International Transmission of Population Policy Experience



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Department of International Economic and Social Affairs ST/ESA/SER.R/108

International Transmission of Population Policy Experience

Proceedings of the Expert Group Meeting on the International Transmission of Population Policy Experience New York City, 27-30 June 1988

United Nations New York, 1990

NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The designations "developed" and "developing" economies are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process.

The term "country" as used in the text of this publication also refers, as appropriate, to territories or areas.

The views expressed in signed papers are those of individual authors and do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the United Nations Secretariat.

Papers have been edited and consolidated in accordance with United Nations practice and requirements.

ST/ESA/SER.R/108

PREFACE

As a step towards the implementation of a recommendation of the United Nations Population Commission at its twenty-fourth session in February 1987, the Expert Group Meeting on the International Transmission of Population Policy Experience was convened in New York City from 27 to 30 June 1988. The Expert Group was organized jointly by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP). The present publication contains the report and recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting, as well as the papers that were presented and discussed.

It is acknowledged with appreciation that the IUSSP Committee on Population Policy, which co-sponsored the Meeting, contributed significantly to both the substantive and the organizational aspects of the Meeting. Thanks are also due to the experts, who prepared invited papers and expended additional effort to revise the papers for this volume, and to all the participants who contributed to the discussions.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

List of figures

Explanatory notes

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures.

Reference to "dollars" ($) indicates United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.

The term "billion" signifies a thousand million.

A point (.) is used to indicate decimals in English; a comma (,) is used in French.

The following symbols have been used in the tables.

Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.

An em dash (--) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.

A hyphen (-) indicates that the item is not applicable.

A minus sign (-) before a number indicates a deficit or decrease, except as indicated.

Use of a hyphen (-) between dates representing years, e.g., 1984-1985, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years. A slash (e.g., 1984/85) indicates a financial year, school year or crop year.

Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals, because of rounding.

The following abbreviations have been used in this volume:

ADB	African Development Bank
ARPD	Association for Demographic Renaissance (France)
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AWARDS	International Research Awards Program on the Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEDEPLAR	Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional
CEGAN	Committee of High-level Government Experts
CELADE	Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia
CERPOD	Center for Population and Development Studies (Sahel Institute)
CFA	Council of Family Affairs (Poland)
CICRED	Committee for International Co-operation in National Research in Demography
CLASCO	Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Social
CONADE	Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (Ecuador)
CPC	Governmental Population Commission (Poland)
CPRS	Central Policy Review Staff (United Kingdom)
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies (United Kingdom)
CPS	Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
DDD	Demographic Data for Development
DDI	Demographic Data Initiatives
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys
DLPP	Development Law and Policy Program
EAPS	European Association for Population Studies
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECWA	Economic Commission for Western Asia
EEC	European Economic Community
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council (United Kingdom)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority
GDA	Groupe de démographie africaine

GDP	gross domestic product
GDS	German Demographic Society (Federal Republic of Germany)
GNP	gross national product
GPC	Governmental Population Commission (Poland)
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
IDS	Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex)
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs (United Kingdom)
IEC	information, education and communication
IFFLP	International Federation for Family Life Promotion
IFORD	Institut de formation et de recherches démographiques
IFS	Institute for Fiscal Studies (United Kingdom)
IGCC	Intergovernmental Co-ordinating Committee (South-east Asia)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPACT	Innovative Materials for Population Action
IMPS	Integrated Microcomputer Processing System
INED	Institut national d'études démographiques (France)
INPARES	Instituto Peruano de Paternida Responsable
INPLAN	Integrated Population and Development Planning
IPDP	Integrated Population and Development Planning
IPPF	International Planned Parenthood Federation
ISI	International Statistical Institute
ISSA	Integrated System for Survey Analysis
IUD	intrauterine device
IUSIPP	International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems
IUSSP	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population
JOICFP	Japanese Organization for International Co-operation in Family Planning
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (surveys)
NAPRO	National Applications Project
NAS	National Academy of Sciences (United States)
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPTIONS	Options for Population Policy
ORSTOM	Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer
PAA	Population Association of America
PISPAL	Programa de Investigaciones Sociales sobre Problemas de Población Relevantes para Políticas de Población in América Latina
POPIN	Population Information Network (United Nations)
POPOLCOM	Committee on Population Policies in Developing Countries (IUSSP)
PREALC	Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe
RAPID	Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development
RIPS	Regional Institute for Population Studies
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
TIPPS	Technical Information on Population for the Private Sector
UFMG	Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFS	World Fertility Survey
WHO	World Health Organization

Part One

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING

INTRODUCTION

Acting upon a recommendation of the Population Commission at its twenty-fourth session in February 1987, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in collaboration with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), convened an Expert Group Meeting on the International Transmission of Population Policy Experience at United Nations Headquarters from 27 to 30 June 1988. The principal aim of the Meeting was to survey and assess critically the existing state of activities, primarily but not exclusively conducted by international agencies, that monitor population policies in individual countries and that seek to provide information on such policies in a comparative framework. Primary areas of concern included the collection of population policy data, the classification or taxonomy to be used to deal with this information, the comparative analyses of these data and the transmission of the results and conclusions of these analyses. Building on such an assessment, the Meeting was also requested to develop specific recommendations directed to increasing the efficiency and timeliness with which international population policy data are collected, analysed and transmitted to interested Governments, researchers and the general public.

Thirteen experts, representing different geographical regions, scientific disciplines and institutions were invited in their individual capacities and participated in the Meeting. Also represented were the secretariats of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank and international and non-governmental organizations. A list of participants appears in annex II.

The meeting was chaired by Philippe de Seynes; Carmen Miró and P. Sankar Menon were elected Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, respectively.

As a basis for discussion, the 13 experts had prepared papers on the main items of the agenda, which is given in annex I. The background papers are listed in annex III.

The present volume is divided into two parts. Part one contains the report and recommendations of the Meeting. Part two comprises the papers prepared by the United Nations Secretariat and by the experts.

I. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING

A. Opening of the Meeting

Opening statements were made by Göran Ohlin, Assistant Secretary-General for Development Research and Policy Analysis of the United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs; Jean-Claude Chasteland, Director of the Population Division; and Paul Demeny, Chairman of the Committee on Population Policy of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population.

The opening statements emphasized the purposes and objectives of the Meeting. A central purpose was to take a close and critical look at how well existing population policy experience had been analysed and how widely the analyses had been disseminated internationally. The Meeting intended to examine what types of institutions had been involved in the gathering, analysis and transmission of population policy experience, what resources had benefited from experience in other policy fields, what had been the distinctive features of the experience of different geographical regions in gathering, analysing and transmitting population policy experience; and, lastly, what developments were likely in that field in the coming decade and beyond.

Other issues to be addressed by the Meeting were the adequacy of the institutional base that had supported the gathering, assessment and dissemination of population policy data (e.g., to what extent policy analysis had become an appendage of the programmed embodiment of the received policy line). A second issue was the why of policy analysis, what had prompted Governments to attempt to modify the size, composition or spatial distribution of a country's population, when each of those attributes represented the aggregate outcome of intensely personal acts (such as couples' decisions to have children or individuals' decisions to move from one place to another). What were the policies countries had pursued in such situations, how effective had they been and what alternatives existed that were consistent with human dignity and freedom? Lastly, in regard to policy priorities, the question was how high population policy was to be placed in the hierarchy of needs. Was population policy merely a relatively late manifestation of the ever-expanding scope of government actions, or did it have a claim for a higher rank on the agenda of chronically overcommitted governments; and within population policy, what should be the order of priorities?

In concluding, the opening session took note that because government policies in the population field were often beset by biases and problems that had been poorly anticipated at the time the policies were adopted, some countries had been locked into programmed commitments that were sustainable only at disproportionately high costs. Consequently, past experience regarding such matters should be carefully analysed. Transmission of the lessons derived would then make it possible to avoid costly mistakes.

B. The Study of Population Policy

The first paper, entitled "The collection, analysis and transmission of population policy data at the United Nations Secretariat" (IESA/P/AC.24/3), presented a description and review of the processes employed by the Population Division of the Department of International and Economic Affairs in collecting, analysing and transmitting population policy data. Key issues, concerns and questions believed to be particularly relevant for population policy research at the United Nations and elsewhere were examined. Among those concerns were the fact that the unit of analysis was that of Governments, and not individuals or households; the issues of the validity, reliability and consistency of population policy data; the appropriateness of various classifications, measures, concepts and definitions employed in global comparisons of Governments' views and policies relating to population; the lack of integration or linkages among various population policies, the relevance of reported population policies to socio-economic development efforts and the availability of financial and human resources for population policy research.

A number of general observations were made. For example, although it had begun from a position of caution and avoidance, population policy had come to be considered a legitimate area of activity within the United Nations Secretariat. Despite the considerable difficulties encountered, the global country-by-country review of national perceptions and policies relating to population had emerged as a relatively new sub-area of demographic inquiry. It was stressed

that a simple examination of past performance and reviewing of problems were not sufficient. What was needed were realistic suggestions for developing strategies and ways of tackling the critical issues in population policy research.

In the discussion of the paper, several experts commented on the difficulties involved in having the United Nations analyse sensitive material. One expert took note that there was a need for policy information to be weighted by country size. Another stated that there should be better qualitative differentiation in the categories employed in policy analysis, e.g., between Governments that merely had high rates of population growth and those which had excessive rates of growth. In regard to the analysis of Governments' perceptions, the experts suggested that more attention should be paid to the consequences of population trends and to what Governments thought those consequences were. Other experts emphasized that it was time for the Population Division to analyse more extensively the indirect measures that influenced population trends. It was also stressed that there should be more research on the implementation of population policies.

The author of the paper on the evolution of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (IESA/P/AC.24/4) noted that population policies had been widely adopted in the developing countries—in part because of the growing body of information and research on population and family planning. Information acquired from over 100 fertility and contraceptive use surveys and from other research had helped to bolster the confidence of leaders of developing countries; it had assured them that they were embarking on policy and programme activities that not only reflected the national will but also would benefit families and would be effective policy interventions.

The thrust of the initial USAID programme in population policy had been to create more reliable information and to improve analyses of demographic and related issues. A central assumption of early USAID policy assistance had been that if reliable and up-to-date information were made available to policy makers, they would be stimulated to develop national policies. USAID saw itself as an "information broker", sponsoring data collection and research and providing forums for the dissemination of its findings. In the second phase of the USAID population policy programme, increasing emphasis had been placed upon the improvement of understanding of population and development relations, the raising of awareness of the consequences of rapid population growth and the strengthening of the capacity of Governments to consider population problems and policy responses. During the third phase of policy assistance, which had begun in 1984, the challenge for policy assistance had become even more complex because of a levelling-off of donor resources at a time when demand for population assistance had increased in all world regions, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. To meet the growing demand, USAID policy assistance had been geared increasingly to the support of highly leveraged activities that were able not only to stimulate new sources of support (e.g., in the for-profit private sector) but also to provide evidence to Governments of the value of their investments in family planning. The approach to awareness-raising that had first been developed in the early USAID projects had increasingly stressed institution-building and technology transfer.

The discussion of the item underlined the importance of determining priorities in the allocation of resources to various components of population policy. Questions were raised regarding the undue emphasis on fertility in the development of population policies. The importance of obtaining information on the impact of policy actions and on institutional factors was also stressed.

C. Policy research outside population

The Chairman took note that research and practical action had, to a large extent, been segregated. Experience in the United Nations system suggested that it was wise to avoid the long term and perhaps to restrict the time horizon to from five to seven years in order to give market forces a chance to reverse certain trends. He also suggested that it was important to utilize powerful new tools of analysis, such as computer verification.

The author of the paper on the relation between policy research and government policy (IESA/P/AC.24/6) stated that research seldom came first when important or contentious policy issues were considered. There, its role was mainly to support or moderate policies already preferred for broader reasons. The author emphasized that in his experience in government the ambiguous nature of much research had weakened its impact and had enabled policy makers to pick and choose to suit their own preferences. In some areas, conclusions could only be reached by Governments experimenting with policies. The pace of decision-making often meant that existing knowledge, including international

evidence, was more important than specially commissioned or academic research. Indirect transmission of research (e.g., through journalism, broadcasting and personal contacts) was sometimes as important, or more important, than the conventional route. He emphasized that researchers should be mindful of the political context in which their work would be evaluated as well as other constraints on policy makers. Moreover, the human factor was important in the successful transmission of research into policy. The author concluded by suggesting that the insights of public choice theory implied that many formulations of the research/policy connection began at the wrong end, i.e., with the researchers, when they perhaps should begin at the other end, i.e., with the politicians.

In the discussion, note was taken of the importance of educating journalists in the area of population policy, in order to minimize alarmism and exaggeration. The subtle effects of cumulative knowledge on changing attitudes towards population issues and the time factor involved were also discussed.

D. The context of population policy formulation

The author of the paper entitled "The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and population policy research, 1954-1987" (IESA/P/AC.24/7) noted that the extent of the influence of research in the social sciences, and in demography in particular, on population policy was difficult to assess. As the scientific core of demography had matured, population policy had gained a sounder footing. At the same time, however, there had been trends that had weakened the policy influence of scholarship. For example, the institutionalization of population policy in specific programmes had generated interests that had to a degree proved unresponsive, even resistant, to research. Indeed, the author stated that it might not be too strong to speak of a cleavage between research and policy.

As the main organization embodying international scholarly attention to population problems, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population presented a natural point of departure for a discussion of those issues. Both where it had proved effective and influential on policy matters and where it had been less so, there are lessons to be learned—particularly in regard to how future contributions from research by social scientists might find their way into applications for the improvement of population policy.

The author touched on the contrast between the breadth of knowledge that should ideally inform population policy and the fairly narrow terrain that demographers had cultivated, noting that both the strengths and the weaknesses of the contributions of demography to policy lay in that area. He also stated that IUSSP, whose members were social scientists active in population research, the majority of whom would probably call themselves demographers, mirrored those strengths and weaknesses. Research on the empirical foundations of population growth, which IUSSP had done much to foster, had established the rationales and some of the major assumptions on which population policy still rested. IUSSP had also been successful in promoting communication among third world population researchers and in drawing on the international network of scholars in its own activities.

In regard to areas where IUSSP could make potentially significant policy contributions, the author mentioned the critical scrutiny of mainline population policy thinking and the programme manifestations of that thinking, primarily in family planning and health; the extraction of lessons of experience in population policy and the study of policy design.

The paper on the theories and practices of economic development and their influence on the steady decline of fecundity (IESA/P/AC.24/8) illustrated the role played by certain market forces in shaping demographic processes in the absence of explicit policies. The author reported that the study of comparative economic growth performance suggested that the degree of openness of a country's economy—as measured by its current exports/gross domestic product (GDP) ratio—was a crucial variable. Also derived from experience was the fact that countries with the poorest growth performance had shown the least progress in fertility control. The decline of birth rates in the industrialized countries as an accompaniment to their increasing affluence had been a familiar picture. That process was currently occurring throughout most of the developing countries. Japan and the Republic of Korea, for example, which had followed a similar development strategy, currently experienced fertility levels below replacement. The factors that were operative there were the same as those in the European past—namely, rising incomes and consumption aspirations, increases in education, improvement in the status of women, urbanization, changes in the

cost/benefit balance from additional children and so forth. Fertility decline must be viewed, therefore, as an integral part of the technological transfer process.

The author of the paper entitled "Channels, filters and gaps: population information beyond élites" (IESA/P/AC.24/9), addressed a number of issues, including the extent to which population information flowed beyond the limited audience of scientists, public officials and non-governmental decision makers to reach the broader public, the channels of such transmission beyond the narrow élite sector, the accuracy of the information communicated; and the extent to which such information had led to a convergence, or divergence, of public opinion.

The author noted that although the mass media were the most obvious source of population information directed towards the general public, media information was sometimes coloured by non-scientific perspectives, including political ideology. There was also a tendency among journalists to reduce complex information to the lowest common denominator or to exaggerate population trends and their implications in a variety of directions. Moreover, various ideological perspectives (for example, left versus right, collective needs versus individual rights, "pro-life" versus "pro-choice"), religious concepts and cultural differences had a tendency to filter information before it reached the general public.

There were major knowledge gaps regarding the effectiveness of information transmitted through those various channels. The author suggested that periodic surveys could be conducted to determine the level of public awareness of population trends and policies, that current population information efforts by international agencies should be expanded; that, given the significant role played by journalism in the dissemination of population information, workshops should be organized for interested journalists; that IUSSP should make efforts to reach beyond its specialist membership to communicate objective scientific knowledge on demographic trends and policies; that efforts should be continued by international organizations to communicate population knowledge to international élites, in particular, to parliamentarians and religious leaders; and that the accessibility of the many valuable United Nations publications on population should be improved.

In the discussion of the paper, one participant stated that instruments should be developed that would assist in drawing public attention to population issues. In addition to population education in school curricula, there was a need to reach persons outside the educational structure. Also, there was a need for periodic surveys of opinions and attitudes regarding population trends and issues. Attention was also drawn to the experience of the Netherlands with public opinion surveys on population issues, which had been instituted by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute in the early 1980s.

E. Population policy experience

The paper on policy experience in Asia (IESA/P/AC.24/10) reported that the fact that several countries in South Asia had accepted family planning as part of their national policies in the second half of the 1960s and in the early 1970s could not be dismissed as a mere accident, particularly because the adoption of family planning went against tradition in most of these countries. The author concluded that external support (e.g., from other heads of State, the United Nations and bodies of experts from outside the region) had been essential in gaining national support for family planning and for mitigating local opposition. Acceptance of family planning by Governments in developing countries had also been facilitated by the emergence of a group of developing countries with national programmes and by the spread of information through news media, international exchange visits and conferences involving high-level government officials. It was concluded that concepts and procedures developed in authoritative circles and favourable contraceptive experience in the more developed countries appeared to have had a greater influence on policies and programmes in South Asia than experience within the region itself.

As concerns programme management, such publications as *Studies in Family Planning*, published by the Population Council, has been a major vehicle for dissemination of information on experience gained in the operation of family planning programmes. In the early 1960s, ESCAP had also taken a lead by making family planning a major area in its population programme. A number of other non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies, such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Population Reference Bureau and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Population Programme, had also made significant contributions.

A participant noted that African populations had become a subject of interest at the beginning of the colonial period for administrative, economic and military reasons. The paper on the region (IESA/P/AC.24/11) mentioned that knowledge, attitudes and practices relating to population issues had been largely shaped by the colonial Powers, and were therefore quite different in anglophone and non-anglophone countries. For example, policies tended to be based mainly on a demographic rationale in the anglophone countries and on a health rationale in the francophone countries. Another important influence had been the experience of South Asian countries, particularly of India, in the field of family planning. Since the 1970s, the major avenues for the international transmission of population policy experience in Africa had been: the African Census Programme, which had been launched in 1972 and had provided basic demographic and socio-economic statistics for a better understanding of population issues in the region; the development of both national and regional training and research programmes directed to development of local capabilities in the field; the organization of conferences and other meetings, such as the African Population Conference (Accra, 1971), the World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974), the Arusha Conference (1974), the International Conference on Population (Mexico City, 1984) and the All-Africa Parliamentary Conference (Harare, 1986); and the development of institutional arrangements, population planning units and national population commissions.

It was noted that the technical and financial assistance of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), various United Nations agencies and USAID had been critical in generating greater awareness of population issues on the part of African leaders, in strengthening local institutional capabilities and in increasing support for population and family planning activities. What had been truly remarkable in sub-Saharan Africa was how rapidly official attitudes towards population growth and family planning had changed—in a period of just 10 years. It was also interesting to note that attitudes appeared to be changing at the family level. In regard to the transmission of population policy experience, it was mentioned that perhaps what was most impressive was the number of national conferences and seminars on population and development that had been held in the past few years, inspired by the Arusha Conference and the All-Africa Parliamentary Conference. Another important vehicle for the transmission of population policy data had been the Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID) model, which had been shown to heads of State and high-level officials in over 20 sub-Saharan African countries. In regard to policy formulation and implementation, the population policy documents of some countries had been used as models by planning officials in other countries. Moreover, technical assistance in policy development had been increasingly provided by African policy makers and country experts. Lastly, study tours had been an especially important component of policy work in a number of African countries.

The paper on the transmission of population policy experience in Latin America (IESA/P/AC.24/12) emphasized that during the 1960s and 1970s the Latin American panorama regarding population policies had changed considerably. During the 1960s, controversy had been stirred up mainly by extraregional family planning activists. The controversy had lost some of its impetus and had tended to disappear when Governments began to learn more about their demographic situations, through analyses conducted by foreigners working in local institutions and abroad as well as from Latin Americans trained within and outside the region. During that period also, many Latin American economists had begun to accept the fact that demographic factors had a considerable impact on an economy's capacity to absorb labour. In consequence, family planning programmes had begun to receive official support, and the Governments of several Latin American countries had decided that it was important to attempt to harmonize demographic growth and social development.

The three regional Latin American population conferences—held in 1965, 1967 and 1970—together with other technical meetings sponsored by the United Nations or by private foundations, had contributed in important ways to clearing the ground for further progress. Teaching and research institutions and programmes—such as Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE), El Colegio de México, the Population and Development Commission of the Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Social (CLASCO), Programa de Investigaciones Sociales sobre Problemas de Población Relevantes para Políticas de Población en América Latina (PISPAL) and Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe (PREALC)—had been instrumental in the training of research personnel, in the creation of a broad data

base and in the generation of knowledge that had permitted some of the advances made in the field. The array of technical, methodological and substantive reports published by the United Nations—and, in spite of language difficulties, specialized journals—had also helped researchers and analysts to study important population topics. But perhaps the most important event had been the World Population Conference sponsored by the United Nations in 1974, which in Latin America had been preceded and followed by regional meetings of high governmental officials. The author concluded that although it was difficult to pin-point specific examples of direct international transmission of population policy experience, there was no doubt that international exchange and support during the 1960s and 1970s had been significant and had contributed in important ways to changing the situation in Latin America in regard to population policy.

Countries in the Latin American region had therefore entered the 1980s with an accumulation of knowledge which placed them in a relatively advantageous position for the potential utilization of that knowledge in the formulation and execution of population policies. A particularly important area for the international transmission of population policy experience was the development of methodologies for the integration of population variables into social and economic planning—something that Latin American Governments were currently willing to do but did not know exactly how to accomplish.

In the discussion of the paper, one participant noted that changing economic perspectives in Latin America had contributed to the increasing acceptance of population policies by Governments in the region. Lower rates of economic growth in many countries, the lack of availability of international capital, the restoration of democracy throughout much of the region (which had led to changing relationships between Governments and academics) and the broadening of the scope of population policy (which had previously been equated with birth control) had all contributed to the changing climate in regard to the adoption of population policies.

In the discussion of the international transmission of population policy experience in Eastern Europe (IESA/P/AC.24/13), it was noted that, independent of the proclamation or non-proclamation of a population policy, one could find in each of the Eastern European countries measures that had directly or indirectly influenced demographic processes. In most countries, however, it was difficult to judge whether a given measure had been introduced mainly to influence demographic processes or simply as a socio-economic measure. Most Eastern European countries had introduced different types of measures that affected fertility. Those measures included maternity benefits, maternity/paternity leave, child-care leave with or without pay, family allowances, tax allowances, reduced working hours for working mothers, social services and legislation concerning access to birth control and abortion. Policies on housing facilities and children's institutions also had had an important influence on fertility. Mortality in Eastern Europe had been influenced by policies related to accessibility to health services, housing and working conditions, diet, environmental conditions and personal habits.

It was concluded that international transmission of experience in the field of population policy formulation—however defined—was inadequate. Independent of the difficulties in distinguishing between population and social policy measures, there was a need for experience to be discussed at international forums and for the conclusions to be widely disseminated.

The author of the paper on the international transmission of population policy experience in Western Europe (IESA/P/AC.24/14) adopted a relatively broad view of population policy and enlarged it to include all policies affecting and reacting to demographic phenomena (e.g., directly and indirectly, intended and unintended), calling such policies "population-related policies".

It was emphasized that developing an overall model of political action and demographic change and making it internationally comparable was an ambitious task. The policy experience of the Federal Republic of Germany indicated that a policy of adaptation to fertility and population decline was feasible. The pivotal need was an early and well-timed assessment of demographic, economic and social change. However, a policy of adaptation required a long period of launching as well as an observation of mechanisms so far unknown.

It was noted that population-relevant policies had been at work for a long time and that indirect influences had always been stronger than direct interventions. Because policies on social security, education, the labour market, economic growth, infrastructure, taxation, family and immigration are integral parts of ways in which the State, society, economy and population influenced one another, it

was unwise to single out a few elements and to exchange experience on what amounted to only the tip of the iceberg.

In the future, it was noted that this complex set of policies would have to be co-ordinated in order to respond to population decline. This would not be an easy task, but rather a major challenge. The contribution that social scientists, economists and demographers could make would be to transmit policy experience on population decline.

F. Population policy and the international environment

In examining the international context of population policy, it was noted in one paper (IESA/P/AC.24/16) that during the period 1984-1987 the United Nations Population Fund had provided assistance to nearly 200 projects for the formulation of population policy in developing countries. In terms of achievements, formal institutional arrangements had been established in a large number of developing countries, a large number of national staff had been trained to undertake project activities, documentation centres had been established in a number of countries, awareness had been raised, policy research studies had been conducted and formulation of population policy and its incorporation into a national development plan had been achieved in a number of countries.

However, a number of substantive and operational issues continued to affect the successful formulation and implementation of population policy. First, although the number of research projects and activities that centred around policy issues had increased, there was a need for: a systematic approach to the identification of policy-relevant issues; analyses of alternative policy choices; an understanding of the political process that influenced policy-making in developing countries and mechanisms for proper utilization of policy research findings in the formulation and implementation of population policy. Secondly, in developing appropriate national population strategies, there was a need properly to identify national priorities and population policy goals to understand adequately the linkages between population and development variables and their utilization in the identification of critical target groups, to assess the complementarity or non-complementarity of population projects *vis-à-vis* projects in other sectors and to translate appropriate findings from social, cultural and anthropological research studies into programme strategies to influence fertility, mortality and migration. Lastly, the inadequacy of financial and human resources, both domestic and international, for the formulation and integration of population policy and its integration with development planning was underlined.

The authors of the paper on the role of transnational policy coalitions in changing approaches to population policy in the international system (IESA/P/AC.24/15) sought to explain the evolution of approaches to population policy in the international system since the mid-1960s, when Governments and international organizations had begun to make significant commitments to programmes intended to limit population growth. The authors argued that the changing distribution of power and influence in the international system, as well as long-run demographic and economic processes, had been fundamental in changing approaches. They further maintained that the critical actors in interpreting constraints and opportunities in the international system had been "transnational policy coalitions" or groups with common policy preferences whose membership transcended national and institutional boundaries.

During the post-Second World War period up to 1965, several groups had organized themselves into what became the "population control" coalition, which had actively pursued public policies to limit rapid population growth, mainly through family planning. That coalition, which had had its greatest strength in the United States of America, had dominated international approaches to population policy from 1965 to the time of the Conference at Bucharest in 1974. Between 1974 and 1981, a "population planning" coalition had prevailed which had sought to integrate policies to limit population growth more closely into national development strategies. Compared with the population control coalition, the population planning coalition had had a stronger base in multilateral and non-United States bilateral development agencies, as well as in the developing countries. Since 1981, that coalition had remained dominant, but the scope of conflict over population policies had widened as the various transnational health, women's and religious coalitions which had challenged the earlier approaches had gained strength.

The paper concluded by proposing that international agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, should focus less upon Governments and do more to facilitate the resolution of conflicts among groups or coalitions from different sectors. In addition,

agencies should rely less upon "North-South" transmission of population policy information and ideas and promote more direct "South-South" contacts and exchanges among different groups from developing countries. Lastly, agencies should facilitate direct exchanges between experts and Governments and private sector decision makers.

In the discussion, it was noted that it would be desirable for a fourth coalition to form around the task of easing the demographic trauma of the next doubling of the world population and of helping to ensure that it should be the last doubling. Whereas it was hoped that such a coalition could break enough with its predecessors so that it would not be based on self-satisfaction with earlier policy accomplishments, but rather on the critical assessment of that experience and of the roles of the earlier coalitions in it, one participant was not optimistic about that happening.

In the discussion, it was pointed out that political pressures were not confined to the area of population policy and that there was a tendency for policy data to be controlled by funding agencies. It was emphasized that greater attention should be paid to the context in which policies were implemented, including the institutional arrangements. Studies of the interrelationships between various population factors, including migration, should be carried out in the United Nations regional commissions and more research should be conducted at the subregional level. Case studies of successes and failures of population policies were clearly needed.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Governments

Recommendation 1. Governments are urged to develop durable capabilities for data collection, processing and analysis, including needed computer facilities, in order to provide reliable and timely information in support of population and other development programmes. They are also urged to accord priority to the development of global, regional and national population information systems. Required assistance should be provided to developing countries by the international community to develop these activities.

Recommendation 2. In order that the population policy data and analyses published by the United Nations shall properly represent the current positions and views of countries, Governments are urged to provide timely and comprehensive information concerning their population policies, in particular through the completion of the United Nations Population Inquiries among Governments.

Recommendation 3. It is recommended that there should be population and policy research institutions independent of government bureaucracies that formulate and implement population policies in order to ensure the objective scientific evaluation of those policies.

Recommendation 4. There should be a systematic approach to the education of the public concerning population in order to stimulate awareness of population issues. Population studies should be part of school curricula as well as multimedia campaigns directed to the general public.

Recommendation 5. To improve the knowledge base relating to population policy, consideration should be given, in ongoing relevant public opinion surveys, to collecting information concerning the level of public knowledge of population trends and policies. In addition, national and international efforts should be strengthened for the taking of periodic national surveys dealing with knowledge and attitudes towards population issues.

B. United nations

Recommendation 6. With the increasing number of organizations, institutions and agencies becoming actively involved in population policy data collection and analysis, efforts should be increased to facilitate the effective exchange of information and research experience. In particular, greater exchange among the United Nations and non-governmental organizations concerning such information and experience should be encouraged.

Recommendation 7. The United Nations, and in particular the Population Division, has a continuing important role to play in the monitoring of population policy. In addition to meeting the needs of intergovernmental bodies (especially the Population Commission), it contributes to population policy research carried out by other organizations, such as universities, national and regional institutes and professional organizations, and in particular the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP). The work of the United Nations in the field of population policy should be strengthened.

Recommendation 8. The United Nations has been collecting and analysing information on government positions on population policies for more than 10 years. The rationale of such monitoring activities was included in the World Population Plan of Action in 1974 and reaffirmed in 1984 at the International Conference on Population. It appears appropriate now to evaluate the experience of the past two decades in terms of its utilization, effectiveness and relevance.

Recommendation 9. The United Nations Population Inquiries among Governments constitute a very useful time-series relating to the development of national population perceptions and policies; and, taken together with other information they offer a good opportunity for more in-depth analysis of population policies, their determinants and their consequences for international action in this field. It is therefore recommended that the United Nations system and IUSSP undertake such in-depth analysis as a priority in their research agendas covering all aspects of population dealt with in the World Population Plan of Action.

Recommendation 10. Given the substantial amount of knowledge that has been accumulated in the past 15 years, the United Nations, in co-operation with IUSSP and other scientific bodies, should consider updating the publication *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends*.

C. International Union for the Scientific Study of Population

Recommendation 11. In assessing the impact of research on policy-making, one should consider the generally positive long-term effects of cumulative scientific knowledge on public decision-making and not only the short-term effects. In this respect, the task of the scientific community should be to ensure that decision makers are aware of the results of research. For this purpose it is recommended that the United Nations and IUSSP encourage responsible dissemination of research findings to a non-technical audience, so as to facilitate its understanding by policy makers.

Recommendation 12. IUSSP should increase its efforts to reach out beyond its specialist membership to communicate objective scientific knowledge about demographic trends and policies to international élites.

Recommendation 13. Given the importance of integrating population and development policies, as well as in view of a lack of appropriate methodologies to affect such integration, it is recommended that IUSSP consider establishing a committee on methodologies to integrate population and development.

D. General

Recommendation 14. In so far as little is to be gained from partial or reduced accounts of the recent histories of countries in the area of population, greater consideration should be given to the changing social, structural and cultural frameworks. In particular, lessons of experience in population policy should extend well beyond the terrain of demography strictly construed.

Recommendation 15. Population policy research could benefit substantially if population policy were viewed as an example of "public goods" and thus could be illuminated by the economic and political theories relating to the study of non-market decision-making known as "public choice theory". In particular, this would help to clarify the ways in which political priorities and interests may prevent inferences from demographic knowledge being translated directly into population policy.

Recommendation 16. Given the importance in population policy-making of transnational networks in different sectors and related conditions that espouse particular approaches or viewpoints transcending national concerns, international agencies could reinforce the initiatives that have already been taken to bring together in various combinations, representatives of public and private sector organizations, representatives of religious groups, health professionals, women's groups and population planners. Task forces and study groups, special publications and joint projects are some of the mechanisms that could be employed.

Recommendation 17. To improve the transmission of knowledge between regions, publications dealing with national experiences in population policy should be issued in as many major languages as possible.

Recommendation 18. Given the rapid growth in the use of microcomputers and related equipment, greater reliance on advanced technology should be made for the transmission of population policy information and research.

Recommendation 19. Given the significant role played by journalism in the broad dissemination of population policies and the sometimes incomplete journalistic treatment of demographic trends, the organization of workshops for interested journalists should be considered.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

Agenda

1. Opening of the meeting:
   (*a*) Opening statements and election of officers;
   (*b*) Election of officers.
2. The study of population policy:
   (*a*) The collection, analysis and transmission of population policy data at the United Nations Secretariat;
   (*b*) The contributions of Governments, non-governmental organizations and academia to the collection, analysis and transmission of population policy data.
3. Population research outside population:
   (*a*) Policy research within the United Nations system: lessons from other fields;
   (*b*) Policy research among Governments, non-governmental organizations and academia: lessons from other fields.
4. The context of population policy formulation:
   (*a*) The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and population policy research;
   (*b*) Les théories et pratiques du développement économique et leur influence possible sur la baisse séculaire de la fécondité;
   (*c*) Channels, filters and gaps: population information beyond élites.
5. Population policy experience:
   (*a*) International transmission of population policy experience in South Asia;
   (*b*) Transmission internationale en Afrique sub-saharienne de l'expérience en matière de politique de population;
   (*c*) International transmission of population policy experience in Latin America;
   (*d*) International transmission of population policy experience in Eastern Europe;
   (*e*) International transmission of population policy experience in Western Europe.
6. Population policy and the international environment:
   (*a*) Changing approaches to population policy in the international system: the role of transnational policy coalitions;
   (*b*) International support for national population policies and programmes.
7. Review and assessment.
8. Adoption of the recommendations and closing of the meeting.

ANNEX II

List of participants

EXPERTS

Chidambara Chandrasekaran, President, Applied Population Research Trust, Bangalore, India

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Mpembele Sala-Diakanda, Director, Institut de formation et de recherche démographiques (IFORD), Yaoundé, Cameroon

Michael S. Teitelbaum, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, New York, New York, United States of America

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Office for Development Research and Policy Analysis
Göran Ohlin, Assistant Secretary-General

Population Division
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Joseph Chamie, Chief, Population Policy Section
Ellen Brennan, Population Affairs Officer, Population Policy Section
Barry Mirkin, Population Affairs Officer, Population Policy Section
P. Sankar Menon, Former Director

Statistical Office
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Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Cesar Pelaez, Chief, Population and Development Area

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)
Robert Hanenberg, Project Expert

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)
Riad B. Tabbarah, Chief, Social Development, Population and Human Settlements Division

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Joop Alberts, Population Programme Co-ordinator Economic and Social Policy Department

World Bank
Susan Cochrane, Population and Human Resources Department

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Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat
Angela Cropper

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration
H. Habenicht, Director, Department of Planning, Liaison and Research

Canadian International Development Agency
Victor Piche

Finnish International Development Agency
Elina Virusi, Counsellor, Research and Planning Unit

The Netherlands, Ministry of Education and Science
J. C. van den Brekel, Director, Office of Population Affairs

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
Frank E. Whitehead, Deputy Director: Statistics

United States of America, Social Security Administration
Alice Wade, Office of the Actuary

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Category I
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
Med Bouzidi, Director, Programme Development Department

Category II
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP)
Bruno Remiche, Executive Secretary
Paul Demeny, Chairman, Committee on Population Policy

The Population Council
Anrudh Jain

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Faith Mitchell

ANNEX III

List of documents

Document No.	*Agenda item*	*Title and author*
IESA/P/AC.24/1	1(c)	Draft provisional agenda
IESA/P/AC.24/2	1(c)	Annotated provisional agenda
IESA/P/AC.24/3	2(a)	The collection, analysis and transmission of population policy data at the United Nations Secretariat United Nations Secretariat
IESA/P/AC.24/4	2(b)	The evolution of United States Agency for International Development and other donor assistance in population policy Elizabeth Maguire
IESA/P/AC.24/6	3(b)	The relation between policy research and government policy David Coleman
IESA/P/AC.24/7	4(a)	The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and population policy research, 1954-1987 Geoffrey McNicoll
IESA/P/AC.24/8	4(b)	Les théories et pratiques du développement économique et leur influence possible sur la baisse séculaire de la fecondité Jean-Claude Chesnais
IESA/P/AC.24/9	4(c)	Channels, filters and gaps: population information beyond élites Michael Teitelbaum
IESA/P/AC.24/10	5(a)	International transmission of population policy experience in South Asia C. Chandrasekaran
IESA/P/AC.24/11	5(b)	Transmission internationale en Afrique sub-saharienne de l'expérience en matière de politique de population Mpmbele Sala-Diakanda
IESA/P/AC.24/12	5(c)	International transmission of population policy experience in Latin America Carmen Miró
IESA/P/AC.24/13	5(d)	International transmission of population policy experience in Eastern Europe Jerzy Holzer
IESA/P/AC.24/14	5(e)	International transmission of population policy experience in Western Europe Charlotte Höhn
IESA/P/AC.24/15	6(a)	The politics of international population policy Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane
IESA/P/AC.24/16	7(b)	The United Nations Population Fund and support for national population policies S. L. N. Rao

Part Two

PAPERS OF THE EXPERT GROUP

III. THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND TRANSMISSION OF POPULATION POLICY DATA AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

*United Nations Secretariat**

The conclusions presented in *World Population Trends and Policies: 1987 Monitoring Report* (United Nations, 1988), prepared by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, include the following:

(a) In 1986, out of a total of 170 countries, 79 viewed their rate of growth as satisfactory, 63 considered their rate too high and 28 perceived their growth rate as too low;

(b) About 60 per cent of the world population lived in countries that had governmental intervention to lower the rate of growth;

(c) Nearly two thirds of the countries of the world perceived their current mortality and morbidity as unacceptable;

(d) Direct governmental support for the effective use of modern methods was provided by 59 per cent of the developed countries and 76 per cent of the developing countries;

(e) Only 19 countries, 14 of which are more developed, considered their patterns of population distribution to be entirely appropriate;

(f) A total of 30 countries had policies designed to reverse migration or to accelerate migration into certain designated regions;

(g) About 65 per cent of Governments did not have any view regarding the desirability of immigration and had no immigration policies beyond the usual visa and passport controls;

(h) More than 60 per cent of all countries did not experience significant emigration and considered this situation to be satisfactory.

* Population Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.

These and similar conclusions are the end-products of a series of lengthy and elaborate processes involving the collection, analysis and transmission of population policy information. Although the published results and conclusions of the population policy research of the United Nations Secretariat are widely recognized and disseminated,[1] the complex processes utilized to produce these findings are frequently ignored or poorly understood by both casual and sophisticated readers. With the general aims of alleviating this situation and improving the overall quality and usefulness of population policy research conducted by the Secretariat, this paper describes the processes employed by the Population Divison to collect, analyse and transmit population policy data.

In order to have a meaningful perspective of these processes, some basic understanding of the history of the United Nations Secretariat in the area of population policy research is essential. Therefore, as a prelude to the central discussion, a brief historical account of Secretariat experience in this field is provided.

A. Historical background[2]

From the very outset of the Population Commission, in 1946, population policy has been within its mandate and hence that of its substantive secretariat, the Population Divison of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. In its resolution 150(VII) of 10 August 1948, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations formally mandated the Population Commission to "arrange for studies and advise the Council on: ... (c) Policies designed to influence the size and structure of populations and the changes therein ..." (United Nations, 1987, p. 105).

For a variety of reasons, however, chief among which was the lack of a consensus on the proper role of the United Nations with regard to population policy, comparatively little population policy research was done during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1947, the Population Commission requested documentation for a discussion on migration statistics and policies. In another instance, in 1950, the Commission recommended that countries be assisted in the formulation of legislative and administrative measures that would have an influence on population.

Eleven years later, the Commission adopted a carefully worded statement on population policy, which was essentially an effort to forge a consensus from among divergent views. Major consequences of this statement and related deliberations of the eleventh session of the Commission were that: *(a)* population policy was placed strictly within the purview of national sovereignty; *(b)* it was considered legitimate for a Government not to take measures to modify population trends; and *(c)* it was also considered legitimate for a Government to exchange knowledge and experience relating to population matters with others and to request technical assistance from the United Nations.

At its session in 1963 the Population Commission requested the First Population Inquiry among Governments on their description of problems resulting from the interaction of economic development and population change. Although information on policies and measures adopted by Governments to deal with those problems also was collected, the formal focus of the Inquiry was on the Governments' views of their population problems. It is also worth noting that although the Inquiry dealt largely with population policies of Governments, the word "policy" itself did not appear in the title.[3]

At its sixteenth session in 1971, the Population Commission requested the Second Inquiry in order to keep in view the rapid changes occurring in national policies pertinent to population growth and development. Both the First and Second Inquiries and their subsequent reports accorded full recognition to the principle that population policy is the prerogative of Governments and avoided any advocacy or expression of any form of judgement on the legitimacy of any policies or measures.

Consistent with this principle and with the goal of avoiding expressions of judgement, both the First and Second Inquiries invited Governments to submit statements covering those points in an outline listing topics of possible importance that the Government considered pertinent and appropriate in the circumstances of its country; the Second Inquiry also included a couple of general questions on each demographic component. Responses to the First and Second Inquiries were received from 53 and 74 Governments, respectively.[4]

The World Population Conferences, convened in Rome in 1954 and at Belgrade in 1965, also reflected the tensions and caution of Governments concerning the issue of population policy. Both Conferences were gatherings not of Governments but of population specialists who attended in their personal capacities. In addition, most papers considered issues relating to traditional population concerns and those which considered policy issues dealt with technical questions of measurement and evaluation.

In contrast to the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, population policy became a matter of increasingly explicit concern to the Population Commission in the late 1960s. The sixteenth session of the Commission in 1971 marked a turning-point in the treatment of population policy issues at the global level. This significant change is believed to be connected largely to two interrelated events: *(a)* the Commission's discussion of the role of population in the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade; and *(b)* the planning of activities for the World Population Year, 1974, which had been designated by the General Assembly in 1970, in resolution 2683(XXV) (United Nations, 1987, p. 108).

During the next few years, that is, in preparation for the World Population Year and the landmark intergovernmental World Population Conference convened at Bucharest in 1974, the Secretariat under the guidance of the Population Commission, carried out a variety of major studies directly involving population policy and organized the Symposium on Population and Human Rights, which was convened at Amsterdam in early 1974.

As a result of the preparatory activities for the World Conference, as well as the achievements of the Conference itself, in particular the adoption of the World Population Plan of Action, the population policy research that was to be carried out by the United Nations was made explicit and official. The new direction and mandate are illustrated clearly in a recommendation of the World Population Conference:

"It is recommended that monitoring of population trends and policies discussed in this Plan of Action should be undertaken continuously as a specialized activity of the United Nations and reviewed biennially by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, beginning in 1977." (United Nations, 1975, para. 107)

With this mandate and direction, population policy research became formally institutionalized and developed into a fundamental component of the Population Division work programme.

Between the first intergovernmental World Population Conference held in 1974 and the second, the International Conference on Population held at Mexico City in 1984, population policy research and related activities carried out by the Population Division increased dramatically both in volume and in scope. The research undertaken included, for example, a series of periodic reports describing key aspects of the population policies of countries throughout the world (i.e., the biennial monitoring reports of population trends and policies) and special reports examining in greater detail particular topics of concern (e.g., international migration, population and human rights, and population distribution policies). In addition, within this 10-year period, three population inquiries were conducted: the Third Inquiry in 1976; the Fourth in 1978; and the Fifth in 1982.

The next major event was the International Conference on Population mentioned above. This Conference, like the World Conference in 1974, was a meeting of Governments and not individual population specialists; it reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Secretariat in the monitoring of population policies.[5] Sessions of the Population Commission subsequent to the International Conference have continued to support current research and to recommend the population policy research to be carried out by the Secretariat.

B. Population policy research

The dynamics of the complex processes of conducting population policy research at the United Nations Secretariat may be divided into three closely interrelated activities: *(a)* the collection of relevant data pertaining to specified aspects of the population policies of Governments; *(b)* the analysis of these data within a comparative and scientifically sound framework; and *(c)* the transmission of the results of these analyses in suitable formats to Governments, institutions and individuals around the world. Each of these activities is briefly described below before the discussion turns to a consideration of some of the basic issues facing the United Nations Secretariat in undertaking its programme of population policy research.

Data collection

Certainly, it is not possible for any organization to gather population policy information without a significant degree of circumscription. The subject-matter is so diverse and exists in such a broad variety of places that without setting limits, the time and cost involved would be much too great. This situation is in contrast to that of research published on the traditional demographic subjects, such as fertility, mortality or migration, where the majority of information is perhaps available in fewer than 20 professional journals.

To a large extent, the collection of population policy data is determined by a combination of two factors: *(a)* the number of countries (or other units of analysis) being considered; and *(b)* the specific substantive issues in need of investigation. When the number of countries examined is relatively large, both the number of issues that may be properly addressed and the detail in which they may be examined are necessarily restricted. Such is the case for the biennial monitoring of population policies for 170 countries, where the analyses are focused, although not exclusively, on the status of countries with respect to perhaps two dozen key variables. In contrast, the data collection for a country case study or a report on a metropolitan area is very different in that the objective is to gather as much information and detail as possible.

Although over-simplified, it may be useful to consider the diagram in figure I, which is intended to be a representation of the major sources of population policy information. In brief, the major sources feeding into the Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division may be classified as falling into four broad groups.

Figure I. Sources for monitoring of governmental population policies and perceptions



The first group consists of publications, documents, speeches and other materials issued by Governments, which also include development plans, laws, regulations, proclamations etc. These materials are a very important source of data as they are official and are directly linked to a specific country. The second group includes publications of intergovernmental bodies and organizations, such as the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Council of Europe. As the countries as a collectivity are issuing these publications, a somewhat official status is attached to the documents, although it may be difficult to link this information to a particular country's specific population policies.

Non-governmental publications, documents and so on constitute an extremely large and rich source of information. Included among this source of data are clippings from the world press, academic journals, magazines, information provided by bibliographical services, proceedings of conferences and meetings and correspondence. Although such information is easily related to a specific country or countries, it does not usually have the status of being official. Consequently, its usefulness in representing a Government's population policy in a publication of the Secretariat is always open to question and requires particularly close scrutiny and evaluation.

The fourth category of sources of information for the Population Policy Data Bank consists of the United Nations Population Inquiries among Governments. Given the uniqueness, the quality and the tremendous amount of official information provided by the inquiries, it is both appropriate and worth while to treat them as a separate category.

Comparatively speaking, the rate of response by Governments to the inquiries has been relatively high. As is shown in table 1, the response rate has increased from 43 to 72 per cent for the world as a whole. In addition, although the differences in response rates among the more, less and least developed countries had at first been large, i.e., slightly above 50 per cent, by the completion of the Fifth Inquiry the differences had been reduced considerably, to about 15 per cent.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES AND TOTAL NUMBER OF COUNTRIES RESPONDING TO UNITED NATIONS POPULATION INQUIRIES AMONG GOVERNMENTS

Country grouping	Inquiry					
	First (1963)	Second (1972)	Third (1976)	Fourth (1978)	Fifth (1982)	Sixth (1988)
	Percentage of responses					
ECA	25	36	68	42	76	57
ECE	62	68	79	56	79	77
ECLAC	32	42	65	38	69	73
ESCAP	48	55	65	61	60	54
ESCWA	38	58	83	25	67	50
Least developed	12	25	58	41	71	45
Less developed	42	53	72	45	67	67
More developed	65	68	82	59	82	74
TOTAL	43	51	71	47	72	64
	Total number of countries					
ECA	32	42	47	50	51	51
ECE	37	38	39	39	39	39
ECLAC	22	24	26	26	29	33
ESCAP	25	29	31	31	35	35
ESCWA	8	12	12	12	12	12
Least developed	25	32	38	39	42	42
Less developed	62	75	78	80	85	89
More developed	37	38	39	39	39	39
TOTAL	124	145	155	158	166	170

Source: Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

NOTE: ECA = Economic Commission for Africa; ECE = Economic Commission for Europe; ECLAC = Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; ESCAP = Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; ESCWA = Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.

Despite the fact that a relatively large number of countries have responded to the inquiries, particularly the Fifth Inquiry, there continues to be a substantial number that have not responded. Although the reasons for the non-responses are not known, it is interesting and perhaps useful to consider several of the likely contributing factors. In some instances, it is believed that non-response is due to political sensitivities regarding population matters among various factions within the Government or among the population at large. When faced with a questionnaire on population policy, the Government may simply find it easier not to respond at all rather than attempt to define or explain its positions. Another reason for non-response may be the inability of the Government, due to strife or civil conflict, economic crises or similar difficult circumstances, to devote the necessary resources for proper completion of the questionnaire. Among the priorities of the Government, the Inquiry may be actually very low.

Important factors that certainly should be noted are the lack of demographic data and the limited awareness of population policy concerns among government officials. This point may be appreciated by considering a recent cable from a resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme in a developing country, who explains why a response to the Sixth Inquiry, which is currently in progress, may not be forthcoming:

> "Please note questionnaire submitted to government 31/10/87 and followed up actively with government authorities concerned regrettably no success so far. According to DTCD's expert in demographic analysis it seems

impossible at this moment to complete questionnaire since data needed only recently available from 1983 national population census on some topics whereas data for other topics completely lacking. In addition, extremely difficult to obtain opinions and perceptions of government officials with respect to population policy and issues as awareness in this respect very low yet. Will try to obtain information later on in 1988."

An indication of the broad coverage of subjects in the Inquiry is illustrated by the topics included in the questionnaire of the Sixth Inquiry, which was mailed in July 1987:

(a) Population growth, size and age structure;

(b) Mortality;

(c) Fertility and the family;

(d) Population distribution and internal migration;

(e) International migration;

(f) Institutional arrangements for integrating demographic factors into development planning;

(g) Population and the status of women;

(h) International co-operation in the area of population;

(i) Monitoring, review and appraisal of progress in implementing the World Population Plan of Action;

(j) Peace, security and population.

The Sixth Inquiry, which was made available in English, French, Spanish and, for the first time, Arabic, consists of approximately 50 pages, containing both open-ended and pre-coded questions, a substantial proportion of which had appeared in previous inquiries. Many of the sections of the questionnaire also invite Governments to provide any official supporting documents that they feel may be relevant to the issues raised in particular sections of the Inquiry.

Each inquiry is sent from the Office of the Secretary-General to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Member and non-member States, which currently number 170. The inquiry is then forwarded by the Government to its national capital for completion. In many cases, the task of completing the inquiry is divided among the responsible ministries or offices within the Government. After the inquiry has been completed, it is usually either sent back to the Mission, which then forwards it to the United Nations Secretariat; or it is sent directly to the United Nations.

Analysis

Population policy research at the United Nations has evolved in stages over the past 40 years and currently operates under a variety of constraints and conditions that have their origins in this evolution. These constraints and conditions, many of which are embodied in the various reports of the Population Commission and international population conferences, determine to a great extent the specific research and analyses undertaken by the Secretariat.

Looking back over the past several decades, the actual policy research that has been conducted by the Population Division may be seen as being of two broad types. The first consists of special studies that examine in detail particular topics of concern to the international population community, such as international migration policies, population distribution policies and population growth and policies in mega-cities. The analyses done within the special studies usually follow traditional lines of social research, with the particular topics suggesting the issues to be addressed, which in turn indicate the data to be collected and the methods to be utilized. A good example of such an analysis is the landmark report, *International Migration Policies and Programmes: A World Survey* (United Nations, 1982), which considers trends, policies and institutional arrangements with reference to the various types of international migration, i.e., permanent immigration/emigration, labour migration, undocumented migration, refugees, brain drain and temporary migration.

The second type of research refers to a series of periodic reports describing key aspects of population policies of countries throughout the world, e.g., the biennial monitoring reports. In contrast to the special studies, these reports follow a more structured framework, resulting in analyses centring around specific sets of tabulations or tables of policy variables. These sets of tables include the major population variables (e.g., growth, mortality, fertility, internal migration and international migration) for all the countries of the world, as well as for various groups of countries classified according to region and developmental level. By and large, the content of these tables focuses on:

(a) The Government's perceptions of each variable: whether the level is viewed as a significant policy issue and whether the level is too high, too low or satisfactory/acceptable in relation to the country's social and economic circumstances;

(b) The Government's goals for each variable; whether to raise, to lower or to maintain the current level; and the targets, if they have been set;

(c) The Government's intervention for each variable: whether intervention is viewed as a legitimate governmental activity; whether Government actively intervenes and, if so, types of intervention.

In order to facilitate analyses of change over time as well as to permit checking for consistency, the format of these reports, and in particular that of the basic tables, remains essentially unchanged from one report to the next. The importance and value of retaining a high degree of similarity over time may be appreciated to some extent by briefly considering the perception of the population growth rate among Governments.

In figure II, the proportions of Governments viewing their respective rates of population growth to be "too high", "too low" or "satisfactory" are shown at seven points in time over the period from 1974 to 1988. The statistics show that although virtually the same proportions of countries have indicated satisfaction with their growth rates over the past decade and a half, important changes have occurred in the proportions of countries that viewed their rates as too low or too high. In general, although an increasing proportion of countries viewed their rates of growth as too high, the proportion of Governments that viewed their growth rate as too low has progressively declined over the period.

Looking at more developed and less developed countries separately, however, reveals divergent historical trends, which are not evident at the global level. Whereas, as shown in figure II, the proportion of Governments that view their rates as satisfactory remained relatively constant, the proportion for more developed countries increased from 55 to 79 per cent (figure III), and for less developed countries it declined from 45 to 33 per cent (figure IV). Accordingly, among more developed countries the proportion that view their growth rates as too low has decreased and among less developed countries the proportion viewing their rates as too high has increased.

Figure II. Perception of growth rate among Governments at seven points in time, 1974-1988



Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

Before leaving this brief example, a final word concerning the perceptions of fertility rates among more developed countries should be mentioned in order not to be misleading. Although it was observed that the proportion of more developed countries that viewed their growth rates as low decreased between 1974 and 1988 (figure III), the proportion that perceived their fertility rates as too low has increased during the past 10 years (figure V). Falling from 33 per cent in 1974 to a low of 21 per cent in 1978, the proportion of more developed countries that viewed their fertility as too low has steadily increased since then, reaching 31 per cent in 1988.

Figure III. Perception of growth rate among Governments of more developed countries at seven points in time, 1974-1988



Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

Figure IV. Perception of growth rate of Governments of less developed countries at seven points in time, 1974-1988



Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

Figure V. Perception of fertility among Governments of more developed countries at seven points in time, 1974-1988

Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

In addition to analyses that may be conducted at the global and regional levels, the information that has been collected over the past decade and a half permits country-specific analysis. For example, the data given in table 2 indicate the views and policies of Algeria relating to a number of key population policy variables during the period from 1974 to 1986. Most noticeable, perhaps, are the changes in the Government's views and policies on growth and fertility that took place around 1980. Prior to that time, the Government had a policy of no intervention, generally viewing its growth and fertility as satisfactory; since 1980, however, the Government has perceived its growth and fertility rates as being too high and has adopted policies to lower the rates of growth and fertility. Another noteworthy change, which is of keen interest to those countries receiving migrants from Algeria, is the shift in the policy on emigration from "raise" to "lower".

Also as a consequence of the historical developments that have occurred in the organization over the past 40 years, four implicit principles have evolved that, in the most general sense, guide analyses of population policy within the Secretariat.[6] These principles may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Be neutral.* Analyses should avoid advocacy and judgement and remain clearly neutral;

(b) *Be comprehensive.* Analyses should give full and complete coverage to each of the demographic variables of policy concern;

(c) *Be global.* The coverage of the analyses should be of all regions of the world;

(d) *Be effective.* The Secretariat should undertake those analyses in which it has a comparative advantage, avoiding the types of research that can be done more effectively by other institutions, such as universities and national research centres.

The transmission of the population policy research conducted by the Secretariat is accomplished along three major avenues. The first, which is the most fundamental as well as substantial, consists of the numerous reports, documents, studies, plans, proceedings etc. published and distributed by the United Nations. Among the more recent of these publications are the biennial *Monitoring Reports*, the series of mega-city studies, the country case-studies of population policy and *World Population Policies*.

A second avenue of transmission of the Secretariat's policy research consists of the interactions and exchanges carried out at conferences, meetings, seminars, symposia and workshops. Although the actual number of persons involved in such gatherings is relatively small in comparison with those reached by publications, the impact tends to be considerable. The interactions, which occur repeatedly usually over a duration of from 4 to 10 days, are comparatively intense and involve participants who are generally influential persons from such places as Governments, donor agencies and foundations, advocacy and

TABLE 2. SELECTED POPULATION VIEWS AND POLICIES, ALGERIA, 1974-1986

Population policy variable	*1974*	*1976*	*1978*	*1980*	*1983*	*1986*
Population growth						
View	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Too high	Too high	Too high
Policy	Maintain/No intervention	Maintain/No intervention	Maintain/No intervention	Maintain/No intervention	Lower	Lower
Fertility						
View	[a]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Too high	Too high	Too high
Policy	[a]	No intervention	No intervention	No intervention	Lower	Lower
Contraceptive use						
Limits	No limits	No limits	No limits	No limits	No limits	No limits
Support	Indirect	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct
Mortality						
Acceptability	[a]	Unacceptable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable
Immigration						
Significance	[a]	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant	Insignificant
View	[a]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Policy	[a]	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain	Maintain
Emigration						
Significance	[a]	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	Insignificant
View	[a]	Too low	Too low	Too low	Too high	Satisfactory
Policy	[a]	Raise	Raise	Raise	Lower	Lower
Spatial distribution						
View	[a]	Inappropriate	Inappropriate	Inappropriate	Inappropriate	Inappropriate
Policy	[a]	Decelerate	Decelerate	Decelerate	Decelerate	Decelerate

Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

[a] Not ascertained at this time.

action groups, intergovernmental organizations, the press, academia and research institutes. Such meetings may lead to the formulation of a national, regional or global consensus on population policy issues. Probably the most notable among such gatherings have been the intergovernmental population conferences held at Bucharest in 1974 and at Mexico City in 1984.

The third and certainly the most recent method of disseminating population policy research is electronically, via computer files. With the increasing availability and use of microcomputers, a growing number of interested persons are requesting population policy information, especially country-specific data bases, on computer diskettes or directly on file. Due to the recency of this method of transmission, it is somewhat premature to offer a proper evaluation of it. Nevertheless, preliminary indications suggest that its impact is likely to be considerable and far-reaching, particularly in facilitating further analyses and research.

Discussion

Thus far, the presentation has been primarily descriptive, providing a historical background and brief summaries of Secretariat activities in the collection, analysis and transmission of population policy information. At this point, attention is directed to a set of key issues, concerns and questions which are raised for consideration because they are believed to be particularly relevant for population policy research carried out at the United Nations as well as elsewhere.

Government as unit of analysis

Although obvious, it should be noted that the unit of analysis in much of the population policy research conducted by the Secretariat is not the individual, couple or household, as is traditionally the case in population analysis, but the Government. The implications and consequences of this fact are

generally poorly understood and not fully appreciated, and many questions arise. For example, who, which or what best represents the official views of a Government? How should one interpret the absence of an articulated policy? Is it to be interpreted as "not ascertained", "satisfactory", "unsatisfactory" or something else? How should one deal with the case of a country that has demographic goals or targets that are not yet formally adopted by the Government?

Validity of results

Not infrequently, the issue of the validity or soundness of the various results and conclusions on governmental views, perceptions and policies on population has been raised. How should this issue be addressed? Every possible effort is taken by the Secretariat to reflect properly the policies and positions of Governments, but are there additional steps or methods that might be utilized to deal with this concern?

Issues of consistency and reliability

Closely related to the question of validity are the issues of consistency and reliability. It is not uncommon for one part of a Government to have an "official" view, position or policy that differs from that of another part. The situation becomes even more complicated when these differing positions or policies are separated by long periods of time because they are then likely to be interpreted as genuine changes within the Government when in fact they are not. Similarly, the question of the reliability of a statement or response, especially in the case of the Inquiries, has been raised. The Secretariat continues to deal with this important issue, relying upon such methods as the use of multiple sources, analysis of trends over time and consultation with government officials as well as substantive experts, but the question arises whether other strategies exist that might be recommended for improving reliability.

Classification of Governments

Various classifications and measures have developed within the Secretariat to classify and to compare government views and policies globally. For example, Governments have been classified as to whether they consider their growth rate to be too high, too low or satisfactory and whether they intervened to lower, raise or maintain their growth rates. In the area of international migration, the Governments are grouped according to whether they view immigration and emigration as significant or insignificant and whether the levels are considered too high, too low or satisfactory. Over the past several decades, these classifications and measures have become institutionalized and are expected to be published and to be distributed globally on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the question of their appropriateness in properly representing government views and policies, which has been raised both within and outside the Secretariat, has not been fully addressed. Furthermore, if some of the classifications are deemed inappropriate or unsatisfactory, the question arises how they may be improved.

Issue of definitions

Intimately linked to the question of classifications and measures is the important issue of definitions. Although precise and unambiguous definitions are fundamental to social science research in general, they are especially critical in cross-national studies. In most cross-national demographic research few problems arise because the events and characteristics, such as births, deaths, movements, marital status and labour force participation are for the most part reasonably comparable across countries. In population policy research, however, the situation is considered more problematical in so far as the meanings of the concepts and terms may differ significantly among countries. For example, questions arise about how the word "acceptable" should be interpreted when countries are asked (or classified as to) whether they consider their levels of mortality acceptable; and, similarly, how one should interpret the case when the Government indicates that it does not have an immigration policy. Does this mean that persons are free to enter without regard to official travel documents (e.g., visas or work permits); or does it indicate that the country does not permit immigration or is it something else?

