

## **MORE THAN REMITTANCES: OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT**

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### **A. BACKGROUND**

That there is a relationship between population migration and development is axiomatic. Just what that relationship might be and how migration affects development, and development migration, is not, however, at all clear. Neither must it be assumed that migration and development are independent variables. This writer has maintained that migration is an integral part of development and the one cannot be truly separated from the other (Skeldon, 1997). Migration, or the more inclusive "mobility", can be conceptualized as the dynamic, spatial dimension of any society or economy. The mobility patterns of a country with a high Gross National Product (GDP) per capita, an economy dominated by service industries and the population distribution concentrated in urban areas, are clearly different from those of a country where the gross national product (GDP) per capita is low, the economy is based on agriculture and the population is dispersed throughout the rural sector. Equally, the mobility patterns of wealthier groups within any country are very different from those of poorer groups. Nevertheless, levels of development are not neatly correlated with particular volumes or types of migration. For example, within the developed world itself, the mobility rates of populations vary greatly. Mobility rates in the settler societies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, where between 17 and 20 per cent of the population change their usual place of residence every year, are consistently higher than in most European countries and Japan, where generally less than 10 per cent of the population change residence every year (Long, 1991; Newton and Bell, 1996). The nature of the housing market in the respective countries is seen as one factor that can help to explain the differences; this raises the issue of appropriate policy intervention to influence the volume and direction of population movement.

Forms of population migration are often seen to increase with rising levels of GDP, or development (Zelinsky, 1971). Yet, in so much policy intervention, migration, both internal and international, is seen as an aberration and if levels of development in the rural sector or in the developing world could only be improved, then people would not have to migrate either to cities or to more developed countries. Research has not supported this idea but suggested that as any country develops, initially at least, rising levels of out-migration can be expected (Nyberg-Sørensen and others, 2002). Similarly, development is almost always associated with increased urbanization, much of which can be attributed to rural-to-urban migration. Concentration of population whether nationally, regionally or globally appears to be an integral part of development under the current dominant model of free markets and liberal democratic political systems.

While certain paths of development can generate migration, migration itself can be the facilitator of profound changes in economy and society that can be considered to be "development". Migration allows the transfer of goods and ideas from destinations back to origins, and perhaps the clearest link between migration and development is the sending of money back to the home area in the form of remittances. Estimates placed the volume of remittances from global international migration in 2001 at some US\$72.3 billion per annum through formal channels (Ratha, 2003). This sum can easily be increased substantially through the addition of the vast but unknown volume sent through informal channels. Even the volume through formal channels exceeds the volume of monies in direct foreign

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assistance from the developed to the developing world and is demonstrably a major force for change at national and local levels in countries of origin of migration. It is of such importance in the migration-development nexus that a separate paper is being prepared on this topic. The present paper will focus on other aspects of the complex relationship between migration and development and it will do so through the identification of a series of "dimensions" that allow different perspectives on the complex relationship. These dimensions include economic, demographic, environmental, political and gender perspectives on migration and development. Although the paper examines these dimensions as discrete entities, in reality they are but different filters through which we can examine the same phenomenon from distinct points of view.

## B. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

### *1. Migration and trade*

#### *a. General patterns of migration and trade*

Excluding remittances, the critical economic factor that bears upon migration is, perhaps, trade. The free movement of goods and services across borders is central to the idea of globalization and increasing trade impacts on the other factor of production, labour. The distribution of labour then changes to reflect the demands of the activities created through the new patterns of trade. It is hypothesized that there can be two principal outcomes. First, increasing trade creates rising prosperity that can reduce the need to migrate: trade thus substitutes for migration. Second, increasing trade strengthens links between places and this is reflected in greater human interaction between those places and thus more migration: migration and trade are complementary. Available evidence from trade liberalization policies in Asia and Latin America suggests that the relationship between migration and trade is more towards complementarity than substitution (Richards, 1994). This conclusion is in line with those who argue that development is likely to induce rather than reduce migration.

Nevertheless, this general statement needs to be tempered lest any simple correlation between increasing trade and increasing migration is drawn. The relative importance of manufacturing trade is given in table 1 where France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States represent the top five countries in terms of both imports and exports. Among these developed countries, Japan clearly stands out as not having seen immigration, as measured by the stock of foreign-born, evolve in tandem with its trading success. Canada, sixth in the manufacturing trade league, as well as Australia and New Zealand, which do not even appear among the top 15 countries, have much higher per capita immigration than the other trading nations: over a fifth of the two Australasian nations' populations are foreign-born. The picture for the trade in services is similar with the same five countries leading the table of both exports and imports (table 2).

China opened up to the outside world through decisively transforming its foreign trade policy after the general reforms of 1978 (Lardy, 1992). As the data in tables 1 and 2 show, by 2000 China had become a major importer as well as exporter of both goods and services. Immigration was almost negligible relative to the size of the country, although there were estimated to be some 250,000 foreign experts working in China (Ma, 2004). The same source estimated that, by 2002, some 520,000 Chinese workers were engaged in labour contracts abroad. In addition, China had emerged as the principal source of immigrants to Canada with over 40,000 in 2001, or some 16 per cent of the total immigrant intake to Canada, up from just 2 per cent in 1980 (Skeldon, 2004). The numbers of immigrants from China to the United States increased from 14,421 in 1977 to 56,426 in 2001; to Australia, the numbers of settlers from China increased from a few hundred to over 6,700 over the same period; and China has emerged as a major source of students to all the major industrialized countries over the last decade. In the case of China, rising migration and increased trade reflect the same policy changes that linked China to the global

economy and have seen China attain annual gross domestic product per capita growth during the period 1990-2001 of 8.8 per cent (United Nations, 2003, p. 280).

In manufacturing trade, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China had emerged as significant nations by the year 2000 and the former was also represented among the leading states that trade in services. Until the 1980s, these economies had been characterized as net exporters of labour and population, primarily to the oil producing countries of West Asia, in the case of the Republic of Korea and the United States, in the case of Taiwan Province of China, but also elsewhere. With rising costs of labour, labour-intensive industries such as textiles were moved off-shore as industries came to focus more on technology and capital-intensive activities as well as services. Both economies shifted from net emigration to net immigration in what have been called "turning points in migration" (Abella, 1994). Thus, increasing trade can indeed substitute for out-migration but lead to rising pressures for in-migration, with a likely increase in the total volumes of population movement. This theme will be pursued further below under the demographic dimension.

