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**Department of International Economic and Social Affairs
Population Studies, No. 70**

**WORLD POPULATION
TRENDS AND POLICIES
1979 Monitoring Report**

**VOLUME II
Population Policies**



**UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1980**

NOTE

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In some tables, the designations "developed" and "developing" economies are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development process.

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PREFACE

The World Population Plan of Action, adopted by the United Nations World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974, recommended that monitoring of population trends and policies "should be undertaken continuously as a specialized activity of the United Nations and reviewed biennially by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, beginning in 1977".¹ The present report is the second in the series of reports on this activity; the report on the first round was prepared in 1977.²

The outline of the present report was based on the discussion at the nineteenth session of the Population Commission.³ In addition to a general survey of the world population situation, special topics dealing with the interrelationships between population and development were included, emphasizing such important areas as demographic aspects of income distribution; association between levels and trends in fertility and in socio-economic variables; demographic aspects of the integration of women in development; implications of rural-urban migration for development; population, food and nutrition; and population and education.

Prior to the report on the first round of monitoring, the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat had carried out numerous assessments of population trends. Mention should be made, for instance, of *The World Population Situation in*

1970,⁴ *Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 7—1963, with special reference to conditions and trends of fertility in the world*,⁵ *Levels and Trends of Fertility throughout the World, 1950–2000*,⁶ *The Situation and Recent Trends of Mortality in the World*,⁷ *Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920–2000*,⁸ and three consecutive reports⁹ on *World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963, 1968 and 1973*.

The present report on the monitoring of population policies includes an analysis of Governments' perceptions and policies with respect to population growth, mortality, fertility, spatial distribution and international migration. Detailed tables are presented in an annex.

The Population Commission at its twentieth session, held in February 1979, reviewed a draft of this report and reiterated the view it expressed at its nineteenth session that monitoring of population trends and policies was an essential service to countries as well as to the international community. The Commission recommended that the report should be published and made available to Governments and to all institutions interested in population studies.

Acknowledgement is due to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities whose grant made this publication possible.

¹Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, 1974 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.XIII.3), part one, chap. I, para. 107.

²United Nations publications, Sales Nos. 78.XIII.3 and 4.

³See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/5913)*, particularly para. 73.

⁴United Nations publication, Sales No. E.71.XIII.4.

⁵United Nations publication, Sales No. 64.XIII.2.

⁶United Nations publication, Sales No. 77.XIII.2.

⁷United Nations publication, Sales No. 62.XIII.2.

⁸United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.XIII.3.

⁹United Nations publications, Sales Nos. 66.XIII.2, E.72.XIII.4 and E.76.XIII.4.

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Explanatory notes

The following symbols have been used in the tables throughout the report:

Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.

A dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible.

A blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable.

A minus sign (–) indicates a deficit or decrease, except as indicated.

A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals.

A slash (/) indicates a crop year or financial year, e.g., 1970/71.

Use of a hyphen (–) between dates representing years, e.g., 1971–1973, signifies the full period involved, including the beginning and end years.

Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals, because of rounding.

Reference to dollars (\$) indicates United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.



Part Three
POPULATION POLICIES

INTRODUCTION

The report on monitoring of population policies was prepared in accordance with a recommendation of the World Population Plan of Action, adopted by the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974, that monitoring of population trends and policies "should be undertaken continuously as a specialized activity of the United Nations and reviewed biennially by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, beginning in 1977."¹

The present report on population policies is divided into five chapters, dealing with population growth, mortality, fertility, spatial distribution and international migration. The first four chapters consist of introductory remarks, sections covering the major issues and changes in demographic behaviour in each of the areas of responsibility of the regional commissions and some general concluding remarks. The fifth chapter, on international migration, is organized differently: it examines major migration flows and selected topics of current concern. It must be mentioned that several of the chapters give greater emphasis to particular geographical regions (the chapter on mortality to the area of responsibility of the Economic Commission for Africa, that on fertility to the area of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific etc.), as those topics were considered to be priority areas by a majority of the countries in the respective regions.