Lack of linkage among policies

Although the population policy research done by the Secretariat covers a wide range of demographic topics (e.g., fertility, mortality, internal and international migration, growth and structure), few linkages exist among the various policies. The lack of

integration or linkages among the various population policies is a consequence of a variety of factors, of which three are considered particularly noteworthy. First, it is generally the case that demographic concerns or areas are "compartmentalized" across a large number of government agencies and offices. For example, numerous offices at various levels are likely to be responsible for internal migration matters. The matter is further complicated by the not infrequent lack of effective communication and co-ordination among the offices. The second factor concerns the relatively small number of professionals who simultaneously consider policies relating to fertility, mortality, internal migration, international migration and so on. For the most part, and quite understandably, the published research of those working in the area of population policy focuses on one or two of the major demographic areas. The third factor, which is closely related to the first two, is the absence of a conceptual framework that would permit the integration of a country's various policies relating to population. For instance, how should a country's policy on fertility relate to its growth policy? Are there certain combinations of policies that should be viewed as incompatible or improbable, such as policies to increase growth and reduce fertility and mortality in the absence of significant international migration?

Justification for population policy research

The basic justification for population policy research at the United Nations Secretariat is based not on academic, political or organizational concerns, but on an international consensus on the interrelationships between population situations and socio-economic development. The World Population Plan of Action, for example, states that the "promotion of development and improvement of quality of life require co-ordination of action in all major socio-economic fields including population" (United Nations, 1975, p. 3). The Plan further declares that the "principal aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people", stating that a population policy "may have a certain success if it constitutes an integral part of socio-economic development ..." (United Nations, 1975, pp. 7 and 3, respectively).

This premise, then, raises an important question concerning the extent to which the population policies of countries, as reported by the Secretariat, are integral parts of their respective socio-economic development efforts. When is it the case (as is not infrequently, but discreetly maintained) that these population policies are largely for public relations and funding purposes? Or, stated slightly differently, in what circumstances or conditions are the reported population policies indeed relevant to socio-economic development, constituting an integral part of a country's development plans, programmes and activities?

Confidentiality of information

The confidentiality of information relating to individuals is an issue that has been debated widely in social science research, including demographic research.[7] Although far from being resolved, there is a general consensus to maintain confidentiality so as to safeguard individual rights and to institute sufficient data protection to ensure against misuse. With respect to information, especially views and policies, relating to Governments, however, the situation is considerably less straightforward and clear. For example, should only information in the public domain be utilized? If not, is it then possible, taking into account the constraints and circumstances within the United Nations, to specify the types of government information that should be included in the population policy research conducted by the Secretariat?

Available resources

Lastly, an important consideration, which is frequently overlooked or only given brief attention, particularly by those outside the Secretariat, is the extent to which financial and human resources are available for population policy research within the Secretariat. Currently, the number of professional staff assigned to this area of research is comparatively small. With the recent contraction of both staff and financial support at the United Nations Secretariat, it is unlikely that significant additional resources will be forthcoming; in fact, significant reductions may actually occur in the coming years. This situation is compounded by the rapidly growing amount of information and material (occurring in a variety of

different languages and locations) relating to the population policies of both more developed and less developed countries.

Conclusion

In this section, a number of general observations are offered for consideration. First, it is evident that considerable progress has been achieved within the United Nations Secretariat in the area of population policy over the past 40 years. Beginning from an initial position of caution, avoidance and at times even opposition, population policy research has come to be considered a legitimate area of activity of the Secretariat. The consequences of this change have been significant, not only for the United Nations but also for Governments and intergovernmental bodies as well as for a variety of organizations, groups and individuals who are active in the international demographic community.

Secondly, population policy research has become institutionalized and is now a fundamental component of the population programme of work of the Secretariat. Specific research and publications, such as the biennial monitoring of population policies, are now expected to be completed and distributed on a regular basis to a large and diverse international audience, including government officials, development planners, demographers, social and economic analysts and donor agencies. Moreover, given the increasing concern of Governments with demographic issues, it seems unlikely that there will be any significant reductions in the demands for this research; on the contrary, it appears likely that in the coming years there may be even greater expectations and requests for it.

Thirdly, despite the considerable conceptual and analytical difficulties encountered, it appears that the global country-by-country review of national perceptions and policies relating to population issues has emerged as a relatively new sub-area of demographic inquiry. As a consequence of this development, one observes an increasing number of organizations and institutions (within as well as outside the United Nations system) becoming interested and actively involved in this type of population research.

Fourthly, the introduction of the microcomputer and related technology has permitted a new and increasingly important method for the transmission of population policy research and information. In addition to its potentially far-reaching impact on transmission, the microcomputer is likely to facilitate greatly the analysis of population policies and their interactions with demographic, social and economic phenomena and trends.

Fifthly, population policy research is constrained by a variety of conceptual, analytical, political and organizational factors and forces, which are either lacking or have considerably less impact in traditional population research. As a consequence, organizations and institutions as well as individual analysts find themselves in differing positions of strength and weakness with regard to undertaking certain types of population policy research. For example, although the Secretariat is especially well positioned to monitor national population policies within a global comparative framework, it is limited in its ability to analyse political events and activities that may relate to the population policies of a particular country. Conversely, although a research institution, such as a university centre, may not have the ability to carry out a global survey of population policy on a recurrent basis, it is comparatively well suited to comment critically on political events that have a bearing on a country's population policies.

Lastly, one of the important goals of this Expert Group Meeting is to put forth proposals directed to, in general, improving the overall quality of population policy research and, in particular, enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness with which international population policy data are collected, analysed and transmitted to interested Governments, researchers and the general public. Certainly, in order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to identify and to understand thoroughly the major issues, problems and constraints facing this type of research. However, simply examining past performances and reviewing the continuing difficulties and problems are not sufficient. Realistic suggestions for strategies and ways to tackle these issues need to be explicitly put forward for consideration.

Notes

[1] The results and conclusions of the monitoring of population policies have been presented in two recurrent United Nations publications: the series of *Monitoring Reports* for 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1987; and the series of *Concise Reports on the World Population Situation* for 1970-1975, 1977, 1979 and 1983. In addition, the Population Division published 74 *Population Policy Compendiums* between 1979 and 1986; each compendium describes population dynamics and population policy in a country. In 1987, the compendium series was superseded by *World Population Policies*, which provides briefer summaries but covers all countries of the world. Two new series have also been recently issued. The first, entitled *Population Growth and Policies in*

Mega-cities, reviews the population policies and plans of selected cities in the developing world. The second, entitled *Case Studies in Population Policy*, focuses on selected issues in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of population policies in selected countries. Also beginning in 1987, population policy data have been made available in a data base format in two publications: *Global Population Policy Database, 1987* (ST/ESA/SER.R/71); and *Population Policy Diskette Documentation, 1987* (ST/ESA/SER.R/73).

2 For a fuller historical account of the work of the United Nations Secretariat in population policy as well as in other areas of population, refer to United Nations, 1987.

3 For further discussion of the Population Commission and the First Inquiry refer to United Nations, 1987a (p. 107) and the references cited at the end of the article.

4 For a list of countries replying to the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Inquiries, see the annex to this chapter.

5 Recommendation 88 of the Report of the International Conference on Population states: "The monitoring of population trends and policies and review and appraisal of the World Population Plan of Action should continue to be undertaken by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as specified in the Plan." (United Nations, 1984, p. 40)

6 For a more detailed discussion of these principles, refer to United Nations, 1987 (pp. 110-111).

7 For a recent review of the conflict between demographic research and privacy at the individual level, see Choldin (1988).

ANNEX

List of countries replying to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth United Nations Population Inquiries among Governments

	Inquiry					
Country	*First (1963)*	*Second (1972)*	*Third (1976)*	*Fourth (1978)*	*Fifth (1982)*	*Sixth (1988)*
Afghanistan	-	-	+	-	+	-
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	+
Algeria	-	-	+	-	+	+
Angola	..	..	..	-	-	+
Antigua and Barbuda	..	..	..	..	..	+
Argentina	-	-	+	-	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+	+
Austria	+	+	-	+	+	+
Bahamas	..	..	-	+	+	-
Bahrain	..	+	+	-	+	+
Bangladesh	..	..	+	+	+	+
Barbados	..	+	+	-	-	+
Belgium	-	+	+	-	-	+
Belize	..	..	..	..	+	-
Benin	..	+	+	+	+	-
Bhutan	..	-	-	-	-	-
Bolivia	+	-	-	-	+	+
Botswana	..	-	+	+	+	+
Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	+
Brunei Darussalam	..	..	..	..	..	-
Bulgaria	+	-	+	-	+	+
Burkina Faso	-	-	+	-	+	+
Burundi	-	-	+	+	+	+
Byelorussian SSR	+	-	-	-	+	+
Cambodia[a]	..	+	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	+	-	-	-	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cape Verde	..	..	-	-	-	+
Central African Rep.	-	-	-	-	+	-
Chad	-	-	+	-	-	-
Chile	+	+	+	-	-	+
China	+	-	-	-	-	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+	+
Comoros	..	..	+	-	+	+
Congo	-	-	+	-	+	-
Costa Rica	-	-	+	-	+	+
Côte d'Ivoire	-	-	-	+	+	-
Cuba	-	-	-	-	+	+
Cyprus	+	+	+	+	+	+
Czechoslovakia	+	+	+	+	+	+
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-
Democratic Yemen[b]	-	-	+	-	-	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+	-
Djibouti	..	..	..	-	+	-
Dominica	..	..	..	..	..	-
Dominican Republic	-	+	+	+	+	+

ANNEX *(continued)*

Country	Inquiry					
	First (1963)	*Second (1972)*	*Third (1976)*	*Fourth (1978)*	*Fifth (1982)*	*Sixth (1988)*
Ecuador	-	-	+	+	+	+
Egypt	+	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	-	-	+	-	+	+
Equatorial Guinea	..	-	-	-	+	-
Ethiopia	-	+	-	+	+	+
Fiji	..	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	-	+	+	+	+	-
Gambia	..	-	-	-	+	+
German Democratic Rep.	..	..	+	+	+	+
Germany, Federal Rep. of	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana	+	-	+	-	-	-
Greece	+	+	+	+	+	-
Grenada	..	..	..	..	..	-
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+	+
Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau	..	..	-	+	+	+
Guyana	..	-	+	+	-	+
Haiti	-	-	+	-	+	+
Holy See	+	-	-	-	+	-
Honduras	-	-	+	+	+	+
Hungary	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	-	+	+	-	-	-
India	+	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia	-	-	+	-	+	+
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	-	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	-	+	+	-	-
Israel	-	+	-	-	-	+
Italy	+	+	+	-	+	+
Jamaica	+	-	+	-	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+	+
Jordan	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	..	+	+	+	-	+
Kiribati	..	..	..	..	+	-
Kuwait	+	+	-	-	+	+
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	-	+	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	+	+	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	..	+	+	-	+	-
Liberia	+	+	+	-	+	+
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	-	+	+	-	+	-
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	-	-	+	+	+	+

ANNEX *(continued)*

Country	Inquiry					
	First (1963)	*Second (1972)*	*Third (1976)*	*Fourth (1978)*	*Fifth (1982)*	*Sixth (1988)*
Madagascar	-	+	+	+	+	+
Malawi	..	+	-	-	-	+
Malaysia	+	-	+	+	+	+
Maldives	..	-	-	+	+	-
Mali	-	-	-	+	+	-
Malta	..	-	-	-	+	+
Mauritania	-	-	-	+	+	+
Mauritius	..	-	+	-	+	+
Mexico	-	+	+	+	+	+
Monaco	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	+
Morocco	+	-	+	+	+	+
Mozambique	..	..	-	-	+	-
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nauru	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal	-	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+	-
Nicaragua	-	-	+	-	+	+
Niger	-	-	+	+	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	+	+	-	-
Norway	+	+	+	-	+	+
Oman	..	-	+	-	-	-
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	+	+
Papua New Guinea	..	..	+	+	+	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	+	-
Peru	-	+	-	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	-	+	+	-	+	+
Portugal	-	-	+	-	+	+
Qatar	..	-	+	-	+	-
Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+	+
Romania	-	+	+	+	+	-
Rwanda	-	+	+	+	+	-
Saint Kitts and Nevis	..	..	..	..	..	-
Saint Lucia	..	..	..	..	-	+
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	..	..	..	..	-	+
Samoa	+	-	+	+	-	-
San Marino	-	-	+	-	-	-
Sao Tome and Principe	..	..	-	-	+	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	+	-	-	-
Senegal	-	-	+	+	+	+
Seychelles	..	..	..	+	-	-

ANNEX *(continued)*

Country	Inquiry					
	First (1963)	*Second (1972)*	*Third (1976)*	*Fourth (1978)*	*Fifth (1982)*	*Sixth (1988)*
Sierra Leone	+	-	+	+	+	+
Singapore	..	+	+	+	+	+
Solomon Islands	..	..	..	..	-	-
Somalia	-	-	+	+	+	+
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	+
Spain	-	+	+	+	+	+
Sri Lanka	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	-	+	-	-	-
Suriname	..	..	-	-	-	-
Swaziland	..	+	+	-	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	-	-	+	+	+	+
Syrian Arab Republic	-	+	+	+	+	-
Thailand	-	+	+	+	+	+
Togo	-	-	+	+	+	-
Tonga	-	-	+	+	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	-	+	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	+	+	+	-	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+	+
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	-	-
Uganda	-	-	+	-	+	+
Ukrainian SSR	-	+	+	-	+	+
USSR	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Arab Emirates	..	+	+	-	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Rep. of Tanzania	-	+	+	-	+	+
United States of America	+	+	+	+	+	+
Uruguay	-	+	+	-	+	-
Vanuatu	..	..	..	..	+	+
Venezuela	+	-	-	-	-	+
Viet Nam	-	+	-	-	-	+
Yemen[b]	-	-	+	-	+	-
Yugoslavia	+	+	+	-	+	+
Zaire	-	-	+	-	+	-
Zambia	..	+	+	-	+	+
Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	+	+
TOTALS						
Received (+)	53	74	110	75	119	108
Not received (-)	71	71	45	83	47	62
Not applicable (..)	46	25	15	12	4	0
Grand total	170	170	170	170	170	170

Source: The Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

NOTE: A plus (+) indicates reply received; a minus (-) indicates reply not received; two dots (..) indicate not available because country neither a United Nations Member State nor an Observer at the time of the Inquiry.

[a] Formerly called Democratic Kampuchea.

[b] In 1990, Democratic Yemen and Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic) united to form the country currently called Yemen.

[c] Formerly called Burma.

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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE IN POPULATION POLICY

*Elizabeth S. Maguire**

The past 25 years have witnessed a remarkable change in the development of population policies, one that continues today. In the 1960s, any country that had adopted a formal population policy was an exception. Now, it is exceptional for a country not to have adopted or to be formulating a population policy. Improved knowledge of population dynamics and the role of family planning for the health and well-being of populations of developing countries has been instrumental in these changes. The knowledge base has been expanded through increased resources and technical innovations applied to the collection, analysis and dissemination of population information. The financial and human resources of multilateral and bilateral donors, private foundations, non-governmental organizations, universities and developing countries themselves have been essential.

The donor community has made a substantial and sustained contribution to population programmes in developing countries. The United States Agency for International Development was one of the first donors and has been a leader in providing population assistance for nearly a quarter of a century. The USAID Office of Population has played a pivotal role in carrying out the programme, which is implemented through centrally funded regional and bilateral agreements. This programme is focused primarily on fertility, family planning, family health and development. Concern with mortality and migration issues is generally limited to their relation to fertility.

The USAID population programme has supported activities directly related to the delivery of family planning services (e.g., training, information, recurrent budget support for service and commodities). These activities have accounted for 71 per cent of the Office of Population budget since 1965; biomedical and operations research have received another 16 per cent of funds. Policy and data collection projects have accounted for 13 per cent of the Office's funding, for a total of $200 million over the past 24 years. Although it has consumed only a relatively small portion of the USAID population funds, the Office's support of policy development has been an important source of technical and financial assistance for Governments of less developed countries wishing to formulate and implement population policies.

This paper focuses on the USAID role in policy development assistance. The paper reviews the evolution in population policy development in developing countries and describes how USAID assistance has responded to changing policy needs. It concludes with a discussion of future policy assistance needs. Also included is a preliminary tabular review of the contributions of other donor agencies to policy development.

A. Defining population policy

Population policy has been defined in numerous ways over the years. Because population policy has different definitions in different settings, USAID takes a broad view of its meaning. All collective actions that affect changes in demographic factors, whether intentional or not, are included in this definition.

The USAID definition goes beyond broad policies and general statements to incorporate specific actions to implement the policies. Implementation of population policies covers a wide range of mechanisms, including service delivery systems, educational strategies, laws affecting fertility determinants, regulations governing imports and local production of contraceptives, commercial and labour regulations and resource allocation plans in the public sector. In the private sector, implementation

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TABLE 3. REPRODUCTIVE INTENTIONS AMONG MARRIED WOMEN OF REPRODUCTIVE AGE, AFRICA, SURVEYS SINCE 1984

Country	*Year of survey*	*Percentage who wanted no more children*	*Percentage who wanted to space next child*
Botswana	1984	33	35[a]
Burundi	1987	24	53[b]
Kenya	1984	32	38[a]
Liberia	1986	17	33[b]
Mali	1987	17	33[b]
Nigeria (Ondo State)	1986	23	35[b]
Senegal	1985	19	30[b]
Zimbabwe	1984	13	33[b]

Sources: For Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys; for other countries, Demographic and Health Surveys.

[a] One or more years.
[b] Two or more years.

of population policies can include employee and dependant health-care programmes, private health service programmes and commercial marketing.

B. EVOLUTION OF POPULATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Fertility decline

Many developing countries have undergone dramatic changes in fertility and mortality rates over the past 30 years in fertility and mortality rates. These changes have helped stimulate a demographic transition in the third world which has led to much lower rates of population growth in some countries.

The transition to low rates of fertility is well under way in some less developed regions and is just beginning in others. Declines in total fertility rates between the early 1960s and the 1980s are estimated to have been highest in East Asia (57 per cent), followed by Latin America and South Asia (31 and 25 per cent, respectively). The decline has been much more moderate in the African region, estimated at 5 per cent, and it is attributable largely to the countries of Northern Africa. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility has remained at high levels, recent survey data suggest that a potential demand for family planning, expressed in percentages of women wanting to limit or space children, may be present in a number of countries (table 3).

The population policy revolution

The majority of third world Governments have come to recognize the importance of lowering rates of population growth for their development objectives as well as for the improvement of family welfare. From 1965 to 1988, the trend in official positions on population growth has been dramatic if not revolutionary (table 4). In many countries, the official positions favouring lower population growth have been accompanied by the adoption of explicit policies to lower fertility and growth and to support family planning programmes.

Countries in Asia and the Near East[1] were the first to acknowledge the need for national population policies. By 1965 some of the largest countries had enacted population policies (with varying degress of success); these included China, India, Pakistan and Turkey. Population policies soon were adopted by countries in Latin America as well as by a few in Africa so that by 1975, the number of developing countries with some form of fertility reduction policies had doubled to 31.

The most remarkable change in policy development has occurred in sub-Saharan Africa during the period since 1975. In 1975, only four African countries had official policies for lowering population growth rates. Since that time, six more countries have promulgated official policies—five of these since 1980. An additional 12 countries, including two of the largest, the Sudan and Zaire, are currently developing national population policies.

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FAVOURING LOWER POPULATION GROWTH RATES, BY REGION[a], 1965, 1975, 1988

Region	*1965*	*1975*	*1988*
Africa[a]	1	4	27
Asia and Near East[a]	9	18	20
Latin America	0	9	16
TOTAL	10	31	63

Sources: For 1965: Dorothy Nortman, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Factbook*, Reports on Population/Family Planning, No. 2 (New York, The Population Council, 1973); for 1975: Dorothy Nortman, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium of Data through 1983* (New York, The Population Council, 1985); for 1988, United States Agency for International Development, *Budget Summaries, FY65-FY88* (Washington, D.C. 1988).

NOTE: This table covers countries fitting Nortman definition "A" or those with official positions to reduce the population growth rate. Official positions refer to either national-level or operational policies. The 1988 figures include such countries as the Sudan, Togo and Zaire, which have current drafts of population policies and are about to enact them.

[a] Assignment of countries to regional categories is based on USAID geographical divisions. Thus, Asia and Near East includes North Africa; Africa includes all sub-Saharan African countries.

Altogether, 63 countries, with well over 90 per cent of the population of the less developed regions, have Governments that officially support lower population growth. In addition, Governments in 95 countries provide support for family planning.

Reasons for population policy development

Population policies in developing countries have been widely adopted in part because of the growing body of information and research on population and family planning, demonstrating that population growth in many developing countries is the highest in human history. Accordingly, Governments and donors, primarily concerned with prospects for economic and social development, identified rapid population growth as a major obstacle to economic progress. When economic growth began to falter in these countries during the late 1970s and the 1980s, population growth became an increasingly important policy issue and government leaders became convinced of the need to develop policies to lower it.

Over 100 fertility and contraceptive use surveys have been conducted in 56 developing countries since 1974. These surveys disclosed a considerable and growing demand for family planning by third world couples. New evidence from these surveys shows the health benefits of family planning, in particular, birth-spacing, for mothers and children. Other research demonstrated that the combination of strong family planning programmes and advancing levels of development (as measured by literacy, school enrolment and infant mortality) results in increases in contraceptive prevalence and decreases in fertility (Ness, Johnson and Bernstein, 1983; Lapham and Mauldin, 1985). This information helped to bolster the confidence of third world leaders that they were embarking on policy and programme activities that reflected the national will, that would benefit the well-being of families and that were effective interventions.

The changing nature of population policies

During the 1960s and much of the 1970s, many population policies or statements of official support were general or macro in nature. Some of the larger Asian countries, such as China and Indonesia, did carry their macro-policies to the operational stage (Freedman, 1987). But the majority of countries with policies or "official support" before 1975 had only general statements of commitment backed by a few efforts to implement those policies.

The promulgation of a national population policy has only limited effect on fertility behaviour unless it is supported by effective implementation leading to greater availability of family planning services. Governments are becoming increasingly aware of the need to emphasize policy implementation. This recognition is nowhere more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa. The recent population policy development activities in Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, the Sudan, Togo and Zaire are distinguished by their attention to policy implementation. In these countries, specific implementation plans are being developed as part of national policies. Other

Figure VI. United States Agency for International Development population policy process



countries with long-established population policies, such as Indonesia, are reassessing their implementation strategies as the demand for family planning outstrips the Government's ability to provide services.

Phases of USAID policy assistance

USAID policy assistance supports the many steps that lead to the articulation and implementation of population policies consonant with the development and family welfare objectives of developing countries. The policy development process moves from awareness of a problem to the analysis of policy options for solving the problem and lastly to policy formulation and implementation. The process is regenerated through policy evaluation. The USAID policy development programme includes five components: data collection and analysis; research; dissemination; policy planning; and policy formulation, implementation and evaluation (figure VI).[2] Assistance is given through an institution-building framework which emphasizes the strengthening skills and the provision of tools to local institutions for furthering policy and programme development. The central projects of the Office of Population primarily support institutional development through short-term training, technical assistance and subproject support.[3]

The activities of the Office of Population in population policy, as in all programme areas, are carried out through co-operating agencies, including United States governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, private research institutes, universities and businesses. In the policy area, there have been 92 agreements with co-operating agencies (primarily based in the United States) since 1965 (table 5). Working with co-operating agencies has been an extremely effective strategy for assistance because: *(a)* it provides an unparalleled level and range of technical expertise and institutional experience; *(b)* it supports focused efforts not possible through bilateral agreements (e.g., surveys, private sector projects); *(c)* it makes possible quick responses to targets of opportunity; *(d)* its flexible and competitive nature invites innovation; and *(e)* it is designed to complement other donor assistance.

As population policy and programme needs have evolved in developing countries, so too has USAID policy assistance. Three phases of assistance correspond to the changing needs in policy development in developing countries since 1965. These phases overlap, and elements of earlier phases continue to the present. Often, methodologies and approaches to population policy assistance developed in one period were applied more broadly in a subsequent period. These phases are defined more by focus and geographical orientation than by levels

TABLE 5. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FOR POPULATION POLICY ACTIVITIES: OFFICE OF POPULATION OBLIGATIONS, 1965-1988

(Millions of dollars)

Activity	*1965-1973*	*1974-1983*	*1984-1988*[a]	*Total*
Data collection	11.1	72.2	21.6	104.8
Per annum	1.2	7.2	4.3	4.4
Percentage	44	66	33	53
Research	7.1	17.7	13.0	37.8
Per annum	0.8	1.8	2.6	1.6
Percentage	28	16	20	19
Policy support[b]	7.1	19.1	30.1	56.9
Per annum	0.8	2.0	6.0	2.4
Percentage	28	18	46	29
TOTAL	25.2	109.7	64.7	199.6
Per annum	2.8	11.0	12.9	8.3
Percentage	100	100	100	100

Source: United States Agency for International Development summary, 1988.

[a] Obligations for 1984-1988 include funding added from bilateral and regional population projects to the Office of Population.

[b] Policy support includes dissemination, policy planning and policy formulation, implementation and evaluation.

of funding devoted to policy programme components. Table 5 shows USAID expenditures on policy activities for the period 1965-1988.

Phase I. Data collection and research

When Governments and donors turned their attention to the population issue in the 1960s, little was known about the dimensions of the problem. Reliable information on demographic indicators, population projections, fertility behaviour, fertility determinants, population and development relationships and even on the actual size of national populations was not readily available, particularly for African countries. A better understanding of population problems was required for effective population policies to be developed.

The thrust of the initial USAID programme in population policy was to create more reliable information and to improve analyses of demographic and related issues. A central assumption of early policy assistance was that if reliable and up-to-date information was made available to policy makers, they would be stimulated to develop national policies. USAID saw itself as an "information broker", sponsoring data collection and research and providing forums for the dissemination of that information.

During the period 1965-1973, Office of Population expenditures for policy activities began at a low level and increased dramatically. Prior to 1969, USAID spent less than $200,000 per annum on data collection and research. By 1970-1973, the budget for policy activities had jumped to an average of $5.5 million per annum.

Of the $25 million allocated to policy activities between 1965 and 1973, nearly half (44 per cent) supported data collection. The remaining resources were evenly split between fertility research and policy support. This was a time of developing methodologies for data collection and research. These efforts included improving methodologies for census-taking, developing software for processing census data and preparing training materials and protocols for census work. Beginning in 1965, USAID established what was to become a long-standing collaboration with the United States Bureau of the Census for compilation, evaluation and analysis of demographic data as well as workshops and training for participants from less developed countries. Although much of this work was based in the United States, the initial field support was provided for conducting censuses, surveys and vital registration systems. Many of these efforts provided a foundation for activities to be undertaken subsequently.

Research efforts on fertility determinants, population dynamics and population growth consequences were undertaken through grants to over a dozen academic and research institutions, including the University of North Carolina, the California Institute of Technology, the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Smithsonian Institution. Policy work was largely based in the United States; it was addressed to American audiences and was undertaken through agreements with various co-operating agencies, such as Tufts University. Efforts focused on the rationale for establishing population policies, assessing the nature of existing population policies and laws, and providing some early analyses of consequences of population growth in developing countries. Field support was provided to a limited number of countries. Fifty subprojects were carried out in developing countries; two thirds of these were in six countries, of which five were in Asia (Population Reference Bureau, 1974).

In 1968, the Office of Population began support to the United Nations Population Fund. Funds for population policy and data collection activities were second only to those for family planning services (Sadik, 1984).

Phase II. Determinants and consequences of population change

The second phase of the USAID population policy programme covers the period from 1974 to 1983. Funding for policy assistance increased and the activities became more field-oriented. Generating accurate and timely demographic data and analysis remained a very important objective. Increasing emphasis was placed on: *(a)* improving the understanding of population and development relations; *(b)* raising awareness of the consequences of rapid population growth; and *(c)* strengthening the capacity of Governments to consider population problems and policy responses. This latter objective responded to the growing interest in population and development policies of third world leaders following the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974.

This phase of policy assistance witnessed a major geographical expansion. In the first phase, USAID was active in a handful of countries, mainly in Asia. By the end of Phase II, USAID had sponsored policy activities in over 50 developing countries throughout Asia and Latin America and in portions of Africa.

The budget for USAID policy assistance expanded from an average of slightly under $3 million to $11 million per annum, or a total of approximately $110 million for the period 1974-1983. Data collection was greatly intensified and accounted for more than 60 per cent of the total budget for policy work. USAID, along with UNFPA, made a major commitment to sample surveys through the World Fertility Survey (WFS), which was implemented by the International Statistical Institute (ISI) (see ISI, 1984). By the late 1970s, ISI established a data archive to facilitate access to the survey data.[4] Later, USAID launched a second survey programme, the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS, 1977-1985), to collect more programme-related information. USAID contributed to the support of 20-25 surveys in the World Fertility Survey, 40 Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys and the 1980 round of censuses in over 40 countries in all the less developed regions. In part because of the greatly increased availability of demographic and family planning data, the Demographic Data for Development project (DDD) with Westinghouse was initiated in 1982. The project assisted developing country institutions in analysing existing, but underutilized, information through training and technical assistance.

Remaining policy resources were fairly evenly split between fertility research and policy support. In 1974, USAID began funding research activities of the East-West Population Institute. In 1977, USAID initiated another long-term relationship with a key institution in policy analysis, the Committee on Population (then the Committee on Population and Demography) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Now a standing committee of NAS, this Committee and the many special working groups it sponsored prepared numerous reviews on topics key to USAID and other donor assistance programmes. These early reports covered levels and trends of fertility and mortality and the determinants of fertility. Between 1975 and 1979, 17 individual research grants on the determinants of fertility were made directly by USAID almost exclusively to universities and research institutes in the United States.

In 1980, USAID made a major commitment to collaborative research and to research sponsored by less developed countries, through the International Research Awards Program on the Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries (AWARDS) during the period 1980-1988. Administered by the Population Council, the AWARDS program supported 37 research projects, including eight in African countries. Research projects were increasingly carried out by research institutions in developing

countries in collaboration with United States universities and research institutions. Towards the end of this period, greater emphasis was being placed on deriving policy and programme-relevant findings from the various research endeavours and disseminating these findings through special publications, conferences and seminars.

The RAPID simulation models were prepared and presented in over 40 countries in all world regions. USAID also supported intensive policy development activities in 20 countries and assisted planning ministries in 18 countries. (Implementation of many of these activities was carried over into the third phase of USAID policy assistance.) This heightened level of assistance reflected an ever-increasing demand from Governments and institutions of developing countries for policy support. USAID policy analysis activities provided direct assistance to Governments wishing to examine their policy needs, to consider various policy options in light of their particular needs and to formulate national or sectoral policies.

During this phase, USAID systematically began to collect information on the population policies of developing countries. Through the DDD project of Westinghouse, a comprehensive framework was developed for compiling policy data. Population policy briefs were prepared and widely disseminated for 36 countries, including 23 in Africa. This activity has been carried over into Phase III and is supported under the Options for Population Policy (OPTIONS) project. In addition, an international, computerized data bank with information on population, family planning, population policy and related socio-economic data on 190 countries was developed.[5]

Phase III. Policy formulation and implementation

The third phase of policy assistance began in 1984 and will undoubtedly extend through the 1990s. The annual policy budget increased about 20 per cent over the earlier period, to an average of $13 million per annum. Although fertility research has continued at a moderate level, there has been a marked shift from data collection to substantially increased support for policy formulation and implementation, accounting for 46 per cent of the total budget during this period.

This phase of USAID policy assistance is best understood as a response to earlier activities sponsored by Governments and donors to stimulate demand for population policies. Increased demand for population policies derives not only from earlier awareness-raising activities but also from a new understanding of the dimensions of the population issue.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the principal population policy concern of Governments and donors was to determine if a policy was needed and if so, to stimulate interest in its development. More and better information was called for to increase awareness in third world countries of the need to address rapid population growth. By the mid-1980s, the majority of Governments throughout the world had agreed that rapid population growth was a major developmental and human welfare concern (United Nations, 1984). The question of the mid- and late 1980s does not concern whether to have a population policy, but how to design and implement one.

The challenge for policy assistance became ever more complex because of a levelling-off of donor resources at a time when demand for population assistance was increasing in all regions, most markedly in sub-Saharan Africa. This increased demand for assistance was sparked in no small measure by the growing demand of couples in all regions to limit and space births. To meet the growing demand, USAID policy assistance has been geared increasingly to supporting highly leveraged activities that can stimulate new sources of support (for example, in the for-profit private sector) and to providing evidence to Governments of the value of their investments in family planning.

At the beginning of this phase, USAID initiated several new efforts directed to meeting the increased demand for formulating and implementing national policies. In addition, USAID began to focus specifically on the private sector through the Technical Information on Population for the Private Sector (TIPPS) project, by assisting businesses and large health providers in expanding family planning service delivery. The demand for assistance in the area of policy formulation and implementation has nearly swamped the largest USAID policy assistance project, OPTIONS, which is carried out by the Futures Group, the University of North Carolina, the Population Reference Bureau and John Short and Associates.

Although USAID policy assistance has shifted more towards policy formulation and implementation, support for basic data collection through census assistance and demographic surveys has continued. The United States Bureau of the Census concentrates its technical assistance and training activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The Demographic and Health

Surveys (DHS) project (1984-1993), the successor to the WFS and CPS projects, has expanded the data it collects to include information on health, particularly maternal and child health. The new emphasis on health data responds to the needs of child survival and birth-spacing programmes. Both data-collection efforts have taken advantage of rapidly improving microcomputer technologies for processing data.

In the research area, USAID has moved away from large-scale support of fertility determinants research. Research is an important component of the DHS project under "further analysis projects" with developing country institutions administered by the Population Council. The National Academy of Sciences continues to provide policy guidance to the donor community. Two studies completed in this period cover, respectively, population growth and economic development, and the effectiveness of family planning programmes. Ongoing efforts include a major study of the health consequences of controlled fertility and contraceptive use in developing countries and a conference on the demographic and programmatic implications of contraceptive development.

During Phase III, USAID continued policy support through several projects begun in the 1970s and renewed in the mid-1980s (see Integrated Population and Development Planning (IPDP and INPLAN), and RAPID I, II and III in the annex). The approach to awareness-raising developed under the early projects increasingly stressed institution-building and technology transfer in the application and dissemination of the various models. Various generic microcomputer-based models have been developed which project population growth and estimate future requirements for family planning. One such endeavour, the TARGET model developed by the Population Council and the RAPID project, utilizes a refined methodology to project contraceptive users by method under different assumptions about fertility rates.

Other simulation models present more detailed information on sectoral or topical consequences (e.g., health or environment). For example, the INPLAN project developed a retrospective cost/benefit model which shows the social expenditure savings generated by family planning programmes. USAID also decided to emphasize information dissemination through a specific project, Innovative Materials for Population Action (IMPACT), which is directed to presenting key research findings in attractive formats for high-level decision-makers. Lastly, USAID has substantially increased its support to countries requesting assistance in analysing and developing national population policies through the OPTIONS project.

During Phase III of USAID policy assistance, there was a major geographical redistribution of activities. The 1980s is proving to be the decade of sub-Saharan Africa in so far as USAID population policy assistance is concerned. In 1980, about 15 per cent of USAID policy assistance was devoted to sub-Saharan Africa. By 1988, nearly 50 per cent of the policy budget supported activities in 23 sub-Saharan countries.

C. Major innovations in policy assistance

Over the past 25 years, a number of advances and innovations have improved the effectiveness of USAID policy assistance work. The following discussion covers the most recent advances spanning the five major areas of USAID policy assistance.

Data collection and analysis

The Demographic and Health Survey questionnaire currently includes information on maternal and child health, birth-spacing practices and family planning services, and characteristics of community-level programmes. These surveys provide more useful information for programme planning and evaluation.

Census assistance and the DHS programme have adapted microcomputer technologies for data processing. Microcomputer software programs have been developed for censuses, the Integrated Microcomputer Processing System (IMPS) of the United States Bureau of the Census; and for surveys, the Integrated System for Survey Analysis (ISSA). These innovations have reduced the costs of conducting censuses and surveys and speeded the turn-round time for generating demographic information.

Research

Projects supported under the AWARDS programme were primarily carried out by researchers from developing countries or were collaborative endeavours. Project proposals were reviewed by an independent peer review. Technical assistance provided for proposal development and project

implementation as well as for the transfer of microcomputers enhancing a capacity-building objective.

NAS now has a standing Committee on Population to provide USAID and other donors with an independent assessment of key population policy and research issues.

Dissemination

Census and survey data compilation incorporates more effective dissemination activities. *World Population Profile*, a biennial report produced by the Bureau of the Census, is a chart book summarizing world population trends.

Greater emphasis has been placed on disseminating research findings within existing research projects. Under the AWARDS programme, a special series, *Fertility Determinants Research Notes*, was developed to inform policy makers of key findings.

One entire project, IMPACT, concentrates on presenting population information and research results in formats appropriate for busy policy makers in developing countries. For example, *Family Planning Saves Lives* presents the results of analysis of WFS data. Another brochure, *Contraceptive Safety: Rumours and Reality*, covers the most recent information on the advantages and disadvantages of the major contraceptive methods.

Policy planning

Microcomputer technology has been utilized for more than 10 years to convey information on the implications of population growth to policy makers. Microcomputer-based models have been refined to become easier to use and adapt and so are more readily transferred to local technical organizations.

Cost/benefit studies have been developed for national, sectoral and business applications. For example, a cost/benefit analysis conducted in Indonesia with the Ministry of Health showed the savings in social services (health and education) from investments made in the national family planning programme. Another innovative application consists of cost/benefit policy analyses and presentations for private sector employers. These analyses have helped stimulate private sector participation in expanding delivery of family planning services in Peru.

Policy formulation, implementation and evaluation

Policy tools have been and are being developed to assist developing country policy makers and planners in formulating policies. *Population Policy*, a manual prepared by Columbia University describes the essential elements of population policies in 20 countries throughout the world. Under the OPTIONS project, a policy tools manual is being prepared on the policy development process which identifies the various tools available at each stage of the policy process.

Increased use has been made of study tours as a way of enabling government officials in one country to learn at first hand from the experience of others in developing and implementing population policies. Study tours have been an especially important component of policy work in a number of African countries.

Technical assistance in policy development is increasingly provided by experienced experts and policy makers in developing countries. For example, a high-level official from Zaire participated in a series of key policy development meetings in Togo and was instrumental in bringing lessons from an ongoing policy development experience to one just beginning. In a high-level seminar at the African Development Bank (ADB), on population and development, senior population experts and policy officials from several African countries presented a compelling case for ADB involvement in population activities.

D. Donor co-ordination

Population policy assistance implemented by the many USAID-funded co-operating agencies frequently complements or is carried out in concert with the assistance provided by other donors (for a review of such assistance, see table 6). Examples of these complementary or joint endeavours cover all five areas of policy assistance.

TABLE 6. POPULATION POLICY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER DONOR AGENCIES, BY MAJOR AREA, 1977-1985

(Millions of dollars)

Major area	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*Total*	*Percentages*
Basic data collection	9.1	17.2	27.5	32.4	37.0	22.9	12.7	13.9	14.1	186.8	33.6
Research, analysis and training (population dynamics)	9.7	16.4	28.4	24.7	29.0	19.9	19.2	21.4	22.2	190.9	34.4
Policy formulation/evaluation/ implementation	50.5	7.1	17.2	23.3	25.3	13.1	12.4	14.0	16.0	178.8	32.1
Total	69.3	40.7	73.1	80.4	91.3	55.9	44.3	49.3	52.3	556.7	100.0
As percentage of all population assistance	19.9	10.4	16.2	16.9	18.6	14.8	12.2	11.4	10.8	14.6	100.0

Sources: Barbara Herz, *Official Development Assistance for Population Activities: A Review*, World Bank Staff Working Paper, No. 688 (Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 1984), tables 1.1, 3.1 and 3.2; and Dorothy Nortman, *The Global Assistance Report on Donor Commitments and Expenditures for Less Developed Country Population Programs* (New York, United Nations Population Fund, forthcoming).

Under data collection and analysis, UNFPA and USAID jointly funded the WFS programme, with additional substantial contributions from the British Overseas Development Administration. UNFPA has provided funds and/or equipment for DHS in Bolivia, Burundi, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Morocco and Myanmar (formerly called Burma). The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has also contributed to surveys in Bolivia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. The Rockefeller Foundation is supporting the collection and analysis of a special module on women's employment in Bolivia, Egypt and Ghana. In a related area, the WFS data archive of ISI has been supported by USAID through March 1988 and will now be funded by UNFPA for at least another two years. Census assistance has benefited from the Inter-agency Co-ordinating Committee for Censuses in sub-Saharan Africa, which was established in 1985. The Committee fosters communication and co-ordination among the three principal donors for census activities—UNFPA, USAID and the World Bank. The United States Bureau of the Census acts as the technical member of the Committee, which meets on a regular basis to review country activities, identify countries with financial shortfalls and avoid duplication of effort.

Activities in the research area have benefited from the contributions of other donors and an impressive group of experts from academic and international organizations. The programme of the NAS Committee on Population is being funded by USAID and the Hewlett, Mellon and Rockefeller foundations. Members of the Committee and the various working groups from universities in the United States, international institutions and institutions in the developing countries contribute their time to carry out the Committee's work. Similarly, the AWARDS Program benefited from the contribution of many scholars who participated in guiding the programme and provided peer review of proposed research.

Donors have also participated in the activities of dissemination projects. UNFPA has funded RAPID analyses in Paraguay, Togo and Zambia. The IMPACT project has prepared materials in collaboration with other donors for: the All-Africa Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development; the Safe Motherhood Conference (the World Bank, WHO and UNFPA) and the International Conference on Better Health for Women and Children through Family Planning (sponsored by IPPF, The Population Council, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, the World Bank and WHO).

Several activities in the area of policy planning and implementation have involved donor co-ordination. The 1987 Expert Workshop on Microcomputer-based Software for Population and Development Planning, organized by NAS, was jointly sponsored by USAID and the ILO. Many of the national population units established in planning ministries in developing countries with UNFPA funding have also received USAID-funded technical assistance, training and technology transfer through the IPDP, RAPID II, INPLAN and OPTIONS projects. UNFPA, through a special policy project called National Applications Project (NAPRO), has worked side by side with USAID projects in Botswana, Liberia, Togo and Zambia. In the early 1980s, USAID and UNFPA funding helped establish the Socio-economic and Demographic Unit of the Sahel Institute. This unit recently became the Center for Population and Development Studies (CERPOD), with an expanded mandate that includes population policy development. Donor support for CERPOD has also expanded to include bilateral contributions from Canada, France, Italy and the Netherlands, and grants from the Rockefeller and Ford foundations and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Lastly, national policy development efforts in Ecuador, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire, among other countries, have received funding from various donors, including USAID, UNFPA and the World Bank.

The list given above is far from a comprehensive accounting of the many policy assistance activities on which donors have collaborated. Even so, it represents an impressive range of such endeavours.

E. Priorities for the future

The future of the USAID population programme assumes an ever-increasing demand for family planning. The increased demand is linked to three factors: a growing number of countries seeking USAID population assistance; a growing number of married women of reproductive age in those countries; and a growing demand for family planning by couples who want to space or limit births (table 7). An important part of the demand for family planning (measured as a percentage of married women of reproductive age who wanted no more children) in USAID-supported countries increased by nearly 50 per cent between 1975 and 1987. It is estimated that the number of married women practising contraception in all developing countries will increase from 256 million in 1984 to 462 million in 2000 (Menken, 1986;

TABLE 7. POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR FAMILY PLANNING IN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1975-1987

Measure	*1975*	*1987*	*Percentage change*
USAID-funded countries	48	70	75
Married women aged 15-49 (millions)	260	331	27
Married women of reproductive age who wanted no more children (millions)	113	167	48

Sources: For number of married women of reproductive age, figures based on *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.XIII.3); data include all countries supported by USAID. For percentage who wanted no more children, figures based on demographic surveys conducted between 1976 and 1987 (World Fertility Surveys, Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys, and Demographic and Health Surveys).

NOTE: Estimates were prepared separately for each of the three USAID geographical regions (Africa, Asia and Near East, and Latin America) through a regression of the percentage who stated that they wanted no more children in the survey year. Point estimates were then weighted by the married women of reproductive age in countries supported by USAID to produce the total estimate.

Bulatao, 1984). New resources, more efficient delivery systems, new delivery channels and a more integrated approach by Governments and the private sector will be needed to meet this growing demand.

The question is what can be anticipated to be the needs in population policy assistance as the transition in world fertility and contraceptive practice proceeds. USAID will continue to support fertility surveys, awareness-raising activities and simulation modelling. However, the focus will continue to shift from assisting third world Governments in formulating national policies to helping them implement them. The relative mix of policy assistance will, of course, vary by region. The following brief notes suggest how USAID policy assistance may change in the coming years:

(a) *Data collection and analysis*. Data collection activities will be expanded to address programme issues. In addition to basic demographic indicators and contraceptive behaviour, future data collection will emphasize more detailed characteristics of family planning demand and supply. For example, information on user profiles, unmet need, sources of supply and price and income elasticities will contribute to understanding of the "market" for family planning. This type of information will enable programme planners to segment the family planning market and channel resources more efficiently and effectively. Understanding the family planning market and how to meet demand will be a major challenge to programme designers in the 1990s;

(b) *Policy planning*. The consequences of high fertility and rapid population growth for countries and individuals are increasingly understood. The majority of Governments of developing countries have adopted policies to lower fertility and population growth and to support family planning services. Policy planning activities will help Governments to assess policy options. Modelling activities will give greater attention to estimating current and future demand and resource requirements;

(c) *Policy formulation and implementation*. To meet the spiralling demand for family planning services, USAID analyses show that local governments and the private sector will have to take a larger share of fiscal responsibility (Gillespie, 1987; Cross, 1986). Policy assistance now places more emphasis on stimulating investments by the private sector (both by providers and consumers). Perhaps even more important for the future, donors will need to assist Governments in effecting structural adjustments to produce long-term sustainability of the population sector. To achieve sustainability, Governments of developing countries will need to work with both the private sector and donors through a broad-sector approach, viewing the range of population activities as a single, integrated system. A sector strategy can help identify "underserved" and "overserved" segments of the market, the constraints on stimulating greater demand and the obstacles to promoting a more efficient match between supply and demand. Understanding these various constraints and obstacles will allow Governments to set policy priorities across the sector (including needed changes in laws and regulations) in order to implement a national policy to expand family planning use.

Another advantage of a sector approach is that it offers opportunities for identifying highly leveraged policy and programme activities. This aspect is especially important for Governments and donors

faced with resource shortages which must select those policy reforms and activities with the greatest potential impact on the family planning market.

Conclusion

USAID will continue to provide strong support to developing countries in population policy development and implementation. It will also continue to co-ordinate policy and programme activities with other donors. Policy work may very well be at the centre of development assistance in the coming decades. Donors simply do not have the human or financial resources to meet the expanding demand for social services in the third world. They must therefore concentrate on support activities that stimulate local investments and result in permanent, sustainable changes in local structures. This is particularly true for family planning services, where recurrent costs are projected to rise threefold by the turn of the century. The challenge will be to stimulate both the demand for family planning and the local capacity to supply services. Improving the environment for policy development and implementation offers perhaps the best hope for meeting this challenge and generating the human and financial resources necessary to continue the progress achieved in family planning to date.

Notes

[1] Regional categories are based on geographical divisions used by the United States Agency for International Development. Thus, Asia and the Near East includes Northern Africa; Africa includes all sub-Saharan African countries.

[2] In the subsequent discussion, three components (dissemination, policy planning and policy formulation, implementation and evaluation) are sometimes combined into one, policy support.

[3] Long-term training and core institutional funding is most often supported through the USAID bilateral and regional projects. (Table 3 indicates the number of trainees supported by USAID and discusses briefly the nature and trends in the training area.)

[4] USAID continued to support the International Statistical Institute (ISI) data archive (Dynamic Data Base) into 1988. UNFPA will provide the subsequent funding. Policy support activities also became more field-oriented and were implemented principally through several projects with United States institutions, including the Battelle Memorial Institute, the Research Triangle Institute, the Futures Group and Columbia University. These projects, the most well known being Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID), supported: in-country research reviews and seminars on population policy issues; technical assistance and training to incorporate population factors into development planning; development of RAPID awareness-raising projection models; and assistance to policy makers in developing countries in reforming laws and policies on population, family planning and the status of women.

[5] This followed the development of an earlier data bank housed at the Population Reference Bureau. The United States Bureau of the Census has for years compiled demographic data and developed the International Data Base. Currently, USAID partially supports the data bank and compilation work of the United States Bureau of the Census.

ANNEX

United States Agency for International Development: population policy assistance projects, 1965-1988

Project	*Organization*	*Years*[a]
	I. Data collection	
Development of methodology for estimating birth and death rates and population changes from interview data	National Center for Health Statistics	1965-1967
Demographic studies	United States Bureau of the Census	1965-1971
Demographic Methods Handbook	United States Bureau of the Census	1965
New Florencia Workshop	United States Bureau of the Census	1968-1971
Demographic services	United States Bureau of the Census	1968-1971
Laboratories for population studies	University of North Carolina	1968
Laboratories for population studies, Phase II	University of North Carolina	1969-1974
Correspondence training in household sample surveys	United States Bureau of the Census	1970-1971
Population data systems	United States Bureau of the Census	1972-1977
Laboratories for population statistics, Phase III	University of North Carolina	1975-1977
Demographic data collection in Asia	East-West Population Institute	1977-1982
World Fertility Survey (WFS)	International Statistical Institute	1972-1984
Disease and demography survey	United States Centers for Disease Control	1972-1977
African data for decision-making	National Data Use and Access Laboratories	1973-1975
Population dynamics in Asia and the Pacific	East-West Population Institute	1974-1977
Evaluation of family planning effectiveness	University of Chicago	1975-1978
Measurement of demographic change	National Center for Health Statistics	1976-1982
Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS)	Westinghouse Electric Corporation	1977-1985
Collection of birth and death data	University of North Carolina	1978-1982
1980 round of census	United States Bureau of the Census	1978-1982
	NTS Research Corporation	
	Data Use and Access Laboratories	
Demographic data for development	United States Bureau of the Census	1982-1988
Dynamic data base	International Statistical Institute	1984-1988
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)	Westinghouse Institute for Resource Development	1984-1989
	The Population Council	
Africa training seminars	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population	1985-1986
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS II)	To be determined	1988-1993
Demographic Data Initiatives (DDI)	United States Bureau of the Census	1988-1993
	II. Research	
Study of the effect of population growth on USAID goals	University of Pittsburgh	1965
Conference on Population Dynamics	Johns Hopkins University	1965
Multivariate factors influencing fertility	Harvard University	1968-1971
Development Center Population Project	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	1968-1974
Human fertility consequences	Rand Corporation	1968
Determinants of fertility	Rand Corporation	1969-1973

ANNEX *(continued)*

Project	*Organization*	*Years*[a]
Situation reports on population problems, policies and programmes	California Institute of Technology	1969-1975
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population Conference	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population	1969-1970
The epidemiology of outcome of pregnancy in diverse cultures in selected countries	Johns Hopkins University	1969-1973
Determinants of family planning attitudes and practices	Harvard University	1969-1973
Utilization of family planning services	Wake Forest University	1969-1971
Cross-cultural research in fertility behaviour	American Institute for Research	1970-1972
A study of fertility rates and earnings capacity of rural migrants in Latin America	University of Wisconsin	1971-1975
Cultural factors in population programmes	American Association for the Advancement of Science	1973-1977
Survey of economic and demographic family behaviour	Rand Corporation	1974-1976
Fertility determinants and consequences	Smithsonian Institution	1975
Fertility determinants and consequences	University of Michigan	1977-1979
Fertility determinants and consequences	University of Texas	1977-1979
Fertility determinants and consequences	University of North Carolina	1977-1980
Fertility determinants and consequences	University of Chicago	1977-1980
Fertility determinants and consequences	Research Institute for the Study of Man	1977-1979
Fertility determinants and consequences	Center for Policy Research	1977-1980
Fertility determinants and consequences	East-West Population Institute	1977-1981
Fertility determinants and consequences	Rajshash University, Bangladesh	1977-1980
Fertility determinants and consequences	Government of Paraguay	1977
Fertility determinants and consequences	Yale University	1978-1982
Fertility determinants and consequences	Boston University	1978-1981
Fertility determinants and consequences	Virginia Polytechnic Institute	1979-1982
Compilation and analysis of population data	Population Reference Bureau	1978-1982
	National Academy of Sciences	
	United States Bureau of the Census	
International Research Awards Program on the Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries (AWARDS)	The Population Council	1980-1988
Demographic Data for Development (DDD)	Westinghouse Public Applied Systems	1982-1988
	East-West Population Institute	
Expert studies of population issues	National Academy of Sciences	1985-1990
Demographic Data Initiatives	East-West Population (under negotiation)	1988-1993
	III. Policy support	
Rationale for population policies	National Academy of Sciences	1968-1971
Population/economic growth analysis	General Electric Company	1968-1969
		1974-1978

ANNEX *(continued)*

Project	*Organization*	*Years*[a]
Improvement of population programme and policy design	University of North Carolina	1969-1973
Law and population programme	Tufts University	1970-1977
Analysis and evaluation of population policies and dynamics	Smithsonian Institution	1972-1977
Statistical research on population policies	Rand Corporation	1972-1975
Population policy analysis	Battelle Memorial Institute and	1975-1983
	University of California, Berkeley	
Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (Rapid I)	The Futures Group	1977-1982
Integrated Population and Development Planning (IPDP)	Research Triangle Institute	1979-1984
The Development Law and Policy Program (DLPP)	Columbia University	1984-1986
Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (Rapid II)	The Futures Group	1983-1988
Programmed support grant	Population Reference Bureau	1983-1985
Integrated Population and Development Planning (INPLAN)	Research Triangle Institute	1984-1987
Innovative Materials for Population Action (IMPACT)	Population Reference Bureau	1985-1990
	Intercultural Communications, Inc.	
Technical Information on Population for the Private Sector (TIPPS)	John Short and Associates	1985-1990
	University Research Corporation	
Options for Population Policy (OPTIONS)	The Futures Group	1986-1991
	Population Reference Bureau	
	John Short and Associates	
	University of North Carolina	
Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development (RAPID III)	The Futures Group	1988-1992
	Research Triangle Institute	
Programmed support	Population Reference Bureau	1988-1992

Sources: United States Agency for International Development, *Projects in Population and Family Planning, Fiscal Years 1965 through 1977* (Washington, D.C., 1978); *Overview of AID Assistance in Population Policy Development* (Washington, D.C., 1985, 1986 and 1988).

[a] Fiscal year obligation

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V. THE RELATION BETWEEN POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

*David Coleman**

A. Background information

This paper considers how research is translated into government policy in fields outside population policy. This author's experience is as a consumer of research for government policy-making, not as a researcher into the process, who concentrates on the relation between researchers and government policy-making from the consumers' view rather than from the supply side. In itself, that is enough for several books.

It is difficult to come to quite the same conclusions as those which have sometimes been conventional among researchers about the relationship of research to policy-making. On important questions, decision-making does not normally proceed from basic knowledge to applied knowledge to policy research to decisions. Instead, the relationship between research and action is complicated and two-way, and it may be weak or unimportant. Policy makers do not necessarily decide what to do in a way that is gratifying or flattering to academic or other researchers. This author's experience is confined to a particular time and place, but some of the literature suggests that such experiences are not confined to a few departments or to the current Government or even to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

In 1985, the present author was recruited from Oxford University to serve as the Special Adviser to the Home Secretary, the Cabinet minister with responsibility for immigration and race relations, and crime and punishment, as well as other matters, including broadcasting, the fire service and relations with the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. After the departure of that Home Secretary, the author served as Special Adviser to the Minister of Housing and to the Minister for the Environment, during the development of new policies on housing, inner city and environmental protection from 1985 to 1987. Both these departments have substantial research and statistical branches and are active customers of research. Both are involved in controversial and radical policies.

Special advisers are not specialists. Instead, they are the generalists who can deal with any matter that their ministers may refer to them, and with anything else they may have time to bring to his attention, especially political questions. Civil servants are meant to keep their distance from political occasions and political parties. Special advisers, however, although they have the status of civil servants, are licensed to be political, e.g., to write political speeches.

Special advisers are appointed directly by ministers and report directly to them. In 1986, there were 20 scattered through 12 government departments and another eight in the Prime Minister's Policy Unit. They are not responsible to the mandarins, but only a foolish adviser fails to keep on the best possible terms with that admirable body of men and women with their formidable body of knowledge. It must be remembered also that ministers can take advice or leave it.

B. Models of the research/policy relationship

Ideal views

Most models of the relationship between research and knowledge are platonic, stressing its essence rather than imperfect reality. The paradigm derives from the supposed direction of knowledge and its application in the natural sciences. That is, a pool of knowledge is created by researchers and academics, most not working with any particular policy goals in mind. Specific research then highlights a problem, possibly previously unrecognized, that requires public action. A concerned Government commissions further, problem-oriented research focused on policy

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alternatives. After evaluation of the options by policy makers, possibly accompanied by a public debate, a choice is made and implemented. Ideally, the results are evaluated and the policy adjusted accordingly over time. A grateful electorate can then reflect on the foresight of its Government, the wisdom of its advisers and the primacy of learning, and all ends well.

This might be termed the "philosopher prince model". It posits politicians and civil servants with open minds on important areas of policy. It assumes that ministers do not already know what to do. It assumes that the terms of reference of the research are the only ones that matter, that research is a good early-warning system in highlighting problems. It tends to ignore other channels for knowledge. It depends upon a direct and open channel of communication between researchers and policy makers. Above all, it assumes that research will give unambiguous results. Weiss (1986) calls this the "knowledge-driven model" and its downstream cousin, after the identification of a problem, the "problem-solving model". Some variant of this model probably comes to the mind of researchers themselves as a model of how things should work, even if reality is disappointing, although the writings of Bulmer (1978, 1986, 1987) have administered a useful corrective. It gives researchers a central position in the policy formation process and keeps basic research prior to applied research.

Practical views

Some of those who have worked inside the Government as researchers, such as Donnison (1972) and Bulmer (1987), retreat from this idealism. Those who have worked as advisers must retreat further. They have seen what happens to the research commissioned from outside or from the department's own researchers when it reaches its destination: how much attention is paid to it; and the contrary or uncomplimentary views expressed by other experts or even by quite unqualified people, such as policy makers. The often complicated two-way relationship of research to policy, and the incompatibility of their relative paces are emphasized by Donnison (1972), academic adviser to the Government during the period 1964-1970, in what Weiss (1986) calls the "interactive" model.

The autonomy of policy makers

One of the central questions is how far research findings may lead to logically inescapable policy decisions. It may seem obvious to the researcher, who may rail at the obtuseness of policy makers in not following the obvious implications of his research. But the facts of their research findings, like any other facts, only have meaning if they have a theory attached to them, in this case a political theory; and it may not be shared by their clients. Other research is simply inconclusive, contradicted by other findings or subordinated to broader considerations. Policy makers, political parties and other interest groups may take charge of the research findings themselves and deploy them to support views or policies already adopted or favoured under other, political grounds. This is what Weiss (1986) calls the "political model". It recognizes the possibility that social science research may not give unambiguous answers or that different research findings may be contradictory. Research findings can be abused by selective or misquotation. But some writings here suggest that there is unease lest the common folk—ministers and all the rest—come to their own conclusions by interpreting for themselves the writings handed down by the academics, without guidance as to their true meaning. Worse, they may challenge their truth or lean towards other experts. It has even been suggested that the obscure and jargon-laden language of much social science is a response designed to defend its autonomy against unlicensed interpretation.

Broader channels betweeen research and policy

Another possibility is that social science research can diffuse into the policy-making process through a broad band of channels, sometimes directly from researchers to consumers but mainly indirectly, through journalism, broadcasting and personal contacts. In these ways, research findings may help form what the educated class regards as its general knowledge or common sense (of which there will be many variants), on which their personalities will operate to form their own, personal views. This possibility raises the spectre of policy makers being as much influenced by the television programme they saw the night before or the newspaper they read in the back of their car that morning as by substantial reports prepared by researchers and presented by their advisers. This is what Weiss (1986) calls the "enlightenment model". This view does not replace

the other models but incorporates them, possibly at considerably diminished stature, in a broader and more devolved process. But at least it suggests that research truth will out, however indirect the road. It is still an optimistic model, although it tends to neglect the possibility that bad research, or the misapprehension of research, may be more newsworthy than reliable research.

C. A CONSUMER'S VIEWPOINT

All these models describe some elements of the narrow section of reality this author has experienced, especially the interactive/enlightenment model, but they do not cover all of it. Researchers, even in Government, tend to view events from their remote, calm and reflective environment. To understand how their product is consumed, they should imagine themselves in the position of a policy maker receiving research findings, with much other competing information and many interests fighting for time and attention in that narrow window of time when decisions are actually taken.

How policy makers spend their time

It is therefore essential to consider the natural history of decision-making—that is, how politicians and officials actually discuss and decide things (see Donoughue, 1987; Willetts, 1987). Researchers are the base of a broad pyramid of research and its transmission. Its width at any height shows how much time there is for an activity; the height at any width reflects the decision-making power. The two are negatively correlated. Only the point of that pyramid is likely to come near a decision maker.

Ministers and their senior officials are usually very busy. The minister will be at his desk between 8.30 and 9.30 a.m. He will spend the day receiving visitors and deputations, attending meetings with his advisers to consider proposals, making decisions or being briefed before taking them to Cabinet and going out to inspect or open projects or on political tours, seeing his constituents. Access to him is fiercely rationed and filtered by his minders in his private office. He will spend Friday afternoon and the weekend at his constituency, listening to his constituents' complaints and attending compulsory trivial social events. On weekday afternoons he may have to attend divisions in the House of Commons or present his department's policies in a debate and answer regular parliamentary questions on them. These debates will continue through the day; when Parliament is sitting there are usually divisions at 10 p.m.; subsequent debate will frequently continue until 1, 2 or 3 a.m., or sometimes all night. His presence may be required for any or all of this. He will usually have a political or official engagement in the evening, requiring him to shuttle backwards and forwards between engagements and the House of Commons. The House of Commons works the longest hours of any assembly in the world. Second is the House of Lords.

At all times of the day, including travelling time, he will have a mountain of paper to work through. This is a portable mountain which follows him around. In the evening his private office will pack the day's mountain into several boxes for him to work on at home. These will include papers that he will not have had time to consider in the day or that were ordered for him during the course of the day. The last group will usually be sent by his officials at about 9 p.m. Junior ministers may receive two or three such boxes per night, sent to their home by official car. A senior cabinet minister will receive up to five, a full day's work for most of us. The assiduous minister will process all of this and make comments, or final or provisional decisions, by the next morning.