#### *b. Distortions in the trading system*

One clear difficulty in any search for a relationship between trade and migration is that models are based on the assumption that areas will capitalize on their comparative advantage in the supply of tradeable commodities. Each area should thus produce locally what it can either grow or manufacture most cheaply and trade these items for goods that can be generated more cheaply elsewhere. Thus, trade theory is based upon complementarities. However, despite stated commitments to the principles of free trade, in reality, it is rare that countries respond to strictly economic criteria. Tariff barriers erected by rich countries to protect primarily their agricultural sector, but also manufacturing, produce distortions that are likely to be prejudicial to the alleviation of poverty in developing countries and yet further complicate the complex relationship between migration and trade. For example, it is possible that North American and European farmers are exporting agricultural products at more than one third of their costs of production, thanks to subsidies given to the farmers (Oxfam, 2002). One of the most blatant examples of distortion is the subsidy given to producers of sugar in Europe where costs of production of sugar are more than six times that in Brazil. Brazil is estimated to lose around US\$500 million a year in market share, with even less efficient producers like Mozambique losing around US\$38 million in 2004 (*The Economist*, 17 April 2004). Subsidies given to European and American cotton growers undercut potentially more efficient producers in West Africa. The destruction of markets in the developing world may be a factor to force farmers off the land towards cities, with subsequent spillover into international migration. These linkages, and particularly those between internal and international population movements, are as yet poorly understood and remain a priority area for research into trade and international development policies, poverty reduction and population migration.

It is not just agricultural subsidies that distort the global trading system. The Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) has provided the basis for the regulation of the trade in clothes and textiles since 1974 and essentially provides protection for industry in developed countries through a series of import quotas. Agreements through the Uruguay round of trade talks to phase the system out by 2005, however, need not necessarily be to the benefit of all current producers in the developing world. Bangladesh, which is guaranteed market access to industrialized countries under the present MFA agreement, is likely to be one of the biggest losers. Currently, the garment industry in Bangladesh accounts for three-quarters of that country's total exports and employs over 1.5 million workers, the vast majority of whom are women migrants to Dhaka (Oxfam, 2002, p. 109). The phasing out of MFA will leave Bangladesh at a disadvantage compared with neighbouring India, and also China, putting the livelihoods of thousands of workers at risk. Many are currently supporting their families in the rural sector and, by 2005, if they lose their jobs, there will be tremendous pressure to seek alternative employment, legally or illegally, overseas. The legal migration overseas of uneducated Bangladeshi women is currently restricted and increased

trafficking of women is a possible future scenario unless changes are made nationally towards the migration of women, and internationally to the nature of the global trading system in textiles.

These distortions are likely to be amplified by the global patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI). Although two thirds of FDI in 2000 was concentrated within countries of the developed world, the distribution of the remaining third largely determined where export-oriented industrialization was established in the developing world. China has emerged as the leading recipient of FDI that is likely to accelerate internal migration to the coastal regions and larger cities. An associated effect, however, has been a reduction in FDI in other countries as foreign investors redirect funds to areas where higher return is expected. FDI in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam has seen a marked decline following the crisis of 1997 but declines have continued into the twenty-first century in at least some of these countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, forthcoming). What impact the decline in FDI will have on migration is as yet difficult to conclude but it is likely to be a factor in encouraging more people to leave for other countries or, more importantly, for their governments to accelerate existing policies to export labour overseas.

Although subsidies and quotas unquestionably prejudice farmers in developing countries, they are but part of a broader picture. The lack of infrastructure also plays an important role. In particular, future improvements to port facilities and customs regulations are seen as one way to stimulate significantly growth in intra-Asian trade (Wilson, Mann and Otsuki, 2003). Similarly, improvements to roads and airports will allow a more level playing field in global trade policy to operate effectively and to the greater benefit of people in poor countries.

### *c. Trade and migrant protection*

The conditions of the workers in the manufacturing enterprises established under the export-oriented pattern of industrialization in developing countries raises yet another aspect of the trade and migration equation. In the drive for development, many countries have sidelined the issue of labour conditions and migrant rights and the multinational or transnational corporation (TNC), seen as a key player in this pattern of industrialization, has attracted much criticism (for example, Klein, 2000). While the drive for profit as the rationale of the TNC may have led many to ignore environmental and labour conditions, equally the TNCs are the most open to international scrutiny. TNCs are likely to pay higher wages than local companies (Legrain, 2002, p. 137). The worst abuses are likely to be perpetrated within the mass of subcontractors that are more difficult to monitor. The industries are established in developing countries specifically to take advantage of abundant supplies of cheap labour and, if pressure is brought to bear on the company, most can relatively easily move on to alternative sources of supply in other countries. Such industries are known as "footloose". For example, industries set up along the Thai side of the Thailand-Myanmar border take advantage of irregular workers from the other side of the border. Following the financial crisis in 1997, proposals to replace the irregular foreign workers with more expensive, if newly unemployed, Thai workers were swiftly met by threats from operators to relocate the factories to other countries. The government was thus left with the dilemma of losing a source of production, employment and revenue, and the labour force with losing its only source of remuneration. Any drive for regularization can result in making a difficult situation even worse.

Still further complications can be introduced through using the standards of developed countries to judge practices in other cultures at other levels of development. There can be no excuse for turning a blind eye to existing forms of exploitation, and migrant workers, often young women, bear the brunt of harsh and difficult conditions. Irrespective of whether the TNC or a national company is responsible, developed and developing countries, international organizations and non-governmental organizations need to work towards the introduction of best practices in labour relations within the companies that are set up to participate in the growing global trade in goods and services. Ultimately, however, in globalizing economies based upon the principles of free markets and liberalized trade, improvements to labour

standards must be implemented from within. As the philanthropist entrepreneurs in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain discovered, a well-fed, well-housed and protected labour force is in their own best interests, leading to improved health and educational status and higher productivity.

