. Such a convention would take us closer to the goal of total
elimination of nuclear weapons under international verification and control.
This could be assisted through the establishment of an inter-sessional working
group.

The States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140
countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underline their
commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. The
States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty
undertake to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue all
possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the
ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this
Treaty.

The States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in
accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on
Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. The States parties agree to
consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin
promptly.

The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with
determination their obligations under article VI, and undertake to pursue in
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament
in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this
context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately
on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

The nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination
of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral
negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.

The States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the
international community’s standing body for disarmament negotiations, is
mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The
Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and
the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal
of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

There would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on
holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched
uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all
States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden
would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.

A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of
consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage
procedures for fissile material at the national level.

Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate
negotiations on a “cut-off” treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear
disarmament.

The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:

(a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if
any, of weapons-grade fissile material;

(b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to
clarify and confirm these declarations;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on
holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such
holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be
withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;

(d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.

An exchange of views and negotiations should be begun on a treaty on nuclear
security and strategic stability, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon
States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and
possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments.

The nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only
within their own territories.

The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be recorded
as one of the goals of the States parties that has been accomplished. Paragraph
4 (a) of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament should be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry into force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and for its signature and
ratification by all the members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.

The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation and the
United States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined
pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally
and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control. The
other nuclear-weapon States should join in the process of structured and
verified nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

(a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the negotiation of a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance
with the Shannon report and the mandate contained
therein.

(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the Conference on
Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations on a non-discriminatory and
universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report
and the mandate contained therein. All States parties that are members of the
Conference should work actively to achieve that goal.

The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad
hoc committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and negotiations
required for a programme of systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate
totally nuclear weapons.

The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by
the Court that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control”.

The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in
their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first
session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of
eliminating those weapons. The States parties underline the importance that the
specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their
commitment be identified and fully implemented.

The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which
proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and
commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a
view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the
report.

The States parties recognize that the nuclear arms race between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation has ended and that this aspect of
article VI has been fulfilled.

The States parties endorse the effectiveness of the step-by-step process of
nuclear disarmament and recognize that nuclear disarmament can only take place
in a stable international security environment.

The States parties support the initiation of negotiations on a fissile
material cut-off treaty as an important step for multilateral action and
recognize both the disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of a fissile
material cut-off convention.

Welcoming the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, States
parties support the regional or nuclear-weapon-free-zone approach to the
provision of legally binding security assurances, as opposed to a global
convention.

We stress the importance of early signature and ratification of the Treaty by
all States, which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an
objective we fully share.

We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early
conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a
non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles
and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second
step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also
stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to
join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with
the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and
the mandate contained therein.

It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the
relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international
peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and
tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our
determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic
and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents
of the Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki on
further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress already achieved.

The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to be welcomed.

We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan and
Ukraine.

All existing zones should come into force as soon as possible, and the
process of ratification of their Protocols by relevant States completed.

The States of the regions concerned, and in particular those in regions of
tension, should engage in discussions on possible arrangements for additional
nuclear-weapon-free zones by 2000. This includes the Central Asian region, for
which there is now a proposal on the table under the Almaty Declaration.

Work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East
should be intensified as a contribution to peace and stability in the region and
internationally.

Cooperation and coordination between States parties and signatories of
existing zones under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and
Pelindaba should be actively pursued to promote the common goals of those
Treaties.

The States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few
years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership
among European States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation
of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the withdrawal
of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus,
Kazakstan and Ukraine and thus from the entire Central and Eastern European
region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The States parties acknowledge the important contribution made by Belarus,
Kazakstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through
their effective efforts in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfilment of
their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear
Missiles, and note with satisfaction the significant contribution of those
States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global
security.

Thus, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern
Europe could reaffirm the intention of the European States to move towards the
final goal of the achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament under
effective international control.

The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned, particularly in
regions afflicted with conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and
security and contributes to non-proliferation and disarmament.

All States should support the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to
establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at and in the light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned. All
nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding
obligations.

Taking into account article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
relating to the establishment of such zones, States parties should express
support of measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to
establish nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and support proposals to establish
these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a
measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and
realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties should welcome
the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among
themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

The States parties and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,
Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those
Treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including
the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere
and adjacent areas.