His senior officials will be hard at work presenting all this material, frequently preparing briefs on an active policy, often commissioned at a meeting in the morning for the evening's box or for a speech or meeting later that day. To do this they activate their subordinate staff, each with his own (temporary) speciality, to present facts, policies or arguments in their particular area of responsibility, at the end of which chains may be found some of the resident experts or researchers. But researchers themselves are rarely summoned to decision-making meetings. This is part of the British Civil Service culture; administrative officials think themselves capable of transmitting any specialized material, putting it into language they think the ministers will be able to understand. Officials and ministers, may often ask journalists or experts or even academics with whom they may be friendly for an instant opinion, and they often retain informal groups of private advisers. In general, however, there is much more communication between academics and the Government in the United States of America than in the United Kingdom (see Bulmer, 1987).

The natural history of official decision-making means that research findings have to survive in an alien environment where they must compete for time and attention with other ideas and attitudes. A few reports will be seen and considered by ministers in full: reports of major projects, particularly those commissioned by the departments; reports of Royal Commissions and other public inquiries; or other material that will be published by their department. Routine published statistics, which may bring good or bad news on unemployment or homelessness, for example, receive particular attention. But most research is not treated in this way. Heavy research papers do not find their way onto the minister's desk unless he specifically asks for them. There would not be time to read them; information overload is a constant problem, probably in all administrations (Weiss, 1987).

New and, in particular, older research, jostling with much other information, is constantly presented in endless recombinations as part of a package of official advice for every occasion, in a way oriented to help decision-making. In the nature of things, old facts and research greatly outnumber the new. Competition for a minister's time and attention is intense. This puts great pressure to keep submissions short and pithy. The usual expansive and discursive academic style is completely out of place here; executive summaries by lunchtime are what is needed, not 100-page reports in three months' time.

Decisions on important matters will ultimately be made according to a timetable determined by external pressures from the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the public, or by the severity of the crisis. In the longer term, there are internal constraints on the time available to develop policies. In the process, policies will often be much modified and sometimes abandoned. However many preliminary meetings there may have been, in the end decisions must be taken at meetings that can seldom last longer than an hour. This is where the sharp point of the pyramid of research and fact (already digested in position papers) may, or may not, make its appearance, possibly condensed to a sentence or two. Interjections and interruptions at such meetings are neccessarily brief. Many will not last for more than 30-90 seconds. In these circumstances, where it is necessary to marshal every consideration to take a final decision, the time and space available for all but the most crucial reminders diminish to insignificance. If a chance is missed to make a particular point for a few seconds, then it may be totally lost, assuming that others do not raise it or the meeting ends early.

Understanding the relative brevity of the encounters of ministers with any given specific opinion is essential to understanding the outcome. Later that day a Cabinet decision may have been taken and the matter passed elsewhere beyond recall, unless the Prime Minister's Office can be reached or the Cabinet Office can fix the minutes.

In so far as decisions go to a Cabinet they are subject to a further level of competition—from other sources of political vested interest, received wisdom, well-known facts, common sense, research and statistics. Some of this competition will come from the officials and research apparatus of other departments that may have an interest in the problem to hand, notably the Treasury, which formally shadows all other departments' activities. And in the British context, the Prime Minister's own team of personal advisers in the Policy Unit is charged with inspecting and commenting on departmental submissions to the Cabinet and putting forward alternatives of their own (Willetts, 1987), in addition to the processing done by the Cabinet Office, which serves the entire Cabinet. All of these will have some sources of information and research in common, but not others. Ministers' diaries vividly emphasize the uncertainties of decision-making at this level (e.g., Crossman, 1975-1977).

D. The primacy of politics

In the end, Governments are devoted to staying in office. To this end, the research all politicians are interested in is opinion research, and private opinion polls are commissioned regularly by the major parties. Even the most idealistic minister does not want to lose the means to put some cherished policies into effect, even if others have to be thrown overboard to keep the ship afloat. Policies indicated by research may look very unappealing to the electorate. Obscure but well-researched policies may be highlighted by local problems or forthcoming elections and may then be quickly abandoned after years of development.

Nuclear waste

One example of such a situation concerns the disposal of nuclear waste. By 1987, the Government of the United Kingdom had developed a policy on the disposal of low-level (non-heat-generating) nuclear waste. Difficult though the subject was, it was neccessary to have a waste-disposal policy, not the

least to guarantee the continued use of nuclear material in medicine and industry as well as nuclear power.

Nothing to do with nuclear energy or waste disposal, especially its risks, is ever far from technical or political controversy. In the United Kingdom, moreover, a long tradition of harmful secretiveness has not helped. This tradition derives in part from the military origins of the nuclear programme, in part from earlier ignorance about the problems of radiation from accidents and in part from international considerations (concerning international transmission of nuclear information). Some earlier problems have only recently fully come to light. An interesting sideline is the attitude of the specialists themselves, the scientists and engineers who traditionally ran the programme. Confident in their ability to run technical matters and insensitive to the needs of public opinion, they disdained good public relations and openness.

Research had led to a respectable case for the safety and practicability of a certain technique for the shallow underground storage of low-level waste. It was almost a paradigm of the ideal basic research-applied, research problem-solving/political decision model, with research contributing substantially to the definition of the problem as well as to the options for its solution. This is not surprising, in a problem based on natural science. The long time-span of research mattered less in this case because the Government did not want to come to a decision. This particular research pointed to the anhydrite (gypsum) mines in Cleveland as being the ideal site.

Unfortunately, the site happened to be almost underneath the town of Billingham on Tees. A clumsy presentation of the proposal to local residents by the nuclear waste organization NIREX (experts, not politicians) stirred up, rather than reassured public concern. The idea was dropped. Four other rural sites were identified; their inhabitants were also alarmed. It was thought that electoral damage could be contained when only one was ultimately chosen and that irrational fears would be assuaged when the installation was operational. But a general election was looming. It is alleged that rather than allow local controversy to become inflated into a national issue by the media election coverage, the entire policy was peremptorily abandoned. Instead of burying the waste, the Government buried its nuclear-waste policy. In doing so, however, after having created an unyielding stand on countryside conservation in the south-east of England, it effectively removed the environment from the agenda of the election. Instead of being the hot issue its devotees insisted it would be, and a vehicle for the centre "Alliance" parties to unseat the Conservatives in its southern constituencies, it was turned into a non-event.

Nevertheless, such responses to democratic pressures are justified. If research cannot convince the public of the harmlessness of a proposal, in the end it is their views that count. Had this factor been taken into account from the beginning, possibly by better opinion research, as well as technical research, an alternative technically acceptable but more expensive deep-burial solution, in geological structures remote from population areas, might have been adopted.

Research-free policies

The reverse can also happen, which underlines the importance of research in challenging assumptions and thinking the unthinkable. Some policies can acquire a momentum of their own with almost no substantial factual backing. In the late 1960s, momentum built up around the notion that fire precautions in shops, offices, factories and other institutions in England were inadequate and that government action was needed. It is unclear exactly why this idea began, although it did fit in with the interventionist attitudes of the time. It was not based on any evaluation of the deaths to be averted by the new precautions. What mattered was that something was being done and that money was being spent.

In 1970, the new Home Secretary wanted to know what the programme would cost, how many lives were likely to be saved and whether there were not more cost-effective ways of protecting life. In response he is said to have received a two-line official reply: no research had been done; no costs were available; none was neccessary; it was a question of human life. By then the policy had then become unstoppable; no Government can be thought to be in favour of letting people burn to death. The policy, which became the Fire Precautions Act, 1971, has cost hundreds of millions without any marked effect except to bankrupt or cripple many smaller institutions and enterprises. But this example is double-edged. Following a disastrous fire at the Bradford football stadium in 1985, even tougher blanket regulations are currently being enforced despite the great variation of objective risk, on which there are now more data. Not one fire death is known from the entire British higher education system in the 10 person-hours of exposure covered by the data

(Marchant, 1988). Nevertheless, like all other institutions, Oxford University, which has certainly had no death by fire for 40 years and possibly not since the fourteenth century, is being forced to spend £1.5 million as a result of this policy, at a time of cuts in university finance.

The ambiguity of research

A further fundamental obstacle to the direct translation of research into policy is its frequent ambiguity: it may have no clear conclusions; it may be contradicted; it may be wrong. Such ambiguity weakens the influence of research (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979; Lindblom, 1980). Even a heavily researched area, such as criminology, still cannot give a conclusive account of the causes of crime. The Minister responsible, who is highly responsive to research and no mean practitioner himself, recently had to admit that "you pay your money and you take your choice" between genetic determinism, personality theory, environmental effects and so on (Tuck, 1988). Similar problems beset the search for means to reform, as well as to punish criminals, where no approaches so far have been strikingly successful. Social science research is particularly vulnerable because people believe they can be their own sociologists in a way in which they would not pretend to do-it-yourself natural science or technical economics. Policy makers, confronted with a variety of competing research findings or theoretical views, can select evidence to suit their own preferences and thus reverse the research/policy relationship, using research selectively to shore up existing policies or to attack those of their opponents.

One example of conflicting research advice relates to the malaise of social housing. The concentration of crime, vandalism and disrepair on council (public housing) estates and of social problems among their inhabitants is a major preoccupation in the United Kingdom. The official view, supported by the relevant department's own researchers and its consultant at the London School of Economics, is that management is the key to the problem: tenant allocation; local devolved management; and tenant involvement (Power, 1988). An alternative view that has gained ground is that the problem is one of design (A. Coleman, 1985). In considering this factor it is important to realize that only the very rich and the poor live in apartments in the United Kingdom; almost everyone prefers houses. Almost all tower blocks and apartments are public, not private, housing, and a high proportion of public housing is high-rise or experimental in design.

Such housing is widely criticized for its lack of defensible space and its multiple access, which Coleman's work emphasizes. It has been criticized on methodological grounds and for ignoring aspects outside design but has made a major public impact through newspapers and the media. Officials' reservations are apparently compounded by concern about cost, by the fact that Coleman's ideas were "not invented here" and by other complications.

After initial resistance, however, some ministers have been persuaded of the importance of design by the media coverage and occasionally by reading the original sources, and some consideration of design has begun to creep into speeches and policy. This interesting conflict of different research interpretations (by no means necessarily exclusive) has been heightened by the contrasting channels through which the information has come and by the labelling of the management notion as more "left" than the other. Recently, it was reported that the design idea had caught the attention of the Prime Minister's Office and that the department might therefore offer a separate consultancy for some controlled trials. Some local authorities are already carrying out appropriate demolitions and rebuilding according to Coleman's ideas.

Usually, competitive trials or other experiments are easier to carry out in natural science or engineering. They often precede policy and put strict limits on the scope for choice. As a rule, they are carried out by researchers in back rooms. Sometimes, however, experiments can only realistically be done by Governments, and they can sometimes attract great public attention. For example, the argument between screw and paddle propulsion for steam warships, deadlocked on paper, was finally resolved in 1845 by the expedient of tying the paddle sloop *Alecto* back to back with the screw vessel *Rattler* of similar power. And in one of the most spectacular publicity stunts of the nineteenth century, Charles Parsons forced a change in naval policy in favour of his steam turbines by racing his experimental vessel *Turbinia* up and down the assembled ships of the Royal Navy in Queen Victoria's presence at the Jubilee Review of 1897 at such a speed that no ship in the fleet could catch him.

A more recent controversy, resembling that between Power and Coleman in that it has attracted unusual media interest, is between the rival claims of "thin" and "fat" frigates for the Navy. The official view favours thin frigates, as traditionally designed by the official Naval Construction Bureau. Private research and engineering favour a new "fat" design, on grounds of stability and weapons capacity, which reportedly has gained the favour of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit but not that of the Ministry of Defence. Although there have been inquiries on paper, the competitive design has not been built, and it may be that a £100 million experiment is too much to ask.

Alternative routes for research knowledge: journalism and the media

Policy makers often come to office fully equipped with views on many problems. As most of them are not specialists, where do they get them? To some degree the answer is the same source as their electors, namely, the media. In the United Kingdom, politicians and their officials spend much time each morning looking at newspaper press clippings (less looking at clips from television programmes that reached audiences 10 times larger). Moreover, politicians are not just influenced by how the media respond to issues; some of their cues for action, including policy changes, may be sparked by events or solutions the media first bring to their attention. Then, one may ask how journalists do their research, if any. They make a telephone call to an expert, usually a researcher; if they make two telephone calls, it is in-depth research. This is one major avenue to ministers' minds which officials cannot control, and it is one reason that journalism and the popularization of research in newspapers, radio and television is—or should be—so important for researchers. For example, journalism has been credited with playing a critical role in the rise of supply-side and monetarist economic thinking in the 1970s (Keegan, 1984).

Social scientists have varying success at this endeavour in different countries. In the United States of America, for example, there is a tradition of first-rate social science journalism. William H. Whyte (*The Organization Man*) and Christopher Jencks (*Inequality*) began as journalists for *Fortune* magazine. Newspapers, such as *The New York Times*, publish serious social science articles. The magazine *The Public Interest* remains a popular vehicle for social science. In the United Kingdom, however, although widely read and influential journalists cover economics and science, they have no counterparts in sociology. The only moderately popular social science weekly, *New Society*, is not influential with the current Government and is confirming its left-of-centre stance by combining with the political weekly *New Statesman*, which will further diminish its readership.

The partiality of social science and its penalties

Cultural and political differences may be important as concerns the partiality of social science. In the United Kingdom, social science journalism tends to be committed and radical: it is devoted to changing society, not describing it; and it concentrates on poverty, inequality, racism and injustice. Most British sociologists are supporters of the current opposition. Accordingly, there is no plurality in thinking on social policy. Following the tradition of committed social science begun by Richard Titmuss (e.g., 1943, 1958), solutions tend to be welfare-led or public sector solutions, taking as their first premise the reduction of inequality. Many eminent British social scientists have served Labour Governments as advisers in various areas, notably during the period 1964-1970, helping form its policy on schools, welfare, rent control and race relations. This period was the golden age of the research and policy link and of the standing of researchers as advisers, and this ideal is the example most commonly cited. This commitment, however, is double-edged: the current Government sees no point in seeking advice from specialists who have been their unrelenting critics, and it effectively ignores British sociology. Instead, for advice on its radical social policies, it looks to economists and others outside academic sociology or to ideas imported from the United States of America.

E. Democracy as experimental research

Unlike some other sciences, social policy research is in a sense incomplete until the policies it prescribes have been put to the test by a Government. Elections and other mechanisms for changing policies or policy makers may then be regarded as the final, experimental conclusion to the research-policy process. Of course, elections are a poor performance indicator of any given policy because (except in a referendum) they try an entire bundle of policies at once.

Elections are not just about policies, and margins of electoral victory can often be well within experimental error, as in the United Kingdom in 1951 and 1964.

None the less, inferences are often made about policies according to election results. The Conservative Government came to power in 1970 with a carefully researched programme following the Selsdon Park Conference of 1969, heavily armed with policies for industrial relations, economic revival, immigration control and housing reform. But many of these policies were abandoned or reversed within two or three years, notably those on industrial relations and inflation, in part because the Government was not prepared, unlike its successor today, to endure the consequences of rising unemployment or protracted industrial unrest directed against them. Then, it lost the next election, which persuaded it against presenting and committing itself to very detailed policies developed in opposition, without the immense knowledge of the Civil Service. It also began a crucial debate as to whether the original policies, or just their implementation and partial abandonment, had been wrong.

Theory, research and the British economic experiment

The role of theory, knowledge and research is particularly interesting in exploring the genesis of the British economic experiment. In 1979, Mrs. Thatcher came to office with almost all the British economic establishment ranged against her proposed policies, which marked a decisive break not only with the policies of the opposition but with those of previous Governments of her own party. As a result, 364 economists, some of them highly eminent, signed a famous letter to *The Times* condemning her policies on inflation and forecasting their failure. The Prime Minister had affronted the economic profession by insisting that inflation mattered. Every schoolboy brought up on neo-Keynsian textbooks (of which Keynes would not have approved) knew perfectly well that with suitable indexation, 20 per cent inflation was just as acceptable as 2 per cent. In 1974, the Treasury model of the economy did not take money supply into account at all. Only a few economists, such as Lionel Robbins (1979), clung to a quantity theory of money and opposed deficit finance. From the early 1960s, ministers who opposed deficit budgets and heavy public expenditure were allowed to resign or were eased out, as were the monetarists in the Party's own research department, squeezed out by the progressive centre (Ramsden, 1980).

The new economic policies proposed by the incoming Government received little support from contemporary economic research or thinking (Walters, 1978; Keegan, 1984). But the advent of the new Government subverted the economic establishment. It provided an opportunity for young radical economists, some of whom had advised the Conservatives when they were in opposition, to try out their ideas in practice. The Government's new chief economic adviser was appointed at age 34 and knighted before age 40, much younger than his predecessors. Almost all his colleagues were under age 40. Not one was a Fellow of the British Academy, the mark of establishment approval. Where did the ideas come from? Who had done the research?

The middle 1970s were a propitious time for a rethinking of economic policy and the chance to make a new choice from the theory on offer. The economy, run broadly on neo-Keynesian lines, was in shambles and in 1976 its control was effectively handed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Dissatisfaction with compromise policies and with leadership within the Conservative Party in the 1970s led to Mrs. Thatcher's appointment as party leader following debates in the Shadow Cabinet after the 1974 electoral defeat. Her closest senior supporter, Sir Keith Joseph, was unusually receptive to new ideas (Joseph and Sumption, 1979). He had himself initiated substantial research on the inheritance of social deprivation (Brown and Madge, 1980) and is one of the few Cabinet ministers ever to hand out reading lists to his senior officials. All this gave alternative economic theory its opportunity, especially the views of Hayek and Friedman, and their minority of followers in the United Kingdom. Although Nobel Prize winners, respected enough abroad, both were regarded unfavourably by most British economists. But by emphasizing the potential damage to savings and competitiveness of inflation, its connection with unbalanced trades union privileges (Hayek, 1944 and 1979, a link denied by Friedman), and the importance of the control by Government of the quantity of money and its price (Friedman, 1962 and 1976), these theorists provided a congenial analysis of economic malaise and some practical prescriptions for action. Personal contacts with sympathetic younger economists and other advisers were important, but the role of journalists and independent pressure groups, such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), was crucial (Keegan, 1984).

It is a reflection of the direction of the research/policy relationship that the new attitudes implied a change in researchers. The staff of the Conservative Research Department were mostly devoted to gradualist, consensual, ... Keynesian solutions (Ramsden, 1980). In 1974, before assuming the leadership, Mrs. Thatcher, together with her chief party theoretician, set up an alternative, privately funded rival organization—the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) to sponsor research into alternative solutions and publicize it, and explicitly to look at how private enterprise and "social market" policies worked in other countries. Eventually this research organization was made less independent and, in a highly symbolic gesture, brought from its physically separate premises into the Party headquarters.

The Prime Minister's economic experiment was widely regarded as having failed in 1982 and still has its critics. Nevertheless, it has since proved successful in some specific and measurable respects and has forced a revision in opposition policy. Whether it has forced a change in prevailing economic fashion is less clear. After a difficult first two years with inflation and unemployment rising together in defiance of the Phillips curve, economic growth has increased every year since 1982 at a rate either equal to or usually greater than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. Inflation has fallen from 27 per cent in 1976 to under 4 per cent, and unemployment by a million from its peak in 1985, tax rates are the lowest in 30 years while tax revenues are the highest ever. Real wages continue to rise and the budget is balanced. But critics inside and outside the Government insist that many substantial problems remain—rising real costs of output, an adverse balance of trade and persistently high public spending—and the Government has abandoned its earlier emphasis on the importance of performance indicators, such as of money supply, which at first was one of its salient features and one of its chief, self-imposed tests of success.

Choosing research and theory

This history emphasizes the fact that, in at least some important policy areas, research or theory can support a wide variety of different and incompatible economic or social policies, such that no policy can be rational; or they all are until proved wrong in action. Indeed research in economics, as opposed to the development of testable theory, has been described as essentially decorative, not fundamental.

Certainly the chief disputes are about theory, much of it almost philosophical, rather than about more narrowly focused empirical research. None of these influential writings contains many graphs or tables or other indications of scholarship. Keynes's general theory (1936) is merely scattered with a few percentages and equations. Orthodox modern economists might not admit the writings of Hayek and Friedman as research at all. Neither were any of them on the payroll of the Governments they eventually influenced.

In many aspects of economics, the conclusive research can only be done by a Government that accepts certain ideas, puts them into practice and keeps to those decisions long enough. The policy is the experiment. The criteria of success are the conventional economic indicators and, to the extent that economic success is the chief criterion for re-election, the Government's popularity and re-election. Drawing inferences from electoral success or failure is the most complicated form of experimental interpretation because of the need to test many propositions simultaneously. This is one reason, when theory is so disparate, that there is so much interest in what other Governments and economies are doing (e.g., in the revenue consequences of reducing tax rates or the success of privatizations), as they provide a natural experimental design of treatments and subjects. Theories on inflation or the balance of payments can only be tested on national economies, but some micro-economic policies have been tried on a regional basis and as explicit experiments with proper scientific controls. Sometimes there are rather inconclusive results, as, for example, in the United States, in the New Jersey/Pennsylvania negative income tax experiment of 1968 (Bulmer, 1986); and at other times, as in the Federal Housing Voucher experiment of 1986/87, there are apparently more favourable results (Kennedy and Finkel, 1987).

Government reversals may be regarded as admissions of failure or the unsuitability of policies, and sometimes they follow research findings or their forceful presentation. For example, the Labour Government of 1974-1979 had promised a wealth tax and set up a Royal Commission with attached eminent researchers to report on it. Its initial report (Diamond, 1975) had conclusions favourable to a wealth tax, presenting convincing economic statistics on the inequality of incomes and wealth to justify it.

In the subsequent Parliamentary Committee, however, it was pointed out that the Commission's statistics had not taken adequately into account the value of pension entitlements. The Commission acknowledged the deficit but pointed to the difficulty of providing estimates. Eventually it was shown that the value of such entitlements (£154 billion in state pensions in 1975) made a substantial difference to the calculations, especially when the effects of age were taken into account. The Parliamentary report was accordingly divided, and not just on party lines, as the new evidence had undermined faith in the basic concept. The matter remains controversial, but the wealth tax was not implemented, unlike the Labour Government's other two tax novelties, the capital gains tax and the capital transfer tax.

F. The Marketing of Ideas

The insights of public choice theory (Buchanan, 1975; McLean, 1987), suggest that many formulations of the research/policy connection begin at the wrong end, with the researchers. They should begin at the other end, with the politicians. Politicians may be regarded as entrepreneurs in search of vote-winning policies. In many areas, but not all, they will have their own preference for solutions, sometimes ideologically strongly held, gleaned in part from public debate and private inquiry. They will be interested in research and ideas that reinforce, make coherent and confirm their own ideas, even if they have to be modified as a result of having their limitations underlined.

Pressure groups, think-tanks and research

In these circumstances, given that there is a plurality of research findings and a wide range of options, the desired research is that which proceeds from the answer back to the question, not the other way round. The lack of unanimity in research and theory, and the impenetrability of much of the research and theoretical literature, means that competing ideas may need to be competitively marketed and presented, not just by their more prominent individual originators but also by pressure groups and think-tanks of various political hues or none. These bodies act as policy "boutiques", sometimes with enough resident or associate expertise to create and develop policy ideas; in other cases, they act as publicity organizations to market ideas and research sympathetic to their general goals. Such organizations will try to influence policy by bombarding policy makers with literature, directly through personal contacts with ministers and their advisers and officials and indirectly through press conferences and broadcasting. The earlier literature on this subject mentions them little; they are not true researchers, unlike the people that write the books.

Policy group activity has mushroomed in the past decade or two. In the United States, there are substantial independent research organizations capable of funding or commissioning independent research as well as theoretical work on a broad or narrow base, such as the Rand Corporation, the Population Council, the Batelle Institute and the Urban Institute. Some United States institutions have a distinct political flavour and have acted as refuges for more intellectual politicians or their advisers in times of political adversity (e.g., the Brookings Institute, the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation).

Their modest equivalents in the United Kingdom are the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Policy Studies Institute. The views of some of these, e.g., IFS, are regarded with respect by the appropriate government department (the Inland Revenue) and account is duly taken of their comments on policy. Others have almost no influence at all. Charitable trusts, such as the Rowntree Trust, established by radical Victorian businessmen, fund from their endowments research into social problems. Some, in particular the campaigning organizations, are supported by public funds, mostly from local authorities, such as the Low Pay Unit and the housing group Shelter, which campaigns for public sector solutions for housing problems. In the United Kingdom, most such bodies have a radical or left-wing orientation. Their influence is probably most effective when the party they are in sympathy with is in opposition and shorn of the immense support of the official Civil Service and its data base (assuming, of course that the party eventually returns to power). The same is true of the research departments both political parties maintain, which have only an innovative or research role, if one at all, when in opposition.

With the current political realities in the United Kingdom, the influential policy groups are those with right-wing views. The most substantial of these groups is IEA, which was founded in 1957 (Harris and Seldon, 1977). It has marketed a consistent product line emphasizing micro-economic solutions, especially the role of pricing and of choice in a free market. It has been one of the chief means whereby

the views of Hayek and Friedman have been presented to the British public and to Ministers in office and politicians in opposition, primarily through publications written for it by a loose confederation of academics and journalists employed elsewhere. It claims, as do other institutions, that independent bodies like IEA that have a coherent view are more likely to be effective in presenting genuinely alternative policy ideas, ultimately based on research and theory, than are units based in universities, whose impact is moderated or compromised by internal differences and made less imaginative by the filtering-out of ideas that are unfashionable in the academic community.

The Adam Smith Institute, with close links with the Heritage Foundation in the United States, is a more radical and ideologically based group which specializes in offering policies ready for use with appropriate adjustments to minimize adverse impacts on important vested interests. The Centre for Policy Studies is in a different category. Although formally independent, it has closer links with the Government. It provides a means whereby ideas can be floated to see how public opinion responds to them and what adjustments may need to be made to them, without commitment.

One may ask how the origin of an implemented policy be traced back to one or another source—a publication, research finding or speech? Nevertheless, the Institute of Economic Affairs claims that its publications led directly to subsequent policy in the abolition of Resale Price Maintainance in 1973, in the abolition of exchange control in 1980, concerning deregulations that enabled the Cable TV and Building Societies to expand their activities (Gough and Taylor 1979; Veljanovski and Bishop, 1983) and in the introduction of portable personal pensions (Morgan, 1984). The historical precedence of the publications cannot be doubted, but in the absence of any policy equivalent of the biologists' radioactive tracer techniques to explore metabolic pathways it is difficult to resolve the question.

Certainly most outside policy proposals fall by the wayside. Outside suggestions have to survive the "not invented here" prejudices of the Civil Service. They are particularly likely to arouse irritated opposition by naively asserting the merits of policies that may have been exhaustively reviewed by officials for years and condemned as being incontrovertibly impractical, sometimes even for good reasons. Partially for this reason, however, some politicians and their advisers value these channels of independent advice, which may help them to prevail against the "official view" the Civil Service may erect against novel proposals.

It is difficult to deny an important role to IEA in promoting a fundamental rethinking on monetary restraint and trades union policy in the 1970s. One testament to the effectiveness of such channels for ideas is the recent suggestion that the Labour Party acquire a body of its own to do the same job for it that IEA, CPS and the Adam Smith Institute do for the Conservatives. Although some of the other research groups (e.g., the Policy Studies Institute) are left-oriented, they never enjoyed the intimate party links enjoyed by IEA. Furthermore, the existence of two new social democratic parties, much addicted to research and study groups, has siphoned off much of the former support from academics.

The inconstancy of research influence

The prestige and influence of researchers varies over time and space. It varies from one Government and the next. It varies between departments of the same Government and between different countries. More science-based departments (e.g., defence) are likely to have their options more narrowly defined as it is easier to show what can work in advance, giving greater scope within narrower limits of the possible financial and political considerations. The golden age of the social science research link in the United Kingdom was in the 1960s. The new Labour Government of 1964 had an unusual number of intellectuals in its Cabinet who were receptive to ideas and naturally believed that social policy should be based on social research. Its leader, Harold Wilson, was a former Oxford economics don. It posed as a modern reforming administration, ready to sweep away the debris of the previous 13-year Conservative Administration. Its rhetoric invoked the "white heat of the technological revolution" and promised better times through metrication, decimalization, the appliance of science and rational economic and social planning. Social scientists, many well known to the politicians personally and all sympathetic to their political goals, were recruited by ministers to the newly invented special adviser posts, created against official opposition to bring in new ideas (Brittan, 1969).

The golden age

One such adviser, David Donnison, was prominent in the formulation of a new legal system of rent

control (the Rent Acts of 1965, 1977) following inquiries into shortages and abuses by landlords (Holland, 1965; Francis, 1971; Donnison, 1972). But the Wilson innovations continued an existing trend. The Milner Holland Committee had been set up by the previous Government. It had been given, for the first time, its own research team drawn from the Housing Ministry's own Social Research Division, itself an innovation of the Conservative Government set up as the Sociological Research Branch in 1960 (Adams, 1977). A. H. Halsey, an eminent education specialist, was primarily responsible for a response to underachievement in schools through the creation of Educational Priority Areas (Halsey, 1972; Bulmer, 1978), although in fact it was the Conservative Government of 1970-1974 (Education Secretary Margaret Thatcher) that implemented them. Professors Kaldor and Balogh were brought in from Cambridge to turn around economic policy and prepare the short-lived National Plan of 1965, which was to be implemented by a new strategic Department of Economic Affairs (abolished in 1970). Although Donnison regarded the research link as untidy and interactive (Weiss, 1986), it nevertheless was a time when research, especially social research, enjoyed high prestige among ministers and a high public profile. This period is the paradigm of most British writing on the subject.

This situation lasted to some extent into the next Conservative Administration (1970-1974), some of whose ministers were sympathetic to some of the policy lines and advice received by the previous Government. Against the opposition of the Civil Service, the new Prime Minister created in 1970 a new research-oriented government policy unit to advise his Government—the Central Policy Review Staff or think-tank staffed mainly by outsiders, some of them academics and social scientists, and headed by distinguished scientist Lord Rothschild (Plowden, 1981). One of its functions was to give more time to strategic considerations in what was still the heyday of belief in rational and planned policy-making (Blume, 1987). Rothschild (1971) was also commissioned to report into the whole area of public funding of research (except the fledgling Social Science Research Council) and recommended a much more client-oriented system of research funding, to focus research better on current problems. By the 1970s, however, the social research and academic friendly relationship was over: it was not solving the problems. Although research in the 1960s might have rediscovered poverty, it was less successful in proposing solutions in the 1970s (Banting, 1979).

Hard times

On top of this situation came the radical new policies of the current Conservative Government. Most of these policies contradicted the conventional wisdom of academic economists and sociologists. Many of the former group, and almost all the latter, were in any case ideologically hostile to the Prime Minister and her policies, had spoken publicly against them and had worked with the then Labour Government to oppose them. Those of the Prime Minister's colleagues most influenced by such theorists and researchers lost the most influence. A twilight of the sociologists has been darkening ever since. The sociological establishment is no more needed in Government than are trades unions. Their grants and departments have been rationalized (cut), the value of their teaching questioned (Rothschild 1982) and their grant-giving body almost abolished. Similar disaffection has demoralized social science in the United States (Miller, 1987). Alternative academic advice, on matters such as education, has come from quite different sources, which had been sent to internal exile by mainline opinion during the 1970s.

G. International contrasts in political culture and attitudes to research

In general, experience in the United States with regard to research and policy is different from that in the United Kingdom. There, contacts with academic life and research are constant and unstrained. Successive Administrations all rely heavily upon external sources for their staff and their advice. There are several reasons for this. In the United Kingdom, there is a strong and prestigious permanent Civil Service, extending up to the permanent counterpart of a minister. It regards itself as an intellectual élite, capable of handling any problem.

In the United States, the permanent Civil Service only reaches to a modest level in the Administration; most top posts are appointments from outside. Although the United States Administration still suffers from "group think", of closing ranks in favour of fashionable explanations, internal conventional wisdom cannot for this reason become established in the same way as in the United Kingdom. Moreover, there is less political partisanship among social scientists in the United States. The majority of the profession there do not sit idle when the other party wins the Presidency. They do not have to because there are many avenues of influence for research, theory and opinion, notably to Congressmen and

Senators with their influential committees and their advisers (although information overload and other problems tend to suppress the role of research there as well; see Weiss, 1987), and to the Department of State and its competing and independent-minded senior officials. Even so, as with the United Kingdom, it is instant advice, not research, that is preferred.

Some Governments seem naturally more disposed to test the research waters before embarking on a policy change. For example, when the Government of Ontario, Canada, considered in 1987 whether to reform its rent control policy, in addition to commissioning substantial research of its own (the Thom Commission), it helped convene an international conference on the subject, including reports on the experiences of other countries (Mintz, forthcoming). Likewise, faced with a need to revise its policy on immigration, the Canadian Government convened in 1987 an international workshop to gather advice and experience on qualified manpower needs. Whether this action actually implies a greater influence for research in final decision-making or is merely window dressing is difficult to say.

Research and the salience of policies

Research probably directly influences policies in inverse proportion to their political importance or controversy. Only a foolish Government introduces a policy the failure of which is guaranteed by every known fact, theory or opinion. Serious policy options, however, are rarely constrained in such a decisive way. In controversial policies, research typically comes second, to confirm, support and modify proposals of more ideological origin. Research, especially longer term research, comes more to the fore in the details of policy and in very numerous but less controversial areas, which in the United Kingdom are left more in the hands of officials, have less urgency and attract less interference from ministers.

Research-led policies accordingly tend to be either inevitable or worthy but relatively minor in that they usually excite little controversy or public attention. Examples of internal research leading to policy change include that on problems of families living in high-rise flats, matching housing needs to dwelling design and construction, why some public housing is difficult to let (Adams, 1977) and almost anything on ethnic minorities. Research does not necessarily have just one policy response implicit in it. For example, official research on the state of the diminished and marginalized private rented sector (Bone and Mason, 1980; Todd, Bone and Noble, 1982) supports calls from the Labour Party for the final abolition of traditional private renting and also policies by the current Government for its fundamental reform and revival. Research from the Home Office Research and Planning Unit (Cornish and Clarke, 1987) has demonstrated the astonishing prevalence both of victimization and of offending among the general population (Clarke and Hough, 1984). Research evidence that neighbourhood watch schemes discourage crime was needed before its wider implementation could go ahead. But research suggesting that there was no evidence that certain kinds of punishment reduced recidivism or that more policemen on the beat might not reduce crime (Gottfredson, 1984) cannot prevail against what the public want. No Government has succeeded in introducing policies that substantially reduce crime, leading even researchers to ask what is the use of criminology (Tuck, 1988) although, fortunately for the researchers, with an affirmative conclusion.

The problem of timing scale in research and policy

Part of the problem is timing. The conventional model of research and policy is likely to work well when dealing with long-standing questions such as those mentioned above. These questions are not likely to change fast and are likely to be of interest to any Government taking office. So the conventional timetable of research—at least a few months, more usually from two to three years, is no great handicap.

This time-scale, however, is quite impossible for the guidance or formulation of more urgent and controversial policies, their day-to-day development or crisis management, with a timetable of not more than a few weeks and possibly not more than a few hours. Then, the previous relationship is reversed. Research is not defining the problem. It is being called upon to ensure that a response already decided upon in outline shall emerge in working order. So although ministers scrutinize and sometimes modify their annual research programme and budget, research is seldom a major topic of interest. It is just too far in the future; even the most intellectual ministers want instant research and are less interested when their researchers wish to undertake broad-brush research on problems that they think are important, even if the results are only ready for the next Government. Sometimes research commissioned by one Govern-

ment surfaces in time to embarrass its successor with recommendations contrary to new government policy. In 1977, the Labour Government set up the Working Group on Inequalities in Health, which was chaired by an eminent physician and included a sympathetic eminent sociologist of the Titmuss school. Its report was not delivered until the Conservative Government had taken office in 1980. It emphasized the "material deprivation" interpretation of its findings rather than "life-style" and recommended substantial increases in public expenditure, contrary to the central policy of the new Government. The scale of publication was very half-hearted (United Kingdom, 1980) and many of its conclusions were publicly rejected; a more popular version has since been published (Townsend and Davidson, 1982).

The example of the community charge

An example of the difficulty of applying research to a central policy is the radical proposal for a community charge or poll-tax to replace domestic rates. Domestic rates are a form of property tax which pay for 36 per cent of local government in the United Kingdom, which in turn spends about 11 per cent of the gross national product. Only 34 per cent of local electors pay full rates; another 9 per cent pay in part. The cost, based on the notional rental value of dwellings, varies from £100 per year to £2,000 per annum. Rates are unpopular among those who pay them. The abolition of rates was promised by Mrs. Thatcher at the election of 1974 in a snap decision. When in office, a consultative paper (United Kingdom, 1981) reviewed all the alternatives, including the poll-tax or community charge (after internal research), and came to the conclusion that none of them was quite right (United Kingdom, 1983). Further unrest against rates in Scotland in 1983 forced the revival of the promise at the 1983 election. A small interdepartmental committee, including ministers, officials and advisers from the Treasury, the Department of Housing and Social Security and the Policy Unit, was set up to report. There was no time to commission fundamental research; indeed, it is not clear what research would have been appropriate for such a novel idea without international precedent. But extensive simulation and modelling was done into the effects of various options on income distributions, gainers and losers, house prices, investment and employment; and much advice was received from outside sources. The crucial question was a political imperative; to maximize the accountability of local government and to reduce its expenditure by putting all the marginal costs of extra spending on the shoulders of those who voted for it (United Kingdom, 1986). Only the implementation of the policy will be able to show whether it delivers its claimed benefits in reducing local authority expenditure and increasing its accountability.

Inside and outside research

The perceived need to keep proposals secret until they are worked out is a reason for minimizing outside research involvement, as potentially unfavourable conclusions will be put into unfriendly or insecure hands before they can even be considered as options. In the 1980s, a radical reform of the welfare state had to be scrapped when preliminary proposals, to which ministers were not yet prepared to make a commitment, were leaked from the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) and had to be peremptorily abandoned. This is a particular problem for politicians before elections, when policies have to be discussed in secret without all the advantages of feedback from public debate.

This is an argument for supporting a flow of basic research even if its precise function cannot be specified in advance and also an argument for internal capacity for research. Previous research may be made suddenly relevant by new events. For example, homelessness is currently a major problem for the Government. Research on it was begun three years ago when there was much less public clamour; the results are now unexpectedly topical. The radical right-to-buy policy for selling public housing to its tenants benefited from "speculative" research that had already been done. A previous housing minister almost turned his department into a research-free zone by halving numbers and splitting the research team. It is alleged that research on waiting-lists for public housing was delayed as it was feared that the results would be unhelpful, would not affect policy and would in any case be done independently by unfriendly pressure groups. In the end, the research was done and perhaps unexpectedly turned out to be helpful, underlining the inflated nature of most of the lists.

This highlights the problem of putting external policy research to use. Internal researchers and statisticians can be told to drop their current task in order to concentrate on the latest crisis. This procedure cannot be followed with outsiders, whose work is almost invariably late and cannot be depended upon to meet deadlines set by ministers

(Barnes, 1983). Sometimes it never appears at all. Some areas of research—in the United Kingdom, for example, on housing—are not much done or well done by outside academics. Like much applied research, it is regarded as a "poor" area. Housing research is very political; opinions are so polarized so that some research is unusable because it shares no common premises with the policy makers.

The sociology of social research

Internal research also has its problems. Civil Service researchers are sometimes regarded as second rate by outsiders, incorrectly if the competition for posts is any guide. Some social scientists will not deal with the current government departments on principle. Instead, they would go for funding to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, a government body) and to independent trusts, such as Rowntree. Thus, in some areas, there is a shortage of good researchers. Bureaucratic marginality is another problem. Researchers inside the Civil Service, including even the prestigious Government Economic Service, rarely attain high rank and are not part of the mainline decision-making process. Experts are on tap, not on top. They must usually present their own or commissioned research to ministers through officials. These officials, particularly those of middle rank, are often much less receptive to research than their political chiefs, as they fear devaluing their own advice. The "not invented here" syndrome can operate even against colleagues. This aspect emphasizes the importance of anonymous or journalistic advice, which readers can pass off as their own. There are some prominent exceptions, of course, in more far-sighted ministries and with individuals whose omniscience makes them indispensable. There are, moreover, some persons with high professional eminence who also are very senior policy makers.

It might be added, though, that this is a broader problem. Social science questions are those where non-specialists do expect to have a view of their own, unlike the technical aspects of science or economics. As one commentator admits, the areas where expert opinion is demonstrably better than everyday knowledge or experience are rather limited (Bulmer, 1987). The background of the Civil Service inclines it not to take social science too seriously and to feel quite confident about acting as its own sociological adviser. Some external advisers have felt that this in built disdain for sociology is the single largest obstacle to a higher profile for social science research in the United Kingdom.

In-house research can acquire its own autonomy and momentum. Civil servants are very difficult to discharge in the United Kingdom. When fashions change in policies or research, personnel recruited to deal with the past decade's problems and qualified to do little else must be retained, making it difficult to recruit further. The Department of the Environment still retains a substantial number of former architectural specialists on other duties, even though it ended its architectural services a decade ago. Uncontroversial but unimportant research can survive unthreatened when other more volatile areas are at risk. For example, it has been suggested that over three quarters of the Home Office research budget goes not on crime analysis or immigration research, but on technical matters to do with fire-fighting and police hardware, which could readily be done by outside technical contractors.

Conclusion

Research seldom comes first when important or contentious policy is considered. There, its role is to support or moderate policy already preferred for broader reasons. The ambiguity of much research weakens its impact and enables policy makers to pick and choose to suit their own preferences. In some areas, conclusions can only be gained by Governments experimenting with policies. The pace of decision-making often means that existing knowledge, including international evidence, is more important than specially commissioned research. Indirect transmission of research can be as important, or more important, than the conventional route. Researchers should not forget the political context in which their work will be evaluated or the constraints on the policy makers. The human factor is important in the successful transmission of research into policy, including publicity and the intermediary and marketing function of independent policy groups. Researchers sometimes have a lower status than they think.

How far all this is true in the population policy field is difficult to say. Some of the more spectacular volte-faces of population policy suggest that it is. In China, the population policy developed from the early 1970s in an environment swept clean of demographers and other social researchers. They reappeared later, to refine the policy. The reversal of the

population policy of Malaysia in 1984, with the intention of quadrupling population to 70 million by the year 2100, followed no new striking demographic or economic discovery; it was more a political response. Pro-natalist policies have developed in Eastern Europe and continue in France without overwhelming evidence that they are capable of delivering the goods in the long run, as opposed to simply accelerating intended births. But research, if only the entire body of demographic knowledge generated by research, may be seen as more influential, in conjunction with economic threats, in the sudden inception of fertility control programmes in Brazil and Mexico.

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VI. THE INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POPULATION AND POPULATION POLICY RESEARCH, 1954-1987

*Geoffrey McNicoll**

In this statist, bureaucratic age it is all but automatic to assume that national Governments learn about other Governments' social and economic policies, and the outcomes of those policies, either directly through their own agency or through official intergovernmental bodies. In some policy spheres, the world's chancelleries feed streams of reports to their home ministries, conveying instant assessments of current lines of action. In other spheres, less instantly, the specialized bodies of the United Nations system and regionally or otherwise circumscribed organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), ADB or OECD, undertake the distillation and transmission of policy aims and outcomes. Yet, it is very likely that the more significant routes along which this kind of knowledge flows are less formal and more fortuitous. "They consist in the network of contacts either face to face or through the published word among persons, both in and outside the Government, who have scholarly as well as practical interests in the particular policy area." The sources of such policy analysis and advice, filtered or even garbled though they may be in the transmission, lie in the interpretation of past experience—mostly, but not only, the experience of countries that a Government takes as its peers or that it seeks in some respect to emulate. The analysis may be well done or flawed; it may be innovative or restating and reinforcing "conventional wisdom"; it may be current or dimly remembered by a government official from distant college days. Typically, its authors—scholars and policy analysts—would have at most slight awareness of how their research or their ruminations influence the course of policy deliberation.

In the sphere of population policy, these indirect routes of influence might be expected to be particularly significant. The experience to be mined is diffuse, often ambiguous and hard to interpret; the time-scale is expansive and assessment of outcomes and attribution of cause are fraught with controversy—all characteristics of a situation where scholarship should come into its own. Yet, they are also characteristics that trouble policy decision makers, for whom hedgings and contingent statements, however reflective of the state of knowledge, may seem to be side-stepping responsibility.

The extent of influence on population policy—of research in the social sciences and social history in general and in demography in particular—is indeed quite difficult to assess. As the scientific core of demography has matured, population policy has gained a sounder footing; many once casually assumed verities have turned out to be ill-founded and are no longer heard; new frameworks for policy debate have come to the fore. These are important, sometimes forgotten, achievements. At the same time, however, there have been trends that weakened the policy influence of scholarship. Precision and circumscription have replaced strength and subtlety of argument and wide-ranging coverage (with associated expertise) as the marks of excellence in population studies; grappling with the unwieldy materials that make up much of the substance of policy analysis in the real world has been correspondingly devalued. And the institutionalization of population policy in specific programmes has generated interests that to a degree have proved unresponsive, even resistant, to research. From both the supply and the demand sides, therefore, the transmission of policy-relevant findings from social scientific and historical research to population policy has been impeded. Indeed, it may not be too strong to speak of a cleavage between research and policy: while the sifting of the record of demographic change and the assessment of its determinants go on in a leisurely fashion, the business of finding immediately applicable policy lessons and packaging them into

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recipes for all users has largely bypassed those activities, under the altogether brisker management of governmental and intergovernmental agencies.

Practicality and immediacy are not always at odds with scientific caution or the uncertainties of historical explanation. One large (perhaps the largest) body of research in the population field—that having to do with the practice and outcomes of fertility regulation among different populations—has been directly responsive to short-run programme interests. But this instance may be the exception to prove the rule, because such programme research tends notably not to be characterized by caution and uncertainty.

As the main organization embodying international scholarly attention to population problems, IUSSP presents a natural point of focus for a discussion of these issues. The experience of its own activities bearing on population policy over its 60-year history and its changing relations with Governments and the United Nations and other international agencies provide illuminating insights on the subject. Both where IUSSP has seemingly proved effective and influential on policy matters and where it has been less so, there are lessons to be extracted. Not least, these lessons bear on how future contributions from social scientific research can find their way to application for the improvement of population policy.

To keep the subject within reasonable bounds, this paper is restricted to treating policy problems of countries in the course of demographic transition and the related knowledge base that informs or plausibly should inform their responses. High fertility is clearly the principal subject of concern. Left aside are the policy problems of post-transition societies, such as how to adjust to diminishing youth cohorts and rapidly increasing numbers of elderly or how to encourage child-bearing, at least at a pace that yields population replacement. There is scope here too for productive transfer of experience among countries, although the quantum of pertinent experience is much smaller.

A. The disciplining of demography

From the time of the classical economists until well into this century, population studies occupied a respectable and often fairly central place in the broad field of political economy. The "principle of population" had expanded, even for Malthus, into a nuanced depiction of individual demographic behavioural responses to economic conditions, to the institutional set-up of the society and to cultural conditioning through education and moral stricture. In turn, aggregate demographic outcomes influenced the macro-economic setting, completing a simple but quite powerful general-equilibrium system. The mechanisms of demographic change, voluntary and involuntary, were of course of interest—deferral of marriage, fertility regulation within marriage, migration (in particular, colonization) and the "positive check" of mortality—but were amenable to matter-of-fact treatment. (Obvious measurement problems were progressively overcome as statistical systems matured.) The article on population by James Bonar in the 1923 edition of Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy* shared much the same coverage as Malthus's own *Encyclopaedia Britannica* contribution of 1823.

The organizing meeting held at Geneva in 1927 for what became the following year the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems (IUSIPP), still lay in most respects within this tradition of classical demography. The purpose of the new organization was one Malthus would have seen as a direct continuation of his own work, that of "securing more comprehensive and exact knowledge concerning the various historical, economic, social and other factors influencing the composition, growth and future relations of populations" (Sanger, 1927, p. 361). Papers read at the meeting had to do with food supply, optimum population, differential fertility (notably, by class) and international migration. The one topic new since Malthus's day was genetics and its policy offshoot, eugenics.

The forging of the modern discipline of demography out of this broad confluence of social history, political economy, statistics and (to a limited extent) biology, applied to population, can be traced through successive General Conferences of the Union, as more specialized, more numerous and more esoteric contributions supplanted the wide-ranging, often speculative and occasionally foolish essays of the older tradition. The process, of course, mirrored similar changes taking place in other research fields.

Scientific respectability called for a free-standing subject, not a session or two attached to public health or statistical meetings, which was how population studies had been treated in international congresses in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (IUSSP, 1985). IUSIPP and its reorganized successor (from 1947), IUSSP, were prominent in helping create this independent identity for demography. A central frame for the subject was provided by Lotka's mathematics of population growth, presented to several of the early conferences of the Union, notably

in a lengthy contribution to the meeting in London in 1931. (Lotka had published those results 20 years earlier, but they had not been directed particularly to population specialists.) Advances in measurement techniques and the development of cohort projection methods followed, providing the mills for which the rapidly accumulating volume of census and registration data produced endless grist. Recently, the development of the model for computable proximate determinants of fertility has represented a further major achievement, as has the generalization of Lotka's theory through use of functional derivative methods.

Accompanying this story of disciplinary success, and in part as a consequence of it (although not perhaps a necessary consequence), was a narrowing of the scope of demography. A discipline must be concerned with its own maintenance, its social reproduction. In earlier days, population studies grew by immigration. The pre-war and early post-war General Assemblies of the Union attracted some of the most distinguished names in economics, anthropology and statistics. The expertise of most participants spanned other fields besides population. More recently, natural increase has become the dominant source of growth in demography, and free movement across disciplinary borders is more difficult. The line separating population studies from the biological sciences is particularly marked—reflecting perhaps a reaction to the 1930s encounter with the eugenics movement (discussed below). Increasingly, research work in population came to be reported principally to other specialists rather than to a wider social scientific audience. Contributing to this process, the proceedings of the Union conferences in effect collected a significant fraction of population research in volumes accessible mainly to its members.

Specialization also meant an increasingly fine-grained research. "Large" topics, by their nature redolent of an earlier age of essayists and amateurs, tended to be inappropriate for the sharp new analytical methods, and they lost interest accordingly. Fortuitously, the heavy demand for dissertation topics by the expanding entry cohorts to the discipline coincided with the burgeoning number of sample survey data sets and the microcomputer revolution. For fertility, by far the largest sub-area in research attention over recent decades, the style of resulting research is epitomized by the contents of the two-volume "summary of knowledge" assembled by the United States National Academy of Sciences Panel on Fertility Determinants (Bulatao and Lee, 1983), and by the findings of the World Fertility Survey, summarized in Cleland and Scott (1986).

The narrowing of demographic perspectives and ambitions was protested along the way, if to little effect. Frank Lorimer, in his opening remarks as IUSSP President to the General Conference in New York in 1961, took note of the "trend toward specialization in demographic research within a relatively restricted field, focused on the analysis of demographic variables" (Lorimer, 1963, p. 27). Although allowing this as a major objective in population study, he deplored the neglect of broader issues entailed in the determinants and consequences of population growth:

> "A clever person by restricting his inquiry may, with reasonable assurance, expect to achieve results that will give him personal satisfaction and enhance his prestige. If he undertakes a more complex task he assumes greater risks. Likewise institutions may reasonably hesitate to sponsor expensive research programs on complex problems in which the "pay-off" in positive results is precarious...." (Lorimer, 1963, p. 28)

He saw political and funding pressures also influencing research in directions away from ambition and controversy.

Lorimer was not, of course, proposing a return to an earlier regard for the scholarly amateur:

> "Obviously, the organization of scientific inquiries that can lead to the objective formulation of complex relations involved in great social issues is a formidable task... It is also more difficult than research on very specific problems. Yet our capacity to make scientific contributions to vital human problems is a critical test of the maturity and competence of demography as a science." (Lorimer, 1963, pp. 29-30)

Similar sentiments have been expressed more recently by Chandrasekaran (1981) and Miró (1985).

B. Policy issues in the early Union

The Geneva meeting in 1927, out of which the IUSIPP emerged, was held at the initiative of Margaret Sanger, one of the pioneers of the birth control movement. Her own interest in the matter, according to Lorimer (1971), was to enlist science to buttress her promotion of what she saw as a self-evident good: the rational regulation of family size by parents, to the family's advantage. There was

no suggestion that the truth would have to be bent in such a task, although Lorimer later drily remarked that Mrs. Sanger "was not severely constrained in her thinking by scrupulous respect for the findings of scientific inquiry" (1971, p. 86). (In the event, although she was nominal editor of the 1927 proceedings, Sanger played no role in the actual establishment of the Union or its subsequent activities.)

The announcement of the meeting at Geneva made no mention of birth control.[1] Population problems were seen as having "biological, social, economic, medical, statistical, and political" aspects and were to be explored by "persons of established scientific standing". Furthermore, "Propaganda of any kind, or for any objective or doctrine whatever, will find no place in the Conference. Its viewpoint is that of the scientific laboratory or the study, rather than that of the pulpit or the hustings" (Sanger, 1927, announcement). The sensitivities to association with an activist of Mrs. Sanger's prominence are apparent in the protestations.

The overall problem to be faced, however, was how to deal with population growth. In the same announcement, this is stated in terms that were to become more familiar three or four decades later:

> "The earth, and every geographical division of it, is strictly limited in size and in ability to support human populations. But these populations keep on growing; and in so doing they are creating social, economic and political situations which threaten to alter profoundly our present civilization, and perhaps ultimately to wreck it." (Sanger, 1927)

A century after Malthus's death, the principal answer to "What can be done?" was no doubt expected to be not Malthus's own preventive checks but the neo-Malthusian approach espoused by Mrs. Sanger.

Ironically, the major policy-connected threat to the Union in its early years came not from birth controllers but from the eugenics movement (the *Eugenics Review* was already in its nineteenth year in 1927) and the burgeoning racist doctrines of Europe in the 1930s. Darwinism was believed to imply the downplaying of the role of social environment compared with inborn endowment in explaining behaviour; recorded patterns of differential fertility were thought to make for the genetic degradation of societies. At the Union conference in 1931, a report on research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics gravely contrasted the fertility of professors and peasants, the former being seriously outbred. Notions now seen as wholly untenable—the risks of "race mingling", intergroup biological differences in reproductive capacity, or the proposition that nations, like people, exhaust their reproductive powers as they age—had the same platform space as ideas that have proved seminal. Matters reached an extreme point at the notorious conference at Berlin in 1935 (the occasion of the third General Assembly of the Union), which was dominated by racist tracts and boycotted by most of the best-known demographers. At the meeting in Paris two years later, a smaller contingent of race researchers and racial policy advocates made up much of a single, overfull session on qualitative problems of population. The session was redeemed by condemnations of this work delivered by several participants, in particular the anthropologist—and cultural determinist—Franz Boaz, who stated that race is "entirely subordinate to cultural setting"; the existence of a cultural personality embracing an entire race "is at best a poetic and dangerous fiction" (Boaz, 1938, pp. 87 and 92). For the organization of the Union, this experience led to the decision in 1947 to shift from being an association of autonomous national committees (16 at its peak) to being an association of individual members. For those members themselves, it plausibly led to an aversion to socio-biological explanation or argument and, for a time, to greater watchfulness over the policy marches.

While population studies thus broke with eugenics, connections with two other social policy movements, each with an independent history, were being forged. The first of these was family planning, originating in the early campaigns for women's rights and individual privacy; the second was public health and hygiene, originating in the ideas of nineteenth-century urban reformers and germ theorists. So linked have population studies become to these movements—they seem now to be almost the subject's policy arms (migration research never quite had an analogous limb)—that the scientific core, to many practitioners, is merely a supporting analytical structure for the development, justification and assessment of family planning and health programmes.

IUSSP, as an organization deliberately concerned with that scientific core, has thrived within this potentially difficult environment. The statutes first proposed for the reformed Union in 1947 specifically excluded "the field of demographic policy" from its domain of interest; the exclusion was removed in subsequent discussion at the General Assembly in 1947 (IUSSP, 1947, p. 303). The experience of the Union with reference to policy aspects of fertility and

mortality, dealing with programmes largely conceived independently of whatever expertise it could have had to offer, is commented on below in the course of a more general discussion of the development of those policy directions.

C. Fertility and the family planners

The emergence over the past three decades of a broad consensus that the best (and virtually the sole effective) means of reducing perceived too-high fertility is through family planning programmes is the most striking feature of population policy thinking since the 1940s. A number of factors have contributed to this development. One of them has been mentioned above: the narrowing scope of demography and, within that scope, its increasing rigour and technical sophistication. Fertility could be neatly "explained" by its proximate determinants; fertility decline, in most instances, resulted from greater recourse to contraception. More distant explanation quickly bogged down in ambiguity and controversy. A policy intent on raising contraceptive practice would naturally look first to provision of supplies and services. Reinforcing this tendency for explanation and policy recipe to stick close to the biology of fertility was the efflorescence of survey-taking, which yielded numerous data sets on the most readily quantifiable aspects of attitudes towards, access to and practice of contraception.

A second factor is emphasized by Hodgson (1983) in his interesting study of demographic thought in the United States of America during the first post-war decade. Hodgson argues that there was a major shift in thinking during this period from a social scientific to a policy orientation, stimulated by the recognition of the need to combat rapid population growth in poor countries. So-called "direct approaches" (i.e., contraceptive supply programmes) came to the fore in this process. They did so, Hodgson first argues, because of the apparent absence of compelling alternatives, that is, policies deriving from transition theory or, later, from research seeking to show the "rationality" of high fertility in pre-industrial societies. In particular, investigation of past fertility declines failed to produce evidence for the types of thresholds for change that had been postulated. In a subsequent article, Hodgson (1988) lays out a more elaborate line of argument: family planning during the early post-war era offered a democratic, voluntaristic remedy that severed a potentially awkward link between fertility decline and industrialization, awkward because the most striking instances of forced-draft industrialization appeared then to be associated with communist régimes and perhaps also because it lent credence to the view that third world population problems were a legacy of Western colonialism. (Hodgson speculates that the large fertility declines actually recorded in recent years, by making policy questions less pressing, will lead to a return to a social science orientation in demography.)

These two factors were in a sense intrinsic to demography; a third factor has been extrinsic: the influence of the family planning movement itself. The depth of influence is well indicated by the now thoroughly muddied distinction between family planning as a term (once a euphemism) for fertility regulation by an individual or couple and family planning as shorthand for an organized promotional activity and supply system, typically run or overseen by government. The resulting conflation of meaning, often scarcely recognized, is a linguistic bedevilment of the field. Funding has been important to this influence—the amount of private and public foreign aid money involved in birth control programmes in developing countries has raised the stakes in "scientific" analysis of the determinants of fertility—but so has sheer energy and commitment. Notestein, in his reflections on demography in the United States, written near the end of his life, remarked on the importance of a few small, tightly led foundations in setting the demographic agenda. He saw this as having been a welcome encouragement of innovation and risk-taking in the early years (the 1930s and 1940s): "Little innovation in the field of population studies came from the universities... For the most part, work in the universities came in response to foundation initiatives" (1982, pp. 674-675). Over time, however, bureaucratization could set in with "new vested interests" emerging (Notestein, 1982, p. 685). Emerge they did (for a discussion of the subject, see Demeny, 1988).

The experience of IUSSP illustrates this shift from social science research on fertility to "operations" research on family planning programmes (for documentary details, see Lebrun, 1987). In the early 1950s, IUSSP set up a Committee on Population Problems of Countries in Process of Industrialization, under the auspices of which, and at the bidding of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), a major research project on culture and fertility was undertaken. The resulting study (Lorimer, 1954) remains one of the landmarks of modern demography. (Other landmarks of the same era are the United Nations report entitled *The*

Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends (United Nations, 1953) and the series of major country studies prepared by the Office of Population Research of Princeton University.) The IUSSP Committee also commissioned a pioneering survey of national population policies as a background document for the World Population Conference in Rome (1954). The survey, by Hope Eldridge (1954), covers family, social security and immigration policies as well as birth control; reflecting the concerns of the time, it has more to say about pro-natalist than anti-natalist measures.

It might have been expected that these early studies would have spawned a long-term research programme centred on what they appeared to show as critical questions for both understanding and policy debate. Instead, they spawned virtually nothing. A decade later, in what was in effect a fresh start on policy research, IUSSP set up its Committee on Comparative Studies of Fertility and Family Planning, which has continued under a succession of memberships (for a time split into separate committees on fertility and on family planning) to the present. The latter committee and its successors worked closely with the Population Division in producing a series of reports on the design and analysis of fertility surveys and the evaluation of family planning programmes. It has also, like the wider demographic community, fed off the enormous accumulation of fertility, proximate determinants and Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) data yielded by the World Fertility Survey.

Only once since the 1950s has the ascendancy of the family planning movement in the role of exemplifier and near-monopolizer of population policy attention seemed to falter. This occurred at the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974, which was sponsored by the United Nations. It was the first fully political international gathering to consider population questions. The earlier World Population Conferences—Rome in 1954 and Belgrade in 1965—had been jointly sponsored by the United Nations and IUSSP, with determinedly scientific programmes and no resolutions or plans of action. At Bucharest, there was a serious, if crudely conceived and politically motivated effort to put population back into a "developmental" setting. The effort scarcely outlived the Conference. More recent attempts to undermine the family planning movement have come from the political right, evident in the position of the United States expounded at the International Conference on Population at Mexico City in 1984 (see United Nations, 1984, pp. 73-75); these efforts appear to have been fairly ineffectual.

Has anything been lost by this ascendancy? To hold that better policies would have been found or that fertility outcomes would have been appreciably different under, say, a more sceptical, experimentally attuned, social-scientifically aware anti-natalist movement is largely speculation. It may indeed be the case that family planning programmes operate within a surface layer of existing or "latent" service demand and appear to achieve greater results only when demand conditions at a deeper level change under the influence of economic and cultural forces well out of the programme's grasp. It does not follow, however, that there are policy instruments at hand in most societies that could reach those deeper levels. Whether policy accomplishment would be greater is thus uncertain. At the least, however, social scientific understanding would be better served and some particular blind spots in existing programme thinking might be removed.