## *2. International agreements*

### *a. GATS mode 4*

The search for international agreements on trade regulations commenced in 1947 with the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, the critical proposals that might affect population movement were only introduced during the Uruguay round of trade talks (1986-1994) that laid down the principles for the World Trade Organization (WTO) that came into effect from 1995 and replaced GATT. The principles with direct relevance to migration were introduced under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and referred to the curiously termed movement of "natural persons" and is known in shorthand as GATS mode 4. Essentially, these principles recognized the importance of the movement of labour as an integral part of the international trade in services. The "movement of natural persons" referred to the rights of individual workers to stay temporarily in a country for the purpose of providing a service in any of the 161 services identified in GATS mode 4. Almost immediately, however, such a recognition introduced tensions with existing national immigration legislations. Although the GATS proposals specifically did not apply to people seeking permanent employment, or to those seeking citizenship or permanent residence, only the most naive could believe that "natural persons" might behave in ways different from "migrants" and temporary workers might not seek extensions of stay, permanent residence and even citizenship.

The critical benefit to be brought by the GATS proposals is to increase flexibility into globalizing labour markets that will allow a matching of skills at various and stipulated levels with available jobs across international boundaries. Existing immigration legislation is generally not responsive enough to allow the quick importation of the workers required in specific activities. However, workers coming into a country are inmigrants, if not immigrants, and the critical issue is how to ensure that they will not become immigrants without going through existing immigration procedures. Substantial financial penalties can be imposed on employers if workers stay beyond the limit of the agreement, and close monitoring is required. Bilateral programmes such as the Canada and the Caribbean and Mexican Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme are cited to show that temporary worker schemes can function successfully (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003a). Bilateral programmes, however, cannot be included under GATS as they do not offer access to particular markets to all WTO members on a non-discriminatory basis and deprive the host market of the flexibility to choose workers from among all members. However, such universalistic strategies of labour recruitment run counter to the observed tendencies of particular migrant groups to control access to specific labour markets and the whole significance of social networks in population migration (Skeldon, 1990). Further reconciliation between theory, empirical evidence and policy is still required before realistic international agreements can be reached.

Given the difficulties inherent in reconciling national immigration policy with flexible labour recruitment policy, it seems likely that, over the short term, any agreements under GATS mode 4 will be limited to a very restricted number of categories and a tiny fraction of those who move internationally. Intra-corporate transferees, managers, investors and entrepreneurs, trainees and a few types of highly skilled service providers appear to fit into categories that countries could agree to move forward towards the liberalization of global labour markets. In the interim, rather than creating global labour markets, attempts to reach agreement at the regional level may prove a more viable strategy.

## *b. Regional integration*

There are many types of regional trade arrangements. The most advanced form is the economic union in which there is a harmonization of all economic policy within the countries of the union, including the free movement of labour and the removal of all internal barriers to trade. The European Union (EU) is the most complete example in the world today, but there are many others that are moving at variable speeds towards such a union, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the common market linking the southern Latin American nations (MERCOSUR); the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).

Only among the countries of the EU, agreements to allow the free movement of people have been reached. It is estimated that before enlargement, some 5.5 million people, or about 1.5 per cent of the population, are citizens of the EU countries and living in another country within the EU. The figures suggest that free markets and policies to allow the free movement of people need not result in massive interchanges of populations. Globally, the United Nations (2002) has estimated that 175 million, or about 3 per cent of the world's population, live outside their country of birth. While free movement of people is allowed between Canada and the United States, no such free movement exists in the southern part of NAFTA between Mexico and the United States. In Southeast Asia, there are no agreements to harmonize migration policies, with the exception of the introduction of the APEC Business Travel Card that facilitates the entry of businessmen into countries that are signatories to the scheme (Hugo, 2004). Increasingly, the United States, as well as Asian countries, are pursuing labour agreements on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis (Martin, 2004; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, forthcoming) and, with the notable exception of the EU, regional trade agreements have as yet made little progress towards the free movement of persons. Even for the EU countries, moves towards the harmonization of asylum policies or policies towards the entry of foreigners from outside the EU have some way to go. What is clear, however, is that international agreements affecting migration at global, regional and national levels are likely to be more favourable towards skilled than unskilled migrants. The future development of present developed countries is seen to be predicated upon the supply of workers, in particular, skilled categories and in the fields of information technology and health. The United States, for example, specifically introduced the H-1B visa category to allow the rapid entry of professionals to meet perceived critical shortages in key sectors. Of the 201,079 people entering under the H-1B programme to 2001, 110,713 were in computer-related occupations and 95,920 of these were from Asia (Kramer, 2003). While the benefits to destination countries might appear obvious, the impact of the skilled migration on countries of origin is not so obvious but has clear developmental implications.

### *3. Migration of the skilled*

The total number of skilled migrants in the global migration system is unknown but it is a minority of those who move. In terms of development, however, these migrants have an importance far greater than their numbers might imply. Just who the skilled are is also a matter for debate. They include those with advanced degrees, students in tertiary education, businessmen and professional managers (Auriol and Sexton, 2002), but also usually encompass those with very practical skills such as nurses. An intuitive interpretation might suggest that their migration is a loss for countries of origin and a gain for countries of destination. More objective assessment, however, indicates that the real situation is more complex. The loss of skills needs to be balanced against gains in the form of remittances (covered in a companion paper) and against the impact that the loss has on home labour markets. The skilled may not always be able to utilize fully their expertise in destination areas, which immediately links the migration of the skilled with issues of accreditation, home area training and education policy.

### *a. Impacts on countries of origin*

Governments in developing countries can view the migration of the highly skilled from two very different points of view: first, that the out-migration of the skilled is detrimental to the development of the country and every effort should be made to retain the skilled at home so that they may contribute to future development; second, that there is a global market for particular skills and it is to a country's advantage to channel manpower that cannot profitably be used at home into that market so that the country can tap into outside sources of revenue. The Philippines is perhaps the "classic" example of the second strategy, exporting over 800,000 workers every year since 1998 (Go, 2004), but other Asian countries such as China, Bangladesh, India and Viet Nam are following suit. A critical issue is to establish facilities in-country whereby workers can be trained to the standards required in overseas markets.

It is the first point of view, however, that has perhaps attracted more attention from development specialists: that the loss of the skilled is detrimental to the developmental prospects of the country concerned. Nevertheless, it is difficult to attribute specific development paths to anything as specific as the emigration of manpower. It is possible that the factors that encouraged the skilled to move away were also those inhibiting development in the first place, although this was certainly not universally the case. For example, large numbers of students left mainly for North America from about the time when a rapid economic growth began in the Eastern Asian economies and it would be difficult to imagine those economies having grown any faster if the students had remained at home. However, what applied in Eastern Asia need not be relevant to other situations. It has been estimated that Ghana lost some 60 per cent of the output of the main medical college over a 10-year period (Dovlo and Nyongator, 1999) and, between 1993 and 2002, some 3,157 health workers left Ghana that was equivalent to over 31 per cent of the health personnel trained in the country over that period (ISSER, 2003). Just what the impact of this exodus has been on Ghana's development prospects is, however, not yet clear.