The States parties reaffirm their conviction that the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among
the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and
security.

The States parties welcome the steps taken to conclude further
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and express their support for the
establishment of a mechanism for cooperation among the agencies of the Treaties
of Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. The States parties decide to
follow all actions required for the early establishment of the
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

All nuclear States express their commitment to respect and support the
relevant protocols necessary for the maximum effectiveness of the established
nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm
that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones,
on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

Significant progress has been made since 1995 in the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of
support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.

In realization of the recommendations contained in the principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are especially pleased to note that on
28 February 1997 they formally endorsed, in the Almaty Declaration,
the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. This joint action,
following earlier initiatives by several countries of the region, is indicative
of the importance the States of Central Asia attach to article VII of the
Treaty and paragraphs V to VII of the principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament.

As the States parties to the Treaty prepare for the next Review Conference in
the year 2000, the Preparatory Committee takes positive note of this
development.

Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones within the boundaries of individual
States complements the obligations undertaken by the States under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, by prohibiting within such zones
deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the dumping of
radioactive wastes, etc., they expand the geographical scope of
nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mongolia’s declaration of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
1992, which has been welcomed and supported by all nuclear-weapon and
non-nuclear-weapon States alike, has demonstrated that the creation of such
zones within the boundaries of single States (single-State zones) is, in
general, politically acceptable. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be effective,
irrespective of their geographical scope, they should be based on international
agreement(s), have clearly defined rights and obligations of parties to such
agreement(s), a system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with
the obligations derived from such status, the assurances from parties to the
agreements, etc. Therefore, in order for single-State zones to have equal legal
basis with other zones, the objectives, purposes and principles, as well as the
status of the zones, should be clearly defined in international agreement(s),
taking duly into account the experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, as
well as the specifics of single-State zones. The interests of neighbouring
States should also be duly taken into account.

Bearing in mind the important role that single-State zones could play as
concrete disarmament and confidence-building measures in widening the
geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus contributing to the
objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mongolia believes that the
Preparatory Committee should focus specifically on this question and contribute
to developing practical procedures in institutionalizing such forms of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between
the States concerned with their neighbours as well as the nuclear-weapon
States.

The States parties welcome the considerable progress in the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 Conference, and especially the
establishment of the zones created by the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The
States parties furthermore renew their call for the establishment of further
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among
the regions concerned, especially in regions where they do not exist, such as
the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

Considering nuclear-weapon-free zones to be important complementary
instruments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the
States parties welcome advances made in this field, on the basis of arrangements
freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

The States parties reaffirm their conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones
are important disarmament measures which enhance regional and global peace and
security, greatly strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in all
its aspects and contribute to the objective of securing a world entirely free of
nuclear weapons.

The States parties welcome the conclusion of two further
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties (the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok) and
the recent entry into force of the latter.

The States parties reaffirm the importance of the cooperation of all the
nuclear-weapon States and their support for the relevant protocols to the
treaties. In this context they welcome the signature by all nuclear-weapon
States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. They look forward to the
signature and ratification of the relevant Protocols by those nuclear-weapon
States which have not yet done so.

The States parties welcome the consultation which is currently under way
between the nuclear-weapon States and the South-East Asian States in relation to
the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and urge those States to make every
effort to resolve the remaining differences in order to facilitate adherence to
the Protocols.

The States parties welcome the intention of States parties and signatories to
the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to promote the
common goals envisaged in those Treaties, and to explore and implement further
ways and means of cooperation.

China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm our conviction
that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,
enhances global and regional peace and security.

We consider that the signature by all the nuclear-weapon States of the
Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing
nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and in Africa, was a significant
development. By signing these protocols, all the nuclear-weapon States are
giving security assurances in treaty form to the very large number of States
concerned.

Moreover, we remain ready to work with the signatories of the Treaty on the
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to remove those obstacles currently
preventing the nuclear-weapon States from signing the Protocol to that
Treaty.

Further steps should be taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to
the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We welcome and
will actively explore ideas in this respect, including those aimed at an
internationally legally binding instrument.