The present report is somewhat different from the report on the first round of monitoring, issued in 1977.² However, the same tables have been retained and have been updated to reflect changes in perceptions and policies since 1976.³ Whereas the first monitoring report concentrated largely on categories of perceptions and policies by region and by level of de-

velopment, the second round focuses to a greater extent on measures, examining the experience of a number of selected countries. This approach was taken when it was determined that, during the period 1976-1978, changes in governmental perceptions and policies at world level had not been great. Therefore, rather than repeat the previous monitoring exercise, it was decided that it would be useful to examine broad changes in each of the geographical statistical regions,⁴ illustrated by the experience of selected countries. The brief country studies included in the text are drawn largely from the replies to the Fourth Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development, as those replies provided the most recent information available on governmental perceptions and policies. Of course, the material from the Fourth Inquiry has been heavily supplemented by material from the Population Policy Data Bank, particularly for an area, such as that of the Economic Commission for Western Asia, where there was a low response rate to the Fourth Inquiry; or for a topic, such as international migration, where there were substantial changes. Although the experiences of all Governments are not examined in the text, the tables given in the annex list the perceptions and policies of all Governments in 1978 and make note of the changes that have occurred since 1976. The text does include a number of summary tables and a series of tables providing a breakdown according to the 24 regions, by area of responsibility of the regional commissions, is given at the end of each chapter.

¹Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, 1974, Bucharest, 19-30 August 1974 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.XIII.3), part one, chap. I, para. 107.

²World Population Trends and Policies, 1977 Monitoring Report, vol. II, Population Policies (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XIII.4).

³Tables that have been updated are given below by subject; the corresponding tables for 1977 are shown in parentheses:

(a) Natural increase: tables 33-37 (43, 45-47); 38 (51-55); 39 (56-59); 40-44 (44, 48-50);

(b) Mortality: table 50 (61);


(c) Fertility: tables 56 (67); 62 (67); 63-67 (63-66);

(d) Spatial distribution: tables 68-72 (68-71);

(e) International migration: tables 79 (73); 91 (74).

⁴The largest geographical groupings used in this publication are the categories of "less developed" and "more developed" regions, as established by the Population Division of the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, on the basis of demographic criteria. The former category includes all countries and other territories of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand). The latter category includes all of Europe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Northern America and the countries just cited as being outside the "less developed" classification. Within these two broadest groupings, there are eight "major areas" subdivided into 24 geographical regions. These regions are listed in the breakdown of the areas of responsibility of the regional commissions and are used at numerous points in the text and tables. For a listing of the countries in the areas of responsibility of the regional commissions, see annex table 39.

In Latin America, the countries of Temperate South America, which were formerly in the "more developed" category, are currently in the "less developed" category.



Chapter XIV

POPULATION GROWTH

The first section of chapter XIV consists of a series of tables and accompanying text dealing with Governments' perceptions of the impact of natural increase as a positive contribution or as a constraint to development, with Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of natural increase and the desirability of attaining different rates etc.¹ Tables 1-6 are intended to provide, albeit somewhat artificially, a step-by-step analysis of the processes by which Governments adopt their perceptions of the acceptability or non-acceptability of natural increase and, lastly, of the feasibility of intervention to change the rate.

The body of the chapter consists of a discussion of the policies and measures adopted by a number of selected countries in each of the major geographical regions with respect to natural increase. At the outset, it is important to state that almost all Governments intervene in each of the demographic components in order to resolve problems that have no connexion with their perception of the acceptability of their rate of population growth. For instance, Governments have policies that are intended to decrease mortality mainly for welfare reasons or measures to monitor immigration that are linked to political considerations etc. In these cases, intervention is undertaken irrespective of its effect on population growth. On the other hand, a number of Governments intervene with respect to the various components of population growth for the purpose of changing the trend and in order to resolve problems of maladjustment between population growth and economic and social structures; in addition, it must be mentioned that intervention with respect to non-demographic processes is often selected as an additional or a substitute measure to resolve problems in relation to population growth.

Governmental intervention for the purpose of resolving problems in relation to unacceptable levels and trends of population growth is examined in the present chapter; subsequent chapters discuss in greater detail the various components of population growth.