If one assumes feedback between the exodus of the skilled and the behaviour of those entering the labour market, the migration can be viewed as essentially positive for development. Entrants to training programmes may deliberately opt for training in an occupation that will give them a higher probability of migrating. Not all, however, will be able to migrate owing to the limited number of positions overseas and the selection process of potential destinations, leaving the origin country with a larger pool of those specific skills than it had originally. Certainly, at the height of the emigration from Hong Kong in the lead-up to 1997, when up to 60,000 people were leaving every year, the majority of whom were highly educated or skilled, the pool of skilled personnel in Hong Kong continued to increase. Such an outcome may not apply in smaller and less dynamic economies and, particularly, in those where the educated and skilled may be in a position to move overseas illegally into occupations for which few skills are required.

### *b. Impacts on countries of destination*

Skilled migrants clearly have a developmental impact on countries of destination: they provide many of the skills required to keep industries and services competitive. However, a discussion still exists as to how real skill shortages actually are in developed countries and whether private companies are importing labour to keep salaries low (Cornelius and Espenshade, 2001). Public services do experience real skill shortages and it would be difficult to envisage the viability of the public health services in the United Kingdom, for example, without the presence of foreign doctors and nurses. Since the early 1990s, at least one third of new registrations of doctors have been from overseas sources and, by 2001-2002, overseas sources had replaced the United Kingdom as the principal provider of new nurses to the register (Buchan and Dovlo, 2003). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the movement of the highly skilled is not simply in one direction as a permanent migration. Much circulation exists, with British-trained personnel going overseas and many of the Australasian or South African personnel returning home after spending time and gaining experience in the United Kingdom. "Brain circulation" rather than "brain drain" is

perhaps a more appropriate term in many parts of the world, although return appears less likely to those countries characterized by low economic growth and political instability. There, skill losses may be very real and, for obvious reasons, difficult to prevent.

One element of the migration of the skilled to the developed world is "skill wastage" where those with particular expertise enter occupations with much lower skill requirements. In part, the difficulty of obtaining professional accreditation may be responsible, and host countries may need to introduce bridging courses to allow migrants both to improve their skills and as a means to have existing skills recognized. In part, too, better-educated migrants often opt for any channel that will secure a position overseas, with one of the clearest examples of "deskilling" being female domestic workers. For example, around 1990, some 30 per cent of Filipina and Thai domestic workers in Hong Kong, for example, had some form of tertiary education, 24 per cent even having a degree (AMWC, 1991).

The migration of the skilled is clearly not just from developing to developed countries but includes substantial exchanges of personnel among developed countries and significant movements from developed to developing countries, usually on short-term assignment. These movements not only encompass the transfers through company networks integral to the expansion of commercial and trading activity but also the assignment of diplomats and the personnel of international organizations and non-governmental organizations that are such a part of the whole process of development itself. The networks established through these migrations, and the flows of funds, goods and ideas within them, give substance to the whole notion of diaspora, a theme that will be considered in greater detail towards the end of this paper.

### C. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION

There is perhaps only one universal generalization that can be made about migration: the majority of those who move are young adults. Thus, the number of migrants in any society is a function of the number of young adults in that society. This is not to argue that migration is demographically determined but to make the obvious point that any assessment of migration needs to take into consideration the supply of those most likely to move in any society. This supply is essentially a function of differences in fertility and mortality that themselves have complex relationships with development. These are often simplified into the descriptive model of the demographic transition. As societies develop, they tend to move from a situation where fertility and mortality are relatively high to one in which they are relatively low. That generalization, however, obscures much variation and deviation. Fertility may rise at the onset of processes of development; the period through which fertility and mortality decline to specific levels varies significantly from society to society; the decline in the two variables is not a neat parallel progression but demonstrates a complex variety of paths. Although no highly developed society has high levels of either fertility or mortality, the converse is not necessarily the case: some societies at relatively low levels of economic development have attained low levels of both mortality and fertility. Just as it is more exact to speak of "demographic transitions" rather than a single demographic "transition", there is no easy relationship between changes in developmental variables and changes in the demographic variables. There is no "magic" level of per capita income at which mortality and fertility must necessarily fall. Other dimensions of development, and particularly the political systems that facilitate the delivery of services such as health and education, are also important in any account of declines in fertility and mortality.

#### *1. Changing age structures*

More direct relations between development and migration have been outlined in previous paragraphs but clearly development also indirectly influences migration through its impact on the basic supply variables of fertility and mortality: and that mainly through the changing age structure of global, national

and regional populations. The sustained decline in fertility in the developed world has brought about the ageing of the populations or the proportional increase of older at the expense of youthful cohorts. Youth dependency is being replaced by increasing aged dependency and, as the growth of the labour force slows, pressures to import labour increase. Various scenarios regarding the number of migrants required to replace cohorts "lost" to the fertility decline have been elaborated by the United Nations (2001). Given the universality of sustained fertility decline in the developed world and the relatively small proportion of total populations that migrate, there is no question of migration halting or reversing the process of ageing in any society: the vast numbers of migrants required would be unsustainable socially but more importantly, politically. What migrants can do is to fill critical shortages in the labour market such as those discussed in the health sector above, but also at the unskilled end of the skill spectrum. As societies develop and the levels of education and expectations rise, local workers tend to shun certain types of jobs that are generally, although not exactly, categorized as "3-D", those that are "dangerous, demanding and dirty" but are, in reality, poorly paid, routine and temporary. Office cleaning or the picking of vegetables or flowers fall into this category and, but for migrants, would not be done in developed economies. Even in quite tightly regulated labour markets such as the United Kingdom, many of the migrants filling these positions are likely to be in the labour force, and even the country, illegally.