All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unconditionally not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or
nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, legally binding
international instruments to that effect.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for
all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative
security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently
concluded. In this regard, there is no objection, in principle, in the
Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, to the idea of an
international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the States parties
should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000
Review Conference on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the
2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The States parties agree to commence negotiations and conclude in the
shortest possible time a treaty banning the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons under any circumstances pursuant to the successful conclusion of the
legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime is fully recognized.
Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of
11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States
concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should
be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the
principles and objectives.

These States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons believe that international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should cover both
negative and positive security assurances.

They consider that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option,
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to
receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

In this context, these States parties consider that the unilateral
declarations made by the four nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council
resolutions 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995 on
security assurances have not fulfilled the requirements of non-nuclear-weapon
States.

Accordingly, the delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan
consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to
the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for
non-nuclear-weapon States.

These States parties, therefore, propose a draft protocol to the Treaty on
security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The text of the protocol is
annexed hereto.

These States parties are of the view that all States parties to the Treaty
must take effective measures for nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile
materials, conclusion of an international legally binding instrument providing
comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon
States, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and universal adherence
to the Treaty. With regard to the question of security assurances for
non-nuclear-weapon States, these States parties urge the Preparatory Committee
to address this issue in a substantive manner with a view to concluding a
protocol to the Treaty, not later than the time of the convening of the 2000
Review Conference. The draft protocol, proposed by the States parties, will
provide a basis for negotiations at the Conference or at the Preparatory
Committee meetings.

These States parties firmly believe that conclusions of such a protocol on
security assurances constitute an essential element of an effective regime of
the Treaty, will strengthen the Treaty and will contribute to the success of the
2000 Review Conference.

The States parties welcome the adoption of Security Council resolution
984 (1995) of 4 November 1995, as well as the declarations by the
nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances
as important developments in this field. The States parties recommend that
further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the
Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the
form of an international legally binding instrument. The States parties
recognize that treaty-based security assurances are available to parties to
nuclear-weapon-free zones through the signature of the relevant protocols to
such zones by the nuclear-weapon States. The States parties recommend that
concerned States that have not yet signed and ratified these treaties do so as
soon as possible and thus bring into effect those security assurances.

The need for an international legally binding, comprehensive and
unconditional arrangement to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has remained
primordial and must be pursued. Nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security
assurances, some of which precede the Treaty, and which are regional, cannot
take the place of a global one because, being party to a
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty does not relieve a State from fulfilling the
obligations that it has undertaken by its accession to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, the status makes it imperative for
a State to comply with the Treaty, and thereby strengthen the Treaty –
which is the main axis of the global non-proliferation regime. This should also
be the relationship between a global legal instrument on security assurances and
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security assurances.

It is necessary therefore for the instrument to be negotiated multilaterally.
It needs to have as its starting point the obligation of “no use, no first use”
of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapons States against a non-nuclear-weapon
State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In other
words, there must be a clear commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to
the Treaty. For just as the non-nuclear-weapon States accepted treaty provisions
not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, they should equally be assured in
treaty form that they would not be victims of use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons. The comprehensive assurances to be given must be such that States would
be unable to withdraw from fulfilling them, especially during hostilities,
because of what may be claimed to be national interest, and the assurances
should not be vulnerable to the veto. It is also necessary for it to be noted
somewhere in the instrument that the best assurances against use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of those weapons, and that
measures to that effect are highly desirable.

The Preparatory Committee recommends that time be allocated at its second
session for further debate and consideration of proposals that have been made on
the issue of security assurances.

The States parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference endorse an
instrument on legally binding security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon
States parties to the Treaty for signature and ratification.

(iii) Main Committee II issues

The conclusion of negotiations on the “93+2” model protocol and its expected
adoption by the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in May is welcomed as a significant contribution to
strengthening safeguards. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons should conclude and ratify agreements with IAEA and implement
the 93+2 package of safeguards as soon as possible to help ensure that
safeguards are effectively strengthened and in a cost-efficient manner. These
strengthened safeguards should become the new norm for comprehensive safeguards
to maximize the potential of the Treaty to provide solid non-proliferation
assurances.

All States that do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in place, and
especially the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, should adopt the
maximum number of measures identified in the model protocol that would help
contribute to the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. The
undertakings by a number of such States to work towards that goal is
welcomed.

All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should now ensure that
their commitment to the full-scope safeguards standard for new supply through
practical trading arrangements is fully observed.