D. Mortality Research and the Health Profession

In contrast to the fertility case, demographic research on mortality has proceeded fairly independently of programmed action. This has probably been because the arena for programme research has been seen as the bailiwick of the medical and public health professions rather than of demographers—the border of prime interest being that between good health and illness rather than between the living and the dead. As demography and its social science affiliates find more to say about morbidity and as health programmes and their institutional supporters find more to ask of the social sciences, the separation is breaking down.

Mortality research has always been drawn on to some extent in health policy-making, virtually from the beginnings of demography in analyses of the bills of mortality in the seventeenth century. Theoretical advances in the parametrization of life tables have made it possible to produce mortality estimates from sketchy survey data in the absence of death registration systems, establishing rough numerical magnitudes for health intervention priorities. Demographic analysis of cause-of-death data takes this work nearer to specific issues of health programme design. Research on the determinants of secular mortality decline, notably in major studies by McKeown (1976) and by Preston (1976), has assessed

the relative contributions of medical progress, public health measures and general socio-economic conditions. Still on the agenda for attention by the discipline is the devising of a proximate determinants framework that might achieve for mortality some of the same conceptual clarification, data-sorting economies and policy insights as those contributed by the Davis and Blake and the Bongaarts frameworks in the fertility case.

Concerted efforts by IUSSP in the mortality and health fields were late in beginning. Morbidity was the subject of a session at a General Conference for the first time in 1959, at the meeting at Vienna. The first IUSSP mortality committee was established only in 1978 (Lebrun and others, 1987, p. 78). In step with demographers at large, however, IUSSP attention to mortality research has increased in the past decade; and a sequence of committees on the subject has produced several important books, in particular, Preston (1982), and Vallin and Lopez (1985). Not coincidentally, the successor to the World Fertility Survey is yielding a mass of data on health as well as fertility.

In the development of health policy for poor countries, a major event was the World Health Organization/United Nations Children's Fund Conference on Primary Health Care at Alma-Ata in 1978, out of which emerged a programme recipe with the potential for the same kind of strength and fixity as the mainline family planning progamme model. UNICEF has been actively promoting this approach. Miró and Potter, writing soon after the Conference at Alma Ata, could speak of the "present consensus as to how to reduce mortality differentials" (1980, p. 85). There have been recent signs of dissent, however. Mosley (1985) wrote a trenchant critique of the primary-care model in terms of demand weakness; and a new strand of research, beginning with the Conference on the Health Achievements of Sri Lanka, Kerala, Costa Rica, Cuba and China (Bellagio, 1985) and continued in work by Caldwell (see, in particular, 1986), promises a deeper analysis of the cultural determinants of "health-seeking behaviour". Social science research may have scope for less marginal prospective influence here than on anti-natalist policy. (The cautious note is in order given the formidable strength of medical establishments and health bureaucracies. In the United States, for example, ample evidence that better health is influenced far more by personal behaviour than by health care does nothing to weaken the identification in public policy of health with health care. (For variations on this theme, see Fuchs, 1986.)

E. Distilling the past

Policy research that must contend with programme models already firmly in mind, and often already in place, is somewhat removed from the ideal type of social science influence on public affairs. The "scientific study of population", by disentangling and assigning weights to the factors at work in past and current demographic change, ought to have much to offer of interest and pertinence to current policy debate.

For the changes that constitute demographic transition, that disentangling task, unfortunately, is very complicated; and the results are often inconclusive. Demographic transition is not plausibly a phenomenon separable from broad processes of socio-economic and cultural change, and its explanation therefore depends upon an understanding of that change. At best, the concreteness and empirical accessibility of the demographic domain may make demography a kind of privileged entry point into that study—as indeed it has been treated by some historians.

A large effort at seeking to understand the early phases of the European demographic transition has been the European Fertility Project at Princeton University. This project has finely calibrated the timing of fertility change throughout the continent, an intricate data-assembling and data-refining operation that has contributed greatly to the materials of historical demography. The project has been less concerned with the detailing of prospective independent variables, the correlates and covariates of demographic change, and thus has been sparing on insights into the deeper societal changes of which demographic transition may be a manifestation. Its monographic constituents vary somewhat in this respect, however, while the use of project materials by social and economic historians and others with pertinent disciplinary interests outside demography is still in the early stages. The theoretical conclusions to which the project has thus far lent itself tend to portray transition as fairly autonomous, somewhat mysteriously set in motion and, once begun, proceeding at its own pace to what might be described as completion. (The mystery is lessened little by current usage describing the critical determinants of fertility transition as "ideational".) The two most important and influential distillations of project findings are a theoretical summary by Ansley Coale presented at the IUSSP General Conference at Liège in 1973 (Coale, 1973), and a later account, couched specifi-

cally in the form of lessons for today, by Knodel and van de Walle (1979). Both might be described as highly abstracted.

Much of the effort at Princeton went into the reconstruction of historical data. More recent country experience should be (although it often is not) more easily retrievable. A set of country monographs focused on demographically important or otherwise interesting instances of secular fertility decline in the contemporary world was sponsored by the United States National Academy of Sciences Panel on Fertility Determinants. (This was a parallel product to the work by Bulatao and Lee cited earlier.) Like the earlier project, it stuck closely to a demographic frame—the more elaborate Bongaarts proximate determinants system replacing the Coale indexes of the Princeton project. The shift was appropriate, given the degree to which modern survey instruments can explore the behaviour underlying marital fertility, but the greater demographic detail tended to displace a broader social scientific perspective on fertility change.

Are there different frameworks through which to filter comparative country population experience that are less constricted to demography and thus perhaps able to contribute more to policy thinking? The IUSSP Committee on Population Policies in Developing Countries (POPOLCOM), set up in 1975 and active until 1980, clearly thought so. The Committee's approach owed much to the distinctive Latin American intellectual tradition in population (and development) policy studies, in which fertility is seen as governed principally by structural features of the economy and society; and policy measures, to be effective, must generally be radical. The research guidelines devised by the Committee were both ambitious in scope and sketchy in detail, giving wide latitude to the authors commissioned to produce country case-studies. Disappointingly, the resulting studies stopped well short of the stage at which they could engage in policy debate. The search for social heterogeneity, a major task specified by the guidelines, looked in practice much like the arid differential fertility analyses that filled the demographic journals in the 1960s. For all its good instincts, the Committee's effort to find a new approach to comparative analysis of population policy left little residue (for a description and assessment of POPOLCOM, see Miró, Gonzalez and McCarthy, 1982).

The next IUSSP policy committee (the predecessor of the current committee) retreated from this level of ambition, as indicated by its name: Committee on the Utilization of Demographic Knowledge in Policy Formation and Planning. This Committee also commissioned country case-studies, though on a smaller scale; a review of some of them is presented in Mundigo (1986). The major products of its activities are not yet published.

A common feature that each of these otherwise diverse research endeavours has shared (in the POPOLCOM case, despite itself) is attention to the minutiae of demographic data. An occupational characteristic of demographers, fitting them for their discipline but ill-fitting them for policy research, is to tolerate, and by their attentions worsen, the imbalance between demographic precision and detail, on the one hand, and casualness of treatment of non-demographic covariates and contextual and policy variables, on the other.

The value for population policy of country studies of demographic change in context is not measured by their closeness to some notional end-point at which full understanding has been achieved. Historical investigation in the social science mode, even where the history is almost current and the documentation possibilities vast, is not like that and does not have to be so for it to enlighten policy debate in the present. Generic historiographical differences concerning, for example, the relation between cultural and economic factors in social change or the relative importance of institutional determination and fortuity—are a continuing condition and should be recognized as such in the field. Insights from past experience are likely to be based on arrays of empirically established observations and a series of more or less well-defended interpretive accounts—stories of what apparently happened and of what in slightly different circumstances might have happened ("counterfactuals"). A minimum qualification for such accounts should be that they take in enough of the surrounds of the demographic system for policy debate not to be arbitrarily truncated.

F. Policy research futures and IUSSP

At various points, this paper has touched on the contrast between the breadth of knowledge that should ideally inform population policy and the fairly narrow terrain that demographers have intensively

cultivated. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of the contributions of demography to policy seem to lie here.

IUSSP, whose members are social scientists active in population research, the large majority of whom would probably call themselves demographers, not surprisingly mirrors those strengths and weaknesses. Research on the empirical foundations of population growth, which the Union has done much to foster, established the rationales and some of the major assumptions on which population policy still rests. IUSSP has been conspicuously successful in promoting communication among third world population researchers and in drawing on the resulting international network of scholars in its own activities. Its meetings have recorded many notable scientific achievements, as any perusal of its publications list will attest. (For the General Conferences, see the bibliography prepared by Jacqueline Claude, 1987.)

A substantial part of IUSSP activities, far more than the programmes of its Policy Committees themselves, has been motivated by direct policy concerns. The difficulties that have been encountered along the way in actually influencing policy have been the main topic of this discussion: some rooted in the scope and style that have come to characterize mainstream demography; others in the strong programmed interests that have come to characterize the population policy enterprise. In combination, the result, in this author's view, has been to attenuate the substance of the interaction between research and policy, while leaving the impression of continuing intensive exchange.

What could IUSSP be doing better for population policy? The question is open-ended and, it could be argued, unfairly addressed to a scientific organization that has been traditionally wary (many would say, very properly wary) of policy involvement. Times change, however, and those sensitivities have lessened. The present author would nominate three areas—all areas of current underinvestment—where work of the type IUSSP would be well equipped to promote, and in which it is to a degree already engaged, could make potentially significant policy contributions.

The first area is critical scrutiny of mainline population policy thinking and of the programme manifestations of that thinking, primarily in family planning and health programmes. In virtually every area of development studies there have been major shifts in policy approach (encompassing understanding, favoured strategy and actual allocation decisions) over the decades since the Second World War, as research has progressed and as the empirical record has accumulated. There were ideas "of the 1950s", "of the 1960s" and so on, a few perhaps faddish or in retrospect foolish, but most not. Such changes may be beginning to be seen in health policy, but they have been all but absent in fertility policy: by insight or luck, it would be necessary to claim, the best approach to fertility policy was lighted on immediately. Even if that were really so, there are some curiously unattended issues: comprehending, for example, cases of modern fertility decline sans programme; cases of increasing recourse to older, non-programme contraceptive methods; the oddity of routine acceptance of government management in family planning programmes when in other development spheres government management skills are being derogated; or the extent to which fertility decline generates family planning programme development in addition to (or as substitution for) the opposite causal link.

A second subject is the scholarly enterprise of extracting lessons of experience in population policy. Comparative social history is a difficult genre, but it is remarkable in the population field how little experience is routinely drawn on. One hears, repeatedly, partial accounts of the recent histories of Indonesia, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand; entire regions of the world where demographic transition has also proceeded far are implicitly held to have little of policy interest to offer or an explicitly reduced to lessons so desiccated as to offer little. Again, one learns much about the modern technology of development, but much less about the changing social structural and cultural frameworks within which that technology is lodged. A potential work programme here should extend well beyond the terrain of demography strictly construed.

Last, a subject that could greatly benefit population policy thinking is the study of policy design *de novo*—seeing such policy as generically an instance of public choice and thus illuminated by the relevant economic and political theory, but also as enmeshed in a particularly inaccessible and culturally central domain of life and thus *sui generis*. It is noteworthy that the current IUSSP committee on population policy has planned a future seminar precisely on this subject.

Note

[1] This omission was at the insistence of Raymond Pearl. In a letter to Margaret Sanger in April 1926, Pearl wrote:

> "The whole project of organizing an international union of population, having as adhering bodies the leading scientific organizations of the world interested in this problem, demands, as I see it, that birth control, or Neo-Malthusianism, shall not appear as being the dominant element in the organization or plan." (Pearl, 1926)

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VII. LES THEORIES ET PRATIQUES DU DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET LEUR INFLUENCE POSSIBLE SUR LA BAISSE SECULAIRE DE LA FECONDITE

*Jean-Claude Chesnais**

Au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, l'une des données majeures de la scène internationale est la division du monde en deux blocs antagonistes : le bloc occidental et le bloc de l'Est. Chacun de ces deux blocs est marqué par la prééminence d'une des deux super-puissances issues de la guerre : les Etats-Unis et l'URSS; chacun se caractérise par un système de valeurs commun : la démocratie parlementaire et l'économie de marché pour le premier; le parti unique et l'économie dirigée pour le second. Entre ces deux mondes va peu à peu émerger un nouvel ensemble, créé par la décolonisation : le tiers monde, que l'Occident et la sphère soviétique ne vont pas tarder à inscrire graduellement dans leur zone d'influence. Mais autant ce clivage de la planète était clair dans les années 1950 et 1960, autant il devient flou aujourd'hui : du fait de leur montée en puissance, nombre de pays se sont écartés de leur tuteur, et surtout le conflit doctrinal s'est, peu à peu, éteint devant l'évidence des faits, pour ne pas dire la sanction des réalités. Une vingtaine d'années après, la Hongrie, la matrice même du système communiste, l'Union soviétique, tente une réforme économique, destinée à réhabiliter le profit, reconnaissant du coup les vertus de l'économie de marché. La Chine continentale qui, dans les années 1950, en créant les communes populaires, était allée plus loin encore que l'URSS dans l'objectif de collectivisation agraire, recule de façon plus spectaculaire encore, en libéralisant la production agricole (1979). Tout se passe ainsi comme si l'utopie marxiste avait cédé le pas devant le réalisme économique.

Mais l'effacement des idéologies semble également déborder le domaine des stratégies de développement; il s'étend aux politiques de population, la Chine donnant, là encore, en son sein même, le plus bel exemple du conflit entre le respect des doctrines et les contraintes de l'action quotidienne. Jusqu'à la fin des années 1960, la ligne suivie par les autorités chinoises a été sinueuse, étant, au gré des circonstances politiques, tantôt marxiste (négation de la pression démographique : c'est le cas des périodes d'effervescence révolutionnaire comme les "cent fleurs", "le grand bond en avant" et la "grande révolution culturelle prolétarienne"), tantôt malthusienne (lancement de campagnes de limitation des naissances, en période d'accalmie). Quoi de plus symbolique, du reste, que la déclaration officielle du Gouvernement chinois à la Conférence mondiale de la population à Bucarest en 1974, chantant l'"avenir radieux" des peuples prolifiques, alors même que quelques années plus tôt, les dirigeants venaient de mettre en oeuvre le programme de réduction de la fécondité le plus austère qui ait jamais été conçu dans l'histoire humaine?

A la fin des années 1980, exception faite de certains pays d'Afrique équatoriale à faible densité, l'accord est quasi unanime sur la nécessité de limiter les naissances dans les pays à forte fécondité. Le dilemme de Bucarest apparaît désormais comme un faux dilemme : mettre l'accent sur le développement comme garant d'une réduction de la fécondité ou miser, au contraire, sur le planning familial comme facteur de promotion du bien-être n'est plus une alternative. L'emballement démographique est devenu tel dans les pays les plus pauvres de la planète que le développement nécessite un freinage de la fécondité : le planning familial fait désormais partie intégrante de toute politique de développement (les seules nuances portant sur son intensité et ses modalités). Cette nécessité du planning familial s'est imposée moins par crainte de la famine ou d'une catastrophe alimentaire (comme durant les décennies précédentes) que par souci de maîtriser le rythme de l'urbanisation et de la création d'emplois productifs. Depuis la récession économique mondiale (1973) et plus encore depuis le second choc pétrolier (1979), cette nécessité se trouve, en effet, accrue : le

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ralentissement de la croissance dans les pays du "Nord", la concurrence de plus en plus vive de certains nouveaux pays industriels, raniment la tentation néo-protectionniste et limitent les débouchés des pays du "Sud"; les perspectives d'émigration vers les pays de la CEE ou les pays pétroliers sont devenus restreintes; l'endettement s'est aggravé. Pour les pays qui ne sont pas encore dotés des outils préalables au décollage économique (institutions politiques, infrastructure physique, capital humain, etc...), l'effort de développement devient plus délicat et plus coûteux.

Faut-il donc conclure à la mort des idéologies, à la fin des divergences? En réalité, derrière cette convergence apparente des discours se dissimulent des différences profondes dans les modalités d'application concrète des politiques. Surtout, l'héritage du passé pèse encore très lourd sur le présent : dans les pays à économie planifiée de nombreuses habitudes néfastes ont été prises, des institutions vieillies (bureaucratie d'Etat, appareil du parti) restent en place, avec leurs prérogatives traditionnelles. Si bien que les niveaux de développement actuels, tout comme les résultats acquis en matière de réduction de la natalité, portent l'empreinte de ce passé.

A. Les théories du développement et la place du facteur démographique

Les théories du développement sont très nombreuses. On peut cependant distinguer trois grands courants. Ces trois écoles de pensée ont, au cours des dernières décennies, dominé l'économie du développement. Ce sont : la théorie de la dépendance; la théorie des obstacles structurels; la théorie de l'échange international.

La théorie de la dépendance

D'inspiration néo-marxiste, la théorie de la dépendance voit dans l'échange international la cause principale de l'inégalité du développement et, finalement, de tous les problèmes du tiers monde. Après des décennies de lutte, les pays colonisés ont acquis leur indépendance politique; mais selon cette thèse, leur émancipation n'est pas achevée, car ils restent économiquement dominés par les anciennes puissances impériales, à travers le commerce international. La division internationale du travail est responsable du sous-développement : les pays dominants pillent les matières premières et profitent de la détérioration séculaire des termes de l'échange au détriment des nations prolétaires. Tous comptes faits, le système international pénalise les pays pauvres spécialisés dans la production et l'exportation de produits primaires à faible valeur ajoutée, dans la mesure où l'élasticité de l'offre pour ces produits serait plus faible que l'élasticité de la demande. L'inverse est exact pour les produits manufacturés exportés par les nations industrielles. Les firmes multinationales, censées incarner l'intérêt des pays riches, extorquent des rentes de monopole, en cédant des produits et des licences de production aux pays en développement sans jamais leur transférer vraiment les technologies dont elles sont détentrices...

Le déséquilibre est tel que les pays en développement sont incapables de concurrencer les pays riches dans le secteur industriel. Ils n'ont, dès lors, qu'une seule arme pour compenser leur handicap : le protectionnisme, en d'autres termes, le recours au "développement auto-centré". Pour éviter que ce développement ne se fasse au profit d'oligarchies nationales, le contrôle par l'Etat des secteurs-clés de l'économie apparaît nécessaire, d'où la nécessité des nationalisations. Tels sont les ingrédients principaux de l'argumentation "dépendantiste".

Après la seconde guerre mondiale, les responsables des pays nouvellement indépendants, qui viennent de rejeter le système colonial, craignent de retomber dans une autre forme de domination néo-colonialiste. Nombreux sont ceux qui sont tentés de s'inspirer du modèle soviétique, et dès lors, de rompre avec le capitalisme. La thèse de la dépendance est donc très populaire.

Mais dès la fin des années 1950, les limites de cette stratégie apparaissent. Les résultats ne sont pas à la hauteur des espérances, ce qui entraîne une radicalisation. Au lieu de remettre en cause l'orientation protectionniste, cette évolution tend à la renforcer, en l'étendant à des ensembles régionaux assez homogènes. On propose une intégration régionale de différents pays en développement de façon à compenser l'étroitesse des marchés nationaux, patente dans de nombreux cas (en Afrique, notamment). Là encore, les performances s'avèrent décevantes. Les pays qui adoptent la thèse de la dépendance éprouvent d'importantes difficultés économiques, contrastant avec la prospérité remarquable des marchés mondiaux qui culmine avec le boom des prix des matières premières en 1974. Après le premier choc pétrolier, en 1973-1974, le "Groupe des 77", qui rassemble les pays en développement adhérant à cette thèse, cherche à transformer ce gain dans les termes de l'échange en avantage permanent et institutionnalisé. Il se crée

alors un vaste mouvement en faveur d'un "nouvel ordre économique international". L'objet est de substituer une planification mondiale aux marchés internationaux de biens et de capitaux. Le mouvement atteint son apogée avec la planification du rapport Brandt (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980).

La chute des cours du pétrole, à partir de 1985, était inévitable : elle résultait des effets induits de la montée excessive des prix (contraction de la demande énergétique, nouvelles découvertes des gisements, rentabilisation des substituts); elle provoque un choc en retour, rappelant les mécanismes implacables de l'économie. De même, le succès, de plus en plus insolent, des "nouveaux pays industriels", qui précisément, s'étaient écartés à temps de la stratégie protectionniste de remplacement des importations, "relativise" le discours sur les mérites attendus du nouvel ordre international et ôte une grande part de sa crédibilité aux thèses "dépendantistes".

En réalité, en rendant le néo-colonialisme ou l'ordre économique international—c'est-à-dire, des abstractions—externes, responsables de leurs échecs internes, certains Gouvernements n'ont-ils pas usé d'alibis commodes, destinés à masquer les insuffisances de leurs propres politiques?

La théorie des obstacles structurels

Plus technique, cette école de pensée voit dans le développement un processus consistant en une série d'étapes successives, en quelque sorte nécessaires, affectant la structure de l'économie : passage d'une économie agraire à une économie industrielle; amélioration de la productivité du travail; hausse du taux d'épargne; progression et diversification des exportations. Les tableaux d'input-output jouent un grand rôle dans cette analyse, mais la fixité des coefficients techniques conduit naturellement à un certain pessimisme à l'égard des progrès potentiels de la productivité. L'aide internationale et les flux d'investissements étrangers occupent également une place centrale dans ce courant de pensée (le rôle des apports extérieurs dans la croissance y est du reste souvent exagéré). Pour comprendre les mouvements structurels, on classe les pays en fonction de différents critères : la taille, la situation géographique, les ressources naturelles... Des variables comme le revenu par tête, la part de l'agriculture dans le produit total, la répartition sectorielle des emplois, le poids du secteur manufacturier sont considérées comme des indicateurs de développement.

Dans les années 1970, à la liste des variables ci-dessus, on ajoute la répartition des revenus. Les niveaux de développement vont alors jusqu'à être assimilés à des coefficients de Gini, le degré d'inégalité devenant un critère de degré de sous-développement (le développement s'accompagne de l'émergence d'une classe moyenne).

Qu'ils soient fondés sur la fonction de production de Harrod-Domar et font alors intervenir le seul capital; qu'ils soient néo-classiques, de type Cobb-Douglas et ajoutent le facteur "travail" au facteur "capital", ou qu'ils soient de simples modèles d'investissement, les modèles économétriques en vogue dans les années 1950 et 1960 se rattachent à ce courant. Les facteurs démographiques y prennent une place souvent stratégique, mais la vision est mécanique, parfois simpliste.

Cette école technocratique a beaucoup de points communs avec l'école de la dépendance. L'une et l'autre estiment possible une planification des différentes étapes du développement. Elles inspirent la mise en oeuvre de plans de développement détaillés portant sur une durée de cinq, sept, voire dix ans, et définissent l'allocation des ressources productives. Cette planification globale est assortie de programmes sectoriels précis. Des calculs complexes sont faits pour situer le pays concerné et savoir s'il atteint les niveaux appropriés des différents indicateurs structurels, compte tenu de ses ressources naturelles et de sa catégorie de revenu. L'approche est donc normative.

Ces deux thèses, souvent appliquées de manière complémentaire, tendent à voir le salut du tiers monde dans la planification centrale et la croissance autocentrée. La stratégie préconisée est celle de la substitution aux importations—autrement dit, de la fabrication par le pays lui-même de biens remplaçant ses importations.

La théorie de l'échange international

La troisième approche fait le pari de l'extraversion—autrement dit, de l'ouverture sur le marché mondial comme stimulant de la croissance économique. Elle se fonde sur la théorie classique des avantages comparés, revue et amendée par le théorème de Heckher-Ohlin-Samuelson. Plus pragmatique, moins normative que les précédentes, elle applique les instruments et les méthodes habituelles de l'analyse économique au cas spécifique étudié. Elle s'efforce de définir les moyens d'une croissance rapide en exploitant au mieux les atouts et

en minimisant les handicaps propres à chaque pays. La nature des choix opérés repose sur une étude des comportements des agents économiques locaux (paysans, ouvriers, consommateurs, entrepreneurs) et de leur capacité de répondre à tel ou tel segment de la demande mondiale. Les propensions à consommer, épargner et investir de ces catégories d'agents sont considérées comme les variables-clés de la croissance : suivant cette thèse, il est en effet possible de les influencer par des politiques respectant les mécanismes du marché (vérité des prix et du taux de change, fiscalité non confiscatoire, taux d'intérêt rémunérateur). Ces mécanismes, quant à eux, sont censés permettre une utilisation et une répartition plus efficace des ressources à travers l'échange intérieur et international. La philosophie est alors celle de l'Etat minimal : le rôle des pouvoirs publics et des conventions internationales consiste simplement à fixer des règles du jeu garantissant le fonctionnement des marchés concurrentiels et permettant de produire de façon efficace et équitable les services collectifs. On retrouve donc les traits caractéristiques du libéralisme classique.

Cette confiance des économistes libéraux dans les mécanismes régulateurs du marché n'exclut cependant pas l'interférence de l'Etat, notamment s'il s'agit de corriger des déséquilibres jugés néfastes à la réalisation de la croissance optimale. C'est, en particulier, le cas dans la sphère démographique, si l'on juge que le libre choix des couples en matière de descendance aboutit à une situation sous-optimale pour la collectivité. La décision d'avoir un grand nombre d'enfants peut engendrer un gain net pour les parents, mais constituer une charge pour la nation. C'est cette existence d'effets externes qui justifie alors l'intervention des pouvoirs publics.

La place de la démographie dans les théories du développement

Le paradoxe vaut d'être noté d'emblée : alors même que la rapidité de la croissance démographique est un des traits majeurs et sans précédent des pays en développement, les facteurs démographiques ne sont guère pris en compte dans la définition, finalement très politique, des théories du développement présentées ci-dessus. L'axe priviligié est le choix d'un certain type de relations internationales et de règles de fonctionnement interne de la société.

A la différence de la pensée classique ou néo-classique, pourtant élaborées à une époque où les fluctuations démographiques étaient sans commune mesure avec les variations actuelles, la réflexion contemporaine n'accorde ainsi que peu de place aux facteurs démographiques—notamment, à la discussion sur l'opportunité de la baisse de la fécondité et les effets économiques à en attendre.

Chez les classiques (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus), l'évolution de la population est soumise à l'influence des moyens de subsistance disponibles. C'est finalement la conjoncture agricole qui commande les rythmes démographiques. Toute société qui essaie de s'affranchir de cette contrainte tombe sous le coup de la loi des rendements agricoles décroissants et est inévitablement sanctionnée par la paupérisation, voire la famine. La régulation démographique doit être permanente et la reproduction prudente : les recommandations du Pasteur Malthus sont, sur ce point, sans ambiguïté.

A cette vision pessimiste d'un monde sous la menace perpétuelle de la catastrophe alimentaire s'oppose l'optimisme des néo-classiques, comme Pareto ou Marshall. Cette fois, la logique démo-économique est inversée. Ce n'est plus la population qui dépend de l'état de l'économie, mais c'est la population qui devient la variable motrice : le volume de la production est réglé par la taille de la population active; et, surtout, ce qui fait la différence, chez Marshall notamment, c'est la croyance dans un progrès technique continu. Autrement dit, la modernité est intégrée dans son essence même : le changement.

Les théories contemporaines du développement sont quant à elles des théories limitées à la production et l'échange des biens—autrement dit, à l'administration des choses. Elles tendent, de ce fait, à se désintéresser de l'organisation des hommes. Tout se passe dès lors comme si, du fait de son appartenance à la sphère non matérielle, la détermination des attitudes à adopter face à la procréation ou, plus généralement, à l'évolution du nombre des hommes était laissée au champ de la morale et de la religion. N'est-ce pas aux prêtres que revient, traditionnellement dans chaque civilisation, la charge de guider les âmes? Le contrôle des moeurs ressortit du domaine religieux là où elle domine, l'église catholique s'attribue la souveraineté des préceptes qui doivent régir la vie sexuelle : la doctrine catholique romaine ne condamne-t-elle pas, aujourd'hui encore, la contraception moderne, seule la procréation étant censée purifier l'acte charnel? La Bible elle-même n'encourage-t-elle pas les Hébreux à se multiplier?

Pour l'Islam, qui tend à maintenir la femme dans son statut d'infériorité, la fécondité n'est-elle pas une preuve de virilité? Un leader charismatique, comme Gandhi, soucieux d'ordre éternel, n'affirme-t-il pas que "la réduction de la natalité par la contraception équivaut au suicide de l'espèce. Les contraceptifs sont une insulte à la féminité. La différence entre une prostituée et une femme qui emploie des contraceptifs est seulement que la première vend son corps à plusieurs hommes, la seconde à un seul"?

Autant ces positions traditionnelles, dictées par le souci de l'harmonie sociale, sont parfaitement adaptées aux sociétés pré-transitionnelles où la prolifération est le seul gage de l'équilibre et de la survie du groupe, autant elles deviennent caduques dès lors que la progéniture survit en nombre très supérieur à celui de ses parents. Mais l'inertie des rites et la force des dogmes s'opposent au progrès technique et à l'émancipation des femmes. L'église anglicane et, plus généralement, le monde protestant, ont cependant, dès les années 1930, reconnu le droit de l'individu à la libre détermination dans ses projets familiaux. C'est, en conséquence, dans l'aire d'influence anglo-saxonne que le planning familial a pénétré en premier. Le cas des ex-colonies britanniques comme l'Inde, l'Egypte ou le Ghana, par opposition aux territoires d'administration française (Afrique francophone) est éclairant à ce sujet.

Dans l'après-guerre, ce ne sont pas tant des économistes que des biologistes anglo-saxons, du reste, tels Vogt, Osborn, Ehrlich, ... qui osent enfreindre ce tabou doctrinal pour appeler, dans la pure tradition malthusienne, à une limitation des naissances dans les pays les plus démunis. Mais ne convient-il pas de rappeler ici que les débats de l'entre-deux-guerres sur l'optimum de population et les chiffres imprudemment avancés par d'éminents experts pour des pays aussi importants et aussi divers que les Etats-Unis, la Chine ou l'Inde avaient de quoi refroidir l'ardeur des économistes!

Jusqu'à une époque récente, l'intervention des planificateurs dans la sphère de la régulation démographique était, en pratique, limitée aux pays où s'était produit une laïcisation suffisante, où donc un compromis était possible entre les autorités civiles et les autorités religieuses. A Bucarest, le clivage politique n'est pas entre les pays développés (à faible fécondité) et les pays peu développés (à fécondité forte), ni même entre les partisans des différentes théories du développement. Le conflit est quasi-religieux. Ne voit-on pas, en effet, le Vatican faire alliance, implicitement, avec le marxisme-léninisme, pour s'opposer farouchement à la baisse de la fécondité préconisée par les Etats-Unis et l'Asie surpeuplée? Pour l'Union soviétique et les pays situés dans sa mouvance, il ne s'agit pas seulement de faire pièce au capitalisme impérialiste des Etats-Unis, dans ce qui est considéré comme sa tentative de réduire la vitalité des nations opprimées, il s'agit aussi de préserver le culte de l'orthodoxie marxiste. Dans l'optique de Marx, en effet, comme dans celle du socialisme utopique du siècle dernier (qu'on se remémore la célèbre formule de Proudhon : "il n'y a qu'un seul homme de trop sur la terre, c'est Monsieur Malthus"!), il ne saurait y avoir de problème de population dans une société socialiste, débarrassée des plaies du capitalisme. La société sans classe ignore le surpeuplement, qui ne peut être mis au compte que des contradictions de la société bourgeoise. La seule question fondamentale est, en fait, celle du régime de propriété. Avec l'abolition de la propriété privée des moyens de production, les difficultés sont résolues d'elles-mêmes. Telle est, du moins, la croyance.

De façon plus générale, d'ailleurs, même au temps où la planification connaissait son époque de gloire—notamment dans les pays qui s'étaient ralliés à la thèse de la dépendance—les facteurs démographiques n'étaient que rarement intégrés dans la planification du développement; même les conséquences prévisibles, mécaniques, de la fécondité passée sur le système scolaire ou sur l'offre de travail n'étaient que faiblement articulées avec la programmation physique et financière.

Depuis la récession économique mondiale et la rupture des taux de croissance macro-économique, la multiplication des incertitudes monétaires à court terme (cours du dollar, taux d'intérêt, ampleur du déficit budgétaire des Etats-Unis, prix des matières premières) atténue l'attrait de la planification à long terme et, du coup, réduit l'attention portée aux données démographiques.

Du fait de son inspiration néo-marxiste, la théorie du développement auto-centré tend à s'accompagner, pendant longtemps du moins (cas de la Chine et de l'Algérie), d'une opposition de principe à la politique de limitation des naissances. Dans les pays où l'héritage culturel anglo-saxon est assez ancré parmi les élites dirigeantes, comme en Inde ou en Egypte, l'influence de cette théorie ne s'étendra toutefois guère à la sphère démographique.

C'est la thèse des obstacles structurels au développement qui accorde à la démographie la place la plus grande. Elle repose, en grande partie, sur l'utilisation de modèles économiques simplifiés. Ces modèles ont comme caractéristique commune de privilégier la fonction d'investissement dans l'analyse du processus de développement. Durant les années 1950, l'investissement considéré n'inclut que le capital physique, et les premiers modèles d'économie appliquée à la démographie ont pour objet de souligner les avantages attachés à une baisse de la fécondité comme la réduction du rapport de dépendance et l'élévation de la capacité d'équipement. Bien que ces modèles ne prennent aucunement en compte la qualité des investissements; bien qu'ils se fondent sur des postulats non démontrés, pour ne pas dire inexacts comme la prétendue "loi des rendements décroissants" (depuis la révolution industrielle, la réalité économique est, au contraire, selon la merveille formule de Schumpeter, précisément celle des "rendements historiquement croissants"); surtout, bien qu'ils ignorent autant les ressorts fondamentaux du développement (comme la stabilité politique, l'ouverture internationale ou la cohésion sociale) que les avantages à long terme de la poussée démographique (valorisation du capital, innovation technique, réalisation d'économies d'échelle), ces modèles ont une indéniable vertu pédagogique et, finalement, une influence marquante sur les orientations politiques des Gouvernements, notamment en Asie. Les termes même utilisés pour justifier l'adoption de politiques de limitation des naissances rappellent l'esprit de l'époque, sur la primauté de l'investissement, et la formalisation qu'en donnent ces premiers modèles économétriques.

Mais c'est, en réalité, dans les pays peu développés à orientation libérale que le planning familial s'implante le plus aisément, le libre choix de la descendance y apparaissant avant tout dans le droit fil de la philosophie des lumières, comme un droit fondamental de la personne, une conquête de la modernité.

B. L'EPREUVE DES FAITS, ET LES REVIREMENTS IDEOLOGIQUES

Un étalon : le degré d'ouverture

La classification des pays est loin d'être évidente car les stratégies de développement menées dans chaque cas ont en réalité pu varier au cours du temps; par ailleurs, il est fréquent que, pour une même période, un pays donné ait eu recours à des pratiques mixtes, parfois du reste assez éloignées des intentions affichées dans les discours officiels! Aussi la trilogie présentée plus haut n'illustre-t-elle pas la totalité des stratégies de développement. A la vérité chaque pays, ou presque, a eu sa propre stratégie avec parfois des changements de cap spectaculaires.

On reconnaît une expérience de type socialiste à six critères : la réforme agraire, tendant à la collectivisation des terres; l'extension du secteur public, considéré comme le moteur de la croissance industrielle; la planification centralisée; la priorité accordée à l'industrie lourde; un contrôle étroit de l'Etat aussi bien pour les investissements que pour les échanges extérieurs. Les pays en développement les plus proches de ce schéma théorique que l'on peut donc, en première approximation, ranger sous la dénomination "expérience de type socialiste" sont : la Mongolie, le Viet Nam, Cuba (membres du CAEM), l'Albanie, la Chine, la République populaire démocratique de Corée, le Cambodge, l'Angola, l'Ethiopie, la République-Unie de Tanzanie. Il existe par ailleurs, des variantes, comme l'Egypte, l'Algérie, Myanmar et la République arabe syrienne.

A l'opposé, les expériences de type libéral sont celles de pays comme la République de Corée, la Malaisie, la Thaïlande, la Turquie, le Brésil et la Côte d'Ivoire.

Dans les faits, les situations sont, bien entendu, plus nuancées que ne le donnent à penser ce premier classement, car certaines politiques sectorielles conduites par des Gouvernements rangés sous des catégories différentes peuvent s'avérer relativement similaires. Aussi convient-il de souligner le caractère approximatif de cette première démarcation.

A titre d'illustration, tenons-nous en à l'expérience des géants asiatiques : la Chine s'est étroitement inspirée du modèle soviétique jusqu'au "grand bond en avant" et, dans une moindre mesure, jusque vers la fin des années 1970; aujourd'hui, elle est en revanche inclassable puisqu'elle remet en cause le marxisme-léninisme sans atténuer véritablement les prérogatives du Parti-Etat (40 millions de membres). De même, l'Inde a longtemps isolé son économie de la concurrence, avant d'entamer sa libéralisation, d'abord timide à la fin des années 1970, puis plus hardie à partir de 1984, avec l'arrivée au pouvoir de Rajiv Gandhi, mais le capitalisme d'Etat est encore très présent.

Pour simplifier, on peut s'en tenir à une caractéristique synthétique : le degré d'ouverture extérieure, mesuré par le taux d'exportation (rapport des exportations au PIB). Certes, l'indicateur est d'interprétation complexe puisque le volume de commerce extérieur est, pour partie, contraint par des données de fait, échappant à la volonté politique. C'est le cas de la taille : plus un pays est petit, moins il a de chance de trouver sur son sol la diversité des ressources nécessaires à son activité économique; ou encore du niveau du revenu : la faiblesse du revenu est un obstacle à l'échange, tout comme l'isolement géographique.

Nous pouvons ainsi présenter un tableau général des pays classés par degré d'ouverture économique et examiner les performances économiques accomplies au cours des dernières décennies, en termes de croissance du revenu réel par habitant.

Le commerce extérieur est l'un des principaux moteurs de la croissance économique. Plus l'économie est ouverte, plus son taux de croissance est élevé : ainsi, sur l'ensemble de la période 1950-1980, seuls les pays dont le ratio "exportations de marchandises/PIB" avoisine 20 p. 100 ou plus ont eu, en moyenne, des performances de croissances comparables, voire supérieures à celles des pays occidentaux. La relation statistique globale, mesurée sur un grand nombre de pays et sur longue période est donc assez probante. Elle confirme les enseignements de l'histoire économique : celle-ci suggère en effet l'existence d'une liaison causale entre la vitalité du commerce international et le rythme de croissance de l'économie mondiale. Les deux grandes périodes de boom de l'économie mondiale (1850-1914 et 1946-1973) ont coïncidé avec un dynamisme exceptionnel du commerce international. De même, les phases prospères de l'Europe médiévale et de la Chine ancienne sont des phases de forte ouverture sur le monde extérieur.

L'étude de cas confirme ces corrélations globales. Ainsi, la comparaison des deux Allemagnes, des deux Chines, des deux Corées est d'autant plus éloquente que le plus avantagé à l'arrivée est celui, qui au départ, semblait le plus handicapé. De même le parallèle entre des pays ayant connu des conditions initiales assez proches comme les tandems Thaïlande-Myanmar, Côte d'Ivoire-Guinée, Porto Rico-Cuba mérite d'être rappelé; plus cruelle encore est la confrontation entre le Brésil et l'Argentine sur le dernier demi-siècle ou entre le Japon et la Chine sur le dernier siècle : dans les années 1920, l'Argentine occupait le 7e rang mondial pour le niveau de vie; elle est aujourd'hui reléguée au 80e rang! La Chine du milieu du XIXe siècle était plus puissante que le Japon, dans les années 1930, elle subissait son occupation et sa colonisation.

TABLEAU 8. CROISSANCE ECONOMIQUE ET COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, DES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT, 1950-1980

Groupe de pays	*Croissance économique; accroissement du PIB réel par tête en 1950-1980 (moyene annuelle, en pourcentage)*	*Degré moyen d'ouverture extérieure et exportations/PIB en 1978-1980 (en pourcentage)*	*Effort d'exportation; taux d'accroissement des exportations en 1950-1980 (moyenne annuelle, en pourcentage)*
1er quart[a]	3,5	24,6	10,0
2e quart[b]	2,7	18,6	9,1
3e quart[c]	1,7	10,9	7,2
4e quart[d]	0,3	11,1	5,2

NOTE : Pays classés par ordre décroissant de progression du PIB par tête entre 1960 et 1980.

[a] République de Corée, Taïwan (province de la Chine), Irak, Brésil, Thaïlande, Malaisie, Nigéria, Indonésie, Turquie, Egypte.

[b] Iran (République islamique d'), Algérie, Colombie, Pakistan, Philippines, Kenya, Mexique, Venezuela, Côte d'Ivoire.

[c] Maroc, Sri Lanka, Argentine, République-Unie de Tanzanie, Chili, Inde, Ethiopie, Myanmar, Pérou.

[d] Zimbabwe, Zambie, Zaïre, Népal, Mozambique, Soudan, Ouganda, Ghana, Afghanistan.

Source : Etabli d'après : L.G. Reynolds. *Economic Growth in the Third World* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 390-411.

Considérons maintenant des cas individuels pris isolément. Dans les années 1950, Israël, cherchant à rompre le "cercle vicieux de la pauvreté", adoptait une stratégie économique extravertie, fondée sur la participation au marché international. Hong Kong allait plus loin en étendant cette stratégie libérale à la politique économique intérieure. La politique américaine d'encouragement aux exportations porto-ricaines vers les Etats-Unis fut étendue ensuite à la République de Corée et à la province de Taïwan en Chine. Or ces deux regions étaient jusqu'alors adeptes de la doctrine de la substitution des importations. A partir de 1961 (province de Taïwan en Chine) et de 1965 (République de Corée), ils se tournent eux aussi vers le libéralisme, avec là encore le succès que l'on sait. Le contraste par rapport à la période précédente, marquée par des troubles économiques et politiques (chômage élevé, difficultés de paiement extérieur, hyper-inflation) est très net. Dans leurs cas, mais aussi dans ceux de pays comme le Brésil et à un moindre degré, la Malaisie, l'Indonésie, la Thaïlande et la Turquie, qui ont suivi une voie analogue, la croissance est loin de s'être réalisée uniquement par l'exportation; l'économie s'est diversifiée et l'on peut parler d'expériences réussies d'industrialisation, le secteur manufacturier ayant connu un grand essor. C'est qu'une stratégie extravertie implique une rigueur monétaire et budgétaire sans faille; toute distorsion majeure dans la fixation du taux de change, des taux d'intérêts, des prix ou des rémunérations est immédiatement sanctionnée par le marché. A l'inverse, les pays en développement qui avaient poursuivi des politiques protectionnistes et autocentrées progressaient lentement : les politiques d'industrialisation protégée pénalisent, en fait, le développement agricole par les subventions aux exportations industrielles ou la fixation de taux de change excessifs.

Avec les turbulences de l'économie mondiale au cours des 15 dernières années, le fossé économique se creuse encore davantage : aussi bien en Europe que dans le reste du monde, les économies socialistes accumulent un grand retard technique, cependant que les économies les plus tournées vers l'extérieur surmontent le mieux la récession mondiale, notamment depuis le début des années 1980, le commerce extérieur améliorant l'affectation des ressources investies et renforçant la productivité. Depuis leur ouverture sur le marché mondial, des pays comme la Chine et l'Inde ont des taux de croissance du revenu réel par habitant supérieurs à la moyenne mondiale.

La période récente a donc vu l'éclatement du tiers-monde. Les pays en développement à forte croissance commencent à rattraper les pays capitalistes développés en termes de revenu par tête (la République de Corée, par exemple, est candidate à l'entrée dans le Club des Riches : l'OCDE); le phénomène est d'autant plus sensible que la croissance dans les vieux pays industriels a commencé à s'essouffler. Les gains de productivité permis par la spécialisation, par les économies d'échelle et par les transferts technologiques inhérents aux échanges ont dépassé les records établis par le Japon au cours de la période 1950-1970. Dans le même temps, d'autres nations qui n'avaient pas adopté des politiques favorables à la croissance voyaient leur retard s'aggraver et, parfois, leur situation se détériorer. Si bien qu'à la fin des années 1980, le monde ne se divise plus entre un "Nord" développé et un "Sud" sous-développé, mais il est constitué d'un continuum de nations, avec des reclassements souvent spectaculaires. Les clivages démographiques eux-mêmes se sont estompés. Là où il s'est produit, le succès des politiques de développement a hâté l'enrichissement et, par contrecoup, la baisse de la fécondité. Certains pays asiatiques pour la plupart, ont, en une trentaine d'années, atteint des niveaux de développement dont l'avènement avait pris un siècle ou davantage dans les pays industriels.

Les revirements idéologiques

Devant la répétition de ses déconvenues, déjà évidente, depuis les années 1950, la doctrine du développement auto-centré a vu depuis les années 1960 diminuer un à un le nombre de ses adeptes : à la liste, déjà longue, des pays cités plus haut, il convient d'ajouter la Turquie, le Brésil, le Mexique, l'Indonésie, pour n'énumérer que les plus peuplés. Avec la rapidité du progrès technique, l'isolement ne condamne-t-il pas à être un pays de seconde zone?

Il est symptomatique de voir l'avidité avec laquelle des pays comme l'Union soviétique et la Chine, symboles du communisme mondial, se tournent vers les technologies occidentales et, en même temps, il est édifiant de mesurer l'effort que doivent y accomplir les autorités pour restaurer la confiance et l'initiative privée. La tendance à l'ouverture est universelle. Même le Viet Nam, foyer d'orthodoxie, est en raison de son échec même (le riche delta du Mékong, traditionnellement exportateur de riz a,

comme l'Ukraine, perdu sa fertilité!), acculé à faire appel aux investisseurs étrangers. En 1987, il adopte pour ce faire un code d'investissement.

En matière démographique également, la doctrine a dû, dans les mêmes pays, faire place au pragmatisme, fût-ce au prix de volte-face spectaculaires. En Union soviétique, après l'ardeur révolutionnaire des années 1920, caractérisée par un grand laxisme à l'égard des institutions "bourgeoises", telles que le mariage et la famille (extension des facilités de divorce, encouragement à l'union libre, autorisation de la contraception, légalisation de l'avortement), les autorités se réveillent soudain au contact de la réalité, révélée par l'état civil et par le recensement de 1937; le taux de natalité est tombé de 44 à 30 p. mille; la population est très inférieure à l'attente des dirigeants. A la désinvolture succède alors le rigorisme : Staline s'inquiète pour la puissance et la sécurité internationale de son pays; brusquement, il décide d'encourager les naissances et d'interdire l'avortement. En 1944, les effets combinés des purges, des déportations et de la seconde guerre mondiale l'amènent à renforcer cette politique nataliste. Mais le déferlement des naissances ne tarde pas à aggraver l'encombrement des écoles et la crise du logement. En 1956, la contraception et l'avortement sont à nouveau autorisés... Dans les années 1970, l'insuffisance de la natalité dans les républiques européennes, contrastant avec l'exubérance des républiques d'Asie musulmane, suscite d'importants débats internes. De 1981 à 1983, une politique d'encouragement à la natalité est mise en place.

La situation des pays satellites d'Europe centrale est, à certains égards, comparable. Dans plusieurs cas, dès la fin des années 1950, la fécondité est tombée en deçà du niveau nécessaire pour garantir le remplacement des générations. Au milieu des années 1960, la Hongrie par exemple, a la fécondité la plus basse du monde : contrairement à la doctrine, le socialisme n'ignore donc pas, lui non plus, les problèmes de population. Des politiques d'encouragement à la natalité, souvent assorties d'interdiction de l'avortement (jusqu'alors autorisé) sont ainsi mises en place. La contradiction entre le souci d'émancipation de la femme (dans les pays socialistes la très forte participation des femmes à la vie professionnelle rend très lourde la charge des mères de famille) et la préoccupation des équilibres économiques et stratégiques est résolue au bénéfice de la raison d'Etat.

Le cas de la Chine et de ses dilemmes a déjà été évoqué plus haut. Celui de l'Algérie, fer de lance du "Groupe des 77", mérite également une mention spéciale. L'Algérie a longtemps récusé la nécessité du planning familial, affirmant au contraire, que le développement suffirait à faire fléchir la fécondité; mais les résultats se sont fait attendre et le développement n'a pas eu la rapidité escomptée. Malgré ses richesses minières et les fonds issus de l'émigration, elle n'a pas pu faire face à la poussée démographique, que les difficultés d'application de son modèle de développement (remplacement des importations, collectivisation agraire, et priorité à l'industrie lourde, aboutissant à une crise agricole) ne faisaient que rendre plus malaisée à absorber. Aussi le Gouvernement a-t-il peu à peu révisé sa position. En janvier 1981, le Comité central du Front de libération nationale a adopté,lors de sa quatrième session, la résolution suivante : "...considérant que la croissance démographique atteint, dans notre pays, le taux annuel de 3,2 p..100 et qu'à ce rythme, l'Algérie doublera sa population en l'an 2000, passant de 19 à 36 millions... le Comité central recommande de dégager les moyens humains, matériels et financiers nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre d'un programme national d'espacement des naissances". Le texte ne va pas jusqu' à prôner la "limitation" des naissances mais l'intention est la même. Quelques années plus tard, en 1985-1986, les autorités algériennes manifestaient leur volonté de libéralisation économique.

Tout aussi exemplaires sont les cas de certains pays catholiques, à faible densité, d'Amérique latine. Là encore, la croissance démographique était telle qu'elle dépassait les possibilités économiques et mordait sur l'investissement, en particulier, l'infrastructure et le logement. En 1973, le Mexique modifie sa constitution pour intégrer l'idée de libre choix pour les couples de leur descendance. De même, l'année suivante, partagés entre le rêve expansionniste (colonisation amazonienne et domination régionale) d'une certaine classe politique et le réalisme des planificateurs, les dirigeants brésiliens optent pour la modération, que l'alourdissement brutal de la facture énergétique rend du reste impérative. Fréquent dans de nombreux pays peu développés, ce conflit entre les préoccupations externes et les préoccupations internes a presque toujours été résolu de la même façon. C'est que, pour les autorités, l'alternative est entre l'industrialisation et ... la révolution (perte du pouvoir). Dans un contexte de forte poussée démographique, la logique économique est impitoyable : compte tenu de la

montée de l'activité professionnelle féminine, le rythme des créations nettes d'emplois doit se maintenir autour de 3 à 4 p. 100 par an pendant plusieurs décennies, simplement pour éviter une aggravation du chômage, déjà très élevé. De plus en plus coûteux à satisfaire, les besoins en énergie, en équipements et en technologie augmentent plus rapidement encore et, avec eux, les risques d'endettement. Même certains pays peu peuplés et dotés en ressources énergétiques, aujourd'hui exportateurs de pétrole, sont, du fait de la croissance de leur marché interne, menacés de devenir, à terme, importateurs. La dialectique démographique est donc complexe : d'un côté l'explosion démographique est garante de l'affranchissement politique, de l'autre incontrôlée, elle peut conduire à l'anarchie ou à la dépendance économique.

C. La diffusion de la baisse de la fecondite et ses liens aves les politiques de developpement

La notion de politique de développement est neuve, elle est née du keynésianisme; celle de politique de planning familial l'est plus encore, elle est née de l'indépendance politique et de l'explosion démographique.

Le calendrier de la baisse séculaire, ou le schéma de diffusion temporel

Si l'on excepte les pays de culture européenne du cône sud de l'Amérique latine (Argentine, Uruguay, Chili), où la baisse de la fécondité est contemporaine de celle des pays d'origine (Europe méridionale, fin du XIXe siècle—début du XXe siècle), jusque vers 1960, la chute de la fécondité ne survient guère que dans de petites sociétés denses, insulaires, et économiquement ouvertes : îles africaines sous influence occidentale (Maurice, Réunion); îles asiatiques de peuplement chinois (province de Taïwan en Chine, Singapour) ou le cas particulier de Sri Lanka; à un moindre degré, pays ou régions maritimes de dimension réduite et très ouverts à l'influence extérieure (Hong Kong, Malaisie, République de Corée, Porto Rico, Cuba etc). Durant la période 1960-1970, la baisse s'étend à des pays de plus grande taille où jouent également les influences extérieures : Brésil, Colombie, Venezuela, Inde, Thaïlande, Philippines, Tunisie, auxquels s'ajoute enfin la Chine, pour le milieu urbain. C'est donc durant les années 1960 que se place le seuil décisif : parmi les quatre pays les plus peuplés du monde en développement, trois (Chine, Inde et Brésil) qui représentent plus de la moitié (55 p. 100) de cet ensemble, basculent, à peu près en même temps, dans la révolution contraceptive. La rapidité de la chute de la fécondité de la Chine continentale s'explique cependant moins par les résultats de la politique économique que par le caractère draconien des mesures mises en oeuvre.

Dans les années 1970, l'évolution s'est étendue à des pays où existaient des freins importants liés à la religion, à la pauvreté ou à l'isolement. Des pays aussi divers que le Mexique, l'Indonésie, le Pérou, le Viet Nam, le Maroc, l'Algérie, le Pakistan ou le Bangladesh ont été, à leur tour, touchés, dans une mesure variable, par ce mouvement historique. Dans les pays islamiques, les niveaux de fécondité demeurent certes très élevés, mais ce premier fléchissement est un fait majeur. La chute notable enregistrée dans plusieurs républiques soviétiques de population musulmane en confirme la signification.

Pour les années 1980, la période est à l'évidence trop proche pour que le diagnostic puisse être autre que provisoire. Les résultats des évolutions démographiques sont connus avec quelques années de retard. Mais il semble d'ores et déjà acquis qu'une baisse sensible a lieu dans certains pays d'Afrique noire anglophone, aussi bien à l'Est (Kenya), qu'à l'Ouest du continent (Nigéria). De manière générale, en dehors de certains pays montagneux enclavés (Afghanistan, Bolivie, Népal) et de cas singuliers, où la misère est due à des conditions politiques, seuls restent encore à l'écart une partie du Moyen-orient arabe, et surtout la presque totalité de l'Afrique noire.

Dans le monde en développement, l'évolution se trouve donc à des stades très variables. De manière générale, une importante inflexion s'est produite vers 1970, un siècle après le tournant européen. Les pays les plus engagés dans la baisse de la fécondité sont précisément ceux qui sont le plus ouverts à une influence extérieure et il faut ajouter que, pour bon nombre d'entre eux, la chute de la fécondité s'est produite à peu près en même temps que la soudaine rechute observée dans le monde occidental. Le schéma spatio-temporel de la baisse n'est pas sans évoquer un mécanisme de diffusion. Comme d'autres phénomènes, les évolutions démographiques se mondialisent. La révolution contraceptive est une rupture technique qui, comme les autres découvertes fondamentales, s'est peu à peu transmise des pays les plus en pointe aux pays les plus éloignés des foyers d'innovation. Seuls les pays les moins ouverts à la pénétration des valeurs ou des comportements de type occidental sont restés relativement à l'écart de la

mutation contemporaine; même pour ces pays, la question n'est pas de savoir si la baisse de la fécondité s'y produira, car le phénomène paraît inéluctable, mais quand et à quel rythme. Pour les pays du tiers monde pris dans leur ensemble, le niveau de fécondité serait passé de 6 enfants, en moyenne, par femme en 1965-1970, à 4 vers 1985.

La mutation est nette. Elle est d'autant plus précoce que le pays est davantage engagé dans les circuits d'échanges internationaux : les pionniers de la baisse de la fécondité (et souvent aussi du planning familial) se recrutent parmi les pays ayant très tôt opté pour les stratégies économiques d'extraversion. C'est le cas des pays ou régions cités plus haut : Porto Rico (et Cuba avant la révolution), province de Taïwan en Chine, Singapour, Hong Kong, République de Corée, Malaisie. Les premiers signes de baisse de la fécondité s'y manifestent dès les années 1950. Le résultat n'est pas pour surprendre tant il relève de l'évidence logique : l'ouverture économique ne révèle-t-elle pas, en vérité, une stratégie plus générale, celle de l'accueil de l'innovation?

La vitesse de baisse de la fécondité

L'influence du modèle de développement n'agit pas seulement sur le calendrier de la baisse—c'est-à-dire la plus ou moins grande précocité de son déclenchement; elle retentit également sur le rythme de cette baisse.

Là encore, l'histoire est riche d'enseignements. Avec même le cas des pays en développement, deux situations étaient sur ce plan lourdes de signification : celle de la République fédérale d'Allemagne et celle du Japon. La République, dont la mondialisation de l'économie a été entamée dès le siècle dernier, par Bismarck, a vu, à la suite d'une phase d'urbanisation et d'industrialisation accélérées, son indicateur conjoncturel de fécondité divisé par 3 en 33 ans (5,0 enfants en moyenne par femme en 1900; 1,6 en 1933). Le Japon a connu une évolution encore plus brutale. En 1940, le Gouvernement impérial y met en oeuvre une politique nataliste et eugénique. L'objectif est d'atteindre 100 millions d'habitants (le pays n'en compte alors que 73 millions). La loi de janvier 1941 rend le mariage obligatoire avant 21 ans pour les femmes et avant 25 ans pour les hommes et elle recommande un nombre minimum de .....5 enfants! Mais, quelques années plus tard, avec la défaite militaire et le retour des rapatriés des anciennes colonies, apparaît la peur du surpeuplement. Le natalisme impérialiste s'effondre, l'éthique militaire elle-même s'évanouit; elle fait peu à peu place au culte du rattrapage et de la modernisation, puis à l'idéologie conquérante de l'exportation. Occupé par les Etats-Unis, le pays procède à des réformes en profondeur et accélère l'occidentalisation de ses institutions. Dès son entrée à Tokyo en 1945, le Général Mac Arthur manifeste son souci de stopper la prolifération japonaise. Suite à l'adoption de la loi de protection eugénique (1948) qui, révisée en 1952, autorise l'avortement, la fécondité enregistre une chute drastique, sans équivalent historique. Le Japon qui, jusqu'alors, avait la fécondité la plus haute du monde industriel (si l'on met à part les années de guerre 1938-1939 et 1944-1946, le nombre moyen d'enfants par femme est supérieur à 4), se trouve soudain à la fin des années 1950 avec la plus faible fécondité de la planète : entre 1949 et 1957, soit en l'espace de huit ans seulement, l'indice tombe de plus de moitié (4,30 en 1949, 2,04 en 1957). La modernisation démographique a accompagné la reconstruction et le décollage économiques : entre 1946 et 1957, le produit total du pays a triplé en volume.

La plupart des pays asiatiques qui se sont inspirés de la stratégie japonaise ont mené des politiques de développement très volontaristes, en respectant les séquences temporelles nécessaires et en consentant d'énormes efforts d'investissement dans les secteurs vitaux : l'agriculture, l'infrastructure, la santé, l'enseignement. Or l'essor de ces secteurs est crucial pour hâter la transition démographique. La baisse de la mortalité dans cette région du monde a d'ailleurs été telle que plusieurs pays ou régions d'Asie orientale (Japon, Hong Kong, Singapour) se sont portés en tête du classement mondial de l'espérance de vie. Ces mêmes pays, ainsi que la République de Corée ont en 1987 une fécondité sensiblement inférieure au niveau de remplacement des générations. Un tel résultat est à mettre au compte non seulement de la politique globale de développement (et, parfois, des programmes de planning familial) mais encore à la politique énergique de scolarisation des filles, dont le handicap traditionnel a été surmonté en un quart de siècle.

De façon plus générale, les "nouveaux pays industriels" où le rythme de croissance économique a été stimulé par l'ouverture sur le marché mondial ont, chacun à leur manière, subi plus ou moins profondément l'empreinte de l'occidentalisation ou, plus exactement, de l'américanisation des modes de vie. La baisse séculaire de la fécondité, qui finalement n'est que la version démographique de la modernisation, s'en est trouvée avancée. Au Brésil,

par exemple, où les disparités régionales sont pourtant immenses, l'indice synthétique de fécondité est tombé autour de 3 enfants par femme (3,3 enfants en 1986); à Sao-Paulo il se situe en deçà du seuil de remplacement des générations. La Turquie, la Malaisie, de même que la totalité des pays (hormis les africains) à fort taux d'ouverture mentionnés dans le tableau ci-avant ont connu une évolution analogue. Le cas de la Thaïlande mérite une mention particulière. Alors que pour des raisons militaires, dans les années 1950 encore, le Gouvernement favorisait les naissances, à partir de 1970, sous l'influence de la Banque mondiale, la position officielle a été reconsidérée et un programme de planning familial mis en oeuvre, dans le cadre d'une politique de développement extravertie. Le résultat est net : depuis la fin des années 1960, la fécondité a diminué de moitié.

A l'inverse, les pays enclavés ou à moindre perméabilité culturelle connaissent un retard plus ou moins profond. Faute de baisse spontanée de la fécondité, les Gouvernements ont parfois été tentés de recourir à des solutions plus radicales, par usage de la contrainte physique : Chine depuis 1971; Inde en 1976-1977; dans ces deux pays, le rythme actuel de baisse de la fécondité est d'ailleurs moindre que ne le prévoyaient les autorités gouvernementales. De même, la pression exercée en direction des couches les plus pauvres de la société dans des pays comme le Mexique ou l'Indonésie n'est-elle pas révélatrice des insuffisances prolongées des politiques de développement?

Conclusion

L'adoption du planning familial fait donc partie de la longue liste des emprunts de toutes sortes qui permettent l'accès à la modernité. La Turquie, pays le plus laïcisé et le plus industrialisé en terre d'Islam est celui dont la fécondité est la moins élevée (moins de 4 enfants par femme). C'est aussi le pays où l'influence européenne est la plus marquée : le code civil est emprunté à la Suisse; le code pénal est adapté du code italien; le droit administratif est français; le droit commercial est moitié suisse, moitié allemand...

L'analyse historique de la transition démographique vient confronter cette analyse. Elle fournit de belles illustrations des mécanismes de modification du comportement fécond. Dans les régions culturellement et linguistiquement proches des provinces françaises (Genève, Catalogne, Wallonnie), la fécondité se met à baisser au contact du malthusianisme, dès le milieu du XIXe siècle. Au début du XXe siècle, la croissance économique entamée en Europe du Nord-ouest gagne l'ensemble du vieux continent et s'accompagne d'une baisse de la fécondité, qui se produit indépendamment des caractéristiques religieuses et culturelles. Les conditions qui ont permis le recul de la mortalité (le désenclavement, par amélioration des communications, le renforcement du système politique et administratif, la chute des coûts de transport, le développement de l'infrastructure sanitaire et scolaire, la diffusion de l'esprit scientifique), affectent également, mais avec un certain délai, l'évolution de la fécondité!