## *2. Migration humps*

Thus, developmental conditions lead to changing fertility levels that bring about declining rates of population growth and shifts in age structure that stimulate demands for certain kinds of migrants to bolster the labour force. This transition may be associated with a shift in migration from net emigration towards net immigration: net emigration when youthful cohorts are large and net immigration when these cohorts contract. This "turning point" was referred to above in section 1a of the economic dimension, in the discussion of changing patterns of industrialization. When population growth is high, labour-intensive industrialization is the norm; after the transition to lower population growth and, eventually, to a slowing in labour force growth, a shift to more capital-intensive industrialization and the export overseas of labour-intensive enterprises are observed. Pressures for immigration of both skilled and unskilled workers build up to sustain the new high-tech industries being established. Thus, development, in its broadest sense, engenders demographic change that, in turn, induces further development. Thus, pronounced out-migration from any area should only persist for as long as there are large numbers of young adults available to emigrate. The transition to lower fertility should ultimately lead to a slowing in emigration not least because the prior migration has contributed to the reduction of the reproductive cohorts in an area, reinforcing the decline in population growth. Thus, emigration becomes a "hump" in the process of development.

Although the system as described sounds plausible, in reality there are few ready economic markers to indicate when the transition might occur. Low fertility and mortality are found in areas such as the southern Indian state of Kerala, where the level of economic development is far lower than might be expected, given the demographic indicators. Social, cultural and political factors are also important in accounting for the rapid fall in fertility. Migration from that state, primarily to the oil-rich countries of West Asia, has also been extremely important to the extent that it has reduced both natural increase and the level of unemployment. Also, the remittances of over US\$3 billion annually have helped to reduce the incidence of poverty in the state by over 3 percentage points (Kannan and Hari, 2002). The remittances have generated sufficient local activities in Kerala to draw migrants from neighbouring states. While hardly a "turning point" in migration as exhibited by the dynamic economies of Eastern Asia, examples of localized emigration stimulating development and giving rise to increasing in-migration from yet poorer areas can also be seen in Mirpur in Pakistan (Ballard, 2003) and Sylhet in Bangladesh (Gardner, 1995). Clearly, not all areas of out-migration can eventually give rise to in-migration and the most marginal areas will experience continued out-migration and ultimate depopulation. Even at the state level, continued out-migration can occur in the face of declining numbers in the cohorts most likely to migrate as witnessed in the cases of some republics of the former Soviet Union, for example. Whether such

emigration will persist once recent sharp changes to the political and economic systems have stabilized remains to be seen. The identification of which areas are likely to make whole or partial "migration transitions" consequent upon their potential for local development still remains largely unresearched. However, prior out-migration and the resultant return flows of money, ideas and the return of some of the migrants themselves seems to be a key to the process at both national and local levels.

#### D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

Geographical differences in the patterns of migration and development in the global system have just been discussed. Location, resource endowment and physical attributes of relief, climate and vegetation all play a role, all too often ignored, in how development proceeds. This is not to say that development is geographically determined but that the physical environment provides the attributes of the all-important space in which development occurs. Resources are not spread evenly throughout the world; neither are the kinds of favoured environments that have given rise to dense populations and the origins of civilizations. The relative importance of cultural and environmental factors in development lies far beyond the confines of this brief paper. Rather, there are specific developmental impacts on the environment that are likely to give rise to future population migrations.

##### *1. Global climate change*

Whether there is presently global climate change and whether human intervention is contributing to any such change remain controversial and contested topics. What appears certain is that human activity as a result of development is increasing the levels of greenhouse gases such as CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere, primarily through the increased burning of hydrocarbons. These greenhouse gases trap heat and lead to global warming. Increases in average temperatures of 1.4 to 5.8<sup>0</sup>C are forecast through the twenty-first century by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, the extent to which human interference is contributing to what may be long-term secular changes in temperature is less certain. The consequences of such long-term shifts are also contested, although evidence of melting glaciers, thinning ice caps and reduced snowfall seems to be well established in both Northern and Southern Hemispheres. Despite the uncertainties in the data, as far as the theme of this paper is concerned, the rise in sea level as a result of global climate change that itself is the consequence of increasing development appears to be the critical issue.

The projections of future rises in sea level are laden with uncertainty. Projections by IPCC place likely increases in the range of 0.11 to 0.77 metres by 2090 (IPCC, 2001). Projecting the likely areas and populations that will be affected by such a rise is even more problematic. Assuming a worst case scenario of a rise of 1 metre this century, and present populations, it has been estimated that some 6 million people in Egypt, 13 million in Bangladesh and 72 million in China will be directly displaced (Gomez and others, 1998). Tens of thousands of hectares of agricultural land will also be inundated, bringing pressure on food production systems and the trade in grain. Global warming will not simply result in rising sea levels but will bring changes to regional and local climates. Some areas are likely to become hotter and drier and others colder and wetter, each with likely implications for population movements. How many people will be affected and where they may move are simply unknown.

Ultimately, perhaps, precise numbers do not matter at this stage. What is important is that a greater awareness emerges of the importance of the environmental dimension in the debate on the interrelationships between migration and development. At present, the environment is often missing altogether from such debate or, at best, relegated to a passive backdrop for the economy. Assuming some rise in sea level, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people will be affected and more research and greater cooperation between those working on environmental issues and those working on demographic modelling are urgently required.

## *2. Other development-induced migrations*

From the long-term and largely unknown consequences of development and environmental change we move to consider much more direct impacts of development on the environment that lead to population displacement. These development-induced migrations largely encompass those people displaced by the expansion of urban areas and the construction of roads and dams. Over the last decade of the twentieth century, it was estimated that between 90 and 100 million people were involuntarily displaced by infrastructural projects (Cernea and McDowell, 2000). The majority of these involved significant change, both direct and indirect, to the environment. Perhaps the most significant of these projects involves the construction of dams and the creation of reservoirs. In China, it has been estimated that schemes for every 100 GWh of electricity generated from large and medium hydroelectric schemes requires the flooding of 50 hectares of farmland and the resettlement of 560 people (Smil, 1992). The massive Three Gorges project alone will displace more than a million people.

Downstream of the dams, the reduction in river flow may cause hardship and the reduction of agriculture in traditional farming areas as, for example, along the Mekong River in Laos and Thailand following the construction of several dams upstream in China. Urban expansion, too, sees the displacement of farmers and their replacement by city dwellers. Official estimates in China give the amount of agricultural land lost to "rural and urban modernization" as 520,000 hectares per annum, with the real amount being three times as much (Smil, 1993). Development-induced migration may bring progress for some but it generally brings impoverishment to those displaced (Cernea, 2000). Given that development planners and political leaders know exactly who will be displaced and when, it appears unconscionable that better provision is not made for those displaced.