Table 1 clearly indicates that all Governments considered that the rate of natural increase contributed to the achievement of development objectives, even if the contribution was perceived to be minor. Slightly more than half of the more developed countries considered the contribution to be major, although only slightly more than one in three of the less developed countries held a similar opinion. Expressed as proportions of the population, 73 per cent of the popula-

tion of the more developed countries and 7 per cent of the population of the less developed countries had Governments that held that view.

Table 2, which deals with the disadvantages posed by natural increase, indicates that 22 countries at world level considered that there were no disadvantages. Of the remaining 136 countries, the difference between the more developed and the less developed countries is striking. Less than one out of five of the industrialized countries considered the disadvantages to be predominant; in contrast, half of the developing countries considered the effect of natural increase to be predominantly negative. With regard to the proportions of the population in the respective groups of countries, 9 per cent of the population of the more developed countries and 82 per cent of the population of the less developed countries had Governments that considered the disadvantages of natural increase to be predominant.

Examining table 3, which shows Governments' perceptions of the balance between the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development and its effect as a constraint, it is interesting to take note that nearly three quarters of the more developed countries, as compared with fewer than half of the less developed countries, considered that the advantages of natural increase outweighed the disadvantages. Expressed as percentages, 85 per cent of the population of the more developed countries, compared with 17 per cent of the population of the less developed countries, had Governments that considered the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages. Examining the inverse situation, 9 per cent of the population of the more developed countries and 82 per cent of the population of the less developed countries had Governments that considered that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.

In table 4, the Governments' views on the acceptability of natural increase—and the desirability of achieving different rates—are divided into three categories of perception: "lower rates desirable"; "neither higher nor lower rates desirable" (i.e., the situation is generally acceptable); and "higher rates desirable". The table indicates that slightly less than half of the world total of 158 countries reported that their rates were acceptable and slightly more than half reported that they desired to change the rates. Those countries which desired to change the rate can be divided into subgroups of almost equal size: 36 countries wanted to attain a higher rate; 46 countries desired to attain a lower rate. Examining the breakdown according to level of development, it is apparent that the dis-

¹For views of individual Governments concerning natural increase, see annex tables 33-34.

tribution was quite different among countries in the more developed regions than among countries in the less developed regions. Thirteen of the 42 industrialized countries desired to attain a higher rate, compared with only 23 of the 116 developing countries. With respect to intervention designed to achieve lower rates, it is important to emphasize that none of the industrialized countries desired a lower rate; in contrast, this was the objective of 46 of the developing countries. Examining the breakdown in terms of proportions of the population rather than absolute numbers of countries, only 30 per cent of the world population was in the "generally acceptable" category, of which 63 per cent resided in the more developed countries and only 18 per cent resided in the less developed countries. Reviewing the situation only in the more developed countries, 37 per cent of the population resided in countries where the Governments desired a higher rate, none resided in countries where the Governments desired a lower rate. Among the developing countries, those percentages were, respectively, 3 per cent and 80 per cent.

The data in table 5, which examines Governments' perceptions of the desirability of intervention to change natural increase, are again divided into three broad categories: "neither direct intervention nor indirect support appropriate"; "some indirect support appropriate" (to encourage an upward trend or a downward trend); and "direct intervention desirable" (to raise rates or to lower rates). The figures indicate that more than two thirds of the more developed countries, which represented 62 per cent of the population of that group of countries, and 47 of the 116 less developed countries (which represented only 17 per cent of the population of the group) considered that intervention was inappropriate. On the other hand, five of the more developed and 12 of the less developed countries considered that some support was appropriate to