La modernisation se diffuse par emprunt et imitation. Mais la diffusion des acquisitions humaines, qu'elles soient d'ordre matériel ou culturel, n'a guère été étudiée. L'invention de la pilule anticonceptionnelle a été une découverte fondamentale dans l'histoire de l'humanité. On sait, à travers divers indices, que son application a commencé en Amérique du Nord, avant de s'étendre à l'Europe occidentale pour se transmettre aux pays semi-industrialisés des autres continents. Mais on ignore ses circuits. A l'heure du village planétaire, les recherches sur les facteurs de la fécondité sont encore enfermées dans des cadres nationaux. Comme si le monde extérieur n'existait pas! Chaque pays est implicitement considéré comme un isolat. Les facteurs qui affectent sa mutation démographique sont supposés n'être liés qu'à son évolution interne, alors que la thèse diffusionniste, certes délicate à mettre en évidence, recèle sans conteste en raison de la multiplication des échanges et des communications, un puissant pouvoir explicatif. Le phénomène vaut particulièrement pour les pays peu développés qui sont des pays "suiveurs" par rapport aux pays "leaders", créateurs d'innovation. Cette explication, présente chez un auteur tel que Kirk (1944), curieusement évacuée aujourd'hui, a pourtant des vertus indéniables au regard de l'histoie contemporaine, que nous venons d'évoquer.

L'histoire de la baisse de la fécondité peut être analysée comme un chapitre de l'histoire des transferts technologiques. Il y a une grande cohérence, nous l'avons vu, entre les indicateurs de développement, qu'ils soient économiques ou démographiques; tout se tient dans les phénomènes sociaux. Chaque élément que l'on peut dissocier de l'ensemble ne peut l'être que par artifice analytique.

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VIII. CHANNELS, FILTERS AND GAPS: POPULATION INFORMATION BEYOND ELITES

*Michael S. Teitelbaum**

The task set for this author by the organizers of this Meeting was to consider the extent to which information about population and population policy reaches beyond narrow élite sectors—both national and international—to the level of broad-based publics. Pointing out that knowledge of this subject is at best "rudimentary", they requested a somewhat speculative essay as to how the reach of such information might best be assessed and explored.

After a review of the materials available to the author, the difficulties described by the organizers seem, if anything, understated. There are many papers with titles involving some aspect of dissemination of "population information", but most concern two types of dissemination that are only peripherally related to these publics' knowledge of population trends and policies:

(a) The dissemination of information favouring the adoption and use of effective contraceptive methods (so-called "information, education and communication", or IEC); and

(b) The dissemination of relatively technical population and family planning information needed by professionals (e.g., programme administrators, medical staff, government officials and researchers). The United Nations has published a comprehensive and informative review of such technical information activities (see United Nations, 1984).

The questions addressed by the present paper are different and far murkier:

(a) The extent to which population information (as distinct from family planning information) has flowed beyond the limited audience of public officials, non-governmental decision makers and scientists to reach the broader public;

(b) The extent to which such information has affected public understanding of population policy issues and public opinion about them;

(c) What channels of such transmission exist beyond the narrow élite sector;

(d) The degree of accuracy of the information so communicated;

(e) The extent to which such information flow has led to a convergence—or divergence—of public opinion, broadly defined;

(f) Whether greater international efforts directed to broader diffusion of such information would be desirable and effective.

A. Channels and filters

The ultimate goal of all efforts to communicate population information has been to achieve a broad outreach to the public at large. Having said that, however, the world is by no means yet a "global village" in which the concerns of some centrally located actor are directly communicable to urban or rural populations throughout the world. Before it can reach its ultimate target audience, all such information must first gain access to a variety of channels, all of which are subject to numerous "filters" which screen and modify information flows:

DATA/INFO → CHANNELS → FILTERS → MASS PUBLIC

Transmission channels

There are various potential and actual channels for the transmission of population information to the public. These channels include the mass media, political and literary discourse, the formal education system, religious organizations, administrative networks of government and non-profit and/or voluntary organizations.

Mass media

The mass media are the most obvious outlet for population information directed towards the broad

* Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, New York.

public. Newspapers, magazines, television, radio and similar communications media reach remote places in most countries of the world. Even in areas in which public literacy is low and television is not available, transistorized radios are often very common and popular.

Several things may be said about the distribution of population information through such mass media outlets. First, because many of these media are controlled by Governments, the Government's perspective is often determinative of the information distributed. Often, information takes the form of political statements by the Government or political leaders, and these statements are frequently coloured by non-scientific perspectives, including political ideology (see discussion of political discourse given below).

Secondly, the mass media are not a notably effective means of communicating complex or subtle information, and there is a general tendency among press professionals to reduce complex or aggreggated information to the lowest common denominator of the individual; hence, the so-called "human interest" focus of much press coverage of complex issues.

Thirdly, in much of the world press, there is a tendency to exaggerate population trends and their implications, in a variety of directions. A cursory review of newspapers and periodicals from any of the world regions would suggest a tendency towards sensationalism, often coloured by misinformation or misunderstanding of demographic trends. A few examples should suffice.

In the United States of America, the press has repeatedly announced a "new baby boom" on the basis of a garbled understanding of increases in the crude birth rate. An unpublished analysis of marriage trends led to greatly exaggerated treatment of the "marriage crunch", including one of the few cover stories of *Newsweek* deploying a graph as its cover illustration (*Population Today*, 1986).

In France, the cautious professional monthly reports of the Institut national d'études démographiques (INED) are widely covered in the popular media, but sometimes in inaccurate or exaggerated form.

Politics and literature

The foregoing point about mass media leads naturally to a discussion of political and literary discourse about population issues. Demographic information *per se* is relatively neutral: a total fertility rate is a total fertility rate, whatever its user's ideological perspective may be. However, any effort to interpret the policy significance of a demographic datum is inevitably entangled with some of the most central political and economic issues extant, and hence political ideologies loom large. Such ideological discussions of demographic issues, themselves often obscured by historical accident and misunderstanding, include the continuing contests between, for example, left and right, collective needs versus individual rights, fundamentalist versus anti-fundamentalist and "pro-life" versus "pro-choice".

In truth, the discussion of population trends has not been a politically neutral issue since at least the time of the French *philosophes* in the eigtheenth century, and certainly since the time of Malthus and the assault upon him by Marx in the nineteenth century. To this very day, centuries-old ideological debates deeply colour public discussion of population matters, although the participants in such discussions are often ill-informed as to their historical antecedents. Many of those involved in what are frequently vehement exchanges would be surprised to learn that their arguments are based on numerous errors of interpretation, personal quirks and ironical zigzags that afflicted earlier advocacy. Here are just two examples: many of those on the left who have long excoriated proponents of family planning programmes as "Malthusians" would be astonished to know that Malthus himself opposed family planning; and those of the new right who have embraced the argument that correctly structured economic systems cannot experience excesses of population growth would be surprised to learn that this is a classic Marxist view.

A brief tour of the most important threads of such argument may serve to illustrate some of the surprising intellectual zigzags that underlie current ideological positions (Teitelbaum, 1988).

The mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw population as a form of national wealth, saw no natural limits to human population growth and advocated state intervention to increase all forms of wealth, including population. Mercantilist thought was countered by the free-market physiocrats, who saw land rather than population as wealth and rejected government intervention in the economy in favour of what they termed *laissez-faire*. The utopians also countered the mercantilists in their advocacy of equitable distribution of resources, while embracing the population optimism.

The writings of Malthus were provoked by the pronouncements of the utopians (one of whom was his father). Malthus and the Malthusians rejected the population optimism of both the utopians and the mercantilists but opposed "unnatural" interventions, such as marital contraception, in favour of "prudential restraint" of marital and extra-marital sexuality. The neo-Malthusians accepted the population pessimism of the Malthusians but rejected their opposition to fertility control within marriage in favour of voluntary contraception. At the same time, the neo-Malthusians opposed abortion, in part because of its dangers at a time before antiseptic techniques were the norm.

Marx, Engels and their Marxist-Leninist followers embraced the population optimism of the utopians, attacked both the Malthusians and neo-Malthusians as political reactionaries and opposed contraception as Malthusian, while at the same time embracing abortion as a basic right of women. To the extent that they believed that some limits on human numbers might be needed, they held that such limitation would occur as a natural result of a correct economic structure. More recently, the Chinese Marxists have rejected the population optimism of their Marxist-Leninist forebears and embraced strong state intervention to promulgate both Malthusian (marriage) and neo-Malthusian (fertility) restraint.

Lastly, the "supply siders" of the modern right share the population optimism of the mercantilists but reject their economic statism. At the same time, they embrace the natural-regulation and anti-contraception, anti-Malthusian arguments of the traditional Marxist-Leninists, while rejecting their support for abortion.

An understanding of this tangled intellectual history is essential to interpreting what currently passes for political and literary discourse on population issues in much of the world. The basic demographic data are filtered through lenses defined by one or more of the ideological perspectives mentioned above. Then, superimposed upon such ideologically filtered perspectives, are value-laden views informed by rivalries of a national, ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic character. Such concerns are especially evident in settings where sharply differing demographic characteristics characterize: *(a)* deep rivalries betweeen neighbouring States; and *(b)* rivalries within States among contesting subnational groups.

Formal education

Population information can also be communicated via the educational system, especially in countries in which most or all children participate in formal education. There is a long history of efforts to inculcate basic knowledge of demographic trends into the curricula of such countries. Such efforts have met with some success, though it must be remembered that population trends and policy questions are complex and difficult to communicate at the primary and secondary educational levels. Note that most demographic training occurs at the university rather than at earlier educational levels. Population trends and policies are quintessentially issues at the aggregate level, in this respect resembling economic trends and policies, which are equally difficult to teach at the primary and secondary levels.

Organized religion

Organized religions have often disseminated a form of population information, although not usually described as such. The precepts and dogmas of most of the major religions evolved many centuries before the onset of the demographic transition, at a time when mortality was high and high fertility levels were essential for cultural survival. It is therefore quite understandable that most organized religions have tended towards a celebration of high fertility as a natural good. In many cases, such a perspective has gradually shifted with the realization that mortality decline since the eighteenth century means that lower fertility now is consistent with survival. None the less, some religions continue to educate their flocks with the old perspectives favouring high fertility.

Government

Administrative networks that reach down to local government levels are natural pathways for communication of information from central Governments to the public. In national settings in which such networks have been employed extensively, such as China or Indonesia, their focus in the population sphere has tended to emphasize the importance of fertility reduction and family planning use rather than direct improvement of public knowledge of population trends.

Non-governmental organizations

A number of non-profit or voluntary organizations have sought to disseminate information about population to the mass public. In most cases, these organizations have focused on family planning and health improvement rather than on the dissemination of population information as such. Nevertheless, a few non-governmental organizations do emphasize efforts to disseminate population information broadly. An example given in a United Nations report is that of the Population Reference Bureau, which "gathers, interprets and publishes information on the social, economic and environmental aspects of national and world population dynamics" (United Nations, 1984, p. 33).

Access to communication channels

In recognition of the highly disaggregated and regulated nature of such communication networks, those interested in the dissemination of accurate and informed information about population trends and policies have naturally gravitated towards efforts to communicate with broader publics through the intermediaries of multinational, national and subnational élites. Such élites, ranging from journalists to government officials to intellectuals, frequently control access of information to channels of communication, as well as the degree to which such information is filtered before transmission. Resident advisers of international agencies have consciously followed a strategy of what might be termed "pro-active propagation" of population information, intended to inform such élites about population trends and their implications. Such efforts have been directed to journalists and editors in the mass media, religious leaderships, teachers, local officials, members of legislative bodies (who are usually influential even in contexts in which they wield little direct political power), academics and others involved in relevant research areas, and medical professionals.

Obviously, given the diversity of the more than 150 countries in the world, few generalizations can be made as to the extent to which such transmissions of information are controlled by Governments or take place independent of government input. In some countries, Governments have established effective control over virtually all sources of information to the public, other than bootlegged writings and video tapes circulated unlawfully. In other countries, such control over information is considered a violation of basic rights, while in a third group, governmental control may be desired but is constrained by problems of communication, transportation or political control.

It is generally true, however, that different types of élites tend to be more or less under government influence; e.g., newspapers and religious organs are often found to be more independent of government control than are Government-controlled outlets, such as television and radio. For this reason, in many settings population information (whether accurate or not) distributed through the press and religious organs tends to filter through to the broader publics irrespective of what the view of the Government may be. Indeed, in some developing countries, religious networks, such as those of the local fundamentalist leaders of Islam, may be better able to convey their message on population issues and related matters than are the direct governmental organs of various ministries and councils.

B. Effectiveness of population information: knowledge gaps

There are major gaps in knowledge of the effectiveness of information transmission about population trends and policies through these various channels. Moreover, the scattered bits of evidence available are scarcely encouraging for those who wish to see the publics informed objectively about population trends and policies. Even in the most highly industrialized and educated societies, it is typically found that only a small minority of the national population know even the rudiments of population information, e.g., the size of the national population, whether it is growing rapidly, what the internal differentials of fertility and mortality may be and so on. Once again, a similar characterization might be made of public knowledge about basic economic trends, such as the overall size of gross national product, its rate of growth and employment rates. Generally speaking, even highly educated publics appear to be better informed about local economic circumstances than about national or international trends. It may well be, therefore, that it is quixotic to imagine that it is possible to convey basic and balanced information on population trends beyond relatively narrow sectors of any national society.

The instrumentalities that appear to be most effective in spreading population information, leaving aside the accuracy of the information so disseminated, include the following:

(a) *Political discourse.* Because population trends have long been on the political agendas in such countries as China, France and Singapore, they are probably more broadly discussed and written about in these countries than in most others (note that demographic rates and trends were central issues in the 1988 presidential election in France);

(b) *Organized activist groups.* Much of what passes for population information is disseminated by organized advocacy groups with strong points of view. During the 1970s in the West, environmentalist groups were among the most outspoken in raising alarms about what they deemed excessive population growth rates; opposing advocacy groups, such as pro-life groups and the Association for a Demographic Renaissance (APRD) in France, sought to counter such arguments with their own form of demographic evidence.

This point leads necessarily to a discussion of role of alarmism in the dissemination of population information. Many of the politicians and activists involved in population-related movements have been quite prepared to issue alarmist statements as to the implications of the demographic trends they decry. Evocative metaphors such as the "population bomb", the "population crisis", "autogenocide" and "collective suicide", have been energetically deployed. The pace has long been set, and is still being set, by advocates unconstrained by the cautions of scientific discourse and rules of evidence. This situation is really no different from similar experiences involving complex aggregate statistics that are remote from the experiences of everyday life, e.g., cancer risks, government expenditures or military balances.

It may well be that such alarmist, evocative language is needed to capture the attention of broad publics about the aggregate, incremental changes that prevail in population patterns. In such a contest, professional demographers and United Nations agencies seem both constitutionally and bureaucratically ill-suited to compete.

Policy impact of public opinion: knowledge gaps

It is also difficult to generalize as to the impact of public opinion on population issues upon governmental policy. First, there obviously are major differences in the nature of governmental structure and its accessibility to input from outside governmental and political institutions. As examples from Europe, consider France and Switzerland, two neighbouring countries with widely differing political structures. It is almost certainly true that the impact of local opinion is more effectively felt within the cantonal structure of Switzerland than comparable local opinion is felt by the highly centralized Government of France. Conversely, the capacity of a highly centralized Government to implement a policy on population (or in any other area, for that matter) is far higher than the capacity of a highly federalized system (e.g., that of the Federal Republic of Germany) or even of a highly centralized Government that lacks the capability to communicate or enforce its perspective down to the local government level.

Secondly, it is scarcely surprising that there is no certain relationship between a Government's knowledge of demographic realities and its views about their desirability. Obviously, political leaders must take into account many factors—political, social, strategic—other than demographic evidence in assessing qualitatively the desirability of demographic change. Such variability of assessment appears clearly in *World Population Trends and Policies: 1987 Monitoring Report*: "Apparently, a particular government perception of its rate of population growth is a consequence of the interplay between the actual level of the rate and the social, economic and political conditions specific to the country" (United Nations, 1988, para. 171).

The same analysis, however, indicates that a relatively high level of agreement exists between Governments' expressed evaluations of demographic growth rates and their adoption or non-adoption of interventionist strategies intended to influence growth. Thus, the main effect of public opinion on government policies is likely to be through direct effects on governmental assessment of the desirability of current or prospective demographic trends.

C. Recommendations for action

In view of the murkiness of the available evidence, recommendations for action are offered with considerable diffidence.

First, in the interest of improving knowledge of the subject, some attention might be paid to assuring that ongoing survey efforts collect basic data concerning the level of public knowledge of population trends and policies. These efforts include the regular monthly surveys implemented by some Governments and special-purpose surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys, as well as commercial public opinion polling activities. (It may be that such data

are already being collected in this way unbeknownst to this author; if so, a correction would be most welcome.)

Secondly, current population information efforts by international agencies might be expanded. The Population Information Network (POPIN) project of the United Nations appears to have made a good beginning a few years ago, but it seems now to be flagging. The preference of United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Population Fund, to implement their information efforts through other United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, is understandable, but in some situations it may unduly limit effectiveness.

Thirdly, given the significant role played by journalism in the broad dissemination of population information and further given the often garbled journalistic treatment of demographic trends, the organization of workshops for interested journalists might be worthy of consideration. Some attention might also be paid to expanding or replicating the model of the Population Reference Bureau, which has established an enviable reputation with media professionals as an unbiased and expert source of demographic information and insight.

Fourthly, the international organization of professional demographers, IUSSP, to date appears to have made only limited efforts to reach beyond its specialist membership to communicate objective scientific knowledge about demographic trends and policies. In this regard, the IUSSP leadership might wish to examine the public information efforts of other professional societies, such as the Population Association of America (PAA), through the PAA Committee on Public Affairs and its Committee on Population Statistics.

Fifthly, the support of UNFPA and other United Nations bodies and agencies in communicating population knowledge to international élites, in particular, parliamentarians and religious leaderships, appears to have been well implemented and productive, and such support should be continued.

Sixthly, it should now be possible—at minimal cost—greatly to improve the readability and accessibility of the many valuable United Nations publications on population. Although some improvements can already be seen in certain Population Division reports, the availability of type fonts to be used with laser printers, coupled with personal computer software, such as programs to design pages, should allow the Population Division to move away rapidly from the unappealing typewritten formats of the past. Such hardware and software would also allow the ample insertion of computer-generated graphics, boxes focused on particular issues and similar expository techniques that are now routinely used in reports by other international agencies, such as the World Bank, and by various Governments and most corporations.

In addition to such technical fixes, any efforts to increase the "reach" of United Nations publications would also have to encourage changes in their distinctive style of exposition. It appears likely that this bureaucratic or technical style has the effect of limiting such materials to official and technical audiences. Such stylistic changes would require no diminishment in scientific standards—merely editorial attention to the needs of a broader audience.

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IX. INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POPULATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

*Chidambara Chandrasekaran**

Well-focused population policies began to emerge in South Asia only during the past four decades, although a few steps had been taken earlier in countries of the region to change some of the demographic variables, notably, mortality. For purposes of this discussion, in considering population policies, importance is given to those measures intended to affect demographic variables directly, although it should be recognized that actions directed towards overall development would also modify population characteristics.

It is also recognized that "experience" is a rather broad term and can subsume scientific evaluation. However, because such evaluation of the effects of population policies is rather complicated and the methodology is not yet well developed, "experience" as used in this paper is related mainly, but not exclusively, to a description of the implementation of population policies and to impressions of the effects of such policies.

Lastly, in United Nations parlance, South Asia covers the region from the Philippines in the east to Turkey and Cyprus in the west—subdivided into the three subregions, South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia and Western Asia. The experience discussed in this paper, however, is more detailed for countries in South-eastern Asia and Southern Asia and less so for countries in Western Asia. This difference derives in part from limitations in the personal knowledge of the author in respect of the countries in Western Asia but might not be unrelated to the greater emphasis that population policies have received in the other two subregions.

Of the factors affecting population size and structure, fertility, mortality and migration are those most often featured in population policies. Therefore, only policies related to these three characteristics are given prominence in this paper. Furthermore, of the policies that would influence these three factors, family planning policies designed to affect fertility receive the largest share of attention, with less being given to health policies affecting mortality and the least to policies affecting population movements.

The discussion begins by giving some insight into the background against which policies relating to each of these factors were evolved and how information on these policies and programmes were disseminated and with what effect. Subsequently, the role of the international transmission of population policy experience is discussed.

A. Policies affecting fertility

Policy formulation

In India, the national family planning programme was included as a part of its First Five-Year Plan, which became operative in 1951. The reason India took the decision to embark upon a national family planning programme at that time cannot be stated precisely. There can be no doubt that the preparation of the plan in itself brought into broad relief the problems that the future rate of growth of population then envisaged would pose for efforts to raise the living standards of the Indian people. Other supporting factors were, probably, the need for family planning in order to realize the goal of improving the health of women and children that was advocated by women's organizations, the several discussions on population issues that foreign demographers had with influential persons at New Delhi; and the findings of the United Nations/Government of India Population Survey, known as the Mysore Population Study, carried out in India around that time, which reflected a favourable attitude of the people towards family planning (Chandrasekaran, 1987). These factors implied the exchange of a good deal of information

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on population matters between the West and India in the early 1950s. It was not as though the intellectuals among the Indians were totally unaware of the problems posed by rapid population growth; but in the 1950s, with the euphoria of independence, the country was ready for bold initiatives.

The acceptance of family planning by India as part of the national policy for social and economic development received wide publicity through the world press and other mass media. The International Conference on Planned Parenthood, at which the International Planned Parenthood Federation was established, was held at Bombay in 1952 and was attended by delegates from many countries in South Asia and other parts of the world. This Conference further publicized the interest of India in family planning programmes, and *The New York Times* published a report on the proceedings of the Conference. The report also referred to the important finding of the United Nations/Government of India Population Survey that even in the rural areas covered by the survey, a majority of men as well as women with three living children did not desire to have more children.

The policies of India were closely watched by other countries in the sub-continent as well as by countries to the east of India. Pakistan, the next country to introduce family planning activities, did so as part of its First Five-Year Plan covering the period 1955-1960, but it could be said that a national family programme as such was adopted only in the Second Five-Year Plan. Until December 1963, when the First Asian Population Conference was held at New Delhi, only three countries had instituted official family planning programmes. Apart from India and Pakistan, only the Republic of Korea had established a national family planning programme.

The 1960s witnessed a sudden spurt in the development of population policies in many countries. An initiative by John D. Rockefeller, III, Chairman of the Board of the Population Council, led to the issuance by U Thant, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, of a declaration on population signed by the heads of States of 12 countries on Human Rights Day, 10 December 1966. Continued efforts by Mr. Rockefeller led to 18 more heads of States signing the Declaration; 19 were from the less developed regions of the world, of whom 11 were from Asia. It is not surprising that all the countries that signed the Declaration had instituted a national family planning policy by 1970.

Preparation of national plans for social and economic development with an increasing population as a parameter was obviously responsible for the readiness with which family planning policies and programmes were formulated.

Berelson describes the sequence of events that led to the acceptance of a national family programme in the following terms:

> "The pressure for family planning typically originates in the planning board or its equivalent, as economists come to appreciate what the current rate of population growth means for their development plans—or, in a fewer countries, it originates in medical circles with concern over the high incidence of induced abortions and their personal and social costs. (The ground had often been prepared by the local, private family planning association; and its relationship to the governmental effort sometimes makes for the natural tensions of organizational rivalries.) Someone in a high position who wishes to promote the policy invites a foreign mission of experts to review the population situation and make recommendations, which then call for adoption of a family planning policy. Even after the policy is formally proclaimed, however, there often remains some ambivalence at high levels based on political sensitivities, actual or perceived." (1969b, pp. 341-342)

In explaining the spread of national family planning programmes, Fawcett emphasized the dissemination of ideas:

> "In the same way that acceptance of family planning by *individuals* has been facilitated by a visible core group of users and by open discussion via mass media, acceptance by *nations* has been facilitated by the emergence of a group of developing countries with national programs and by spread of information about national programs via news media and particularly international exchange visits and conferences among high government officials. What other countries are doing is a persuasive element in moving countries towards a national family planning program." (Berelson, 1969b, pp. 380-381)

Programme management

When India adopted family planning as a national policy, there was little or no experience in how to administer and manage a national family planning

programme. The little experience that existed was confined to the services offered by voluntary agencies, such as family planning organizations in the Western countries, particularly in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and in the United States of America. Essentially, the services provided by these agencies were clinic-oriented. In addition, although it is not well established, health services have generally included family planning in their programmes as part of pre-natal care for the purpose of avoiding narrow intervals between births. However, in the state of development of public health practice in many developing countries prior to 1950, such advice could not have reached a large percentage of women in most of these countries. It was no wonder that even India, in evolving its family planning programme, had to look for guidance from individuals and organizations in Western countries with experience in offering family planning services.

Contributions by the Population Council

Experience in operating programmes in a community was gained first by carrying out some experimental studies in selected areas. One of these was the Singur Study of Population Control undertaken in the field practice area of the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Calcutta, in the 1950s. A summary of the findings of this study was the first article in the first issue of *Studies of Family Planning*, published by the Population Council. This journal, among the several publications of journals and books by the Council, has in the author's view served as one of the most important vehicles for disseminating information on experience gained in operating family planning programmes. In introducing this first issue of *Studies in Family Planning* in 1963, Frank Notestein, the then President of the Population Council, wrote:

> "In their travels throughout the world in the past few years, staff members of the Population Council have been impressed with the rapidly developing interest in population problems and the slowly disseminating information and experience. Partly as a result of rapid growth in the field, the communication of careful, sound, scientific studies of efforts to implement family planning seems increasingly to be lagging behind the developments themselves." (Notestein, 1963, p. 1)

Although *Studies in Family Planning* kept to the aims outlined above by Notestein and published notes and articles on various aspects pertaining to the development and management of family planning programmes in different parts of the world, it also began giving periodic reports on the performance of programmes. The first summaries of achievements, which covered the programmes then considered the most successful—those in the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan Province of China, were reported by S. M. Keeny, the Population Council resident representative for South-east Asia. Subsequently, the programme experiences of several countries were reported in *Studies in Family Planning*. Soon such reporting was given a special status, and the Council began publishing a compendium of data on population and family planning programmes throughout the world (see Nortman, 1972). Without dwelling further on the variety of topics dealt with by the Council which had considerable transmission value, the discussion turns to some other efforts for the generation and dissemination of information that were of great value to those interested in family planning programmes.

Publicizing newer contraceptives

Family planning programmes in South Asia, as elsewhere, have been assisted by the spread of knowledge of newer contraceptives, their efficacy and safety. Mention should be made of at least two types of newer contraceptives, the intrauterine device (IUD) and the oral pill. Plastic IUDs which retained their shape after insertion came into use in the early 1960s and again the Population Council took the lead in testing their utility and safety. International conferences were arranged by the Council at which physicians from different parts of the world who had carried out clinical trials on IUDs were invited to report their findings. The Cooperative Statistical Program supported by the Population Council and established by the National Committee on Maternal Health of the United States led to the legitimization of the use of IUDs in family planning programmes. The introduction of several new types of IUD simultaneously in South Asia was in part a reflection of the support given by the international aid agencies to supply the device and in part because of the ease with which it could be utilized in a large-scale family planning programme. Information on statistical methods developed to evaluate the effectiveness of IUD use were also well publicized and widely adopted.

Acceptance of the oral pill as a contraceptive was somewhat more restricted, but there is no gainsaying its availability and it also spread very widely. Because the pill is a hormonal method, experience with its use was discussed in detail in medical journals read by physicians throughout the world, including those in South Asia. Although the pill has been extremely popular in some South Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, it is doubtful if follow-up studies on the use of pills in these countries have been undertaken on an adequate scale. However, one of the ways in which information in well-digested form on the efficacy and safety of the use of contraceptive has been made available in South Asia is through such publications as the Population Reports series prepared by the Population Information Program of the Johns Hopkins University.

Sterilization of the male was for the first time widely used in India, and research to make it reversible was undertaken simultaneously. Today, sterilization occupies an important place in the use of contraceptives in South Asia, as well as in some of the Western countries.

Efforts of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, formerly known as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, was the regional commission of the United Nations that took a lead in making family planning a major area of interest in its population programme. At the Asian Population Conference that ESCAP organized at New Delhi in December 1963, which was attended by 200 participants from 14 Asian countries and five Member States outside the ESCAP region, an important resolution relating to action programmes was adopted. The resolution recommended that the United Nations and its specialized agencies should provide technical assistance on action programmes upon request by Member States. Further, Governments in the region were invited to take account of the urgency of adopting a positive population policy relating to their individual needs and the general needs of the region. A resolution adopted at the 1964 session of ESCAP at Teheran requested the Executive Secretary to organize a collaborative regional, subregional and interregional technical working groups in order to provide guidelines for governmental action and international assistance in a particular field relating to population problems in the ESCAP region.

This resolution made it possible for ESCAP to appoint a Regional Demographic Adviser on Population Policy and Programmes and to take an active interest in matters relating, in particular, to family planning programmes. Activities promoted at that time were the sharing of recent experiences, the development of new ideas and the establishment of channels for further communication of ideas and experience by organizing working groups on administration, communication, evaluation and training aspects of family planning programmes. The Working Group on the Administrative Aspects was attended by 23 participants from 10 Member States of ESCAP and 12 participants from international agencies engaged in population programmes. One of the items discussed at this meeting was the setting of targets in family planning programmes. It should be realized that the concept of operational targets was first developed in the programme of Taiwan Province of China but was increasingly adopted by many countries in South Asia after that Working Group met.

Just as the participants from different countries described their experience with the administration of family planning programmes in the Working Group on Admininistrative Aspects, there was an exchange of experience with respect to the communication aspects in the Working Group devoted to that field. Because the programmes in many countries were at the early stages, such exchanges were of great value in developing the communication programmes of many countries. Among the several topics discussed, the Working Group on Communications emphasized the need to integrate mass communication with face-to-face communication and identified the strategic groups for communications in the community, such as political decision makers and administrators, employers' and employees' organizations and the medical and nursing professions. With respect to the use of effective informal channels of communications at the local level, it was considered useful to have some understanding of the particular social system in which one was working at any given time.

As a sequel to the regional Working Group on the Communications Aspects, national seminars were organized in, for example, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, in order to promote exchange of experiences within the country as well as to transmit experiences of other countries in the region to the participants. The Working Group that dealt with

evaluation, on the other hand, led to a series of national training courses in some countries such as, India, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea.

Since its establishment in 1969, the Population Division at ESCAP has helped build the capabilities for dealing with problems of family planning programmes at diverse levels through the organization of seminars and working groups.

Evaluation of family planning programmes

Evaluation of family planning policies necessarily involves the evaluation of programmes designed for the implementation of those policies. The steps in such evaluations have been discussed on various occasions, especially at international meetings, and have found applications in several countries. Some noteworthy tools evolved for gauging the effectiveness of programme operations are acceptor statistics, the continuation rate and the use-effectiveness of specific contraceptives. The overall effectiveness of family planning programmes in reducing the fertility of the population is often judged by the reduction in the birth rate. The measurement of the effectiveness of family planning programmes poses a number of difficult problems. The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, working with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations, has attempted to popularize the evaluative procedures. Several manuals and working group reports have been published.

Contribution of non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies

IPPF has played an important role through its publication in the interchange of experience through its publications; mention should be made of its periodical publication *People* in stimulating interest in family planning programmes and in providing scientific data useful in the management of programmes. Several international publications, such as *International Family Planning Perspectives*, published by the Alan Guttmacher Institute; and the Population Bulletin series, issued by the Population Reference Bureau, have proved useful in disseminating information on the experience gained in operating family planning programmes.

The Intergovernmental Co-ordinating Committee (IGCC) of the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation in Family and Population Planning, in co-operation with such organizations as ESCAP, has organized workshops on reducing fertility through measures beyond family planning and on similar topics to evolve procedures to increase the demand for family planning services.

Another experience of regional co-operation in dealing with population problems was the population programme established by the Association of South-East Asian Nations in response to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed by the heads of Governments of the five original members of ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It calls for existing co-operation to be intensified and expanded to meet the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, new strategies to be formulated in collaboration with appropriate international agencies. An important goal of this programme was to undertake similar studies in the participating countries in close co-operation with each other in planning and execution.

A relatively new development in South Asia is the setting-up of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), which has included population as one of its areas of co-operative activity.

Transference of experience in family planning

The varied reactions of countries to the experience of other countries has depended upon the nature of the experience and how relevant it was in the political, social and economic context of the recipient countries.

That several countries in South Asia accepted family planning as part of their national policy during the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s cannot be dismissed as a mere accident. As stated above, many of the countries were developing plans for economic and social development, and the planners realized that a continuous and possibly accelerated growth in population size would impede their efforts to improve the living standards of the population. In most of these countries, however, the adoption of family planning went against tradition, and external support from respected quarters was essential to gain national support for emphasizing a reduction of the birth rate as a national goal. The support of other heads of State or of a personage

such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations went a long way to mitigate local opposition. In addition, the views of a body of experts from other countries assessing the national situation and recommending a family planning policy made it easier for government leaders to enunciate national policies on family planning.

Today, there are several opportunities for national leaders and professionals to keep abreast of developments in other countries. Some countries tend to follow the examples set by others whose developmental efforts and achievement they respect, particularly if their social and economic conditions are somewhat similar to their own. It is most likely that such a diffusion would also have taken place in the acceptance of national family planning programmes. In some instances, a sense of pride in not wanting to be considered conservative in accepting modern ideas may have induced some countries to accept family planning as a policy measure when other countries in the region had already done so.

When it came to a question of translating these policies into an action programme, without doubt, countries that had accepted family planning as a national policy were at a loss in not knowing how to implement it. India, for instance, had to look to the experience in Western countries for such guidance. Transferring such experience poses problems. In retrospect, it is certainly baffling to try to comprehend why the Family Planning Association of India accepted the diaphragm and jelly as a method of choice, given that the housing conditions of most of the population of Bombay would not have justified its use. The main reason for its acceptance would appear to be that eminent physicians considered it the safest and most effective method at that time.

In the operation of a family planning programme, one of the important components is the type of contraceptive offered to the public. Mention has been made earlier that the plastic IUD and the pill were two of the important contraceptives that became available when countries in South Asia initiated family planning programmes. The use of IUDs was greatly supported by the Population Council, while the United States Agency for International Development backed the supply of oral pills. Knowledge of both these methods was communicated by publications addressed to professionals in the family planning field as well as to medical practitioners. Others involved in popularizing these methods were resident representatives of some of the donor organizations and commercial salesmen, especially in the case of pills.

Although, in some instances, countries carried out local studies to convince themselves of the propriety of using some of the newly available contraceptives, more often than not much reliance was placed upon the advice received from abroad, especially from the West. The large-scale distribution of the Lippes Loop, for instance, was mainly guided by the confidence that professionals and administrators had in the recommendations of the Population Council. Reports of the wide acceptance and continued use of the Lippes Loop in the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan Province of China led several countries in South Asia to assume a favourable attitude towards it and to propagate its wide use. Although IUDs have been the most accepted method in several countries, in some of them the pill has overtaken that method.

It is doubtful if the popularity of the oral pill was due so much to the acceptors' satisfaction with its use as to the spread of information of its high effectiveness in preventing conception. The role played by some of the donor countries who, believing in the saturation theory, flooded some of the recipient countries with contraceptives, including the pill, could also have been responsible for the widespread use of this method.

Distinct differences exist among countries in their organization for family planning. For instance, Indonesia has established the National Family Planning Co-ordinating Board to implement its family planning programme. Pakistan, at one time, had a vertical set-up to integrate family planning with the activities of other departments of the Government. By and large, however, the responsibility for family planning is vested in health ministries.

Because of the global interest in family planning during the past few decades there has been considerable exchange of experience during international conferences, workshops and seminars and informal training courses for trainees from developing countries. Yet, in the operation of family planning programmes, there is not much indication that such exchanges have been directly utilized.

Several ideas to strengthen family planning efforts have found wide acceptance. One is the "beyond family planning" approach discussed by Berelson (1969a). Procedures listed by him that have found wide acceptance and adoption include population education in schools, provision of incentives, strengthening of advice on family planning in maternal and child welfare services, promotion of

female education and employment, and increase in the minimum age at marriage of girls through legislation.

Another concept that has gained wide acceptance in recent years is the interrelationship of population and development, which is emphasized in the World Population Plan of Action in the following terms:

> "Population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables and are influenced by them; thus the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in the Plan of Action reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting population trends." (United Nations, 1975, para. 14 (c))

Further, the Plan invites Governments that have family planning programmes "to consider integrating and co-ordinating those services with health and other services designed to raise the quality of family life" (United Nations, 1975, para. 30).

Countries in South Asia have begun to appreciate the importance of integrating family planning with other services. The relationship between the level of infant mortality and the level of fertility is now well recognized. In an effort to improve child health, Indonesia integrated child care, particularly the periodic weighing of children to measure their development, with family planning services. A study relating parasite control to increased acceptance of family planning was sponsored by the Japanese Organization for International Co-operation in Family Planning (JOICFP) in several countries. In some countries, departments of agriculture, industry, rural development and others are encouraged to popularize the small family norm during the course of their activities. Evaluation of the effectiveness of such integrated programmes is difficult; and despite similar forms of integration in many countries, it is difficult to judge to what extent such integration was undertaken on the basis of experience elsewhere.

Some examples do exist of concepts of family planning operations developed in one or more countries finding application in others. One such concept is target-setting in terms of the number of acceptors to be enlisted. This idea, which is in a sense novel in the field of human behaviour, was first applied in just one country. Although the propriety of setting such goals is still debated, a very large number of countries now do set targets in terms of acceptors to be recruited or in terms of lowered birth rates or growth rates.

Several measures, such as shifting emphasis from the clinic approach, using marketing procedures for the distribution of contraceptives in rural areas, bringing contraceptive distribution centres closer to the people and giving publicity to the small family norm through mass media, undoubtedly have been supported by experience elsewhere.

In general, concepts and procedures developed in authoritative circles and favourable contraceptive experience in more developed countries appear to have had a greater influence on acceptance of policies and programme procedures in South Asia than the experience within the region itself.

B. Mortality and health policies

The alleviation of suffering from disease of near and dear ones and the prolongation of their life have been a part of human effort from time immemorial. Various ways to achieve these ends can be found even in primitive communities. However, substantial progress in reducing morbidity and mortality dates back about a century and a half in the more developed regions parts of the world, whereas in the developing countries it is much more recent. The concept of the prevention of disease as opposed to its cure is a fairly recent idea. Medical procedures used in many areas of South Asia today are of the allopathic system which originated in the West. Development of health policies in most regions of the world has depended to a large extent upon the knowledge gained in this system.

The ways in which this system has become widespread—often to the detriment of several indigenous systems—are fairly well known. It is not merely a manifestation of the foreign rule by Western countries. Its well-established scientific basis has had a wide appeal, and several of the "miracle" drugs that have been discovered under this system in recent years are much sought after. The control of malaria in many countries, especially since the Second World War, in many tropical countries, and the eradication of smallpox from the world (eliminating it finally in India) could not fail to impress people in the developing countries with the potential of allopathic medicine.

Public health procedures, albeit of the Western model, began to be applied in South Asia largely through the efforts of the Rockfeller Foundation. The Foundation provided fellowships for persons from countries in South Asia to receive training in public health at such institutions as the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health at Baltimore, Maryland (United States). Further, the Foundation assisted in setting up such institutions as the All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health at Calcutta for training public health personnel within the country. It also assisted in setting up demonstration health centres in India and Sri Lanka, where procedures to improve public health practice could be evolved.

As evidence of local efforts made to develop large-scale programmes to improve the health of the people, the example of India could be cited. In the early 1940s, the Government of India set up the Health Survey and Development Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Joseph Bhore. The committee was ably assisted in its work by Dr. John B. Grant of the Rockefeller Foundation, whose services had been lent to the Government of India, as the Director of the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health. Several experts from abroad, including Professor Sigerest, who was acquainted with the developments in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and particularly the *feldscher* system operating in that country, were invited to advise the Bhore Committee, which presented a very useful report in 1946.

It should be mentioned that the training at schools of public health in the United States of America did inspire health workers from South Asia to contribute to achieving better health for the people in their respective countries. The schools also benefited from the presence of these students, some of whom had had considerable experience in public health in their countries. In the Master of Public Health course conducted at the Johns Hopkins University in 1947/48, an experimental course in international health was attempted. Trainees from several countries in South Asia discussed public health programmes in their countries at various sessions. Such exchange of information and experience proved very useful.

In spite of the developments that took place over the years in South Asia, aided also by UNICEF and WHO, several problems still remained. Many developing countries, including most in South Asia, had relatively high infant mortality rates and low life expectancies at birth. Differentials in length of life existed between the rural and urban people and between different social and economic groups. A number of factors had been identified as responsible for such differentials; not all of them were strictly "health factors".

The 30th World Health Assembly in 1977 adopted the goal of Health for All by the Year 2000; and in 1978, the World Health Assembly adopted the Declaration of Alma-Ata and endorsed the concept of primary health care embodied in it. This Declaration gained wide publicity through the world press and other media and became the mandate for all developing countries for the development of their health programmes.

The Declaration of Alma-Ata also defines the essential elements of primary health care as including:

> "Education concerning prevailing health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them; promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; an adequate supply of safe water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health care, including family planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases; prevention and control of locally endemic diseases; appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs." (World Health Organization, 1978, pp. 3-4)

This list is formidable when it comes to the matter of implementation. The progress made is dealt with in the report on "Mortality decline and health policy: an overview of developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region", prepared by the ESCAP secretariat for the Expert Group on Mortality and Health Policy in connection with the International Conference on Population, 1984 (United Nations, 1984, pp. 126-145).

The difficulty in assessing the effect of health programmes in situations such as those in South Asia has been well brought out by several statements in the papers prepared for the Expert Group referred to above. Paucity of data on mortality and morbidity in several countries of the region makes assessment of changes in the incidence or prevalence of individual diseases or the overall effect of these diseases nearly impossible. Moreover, the conceptual framework for improving the health status of a population has changed. Health problems are no longer considered the purview only of medical and public health personnel. Interactions between health and development are beginning to be highlighted.

Education is often singled out as one of the most important factors related to health. Evaluation of the experience of health programmes integrated with other sectors becomes very complex. Although transmission of information of health policies as such is relatively easy, evaluation of the impact of programmes is far more difficult.

The results of small-scale research projects in the field of medicine or public health are published in scientific journals and are of great value in policy-making. Such journals as *Lancet*, the *British Medical Journal*, the *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* and the *American Journal of Public Health* have wide circulation and are read by medical and public health professionals in many parts of the world.

The World Health Organization has been the main international body publishing reports of research findings that are of importance in developing health policies. Of the several periodicals published by WHO, the *World Health Forum* contains articles of interest not only for those actively working in the field of health but also for professionals in other sectors to whom health issues are important. As stated by WHO, "The main purpose of the *Forum* is to provide for the international exchange of experiences, ideas and opinion on all aspects of public health". One issue of the *Forum* has an article that reports the evaluation by Governments of their progress towards that goal of health for all. A quotation taken from the response of Sri Lanka might be of interest:

> "Community involvement in health care and the confidence of the people to act responsibly for their own health are basic concepts in the traditional system, which has been eroded to some extent by the Western medical care model. These traditional values are being revived, to counteract the dependence on doctors, drugs, clinics and hospitals that has been brought about by the predominance of curative services." (WHO, 1987, p. 169)

Another publication of importance for our discussion is the WHO Technical Report series, which gives the views of expert committees on various topics related to health administration and health policies. The annual reports of the Regional Directors of WHO also provide an insight into the progress in public health made during the year by member countries in the region.

C. Migration policies

Concern about issues relating to population movement differs between South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia and Western Asia. Some countries in South-eastern Asia, in particular, Malaysia and Singapore, have been subjected to substantial immigration from countries in Southern Asia and East Asia, while Indonesia, the main problem is the high density of population in Java and Madura and the low density of population in the Outer Islands. In many countries in Southern Asia, the main problem is the movement of people from rural to urban areas, especially to the cities. In Western Asia, particularly in the Arab countries, the foreign-born account for a sizeable proportion of the population and this necessitates policy measures concerning immigration.

The World Population Plan of Action deals extensively with policies that can be implemented with respect both to population distribution and internal migration and to international migration. The Conference at Bucharest in 1974, which adopted the Plan, also recommended that a comprehensive and thorough review and appraisal of progress made towards achieving the goals and recommendations of the Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years by the United Nations system. In view of this recommendation, the United Nations system has been serving as one of the chief sources for disseminating information on policy adoption in population matters.

In the fields of internal population movements as well as international migration, the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Population Fund appear to be the main agencies for disseminating information. As is only to be expected, the activities of the United Nations Secretariat and UNFPA are supported by the work and information supplied by the regional commissions of the United Nations. One such joint effort was the workshop held in 1979 at Bangkok, Thailand (Gosling and Lim, 1979). This workshop brought out clearly that population redistribution posed many problems and that there could be a large gap between policy statements and achievements.

The series *Population Growth and Policies in Mega-Cities* prepared by the Population Division focuses on the population policies and plans of some mega-cities in developing countries and, among other things, will deal with the possible extent to which sectoral policies may have served as implicit spatial

policies that reinforce or perhaps counteract explicit spatial goals. The mega-cities considered so far include Bangkok, Bombay, Cairo, Calcutta, Delhi, Dhaka, Jakarta, Karachi, Madras, Metro Manila and Seoul.

Apart from expressions of policies by many countries of South Asia to stop large cities from growing by restricting rural-to-urban migration, it is doubtful if there has been even limited success. Some programmes intended for promoting essentially rural-to-rural migration are well known. These include the programme of transmigration in Indonesia, the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) resettlement scheme in Malaysia, the movement into the dry zone of Sri Lanka (the Mahaweli scheme) and the clearing of Terai in northern India and southern Nepal. These programmes have been partially successful but have generally been expensive. Resettlement policies related to the construction of dams and the squatter movement attract considerable public attention in part because of the hardships posed to the resettlement population.

Information on policies affecting migration in Western Asia is available through various publications of the United Nations, such as the Population Policy Compendium series[1] prepared on the basis of information obtained largely from government sources. In its compendium on Bahrain, the Government's view on international migration in the country is stated as follows:

> "Thus, in recent years the official policy of the Government has been to maintain the levels of immigration. Despite strict entry, residence and employment permit controls enforced in the late 1970s, it is expected, in the short run, that the demand for immigrant labour will remain substantial given the scale of construction projects in process. In the long run, however, it is envisaged that with a better trained and more educated labour force, with women entering the labour market, and so forth, net immigration could be reduced in the coming decades."

The Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA)[2] has also published reports on population situation in most of the countries in the ECWA region. Its report on migration in the United Arab Emirates includes the following views of Riad Tabbarah:

> "Though difficult to determine with confidence, the immediate prospect for international migration is a reduction in net migration or even a reversal. During the seventies a major proportion of the foreign labour force was employed in construction, a sector in which intensive activities in the past have led to large surpluses and hence to a considerable slow-down in present activities. Since unemployed foreign workers have difficulties obtaining renewal of their working permits, which are in turn essential for obtaining extensions of residence permits, increasing numbers are likely to be obliged to leave the country in the foreseeable future. In fact, a labour regulation was recently passed according to which expatriate workers have to meet all legal requirements or face immediate deportation. Since the workers affected, who number in thousands, are in large part Indian and Pakistani, the Gulf Indians' Welfare Association has been active and vocal in the efforts to prevent their deportation." (ECWA, 1980, p. 13)

Studies on population distribution have generally been conducted in academic settings and special efforts are needed to publicize the findings. The United Nations, ably assisted by UNFPA, has been the main source for disseminating information on policies affecting internal and international migration. It is also evident that, as compared with the fertility and mortality fields, experience in the field of migration is not easily transferable from one country to another even within subregions.

D. Summary

The foregoing presentation has brought out that in South Asia policies in respect of different demographic variables have not received equal emphasis. A main reason is likely to be the relative importance of the population issues involved, which differ between the subregions and to a minor extent between the countries in a subregion. Although family planning policies have attracted the most attention in South-eastern Asia and Southern Asia, policies affecting international migration have been important in Western Asia. Policies affecting international migration have also received attention in some countries in South-eastern and Southern Asia.

The United Nations system and some non-governmental agencies have been largely responsible for the dissemination of information on population policies. In their several publications, the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat and the population units of the regional commissions, such as ESCAP and ESCWA, assisted by UNFPA, have been dealing with population policies fairly comprehensively. UNFPA, by itself, has been conducting studies and preparing reports on population policies. Conferences, expert groups, working groups and seminars organized by the United Nations system have been a potent force in the exchange of information and transmission of experience on population policies.

Non-governmental organizations and their regional offices, along with UNICEF, have been concerned with policies related to family health including family planning and have organized group activities for exchange of experiences. Other specialized agencies, such as the ILO and FAO, have contributed to the transmission of experience in population policies within their areas of competence.

Among the non-governmental organizations, the Population Council has been an active force in disseminating information on family planning policies. Several other organizations, such as IPPF, the Alan Guttmacher Institute and the Population Information Program of the Johns Hopkins University, have also been dealing with family planning policies in their widely read publications. The Population Reference Bureau as well, through its publications, has been transmitting information on population policies between regions.

As an outcome of the World Population Plan of Action, the United Nations Secretariat has periodically obtained information on population policies from Member Governments and other relevant sources and published them as monitoring reports. Commenting on the 1977 report, the United Nations Population Commission said that the reports, which contain a great deal of information and analyses, should be made available to Governments, demographers and planners. In addition, the Population Division has undertaken reviews and appraisals of the Plan of Action. The second such report, prepared in 1984, provided the rationale for the recommendations adopted by the International Conference on Population, held at Mexico City in August 1984, on the implementation of the Plan. These activities of the United Nations have undoubtedly been very informative on policies and programmes and should be continued.

Several principles, such as visible neutrality and global coverage guide the commendable efforts of the United Nations system referred to above. These principles leave out of consideration some detailed assessments relating to transmission of population policy experience. Although some policies, as in the case of international migration, depend only upon administrative and possibly political support for execution, those relating to such fields as family planning or health are more complicated in that they call for new knowledge in several scientific disciplines to help in the achievement of their goals. The type of research required in individual programmes associated with such policies or to be undertaken on a co-operative basis to cover several such programmes is complex, and steps must be taken to make such research possible. In addition, experience reported on a national policy gains credibility in other countries when it is the result of scientific evaluation, and measures to encourage such evaluation on a large scale have to be encouraged.

The earlier issues of *Studies in Family Planning* not only gave insights into policy formulation in the field of family planning but also reported on scientifically evaluated experience related to programmes to achieve the policy goals. While the continued publication of *Studies in Family Planning* has to be recommended, similar publications relating to organization on other aspects of population are called for.

As indicated above, the transmission of population policy experience presupposes the existence of such experience. UNFPA has in various ways assisted in generating such experience by countries and in the exchange of such information. Not only should this effort be continued but the infrastructure to gain experience also should be developed where it is inadequate. The services of non-governmental organizations, such as IPPF, IUSSP, the Population Reference Bureau and the World Watch Institute, have to be utilized, each in its own way, to enhance transmission of population policy experience.

Printed material, international conferences, working groups and seminars have hitherto served as the main vehicles for transmitting population policy experience and have proved useful. There are visible indications that such exchanges are sought by various countries, and what has proved of value is the dissemination of the findings of critical assessments of policies and programmes.

Notes

[1] The *Population Policy Compendium* has since been superseded by a three-volume publication entitled *World Population Policies*, which provides the most recent information available on the population perceptions and policies of 170 developed and developing countries. The countries are arranged in alphabetical order: volume I (Sales No. E.87.XIII.4) covers Afghanistan to France; volume II (Sales No. E.89.XIII.3), Gabon to Norway; and volume III (forthcoming), Oman to Zimbabwe.

[2] Currently called the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).

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X. TRANSMISSION INTERNATIONALE EN AFRIQUE SUB-SAHARIENNE DE L'EXPERIENCE EN MATIERE DE POLITIQUE DE POPULATION

*Mpembele Sala-Diakanda**

En janvier 1984, les pays africains réunis à Arusha (République-Unie de Tanzanie) à l'occasion de la Deuxième Conférence africaine sur la population ont, après une analyse objective et sans complaisance de la situation démographique du continent et des pressions qu'elle exerce sur les efforts de développement de leurs Gouvernements respectifs et sur les maigres ressources à leur disposition, ont adopté le "Programme d'action de Kilimanjaro" (Nations Unies, 1984)[1]. Ce document, d'une très haute signification politique, consacre l'intérêt que les pays africains accordent désormais aux questions de population et marque de ce fait un tournant décisif dans l'histoire démographique du continent.

L'attitude actuelle des pays africains face aux problèmes démographiques est, peut-on dès lors dire, l'opposé de celle défendue par ces mêmes pays en 1974 à Bucarest. A l'époque, "la position la plus communément admise était que la population était insuffisante et qu'il fallait l'encourager à croître". Les idées et les positions en matière de population ont évolué (Sala-Diakanda, 1988a) : en Afrique, plus particulièrement dans la partie sub-saharienne du continent, comme dans les autres grandes régions en développement, la population est devenue un problème et il faut des politiques et programmes spécifiques pour enrayer le mal! Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de passer en revue les positions officielles, les législations adoptées, les arrangements institutionnels mis en place, les services rendus en la matière, etc. A l'instar donc de l'Amérique latine et de l'Asie notamment, l'Afrique sub-saharienne s'est mise à parler "politiques et programmes de population". Que s'est-il passé et comment en est-on arrivé là?

Cette communication a principalement pour but d'examiner de façon concise et critique comment et jusqu'à quel point la conception, la formulation et la mise en oeuvre des politiques et programmes de population dans les pays africains au sud du Sahara sont conditionnées par des expériences dans ce domaine venues de l'intérieur même du continent ou d'ailleurs, quelles sont les principales chaînes de transmission de ces expériences, dans quelle mesure de telles expériences sont-elles transposables et que peut apporter l'Afrique sub-saharienne dans ce domaine?

Après avoir esquissé une réponse à la question "comment l'Afrique est-elle entrée sur la scène internationale des questions de population?", nous examinons les principaux mécanismes de transmission, en Afrique sub-saharienne, des expériences récentes en matière de population avant de nous interroger sur l'apport éventuel de l'Afrique à l'humanité dans ce domaine. Une vue d'ensemble clôture cette communication qui n'a aucunement la prétention d'avoir épuisé—tant s'en faut—un sujet aussi complexe qui nécessite une étude minutieuse et fouillée des motivations, des déclarations et des actions entreprises par les différents acteurs de la scène politico-démographique.

A. L'AFRIQUE SUB-SAHARIENNE SUR LA SCÈNE INTERNATIONALE DES QUESTIONS DE POPULATION : COMMENT EN EST-ELLE ARRIVÉE LÀ?

L'intérêt porté aux problèmes de population en Afrique sub-saharienne ne remonte qu'au début de la période coloniale au fur et à mesure que les besoins de connaissance des populations nouvellement colonisées se faisaient sentir sur :

a) *Le plan administratif* : nécessité de connaître le volume et la répartition territoriale des populations autochtones et ce, pour plusieurs raisons, dont les principales sont :

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i) La puissance coloniale : plus la population colonisée était nombreuse, plus important était le poids de la métropole au regard des autres nations colonisatrices (notamment en termes de "puissance militaire");

ii) L'organisation administrative : la connaissance du volume et de la répartition de la population était nécessaire pour organiser administrativement la colonie (découpage du territoire, contrôle des mouvements des populations, ...);

b) *Le plan économique* : la connaissance des populations devait répondre à deux besoins principaux :

i) Détermination du volume de la main d'oeuvre disponible pour la "mise en valeur" du territoire;

ii) Détermination de la population imposable.

Les investigations démographiques entreprises dès lors par les puissances colonisatrices ont, entre autres choses, permis de mettre en évidence le phénomène de dépopulation qui menaçait certains groupes ethniques particuliers du fait notamment de la stérilité et de certaines maladies endémiques. Dans la conjoncture de l'époque et compte tenu des motivations administratives et économiques qui prévalaient, le risque de dépopulation des populations autochtones a considérablement accru l'intérêt porté à la démographie africaine.

Compte tenu des raisons historiques ci-dessus invoquées, l'investigation démographique sur le continent a été dominée dès ses débuts par l'importance des problèmes de collecte des données de base car il n'existait pratiquement aucune source de données, jusqu'aux environs du début du XXe siècle, susceptible de répondre aux diverses interrogations (combien sont-ils?, comment sont-ils répartis?) et sur laquelle appuyer une recherche démographique. Par ailleurs, les attitudes face aux questions de population, observées ça et là dans les Etats africains nouvellement indépendants, ont été largement déterminées par les législations coloniales en la matière.

Il convient en effet de rappeler que suite au déclin de sa population, la France, une des grandes puissances colonisatrices en Afrique, a créé en 1919 un Conseil supérieur de la natalité et a adopté un an plus tard la loi, dite de 1920, interdisant la dissémination des connaissances et des moyens contraceptifs et, en 1923, des mesures contre l'avortement provoqué furent également adoptées pendant qu'un système d'allocations familiales était progressivement mis en place. Les autres puissances colonisatrices comme la Belgique et l'Italie avaient des préoccupations similaires à celles de la France. En revanche, dès le début du siècle la pensée malthusienne fortement dominante en Grande-Bretagne et l'émergence des mouvements en faveur du "contrôle des naissances" ont été à la base d'une législation plutôt libérale en matière de population dans ce pays.

La connaissance démographique et les attitudes face aux questions de population variaient donc considérablement en Afrique sub-saharienne où l'on peut globalement distinguer à cet effet quatre groupes de pays :

a) *Pays sous domination britannique*. On y observe une plus longue tradition des recensements répondant de plus en plus à des besoins essentiellement démographiques plutôt qu'administratifs (cas du Nigéria excepté), cette tradition a été maintenue après les indépendances; de plus, dans les pays de ce groupe, l'importation ou la fabrication de contraceptifs ainsi que leur vente ou leur distribution était légalement autorisée. Bien que peu répandue, comme d'ailleurs l'usage des contraceptifs parmi les populations autochtones, la pratique des avortements et de la stérilisation était autorisée pour des raisons médicales;

b) *Pays sous domination française*. Contrairement aux pays du premier groupe, les recensements restèrent ici essentiellement "administratifs" et la connaissance démographique y était donc peu développée; c'est seulement dans les années 1955-1960 que la pratique des enquêtes par sondage a été introduite dans ces pays qui, en plus, avaient hérité d'une législation interdisant l'importation, la fabrication ou la vente des produits contraceptifs. L'avortement provoqué et la stérilisation y étaient également interdits;

c) *Pays sous domination belge*. Très semblables sur le plan législatif aux ex-colonies françaises avec, en plus, d'intenses campagnes médicales pour lutter contre la dépopulation de certaines ethnies particulières, les pays sous domination belge s'en différencient cependant en ce qui concerne l'investigation démographique. La mise sur pied dès 1933 d'un système d'enregistrement continu des faits de population a permis une connaissance relativement bonne des populations autochtones; ce système, qui a fait l'objet de plusieurs modifications et améliorations a été plus ou moins maintenu après l'indépendance;

d) *Pays sous domination portugaise ou espagnole*. Ici, la pratique des recensements date de 1930 et s'est poursuivie à intervalles décennaux quasi

réguliers; la législation sur des questions de population y était très proche de celle alors en vigueur dans les pays sous domination française.

S'il ne fait aucun doute que dans le contexte colonial africain le recours aux méthodes contraceptives modernes était loin d'être un mouvement de masse parmi les populations autochtones même là où la législation en la matière était plus libérale, il est tout aussi évident que la différence était profonde, entre les pays sous domination britannique et les autres, du point de vue de la disponibilité des services pour la planification familiale et de la présence de facteurs susceptibles d'entrainer un changement plus ou moins rapide des mentalités des autochtones dans ce domaine. On notera d'ailleurs que parmi les douze premiers pays africains ayant mis sur pied des projets de planification de la famille avec l'aide du Fonds des Nations Unies pour la population (FNUAP) en 1973, trois étaient des pays d'Afrique du Nord (Algérie, Egypte et Tunisie) et les neuf autres étaient des pays anglophones d'Afrique sub-saharienne : Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Libéria, Maurice, Nigéria, République-Unie de Tanzanie, Sierra Leone et Swaziland.

Après les indépendances des pays africains et compte tenu à la fois de la modification du paysage politique international, notamment par l'entrée des jeunes Etats indépendants et "progressistes" aux Nations Unies et de l'évolution de la population mondiale--et celle des pays en développement tout particulièrement--du fait d'une mortalité en baisse, d'une natalité élevée et du recul de la stérilité là où elle sévissait, l'intérêt porté à la démographie du continent a changé de nature et est désormais dû, quasi exclusivement, à l'importance de sa dynamique d'évolution sans précédent dans l'histoire de l'humanité! (Sala-Diakanda, 1988).

Alors qu'hier tout était mis en oeuvre, ou presque, pour interdire ou limiter la dissémination des connaissances et des moyens contraceptifs modernes parmi les populations autochtones, aujourd'hui les "politiques et programmes de population" développés tous azimuts sur le continent africain ont essentiellement pour but de promouvoir la "planification de la famille", entendue au sens de "réduction des naissances", pour maîtriser la croissance démographique. Le vent a donc tourné et changé de cap et on est loin du risque de dépopulation! Ne regarde-t-on pas du reste le cas des pays d'Asie (République de Corée, Inde, Singapour etc.) comme des expériences réussies et exportables en matière de "planning familial"? Mais comment transmettre ces expériences à d'autres pays en développement et plus particulièrement ceux d'Afrique sub-saharienne dont la croissance démographique est la plus rapide du monde? En d'autres termes, que faire pour amener les pays d'Afrique à reconnaître qu'ils ont un "problème de population", et qu'une action devrait être menée dans le cadre d'une politique nationale et comment cette action pourrait-elle être menée?

B. Mécanismes de transmission de l'expérience en matière de population

L'impérieuse nécessité d'une approche globale des questions de population

Bien que les problèmes de population sont perçus et définis de façon différente d'un pays à un autre, voire d'une époque à une autre dans un même pays, une condition nécessaire, bien que non suffisante, pour qu'un pays puisse reconnaître qu'il a un problème de population est, sans nul doute, une connaissance suffisante des niveaux et tendances démographiques de ce pays d'une part, et des relations inextricables qu'entretiennent les grandeurs démographiques et les autres facteurs du développement socio-économique. Le problème de population ne doit donc pas être considéré en soi mais dans sa relation avec l'environnement socio-culturel et économique dans lequel il s'insère nécessairement.