### F. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The examination of those displaced by the process of development itself leads into a broader discussion of those who move as a result of politics. Although the refugee, or that person forced outside his or her state of citizenship through a "well-founded fear of persecution", is generally considered in a distinct category from the "voluntary migrant", there is often not such a clear and fast distinction between the two types as is generally assumed. Many so-called voluntary migrants would lose their jobs if they refused to follow a company directive to move to another branch, and many refugees may move to protect their livelihoods or economic interests. In practice, clear and hard distinctions are often impossible. More important from the point of view of this paper is that the displaced are created by, and have consequences for, development. In the case of refugees, as well as the internally displaced, it is the development of the political system that is of primary concern although the development and evolution of political systems themselves are inextricably related to economic development.

#### *1. Evolving political systems and migration*

Following the seminal work of Zolberg (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989), the creation of the refugee became associated with the emergence and diffusion of the idea of the nation state. The nation state is based upon the idea of a homogeneous community of interest that implies that those who do not fit the idea of who belong to that community are often expelled. The idea of the nation state evolved in the Europe of the late eighteenth century but has come to haunt the international community in the post-colonial period following the Second World War which saw the emergence of large numbers of "new" states from the previous colonies. These colonies may well have borne little relationship to pre-existing cultural and religious divisions and the new states were faced with the difficult task of creating national identities. Where a tradition of states was weak and the underlying ethnic matrix complex, as in several parts of sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia following independence, the resultant population displacements were significant.

The linkages between the emergence and consolidation of the nation state and population migrations are well known. Less well known are ideas about the long-term evolution of the state and linkages to economic development and to migration. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the development of the state remains (Finer, 1997). More recently, Bobbitt (2002) has attempted to link state development with technological development and particularly the technologies associated with warfare. The evolution of the state is seen to evolve from the princely-state through kingly-states, territorial-states, state-nations and nation-states to the market-state. Each new form of the state in this sequence is brought about by challenges to existing legitimacy as a result of the emergence of new forms of technology of control and is resolved in what Bobbitt terms "epochal wars".

In our present era, the nation state is not dead but is undergoing challenges to its legitimacy through attempting to reconcile liberal democratic ideas of equality and the multiculturalism occasioned by past and present migrations. The new forms of technology facilitating the challenges to legitimacy include the information technology that affects everything from flows of capital to the battlefield to the emergence of weapons of mass destruction. The decentralization of information and the new types of weapons undermine the institutions of the nation state. The emerging market state, according to Bobbitt, sees much more reliance on international capital markets and business networks to create stability in the global economy and depends increasingly on the privatization of security and welfare to bring greater benefits to all members of society irrespective of ethnicity, class and, ultimately, citizenship. The intricacy of the argument need not detain us here, but the critical issue is that forms of mobility can be expected to shift with the evolution of state structures that are themselves a product of changing market conditions.

Not only can the pattern of population movement from any area be affected by the structure of the state but the impact that the migrations have will vary depending upon political structures. Where state structures are poorly developed, the impact of out-migration in the form of a brain drain is likely to be much greater than where there has been a long tradition of state formation, for example. Where production and welfare are separated in space, the movements of population will adjust accordingly. In a market state, for example, people may be trained in one area, go on to work in another, receive medical care in a third and retire in yet another, all linked through some form of global security. The role of the state, and international agreements among states, will remain critical in setting standards and monitoring the implementation of these standards but the provision of services and security will increasingly become the responsibility of the market. Migration is related to the way in which the pattern of political systems develops and, just as attention is directed towards migration and the economy, some consideration needs to be given to the relationships between the structure of the state and population movements.

## *2. Political decisions and migration*

The above discussion of the macro-political environment shaping population movements should not imply that migration parallels political change in any simple unilinear way. Political actors are some of the key agents that can influence the volume and direction of population movements. Systems of governance, or the institutional framework for delivering stability and services to the populations of a defined state, change in response to the policies of these actors. Political actors are likely to be essential in attempts to control the levels of emissions that will determine rates of global warming that, in turn, will influence change in sea level and its impact on coastal populations. Most specifically, however, as systems of governance have evolved, the types of migration policies implemented by governments have changed. The triumph of liberal democratic systems of government over fascism in 1945 led to the ascendancy of non-discriminatory ideas of government that eventually saw the sweeping away of race-based immigration policies in the main settler societies in North America and Australasia, for example. Although there is some evidence for a convergence of migration policies among the countries of the developed world (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield, 1994), not all follow the same path in confronting the globalizing economy and changing national demographics.

The policies of Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom can be used to illustrate quite different aspects of the responses. Canada, like Australia, New Zealand and the United States, is a creation of migration and has persisted with policies that will favour a regular intake of the kinds of migrants best suited to the needs of the state. The emphasis is on the "best and the brightest" or those who can contribute most to both nation building and future economic development. The emphasis in immigrant selection is on transferable skills. In 2002, over half of the annual intake, or 53.2 per cent, was made up of skilled workers and business immigrants and their families (Canada, 2003). The United Kingdom has a long tradition of immigration but, in the perceived threat of mass migration from its former colonies in the post-Second World War period, has attempted to close the door on much of the new immigration. Under increasing pressure to fill gaps in the labour force at various skill levels, the United Kingdom Government introduced the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme in 2001. That government is also reviewing and has more than doubled the number of migrants admitted under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme since 2001, and it introduced a new low-skill work permit scheme in 2003 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003b). The preoccupation of the United Kingdom is still towards asylum seekers and illegal migration and politically, is, unlike Canada, a more reluctant participant in immigration. Unlike North American and European countries, the post-Second World War expansion of Japan was achieved without immigration (Peach, 2003) and it remains a country attempting to preserve the illusion of homogeneity (Weiner, 1997). Pressures for immigration have been tempered by the downturn in the economy in the 1990s with irregular movements declining even if the numbers of trainees and students, as well as ethnic Japanese from Brazil, continued to grow. Just how all these various policies of developed countries will adjust to the continuing ageing of their populations and to their transition to market states within a globalizing economy remains perhaps the least appreciated and studied aspect in the complex nexus of migration and development.