States not parties to the Treaty that continue to have unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities should enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA
without delay.

Nuclear-weapon States should place permanently under IAEA safeguards all of
the nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear
activities.

The safeguards agreement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with
IAEA, which remains binding and in force, should be implemented without delay.
The full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and the United States of America will be an important
contribution to international peace and security.

We urge every State party to the Treaty that has not already done so to bring
into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We also urge
States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive safeguards
agreements.

We look forward to approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the model
protocol to safeguards agreements (part II 93+2).

We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to place permanently under safeguards
nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.

In order to facilitate the Treaty’s function in preventing nuclear weapons
proliferation, the States parties should continue to support the safeguards of
the International Atomic Energy Agency.

All States parties should support the IAEA programme for strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. The
nuclear-weapon States should apply those measures provided for in the model
protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear
non-proliferation objectives.

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are an essential element in
providing a guarantee that States are complying with article III
undertakings. All States parties that have not yet done so should sign without
delay the safeguard agreements required by article III of the Treaty.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that new supply arrangements for
the transfer of the source of special fissionable material or equipment or
material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a
necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should
be placed under IAEA safeguards.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent responsible body to
verify compliance of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons. The States parties that have concerns regarding
non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by other States
parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and
information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide
on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to
ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the provisions of
the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State
party is limited in the exercise of these rights based on allegations of
non-compliance which are not verified by IAEA.

All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and
bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done
so should do so without further delay.

A further position on 93+2 to be developed at the second session of the
Preparatory Committee.

A report should be furnished by the Secretariat on the fulfilment of
requirements related to the transfer of nuclear material to non-nuclear States
for evaluation of the issue by the States parties (principles and objectives,
para. 13).

Information needs to be provided by the Secretariat on actual placing under
Agency safeguards of material transferred from military to peaceful uses for
evaluation by the States parties.

It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the second part of the
93+2 programme was adopted in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is strongly
hoped that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of
Governors in May.

The States parties call on all States and other Parties with INFCIRC 153-type
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so
to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into effect
additional safeguards agreements using the model protocol containing the second
part of the 93+2 programme measures as a standard text.

The States parties call on States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements
with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to
conclude additional agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency
incorporating measures that they have identified as capable of contributing to
the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol, when implemented with
regard to that party and as consistent with its obligations under
article I.

The States parties call upon States with INFCIRC 66-type safeguards
agreements to negotiate and bring into effect agreements providing for the
implementation of the second part of the 93+2 programme measures.

The States parties recommend that each party with nuclear materials on its
territory maintain and improve its own arrangements for nuclear materials
accountancy, safety and physical protection, applying the appropriate
internationally agreed standards.

We recommend that, as soon as the Board of Governors of IAEA has approved the
text, all States parties should be encouraged to begin negotiating their
individual agreements with IAEA as soon as practicable; this will enable early
implementation of the strengthened safeguards on a global basis.

At the same time, we would sincerely welcome an indication on the part of the
States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons with limited safeguards agreements, some of which are observing the
Preparatory Committee (and, of course, we welcome their interest very much) that
they too were considering the possible application of the model protocol to
their own situations.

An important element of the strengthened safeguards is that they should not
place an undue burden on members; it is therefore encouraging that the IAEA
secretariat has assured members that in the medium to long term the process will
be cost-neutral.

The States parties urge all States that have not done so to conclude and
bring into force the safeguards agreements required by the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The States parties further urge those with comprehensive safeguards
agreements to implement those safeguards-strengthening measures already approved
by the Board of Governors of IAEA, and conclude and bring into force a protocol
to their safeguards agreements incorporating 93+2 safeguards-strengthening
measures at an early time.

The States parties reiterate that IAEA should take full advantage of its
rights under special inspections.

Taking note of the United States of America/Russian Federation/IAEA
trilateral fissile material initiative, the States parties welcome unilateral
decisions to accept safeguards on nuclear material no longer needed for defence
purposes, and endorse plans for the safe and effective disposition of plutonium
and high-enriched uranium no longer needed for defence requirements in a manner
that renders it unavailable for use in nuclear explosives.

The States parties call upon parties to provide political, technical and
financial support so that IAEA can meet all of its obligations.