Disons en effet, pour simplifier que, dès lors qu'il peut être clairement démontré que l'évolution démographique entrave le développement d'un pays, soit parce que la croissance trop rapide de la population annihile les efforts de développement, soit parce que cette croissance est insuffisante, en termes de marché intérieur notamment, pour soutenir une économie en pleine expansion, il est possible de réveiller l'intérêt et, plus tard, de susciter et de promouvoir l'appui et l'engagement politiques des pouvoirs publics ainsi que l'adhésion des masses populaires aux actions susceptibles de corriger le déséquilibre ainsi constaté. Il s'agit bien évidemment là d'un processus à plus ou moins long terme et, vouloir brûler les étapes en attaquant de front la croissance démographique des populations africaines, considérée comme trop rapide, sans un travail de longue haleine comprenant notamment l'investigation et la formation démographiques, l'information, l'éducation et la sensibilisation aux questions de population en relation avec le développement socio-économique, c'est courir le risque d'éveiller la méfiance des dirigeants et des masses populaires à

l'égard des politiques et programmes qu'on cherche à promouvoir et ce, vu le contexte culturel et historique des populations concernées. Les organisations non-gouvernementales, qui sont incontestablement les pionniers dans la promotion des méthodes modernes de planification familiale en Afrique, ont expérimenté, à leurs dépens, cette dure réalité. Fort de cette expérience, l'Organisation des Nations Unies a développé, à travers le FNUAP créé en 1969, la plus vaste assistance en matière de population "visant à faire prendre conscience des incidences sociales et économiques des problèmes démographiques et de leurs solutions possibles". Avant d'examiner en détail le rôle des Nations Unies dans la transmission internationale, en Afrique sub-saharienne, de l'expérience en matière des politiques et programmes de population et les principales chaînes par lesquelles cette expérience a été transmise, disons très brièvement un mot sur les perceptions et pratiques dans ce domaine, telles qu'elles prévalaient dans les autres grandes régions en développement.

Les politiques et programmes de population avant la décennie 70 : un tour d'horizon

Le point de diffusion de l'expérience en matière de politiques et programmes de population dans le monde en développement est incontestablement la populeuse région sud-asiatique[2], en particulier l'Inde, qui, dès 1951, est devenue le premier pays au monde ayant adopté une politique officielle de population dont le but essentiel est de limiter la croissance démographique, considérée comme excessive, par la réduction de la fécondité à travers notamment certaines mesures incitatives et l'élévation de l'âge au mariage. La prise de conscience des problèmes démographiques est en fait très ancienne en Inde à la suite, notamment, de l'influence britannique en la matière comme le note Stephan P. Johnson[3]. L'expérience de l'Inde a été suivie, presque 10 ans plus tard, par d'autres pays de la sous-région : le Pakistan en 1960, le Sri Lanka en 1965 et le Népal en 1966.

Beaucoup d'autres pays asiatiques ne seront pas en reste car la campagne contre la croissance démographique, qui a pris naissance en Inde, s'étend également dans le Sud-Est et dans la partie orientale du continent. La Chine, Singapour, la Malaisie et l'Indonésie adopteront en effet des politiques de réduction de la fécondité en 1962, 1965, 1966 et 1968 respectivement. Ici, comme dans les pays du premier groupe, le mouvement se poursuivra et s'intensifiera au cours de la décennie suivante débordant du reste les frontières continentales asiatiques. Contrairement cependant aux pays de l'Asie du Sud, les mesures gouvernementales prises dans les pays du deuxième groupe dans le cadre de ces politiques ont généralement un caractère coercitif; de plus, d'importants et vigoureux programmes de contrôle des naissances sont lancés par les gouvernements concernés.

La situation était à l'époque toute différente en Amérique latine dont le taux annuel moyen d'accroissement démographique était pourtant le plus élevé du monde jusqu'à la fin des années 60[4]. En effet, les pays latino-américains, dont les économies étaient particulièrement florissantes, ne semblaient pas du tout préoccupés par les effets d'une rapide croissance démographique sur le processus de développement; les politiques de population visant la réduction des naissances étaient même très fortement controversées en général. Aujourd'hui, la situation a beaucoup changé et les politiques de population sont considérées comme une composante des politiques de développement (Miró and Potter, 1980).

Le système des Nations Unies face aux problèmes de population

L'entrée en scène

C'est dès sa création à San Francisco (Etats-Unis) en 1945 que l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'est intéressée progressivement aux problèmes de la population mondiale, aidée en cela par l'expérience accumulée dans ce domaine, directement ou indirectement. par la Société des Nations[5].

Sans entrer dans les détails, remarquons simplement en effet que, dès octobre 1946, la Commission de la population des Nations Unies était créée et, depuis lors, l'Organisation des Nations Unies s'est davantage préoccupée des questions de population, notamment en encourageant et en assistant les Gouvernements membres à recueillir, analyser et diffuser les renseignements sur leurs populations respectives. L'Annuaire démographique, publié pour la première fois en 1948, n'a d'ailleurs cessé de paraître depuis lors et constitue sans nul doute aujourd'hui un document de référence de très grande valeur pour la connaissance et la transparence des niveaux et tendances des phénomènes démographiques au niveau mondial. Avec le temps, cet annuaire s'est progressivement amélioré; la collection même

s'est enrichie et inclut désormais quasiment toutes les statistiques de base nécessaires à la planification du développement économique et social.

L'importance du rôle de l'Organisation—et de ses agences ou services spécialisés—dans la connaissance et la prise de conscience des problèmes que pose l'évolution démographique en relation avec le développement économique et social de l'humanité en général et du tiers monde en particulier s'est réellement manifestée et considérablement accrue avec la création, en 1969, du FNUAP.

L'entrée en scène du FNUAP tranche en effet nettement avec la période antérieure. A ce sujet, Johnson souligne que la modification du paysage politique international, notamment par l'entrée aux Nations Unies des jeunes Etats indépendants "progressistes", est un élément important à prendre en considération si l'on veut comprendre pourquoi l'Assemblée générale, jusqu'alors fort dominée par les actions européennes d'obédience catholique et dont les législations en matière de population sont dans l'ensemble non-malthusiennes, a adopté, en décembre 1966, la résolution 2211(XXI). Cette résolution historique autorise en effet l'Organisation à apporter aux pays en développement, sur demande, l'assistance nécessaire pour le développement et le renforcement des facilités nationales et régionales pour la formation, la recherche, l'information et les services consultatifs dans le domaine de la population[6]. Il est significatif de noter que la résolution 2211(XXI) était parrainée par l'Inde, le Pakistan et le Sri Lanka—pays d'avant-garde en matière des politiques de population—appuyés notamment par la Suède et les Etats-Unis. Il convient enfin de souligner que les différents secteurs définis par la résolution et pour lesquels une assistance technique des Nations Unies peut désormais être sollicitée constitueront les principales chaînes de transmission des expériences sur des questions de population d'une région à une autre, voire d'un pays à un autre.

Les principaux secteurs d'intervention

Le problème africain de recensement

Etant donné qu'en matière de planification du développement socio-économique aucune politique valable ne peut être formulée et mise en oeuvre sans une connaissance et une compréhension préalables et suffisantes des phénomènes démographiques et, compte tenu du fait que l'Afrique au sud du Sahara était très en retard par rapport aux autres régions du monde en ce qui concerne la connaissance de sa population, l'entreprise la plus ambitieuse du FNUAP, au cours de ses dix premières années, était l'amélioration des mécanismes de collecte et d'analyse des données démographiques à travers, notamment, le "Programme africain de recensement", qui a démarré en 1971[7].

Dans le cadre de ce programme, la priorité ayant été accordée aux pays qui n'avaient jamais procédé à un recensement de leur population selon les normes modernes en la matière, il n'est pas étonnant que sur les 22 premiers pays africains qui ont sollicité et obtenu une assistance du FNUAP, 14 étaient des pays francophones : Bénin, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroun, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Maurice, Mauritanie, Niger, République Centrafricaine, Sénégal et Tchad. L'effort de collecte et d'analyse des données démographiques s'est depuis lors poursuivi sans relache au point qu'actuellement certains pays organisent leur deuxième recensement de la populution et de l'habitation; d'autre part, seuls le Nigéria et le Tchad n'ont pas encore réalisé leur premier dénombrement à ce jour. Une assistance a aussi été accordée à certains gouvernements pour effectuer des enquêtes démographiques et développer leurs systèmes.

Pour mener à bien cet ambitieux programme, le FNUAP a, entre autres choses, financé l'expansion de la Division de statistique et de la Division de la population de la Commission économique pour l'Afrique (CEA) afin de leur permettre d'apporter aux pays africains une assistance technique pour toutes les questions que posent les questions de collecte et l'utilisation des données issues de ces opérations[8]. Les différents programmes exécutés depuis lors par la CEA dans ce domaine sur financement du FNUAP ont largement contribué à l'amélioration des connaissances démographiques en Afrique au sud du Sahara. Il ne fait d'ailleurs aucun doute que "tous les gouvernements comprennent désormais pleinement qu'une meilleure connaissance des niveaux, tendances et caractéristiques démographiques constitue une condition préalable aussi bien de l'action dans le domaine démographique que de l'intégration progressive des facteurs démographiques aux autres aspects de la stratégie et de la planification du développement" (Salas, 1979).

L'expérience des "Recensements de la population et de l'habitation", ainsi transmise en Afrique sub-saharienne et progressivement assimilée par les pouvoirs publics et les masses populaires, constitue un premier pas fondamental vers la conception, la

formulation et la mise en oeuvre des politiques et programmes de population en Afrique au sud du Sahara. Conscient cependant du fait que sa contribution ne peut avoir des effets durables que si cette expérience est correctement assimilée et régulièrement transmise aux générations futures de sorte que les pays africains puissent eux-mêmes être en mesure de faire face à l'avenir à leurs problèmes de population, le FNUAP a quasi-simultanément développé des programmes de formation tendant à accroître en Afrique sub-saharienne les compétences nécessaires aux activités de population.

Formation et recherche en démographie

A l'instar des centres fonctionnant dans d'autres parties du monde pour le développement des compétences nécessaires aux activités de population[9], le FNUAP finance, depuis 1972, deux centres régionaux en Afrique au sud du Sahara chargés de la formation des démographes et de la promotion de la recherche sur le continent. Il s'agit de l'Institut de formation et de recherche démographiques (IFORD), basé à Yaoundé (Cameroun), et du Regional Institute for Population Studies (RIPS), basé à Accra (Ghana); le premier dessert les pays d'expression française, le second a juridiction sur les pays anglophones. A ce jour, l'IFORD et le RIPS ont déjà formé ensemble plus de 500 démographes de niveau élevé travaillant dans différents services nationaux—le plus souvent au sein du Ministère chargé de la planification—impliqués dans les activités de population. Ces centres réalisent aussi des travaux de recherche, généralement sous forme d'études de cas, portant sur les problèmes démographiques des pays qu'ils desservent. Des universités ou écoles nationales et étrangères assurent également, souvent avec l'assistance du FNUAP, la formation des spécialistes des questions de population et contribuent au développement de la démographie africaine.

La présence dans les structures nationales d'un personnel local compétant et en nombre suffisant spécialisé sur des questions de population, en permettant aux pouvoirs publics d'être mieux conseillés et aux masses populaires d'être mieux informées à partir, notamment, des résultats concrets des recherches effectuées sur des données nationales, constitue un facteur important d'amélioration des connaissances et d'évolution des attitudes, mentalités et comportements dans ce domaine.

Les conférences mondiales sur la population

La Conférence mondiale de la population, organisée par les Nations Unies à Bucarest en 1974, a été sans nul doute un puissant moyen de transmission, en Afrique sub-saharienne, de l'expérience en matière de politique de population à la fois par la nature du débat engagé à Bucarest et par les résolutions et recommandations adoptées presque à l'unanimité et consignées dans le Plan d'action mondial de la population, qui apparaît comme une véritable légitimation de l'assistance internationale en matière de population.

Cette conférence, réunissant pour la première fois à l'échelon mondial des chefs de Gouvernement et des spécialistes des questions de population, avait en effet pour but principal de susciter dans tous les pays du monde une prise de conscience plus aiguë et une meilleure compréhension des questions démographiques. Pour la première fois en effet, la question de population était débattue au grand jour à l'échelle de la planète démystifiant ainsi un sujet généralement considéré comme tabou, notamment en Afrique sub-saharienne caractérisée par des valeurs socio-culturelles et religieuses réfractaires aux pratiques relatives à la limitation des naissances et au comptage d'individus—sur les enfants—dans les ménages.

Parmi les recommandations adoptées à Bucarest il y en a une dont l'impact sur la transmission de l'expérience en matière de population est théoriquement important. Il s'agit de la recommandation demandant que les tendances et les politiques démographiques soient suivies de façon constante par les Nations Unies, à titre d'activités spécialisées, et qu'elles soient examinées tous les deux ans, à partir de 1977, par les organes compétents des Nations Unies. Depuis lors, les résultats des enquêtes de l'ONU auprès des Gouvernements, sur l'application du Plan mondial, sont régulièrement publiés. Cette pratique, en introduisant une plus grande transparence des positions adoptées par les différents Gouvernements sur les questions de population, agit comme un puissant facteur de rapprochement.

Dans le cas très particulier de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara on peut d'ailleurs très valablement parler de deux grandes périodes dans l'évolution des attitudes—gouvernementales—notamment, sur les politiques de population : avant 1974 et après 1974. A peine 10 ans après Bucarest, les Gouvernements africains accordent un intérêt tout particulier aux questions de population comme en témoignent les principes et recommandations adoptés à la

Conférence d'Arusha en 1984 et consignés dans le Programme d'action de Kilimandjaro relatif à la population africaine et le développement autonome.

On est certes loin d'une uniformisation des attitudes, du reste non nécessairement souhaitable ni d'ailleurs possible, mais les données actuellement disponibles indiquent une tendance nette et irréversible vers une plus grande prise de conscience et la mise en oeuvre de politiques de population en Afrique sub-saharienne. Alors qu'au début des années 70 les problèmes de population ne constituaient pas une préoccupation particulière pour les Gouvernements africains, aujourd'hui les positions en la matière ont considérablement évolué. Ainsi, sur 44 Etats-membres de la CEA situés au sud du Sahara, 16 ont déjà adopté ou souhaitent adopter des mesures destinées à influencer leur taux de fécondité. En ce qui concerne la mortalité, 41 Etats considèrent que leurs taux de mortalité sont inacceptables, particulièrement la mortalité infantile et juvénile, et qu'il faut les réduire. Quant à la répartition de la population, 30 Etats estiment qu'il y a lieu de corriger le déséquilibre de peuplement (Nations Unies, 1987).

Les arrangements institutionnels

Outre l'assistance apportée à l'Afrique pour le développement des compétences nationales et la promotion de la recherche en démographie, le FNUAP encourage les Etats à mettre sur pied des structures nationales chargées de la conception, de la formulation, de la mise en oeuvre et du suivi des politiques et programmes de population intégrés dans la stratégie globale de développement socio-économique. C'est dans ce cadre que des Commissions nationales de population ont été créées ou sont en voie de l'être dans quelques pays africains au sud du Sahara.

Ces commissions, qui sont conçues comme des organes interministériels de conception et d'orientation, sont fréquentes dans les pays d'Amérique latine qui en sont encore à formuler leurs politiques (Population Information Program, 1985); elles sont généralement assistées, sur le plan technique, par des Unités de planification de la population, chargées, comme dans un grand nombre de pays asiatiques (Population Information Program, 1985), de l'intégration des facteurs démographiques dans les plans de développement socio-économiques. Plusieurs pays africains sub-sahariens ont déjà mis sur pied de telles structures; il s'agit notamment des pays suivants : Cameroun, Congo, Guinée, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Sénégal et Sierra Léone. Ces structures, qui ont le mérite d'exister, pourront, une fois correctement étoffées, jouer valablement le rôle attendu d'elles.

Les programmes de santé maternelle et infantile et de planification familiale

Parmi les activités en matière de population, la planification familiale est celle pour laquelle les tentatives d'implantation en Afrique sub-saharienne est la plus ancienne à travers, essentiellement, les activités des organisations non-gouvernementales dont le rôle de pionniers dans ce domaine est unanimement reconnu[10]. La région, plus particulièrement l'Afrique d'expression française, reste cependant encore la partie du continent où les programmes et services de planification familiale, pour des raisons démographiques, sont nettement les moins importants (tableau 9) et la fécondité, parmi la plus élevée du monde, n'y semble pas montrer de signes de fléchissement, le cas de Maurice excepté!

Le tableau 10 montre d'ailleurs que, alors que 78,6 p. 100 de la population du monde en développement vit dans des pays appuyant les programmes de planification familiale pour des raisons essentiellement démographiques, cette proportion est à peine de 19,7 p. 100 et 4,5 p. 100, respectivement, dans les pays anglophones et les pays francophones ou lusophones d'Afrique au sud du Sahara. Ailleurs, les proportions correspondantes sont au moins égales à 87 p. 100 dans les pays asiatiques, 57,7 p. 100 au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord et 36,4 p. 100 en Amérique latine (dans une certaine mesure), c'est essentiellement pour des raisons de santé maternelle et infantile (SMI) que les Gouvernements soutiennent directement ou indirectement les activités de planification familiale.

Le FNUAP, qui considère non sans raison que "les programmes en matière de communication sont le complément indispensable des activités de planification de la famille, non seulement pour que la population soit informée de l'existence de services de planification familiale, mais encore pour que la notion de régulation de la fécondité soit acceptée et que la pratique de la planification de la famille soit encouragée et entretenue (FNUAP, 1974), a entrepris avec l'aide d'agences spécialisées des Nations Unies une vaste campagne de sensibilisation de toutes les couches de la population à travers le programme d'information, d'éducation et de communication (IEC).

TABLEAU 9. NOMBRE DE PAYS SELON LA POSITION GOUVERNEMENTALE ET LA DATE INITIALE DE L'APPUI AUX ACTIVITÉS DE PLANIFICATION FAMILIALE EN AFRIQUE AU SUD DU SAHARA, 1980

	Appui aux activités de SMI/PF			
Sous-région	*Argument démographique*[a]	*Argument santé et droits de l'homme*[b]	*Pas d'appui*[c]	*Total*
Pays anglophones	8	10	1	19
Pays francophones et autres	1	16	8	25
TOTAL	9	26	9	44

Source: Stanley P.Johnson, *World Population and the United Nations: Challenge and Response* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 151-152.

[a] Botswana, 1970; Ghana, 1968; Kenya, 1966; Lesotho, 1974; Maurice, 1964; Sénégal, 1976; Seychelles, 1975; Swaziland, 1971; Ouganda, 1971.

[b] Bénin, 1969; Burundi, 1979; Cameroun, 1975; Cap Vert, 1978; Centrafrique, 1978; Comores, 1979; Congo, 1976; Ethiopie, 1972; Gambie, 1968; Guinée Bissau, 1976; Libéria, 1973; Madagascar, 1976; Mali, 1971; Mozambique, 1977; Namibie, 1972; Niger, 1977; Nigéria, 1970; République-Unie de Tanzanie, 1970; Réunion, 1966; Rwanda, 1977; Sierra Leone, 1976; Somalie, 1977; Togo, 1974; Zaïre, 1972; Zambie, 1974; Zimbabwe, 1968.

[c] Angola, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinée, Guinée Equatoriale, Malawi, Mauritanie, Sao Tomé et Principe, Tchad. Selon la Commission économique pour l'Afrique, "Mise en oeuvre du Programme d'action de Kilimanjaro" (E/ECA/PSF.5/42), 1987, *op. cit.*, les pays suivants ont déjà un programme SMI/PF ou en désirent un: Angola, Burkina Faso, Guinée, Malawi, Sao Tomé et Principé.

TABLEAU 10. PROPORTION DE LA POPULATION SOUS-RÉGIONALE COUVERTE SELON LE TYPE D'APPUI GOUVERNEMENTAL AUX ACTIVITÉS DE PLANIFICATION FAMILIALE DANS LE MONDE EN DÉVELOPPEMENT EN 1980

Sous-région	*Argument démographique*	*Argument santé*	*Pas d'appui*	*Total*
Asie du Sud	99,8	0,2	-	100
Asie de l'Est	98,1	-	1,9	100
Sud-Est asiatique et Océanie	86,7	0,9	12,4	100
Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord	57,7	35,0	7,3	100
Amérique latine et Caraïbes	36,4	61,7	1,8	100
Afrique noire anglophone	19,7	77,6	2,7	100
Afrique noire francophone	4,5	70,4	25,2	100
Monde en développement	78,6	17,5	3,9	100
	(52)	(65)	(35)	(152)

Source: Stanley P. Johnson, *World Population and the United Nations: Challenge and Response* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp..151-152.

[a] Le nombre total de pays apparaît entre parenthèses.

En Afrique au sud du Sahara, comme en Amérique latine, où la planification familiale a actuellement un intérêt surtout du point de vue de la santé, la stratégie adoptée dans les diverses activités menées dans le cadre du programme IBC[11] est, conformément à la sensibilité locale, de concentrer le discours sur le rôle de la planification familiale en tant que moyen d'espacer les naissances afin de préserver la santé de la mère et de l'enfant. Cette stratégie s'est révélée efficace. En effet, alors qu'en 1969, les activités en matière de planification familiale étaient pratiquement inexistantes en Afrique sub-saharienne, quasiment tous les pays de la région ont à ce jour intégré de telles activités dans les services de santé publique; selon la CEA les quelques rares pays qui, en 1987, n'ont pas ou ne désirent pas un programme de planification familiale, sont la Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, le Gabon, la Guinée équatoriale, la Mauritanie et le Tchad (Commission économique pour l'Afrique, 1987).

Autres secteurs d'intervention

Parmi les secteurs d'intervention à travers lesquels l'expérience en matière de politique de population est progressivement transmise en Afrique sub-saharienne, il y a la Conférence des parlementaires pour la population et le développement et les programmes spéciaux du FNUAP destinés à certains groupes cibles particuliers : les femmes, les enfants et les jeunes, les personnes âgées et défavorisées.

Etant donné qu'une certaine "couverture juridique" est parfois nécessaire pour que des comportements nouveaux s'expriment, particulièrement dans des domaines à haute sensibilité sociale comme la planification familiale, certaines lois doivent faire l'objet d'une réforme au fur et à mesure que les opinions et les attitudes évoluent. Il était dès lors nécessaire qu'une action de sensibilisation soit menée auprès de ceux-là mêmes qui sont investis du pouvoir législatif, à savoir les parlementaires. Dans ce cadre, le FNUAP a financé la Conférence internationale des parlementaires pour la population et le développement, tenue à Colombo (Sri Lanka) en septembre 1979. A cette occasion, un Comité des parlementaires sur la population et le développement a été mis sur pied pour, notamment, servir de forum pour l'échange d'idées et d'informations sur des questions de population en relation avec le développement. La Conférence a également adopté une déclaration qui traduit l'engagement des parlementaires, en tant que guides de l'opinion publique et représentants de circonscriptions électorales, à commencer à élaborer une méthode efficace et intégrée de traitement des problèmes de population et de développement. Depuis lors, des conférences régionales de parlementaires se sont tenues en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine et ont donné lieu à la formation de groupes parlementaires régionaux (Nations Unies, 1986a).

Les législateurs africains se sont réunis du 12 au 16 mai 1986 à Harare (Zimbabwe) et ont décidé la mise sur pied d'un Conseil des parlementaires d'Afrique sur la population et le développement comme mécanisme permanent par l'intermédiaire duquel ils pourront s'attaquer de façon continue et à long terme aux graves problèmes avec lesquels est aux prises le continent. A l'issue de cette conférence, les parlementaires ont adopté La Déclaration de Harare, dans laquelle ils reconnaissent que l'accroissement actuel et projeté de la population fait échec à la réalisation des objectifs socio-économiques du continent et s'engagent, notamment, à promouvoir la législation, l'éducation et les programmes permettant de mettre en place et renforcer les programmes d'information et de prestation de services en matière de planification de la famille, y compris ceux des Gouvernements, des organisations non-gouvernementales et du secteur privé (Conseil mondial des parlementaires, 1986). Les activités en matière de population en Afrique sub-saharienne ne pouvaient, politiquement, recevoir un meilleur coup de pouce. Il est cependant évident, que le dynamisme, avec lequel les groupes nationaux de parlementaires constitués—ou devant être constitués—dans les pays-membres de la Conférence défendront leurs idéaux, conditionnera très largement le succès des politiques et programmes de population dans ces pays[12].

Quelle que soit la législation cependant, les activités en matière de population, plus particulièrement celles relatives à la planification de la famille, n'auront le succès attendu si une partie importante voire numériquement dominante de la population est laissée pour compte. C'est ainsi que des programmes spéciaux sont conçus en faveur des femmes afin d'améliorer leurs niveaux d'instruction, leurs conditions et leur statut dans la société et assurer leur participation active dans tous les domaines de la vie socio-économique et culturelle. Ces programmes mettent l'accent notamment sur la formation à tous les niveaux et dans toutes les disciplines où la participation des femmes est essentielle. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs projets bénéficient de l'assistance du FNUAP comme, par exemple, l'organisation

d'ateliers, séminaires, conférences et autres voyages d'études, et la conduite de travaux de recherche sur des thèmes spécifiques aux femmes vue la nécessité de redéfinir les rôles et responsabilités des femmes dans la société et garantir leur intégration effective au processus de développement. Plusieurs organisations ou associations féminines existent déjà en Afrique au sud du Sahara; parmi elles, celles qui sont bien organisées et dynamiques constituent assurément de véritables groupes de pression avec lesquels les décideurs doivent désormais compter! Les Gouvernements sont du reste de plus en plus conscients que pour atteindre les objectifs des politiques et programmes de population et développement, une attention toute particulière doit être accordée aux femmes dans les stratégies nationales de développement.

Rôle des organisations non-gouvernementales

Comme il a été souligné plus haut, les organisations non-gouvernementales sont incontestablement les pionniers dans la transmission internationale de l'expérience en matière de population. La plus ancienne de ces organisations, c'est l'Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population (UIESP), fondée à Paris en juillet 1928. L'idée de mettre sur pied une telle organisation fut exprimée à l'occasion du premier Congrès mondial de la population tenu en septembre 1927 à Genève, siège de la Société des Nations (SDN), à l'initiative de Margaret Sanger[13]. Dans l'esprit de ses initiateurs, l'Union serait constituée afin d'aborder dans un esprit purement scientifique les problèmes de population; cette "neutralité scientifique" a été réaffirmée lors de la réforme institutionnelle de l'UIESP intervenue en 1947[14]. Au cours des 40 dernières années, l'UIESP a collaboré très étroitement avec l'Organisation des Nations Unies à la fois pour le développement de la démographie comme discipline scientifique et pour l'évolution des idées sur des questions de population dans le monde. Le domaine de collaboration entre l'UIESP et l'ONU est en effet très vaste et comprend notamment :

a) La mise au point d'un Dictionnaire démographique multilingue, publié en 14 langues au moins entre 1958 et 1971 et fournissant, selon un système de codage spécifique, des équivalences linguistiques des concepts et de la terminologie de la science de la population favorisant ainsi une unicité du language entre toutes les personnes, spécialistes ou non, intéressées aux questions de population;

b) La conduite et la publication des travaux de recherche sur tous les aspects de la démographie;

c) La confection de manuels méthodologiques;

d) L'organisation des conférences et séminaires au niveau régional et international;

e) La formation des cadres spécialisés en démographie etc. (UIESP, 1987).

L'une des activités les plus importantes de l'UIESP en Afrique, et qui a pu avoir un impact sur la transmission sur le continent, de l'expérience en matière de politique de population, est sans nul doute la première Conférence africaine sur la population, première rencontre du genre en Afrique. Cette conférence, organisée conjointement avec la CEA, a eu lieu à Accra (Ghana) du 9 au 18 décembre 1971; elle a vu la participation d'environ 400 personnes. La conférence, qui a couvert quasiment tous les aspects intéressant la démographie africaine, avait pour thème principal "La population dans le développement de l'Afrique". Elle a invité les Gouvernements africains à susciter "une conscience plus aiguë des relations existant entre la population et la croissance économique et de la nécessité permanente de tenir compte, dans le cadre de l'action menée en faveur du développement national, de l'interdépendance réciproque de ces deux variables critiques". La Conférence a ainsi joué un rôle de premier plan pour le développement futur des études démographiques en Afrique.

Dix ans après la Conférence d'Accra, l'UIESP se manifeste à nouveau sur le continent africain. En effet, en 1981 l'Union a institué un cycle de stages de perfectionnement régional, destinés à compléter la formation de démographes des pays en développement. Les deux premiers stages destinés aux démographes africains francophones ont été organisés en étroite collaboration avec l'IFORD et le Groupe de démographie africaine; ils ont eu lieu respectivement à Yaoundé (Cameroun) en 1981 et à Bordeau (France) en 1982. Le troisième a été organisé à Bamako (Mali) en 1986 avec la collaboration de l'IFORD, du Groupe de démographie africaine et de l'Institut du Sahel. Le Conseil de l'Union accorde aussi un degré de priorité élevé à la promotion des recherches démographiques relatives à l'Afrique et, dans cette perspective, un programme démographique africain avait été élaboré et mis en oeuvre. Ce programme intégré d'activités se rapporte à quatre domaines d'actions interdépendantes : un programme de documentation; des stages de formation avancée en démographie; des séminaires; et, en tant que point culminant de ce

programme, le second Congrès régional africain de population, prévu pour novembre 1988 à Dakar (Sénégal). Il convient de signaler également que dans le cadre de son programme "Bourses de voyage réservées aux jeunes démographes", l'UIESP permet aux jeunes africains de prendre part aux conférences ou séminaires de l'Union organisés à travers le monde. Enfin, la dernière activité de l'Union en date à ce jour sur le continent africain est le Séminaire international sur mortalité et société en Afrique au sud du Sahara, organisé avec le co-parrainage de l'IFORD et de deux Commissions de l'UIESP : Commission anthropologie et démographie et Commission sur les variations comparées de la mortalité. Il ne fait donc l'ombre d'un doute que l'UIESP participe activement, à travers ses programmes de formation et de recherche, à la transmission de l'expérience en matière de population en Afrique sub-saharienne.

A côté de l'UIESP dont le rôle est essentiellement scientifique, plusieurs autres organisations non-gouvernementales s'occupent plus activement, sur le terrain, de la fourniture des programmes et services de planification familiale; la plus importante et la mieux connue est incontestablement la Fédération internationale pour le planning familial—International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)—qui regroupe actuellement des associations de planification familiales disséminées dans 120 pays environ. Historiquement, les associations affiliées à l'IPPF ont été les pionnières de la planification familiale, proposant des informations et des services avant que les Gouvernements ne soient disposés à accepter ce rôle ou ne soient capables de développer l'infrastructure sanitaire nécessaire pour fournir des services à grande échelle (Fédération internationale pour le planning familiale/Fonds des Nations Unies pour les activités en matière de population, 1981).

En Afrique au sud du Sahara, l'action de l'IPPF est canalisée à travers quatre bureaux de laison basés à Brazzaville (Congo), Lomé (Togo), Mbabane (Swaziland) et Nairobi (Kenya) et couvrant 38 pays[15]. Il convient cependant de signaler que si la couverture régionale de l'IPPF est déjà excellente, les programmes de distribution des services ne sont pas encore basés sur les communautés locales, contrairement à ce qui se passe en Asie ou en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes; une partie très importante de la population en Afrique sub-saharienne n'est donc pas touchée par ces services. La région est du reste actuellement la partie du monde où l'accès aux méthodes modernes de planification de la famille est le plus limité[16].

Enfin, d'autres organismes multilatéraux et bilatéraux jouent également en Afrique un rôle important à la fois dans la sensibilisation aux questions de population et la fourniture des services de planification familiale; on peut citer l'Agence pour le développement international (USAID), le Population Council, le Pathfinder Fund, et les Fondations Ford et Rockefeller.

C. L'AFRIQUE SUB-SAHARIENNE À LA CROISÉE DES CHEMINS

Selon l'Enquête mondiale sur la fécondité (EMF), l'Afrique au sud du Sahara reste la région du monde où le désir d'une progéniture nombreuse est encore répandue; la dimension familiale désirée par femme varierait entre 6 enfants au Ghana et 8,8 enfants en Mauritanie. Par ailleurs, comme on l'a déjà dit, l'utilisation des moyens contraceptifs modernes est très limitée même là où existent de vigoureux programmes de planification familiale[17]. Certes, les positions gouvernementales en matière de population ont beaucoup évolué depuis 1974, mais les politiques et programmes visant à réduire la croissance démographique par une réduction de la fécondité ne portent pas encore, à quelques rares exceptions près, les résultats attendus.

Ces conclusions, bien que basées essentiellement sur les seuls pays de la région ayant participé au programme EMF, reflètent relativement bien les attitudes traditionnelles pro-natalistes des populations dans cette partie du monde et montrent d'autre part qu'un certain temps est nécessaire avant que des nouvelles idées, érigées en normes, ne se traduisent en comportements. Il faut souligner d'ailleurs aussi que quand bien même l'usage des méthodes contraceptives modernes serait largement répandu, le but ne serait pas nécessairement de limiter les naissances mais plutôt de réaliser des espacements intergénésiques susceptibles d'assurer une bonne santé à la mère et à l'enfant comme le veut la tradition. Les méthodes contraceptives modernes ne seraient donc qu'un substitut des méthodes traditionnelles dont l'efficacité est souvent sujette à caution. Les comportements ne seraient certainement pas les mêmes selon qu'il s'agit des anciennes ou des nouvelles générations très différemment caractérisées sur le plan socio-économique et culturel et n'ayant donc probablement pas les mêmes motivations en matière de procréation. L'histoire montre en effet qu'une vie fortement "modernisée" (instruction généralisée et de niveau élevé, emploi salarié pour

tous ou presque, structure familiale atomisée etc.) est incompatible avec des naissances survenant "trop tôt, trop nombreuses et trop rapprochées".

La situation actuellement observable en Afrique est le résultat, en grande partie, d'une dissociation entre la rationalité individuelle et la rationalité "collective" (celle de l'Etat) en matière de reproduction humaine. Cette dissociation est elle-même la conséquence d'une évolution lente mais irréversible d'un mode de vie "existentiel", où l'intérêt du groupe prime sur celui de l'individu, vers un mode de vie "essentiel" où l'action individuelle est avant tout une action pour soi! Dans la société traditionnelle donc, il y a, en matière de reproduction, comme une symbiose entre l'individu et son groupe. Dans le cadre d'une institution fondamentale qu'est la famille, l'individu tente, par une progéniture nombreuse d'être en conformité avec les exigences de son groupe et du milieu tout en assurant ses vieux jours, pendant que le groupe social est, lui aussi, par cette même progéniture, assuré de sa reproduction et donc de sa perpétuation; ce qui lui permet de toujours remplir une de ses fonctions importantes : la protection de ses membres! La modernisation des sociétés africaines a notamment pour conséquence la désintégration des structures familiales traditionnelles et l'atomisation des individus qui ne retrouvent plus, auprès du groupe social traditionnel, les garanties fondamentales inhérentes à l'existence humaine. Par ailleurs, l'Etat, qui invite à de nouvelles normes et de nouveaux comportements en matière de reproduction, ne semble pas non plus préparé à jouer pleinement le rôle dévolu hier au groupe social traditionnel. Du côté des individus, eux aussi mal préparés à affronter les réalités nouvelles, c'est le dilemme et l'incertitude engendrant des attitudes conservatrices!

Aujourd'hui donc, l'Afrique est à la croisée des chemins! Il est désormais impératif et urgent pour les Gouvernements de mettre sur pied des politiques et programmes cohérents et intégrés susceptibles de trouver une solution au problème économique et culturel auquel fait face la région. Il y a lieu en effet de mettre fin, autant que faire se peut, au disfonctionnement culturel de la société africaine et garantir aux individus, en lieu et place des groupes sociaux traditionnels, la satisfaction de leurs besoins fondamentaux (l'alimentation, l' éducation, l'emploi, le logement, les soins divers etc.) et la préservation de l'identité africaine, notamment en ce qui concerne les relations qui lient l'homme africain à son environnement et à sa nature humaine! Ce sont là les termes du défi que les générations actuelles et futures doivent relever; de la réussite de cet exaltant et noble devoir dépendra non seulement la dignité et la place des peuples de ce continent dans le concert des nations, mais aussi leur apport à l'humanité!

Vue d'ensemble

De ce qui précède il ressort que la transmission en Afrique sub-saharienne de l'expérience en matière de population est un fait très récent et dont l'assimilation par les populations concernées n'est pas encore complète! L'intérêt porté à la démographie africaine, d'abord conditionné au début du siècle par le besoin de connaissance des populations nouvellement colonisées, est essentiellement dû aujourd'hui à la croissance démographique, sans précédent dans l'histoire de l'humanité, observée depuis la fin des années 60 dans ces populations. Pour amener l'Afrique sub-saharienne à prendre conscience de son "problème de population" et à engager des politiques et programmes spécifiques, plusieurs actions sont menées sur le terrain en s'appuyant, le plus souvent, sur l'expérience des pays asiatiques en la matière. Parmi les actions les plus vigoureuses, on peut citer le lancement tous azimuts des programmes et services de planification familiale dans les pays de la région.

L'entrée en scène de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et des agences spécialisées, dont le FNUAP, a considérablement accéléré la prise de conscience par les autorités africaines des problèmes que pose l'évolution démographique actuelle et projetée. Quasiment tous les pays de la région reconnaissent aujourd'hui qu'une croissance démographique trop rapide annihile les efforts de développement et qu'il faut des politiques et programmes de population intégrés aux stratégies globales de développement pour y faire face. Pour obtenir ce résultat en l'espace de 10 ans, des actions vigoureuses ont été menées dans les secteurs ci-après avec l'assistance des organisations bilatérales et multilatérales : la collecte et l'analyse des données démographiques; la formation et la recherche; la mise sur pied d'institutions nationales et/ou régionales; la santé maternelle et infantile et la planification familiale; la tenue des conférences régionales et internationales etc. Beaucoup reste cependant à faire!

A la croisée des chemins, l'Afrique sub-saharienne est aujourd'hui confrontée à un problème économique et culturel. Il faut notamment mettre fin au disfonctionnement de la société et garantir aux individus, en lieu et place de leurs groupes

traditionnels d'appartenance, la satisfaction de leurs besoins fondamentaux tout en s'efforçant de conserver la spécifique de l'homme africain.

NOTES

1 Ce programme a été entériné par la 10e réunion de la Conférence des ministres de la CEA/19e session de la Commission. Addis Ababa, 26-30 avril 1984, selon la résolution 506(XIX).

2 Il s'agit de la région composée des pays suivants : Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhoutan, Inde, Iran (République islamique d'), Maldives, Népal, Pakistan et Sri Lanka.

3 Selon cet auteur, "The Congress National Planning Committee, set up in 1935 to prepare for independence, convened a special sub-committee to investigate family planning and population policy and recommend : 'in the interests of social economy, family happiness and national planning, family planning and the limitation of children are essential, and the State should adopt a policy to encourage these'. This forthright statement can be seen as a precursor of the 'policy commitments' which would serve not only as the basis of India's population and family-planning efforts, but also as the model for other newly independent countries anxious to follow a similar path" (voir Johnson, 1987).

4 A cette époque, l'Amérique latine--plus particulièrement dans ses parties centrale et tropicale--accusait la croissance la plus rapide avec un taux annuel variant entre 2,7 et 2,8 p. 100 de 1950 et 1965 (3,0 p. 100 en moyenne en Amérique latine tropicale) contre 2,2 à 2,4 p. 100 pour l'Afrique et 1,9 à 2,4 p. 100 pour l'Asie au cours de la même période.

5 Il convient de signaler que déjà entre les deux guerres mondiales, des conférences internationales sur des questions de population (migrations internationales, problème de l'avortement et du contrôle des naissances etc.) avaient été organisées, soit sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, soit avec la participation de ses experts. (Pour plus de détail, voir Johnson, 1987).

6 Un an après l'adoption de cette résolution, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, U. Thant, crée un "Trust Fund" devant permettre aux Nations Unies d'assister les pays en développement conformément à la résolution 2211(XXI) et, en 1969, le "Trust Fund" fit place au "Fonds des Nations Unies pour la population (FNUAP)".

7 Au moment de la création du FNUAP en 1969, les Nations Unies avaient déjà subventionné deux programmes mondiaux de recensements (série 1950 et série 1960); le troisième programme, celui de 1970, a pris le départ en 1965. Entre 1955 et 1964, 35 pays africains, essentiellement anglophones, avaient réalisé au moins un avancement; 21 autres n'en avaient organisé encore aucun en 1965. De plus, les données recueillies dans le premier groupe de pays étaient fragmentaires. Le programme de 1970 avait notamment pour but de remédier à ces lacunes. Pour plus de détail, voir FNUAP, "Les recensements nationaux de l'Organisation des Nations Unies". Population Monographie, No. 2 (Décembre 1977).

8 Depuis 1969 par exemple, le FNUAP finance les activités des conseillers régionaux de la CEA travaillant dans le domaine de la population.

9 Il s'agit de l'Institut international d'études démographiques (IIED), créé en 1956 à Bombay (Inde), du Centre latino-américain de démographie (CELADE), créé en 1958 à Santiago du Chili (Chili), et du Centre de démographie du Caire (CDC), créé en 1962 au Caire (Egypte).

10 Des tentatives de créer un mouvement de planification familiale ou d'ouvrir des cliniques ont commencé à se manifester pendant la période coloniale : au Zimbabwe et en Ouganda en 1955, au Kenya et à Maurice en 1957, au Nigéria en 1958 et en Sierra Leone en 1959. Voir FNUAP, "Afrique". Population Monographie, No. 20, p. 11.

11 Parmi les activités menées dans les différents pays, on peut citer : la production des affiches, des films et des brochures sur les bienfaits de la planification familiale, l'introduction de l'éducation à la vie familiale" dans les programmes d'enseignement, les séminaires et missions d'études etc.

12 Sur les 31 des 36 pays africains qui sont dotés de parlements et qui ont participé à la Conférence de Herare, 28 sont des pays de l'Afrique sub-saharienne : Angola, Bénin, Botswana, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambie, Guinée-Bissau, Guinée Equatoriale, Kenya, Libéria, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurice, Ouganda, République-Unie de Tanzanie, Rwanda, Sao Tomé et Principe, Sénégal, Seychelles, Somalie, Swaziland, Tchad, Togo, Zaïre, Zambie et Zimbabwe. Huit autres pays étaient observateurs à cette conférence : Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Guinée, Niger, Nigéria, République Centrafricaine et Sierra Leone. Au total, donc, 36 pays africains au sud du Sahara ont pris part aux travaux de Harare.

13 Pour Margaret Sanger, Présidente de "American Birth Control League", la Conférence visait à appréhender le plus crucial des problèmes auquel devait faire face : "La planète ne peut faire vivre qu'un nombre limité de personnes. Si les populations humaines continuent de croître, il en résultera des désordres sociaux, économiques et politiques susceptibles de menacer profondément notre civilisation actuelle". Voir UIESP, 1985.

14 Constituée jusqu'en 1947 de comités nationaux de population, l'UIESP devint, depuis sa réforme, une association de membres individuels.

15 Il s'agit des pays suivants : Angola, Bénin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroun, Cap-Vert, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopie, Gambie, Ghana, Guinée, Guinée Bissau, Guinée Equatoriale, Kenya, Lesotho, Libéria, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurice, Mozambique, Niger, Nigéria, Ouganda, République Centrafricaine, République-Unie de Tanzanie, Rwanda, Sao Tomé et Principe, Sénégal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tchad, Togo, Zaïre, Zambie, Zimbabwe.

16 Il importe toutefois de signaler que pour accroître son audience en Afrique sub-saharienne et garantir quelque peu le succès de ses programmes, l'IPPF mène un travail immense de sensibilisation des responsables des APF. Dans ce cadre, elle organise des séminaires régionaux sur l'argument santé de la planification familiale. Le dernier séminaire en date a été organisé en avril 1988 à Lomé (Togo) avec la collaboration de l'IFORD.

17 Selon le Population Crisis Committee, sur une échelle donnant le score d'accès à la contraception et variant entre 0 et 100 p. 100, seule l'Ile Maurice atteint 60 p. 100 et une réduction concomitante de 25 p. 100 de l'indice synthétique de fécondité; tous les autres pays de la région ont un score inférieur à 39 p. 100 n'ayant du reste aucun effet sur la fécondité.

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XI. INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POPULATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

*Carmen Miró**

A. Some prior definitions

The annotated agenda for this Meeting asks for a "detailed examination of regional experiences relating to the international transmission of knowledge (underscoring by this paper's author) concerning population policy" that could in some way be interpreted as being different from "international transmission of population policy experience". This assignment gives rise to the need to clarify what is to be understood by "knowledge", which in the controversial field of population policy would create some definitional difficulties, at least in the Latin American case. Therefore, "transmission of experience" is interpreted here rather broadly to encompass international exchanges of knowledge, techniques, opinions or simply information in the population policy field, either regionally or extraregionally among policy makers, among social scientists dealing with population research and among population policy analysts or between these three groups.

It should also be clarified that although Governments in Latin America, in general, subscribe to the broad definition of population policy emanating from the World Population Plan of Action, adopted in 1974 at the Conference at Bucharest, one can find in the region almost as many situations regarding population policy development as countries exist. Because of this factor, and because the author considers it useful for the purposes of the present Meeting, this paper refers to "transmission" not only of experiences in population policy but also of closely related subjects.

Because transmission of experience in what can be construed broadly as population policy began rather early in the region, a brief examination is made of how the situation evolved to its current status.

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B. Population policies in Latin America before 1960

With considerable expanses of empty lands, with relatively small populations and without the social pressures that today demand adequate living conditions for different social groups within a country, it was almost natural that in the few Latin American countries with Governments wondering what to do about population growth, the stance taken would be pro-natalist.

In Argentina and Uruguay, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, population growth was promoted through very liberal in-migration policies. The extensive and empty frontier lands that international migration would help to populate, such as São Paulo, Panama, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul in South Brazil (Diégues, 1955), were a source of concern for these countries, in view of the experience of Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century with the expansionism of the United States.

On the occasion of the World Population Conference in 1954, Hope Eldridge prepared a pioneer study[1] in which she made a detailed examination of the measures recently adopted by a group of countries in the areas that she identified as related to population policy (Eldridge, 1954). The information included in that study about some Latin American countries made it clear that those countries had an openly pro-natalist position during the first decades of this century. It appears, however, that Mexico was the only country that had legislated with the explicit intent of stimulating population growth by increasing natural growth, through health measures designed to reduce mortality of infants and children and by in-migration, in the General Law of Population of 23 December 1947.

Other Latin American countries had adopted legislation that, in addition to promoting (essentially for social motives) the welfare of certain population groups (particularly of labourers), had open or concealed pro-natalist purposes. This legislation

varied in the different countries; but in general, it comprised programmes protecting the family through health schemes, cash subsidies and medical assistance, maternity cash subsidies and subsidies for infants. In relation to this latter group, there were systems that paid subsidies to families for each child born, beginning with the first. An exception to this trend was Brazil, where, strangely enough, subsidies began only with the eighth child.

On the other hand, although the majority of the Latin American countries had not enacted legislation restraining contraception, few countries, e.g., Costa Rica and Brazil, considered the sale or promotion of contraceptives illegal. Abortion was prohibited except for medical reasons, as it is today. Only one country appeared to have anti-natalist legislation: Panama, which currently has one of the highest rates of female sterilization, had enacted legislation that allowed sterilization of a woman who requested it, provided she had five or more children and could claim to be in a "difficult social and economic situation".

C. Controversial positions adopted during the 1960s and 1970s

In 1940, the rate of growth of the Latin American population, which up to then had been below 2 per cent per annum, began to accelerate, increasing from 2.2 per cent during the period 1940-1950 to almost 2.9 during 1960-1965. From a little over 124 million in 1940, the population had almost doubled by 1965 to 241 million, in a period of 25 years. This growing population—with a young age structure and a tendency to concentrate in cities—coupled with rising social aspirations, began to make increasing demands on Latin American Governments, which at that time were unable to respond to those demands adequately.

In the meantime, Latin America was being confronted with the proposition, which had been generated abroad, that the adoption of birth control could turn out to be the solution to the problems posed by the high rate of population growth resulting from a fertility level practically stabilized at rather high rates combined with declining mortality. The concept of population policy was being erroneously equated with that of birth control. This is perhaps one of the earliest examples of population policy "transmission". The emissaries of an extraregional Power, usually personnel of the United States Agency for International Development, laid down the "gospel" concerning the policy that countries should adopt. By doing this, they contributed to stimulating in the Latin American countries a controversy like that Malthus's *Essay on Population* had stirred a century and half earlier.

Reacting against what could easily be labelled as foreign intervention in a delicate matter of exclusive sovereign decision of Governments, and in an effort to avoid unnecessary internal political problems that might have arisen due to opposition from the Catholic Church hierarchy and from leftist groups that, for different reasons, were against birth control, Latin American Governments generally refrained from adopting positions in regard to policies tending to reduce population growth.

During this period, there was a very active exchange of views among politicians in the region; and, as is described below, one of the first Latin American conferences on population took place, in 1965. There was also a growing accumulation of information and knowledge useful for making policy decisions.

The United Nations Latin American Demographic Centre, which began operation in 1958, had already trained a small number of professionals to be competent in basic techniques of demographic analysis and with their collaboration at the country level, descriptions of national demographic situations became available, in many cases for the first time. Through several means, CELADE made those descriptions available to different sectors in the countries concerned and in other countries of the region.

CELADE also undertook a series of cross-national comparative urban and rural fertility surveys of the Knowledge, Attitude and Practice type. These constitute examples of transmission of techniques, information and even knowledge. After lengthy discussions among professionals from the countries participating in the surveys, adaptations were made of the basic questionnaires that had been developed originally by Donald Bogue's staff at the University of Chicago Community and Family Center. The information and knowledge that were generated by the surveys later came to be used by policy makers and scholars as sources of basic information on fertility-related subjects or as a point of departure for devising new conceptual approaches to the study of fertility in Latin America (Miró, 1967).

Although the Governments remained uncommitted *vis-à-vis* population policy, in almost all countries of the region private family planning activities were being developed, most of them supported by the International Planned Parenthood Federation, with headquarters in London. Obviously those activities could have been undertaken only with the explicit or tacit consent of the respective Governments. By 1966, activities were under way in 14 countries; and by 1968, private family planning activities were being carried out in all the Latin American countries except Cuba.

A few years later, a good number of countries included family planning programmes in their official health services in response to the demands generated by the activities described above among certain sectors of the female population. They also took into account the position taken by different social groups, particularly those related to public health, ascribing responsibility for actions affecting women's health to the public sector. By 1969, this was the case in 11 countries of the region. In the 1970s, five other countries were added; and more recently, Brazil and Peru joined the list of countries offering family planning services in their health facilities. Only two countries in the region (Argentina and Uruguay) decided not to offer those services, in accordance with their declared objective of stimulating the growth of their respective populations.

Although the continued operation of those programmes would eventually lead to declines in the level of fertility and consequently in the rate of population growth, as in effect they did in many cases, their official adoption was not to be taken as an indication that the Governments concerned, excluding the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, had taken an openly anti-natalist stance. The programmes were justified as instruments for the protection of mothers' health and for the reduction of the incidence of abortion, thus contributing to reducing maternal mortality. Those accomplishments were in some cases supported by statistical evidence.

In spite of what has been stated above, it began to be generally recognized in the region that demographic trends and those of economic and social development should be harmonized, an objective that could not be accomplished solely through family planning programmes. It was essential, so the argument went, to adopt population policies with broader objectives. Parallel to this development, discussions in several Latin American forums attempted to clarify, with the collaboration of good neighbours from the North, what population policy meant.

The first Pan American Assembly on Population, held at Cali in 1965, was another early exercise in international transmission of population policy experience. The meeting followed the model of the American Assembly. Even the title of the proceedings, "Latin American population dilemma", copied that used for the report of the Assembly which met in the United States to study the "American population dilemma". The Cali meeting was attended by several very distinguished Latin American politicians, by physicians interested in the family planning movement and by scholars and students of population subjects in general, as well as a few members of the American Assembly and American demographers and sociologists. The Pan American Assembly approved what might be considered the first definition of population policy adopted in the region, one that was to include broad national objectives concerning population distribution, fertility, rate of growth, levels of mortality and migration, as integral parts of economic and social development policy. This definition preceded by nine years the recommendations made by the World Population Plan of Action adopted at Bucharest in 1974. The Pan American Assembly went further, indicating that enactment of such a policy should be preceded by adequate public discussion and in-depth analyses of the demographic, economic and social data (Delgado García, Stycos and Arias, 1968).

Just prior to the convening of the First Pan American Assembly, El Colegio de Mexico had established its Centre of Demographic Studies, where two master courses were organized—one in demography and the other in economics. The Mexican Demographic Centre soon became an important link in the development of activities stimulating public discussion of population issues, which eventually led to the adoption by the Government of a distinct population policy. The case of El Colegio de Mexico is a good example of transmission of knowledge and information on population policy primarily at the national level.

Two years after the Assembly referred to above, in 1967, the Organization of American States (OAS) convened a meeting on population policies in relation to development in Latin America. Again, this meeting brought together Latin American policy makers and technical personnel from planning ministries and statistical offices, including some scholars, some of whom were very active in the family

planning movement. As an indication that the controversy about population policy persisted in the region, the Meeting came out with a definition of this policy cast in such broad terms that it was practically synonymous with the definition of global policy of economic and social development. If anything, this meeting could be considered a negative international transmission of population policy experience. The proponents of family planning were able to persuade few, if any, to their views.

The Regional Latin American Population Conference held at Mexico City in 1970 by IUSSP with the collaboration of El Colegio de Mexico, which included a session on population policies, confirmed that the controversy was still going strongly. A document submitted by the adviser to the United States President on matters of population at the time provoked strong objections from several Latin American demographers with regard to its insistence that the existence of numerous economic and social problems in the region could be attributed to the prevailing population growth, and to its recommendation of the reduction of fertility as a solution to those problems—once more, a negative international transmission of population policy experience. On the positive side, however, the general tone of the documents submitted by Latin Americans to the session on population policy showed a certain convergence of opinions as to the advisability of acting upon demographic phenomena. One of the groups less inclined to do so were the Latin American economists. Many of them claimed that in order to expand the internal market, with ensuing beneficial effect on general economic activity, a large and fast-growing population was indispensable. Nothing was said about the purchasing power of this population nor about the effective insertion into productive activities of the growing contingents of population of working age. But the Conference registered what could properly be called a breakthrough when Prebisch, who at that time was the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)[2] and the most highly respected economist in the region, after describing the Latin American economic and social situation and the role he assigned to family planning, declared very forcefully that it was indispensable to act consciously and deliberately upon the "force of demography".

This invocation came at a very opportune time because, due to the improvement of living conditions among certain sectors of the population and due partially to the operation of the family planning programmes, fertility had begun to decline in some countries. There were cases like Costa Rica, where the declines represented historical records. According to declarations by the respective Governments, this decline was occurring, among other reasons, as a corollary of actions taken in the health field and, with few exceptions, not as an expressly sought demographic consequence. In view of this, some countries decided that they should attempt to give some coherence to the actions being taken in the sphere of population. The first country to act consciously and deliberately in this sphere was Mexico, which in 1973 adopted a new General Law of Population. Its first article states that the objective of the population policy is to regulate phenomena that affect population, so that it may participate in an equitable manner in the benefits of economic and social development. The general approach of this law is similar to that subsequently taken by the World Population Plan of Action.

The most recent additions in the same direction are Peru (Instituto Peruano de Paternidad Responsable, 1985) and Ecuador (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, 1987b). Both have adopted broad population policies that have as declared objectives the modification of demographic growth by acting upon population dynamics as well as upon economic and social conditions, particularly in regard to the status of women. A less uneven distribution of the population in the territory is another policy objective.

Prior to the enactment of their respective population policies both countries received significant support from UNFPA to conduct studies and analyses of the socio-demographic situation. In the case of Peru, the studies were generally executed by national professionals: some were related to the Government through the National Population Council; others were associated with the Catholic University and two private research institutions that received some support from the Ford Foundation, which at the time had a resident adviser on population stationed at Lima. The main outside contribution, then, was financial. As for Ecuador, a rather comprehensive socio-demographic diagnosis was prepared by Ecuadorian professionals with close technical collaboration from CELADE. The diagnosis, which has been printed in the form of a book

(CONADE, 1987a) and is widely distributed, highlights those aspects of the demographic situation meriting attention by the Government.

In spite of the fact that the majority of the countries in Latin America have not defined a population policy with the orientation referred to above, there was more general acceptance, particularly after the World Population Conference in 1974, of the postulate that demographic variables influence development variables and vice versa, as stated in paragraph 14 of the World Population Plan of Action (United Nations, 1975, p. 7). This led the Governments of the countries that had not established an organization to deal explicitly with population matters in relation to planning to do so. By 1976, at least 14 Latin American countries had created a commission, council, committee, department or directorate with the function of "integrating" demographic factors in sectoral and global development plans. The beginning of the 1980s found most of those Latin American organizations searching for ways and means to implement such a mandate.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Latin American panorama, as far as population policies were concerned, changed considerably. The controversy stirred up during the 1960s mainly by extraregional family planning activists and preachers lost some of its impetus and tended to dry up when the countries began to learn more about their demographic situation through analyses conducted by outsiders both in local institutions and abroad and by Latin Americans trained in the region and outside it, when many Latin American economists began to accept that demographic factors have a considerable impact on an economy's capacity to absorb the labour force, when family planning programmes began to receive official support and when several Latin American Governments decided that it was important to attempt to harmonize demographic growth and economic and social development.

The three regional conferences, held in 1965, 1967 and 1970, together with other technical meetings sponsored by the United Nations or by private United States foundations, contributed in important ways to clearing the ground for further progress. Teaching and research institutions and programmes (CELADE, El Colegio de Mexico, the CLACSO Population and Development Commission, PISPAL and PREALC) were instrumental in the training of research personnel, in creating a broad data base and generating knowledge that made possible some of the advances accomplished by the field. Many of those activities were made possible by UNFPA financial support; bilateral assistance from Canada, the United States, Sweden and other European countries; and particularly by technical and financial assistance from private foundations in the United States.

The numerous technical, methodological and substantive reports published by the United Nations have helped researchers and analysts in the study of important population topics. In spite of language difficulties, specialized journals, e.g., *Population and Development Review*, *Population Studies*, *Population Index*, *Demography* and *Population*, have also served the same purpose.

The IUSSP General Conferences, by opening the possibility of exchange with professionals from other parts of the world and from other disciplines, have provided many Latin Americans with broader insights into population phenomena. But perhaps the most important event that captured the attention of many Latin American politicians and policy makers was the United Nations World Population Conference in 1974, which was preceded and followed by regional meetings of high government officials in Latin America to discuss first the draft of the World Population Plan of Action and, subsequently, its implementation. An indication that the 1970s witnessed a greater involvement of Governments in population subjects is the decision taken to devote at least one annual session of the Committee of High Level Government Experts (CEGAN), convened periodically by ECLA, for discussion of regional population activities and adoption of pertinent recommendations. In 1976, CELADE convened the first technical meeting for government officials working in the population policy field. It was the first and only attempt at establishing a permanent vehicle for the exchange of views and experience among personnel working with Governments of the region on the subject.

It is difficult to pin-point specific examples of direct international transmission of population policy experience, but there is no doubt that international exchange and support during the 1960s and 1970s were significant and contributed in important ways to changing the situation *vis-a-vis* population policy as Latin America approached the 1980s.

D. The 1980s and utilization of accumulated knowledge on population

The accumulation of knowledge on population that had been made possible as a result of work undertaken by the organizations already mentioned

above, as well as by national research centres in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba and Mexico, placed Latin America in a relatively advantageous position for the potential utilization of that knowledge in the formulation and eventual execution of population policies.

The official population councils, logical consumers of the research findings produced by those Latin American institutions and other pertinent findings generated by research conducted abroad, also executed their own research activities, thus increasing the fund of knowledge.

Latin America came to know better than ever before, at least for some countries of the region, the peculiarities of the demographic transition; the social differences in mortality and fertility; the characteristics of internal migration and the determinants of the spatial distribution of the population, particularly those associated with concentration in cities; the relationship between certain demographic phenomena and some aspects of economic and social development and the potential future evolution of population dynamics. Even in the difficult area of causal explanation of the behaviour of certain demographic variables, several Latin American researchers have made important advances.

Perhaps the availability of this fund of knowledge coupled with the aspirations of certain sectors to find adequate methodology to integrate, if not a comprehensive population policy, then at least the consideration of demographic variables into economic and social development; might explain the intense intellectual activities carried out during the first half of the decade. Seminars, workshops, symposia and other technical meetings held at the regional or subregional level were organized with population policy as their central theme.

UNFPA had initiated its support to official population councils in several countries so that they would develop projects directed at promoting the integration of population aspects into the policies or actions in the economic and social spheres. Those projects have produced numerous documents, many of them instructive for policy makers and academicians, but the search continues for methodologies for integrating what is known about the reciprocal relations between population dynamics and other social and demographic variables into the formulation of population policies and the execution of development programmes. The Latin American region appears to require assistance in the fulfilment of that objective. It should be recognized that the availability of the documents referred to above opens the way for the convocation of national and regional meetings to discuss their contents. Mexico is perhaps the country that has most successfully shared its experience in population policies with other Latin American countries. But the truth of the matter is that Mexicans still continue to search for methodologies to "integrate" their policy into the planning process in that country.

Aside from the obstacles arising from the economic crisis that afflict most Latin American countries, there are institutional obstacles which complicate an already difficult task. In a recent evaluation of a project designed to integrate population policy with the development plans and programmes for Latin American countries, the evaluating mission pointed to the need for recognizing that "the planning systems have a conceptual frame and adequate approximation to integration requires two things: on one side, the identification of the opportunities to associate the integration activities to that conceptual frame, and on the other, the recognition that sometimes those opportunities might not exist". The mission added that "the task of integration, due to the very nature of population policies, is subject to multiple limitations derived from the planning institutional set-up where these policies aimed to be inserted" (UNFPA, 1984, p. 59).

There is no doubt that Latin America has advanced considerably in the field of population policies in the past 30 years: from private family planning activities, mainly financed from abroad, to official programmes integrated into national health systems with some support from UNFPA; from unplanned demographic effects to the conscious and deliberate definition of population policies; from isolated measures addressed at modifying some aspects of demographic dynamics to attempts at integrating a comprehensive population policy into the economic and social planning process.