## G. THE GENDER DIMENSION

Gender is clearly a cross-cutting issue that is central to all of the earlier discussions, and development impacts on men and women in different ways. As development proceeds, women have often emerged as taking on additional tasks in the labour force while maintaining their traditional roles as "feeder and breeder". The demand for cheap labour as labour-intensive industries have been exported out of core developed economies has particularly been met by women in certain sectors of the industry. The status of women is an important factor in any explanation of reasons for fertility decline but also, where labour force growth has declined, women are absorbed into the labour forces to help to reduce skill shortages. The movement of women into the labour force in some newly developed countries has in turn stimulated a demand for household workers to fill the domestic vacuum that is met mainly through the migration of women from poorer economies. Gender is also apparent in the political dimension where policies can be biased against the movement of women virtually forcing them into irregular migration. Whether women are empowered or adversely affected through their migration remains a matter of debate but the incorporation of women into lowly paid work, and particularly domestic service, and into trafficking networks has drawn attention to a darker side of development and migration.

### *1. Migration, development and the migrant as victim*

The migration flows to the cities of South-eastern Asia or to the special economic zones of China tend to be dominated by young women, the majority of whom are entering light industries such as textiles or toy making. The conditions are often hard: long hours, poor pay, unhealthy work environments and insecurity (United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1993). Conditions in multinational corporations may be marginally better than in national companies, as discussed earlier in this paper, but exploitation is a recurrent theme. Conditions in the other activity with which migrant women are so often associated, domestic work, also suggest that abuse and insecurity are common (Constable, 1997; Gamburd, 2000). Development leading to the exploitation of female migrants is thus a recurrent theme and although male migrants, too, are exploited, the case of women is compounded by

their general subjugation to men in many cultures in the developing world. Women are particularly vulnerable and their portrayal as victims of development in many contexts, "disposable people" (Bales, 1999), seems to capture the context into which they have been placed through their migration.

The industry in which the greatest exploitation of women is seen to occur is the global sex industry. Women are trafficked to cities and across borders to developed countries to be held as virtual slaves in brothels until they contract HIV/AIDS when, if lucky, they are sent home to die (Skrobanek, Boonpakdi and Janthakeero, 1997; Brown, 2000). Numbers are difficult to obtain and are often exaggerated in order to pursue particular agendas, although see the balanced critique in Lim (1998). Undoubtedly, the numbers involved are large and the exploitation of migrant women pervasive. The very insecurity, poor conditions and low remuneration in the other industries may virtually force women to opt for the sex trade. Income from prostitution in Bangkok, for example, was about 25 times the median earnings that women might expect in other occupations (Phongpaichit, 1982). The forced trafficking of women, as well as children, is certainly one of the most negative aspects of the whole relationship between migration and development and there is universal government agreement that steps must be taken to reduce, if not eliminate, it. Clearly, however, the ability of governments to achieve such an objective depends upon the efficacy of the institutions of the state and is thus closely related to the political dimension discussed above.

## *2. Migration, development and the empowered migrant*

The gender dimension of development should not universally be associated with exploitation and the creation of the migrant as victim. Difficult though the position of women may be in occupations in destination areas, these need to be compared with those in areas of origin. Women, through their migration, escape paternalistic domestic structures and improve their status. Increasingly, women are migrating independently of fathers, brothers and husbands and, as an examination of the movement of Mexicans to the United States demonstrated, are likely to benefit more than men from their migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). Even in an occupation as potentially abusive as the sex industry, women can also be empowered through an escape from domestic violence and by the financial independence that the greater earning power can bring (Kempadoo and Doezema, 1998).

Migrants, both men and women, can improve their status through their migration. The negative aspects of migration are too often given prominence over the positive. Rather than reflecting poverty and impoverishing the migrant, migration provides a means to access resources outside the local. Migration can play an important role in poverty alleviation (Skeldon, 2002). There can be no denying the very real exploitation that exists but, equally, it must be accepted that migration is one of the key ways through which people, men and women, can improve themselves. It is incumbent upon governments to implement policies that seek to minimize the risks while maximizing the benefits that migration can bring. Policies that seek to control and restrict population movement are not likely to lead to improved development. Migration is likely to lead to some kind of empowerment of the majority of those who move.

## H. TOWARDS A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL VIEW

The examination of the relationships between migration and development through the various dimensions identified might have given an artificial sense of separation: the economic from the political or the environmental from the demographic. One way to attempt to bring them together is through the idea of the spatial structure of the migration fields of any country or area that introduces the idea of the diaspora into the nexus of migration and development.

### *1. Diaspora as a global phenomenon*

The diaspora is made up of migrants from a particular area living scattered outside their place of birth but remaining in contact with it through transnational linkages. As Cohen (1997) has demonstrated, there are several different types of diasporas, trading, labour, cultural as well as victim diasporas, to the extent that the word "diaspora" has virtually come to mean "international migration" in the current discourse on migration. The value of the concept is that it has drawn attention to the continued contact between origins and destinations and particularly to the circulation of migrants backwards and forwards that is the basis for transnational communities. In a post-Cold War world, and increasing population migration within a globalizing economy (Castles and Miller, 2003), diasporas provide a foundation for social identity among "deterritorialized" peoples.

The danger with the idea of diasporas is that it is essentialized into a coherent, homogeneous entity rather than the constantly changing and fractured phenomenon that it appears to be (Skeldon, 2001). The migrants may have been dissidents in their homeland or come from different areas or classes: diasporas can be highly heterogeneous. Some of the migrants and more of their children are likely to come to identify primarily with destination societies even without losing their roots. Assimilation does occur and policies of integration are important factors in deciding whether and how fast any such trend will take place. Nevertheless, any trend towards the market state, as described above, is likely to see the strengthening of "deterritorialization" and the emergence of increasing numbers of "global citizens".

Much of the work on diasporas has focused upon those created through the migration from developing to developed countries. Yet, much less recognized, is the significance of migration from the developed countries themselves: the United States and Australia are significant countries of emigration, not just immigration. There are American and Australian diasporas with perhaps at least 7.5 million Americans (American Citizens Abroad, 2004) and some 1 million Australians overseas (Hugo, Rudd and Harris, 2003). Some of these migrants are the highly skilled moving to developing countries to fill specific needs in development projects. Others are returned migrants going back to their countries of origin with newly acquired citizenship and with savings to invest. Still others are retirees who are moving to areas that offer a benign climate and low cost of living for those on reduced and fixed incomes. The majority, however, are young professionals moving to other developed countries in a system of "brain circulation", gaining training and experience that will benefit not only themselves but also their countries of temporary and longer-term residence.