The States parties urge all States to adopt physical protection arrangements
that reflect the latest international standard and adhere to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and request all States to take
safeguards and physical protection requirements into account when planning and
designing new facilities.

Nuclear supplier regimes should not restrict access for developing countries
to advanced technology. This would be contrary to the range of undertakings on
peaceful nuclear cooperation reaffirmed most recently at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference.

The fulfilment of nuclear supplier obligations to promote the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy is facilitated by an effective non-proliferation regime, of
which strict and transparent nuclear supply policies are an integral part.

The international Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, to be held in Vienna on 6 and 7 October 1997
following the forty-first session of the General Conference of the International
Atomic Energy Agency is welcomed as a first step to improve further transparency
in the operation of nuclear export control regimes. All States are encouraged to
attend and participate actively in this seminar.

Adherence by all States to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines would be
consistent with the Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty objectives of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitating cooperation in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Non-member States should receive assistance
and advice about the practical and legal aspects of implementing the Guidelines
from members of nuclear supplier regimes.

We regard effective national nuclear export controls as integral to a strong
non-proliferation regime which facilitates international nuclear cooperation in
pursuit of economic and technological development.

We support ongoing efforts to enhance transparency in multilaterally agreed
nuclear export guidelines and call upon all States to join in this activity.

The States parties recommend that transparency in nuclear-related export
controls should continue to be promoted within the framework of dialogue and
cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

All States parties should exercise their responsibility to control
nuclear-related exports whatever their destination and give full effect to their
commitment that new supply arrangements should require, as a necessary
precondition, acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s full-scope
safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The States parties call upon parties that have not yet done so to adhere to
the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency
of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger
Committee.

The States parties call upon all parties that have not yet done so to adhere
to the Programme of Action on Illicit Trafficking as agreed by the group of
seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation. The States
parties that have adhered should continue to work to promote international
cooperation between the relevant national agencies with a view to preventing
such smuggling.

(iv) Main Committee III issues

The States parties reaffirm the importance they attach to ensuring the
exercise of the inalienable rights of all the parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

The States parties also reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of
the International Atomic Energy Agency as the principal agent for multilateral
technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes and reiterate their call for every effort to be made to
ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its
responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear
safety.

The States parties welcome the progress made since the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference in developing and strengthening the international legal and
institutional framework within which the development of research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes takes place.

In this context, the States parties welcome the entry into force in 1996 of
the Convention on Nuclear Safety and call on countries that have not already
done so – particularly those with nuclear installations that fall within the
scope of the Convention – to sign and ratify the Convention. States parties also
welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
States parties note the progress that has been made towards the development of a
comprehensive international nuclear liability regime and express the hope for an
early conclusion to these negotiations.

The States parties stress the importance they attach to efforts at the
national, regional and global levels to promote and maintain the highest
standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. They
welcome the initiatives that have been taken to this end since the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference, including the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security,
held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, and the Tokyo Conference on
Nuclear Safety in Asia, held at Tokyo in 1996.

The States parties note that it is in the interests of all States that the
transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be
conducted in accordance with strict international standards of safety and
security. They note that the transportation of such materials by sea is a matter
of particular concern to small island developing States and other coastal
States. A number of States in this category call on those directly engaged in
the maritime transportation of radioactive materials to continue to provide
information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing,
route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such
shipments.

Canada believes in the right, as set out in article IV of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of all parties to the Treaty to engage in
and to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – a right to be
exercised in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

Through bilateral agreements, Canada is engaged in the full range of
cooperation as called for in paragraph 15 of the principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In accordance with paragraph 18 of the principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, Canada is working actively to bring into
force in Canada the provisions of three recently agreed international
agreements: the International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on Nuclear Safety,
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of
Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on
Board Ships (the INF Code), and revised IAEA recommendations on transportation
of nuclear fuel.

Canada would welcome the approval of the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

As a significant donor to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Canada believes
that there can be no further growth in the Fund unless the donor base is
broadened. It strongly urges all States in a position to contribute their fair
share to do so.

All States parties should make every effort to facilitate international
cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States that are in a position to
do so should assist the developing countries to master technologies for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.