Unfortunately, in spite of the activities that have been summarized in this paper, and recognizing the advances made, there is no denying that the region has had very little contact with the experience gathered in other regions, particularly in Asia, in the field of population policy. Systematizing the information on population policies becomes a rather complicated task, but even more complicated is the intelligent reading of the pertinent report. It is indeed somewhat doubtful that many policy makers would be able to make full utilization of the potentialities of the report.

Since the adoption of the Plan of Action, however, the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat has conducted periodic population inquiries among Governments, the results of which concerning population policies are published in conjunction with the statistical data on population.

Since 1979, the Division has also published "Population policy briefs", which give information in more accessible fashion. Reading them, however, leads to the conclusion that they are outdated or that the national personnel responsible for reporting are unaware of what is actually happening in the population field in their country or are misrepresenting the facts. For example, reading the brief for Argentina in the 1985 version one gets a completely different impression than one gathers from reading the study by Torrado, Novick and Olego de Campor (1986), in which the authors examine the population policies of the Peronist, military and radical régimes. A similar observation could be made by the author of this paper on the basis of personal knowledge and perception in the cases of the briefs for Mexico and Panama.

Obviously, the Population Division has no alternative other than to publish what is officially submitted by the Governments, but in order to give information that would be of greater value in terms of the international transmission of population policy experience, some means should be devised for examining what is actually happening, with comments on procedures to overcome difficulties or solve problems. The manner of "integrating" population policies into economic and social plans is one of the greatest unsolved challenges. Perhaps the Population Division and the IUSSP Committee on Population and Policy can join efforts in meeting it. In the case of Latin America, perhaps CELADE, which theoretically has responsibility in the field, could be invited to collaborate.

Notes

[1] Eldridge confronted the problems, still plaguing the field, of how to define population policy. She points out that in the broadest sense all aspects of national legislation affecting population trends should be correctly considered population policies, but in a narrower sense only legislation designed to affect the size, structure, distribution or characteristics of the population should properly be considered as such. She decided to examine in her paper recent measures affecting the integrity and health of the family, emigration and immigration policies, and birth control policies (1954, p. 8).

[2] Currently called the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

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XII. INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POPULATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

Jerzy Holzer *

A. Some general considerations

Definition of population policy

The definition of population policy most frequently applied throughout contemporary demographic literature is that it comprises direct and indirect measures formulated by a Government to influence population number, rate of growth, age and sex structure and geographical distribution. Among others, Andorka's (1978) definition of population policy in a broad sense is that it includes measures to influence fertility, mortality, migration, marriage and divorce. Even so, the discussion of policy is very often limited to measures intended to influence fertility. The most recent descriptions, however, include the relationships between population policy and socio-economic development policy. Although the various formulations are not described in detail in this paper, it is assumed here that population policy should be understood as a set of actions undertaken by a Government, by means of appropriate measures, to influence population processes so as to achieve the desired number and/or age and sex structure of the population and/or the desired growth rate and/or spatial distribution (Holzer, 1980 and 1982; Okolski, 1974; Dzienio and Latuch, 1983).

A distinct dilemma often discussed is whether population policy has an autonomous character or is subsumed under general socio-economic policy. This dilemma has special importance in a country with a centrally planned economy. Taking into account the fact that long-term population policy should have its own distinct defined objectives, it can be stated that it is undoubtedly independent of nature. To attain a set of goals requires time. For this reason, a Government should synchronize measures to promote both population policies and socio-economic policies.

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Goal of population policy

Population policy, like any other policy, should involve consistent action directed towards achievement of a fixed objective. The goal meant here is a strategic one; frequently, its achievement is deterred by the short-term effects of the implementation of a given policy.

Taking into consideration the known results of existing research, three strategic objectives of population policy can be pointed out, those determined directly by demographic causes and indirectly by socio-economic causes. Similarly, the long-term population policy recently proposed for Poland includes three objectives:

(a) To maintain total fertility rates at a level guaranteeing at least replacement level to reach a stable or, in the long term, a stationary model of population age/sex structure;

(b) To improve permanently the quality of life of the population in terms of better health conditions and a higher standard of living and cultural level;

(c) To stimulate the inflow and outflow of migratory movements (especially urban to rural) in order to avoid age/sex structure deformations, which make normal demographic and economic development difficult in a particular region.

The long-term ideas of population policy based on very similar aims were presented at the seminar on population policy organized by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute of the Central Statistical Office at Budapest (14-15 October 1986) and in the paper by Danyi and Monigl (1987). These authors conclude that it appears certain that Hungary, because of its multifaceted unfavourable demographic conditions, will in the next few decades put into effect a long-term population policy as an organic part of its social policy.

Before commenting on the goals listed above, it seems worthwhile to stress that they include neither the size of the population of Poland nor the rate of population growth, except for a single limitation, which is that growth is to adopt non-negative values. However, the situation of negative values cannot be excluded. For example, with the passing of age groups through the ages of their most intensive fertility and mortality, highly unfavourable increases in mortality and decreases in fertility could lead to a negative growth rate, which would not, however, necessarily prevent the achievement of ultimate goals.

Consequently, the size of a population as well as its level of natural increase will result from realization of the strategic objectives adopted. Irrespective of these objectives, assumptions and simulations show that the population of Poland is likely to continue growing or to stabilize in the future, at a level that is difficult to pin-point, but at not fewer than 40 million.

In answering the question, whether there is need for population policy in a given country, the discussion of stragetic demographic goals is here limited to problems the author considers to be of fundamental significance. The theory concerning the construction of stable population models makes it clear that stabilization of age-specific fertility and mortality rates results in a situation where the trend of population structure according to sex and age is towards a stable model. At an average life expectancy of 70 years and zero natural increase, with a birth rate equal to the death rate (a level of about 14-15 per 1,000), the stable population yields the following proportions according to age: 0-14 years, 20 per cent; 15-59 years, 60 per cent; 60 years and over, 20 per cent. The corresponding proportional age structure in Poland is 25, 61 and 14 per cent. A stable age structure ensures unchanging and favourable proportions between basic age groups, which is of paramount importance to the socio-economic development of the country.

Both fertility and mortality should be receptive to the influence of population policy. However, the objective of a substantial decrease in the mortality level, which entails adequate evaluation of such problems as quality of health services, accessibility of medical care and modern medical facilities, environmental preservation and alcohol and drug abuse, is a task that should be undertaken by social policy. In this area, much can be achieved through socio-economic policy.

In the mid-1980s, the mortality level in Poland is distressing: a decrease, rather than an increase, of life expectancy is being reported; the infant mortality rate is considerably higher than the average in Europe and twice as high as that of Northern and Western Europe; and the excessive male mortality (as compared with female mortality), in particular for persons of working age, exceeds all corresponding mortality values in other European countries. Another trend that began to be evident in the early 1980s, i.e., the decrease in female life expectancy at birth, is also alarming (Glowny Urzad Statystyczy, 1988).

Consequently, there is little prospect that the mortality level for various age groups will stabilize at the lowest possible level, and measures leading to a lower mortality rate are of first priority.

Urgent tasks assigned to the policy for preserving health and the environment must be encouraged by a properly constructed socio-economic policy. A population policy calling for achievement of a mentally and physically healthier and longer-lived population as one of its strategic goals cannot set a timetable for its realization without taking into account the current and projected socio-economic situation of the country.

Observed trends in female fertility, particularly in cohort fertility, suggest that the small family is becoming a dominant pattern in Poland. The changes in procreational attitudes observed in other developed countries, including neighbouring countries, leads one to conclude that the small-family model will continue to strengthen.

These statements suggest that population policy activities must be focused on the family, with some provision to overcome manifestations of family pathology. Taking into consideration the results of simulations, even now it can be asserted that in order to obtain even a simple replacement level in Poland, it will be necessary to provide incentives to support the two-child family, particularly at a time when the proportion of childless and one-child families is growing.

It seems necessary to stress here once more that the tasks with which social policy is charged, for instance, to secure the minimum standard of living for every citizen, are expressed differently than those constituting a preferential system of incentives to promote a defined family pattern. The latter case poses a question to which no obvious solution has thus far been found, that is, to what extent population policy can or should selectively classify families

according to set criteria, e.g., place of residence (rural or urban areas) or level of education. It is known that females resident in urban areas in Eastern Europe have lower total fertility levels than those needed for simple replacement of a generation. Results of most of the research of recent years show the existence of a close negative correlation between the educational level of parents and the number of children born. This situation is related to the desire to reconcile the professional aspirations of females with secondary and university education with socio-economic conditions enabling them to have and rear children. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it should be added that in those cases the measures for fertility encouragement, not prohibition, should be considered as far as possible.

As for the second strategic aim of population policy, in a time of rapid urbanization and industrialization, mechanization and, in particular, development in agriculture, the deterioration of the natural environment is aggravated. Environmental conditions that are hazardous for health and longevity are prevalent from the moment of conception up to a person's last days. Thus, there is need for maternity services, diet and food programmes, improved dwelling conditions and housing plans, and health protection, i.e., plans for eliminating the most dangerous causes of untimely death, including dangerous working conditions. All activities related to socio-economic policy should tend towards constant improvement of the standard of living of the population.

Education exerts an immediate influence on the quality of society. Taking only demographic aspects into consideration, the results of research in Poland show that females with only elementary education characteristically have premature deliveries twice as frequently as those with a university education. The latter group typically have had a perinatal mortality rate two times lower than females at other educational levels (Troszynski, 1982).

The quality of life—expressed generally by higher education—itself constitutes a value of potentially far-reaching significance for the socio-economic development of the country. At the same time, there is an important condition, which is that the existing socio-economic system must realize this value in a proper way.

The examples mentioned above present some basic conditions for achieving the second strategic goal of the population policy. It is not easy in this case to distinguish between socio-economic and population policy.

In the following discussions, the problem of spatial distribution is excluded, although it undoubtedly constitutes a part of population policy. There is evidence that it is much easier to direct in-migration through use of proper incentives than it is to cope with out-migration from a given region with positive and negative consequences (Holzer, 1982).

Relationship between socio-economic policy and population policy

In this paper, population policy has been designated, in accordance with the given definition, as actively striving towards the achievement of a desired objective. Therefore, socio-economic enterprises, which result from the necessities created by the current population structure according to sex and age, should not be included with the elements of that policy. Thus, the provision of certain conditions of living (apartment), upbringing, education and recreation is covered by socio-economic policy (sometimes termed "responsive population policy").

Two topics often discussed during the debates on population and socio-economic policies are now considered.

In Poland, the existing wage system was meant to provide a relatively egalitarian guarantee of living in a given household whose members are economically active. Systems of family allowances and other measures, such as tax rebates, were intended to level out possible inequalities. Apart from the evaluation of practical functioning of the assumptions, it can be stated that these activities are not part of population policy as it is defined in this paper. The idea of minimum wage would be of particular importance for full clarity and for the potential for realizing social and population policies. What constitutes a living wage would be very different for different social groups.

Recognition of woman's rights and obligations must offer women the chance to perform properly both maternal and socio-professional functions. If such an attitude is accepted, paid leaves for child-rearing as well as adequate development of a kindergarten system fall within the domain of socio-economic policy, not population policy.

The relationship between population and socio-economic policies is primarily the result of the former policy being to a great extent dependent upon the capability and actual results of the latter, as population policy measures are conditioned by the actual degree of socio-economic development.

Active population policy measures must go beyond those related to functional elements of a socio-economic policy. An active population policy must promote the idea of a couple having a defined—smaller or larger—number of children.

It is obvious that interactions occur between both policies and demographic processes. Hence, the measures of socio-economic policy indirectly evoke pro-natalist or anti-natalist reactions. Consideration of all the expected effects of introducing specific measures for each policy should form the realization of basic principles of rational conduct on the ground of system analysis. The current situation in Poland, with an unsaturated market for apartments and real property (unsatisfied consumer demand), means that many measures in the realm of socio-economic policy can influence demographic processes.

To conclude, one can state that under the conditions of unsatisfied consumer demand (unsaturated market) it is difficult to distinguish between socio-economic and population policy measures, due to the potential influence of most socio-economic interventions on demographic processes. Perhaps under conditions of relative affluence, the distinction between the two types of measures would become possible and reasonable.

Execution of the long-term population policy in Hungary and Poland is modifying the realization of the original goals of that policy. Therefore, there are reasons to formulate an explicit population policy in Poland to promote the idea of a family with two and, to a lesser extent, more children, so that fertility for the country as a whole will be at a level of 2.10-2.20. The question may arise whether such policy would be pro-natalist: yes, it would. Given a relatively large share of childless and single-child families, a population policy so formulated is indeed pro-natalist.

A pro-natalist policy, however, must leave the freedom of procreational decisions to families, allowing full access to contraceptive devices and the functioning of the law permitting the possibility of abortion. Moreover, to be successful, the suggested population policy measures, i.e., those not covering socio-economic policy measures, which tend to secure certain living standards, must be broadly accepted by the society.

In other words the principles of a democratic population policy, as formulated by Andorka (1978), may be given as obligatory when shaping a long-term population policy:

(a) Individuals should be free to determine the number of children, i.e., voluntary parenthood, which implies no coercion, permission for abortions on therapeutic, eugenic, ethical and also social grounds and, at the same time, reliable information on methods of birth control available to everybody in order to avoid an increase in the number of abortions.

(b) Couples should be encouraged to have larger families by means of social benefits given to families with children: in the Swedish population policy these incentives were mostly given in services, although the cash benefits were also important;

(c) Social benefits given to families with children should serve also to assure the equality of conditions for children from different social strata and in smaller or larger families;

(d) The quality of life for children should not be sacrificed for a larger number of children; social benefits should serve to improve quality by providing better opportunities for children.

B. Organization of analytical framework contributing to policy formulation

The basic research programmes and scientific discussions that create an analytical framework contributing to population policy formulation are conducted in Eastern Europe within the structure of academies of sciences and governmental bodies. Two Eastern European countries, Hungary and Poland, have committees of demographic sciences within the Academy of Sciences. Four countries, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Romania and the USSR, have institutes of sociology within the Academy of Sciences covering research in the field of demography.

Moreover, there are national governmental population commissions that are directly responsible for monitoring demographic processes shaping national population policies. It should be emphasized that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania report that they have definite population policies directed to achievement of quantitative and qualitative targets.

Poland and the USSR have had no declared population policy, but several of their socio-economic measures have indirectly influenced natality, mortality and migration. However, current (1980s) discussions in Hungary and in Poland show increasing attempts to encourage the Government to declare and enforce a long-term population policy.

The organization of research and scientific societies and the sphere of activity of the population commission in Poland are discussed below. Some comments also are given with regard to international connections. It is not easy, however, to specify exactly the international transmission of knowledge concerning population policy.

Demographic research programme and scientific societies

The basic research in the field of demography is carried out in Poland by the Central Statistical Office of the Department of Censuses and Demographic Research. Besides compiling routine statistics, the Department conducts special surveys in the field of fertility (also within the World Fertility Survey programme), mortality, migration and household structures. The Department also publishes yearbooks and series of analytical monographs.

At the beginning of 1970, the Government decided to create a special five-year demographic research programme, which it would sponsor. The programme was shaped by scientists in co-operation with the Governmental Population Commission, and the Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Central School of Planning and Statistics was nominated as the co-ordinating body. The first research programme, entitled "Optimization of demographic structures and processes in Poland", was carried out during the period 1976-1980. The second, entitled "Shaping of demographic processes and socio-economic development of Poland", was carried out from 1981 to 1985.

The results in the form of current and final reports were transmitted to the Governmental Population Commission and brought to the attention of policy makers. Some recommendations were introduced in practice.

The currently implemented programme is entitled "Demographic determinants of economic develoment of Poland" and is supposed to be completed in 1990. The Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Central School of Planning and Statistics at Warsaw is also responsible for organization of the research, which includes all academic and ministerial institutes involved in the programme.

Final reports on research carried out during the periods 1976-1980 and 1981-1986 have been published by the Institute of Statistics and Demography in two series of monographs and studies, entitled *Studies on the Optimization of Demographic Structures and Processes in the Polish People's Republic* (14 volumes) and *Shaping of Demographic Processes and Socio-economic Development of Poland* (16 volumes), respectively. A new series of reports, entitled *Demographic Determinants of Socio-economic Development of Poland*, is in progress.

The research programme for the period 1986-1990 should clarify, *inter alia*, the following tasks:

(a) Formulation of policies for shaping demographic processes according to the state of socio-economic development;

(b) Determination of the role of the family and its evolution due to socio-economic change and the influence of that evolution on demographic processes;

(c) Determination of the socio-economic consequences of current and expected demographic processes;

(d) Formulation of a model of social policy in the context of expected demographic processes and socio-economic growth;

(e) Determination of the demographic consequences of natural and man-made disasters;

(f) Determination and analysis of the causes of deaths and trends of mortality in order to help improve the health status of the society.

Internal and international seminars are very good forums for transmission of pragmatic approaches concerning formulation of population policies, suggested by different scientific groups of experts. Both types of seminars—the purely scientific and the operational—are attended by representatives of decision makers.

Since 1963, the Committee of Demographic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences has provided a scientific forum for discussion that seeks first of all: *(a)* to present the most recent scientific achievements in demography; *(b)* to initiate and lay out directions for needed scientific research; *(c)* to carry out necessary demographic research.

The Committee has approximately 50 members including, among others, demographers, economists, geographers, palaeodemographers, historians, anthropologists, planners and physicians. They are appointed by the authorities of the Academy for a term of three years. The current term is for 1986-1989.

The Committee works in sections, viz., theory of demography, historical demography, demometrics, medical demography, palaeodemography and socio-economic demography. Scientific meetings of the sections are attended by members of the Committee as well as by all persons interested in the given topic. Through invitation as guests, persons representing other related scientific disciplines are enabled to participate in the discussions.

The Committee of Demographic Sciences publishes a quarterly, *Demographic Studies*, and an annual entitled *Poland's Demographic Past*. Both publications contain English and Russian summaries and bilingual Polish-English tables and diagrams. It should be added that two other Committees of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the Committee "Poland 2000" and the Committee of Spatial Physical Planning, extensively use the results of demographic studies.

In 1982, the Polish Demographic Society was registered; its primary concern is to disseminate knowledge about patterns prevailing in demographic processes and also about the social, economic and cultural aspects of those processes. This information reaches persons who are concerned with the demographic development of the country. The Society must also inform authorities and public opinion about existing and possible future threats to demographic development in Poland; and in co-operation with scientific research centres and other units, must indicate ways and means of eliminating such threats.

Governmental Population Commission and Council of Family Affairs

In Poland, the results of scientific research, in the form of reports or specially prepared expert studies, are transmitted to decision makers through two governmental bodies. The Governmental Population Commission (GPC) and the Council of Family Affairs (CFA) analyse received materials, order preparation of special investigations by scientific institutions and then transmit conclusions for information or in the form of recommendations to the proper ministries.

The Commission was established in 1974 as an advisory body to the Prime Minister's Office in the field of demographic problems and population policy.

The members of GPC are nominated by the Prime Minister's Office and are selected from scholars representing demography, medicine, law and sociology and from representatives (with the rank of vice-ministers) of various ministries.

The most important activities of GPC encompass, *inter alia*:

(a) Assessment of the demographic situation of the country and elaboration of periodic (annual) reports for the Cabinet on the demographic situation in Poland;

(b) Initiation of topics and assessment of premises of scientific research in the area of demography and population policy;

(c) Initiation of scientific research concerning the projected process of population reproduction in Poland and its consequences for the socio-economic development of the country;

(d) Assessment in common with the interested ministries (central authorities) and social organizations of the implementation of recommendations of the Cabinet concerning population policy and related problems of social policy;

(e) Initiation of legal measures connected with population policy and directly related problems of social policy;

(f) Elaboration and giving of opinions on proposed legal acts in matters of population policy and directly related problems of social policy;

(g) Co-operation with national population commissions and organizations of the United Nations system concerned with population problems;

(h) Initiation of the dissemination of information about demography and population policy, as well as co-operation in these matters with the respective publishing institutions and publication of the Bulletin of the Governmental Population Commission;

(i) Initiation and organization of and participation in organizing conferences and symposia devoted to problems of population policy;

(j) Co-operation with the Committee of Demographic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, scientific research institutes in universities and the Central Statistical Office in matters of demographic research as well as research in population and social policy.

The Council of Family Affairs was established in 1978 as an advisory body to the Council of Ministries. Its main task is the monitoring of implementation of social policy measures for the benefit of the family. The chairman of CFA is nominated by the Prime Minister's Office. The chairman nominates members of the Council, who are recruited from among scholars, social activists dealing with social policy and representatives of ministries.

The most important duties of CFA are listed below:

(a) Assessment of the situation of families in towns and villages;

(b) Initiation of actions and measures of social policy for the benefit of the family and children and co-operation in solving problems concerning old and disabled people;

(c) Co-ordination of the activities of ministries, social organizations and other organizational units concerning problems of the family and encouragement of initiative and participation of society in these matters;

(d) Formulation and presentation of opinions about drafts of legislation concerning development, needs and strengthening of the family;

(e) Control of the implementation of measures for the benefit of families taken on the basis of decisions of the Cabinet, the presidium of the Government and committees of the Cabinet;

(f) Proposal of new legal, economic and social solutions concerning the family;

(g) Initiation of scientific research concerning the family;

(h) Analysis of living conditions of various types of families and the impact of changes in the cost of living on household budgets;

(i) Initiation of activities directed to improving the level of family life;

(j) Analysis of the structure of various types of material, housing, hygienic, cultural and educational needs of households as pertains to the supply of goods and services and submission of proposals on these matters in connection with plans and programmes;

(k) Assessment of the implementation of programmes for improving the situation of the family;

(l) Co-operation with units of the state administration, political, social and religious organizations and with the regional Committee for the Family Affairs appointed for the programming and implementation of social policy with respect to the family;

(m) Co-operation in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with units in other countries and with organizations of the United Nations engaged in problems of the family, women, children and the elderly.

Both bodies provide a platform for the discussion of ideas to formulate population and social policy. Scholars present results of research and executives describe difficulties in implementing policy. Moreover, international meetings of demographers and members of the mentioned governmental bodies are the main channel for the international transmission of ideas.

For many years, Eastern European demographers have actively participated in discussions concerning formulation of research programmes dealing with all aspects of family formation. Annual seminars are organized by the Demographic Working Group of the Multilateral Cooperation of Academies of Sciences of Socialist Countries.

C. Some comments concerning international transmission of knowledge

Independent of the proclamation or non-proclamation of population policy, one can find in each of the Eastern European countries measures that directly or indirectly influence demographic processes. Moreover, it is very difficult to determine whether a given measure was introduced primarily to influence demographic processes (population policy measures) or simply to alleviate the inequalities of income per capita of families (socio-economic measures).

Most Eastern European countries have introduced different types of measures that affect fertility regardless of the intentions of legislators or decision makers. For example, there are: *(a)* maternity benefits; *(b)* maternity/paternity leave; *(c)* child-care leave with or without pay; *(d)* family allowances; *(e)* tax allowances; *(f)* reduced working hours for working mothers; *(g)* social services; *(h)* legislation concerning access to birth control and abortion (Klinger, 1987).

A special group of measures relates to housing facilities and child-care institutions. In an unsaturated market, benefits connected with access to housing facilities and child-care institutions have an important influence on fertility. But in this author's judgement, these benefits should be treated as a socio-economic obligation of the Government to provide appropriate opportunity to everyone in the society and should not be considered a means of population policy.

Mortality is influenced by accessibility of the system of health services and by housing and working conditions, diet, environmental conditions and habits.

Internal migration is stimulated by the development of a given region. It is well known that it is much easier to stimulate in-migration than out-migration. This situation exists because out-migration creates, especially in some rural areas of Eastern European countries, deformations in age and sex structure leading to significantly unsatisfactory demographic and economic consequences.

International migration is usually controlled by legislation. International transmission of experience in the field of population policy formulation, however it is defined, is not adequate. Independently of difficulties in distinguishing between population and socio-economic policy measures, experience should be discussed in international forums and conclusions should be widely disseminated.

The most widely discussed population policy concerns natality.

Fields of proposed research for international transmission of experience

Eastern European countries had some interesting experience in obtaining rapid and rather short-term increases in fertility due to changes in the level of family allowances.

In Romania, radical changes in the abortion law also had a tremendous impact on the annual number of births. On the other hand, Poland represents an experience with rather liberal access to abortion and, at the same time, strong influence of the Catholic Church.

Poland, with an unsaturated market and deep economic and social crises in 1980, experienced an increase in total fertility rates. This new phenomenon of unexpected, rapid birth increase in the early 1908s has already been investigated and a report has been published (Holzer, 1988).

Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are countries with interesting ways of organizing the transmission of demographic knowledge from researchers to decision makers. The experience of Poland provides practical proof of the merit of some solutions.

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XIII. INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF POPULATION POLICY EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE

*Charlotte Höhn**

A. Some preliminary remarks

If one were to begin with a strict definition of population policy and the United Nations definition of Western Europe, there would be very few instances of international transmission of population policy experience in Western Europe to discuss. A classic definition of population policy encompasses measures and political actions that have the explicit demographic aim of influencing population size and structure with the strategic variables of fertility, nuptiality, mortality and migration. Experience with such determined, goal-oriented policies in Western Europe exists only concerning fertility because migration strategies, as is shown elsewhere (Höhn, 1988), have so far had non-demographic objectives. The only examples (though of a very different nature) would then be France and the Netherlands, even if all countries of Northern and Southern Europe were included under the cap of Western Europe as opposed to Eastern Europe.

This paper takes a broader view of population policies, one which covers all policies affecting and reacting to demographic phenomena, both directly and indirectly, intended and unintended. Such policies are here called population-related policies. At the same time, all policies concerning mortality and internal migration are excluded, thus limiting the discussion to fertility and nuptiality, which are closely interrelated and, to a lesser degree, to international migration. The focus is what some Governments envisage doing or have done in the face of sustained below-replacement fertility, advanced demographic aging and imminent population decline, and how such experience has been or might be internationally transmitted.

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The main example is the Federal Republic of Germany because the author not only is familiar with the demographic issues but also has advised policy makers there. Considerations regarding the exchange of ideas on population-related policy do, however, include Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and a few other countries.

Mortality policies are excluded here because this author believes they are not demographically determined but in principle constitute basic human values and ends in themselves. As stated in a United Nations report: "All countries have policies or programmes to improve the health and well-being of their citizens" (United Nations, 1985, p. 164). The crude death rate in an already aged population can only be significantly reduced if the aged population itself as the population at risk is reduced. Such a policy is against humane endeavours and is nowhere even contemplated. Infant mortality in the countries concerned is so low that there is no impact on fertility. In advanced societies, mortality therefore is no longer a strategic variable.

As for internal migration, this paper does not deal with it because regional distribution is of minor concern in the countries under consideration.

B. International transmission of the concept of population-related policies

Before coming to the core of this analysis, it is appropriate to explain why the classic definition of fertility and migration policy needs to be relaxed and how the concept of population-related policies has spread.

Not all policies affecting these two demographic processes are population policies; indeed, many have an unintended effect on demographic trends. The most obvious example is provided by many migration policies in Northern and Western Europe. Almost all countries had one or more of the following goals: to

recruit labour; to admit citizens from former colonies or family members of labour migrants; or to encourage return migration because of economic recession with unemployment or social tensions. In all such cases, migration policies do not have a demographic goal in the strict sense, although they certainly have demographic effects (Höhn, 1988).

Examples of policies indirectly affecting fertility are those relating to education, emancipation, social security, housing, direct and indirect taxation and regional planning. It is ironical that with classical population policy, mainly pro-natalist policy, the State is trying to solve a problem that it partially created itself. Much of the lack of success of pro-natalist policies and the eventual need for migration strategies derive from goal conflicts with other important and powerful policies of the modern welfare state (Höhn, 1988).

The decisive impact of the welfare state on fertility decline has been convincingly explained by Demeny (1986a), giving four major areas of intervention. Labour force participation of children has been suppressed and compulsory schooling introduced; removal of female discrimination has led to economic activity of women and a weakening of the institution of marriage; family-based provision for old age has been replaced by transfer systems of social security; and "in a democracy operating on the one-adult, one-vote principle, population aging tends to shift political power towards the aged" (Demeny, 1986a, p. 485). Moreover, he also states:

> "Micro-level sovereignty concerning fertility decisions was explicitly elevated to the rank of a fundamental human right, protected from social control by the state. But major influences that condition individual choices are, of course, determined by forces outside individual control: how these influences change came to depend on the particular blend of the invisible-hand-driven economic system and the overlay of the overt-hand modification of that system by the modern welfare state." (Demeny, 1986a, p. 484)

The message about the fertility-depressing influence of the interventions by the welfare state and the invisible-hand mechanisms of the free market was transmitted to the German-speaking community by a translation of this fundamental article for the *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft* (Demeny, 1986b). In non-anglophone countries it is very often important to give access to high-quality analysis by means of translations of such articles (or abstracts or reviews) into the local language. The editors of smaller (national) scientific journals have an important obligation to disseminate knowledge from other countries to their national audience. In this context, the role of the large international demographic journals should also be emphasized. It is evident that they too constitute a major source for research findings on population policy. The transmission from national demographic journals to the international community is assured by the *Review of Population Reviews*, published by the Committee for International Co-operation in National Research in Demography (CICRED).

Concerning the specific issue of population-related policies with an indirect effect on fertility, the Conference on the Demographic Impact of Political Action, held at Bielefeld (Federal Republic of Germany) in March 1986 should be mentioned. This Conference was jointly organized by the European Association for Population Studies (EAPS) and the German Demographic Society (GDS). Its main objective was to show for a number of European countries how social security systems, labour market policies, regional planning and equal pay policies indirectly affect demographic change. It was argued that migration policies are, in most examples, not demographically oriented. Lastly, a number of case studies on pro-natalist policies were presented. The general conclusion of this Conference, which brought together a number of European demographers, was that the impact of indirect political action on fertility appears to be much stronger than that of the class population policies in so far as they are designed to affect fertility explicitly. (For proceedings of the Conference, see Birg and Mackensen, 1988.) The participation of senior administrators from the Federal Republic of Germany in the Conference and the reception in the press indicated that this new approach to population-related policies was well received. Indeed, it enlarges the scope of advice demographers can give to policy makers. What still has to be provided is a coherent concept of population-related policies as well as an empirical test of interrelations with demographic phenomena. According to Demeny, "As yet our profession has done little to take the measure of the disjunction between private interest and public good in low-fertility societies and explore possible approaches to structural-institutional reform that could provide a remedy for the problem" (1986a, p. 485).

It remains an ambitious task to develop such an overall model of political action and demographic change and to make it internationally comparable. Even on a much more modest level, it is difficult to compare the well-known staple of pro-natalist measures in European countries because the evidence is scattered (Klinger, 1987), although the effort to collect such information is enormous and admirable. Such surveys, in addition, have the unpleasant property of ephemerality and will soon be outdated. This is also true for a study by Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980), who assessed the systems of child support in the European Community in the late 1970s. Since then, many measures have changed or new measures have been introduced.

C. International comparison of child-support systems

Nevertheless, the study by Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980) is not without interest for the present topic because it not only highlights some methodological difficulties in comparing child-support systems but also demonstrates the *de facto* situation of what might be called "pro-natalist" policies in the European Economic Community (EEC), irrespective of Governments' perceptions of a too low or a satisfactory fertility level and the desirability of intervention to change it.

Bradshaw and Piachaud do not bother about the cumbersome discussion among demographers concerning what constitutes population policy and, more particularly, pro-natalist measures. As social policy researchers they "simply" compare the relative value of child-support systems in the then nine member States of EEC (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom). They are also not interested in the efficacy of such policies (although a few comments on that issue are made here). The purpose of their study is "to increase understanding of differences in approach and differences in the extent to which society shares with parents the costs of providing for children" (Bradshaw and Piachaud, 1980, p. 13). Their study goes beyond the usual comparison of cash support by several types of family allowances and grants and tax relief by also taking into account other social service provisions, namely, parental expenses or relief for children's education and health and for housing. Their study was supported by a grant from the European Community, which indicates EEC interest in obtaining comparable policy data also in respect of demography.

Methodological difficulties arise because there are variations both in the systems of child support and in the levels of income of families of different sizes and with children of different ages (or stages in the family life cycle). The method chosen by Bradshaw and Piachaud was to use model family types (two-parent families) with standard numbers of children (none, one, two, four) in the specified age group 9-12 years, with an average income, a low income (two thirds of average) on a higher income (one and one half of average). The findings therefore ignore the situation of single-parent families and of families with three children (an omission no demographer would have made because many pro-natalist measures particularly stress the third child).

Children under nine years were omitted to avoid including pre-school children; in some countries, children do not begin school until they are seven years of age. Bradshaw and Piachaud state:

> "The provision of day care/education for pre-school children varies very greatly in the EC [European Community]. The quality and quantity of this provision is likely to be an important determinant of family income because it enables mothers to go to work, and it is certainly an important and interesting enough issue in its own right to deserve separate study." (1980, p. 18)

The present author can only agree and would also like to see studies on the number of days and the duration of daily stay at school (half-days or full days) and on the age at which mandatory schooling begins and ends. Lastly, the decision to use average earnings (as well as two thirds of average and one and one half of average) "does not represent the position of the unemployed and the non-employed"; moreover, the situation of families in which the wife works is included only "to a limited extent" (Bradshaw and Piachaud, 1980, p. 19). This brief methodological sketch demonstrates the complexity of child-support situations, which calls for standardizing but avoids modelling a case that does not exist in reality.

Another important methodological aspect concerns the collection of information, either by contacting national experts (e.g., Kamerman and Kahn, 1978; or Kirk, Livi Bacci and Szabady, 1975) or by visiting to the countries in question (e.g., McIntosh, 1983).

Figure VII. Additional income[a] for families with one, two or four children, as percentage of net income of childless couple, at two thirds of average, average and one and one half of average earnings



Source: Jonathan Bradshaw and David Pichaud, *Child Support in the European Community*, Occasional Papers on Social Administration, No. 66 (London: Bedford Square Press of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 1980), p. 141.

NOTE: B = Belgium; D = Denmark; G = Germany, Federal Republic of; F = France; IR = Ireland; IT = Italy; L = Luxembourg; N = Netherlands; UK = United Kingdom

[a] Adjusted for family allowance, tax, social security contributions and education, health and housing gains and losses.

Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980) chose the latter approach, which usually entailed visiting a capital and going to the official offices in turn until all the information had been collected. Relevant draft chapters were then sent back to their sources in the country concerned.

The main and summary findings are presented in diagrams; two are included here. Figure VII shows the additional income (adjusted for family allowances, tax, social security contributions and education, health and housing gains and losses) for families with one, two or four children as a percentage of the net income of a childless couple, at two thirds of and one and one half of average earnings. "Broadly speaking, Belgium, France and Luxembourg are a long way ahead of the United Kingdom, Netherlands and [the Federal Republic of] Germany, with Denmark some way behind them, and Italy and Ireland trailing a long way behind Denmark" (Bradshaw and Pichaud, 1980, p. 138).

It is interesting to note that France, contrary to the general opinion, does not always hold the first position as the most supportive of children. This is particularly true for the one-child family. France is surpassed by Belgium for all model families with one and one half of average earnings and also in the case of a two-child family with average income. On the other side, the Federal Republic of Germany has a much better overall position than is generally believed. This "generosity", however, begins beyond the two-child family with average or one and one half of average earnings.

It should be recalled that in the Federal Republic the one- or two-child family has been the norm for decades, with a high percentage of childless couples.

Figure VIII presents the components of additional income of two-child families with average earnings, in purchasing power in pounds sterling. It decomposes the total additional income (in comparison to a childless couple) into the contributions from family allowance, reduction in taxes and gains and losses from education, health and housing. This diagram is a warning against comparing only family allowances. Only the cases of Belgium (to a lesser degree), the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom could justify such an approach. Reductions in taxes are very important in Belgium, France, Ireland and Luxembourg; and the component of education, health and housing should not be ignored in Denmark, France and Italy.

Figure VIII. Purchasing power of components of additional income of two-child family at average earnings (Thousands of pounds sterling)



Source: Jonathan Bradshaw and David Pichaud, *Child Support in the European Community*, Occasional Papers on Social Administration, No. 66 (London: Bedford Square Press of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 1980), p. 144.

NOTE: B=Belgium; D=Denmark; G=Germany, Federal Republic of; F=France; IR=Ireland; IT=Italy; L=Luxembourg; N=Netherlands; UK=United Kingdom; education includes health and housing.

Of course, the picture has changed. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, important income tax reductions became effective on 1 January 1986. An updating of the study by Bradshaw and Piachaud would show other changes and would yield important insights for both policy makers and the academic community.

D. Population policy lessons from the Bradshaw and Piachaud study

This section comments on the Bradshaw and Piachaud study from a demographer's point of view.

Bradshaw and Piachaud state that their study is "primarily concerned with the comparative performance of countries rather than seeking to explain differences in child support in terms of differences in social, political, economic or demographic structures of the countries" (1980, p. 139). They further assert:

> "It is not true, for example, that the richest countries in the European Community have the most generous child support. Nor is there any association between the dominance of a particular church or political party and the level of child support." (Bradshaw and Piachaud, p. 140)

There are, however, differences in the growth rates of population: in fertility levels and in the degree of fertility decline, on the one hand; and in the Governments' perception of such demographic trends, on the other hand. To show such differences, tables 11 and 12 bring together demographic data and Governments' perceptions as of 1976 and 1983. This policy information is derived not only from the replies of Governments to the Third (1976) and Fifth (1983) Inquiries, but also from the governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental material in the Population Policy Data Bank maintained by the Population Division (see United Nations, 1978, 1985).

Table 11 gives the population for EEC countries in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1986; and table 12 shows the total fertility rate for those countries in the same years. Both tables show the change that Governments wanted as of 1976 and 1982, and table 12 gives a ranking of child-support systems as they were assessed by Bradshaw and Piachaud (1980) in the late 1970s.

It should be noted that the Third United Nations Inquiry asked for Governments' appraisal of rates of natural increase while the Fifth Inquiry sought to obtain Governments' views on the population growth rate. In countries where international migration plays a decisive role, as in the European countries chosen, such a difference in the questionnaire is important. Although longitudinal comparisons require caution, the Governments' perceptions as of 1976 and 1983 (United Nations, 1978, 1985) are useful. Most countries then members of the EEC, excluding Ireland, found natural increase rates as well as the current level of fertility satisfactory. Only a minority of three countries, France, Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, considered their fertility level too low.

It is remarkable that Denmark, France and the United Kingdom, despite having approximately the same fertility level of 1.8-1.9 in 1975, had such divergent perceptions of their fertility level and such different political attitudes on intervention, given the existing child-support system in the late 1970s. France and the United Kingdom have witnessed more or less the same fertility decline since 1970, from 2.5 to 1.93 (France) and 1.81 (United Kingdom), although France has a generous child-support system and the United Kingdom has only a moderately generous one. This fact casts some circumstantial doubt on the (pro-natalist) effectiveness of child-support systems. Particularly surprising is the political evaluation of the same fertility decline and level: France perceived the fertility level as too low, the United Kingdom as satisfactory; France was determined to raise it with a generous child-support system, whereas the United Kingdom considered intervention "not appropriate", relying upon a moderately generous child-support system. Denmark had no significant fertility decline from 1970 to 1975, and it considered its fertility level of 1.9 satisfactory, found intervention not appropriate and had a low-key child-support system. Does this lack of generosity towards children, somewhat surprising for a welfare state like Denmark, have anything to do with the fertility level? What then was the impact of the generous child-support system of Belgium on fertility?

TABLE 11. POPULATION SIZE AND GOVERNMENTS' APPRAISAL OF POPULATION GROWTH RATES AND INTERVENTION IN NINE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1970-1986

Country	Population (millions)				Governments' appraisal of population growth and intervention			
					Rates		Intervention	
	1970	1975	1980	1986	1978[a]	1983[b]	1978	1983
Belgium	9.66	9.79	9.86	9.86	Satisfactory[c]	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	To maintain
Denmark	4.91	5.01	5.12	5.12	Satisfactory[c]	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate[d]
France	50.53	52.60	53.73	55.28	Too low	Too low	Full support	To raise
Germany, Federal Republic of	60.37	61.99	61.44	61.02	Too low	Too low	Some support	Not appropriate[d]
Ireland	2.94	3.16	3.39	3.54	Too low	Too low	Some support	To maintain
Italy	53.49	55.65	56.39	57.02	Satisfactory[c]	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	To maintain
Luxembourg	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.37	Too low	Too low	Full support	To raise
Netherlands	12.96	13.60	14.09	14.53	Satisfactory[c]	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate[d]
United Kingdom	55.46	56.01	56.29	56.69	Satisfactory[c]	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate[d]

Source: For population, Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe* (Strasbourg, 1982 and 1987); for Governments' views, *World Population Trends and Policies: 1977 Monitoring Report*, vol. II, *Population Policies* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XIII.4; and *World Population Trends, Population and Development Interrelations and Population Policies: 1983 Monitoring Report*, vol. II, *Population and Development Interrelations and Population Policies* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.XIII.2).

[a] Rate of natural increase.

[b] Rate of population growth.

[c] Neither too low nor too high.

[d] No direct intervention reported.

TABLE 12. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF FERTILITY LEVEL AND INTERVENTION IN NINE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1970-1986, CHILD-SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN THE LATE 1970S

	Total fertility rate (millions)				*Governments' perception of fertility level and intervention*				
					Fertility level		*Intervention*		
Country	*1970*	*1975*	*1980*	*1986*	*1976*	*1983*	*1976*	*1983*	*Ranking of child-support system, late 1970s*
Belgium	2.25	1.74	1.70	1.53[a]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	To maintain	Generous
Denmark	1.95	1.92	1.55	1.48[c]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate	Low
France	2.47	1.93	1.95	1.84[b]	Too Low	Too low	To raise	To raise	Generous
Germany, Federal Republic of	2.02	1.45	1.45	1.35	Too low	Too low	Not appropriate	Not appropriate	Medium
Ireland	3.87	3.40	3.23	2.43	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	To maintain	To maintain	Low
Italy	2.45	2.19	1.66	1.34[a]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate	Low
Luxembourg	1.97	1.53	1.51	1.45	Too low	Too low	To raise	To raise	Generous
Netherlands	2.57	1.66	1.60	1.51[c]	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate	Medium
United Kingdom	2.45	1.81	1.89	1.78	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not appropriate	Not appropriate	Medium

Sources: For total fertility rate, Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe* (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1982 and 1987); for Governments' views, *World Population Trends and Policies: 1977 Monitoring Report*, vol. II, *Population Policies* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XIII.4); *World Population Trends, Population and Development Interrelations and Population Policies: 1983 Monitoring Report*, vol. II, *Population and Development Interrelations and Population Policies* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.XIII.2); for child-support system, ranking by present author based on Jonathan Bradshaw and David Piachaud, *Child Support in the European Community*, Occasional Papers on Social Administration, No. 66 (London, Bedford Square Press of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 1980).

[a] Estimate.

[b] Provisional.

[c] For 1985.

Although Belgium had a lower fertility level (1.74 in 1975) than France and the same fertility decline, the Belgian Government perceived this demographic situation as satisfactory and deemed intervention not appropriate. Nevertheless, the Belgian child-support system in the late 1970s can be ranked as generous. Of course, if the fertility level is perceived as satisfactory, the political strategy can be to maintain it or to deem additional intervention not appropriate. The question is whether the Belgian Government is aware of its generous child-support system and does not want to expand it. Then the answer "no additional intervention" would be more illuminating.

It would also be good to know what type of measures of family-related policies exist (and since when). Perhaps one of the next United Nations Inquiries among Governments could include an inventory of population-relevant policy measures.

E. On the subjectivity of the population policy concept

As of 1983, the Belgian Government indicated that it was still satisfied with the fertility level of 1.7 but wanted to maintain the level (table 10). A recent United Nations compendium on Belgium, concerning fertility and the family, states: "The national Government has established a family-oriented fiscal policy; however, there are no explicit goals" (United Nations, 1987, p. 52). In the Belgian statement for the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Regional Meeting on Population and Development at Budapest, 1987, both the Flemish and the Walloon community declare that there is no direct pro-natalist policy envisaged but that a good social and family policy might have demographic effects:

> "L'accent est placé sur les conditions socio-économiques de l'accueil de l'enfant et non sur des incitants directs à la fécondité. Sur base d'une parenté libre et responsable, la thèse défendue est que ces conditions permettent aujourd'hui aux couples de ne pas avoir les enfants non désirés—grâce notamment à la maîtrise du contrôle des naissances—mais ne permettent pas aux couples d'avoir les enfants désirés." (Economic Commission for Europe, 1987, p. 66)

The reluctance to call a family- and children-oriented policy a pro-natalist policy is not restricted to the Federal Republic of Germany. One finds it also in Austria and Sweden, where such policies are called "social policy" (Höhn and Schubnell, 1986; for Sweden, see also McIntosh, 1983). It is presumed that what Schubnell calls *Etikettenschwindel* (cheating by using an "innocent" label) exists in Belgium and to a smaller degree, in relation to the generosity of the child-support system, also in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, among others.

It would indeed be an enormous advantage to exchange experience on population-related policy irrespective of the official heading under which such measures are subsumed. Perhaps scholars or a scientific association or an independent research centre would be better placed to collect such data and to compare them than an international agency like the United Nations. Official views and perceptions have to be respected. A questionnaire will always leave room for an interpretation of a given term. Population policy is a notion particularly susceptible to misunderstanding and even to ideology.

Despite a generous child-support system, both Belgium and Luxembourg had reached a very low fertility level in 1986, and France had witnessed a moderate fertility decline. It is also not the political determination and the political atmosphere that makes the difference if one compares Luxembourg and France, the two overtly pro-natalist countries in Western Europe.

As of 1983, France classified a total fertility rate of 1.95 in 1980 as "too low", while rates of 1.55, Denmark, 1.66 for Italy and 1.60 for the Netherlands in the same year were perceived as "satisfactory" (United Nations, 1985).

This is surprising as far as Denmark and Italy are concerned. The Netherlands, with the highest population density in Europe (425 inhabitants per square kilometre) pursues a policy to stop population growth. The Government states: "For the time being this situation of low fertility is regarded as favourable since it will lead within the forseeable future to a termination of population growth" (Economic Commission for Europe, 1987, p. 56). The Netherlands takes this view because its population pressure is already very high, although it recognizes that in due time fertility would need to begin increasing. Although such an increase might occur spontaneously, research should begin on possible policy measures to favour such a development should it not occur spontaneously. It was considered that this research was even more needed "because possibilities of controlling demographic processes have proved to be limited" (ECE, 1987, p. 56). The Netherlands, nevertheless, has a child-support system which can be ranked as moderately generous. New measures, such

as a parental leave, have also been launched and are being discussed in the Parliament: "The arguments used in the document are primarily drawn from the emancipation point of view. However, during the debate in parliament attention was also given to arguments of a demographic nature." (ECE, 1987, p. 57)

The Netherlands obviously has a population policy, even with numerical targets for temporarily below-replacement fertility (15-30 per cent) and a desired ultimate stationary population of 14 million. Nevertheless, as of 1983, the Government reported that it took no direct intervention concerning population growth, which they found satisfactory (United Nations, 1985). This puzzling answer suggests a "no-population" policy, but the difficulty lies in the wording of the questionnaire. There are no direct interventions (although one may ask whether a restriction of immigration is not direct), but there are targets and numerous measures of a quasi-population policy. Here the labels do not fit.

This ambiguity can also be found in Denmark: "The Government does not intervene to influence fertility" (United Nations, 1987, p. 176). However, it then reports on family planning programmes, compulsory sex education, parental leave, day-care facilities and states under the heading "Other issues": "The Government is planning to provide a special financial allowance for children under age 10 and increased assistance to families with children under age 18. This is to be part of a broader tax reform...in favour of families with children." (ECE, 1987, p. 177)

As long as every Government has its own definition of population policy and of direct and indirect intervention, no comparable information can be obtained. The aim of transmitting population policy experience by means of such inquiries is obstructed by the Governments' sovereignty which allows them to answer at their discretion.

F. Goal conflicts with other policies

Two other aspects of the concept of population policy, more particularly fertility policies, deserve attention. If it is true that modern family planning and higher status of women are decisive factors in decreasing fertility in developing countries, the question arises how they can increase fertility in developed countries. This author is not, of course, arguing against free access to familiy planning nor against improvements of the status of women, but is only alluding to important goal conflicts. For example, the Government of Denmark acknowledges that "women's rights to good health, equal education and employment opportunities and the right to control their fertility are of prime importance if population policies are to succeed—as well as being goals in themselves" (ECE, 1987, p. 176). Other similar examples can be found for most developed countries.

Italy, too, perceived its low level of fertility (total fertility rate of 1.66 in 1980) as satisfactory and reported that it was not appropriate to intervene. This was even true in 1987 when the Italian delegation to the ECE Conference commented on its fertility level, calling it the lowest in the world after that of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to the delegation statement: "Italian society clearly and strongly discourages procreation" (ECE, 1987, p. 71). In Italy, public opinion has been encouraged to consider a decline in births to be positive, because the rate of population growth, above all in southern Italy, has historically been considered primarily responsible for many problems, such as emigration, unemployment and severe environmental pressures. Therefore, at least in the short and medium term, a sharp decline in fertility in Italy is not considered alarming. The delegation stated, however, that both the Government and political forces should "attentively evaluate (as industry has already done and is still doing) the transformations induced by current demographic trends on the whole society" (ECE, 1987, p. 71). It seems only consequent that the Italian child-support system is meagre (whether or not intentionally). In the long run, however, the Italian Government might well increase family policy provisions and change its very positive attitudes towards fertility decline, as has already been suggested.

G. Transmission of population-oriented policy experience in the Federal Republic of Germany

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is not satisfied with having had the lowest fertility level in the world since 1972. Since 1976, it has considered its fertility level "too low". Unlike France and Luxembourg, however, the Government of the Fereral Republic reports that direct intervention is not appropriate. Many observers believe that these perceptions are contradictory. McIntosh (1983) has therefore described the Federal Republic of Germany as a "prisoner of the past", making allusion to a deep-seated aversion against population policy as

a legacy of the abuse of population policy by the Nazis. This is, of course, a good explanation, but for two reasons not sufficient. If there was trauma from the racist population policy, why did it affect only the Federal Republic? The German Democratic Republic established a generous social and population policy in 1976 and has since then been among the overt pro-natalist countries. The Federal Republic of Germany might free itself from the burden of the past, but this seems to be necessary only if the consequences of the population decline are considered unacceptable and if pro-natalist policies would be a decisive remedy.

As early as the 1970s, when the population in the Federal Republic of Germany began to decline, an interministerial working group was set up to assess the demographic problems. A first report on demographic trends and population projections was published in 1980. One of the main findings was that fertility decline has a long tradition in Germany (table 13). Couples married after the First World War barely reproduced themselves. The aggressive Nazi population policy obviously did not change the trend, and there was practically no post-war "baby boom" in the cohorts. (The increase in number of births in the late 1950s, until 1966, was due to a lower age at marriage and closer spacing.) Since the 1960s, a further decline to a below-replacement level has begun, reaching 1.5 children for the younger marriage cohorts. A remarkably high percentage of childless marriages has accompanied this trend.

TABLE 13. FINAL FAMILY SIZE OF MARRIAGE COHORTS, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1900-1974[a]

Date of marriage 1900 - 1974	*Of 100 marriages, number of couples who had*					
	No children	*One child*	*Two children*	*Three Children*	*Four and more*	*All children together*
1900-1904	9	12	16	15	47	393
1905-1909	10	15	20	17	38	335
1910-1912	12	17	22	17	32	294
1913-1918	14	20	24	17	25	252
1919-1921	16	23	24	15	21	234
1922-1925	18	24	24	15	20	222
1926-1930	17	23	25	15	20	223
1931-1935	16	22	27	17	18	218
1936-1940	14	25	31	17	14	205
1941-1945	13	25	31	17	14	205
1946-1950	13	26	30	17	14	207
1951-1955	13	25	31	17	14	205
1958-1962	13	22	36	19	10	200
1963-1967	14	27	41	14	5	171
1965-1969	16	29	40	12	3	159
1970-1974	19	29	40	10	2	148

Source: Federal Institute for Population Research, *Demographic Facts and Trends in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Wiesbaden, 1984).

[a] Up to 1912, results of the 1933 census of Prussia; for 1913-1921, results of the 1933 and 1939 censues of the German Reich; for 1922-1935, results of the 1950 census of the Federal Republic of Germany (excluding Berlin); thereafter, results of the 1970 census and the microcensus, only families of nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany including children from prior marriages; and before that time, only children from current marriage at enumeration date.

This "tradition" of childlessness very likely reduced the social pressure of the older generations on the younger to have children. The other important insight in the report is that among the determinants of fertility decline most are of a non-material nature. No indications for a spontaneous reversal could be discerned (Schmid, 1984).

The projections for the interministerial working group, which are based on constant low fertility for the native population, assuming a further adjustment of foreigners' fertility to that of the native population and taking into account immigration both of nationals of the Federal Republic and of foreigners, conclude that the total population of the Federal Republic of Germany, which declined from 62 million in 1974 to 61 million in 1986, may continue to decline to 48.4 million in 2030. This is a decrease of 13 million inhabitants, or 21 per cent. Certainly demographic aging constitutes a major concern. Currently, 20 per cent of the population are over 60 years of age. But in 2030 this older segment of the population might constitute 38 per cent.

Why were the different Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany not concerned, neither the Social Democrats before 1982 nor the Christian Democrats since then? The second population report of the above-mentioned interministerial working group tries to assess the consequences of population decline. There are serious problems to be faced, mainly concerning old-age security and health services: "Characteristic for the period following the year 2000 will be first of all the problems of old-age insurance and increasing demand for care for the aged" (Federal Institute for Population Research, 1984, p. 77).

The report further states: "With the growing number of old people in the population, many of whom will live alone, an extension of social services provided in individual households and aids for families who care for old people will become necessary" (Federal Institute for Population Research, 1984, p. 69). The existing social security system is, however, so generous and so flexible that a reform policy with an objective of reducing the level of pensions and increasing contributions by the working population together with an increase in the age of retirement appears feasible. The theoretical alternative, either to halve the pensions or to double the social security contributions, is politically unacceptable. And it can be avoided.

There is no fear of population decline in the Federal Republic of Germany as it exists, for historical reasons, in France (McIntosh, 1983; Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985). French colleagues even fear for the Federal Republic and Europe. Ironically, McIntosh cites a French analyst, Chesnais, as fearing that "the real problem is that labor shortages and rising costs will price German—and European—goods out of the market" (McIntosh, 1983, pp. 185-186). Chesnais, quite in the tradition of French thinking and by far not the only protagonist of fear of population decline, visited the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980. Based on this experience, he writes on that country's future: "Cette chute de potentiel démographique s'accompagne, toutes choses égales d'ailleurs, d'une perte de puissance (rayonnement culturel, taille du marché interne, dynamisme commercial, poids politique)" (Chesnais, 1981, p. 409). He also asserts that cultural penetration by foreigners cannot be the right answer. Chesnais deplores the absence of pro-natalist policies in the Federal Republic of Germany so much that he concludes: "Avant d'être un modèle économique, l'Allemagne a longtemps été un modèle culturel. Le nazisme y a tué l'éclat de la pensée; va-t-il aujourd'hui, par les tabous qu'il a fait naître, condamner le modèle économique?" (1981, p. 412). This is not the type of message one likes to see transmitted. In some of his later studies, however, Chesnais is much more objective. In a study that has been examined by an international working group, his views on the consequences of population decline (Chesnais, 1985) are as balanced as those of Amann (1985), an Austrian expert for the Council of Europe.

While Chesnais, in view of the supposed absence of a population-relevant policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, calls for "un regard froid sur les questions démographiques" (1981, p. 412), Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) comment on the country's sang-froid about economic issues.

Does the Federal Republic of Germany have sang-froid and no family policy? In the second population report, based on numerous expert reports both from academic and administrative economists, one finds the following statements:

> "Population trends constitute only one of many determinant factors for economic growth and economic structure... Population trends may indeed increase the pressure for adjustments produced by other factors (technological progress, international division of labour, change of demand structure) on the German economy

and thus increase the necessity for higher flexibility, mobility, creativity and social responsibility of all market participants." (Federal Institute for Population Research, 1984, pp. 70-71)

The policy experience the Federal Republic of Germany can transmit is that a policy of adaptation is feasible. This can already be shown by the flexibility in the educational sector. The "waves" caused by the baby boom generations could be managed. The pressure on the labour market due to the influx of these numerous generations is already slackening. Unemployment, however, has mainly structural causes. The modern economies will need less (expensive) labour that can be (and is) replaced by capital-intensive technology. The opinion of the Italian delegation at the Conference in 1987 is worth mentioning. They consider that the decline in births will slowly lessen the pressure on the labour market through a reduction in the working-age population and later, beginning in 1997, a decrease in population size. This trend could be a "strong positive element" in a period of growing automation and innovations resulting from the microelectronic and biotechnological revolution (ECE, 1987, p. 73). The exchange of such ideas is important. It shows that original thinking has its chances.

The interministerial population report, however, warns optimistic ecologists that "The extent of pollution caused by man is primarily a function of economic development...no absolute decrease in environmental pollution can be expected" (Federal Institute for Population Research, 1984, p. 75).

The message this author would like to convey, based on the experience in the Federal Republic of Germany, is that a policy of adaptation to fertility and population decline is feasible. The pivotal point is an early and well-timed assessment of demographic, economic and social change. A policy of adaptation requires a long period of launching and an observation of mechanisms so far unknown. And it indeed requires sang-froid, for fear is a bad adviser.

Is a pro-natalist policy necessary? Even if efficacy were guaranteed, the problems related to advanced aging of population cannot be completely overcome. But, of course, demographers in the Federal Republic have been asked to assess the efficacy of a pro-natalist policy. The long-term effect of pro-natalist policies in a number of European countries with experience in such endeavours was an increase of final family size of from 0.2 to 0.3 child per woman in France, 0.1 in the German Democratic Republic and 0.2 in Romania, whereas no effect was found in Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Höhn and Schubnell, 1986).

This author has asked before why pro-natalist measures are not more successful and has given some answers (Höhn, 1988). Of the manifold determinants of fertility decline, only a small fraction are material in nature and can be financially compensated by the State. Other policies indirectly and unintentionally create conditions that lessen the desire to have many children. From the individual point of view, the benefits of the "welfare state, with social security for health and old age, can be enjoyed even without children..." (Höhn, 1988, p.11). From the macrolevel, of course, this is a dubious view. However, Höhn continues:

> "Fertility decisions are made by individuals weighing their advantages and disadvantages. In addition, a rising level of education enhances rationality. A prosperous economy offers many other options for time and money. Consumption and leisure then compete increasingly with the rearing of children. The promotion of female emancipation is a political programme that also tends to conflict with pro-natalist policy." (1988, p. 11)

Frequently, these other policies are more important or it is not possible to redirect them.

One may ask whether these are reasons to abstain from or cancel any measure with a pro-natalist flavour. According to Höhn:

> "Pro-natalist policies, though not sufficient to guarantee zero-growth of the native population, always have the advantage of providing social justice for parents as compared to childless couples or individuals. This alone is a sufficient objective of a policy that requires no further demographic justification." (1988, p. 19)

The Federal Republic of Germany has such a family policy, as Bradshaw and Piachaud also demonstrate. In the 1970s at least, that policy was moderately generous, compared with child-support systems in other EEC countries (table 12). The family policy (it does not really matter what one calls such a set of measures) in the Federal Republic has recently been expanded. In the long run, new immigration policies also should be prepared in order to avoid being surprised by new waves of immigrants.

Population-relevant policies have been in effect a long time. And it seems that indirect influences have always been stronger than direct interventions. Policies relating to social security, education, emancipation, labour market, economic growth, infrastructure, taxation, family and immigration are integral parts of the ways in which the State, the society, the economy and the population influence one another. It would be unwise to single out a few elements and to exchange experience only on the tip of the iceberg, particularly as long as labels are fixed at discretion.

As for the future, only a complete and complex set of policies will be able to react to population decline. Policies always and everywhere must be co-ordinated. This will not be an easy task but a major challenge for policy makers as they seek to cope with socio-economic and demographic change. The support that social scientists, economists and demographers can provide is to transmit policy experience with population decline. Population-relevant policies need to be monitored and understood, and experience needs to be exchanged.

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XIV. THE UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND AND SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL POPULATION POLICIES

*S. L. N. Rao**

The interrelationship between socio-economic development and population trends is now widely acknowledged. Development patterns influence population trends and are, in turn, affected by population factors. Different countries have differing styles of development. Thus, population policies need to be shaped according to the emphasis of these development styles to be acceptable both socially and culturally (United Nations Population Fund, 1987).

Population policy has emerged, more noticeably since the 1960s, as an important aspect of social science research (Demeny, 1988), as well as an integral element of development planning (UNFPA, 1987). Although a number of factors have contributed to this, perhaps the most important is the growing recognition that is being accorded the crucial role that population factors play in social and economic development.

Not only is recognition of the relevance of population policy growing in developing countries but its scope and content are changing dramatically. From an initial emphasis on issues related to the control and elimination of premature mortality, the scope of population policy expanded to include fertility regulation and family planning; and it subsequently has encompassed aspects of migration, urbanization and population distribution. Beginning in the 1970s, the integration of population and development policies has been added as a new dimension to the population policy field, and suggestions are being made in the 1980s for inclusion of the benefits of enhancing the role and status of women, as well as of interrelationships among population, resources, the environment and development as integral elements in the formulation and implementation of population policy. Although this trend might be perceived by many as giving unprecedented recognition to the role of population policy in sustainable development, it also implies that the impact of population policy is to be traced in many development sectors, which raises the issue whether the population policy field is sophisticated enough for such a complex task.

Parallel to these substantive demands, the population policy field additionally faces financial challenges in view of the fact that international population assistance is not growing in real terms, and prospects for domestic resources are in jeopardy as a result of the stress of structural adjustments becoming commonplace in a large number of developing countries. Against this background, this Expert Group Meeting on Transmission of Population Policy is both timely and useful. The rest of this paper is devoted to a brief description of UNFPA activities in the population policy area, with a résumé of its achievements and constraints followed by a section on international population assistance; the penultimate section raises a few substantive and operational issues facing the population policy sector in particular and population programmes in general.

A. UNFPA SUPPORT TO NATIONAL POPULATION POLICIES

In spite of its importance, population policy is not an easy concept to define. In operational terms, it is even more difficult to describe. In a broad sense, population policy can include an entire spectrum of activities required to formulate a sound and scientific policy (i.e., data collection, population analysis and policy research, institutional arrangements for policy formulation and planning etc.), as well as the entire range of activities to implement the policy so formulated—action programmes to influence, for instance, fertility, family planning, mortality, migration, urbanization, population distribution and the role and status of women, as well as information, education and communication activities in support of such action programmes. By this definition, almost

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all population activities can be viewed as various aspects of the process of formulation, implementation and evaluation of population policy.