### *2. Diaspora as an instrument of development*

The diaspora is often seen as a resource that countries of origin can tap into for their development needs. In the diaspora, reside some of the best educated, entrepreneurial and wealthy of a country's citizens. If they can be encouraged to return, or at least invest in their home country, considerable developmental impact might be expected. Overseas migrants have also been seen as a potential source of tax revenue for the home country, originally seen as a way to reimburse the costs of training in the home country but also to compensate for the loss of future revenue that the emigration brings (Bhagwati, 1976). However, there is a clear moral issue to what extent a state "owns" the proceeds of any individual's productive life (Simon, 1989, pp. 272-273). Issues surrounding the collection of such a tax in the jurisdiction of another state and whether there would be double taxation have generally made such proposals impractical.

Certain migrant groups have indeed played critical roles in the development of their home areas, of which the non-resident Indians, the overseas Chinese and the Viet Kieu are notable examples. Just taking the latter, it is estimated that some US\$1 billion was sent back to Viet Nam in 1999 through official

channels, which represented almost 4 per cent of the country's total economic output in that year (Woods, 2002, p. 181). The impact of remittances in general is elaborated in the companion paper. Suffice it to say here that investment from entrepreneurs such as the non-resident Indians or the Overseas Chinese is often not classified with remittances but with FDI, further complicating the whole picture of capital flows from migrant groups. It is not just capital flows, however, that are important within the diaspora but also ideas. Educated citizens often return from overseas to take up positions of authority in industry but perhaps most significantly in bureaucracy and in politics. The parliaments of the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) of Eastern Asia are dominated by returned migrants whose exposure to new ideas and ways of doing things is fundamental to the transformation of domestic political systems (see, for example, Lin, 1994).

The significance of the diaspora as a facilitator of development must not be exaggerated. Although most of the capital flows to China come from Hong Kong and Taiwan Province of China, little actually flows through traditional informal Chinese business and migrant networks. Most can be understood through rational capitalist investment strategies in which migrant networks may or may not be important (Li, 2000). Also, given the heterogeneous nature of the diaspora, the return of skilled migrants may not be universally welcomed. They may be viewed as having fled from a difficult regime or hard economic conditions to live an easy life as a well-paid professional in a developed country. They are not necessarily going to be welcomed back with open arms to positions of responsibility by those who survived through difficult times. The political affiliations of migrants relative to home governments will be important to such perceptions. There are also very practical details about how skilled returnees should be remunerated, at local or expatriate rates, and how and where they can hold their savings.

## I. CONCLUSION

The mandate of this paper was to look beyond remittances at the relationship between migration and development. The flows of capital that are sent back home by migrants are, arguably, the most important aspect of migration and development. These flows act to transform regions of origin and help to alleviate poverty even if they can also lead to rising inequalities and increasing dependence. However, there is much more to the migration and development equation than just remittances and this paper has tried to draw attention to many of these issues. Some are well researched and incorporated into policy such as issues surrounding trade and migration or the brain drain. Others remain largely unknown such as long-term climate change and its likely impact on migration. Yet others are more speculative such as the changing structure of the state and population movements. Underlying all these dimensions is one that is so often unappreciated: the demographic dimension or the changing patterns of fertility and mortality that produce changes in age structure that are likely to affect both the numbers who move and the demand for labour. The critical relationships between economic, social and political factors and fertility and mortality also need to be incorporated into the discussion of the migration and development nexus. Changing gender relations, too, are part of this complex relationship.

The complexity of the relationship is the one overriding theme. In terms of policy, there will be no single, one-size-fits-all solution. The impact of the so-called brain drain appears to be different in Eastern Asia compared with sub-Saharan Africa, for example. At best, regional policy applications may be attainable but often country or even local-level policy solutions will be required. Ultimately, however, migration and development are not separate or independent phenomena. Migration is, in effect, the spatial expression of a population undergoing change or development. Nevertheless, the very fact that people move and become exposed to new environments and new ideas will engender development. The one cannot be separated from the other. What policymakers can hope to do is to identify what the likely implications of certain dimensions of development for migration are likely to be, and vice versa, and to plan accordingly. Migration still remains the most intractable of the demographic variables but at least, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has entered fully into the policy arena.

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Table 1. Manufacturing Trade and the Relative Importance of Immigration, 2000

	<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>		<i>Migrant stock as a percentage of national population</i>
	<i>Percentage of world total</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Percentage of world total</i>	<i>Rank</i>	
United States	12.3	1	18.9	1	12.4
Germany	8.7	2	7.5	2	9.0
Japan	7.7	3	5.7	3	1.3
France	4.7	4	4.6	5	10.6
United Kingdom	4.5	5	5.1	4	6.8
Canada	4.3	6	3.7	6	18.9
China	3.9	7	3.4	8	0.0
Italy	3.7	8	3.5	7	2.8
Netherlands	3.3	9	3.0	10	9.9
China, Hong Kong SAR	3.2	10	3.4	9	39.4
Belgium	2.9	11	2.7	12	8.6
Republic of Korea	2.7	12	2.4	13	1.3
Mexico	2.6	13	2.7	11	0.5
Taiwan Province of China	2.3	14	2.1	15	--
Singapore	2.2	15	--	--	33.6

Sources: P. Dicken, *Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, London, Sage Publications, 2003, Fourth Edition, p. 40; United Nations, *International Migration 2002*, New York, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social.

Table 2. Relative Importance of Trade In Services, 2000

	<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>	
	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Rank</i>
United States	12.3	1	13.8	1
United Kingdom	7.0	2	5.7	4
France	5.7	3	4.3	5
Germany	5.6	4	9.2	2
Japan	4.8	5	8.1	3
Italy	4.0	6	3.9	6
Spain	3.7	7	2.1	12
Netherlands	3.6	8	3.6	7
China, Hong Kong SAR	2.9	9	1.8	15
Belgium and Luxembourg	2.9	10	2.7	9
Canada	2.6	11	2.9	8
China	2.1	12	2.5	10
Austria	2.1	13	2.0	13
Republic of Korea	2.0	14	2.3	11
Singapore	1.9	15	--	--

Source: P. Dicken, *Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, London, Sage Publications, 2003, Fourth Edition, p. 44.