All States parties should ensure that measures taken by them to prevent
nuclear weapons proliferation would facilitate rather than hamper the exercise
of the legitimate rights of the developing countries for peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Those restrictions on the transfer of technologies for peaceful
uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty
should be removed.

The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be
reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also
essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed.
States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of
article IV of the Treaty.

Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under
the Treaty, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to
the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing
countries.

The States parties recognize the shortcomings in the realization of the
provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty and those of the
principles and objectives decision related to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and decide to take further steps to ensure full, unrestricted and
indiscriminate implementation of all these provisions.

Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the
inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to
the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing
countries.

Arrangements to control nuclear-related exports for the purpose of
non-proliferation should be transparent and balanced in membership to include
both supplier and recipient States parties. Their activities and guidelines
should under no circumstances and in no way hamper or limit any State party’s
exercise of the rights and privileges set out in the provisions of the preamble
and articles of the Treaty and those of the principles and objectives decision
as well as the fulfilment of all related commitments contained therein. Initial
efforts towards transparency of existing nuclear-related export controls should
be followed by immediate action to ensure full transparency and participation on
an equal footing by all interested parties.

All States should, through rigorous national measures and international
cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety,
including in waste management, and should observe standards and guidelines in
nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear
materials.

Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy
Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet its
responsibilities effectively in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards
and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its
efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through
predictable and assured resources.

Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful
purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the
application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could
warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations. All States parties remain committed to pursue such actions,
particularly in relation to facilities that are under IAEA safeguard.

The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is
a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless
efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group’s
recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting
the Convention is also worthy of support.

It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted
in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and
freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not
be impaired.

As noted in the report of Main Committee III of the Review and Extension
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which was adopted by consensus, there have been exceptional instances
in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining
and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear
weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference’s call upon
all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field
of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving
appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those
affected areas.

The States parties recommend continued international cooperation in this
field, taking into account, in particular, the needs of developing
countries.

The States parties call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and
ratify the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety at the earliest possible date.

The States parties urge early conclusion of a convention on the safety of
spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management, and
call on all States to sign and ratify that convention at the earliest possible
date.

In the area of conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, increased
attention should be paid to problems of safety and contamination related to the
discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapon
programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced
human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected
areas. In this regard, a special responsibility exists towards the people of
former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a
result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted during the period of Trusteeship.
Furthermore, consideration should be given by all Governments and international
organizations that have expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive
contaminants to providing appropriate assistance as may be requested for
remedial purposes in adversely affected areas. This decision was endorsed by the
Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

The disarmament process requires strict procedures for safe handling, storage
and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials as well as safe management of
radioactive contaminants in compliance with high standards of environmental
protection and nuclear safety.

Continued international attention needs to be directed at the problems of
safety and contamination related to former nuclear operations,
inter alia, associated with discontinued nuclear weapons
programmes.

We would reiterate the call made in an agreed draft document of Main
Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference addressed to all
Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of
clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving assistance
as may be requested in affected areas, taking into account efforts that have
been made or that are planned to be implemented at the regional and national
levels in this regard.

Recognizing the right and obligation of States not to transfer
nuclear-related items and technology if they believe such transfer will
contribute to proliferation, the States parties call for continued efforts to
improve nuclear-related export controls so that such controls can continue to
promote the objectives of the Treaty by reducing the risks of proliferation and
by contributing to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The States parties urge all States to ensure that nuclear material is subject
to a system of accountancy and control at the State and facility level that
meets the latest international standards.

The States parties reaffirm the view, expressed in the principles and
objectives decision, that new supply arrangements of nuclear material and
equipment controlled pursuant to article III, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA
full-scope safeguards.

China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America attach importance to the
full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. In this context we
reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I,
II and III of the Treaty and following the decision on the principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The States parties note that radioactive material has been successfully
transported by sea for more than 30 years in accordance with internationally
agreed standards of safety and security.

The States parties also note that it is in the interests of all States that
the transport of radioactive material should continue to be conducted in a safe
and secure manner in accordance with relevant INF and IAEA codes. We urge early
conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which provides the basis for a
possible future framework for transboundary movement of such material.

The States parties conclude that, while navigational rights and freedoms as
provided for by the applicable rules of international law should not be
impaired, the States concerned should maintain a dialogue on the transport by
sea of the material in question.