Although such a broad definition may be more accurate in certain contexts, the definition adopted in this note is much narrower (UNFPA). It refers only to the activities that are directed to policy formulation, and includes such aspects as: *(a)* support to legislative measures to help promulgate population policy and to help eliminate legal obstacles, if any, to implementing population policy; *(b)* policy research to identify measures and instruments intended to modify fertility, mortality, migration etc.; *(c)* training courses and workshops for national staff on policy formulation; *(d)* conferences and seminars to help create awareness among policy makers and political leaders; and *(e)* institutional arrangements, such as population policy units, population councils or population commissions, to permit countries to formulate and co-ordinate population policy in the context of development planning.

Programme trends

The data provided in table 14 indicate UNFPA support to population policy activities in the various developing regions. During the period 1984-1987, the Fund provided assistance to nearly 200 projects amounting to $34 million, or 7 per cent of all assistance, for the formulation of population policy in developing countries. Of this total, the greatest share is accounted for by research, analysis and legislative measures (66 per cent), followed by institutional arrangements (16 per cent), training activities (14 per cent) and, lastly, conferences and seminars (4 per cent). By historical comparison (Siddiqui, unpublished), these proportions indicate a shift towards higher financial allocations to research and training, and proportionately lower allocations to institutional arrangements and awareness-creating activities.

The regional differentials in the UNFPA support to policy indicate that the largest number of policy projects are found in sub-Saharan Africa (54), followed by Asia and the Pacific (46), Latin America and the Caribbean (44), interregional and global (29) and the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe region (22). In terms of magnitude of assistance, the following rankings are noted: Latin America and the Caribbean (27 per cent); inter-regional and global (25 per cent); Asia and the Pacific (25 per cent); sub-Saharan Africa (18 per cent); and the Middle East, Mediterranean and Europe region (5 per cent).

An extensive analysis of the objectives of these population policy projects indicates that most countries consider the institutionalization of formulation, assessment and evaluation of population policy a major goal of policy projects. Similarly, development of a policy research agenda and strengthening of the needed population data base and their dissemination for policy-making are considered equally important objectives. Training of national staff and

TABLE 14. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND SUPPORT TO POLICY PROJECTS, BY REGION AND TYPE OF ACTIVITY, 1984-1987

(Thousands of dollars)

Region	*Institutional arrangements*		*Research and legislation*		*Training activities*		*Conferences, workshops/ seminars*	
Sub-Saharan Africa	3 539	(15)	1 917	(18)	161	(14)	591	(7)
Asia and the Pacific	405	(3)	6 356	(32)	1 236	(7)	418	(4)
Latin America and the Caribbean	942	(4)	5 393	(25)	2 751	(4)	134	(11)
Middle East, Meditteranean and Europe	436	(2)	959	(14)	39	(4)	66	(2)
Interregional/global	-		7 790	(23)	636	(3)	203	(3)
TOTAL	5 322	(24)	22 415	(112)	4 823	(32)	1 412	(27)

Source: United Nations Population Fund; Management Information Systems print-out.

NOTE: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of projects.

co-ordination of technical collaboration also figure prominently among the objectives of these projects.

Achievements

In general, no project can be expected to achieve all its objectives within the specified time frame in view of the many operational constraints that most projects face during the implementation stage. On the basis of both external evaluations and internal assessments, the following current achievements of policy projects can be identified:

(a) Formal institutional arrangements have been established in a large number of developing countries;

(b) A large number of national staff have been trained to undertake project activities;

(c) Documentation centres have been established in a number of countries;

(d) Awareness has been created in a large number of countries;

(e) More descriptive and to a limited extent, policy research studies have been conducted in a number of countries;

(f) Formulation of population policy and its incorporation into a national development plan has been achieved in only a few countries.

Constraints

The evaluation exercises conducted have identified a number of constraints in the implementation of policy projects. The difficulty most often cited refers to an inadequate number of qualified professional staff and an acute shortage of logistical support; similarly, government administrative procedures, unstable political situation and a lack of political support have also been identified as factors constraining the progress of policy projects.

It should be emphasized that although national commitment to solving population problems through formulation and implementation of population policy is paramount, the critical role of international population assistance in raising awareness of the population issue, helping countries with technical assistance and providing international financial and political support for population intervention cannot be exaggerated. International population assistance has played, continues to play and can be expected to play in the future an important role in the population policy field. Accordingly, the next section presents a concise summary of recent trends and characteristics of international population assistance.

B. International population assistance

Population aid has grown considerably over the years. Data given in tables 15 and 16 show trends in international population assistance during the past 25 years. From about $6 million in 1961, population assistance to developing countries has increased to over $560 million in 1985. Unfortunately, data are not yet available for the past two years to bring the analysis up to date. Cumulatively, the international community has provided a sum of $5.9 billion during the past 25 years for population activities of the developing countries.

First 20 years: 1961-1981

The first two decades of international population assistance experienced a phenomenal growth. During that period, close to $3.5 billion was made available by the international community for the population programmes of developing countries. Substantial increments in population assistance have been noted for the individual years 1974, 1977, 1978 and 1979. This dramatic increase in population aid is a clear evidence of the growing importance of population issues and the commitment of the international community to assisting developing countries in tackling their population problems (Gille, 1979).

During most of the first 20 years, population assistance grew at very high rates of annual increase. During the first period, 1961-1971, annual rates of over 20 per cent were common, although this was largely due to small amounts of assistance serving as a base for the computation. The most significant period was the second, 1971-1981, when very large sums of money were committed to international population assistance. This period witnessed sustained increases in resources for population assistance, with annual rates of increase in excess of 10 per cent.

The period 1971-1981 experienced substantial increases for population assistance, in real terms as well. During much of the decade, the increases in current dollars were large enough to compensate for rising prices. Beginning in 1979, however, although population assistance was still growing in current dollars, net assistance began to decline in real terms.

The magnitude of population assistance, as a percentage of all official development assistance, grew dramatically during the first 15 years and reached an all-time high of 2.08 per cent during the period 1971-1975. Since 1976, however, population assistance has not kept pace with development assistance. This situation is basically due to the fact that since 1980, contributions of most Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries for the population sector are bearing a successively declining proportion of all official development assistance.

TABLE 15. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL POPULATION ASSISTANCE, 1961-1985

(Thousands of dollars)

	Total net assistance[a]			*Total net assistance*[a]	
Year	*Current dollars*	*Constant dollars*	*Year*	*Current dollars*	*Constant dollars*
1961	6 000	..	1974	251 291	499 500
1962	5 000	..	1975	278 655	506 000
1963	11 000	..	1976	303 245	524 100
1964	16 000	..	1977	348 178	568 200
1965	18 000	..	1978	391 294	594 100
1966	34 000	..	1979	451 246	633 300
1967	30 000	..	1980	475 912	612 400
1968	58 000	..	1981	491 105	579 000
1969	86 000	..	1982	429 700	478 400
1970	125 000	309 900	1983	432 300	463 500
1971	169 164	396 300	1984	522 800	540 200
1972	186 851	420 100	1985	560 300	560 300
1973	209 242	452 200	1986		

Source: For 1961-1970, Halvor Gille, "Recent trends in international population assistance", in *International Population Assistance: The First Decade*, R. M. Salas, ed. (New York, Pergamon Press, 1979). p. 391; for 1971-1981, A. Thavarajah and S. L. N. Rao, "International assistance for population activities", in *Population, Aid and Development*, Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo, ed. (Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1987); and for 1982-1985, United Nations Population Fund, "Global population assistance report", unpublished.

[a] At 1985 prices and exchange rates.

TABLE 16. SUMMARY INDICES OF INTERNATIONAL POPULATION ASSISTANCE, 1961-1985

	Population assistance		
Period	*In absolute amounts (millions of dollars)*	*Average rate of change per annum (percentage)*	*As a proportion of official development assistance (percentage)*
1961-1965	56	-	0.20
1966-1970	333	35.7	1.02
1971-1975	1 095	23.8	2.08
1976-1980	1 970	11.7	1.62
1981-1985	2 436	4.2	1.10
TOTAL	5 890	18.9	..

Source: Table 15; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Development Co-operation: 1986 Report* (Paris, OECD, 1987).

TABLE 17. COMMITMENTS FOR POPULATION PROGRAMMES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BY SELECTED MAJOR DONOR[a], SELECTED YEARS

(Millions of dollars)

Donor country	*1971*	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*
Canada	2.5	7.2	13.3	19.6
Germany, Federal Republic of	1.7	13.4	21.4	18.4
Japan	2.1	8.0	26.4	46.5
Netherlands	1.1	6.7	15.3	11.4
Norway	3.9	18.5	34.4	23.6
Sweden	7.4	26.2	35.8	17.5
United Kingdom	2.3	6.5	17.7	20.2
United States of America	109.6	106.0	168.5	288.2
Subtotal	130.6	192.5	332.8	445.5
DAC total	134.6	204.7	352.2	472.5
Grand total	169.2	278.7	475.9	560.2

Sources: For 1961-1970, Halvor Gille, "Recent trends in international population assistance", in *International Population Assistance: The First Decade*, R. Salas, ed. (New York, Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 391; for 1971-1981, A. Thavarajah and S. L. N. Rao, "International assistance for population activities", in *Population, Aid and Development*, Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo, ed. (Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1987), p. 37, table 5; and for 1982-1985, United Nations Population fund, "Global population assistance report", unpublished.

NOTE: DAC = Development Assistance Committee.

[a] Contribution exceeding $10 million in 1985.

Recent five years, 1981-1985

The trend in international population assistance during the most recent five years for which data are available is a mixed one. Unlike the first 20 years, this quinquennium experienced actual declines in international population assistance, both in current and in constant dollars. The years 1982 and 1983 were particularly bad. For 1984 and 1985, however, substantial increases have been subsequently noted. Although a new all-time high for international population assistance, in terms of current dollars, was reached in 1985, the magnitude of assistance in constant dollars is still lagging behind the all-time peak reached in 1979.

In proportionate terms, the annual growth rate of population assistance during the period 1981-1985 was only about 4 per cent, as compared with 12 per cent during the immediately preceding quinquennium. In terms of proportionate official development assistance, the recent quinquennium experienced one of the lowest magnitude of population assistance. During 1981-1985, only 1.1 per cent of official development assistance was programmed for population assistance.

Absolute amounts of population assistance during the past three years have totalled only $1.5 billion. This total has fallen short of even the most pessimistic level of assistance (Thavarajah and Rao, 1985) of $1.8 billion projected for the period 1983-1985. Although it is still tenuous to "predict" the long-term trend in future population assistance, it is likely that the reversal of the declining trend that occurred in 1984 may gather momentum in the coming years.

Sources of funding and channels of distribution

Sources of funding

The bulk of international population assistance (between 75 and 85 per cent) is provided each year by the 17 countries in the Development Assistance Committee (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America). The remaining resources (15-25 per cent) are contributed

by United Nations organizations, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, as well as the World Bank, in the form of loans or credits.

Among the major donors of DAC countries, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States taken together account for most of the population aid. For instance, in 1985, these eight countries alone contributed 94 per cent of all assistance from DAC countries and close to 80 per cent of all population assistance from all sources combined. Thus, the data given in table 17 clearly show that trends in population aid of these countries dominate, to a very large extent, the global picture of population assistance.

As a proportion of gross national product (GNP), the commitments by Norway and Sweden have consistently surpassed all other countries in every year during the past 15-year period. During the recent past, five countries—Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden—have contributed consistently higher-than-average proportions of their GNP to population assistance.

Channels of distribution

International population assistance flows through four channels: *(a)* bilateral channels; *(b)* multilateral channels; *(c)* non-governmental channels; and *(d)* multilateral-bilateral channels. In the early 1960s, most assistance was provided through non-governmental channels. The founding of UNFPA as an organization for population assistance was important in the emergence of the multilateral source as a channel of funding. The complementary character of these channels deserves to be emphasized. Each channel has its own strength, and together they attempt to meet the needs of population assistance in developing countries.

Although data are not yet available to analyse the channels of distribution of all international population assistance, comparable information is available for the commitments of DAC countries. Bilateral aid, once the major route for donor country funding, declined noticeably between 1977 and 1983 as a proportion of the distribution. The bilateral percentage was 44 in 1977, down to 26 in 1983. Between 1977 and 1981, United Nations organizations picked up the difference, their share rising from one third to one half, with non-governmental organizations retaining their one-fifth share. The year 1982 seems to have been a turning-point, with the share of non-governmental organizations rising from 22 to 33 per cent, mainly at the expense of United Nations agencies.

It should be remarked that because the United States accounts for a very large share of the commitments of DAC countries, its channels of distribution disproportionately affect the global shares of bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental organizations channels. The effect of the cut-off of funds to UNFPA by the United States may have been to increase the proportions of the bilateral and non-governmental organizations, with a corresponding decline in the multilateral percentage.

An enormous variation in the percentage share of the various channels of distribution among the 17 DAC countries can be noted. For instance, the bilateral percentage share varies between zero in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Switzerland, to 46 per cent in the United States; the multilateral share similarly ranges from 12 per cent in the United States to over 90 per cent in seven DAC countries; and the organization share is close to 40 per cent in New Zealand, Sweden and the United States.

Fields of population assistance

In view of the fact that there is a large variation in the needs for population assistance among the developing countries and because the component costs of the different activities are not the same, it is useful to analyse the trends in population assistance by sector or field. For the sake of international comparability, sectors of population assistance are defined as projects specific to seven different types of population activities: *(a)* basic data collection, including censuses, vital statistics registration and sample surveys and related sources of population data; *(b)* population dynamics, encompassing social, economic and demographic research on population and training in demography and related fields; *(c)* population policy, including legislative, institutional and awareness-creation activities related to population policy; *(d)* implementation of population policies other than family planning; *(e)* family planning programmes; *(f)* population education and communication; *(g)* special programmes for women, youth, the aged, the disadvantaged etc.; and *(h)* multi-sectoral activities including multidisciplinary training and research, and programme development.

Population assistance data by sector, given in table 18, indicates that family planning programmes have received the largest share throughout the period of analysis. From 65.9 per cent in 1981, the family planning share has successively increased and was over 73 per cent in 1985, only a few percentage points behind the all-time high of 76.6 per cent attained in 1978. A clear trend can be noted for data-collection activities, which are receiving a lower share of assistance. In 1985, only 3.3 per cent was for the support of data collection. Similarly, there is a decline in the share of multi-sectoral activities. The communication and education sector is gaining its share and currently accounts for close to 8 per cent.

Broadly speaking, the first three sectors (data, research and policy) can be considered activities in support of the scientific formulation of population policy, whereas the remaining sectors taken together can be viewed as implementation of population policies. By taking such a broad categorization and comparing the average distributional shares for 1978 and 1979 with those of 1984 and 1985, it can be pointed out that the relative share for policy formulation has basically remained stable, at about 13 per cent, while support for implementation of population policy has also remained unchanging at approximately 87 per cent. It is interesting that these shares are much lower than the corresponding figures for UNFPA-assisted programmes. In 1986-1987, for instance, UNFPA support to policy formulation accounted for 27.1 per cent while 72.9 per cent was devoted to policy implementation. It is clear from this comparison that the Fund emphasizes data, research and policy activities much more than the programmes of either bilateral or non-governmental organizations.

C. Selected substantive and operational issues

A number of substantive and operational issues continue to affect successful formulation and implementation of population policy. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to make a comprehensive analysis of the topic and particularly in view of the fact that a number of other papers have touched upon the subject, only a few issues are raised here.

The first issue is conceptual inadequacies and limited insights from policy research. Although the number of research projects and activities centring around policy issues has increased, there is a lack of systematic approach to the identification of policy-relevant issues, the undertaking of analysis of alternative choices; the understanding of the political process, which influences policy-making in developing countries; and the mechanisms for proper utilization of policy research findings in the formulation and implementation of population policy.

The second issue is the need to develop, in operational terms, an appropriate national population strategy. Several sub-issues of relevance here are:

Table 18. Trends in population assistance, by major sector, 1977-1985

(Percentage)

Major population sector	*1977*	*1978*	*1979*	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*
Basic data collection	2.6	4.38	6.10	6.81	7.54	6.97	4.10	3.70	3.31
Population dynamics	2.8	4.22	6.28	5.24	5.91	6.08	6.21	5.66	5.25
Population policies	1.2	1.60	2.82	2.33	2.44	3.54	3.63	3.35	3.42
Implementation policies	13.3	0.23	1.01	2.61	2.71	0.34	0.35	0.46	0.46
Family planning	75.2	76.64	70.41	66.85	65.94	68.77	69.91	72.16	73.06
Communication and education	2.2	2.72	4.04	4.00	4.25	6.20	8.43	7.74	7.42
Special programmes	0.3	0.63	0.69	0.64	0.83	1.37	0.59	0.69	1.37
Multi-sectoral activities	2.4	9.58	8.65	11.52	10.38	6.73	6.79	6.24	5.71
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Sources: For 1961-1970, Halvor Gille, "Recent trends in international population assistance", in *International Population Assistance: The First Decade*, R. M. Salas, ed. (New York, Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 391; for 1971-1981, A. Thavarajah and S. L. N. Rao, "International assistance for population activities", in *Population, Aid and Development*, Raimondo Cagiano de Azevedo, ed. (Liège, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 1987, p. 37, table 5; and for 1982-1985, United Nations Population Fund, "Global population assistance report", unpublished.

(a) a proper identification of national priorities and goals of population policy; *(b)* an adequate understanding of the linkages between population and development variables and their utilization in the identification of critical target group(s); *(c)* an assessment of complementarity or non-complementarity of population projects *vis-à-vis* projects specific to other sectors; and *(d)* a translation of appropriate findings from social, cultural and anthropological research studies to define programme strategies to influence fertility, mortality and migration through action programmes as well as information, education and communication campaigns.

Thirdly, there exists an inadequacy of financial and human resources, both domestic and international, for the formulation and implementation of population policy and its integration with development planning. Many sub-issues of relevance are:

(a) Given the preoccupation of developing countries with solving more immediate problems, for instance, arising out of structural adjustments, whether they would be able to augment their own resources for the needed population activities;

(b) Whether the private sector play a more important role in international population assistance;

(c) How the cost of technical co-operation can be reduced, while at the same time improving its impact;

(d) Whether an increasing role given to technical co-operation among developing countries will be a viable alternative to traditional technical assistance;

(e) What should be done to improve both the quality and appropriateness of international population assistance.

There are undoubtedly many other issues, but these are starters.

Concluding Remarks

This brief note has attempted to sketch the UNFPA experience in the area of population policy formulation and has presented some data on recent trends in international population assistance. As has been made clear in many other papers, an ever-increasing number of countries are formulating policies on various aspects of population. Substantive demands on the content of population policies can be expected to grow. This combined trend of increasing complexity and a larger number of countries interested in population policy will require a systematic approach to solving conceptual problems, operational issues and institutional difficulties in developing countries and mobilizing the needed resources, both financial and human.

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XV. THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL POPULATION POLICY

*Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane**

In the past several decades, Governments from developing countries in every region of the world have formulated national policies to reduce population growth.[1] Almost all have endorsed international declarations concerning population issues, such as the World Population Plan of Action adopted at the global conference at Bucharest in 1974 or the recommendations adopted at Mexico City in 1984 (United Nations, 1975, pp. 3-25; and 1984, pp. 6-43). In addition, population programmes have become a regular feature of international development co-operation. In order to understand these international responses to population issues, one may begin with the formal decision-making process, which presumes that the key participants are sovereign Governments, unified within themselves and, in most international arenas, legally equal to one another. Other participants are international organizations, which are presumed to act under the guidance of member Governments, and officially recognized non-governmental organizations.[2]

Like other descriptions of institutional processes based in law, however, this depiction does not capture the reality of population policy-making in the contemporary international system. Countries exhibit vast differences in their relative power and influence as well as in their demographic situations. Moreover, they continue to be seriously divided within and among themselves over appropriate policy responses to rapid population growth. Similar divisions can be observed within the secretariats of international organizations. Groups with different approaches disagree on a number of issues as fundamental as: *(a)* what the economic and social consequences of population growth are in various regions; *(b)* what degree of intervention by Governments is desirable; *(c)* how population policies should relate to policies in other sectors; *(d)* what the optimal organizational arrangements are for carrying out policies; and *(e)* the amount of resources that should be devoted to population-related programmes.

Because of these differences, in order to analyse approaches to population policy issues in the international system and to see how the dominant approaches have changed over the past several decades, it is essential to look beyond the formal process in which sovereign Governments and international organizations are the official actors and to adopt a broader concept of policy extending to the way policies are implemented by population assistance donors and by the Governments of developing countries. In short, the focus must be shifted away from the rather abstract, often static quality of official statements of policy goals to the realm of practical politics. In this realm, one finds that the evolution of dominant approaches to population policy has been fundamentally determined not only by long-term demographic and economic processes but by the changing distribution of power and influence in the international system.

Essentially, the international system has moved from one in which the United States wielded near-hegemonic influence over approaches to global economic and social issues during the 1950s and 1960s to a system that more nearly constitutes a polyarchy. That is, policy-making on many economic and social issues has become more "highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (Dahl, 1971, p. 8; see also Brown, 1988). As a consequence of the diffusion of power in the international system, an increasing number of groups with different ideological perspectives have had opportunities to coalesce with one another and exercise influence over policy. The present analysis suggests that the critical actors in interpreting the constraints and opportunities in the international system and in defining alternative approaches to population policy have been

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coalitions whose memberships transcend national and institutional boundaries. These transnational policy coalitions represent groups with common policy preferences who may draw members and supporters from national Governments, international organizations, academia and a vast range of private associations.

Although it is difficult to identify historical turning-points in a complex process involving multiple actors often geographically distant from one another, several distinct periods in the evolution of approaches to population policy have nevertheless been identified. In the post-Second World War period up to 1965, several groups organized themselves into what became the population control coalition, which actively pursued public policies to limit rapid population growth by means of family planning. From approximately 1965 to 1974, the first phase to which attention is given, this ideology dominated international approaches to population policy. Members of the population control coalition tended to view population growth in the developing countries as the equivalent of a global pandemic needing to be brought under quick control. The population control coalition had its greatest strength in the United States, still the dominant global power, while the developing countries at that time were much more dependent upon the Western donor Governments than they are today.

In the second phase, roughly from the time of the Conference at Bucharest in 1974 to 1981, a population planning coalition prevailed. This coalition treated population growth less as a global crisis than as a more localized problem affecting the development prospects of individual countries. It sought to integrate population policy into a larger exercise in planned social change or development planning. Although the population planning coalition had strength in some institutions in the United States, it had a much more geographically and professionally diverse membership than the population control coalition, drawing most of its support from multilateral and non-United States bilateral development agencies, as well as from development planning agencies and other modernizing élites in developing countries. During this period, Governments of developing countries were successfully increasing their bargaining power in the international system while generally pursuing comprehensive and ambitious state-led development strategies at home.

In the third or current phase, roughly since 1981, the population planning coalition still dominates. Yet, as previously noted, the scope of conflict over population policy issues has widened further because the strength of the various coalitions challenging the earlier approaches has increased. The growing importance of these transnational coalitions seems consistent with a more complex and turbulent global political environment in which both the relative influence of the United States and the degree of policy consensus among American élites have diminished considerably. Political competition within many developing countries has also increased. Moreover, the variations in the development progress of third world countries since the 1960s have contributed to disagreement over the importance of population growth as an obstacle to development and over appropriate ends and means of fertility reduction policies.

Before these historical developments are further examined, the concept of transnational policy coalitions should be elucidated, as it is fundamental to this analysis. It derives from previous studies demonstrating the importance of networks and coalitions in domestic policy formulation in the United States, as well as in international decision-making processes related to economic and social issues (Anderson, 1979; Heclo, 1978; Huntington, 1973; Keohane and Nye, 1974; and Jönsson, 1986). Regular communications, contacts and other exchanges facilitate the formation of networks of persons with similar interests and concerns which draw members from both the public and the private sectors. Common professional backgrounds and specialized publications often reinforce the emergence of a relatively coherent perspective. But other conditions also must generally be present in order for networks to evolve into transnational coalitions working towards similar policy objectives. Individuals are more likely to reach out to form coalitions with others when they have policy differences within their own organizations or countries and when central authorities do not exercise strong control or leadership over policy (Keohane and Nye, 1974). For example, groups in the United States who supported population control, including certain State Department officials in the early 1960s, found it useful to work with like-minded counterparts in other countries and in the United Nations system to help create a favourable environment for subsequent changes in the official policy of the United States (Piotrow, 1973).

The strength of coalitions depends upon the degree of cohesion and co-ordination among their members and upon whether they have committed imaginative leadership. Equally important, a coalition is likely to be a more important political force if it has command of money, grass-roots membership, specialized technical information, élite connections or strategic roles in key institutions in the public or private sector. The greater the influence members of a transnational coalition have in the national policy-making systems of powerful countries, the greater the influence the coalition is likely to have in international decision-making arenas. Conversely, the strength of a coalition is likely to decline if its members in leading countries lose influence or if the countries in which it is based become relatively less powerful.

Transnational policy coalitions may exercise and reveal their influence in a number of ways. For instance, they may successfully enlist and support members in different countries. They may obtain official endorsements and create an international climate of support for their preferred approach. In the population field, their impact on broad policy guidelines has been especially apparent in the proceedings and outcomes of major international conferences, such as those held at Geneva and Belgrade in 1965, at Bucharest in 1974, Jakarta in 1981 and at Mexico City in 1984 (Berelson and others, 1966; United Nations, 1966, 1975 and 1984; UNFPA, 1981). These meetings not only may serve to reveal the influence of coalitions but may facilitate the emergence of new coalitions and help cement their sense of identity. Coalitions may help induce co-operative activities among Governments (or other relevant organizations) and may contribute to defining and developing coherent policies and programmes at all levels. They may even be able to bring about the creation of new organizations. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (now called the United Nations Population Fund), for example, was in large measure the result of initiatives taken by members of the population control coalition in the 1960s. More frequently, coalitions can affect the structures and priorities of existing organizations. Organizations become committed to certain ways of doing things, however, and often resist the efforts of a new, dominant coalition to introduce changes.[3]

Although transnational policy coalitions may help to accomplish important tasks in the international system, they also may exhibit other characteristics which hinder their effectiveness. They frequently become inbred, for example, and some coalition members may resist new information or even selectively promote information and analyses that support their predispositions and preferences. Because of the resources required to build and maintain transnational ties, the membership of major coalitions in areas relevant to population and development is primarily drawn from Western élites or from the élites in the developing countries who share Western ideological, professional or religious orientations. By contrast, socialist countries are underrepresented in these coalitions.

As indicated above, the present authors believe the rise and decline of various coalitions have shaped the dominant approaches to population policy over the past several decades. Furthermore, their observations suggest that the objectives, composition and influence of future transnational policy coalitions concerned with population issues will continue to be governed to a great extent by the distribution of power in the international system as well as by larger economic and demographic trends. These ideas are further explored in the remainder of this paper, through a discussion of each major period in the history of international population programmes since 1965. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this analysis for approaches to population policy and for the transmission of population policy experience in the future.

A. Phase I. The population control approach, 1965-1974

Population policies gained prominence in the mid-1960s as a significant vehicle for promoting economic development in the third world. For the first time, major bilateral and multilateral agencies received mandates to provide technical assistance for action programmes in the population field (Symonds and Carder, 1973). The dominant approach to population policy between 1965 and 1974 was embodied in the proceedings of two international conferences held in 1965, one organized by the Population Council at Geneva in August and the other by the United Nations, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and the International Planned Parenthood Federation at Belgrade a few days later in September (Berelson and others, 1966; and United Nations, 1966). Neither of these conferences was an intergovernmental conference; rather, participants were leading population specialists and other interested scholars, activists and policy makers. Both conferences provided a platform for the growing coalition supporting the

propositions that population growth was an urgent global problem and that vigourous, Government-led family planning programmes could reduce fertility.

The global political environment in which these developments occurred was marked by a concentration of power and influence in the United States, which continued to dominate the market economies with its military strength and its central role in world trade and financial relations. The developing countries remained weak, with the income per capita of all but a few less than $600 per annum (1965 prices; see Cox and Jacobson, 1974). Population growth rates in the poorest countries, with two thirds of the population of the developing regions, exceeded 2 per cent per annum, while increases in GNP per capita were averaging only 1.5 per cent per annum from 1960 to 1970 (Blake and Walters, 1976). Most developing countries were highly dependent upon a single major donor for external assistance, often the former colonial power[4] (Wood, 1986). Collective consciousness was just beginning to evolve, through meetings of the non-aligned nations and the newly formed Group of 77.

While disillusionment with foreign aid was spreading in the United States in the 1960s, certain foreign policy élites in the State Department, Congress and the private sector continued to be concerned about global partnership (Gardner and Milliken, 1968). For these élites, international organizations were a desirable avenue—supplementing bilateral aid and trade relations—through which to pursue certain long-term United States objectives of promoting the prosperity and stability of third world countries and their integration into the world market economy.[5] With support from United States policy makers, programmes like the International Development Association (the soft-loan window of the World Bank), the regional development banks, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme were able to establish themselves and grow steadily through the mid-1970s. Although these activities were jointly financed by the Western donor countries and became collective undertakings supported by other developed and developing countries, the leadership role of the United States was crucial. Working in conjunction with other major donors, the Government of the United States could exercise considerable influence with both multilateral development agencies and recipient countries—at least to the point of persuading them to articulate desired policies in many development sectors.

The importance of the Government of the United States in international development co-operation was a critical reason for intergovernmental agencies, on an official level at least, not proceeding ahead of that country on a sensitive issue like population. When the United States reversed its previous "hands-off" posture in 1965, population policy became not only a legitimate subject at the international level but also the focus of an increasingly ambitious international campaign.[6] This campaign grew out of efforts begun in the early 1950s by a transnational coalition committed to reducing population growth in developing countries.

The coalition had three major components: the first, oldest and most international element was the planned parenthood movement, primarily represented in IPPF, which was founded in 1952 with its strongest roots in India, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States (Suitters, 1973). By 1965, IPPF had affiliates in approximately 50 countries, although until the late 1960s, the movement relied upon the fund-raising efforts of American activists for much, if not most of its resources. The second element was comprised of demographers and social scientists, primarily associated with universities in the United States, who also worked through such bodies as the Population Division of the Department of International, Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, IUSSP and the Population Association of America. The final element was made up of philanthropists and private foundations, again based essentially in the United States. It was they who fused knowledge with action and who provided initial resources to population and family planning programmes throughout the world and articulated an overall vision of what needed to be accomplished. In this process, the New York-based Population Council, also founded in 1952 and funded in its earlier years by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, played a leading role. The major strength of this population control coalition was thus in the United States, especially after the coalition succeeded in mobilizing key figures in the foreign policy establishment behind its cause. It also had a growing number of adherents throughout the world, however, primarily in the United Kingdom, in Nordic countries and in Asian and other developing countries that had formerly been British colonies.

What united this coalition more than anything else were two basic ideas: *(a)* that population growth was too rapid to be accommodated by the resources, technology and social institutions likely to become available in the foreseeable future and thus constituted a significant threat to social stability and quality of life not only in individual countries but globally; and *(b)* that large-scale family planning programmes offered a feasible and cost-effective policy response.[7] Programmes that had begun in the 1950s and early 1960s in Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China became models, which, it was hoped and expected, other, poorer countries could emulate (Berelson and others, 1966; Keeny, 1969; Kanagaratnam, 1969; Chow, 1969; Berelson, 1969[b]). These programmes appeared to have succeeded with heavily subsidized clinic-based services supported by information, education and communications efforts through the mass media and home visits. Other models for family planning programmes came from experience in the public health field with large-scale immunization and disease eradication programmes, and in agriculture, with "green revolution" programmes to introduce miracle grains.[8]

Beliefs about the family planning approach to population policy rested to a great extent on assumptions about women's motivation to practise family planning, their ability to make independent decisions concerning child-bearing and to find sources of self-esteem outside the family, and their ability to communicate freely with their husbands about fertility control.[9] Along with their optimistic view of individual motivations, members of the coalition failed to appreciate the economic and social roles of children in non-Western families.[10] The expectation of the population control coalition that family planning programmes would be effective was rooted in a liberal faith that new knowledge and information, directed to individuals, would be sufficient to produce a change in behaviour. The coalition was confident that the new fertility control methods becoming available, primarily intrauterine devices (IUDs) and oral contraceptives, could be readily used by a broad cross-section of women. It was also convinced, although not always publicly, of the need to liberalize abortion policies.[11]

The sense of urgency that coalition members felt about reducing fertility often led them to reject proposals to "integrate" family planning with health services, except as a long-range ideal. In the words of the Secretary-General of IPPF in his address to the Geneva Conference in 1965, "you cannot integrate with something that does not exist" (Deverell, 1966, p. 793). In general, members of the population control coalition sought to channel resources to the public and private sector organizations that they considered most likely to spread the family planning message quickly and effectively. Despite their identification with the population control cause, leading coalition members showed no strong inclination to support financial incentives for acceptors of family planning. Frank Notestein, then President of the Population Council, told the same audience: "It is quite possible that to poor and harassed people financial inducements will amount to coercion and not to an enlargement of their freedom of choice" (Notestein, 1966, p. 829).[12]

Although many groups and individuals involved in development research or action programmes were sceptical about the assumptions of the population control coalition, the policies and programmes adopted both by international agencies and by countries tended to incorporate the dominant approach. In 1965, a Population Branch was created in the United States Agency for International Development and later renamed the Office of Population. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities, initiated in 1967 as a small voluntary trust fund, was endowed with significant funds by Western donors in 1969 and given a mandate to energize the rest of the United Nations system as well as to assist countries directly. UNFPA supported new units in a number of agencies directed primarily towards promoting family planning, notably the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. In 1968, the president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, announced his commitment to population control, and in 1970 a Population Projects Department was established.[13] IPPF, although it had already been in existence for many years, experienced a sudden growth spurt beginning in 1967, as it too received an infusion of funds from Western donor Governments.

The population control coalition also influenced the formulation and, to some extent, the implementation of national policies. After 1965, an additional 27 developing countries adopted policies to reduce population growth, bringing to 33 the total number of developing countries with officially announced policies (in 1974). In the same period, an additional 26 Governments began to support family planning services purportedly for other than demographic reasons. By 1975, some 77 per cent of the developing

world lived in countries with official policies to reduce population growth, and an additional 15 per cent lived in countries whose Governments supported family planning (Nortman, 1975). In implementing its policy, Pakistan, for example, created an organizationally autonomous family planning programme providing services through clinics, mobile units, and IUD and sterilization camps. In India, the programme, although more closely integrated administratively with the health system, followed a similar service model. Both programmes set ambitious demographic targets, while stressing their reliance upon information and education through the mass media and outreach workers as the means of attracting clients (Finkle, 1972).[14] With a few variations, other countries, such as Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and the Philippines, enunciated similar strategies when they began their national population programmes. The inclination to establish organizationally separate population programmes, both at the national and at the international level, clearly presented short-term advantages, although the result was to erect communications barriers between population and other development programmes.

By the early 1970s, this phase began to draw to a close as several trends became evident. The first trend was that programmes using the service-oriented model described were simply not having much impact on fertility in most poor countries. Population and development specialists often disagreed on whether the problems were due more to the design of the programmes or to failures in their implementation. The second trend was that the population control strategy had little appeal in most of Africa and Latin America, and even within Asian and African Governments with "strong" policies the programmes had continued to face difficult struggles for support. Lastly, the way programmes were being carried out was producing a negative reaction among groups—especially the international health community—who felt that the progress of family planning depended upon building up health systems and that the safety and quality of services were being sacrificed in the rush to achieve demographic objectives (Finkle and Crane, 1976; United States House of Representatives, 1973).

A new transnational population planning coalition began to form around a different approach to population policy. The growth of this coalition was facilitated by the increasing role of multilateral organizations in both population and development assistance as well as by the preparations for a World Population Conference to be held at Bucharest. However, as is discussed below, even more important to the ability of this coalition to gain ascendancy were emerging forces in the global political environment.

B. Phase II. The population planning approach, 1974-1981

The new directions that would appear in international approaches to population policy in this phase became dramatically visible in August 1974, when the first global intergovernmental conference devoted to population issues was convened by the United Nations at Bucharest. At that Conference, rather than accept the proposition that population stabilization is a prerequisite of development, third world delegates repeated the collective call they had issued earlier that year for a New International Economic Order (Finkle and Crane, 1975). After much debate, the developing countries accepted a World Population Plan of Action which incorporated new language, including the assertion that "the basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation" (United Nations, 1975, para. 1). The position taken by the developing countries and adopted at the Conference gave greater force to a new mandate for national and international agencies in the population field not to emphasize family planning, but rather to pursue closer links between population and other development policies. Prior to the Conference, the drafters of the Plan had outlined the basic elements of this mandate, in which a central principle is stated as follows:

> "Population measures and programmes should be integrated into comprehensive social and economic plans and programmes and this integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and organizations for planning within the countries. In general, it is suggested that a unit dealing with population aspects be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative structure and that such a unit be staffed with qualified persons from the relevant disciplines." (United Nations, 1975, para. 95)

The Plan is imbued throughout with faith in the potential efficacy of comprehensive development planning. After reference to a long series of international resolutions concerned with development strategies and planning, the Plan announces that its "explicit aim" was "to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development"; and without insisting on fertility reduction policies for all countries, the Plan neverthe-

less proposes that "...countries which consider their birth-rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985" (United Nations, 1975, paras. 1 and 37). The Plan further demonstrates the new breadth of vision by delineating a long series of measures that Governments might take to attain their demographic goals, including reduction of infant and child mortality, improving the status of women, promoting more equitable income distribution, changing the age of marriage etc. The Plan acknowledges the legitimacy of incentive and disincentive schemes, while simultaneously admonishing that such schemes should not violate human rights.

The Conference at Bucharest occurred at a time when changes in the global political environment were converging. In the early 1970s, the developing countries had become significantly more cohesive in international arenas (Jacobson, 1984). After the oil price increase imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-1974, leaders of the developing countries believed they could benefit from the leverage provided by OPEC control of the oil market and could bargain collectively for economic concessions from the West. They saw the advantage of stressing the external causes of their development difficulties, focusing on the world trade and financial system. Working as a bloc, the developing countries were able to gain considerable influence in international organizations (Krasner, 1985). Leaders of such countries as India, Indonesia, Kenya and Mexico were pragmatic, however, in their recognition that they could neither overturn the world economic order nor ignore domestic problems like population growth. Hopes remained high during the 1970s that progress could be made through planned economic and social change and that the state could successfully channel capital from both public and private sources in the West to those ends.[15]

During this period of increasing bargaining power for the developing countries, the United States was losing influence both with its allies and throughout the world (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984; Avery and Rabkin, 1982). Although Europe and Japan were shown to be more vulnerable to OPEC during the 1973 oil crisis, they had nevertheless gained sufficient economic strength to compete effectively with the United States, and the energy crisis itself exposed rifts among the Western countries. During the 1970s, these rifts were also deepening over East-West and security issues as the sense of the Soviet threat diminished. The defeat in Viet Nam provided perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the limits on the power of the United States. At the same time, its monetary and trade position was worsening. Spurred by renewed realization that the United States could neither accomplish its goals unilaterally nor as easily impose its preferences on other countries, American leaders during the 1970s strengthened commitments to some existing multilateral mechanisms, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and were active in the creation of new ones, such as the North-South dialogue between 1975 and 1977 (the Conference on International Economic Co-operation) and the annual Western economic summit. American leaders joined other Western policy makers in the 1970s in beginning to see aid less as a means of providing the capital and infrastructure for industrialization and more as a framework for supporting policies and programmes to alleviate poverty and meet basic human needs (Pastor, 1980). These objectives implied a need for more comprehensive planning and co-ordination by recipient Governments in developing socially oriented strategies to foster both rural and urban development (Streeten, 1981; Jolly, 1976). The promotion of human resources—through education, employment, nutrition and, to some extent, health—was elevated in importance.

This environment fostered the ascendancy of a new transnational coalition which might be described as the population planning coalition and which assumed the task of linking fertility reduction objectives to the broadened development agenda. The strongest and most influential component of the population planning coalition included national and international civil servants with responsibilities in the area of population policy. Unlike the members of the population control coalition, however, these officials also were in close contact with the wider international development community and were more sensitive to new trends in development strategies. The population planning perspective was most actively defined and pursued by officials based in United Nations agencies—as well as in some European and third world Governments, the higher echelons of the United States Agency for International Development and the relevant committees of the United States Congress.

Many of the basic ideas of the population planning coalition originated with development thinkers from European, Nordic and third world countries.[16] But it was policy analysts and social scientists with a special interest in population, often based in universities and

organizations in the United States, who did most to articulate and disseminate the population planning perspective (see Wyon and Gordon, 1971; Mamdani, 1972; McGreevey and others, 1972; Tabbarah, 1973; Rich, 1973; Kocher, 1973). In the foundation world as well, a reaction by some leading foundation staff against the population control approach helped prepare the way for a landmark statement by John D. Rockefeller at Bucharest, in which he confessed "disappointment" with the "family planning approach" and called for "population planning" as an "integral part of any modern development program", one that seeks to provide jobs and meet basic needs (Rockefeller, 1978). In 1975, the Population Council initiated the *Population and Development Review*, which became a major forum for diverse perspectives on issues of population planning; and in 1976 a new president from outside the population field assumed leadership of the Council.[17]

Members of the population planning coalition were generally discontented with the limited strategy of the population control coalition and its failure to pursue approaches beyond the family planning service models described earlier. Like the population controllers, the population planners saw rapid population growth as harmful to development, but their perceptions were tempered by greater cognizance of the complexity of the development process and the many other factors involved. This coalition was less impressed by alarmist projections of trends in global population growth—or in the growth of the third world (Demeny, 1975). Members of the coalition also discounted the links that were claimed to exist between population growth and global peace and security. Instead, they were more concerned with the consequences of high birth rates for aggravating poverty in individual countries, large or small, and for causing stress in certain sectors. They also focused more on the implications of high fertility for maternal and child health.

More than the population control coalition, population planners endorsed a leading role for government (as opposed to the private sector) in efforts to reduce fertility.[18] Most were sceptical, however, about what could be accomplished by concentrating resources—especially external assistance—on the training, salaries, commodities and other elements directly required for family planning services. In contrast to the relatively optimistic expectations that had prevailed in the population control coalition, population planners saw progress in promoting family planning as more of a long-term endeavour.

What had united population planners more than anything else was their interest in what could be done to increase the motivation of people to practise family planning. They favoured further research on the determinants of fertility, as they believed Governments should accelerate the changes in economic and social conditions conducive to lower fertility. Most advocated various types of incentives to encourage individuals and communities to limit child-bearing. The Chinese model exerted a powerful influence on population planners (McNicoll, 1975; Brown, 1974). Consistent with their emphasis on motivation, population planners supported the integration of family planning services and related communications efforts with other development activities, such as rural development projects or women's employment projects. Functional integration with primary health care was seen as particularly desirable by most population planners because of their assumptions that improving health care would decrease infant and child mortality and that providing family planning in conjunction with health services would reach clients more effectively.

Following the Conference at Bucharest, various donor agencies, including the USAID Office of Population, under pressure from other parts of the agency and Congress, undertook new programme initiatives and, in some cases, reorganizations based on the concept of "integration" (Wolfson, 1978). The World Bank developed more multi-sectoral projects, and during 1978 and 1979 it took steps towards a new organizational integration of lending operations for population with those for health and nutrition. Both the Bank and UNFPA sought to strengthen their roles in the overall analysis of countries' needs in the population sector. A number of international agencies, most notably UNFPA, assisted Governments in establishing special population units in their development planning agencies, not just to improve technical expertise in demography but to create what was thought to be a more powerful voice on behalf of comprehensive population policies. Some Governments attempted to design and implement large-scale integrated rural development projects or income-generating projects for women that included family planning components. Various forms of incentives for providers and clients of family planning programmes also became more common[19] (UNFPA, 1980; David, 1982; Jacobsen, 1983).

Despite its broad international base of support, the population planning coalition encountered intense scepticism from adherents of the population control perspective in its efforts to translate its approach into specific policies and programmes. This scepticism reflected the convictions of many population controllers that family planning could still prove itself if given adequate support. Resistance to the population planning approach was also due to vested interests in the existing structures and objectives of family planning programmes. Among the donor agencies, opposition was particularly strong in the Office of Population of USAID. Even after leadership of the Office was changed under the 1978 reorganization, and greater programming responsibilities were given to USAID regional bureau and country missions, the Office sought to maintain its emphasis on population control and family planning services. Because the Office was the largest single source of population assistance and had the strongest field structure in key countries of any of the population donors, it was able to continue supporting national family planning programmes with a heavy emphasis on vertical service delivery rather than on the more complex demand-oriented approaches favoured by the population planning coalition.

By the end of the 1970s, efforts to implement population planning approaches, like the population control approach before them, had generally failed to achieve dramatic results in reducing fertility. A possible exception was China, although the transferability of the Chinese experience to other countries was subject to much disagreement.[20] Population planning approaches attracted criticism because of their perceived cost and complexity (see, for example, Simmons, 1979; Wolfson, 1978; Ness, 1981). Others were uncomfortable with their inattention to the need for well-informed clients and for improvements in the quality of family planning services (Warwick, 1982). Still others were simply disappointed that other development sectors had been slow to incorporate demographic considerations in their programmes.

The dialogue on these issues at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was largely confined to groups and organizations already involved in international population and family planning programmes. New forces were appearing from different parts of the ideological spectrum, however, that were questioning the ethical basis of population and family planning programmes and in some cases the ethics of family planning itself. These forces would increase pressure on population planners to redefine their priorities and seek broader support for their programmes.

C. Phase III. Competitive Pluralism in Population Policy Approaches, 1981-Present

The population control and population planning approaches had always faced challenges from groups with different perspectives, but in the early 1980s, these groups began to have a more visible impact on policy deliberations. For example, in 1981, UNFPA, IPPF and the Population Council organized a conference at Jakarta, Indonesia, on Family Planning in the 1980s, which was intended to prepare for the decade ahead (UNFPA, 1981). As reflected in statements and recommendations included in the final report, the participants, 133 population and family planning specialists from 63 countries, introduced some new principles to guide family planning programmes.

First, they placed less emphasis on modernization and social change as prerequisites of fertility reduction. As the very title of the Conference suggested, participants were determined to renew commitment to the more limited objective of providing family planning services to individuals and couples desiring them. The family planning focus as expressed at the Conference and in other subsequent decisions and actions concerning international population programmes did not signify a return to the population control perspective, however. Instead, new stress was given to respect for local values and cultural traditions. Greater sensitivity was shown to the needs of different segments of society, notably women, but also adolescents and those with strong religious identifications. The earlier faith in comprehensive, centrally planned approaches gave way to emphasis on decentralization, broad participation in population policy formulation, community participation in developing and carrying out programmes and the "user perspective". A greater role for non-governmental organizations, both private voluntary associations and profit-making enterprises, was envisioned. A more sceptical view of incentives, in particular, cash incentives paid to family planning acceptors, was expressed.

These themes became even more prominent in the resolutions adopted at the second intergovernmental population conference, held at Mexico City in 1984, a decade after Bucharest (United Nations, 1984). The recommendations of the Conference still promote multifaceted population policies, as had the 1974

World Population Plan of Action, but they attach greatest urgency to Governments making family planning services universally available. Reflecting what some consider to be an important change from the Bucharest Plan, which invites countries to consider setting quantitative population growth targets, recommendation 13 of the International Conference substitutes the suggestion that countries consider pursuing "relevant demographic policies" (United Nations, 1984, p. 19).

The consensus statements that emerged from the conferences at Jakarta and Mexico City actually represent accommodations by the population planning coalition to the more heterogeneous political environment that would characterize the 1980s. Not only is the United States Government still in a weaker position internationally than it was in the 1960s, but since 1981, it also has been more internally divided on foreign policy issues. Conservative members of the Administration have been able to have their greatest influence on those issues where domestic interest groups are least well organized, such as issues involving multilateral organizations and development assistance. Conservatives favour private enterprise and believe in a minimal role for the State in economic development; and they are unenthusiastic about supporting either multilateral or bilateral aid, except for humanitarian purposes.[21] Within international agencies themselves, most notably the World Bank, the new approaches espoused by the Government of the United States have competed with earlier philosophies of development, for example, the planning orientation and basic-needs approaches that had prevailed in the 1970s.

The other major group of actors in the international system, the developing countries, also have been less unified and less able to pursue the agenda of the New International Economic Order and the state-dominated development strategies that attracted them in the 1970s. Economic and demographic stratification among developing countries has greatly increased, and the weakening of OPEC has reduced their leverage in collective bargaining with the West. On the national level, the economic reversals of the late 1970s and early 1980s caused by new oil price shocks, commodity price declines, high interest rates and mounting debt have put many Governments of developing countries in a shakier position both financially and politically and made them less able to support social programmes. In the absence of strong central leadership or control, resolution of population policy issues in many countries has been more difficult. Faced with multiple demands, even autocratic leaders have been reluctant to invest their political capital in fertility limitation. Therefore, they have depended more upon consensus-building processes to generate support for policies. In a few countries, such as Brazil, Kenya, Nigeria and the Philippines, struggles over the organization and strategies of family planning programmes have become more intense and overt.

Policy disagreements within developing countries during the 1980s often have been exacerbated by the strengthening of transnational networks and coalitions in several sectors involving participants from both Western and developing countries and, to varying degrees, from international agencies as well. After 1978, networks concerned with primary health care and child survival gained new strength, along with increased donor spending for these purposes. Women's networks also became more active, both among radical feminists and women's health advocates and among groups and organizations involved in working with women in the developing countries. Lastly, the right-to-life movement, with support from religious conservatives in the United States, expanded its international base. Representatives of the Catholic Church, mobilized under the leadership of Pope John Paul II after 1979, became much more active in opposing abortion and artificial contraception and in promoting natural family planning. International conferences, augmented by communications through the mass media and specialized journals and publications, have contributed to shared perceptions and cohesiveness among national groups which might otherwise have worked quite independently (World Health Organization, 1978; Ashworth, 1982; Santamaria and others, 1980).

Important groups in each of the networks referred to here regard earlier international approaches to population policy with suspicion or even hostility. In the health sector, many professionals see family planning programmes, in the words of the Director-General of WHO, as "imposing a vertical structure which has nothing to do with people's understanding" (IPPF, 1979, p. 28). Alternatively, he proposes primary health care as the answer to extending family planning coverage (IPPF, 1979; Mahler, 1984). Activists and writers involved in international women's issues see population policies and programmes as having been dominated by men and as having given higher priority to demographic objectives than to meeting the reproductive health needs of women (Hartmann, 1987; Rogow, 1987; Mies, 1987). Members of the international right-to-

life movement, whose major objective is to stop abortion, have also mobilized against population policies and family planning programmes. They argue that population growth poses few obstacles to development, that family planning programmes are usually coercive and that promoting the use of artificial methods of contraception contributes to irresponsible sexual behaviour (Kasun, 1981; Riches, 1986; McHugh, 1984). Although the three categories of groups described above seldom work together, overlapping memberships and cross-fertilization of ideas are not uncommon (Feldman, 1987).

Although leading groups within international health, women's and religious networks have been critical of the premises underlying population and family planning programmes, their strongest objections have focused on particular fertility control methods and delivery systems. Within these networks, there are also groups that are, in principle, highly supportive of fertility reduction objectives and of the rights of individuals to determine the number and spacing of their children. Because of the ability of these groups to reach to the grass-roots level in developing countries, they have the potential to improve understanding of fertility regulation, convey information and facilitate access to services. For example, health systems represent a primary means of reaching people. Organizations working with women—in income-generating activities, women's health or community service—can also be influential. Lastly, by promoting the concept of responsible parenthood and natural family planning methods, Catholic institutions at the local level can draw new people into the practice of family planning. What the population planning coalition has been compelled to accept, however, is that these groups will become involved with family planning only on their own terms. Each has demanded more support for its own objectives, whether these involve building up health infrastructure, serving women's educational and reproductive health needs or promoting natural family planning.

In recent years, the population planning coalition has tried to work more closely with these networks. For example, major conferences were held recently on health and family planning with the objective of raising the consciousness of health and child survival professionals of the health benefits of family planning (Isaacs and Fincancioglu, 1987). New initiatives have also been directed to organizations of medical practitioners, such as the International Federation of Gynecologists and Obstetricians. At the international women's conference at Nairobi in 1985, population planning groups were well represented. More recently, the Population Council has sponsored meetings to work with feminist leaders on contraceptive technology issues, and UNFPA has created a special women's unit and has supported meetings featuring women's concerns (UNFPA and others, 1986). In addition, donor agencies have funded conferences on natural family planning as well as education and services through Catholic and other organizations (van Arendonk, 1985; International Federation for Family Life Promotion, 1985).

In order to gain the co-operation of these groups and to reach clients more effectively, international agencies involved in population have also been seeking to channel more assistance through non-governmental organizations. The dilemma for these agencies in pursuing a more decentralized, private sector-oriented approach is that the aid framework is often not conducive to working effectively with non-governmental organizations. Public donor agencies tend to impose strict accountability requirements on intermediaries, while Governments of host countries also seek to limit and control spending through non-governmental organizations. Moreover, although the population planning coalition has sought to accommodate to a more complex demographic and political environment in shifting the emphasis away from comprehensive "top down" approaches, the basic convictions of its members—that rapid population growth is a significant obstacle to development in the poorest countries and that public policies to accelerate the process of fertility decline are desirable—have not changed. Population planners thus tend to be impatient with the scattered, often experimental quality of non-governmental organization efforts. Many question how well broader policies can be implemented without the resources, authority and administrative involvement of Governments. Members of the population planning coalition have therefore supported and participated in several quasi-private organizations that are continuing to promote population policy development, especially in Africa, as intermediaries of the USAID Office of Population and UNFPA.

At the international level, in the absence of a central Government, it is possible for a variety of perspectives to coexist, with different agencies, or units within agencies, emphasizing different population policy approaches. International resolutions and conference documents tend to slide over differences or allow for multiple interpretations. The guiding principle is that policy formulation and co-ordination are the sovereign responsibility of each Government.

Intense conflicts are thus more likely to arise at the country level. With the multiplicity of transnational actors now involved in population policy issues, differences over population issues may be fuelled not only by indigenous political forces but also by outside influences exercised through transnational contacts. This process may be healthy—as in Brazil or India (since the end of the emergency)—if national decision-making procedures allow for representation of different viewpoints of groups in the society, use of information from a variety of sources and resolutions that are responsive to local considerations. But if the policy process is not relatively open and if coalitions of outsiders and national groups are able to "short-circuit" the process, thus alienating and excluding other politically important groups, the costs may be high. The process may bring short-run benefits to the coalitions involved but at the same time it may yield policies and programmes that are rendered ineffective because of their lack of broad-based support. Countries in Africa may be particularly susceptible to these patterns of influence.

D. The international transmission of population policy experience: conclusion and implications

This paper has advanced an explanation for changing approaches to population policy at the international level based on conditions in the global political economy and on bargaining processes among transnational policy coalitions. The accessibility of demographic information and other population-related knowledge, patterns of information flows and learning processes may also accelerate or retard policy changes. Yet, even in the supposedly "policy neutral" setting of multilateral agencies, the interpretation of information related to population growth, fertility behaviour and fertility reduction programmes is seldom independent of political and ideological considerations. Consequently, those who wish to improve the quality of decision-making will be more effective if they begin with an accurate understanding of the changing political and organizational environment in which knowledge and information will be used by policy makers.

First, officials of international development agencies, both bilateral and multilateral, have tended to see their role as fostering consensus and co-operation among Governments. But the analysis undertaken here reveals the importance in population policy-making of transnational networks in different sectors and related coalitions that espouse particular approaches or viewpoints transcending national concerns. International agencies could reinforce the initiatives that have already been taken to bring together in various combinations representatives of public and private sector organizations or representatives of religious groups, health professionals, women's groups and population planners. Task forces and study groups, special publications and joint projects are some of the mechanisms that could be employed. Facilitating the search for common ground among the various groups at the international level might help in the resolution of policy conflicts at the national level and in more effective implementation of population and family planning programmes. International agencies can play a more constructive role in this process if they themselves have avoided being identified too closely with particular transnational policy coalitions.

Secondly, international development programmes in the past have tended to transmit policy information and ideas primarily from North to South. Now, however, developing countries can claim more experience of their own in the various aspects of population issues. Rather than participate in Western-led transnational networks that are pursuing their own ideological or professional agendas, the relevant policy networks in various countries—whether population or health specialists, women or even religious leaders—may have more to gain from contacts and exchanges with diverse groups from other developing countries. Shared observations and experiences are likely to be far more meaningful than internationally sanctified formulae or nostrums, such as "integrated programmes," "community participation", "primary health care" or even "natural family planning".

Lastly, consensus-building through international conferences and preparatory meetings as they are currently structured is often an unproductive process. The pattern appears to be one in which intellectual issues are addressed by experts first, as in the four major meetings held prior to the Conference at Mexico City. These expert deliberations tend to give scant consideration to the political and organizational aspects of how to achieve desired policy objectives. Expert meetings are then followed by intergovernmental meetings, the deliberations of which make limited use of the expert findings and which tend to focus their efforts on prescribing long menus of policy responses. In an alternative model, however, preparatory meetings could be organized in a way that would do more to bring together in their individual capacities experts (e.g., demographers,

policy analysts and other family planning and development professionals) and decision makers (e.g., government officials with responsibilities in the population area and representatives of non-governmental organizations). The purpose of these encounters would be to examine specific policy-relevant issues in an atmosphere that would promote learning by both categories of participants. Workshops or mid-career internships and fellowship programmes could also contribute to this two-way learning.

The outcomes of exchanges like those described above—among different sectors, among groups from developing countries and between experts and decision makers—could be incorporated in publications and could also be made available to decision-making bodies at different levels. Instead of the types of overall formulae or approaches advocated by some of the coalitions described in this analysis, the goal of these exchanges should be to encourage more flexible, knowledge-based government policies in the population field.

NOTES

1 The focus of this paper on policies concerning fertility reduction and population growth reflects the authors' interests and previous research. In addition, policies designed to reduce fertility have encountered greater obstacles to acceptance in both national and international decision-making arenas than have policies concerning mortality, migration and distribution, which have been incorporated more readily into the mainstream concerns of health and development planning, respectively. Issues arising from low fertility in the developed countries may elicit increasing attention at the international level, but they are less likely to require either policy analysis or material assistance from international organizations to the countries affected. Although the areas of controversy and the "actors" involved in mortality, migration and other demographic issues are different, it may still be possible to generalize elements of the analysis presented here beyond the politics of fertility and population limitation.

2 Leading international organizations include the United Nations, through the Population Division of its Secretariat and the United Nations Population Fund; the World Health Organization, the World Bank and other United Nations agencies. Leading non-governmental organizations include the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population and the International Planned Parenthood Federation.

3 The types of obstacles presented to the population control coalition by existing organizational structures, priorities and procedures in the World Bank are discussed in Crane and Finkle (1981).

4 In 1965, financing from the Governments of Western industrialized countries was the single largest source of external capital for developing countries (about 52 per cent of the total). Ten years later, it was only 27 per cent (Wood, 1986, p. 83).

5 Senator J. William Fulbright, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, took the lead in the 1960s in advocating more multilateral aid (see Fulbright, 1967).

6 Excellent accounts of the key individuals and chronological events in this campaign can be found in Symonds and Carder (1973) and in Piotrow (1973).

7 Further insights into the assumptions of the population control coalition can be found in Warwick (1982, pp. 33-39).

8 It is notable that the leaders of the three major international agencies in the population field from 1969 to the early 1980s were a public health physician with a background in immunization programmes and epidemiology in the United States (the USAID Office of Population), a physician who had been a family planning leader in Singapore (the World Bank) and a former official from the Philippine Government whose primary responsibility had been to help improve rice production (UNFPA).

9 The view that women were eager to adopt family planning is well reflected in an article by the head of USAID Office of Population (Ravenholt, 1969, pp. 124-125).

10 Caldwell (1976) drew attention to family structure and intergenerational flows of wealth as determinants of fertility.

11 This perspective is strongly implied, for example, in Freymann (1969, p. 325) and Freedman (1969a).

12 Scepticism about incentives was also expressed by Berelson (1969a).

13 The population control perspective was well reflected in the World Bank basic policy paper in the population field (World Bank, 1972).

14 One observer comments on the media campaign carried out in India between 1966 and 1969, "...the messages carried were primarily merely informative rather than motivation oriented". Ledbetter (1984, p. 746).

15 This perspective was fundamental to the work of the Brandt Commission on North-South issues between 1977 and 1979 (see Brandt and others, 1980). For an account of the historical and intellectual roots of the ideology of planning, see Myrdal (1968, pp. 707-740).

16 The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex in England was an important intellectual influence. See writings by IDS economists, for example, Singer (1964), Seers (1972) and Jolly (1976). A leading exponent of more attention to social sectors in development planning, including population policy, was the Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal (1968). Although Myrdal provides an intellectual framework for incorporating population considerations into development planning, the assumptions and strategies he articulates in his book on population policy issues reflect more of the population control approach that prevailed at the time.

17 At a Conference at Bellagio in 1977, the President of the Population Council, George Zeidenstein (1977) delineated the population planning approach as it applied to the work of the Council. Significantly, he also expressed continued support for "single sector" family planning programmes and anticipated some of the themes which would come to the fore in the 1980s, emphasizing decentralization, quality of services and women's concerns.

18 The relative neglect of a role for the private sector is exemplified in a paper prepared for a UNFPA expert meeting after Bucharest by Urquidi (1976). On the same topic, Carl Wahren, a Swedish Government official and planned parenthood leader, reported to IPPF in 1975: "I witnessed open hostility to NGO's in the working group (on the World Population Plan of Action) at the (Bucharest) Conference, and then saw a similar pattern at regional follow-up meetings" (Wahren, 1975).

[19] India embarked on a course of its own led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son, Sanjay, which resulted in instances of compulsory sterilization. Significantly, by 1977, after the fall of her Government, the new Ministry of Health and Family Welfare issued a revised statement of policy embracing a set of principles more consonant with the population planning perspective. (Ledbetter, 1984; Mitra, 1977).

[20] For a discussion of the Chinese case that reflects these uncertainties, see Ness and Ando (1984, pp. 101-113).

[21] See an interview on foreign aid with a key member of the Reagan transition team, Edwin J. Fuelner, Jr., of the Heritage Foundation (*The New York Times*, 1 March 1981).

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