modify their rate of natural increase; however, although all five of the developed countries desired an upward trend, four of the developing countries desired an upward trend and eight desired a downward trend. In terms of proportion of population, 28 per cent of the population of the more developed countries had Governments that considered some support to be appropriate, while only 1 per cent of the less developed countries had Governments with such a view. With respect to direct intervention to modify the rate, eight of the more developed countries, which comprised 9 per cent of the population of the countries in that category, and 57 of the developing countries, which represented 81 per cent of the population of the countries in that group (this figure clearly includes a number of the largest countries) considered that direct intervention was desirable. Examining the breakdown between those countries which desired to achieve higher rates and those which desired to achieve lower rates, it is interesting to note that all eight of the more developed countries that favoured direct intervention desired to raise the rate; but of the 57 less developed countries, 19 countries (which comprised only 3 per cent of the population of the countries in that group) desired to attain higher rates, while 38 countries (78 per cent of the population of the less developed regions) desired to attain lower rates. Lastly, examining world totals, it is apparent that 30 per cent of the world population resided in countries where the Governments considered that support was inappropriate, 9 per cent in countries that provided indirect support (8 per cent to achieve an upward trend and 1 per cent to achieve a downward trend). In contrast, 61 per cent of the world population lived in countries where the Governments supported direct intervention to modify rates of natural increase, 5 per cent in countries where the Governments desired to raise the rate, and the majority—56 per cent—in countries where the Governments desired to decrease the rate. (Table 6 provides a synthesis of tables 1-5.)

TABLE 1. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978^a

	Positive contribution minor (C)	Positive contribution significant (B)	Positive contribution predominant (A)	Total
<i>Number of Governments and percentage of total in each category^b</i>				
More developed regions	6 (14)	14 (33)	22 (53)	42 (100)
Less developed regions	26 (22)	74 (64)	16 (14)	116 (100)
TOTAL	32 (20)	88 (56)	38 (24)	158 (100)
<i>Population in 1975 (millions) and percentage of total in each category^b</i>				
More developed regions	81 (7)	227 (20)	829 (73)	1 137 (100)
Less developed regions	936 (32)	1 753 (61)	206 (7)	2 895 (100)
TOTAL	1 017 (25)	1 980 (50)	1 035 (25)	4 032 (100)
<i>Percentage of world population in 1975</i>				
More developed regions	2	6	21	28
Less developed regions	23	43	5	72
TOTAL	25	49	26	100

^a For countries in more developed regions, see annex table 33; for those in less developed regions, see annex tables 34-36.

^b Percentages shown in parentheses.

TABLE 2. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE AS A CONSTRAINT ON DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978^a

	Constraint predominant (A)	Constraint significant (B)	Constraint minor (C)	No Constraint	Total
<i>Number of Governments and percentage of total in each category^b</i>					
More developed regions	8 (19)	5 (12)	17 (40)	12 (29)	42 (100)
Less developed regions	57 (48)	12 (10)	37 (33)	10 (9)	116 (100)
WORLD	65 (40)	17 (11)	54 (35)	22 (14)	158 (100)
<i>Population in 1975 (millions) and percentage of total in each category^b</i>					
More developed regions	107 (9)	323 (29)	306 (27)	401 (35)	1 137 (100)
Less developed regions	2 371 (82)	32 (1)	342 (12)	150 (5)	2 895 (100)
WORLD	2 478 (61)	355 (9)	648 (16)	551 (14)	4 032 (100)
<i>Percentage of world population in 1975</i>					
More developed regions	3	8	7	10	28
Less developed regions	59	1	8	4	72
WORLD	62	9	15	14	100

^a See table 1, foot-note a.

^b Percentages shown in parentheses.

TABLE 3. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT AND ITS EFFECT AS A CONSTRAINT, JULY 1978^a

	Positive contribution			Total
	More important than constraints ^b	Of equal importance to constraints	Less important than constraints	
<i>Number of Governments and percentage of total in each category^c</i>				
More developed regions	32 (76)	2 (5)	8 (19)	42 (100)
Less developed regions	46 (41)	12 (10)	58 (49)	116 (100)
TOTAL	78 (50)	14 (9)	66 (41)	158 (100)
<i>Population in 1975 (millions) and percentage of total in each category^c</i>				
More developed regions	968 (85)	62 (6)	107 (9)	1 137 (100)
Less developed regions	492 (17)	38 (1)	2 365 (82)	2 895 (100)
TOTAL	1 460 (36)	100 (2)	2 472 (62)	4 032 (100)
<i>Percentage of world population in 1975</i>				
More developed regions	24	1	3	28
Less developed regions	12	1	59	72
TOTAL	36	2	62	100

^a See table 1, foot-note a.

(22 countries).

^b Including situations in which no constraints were perceived

^c Percentages shown in parentheses.

TABLE 4. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1978^a

	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total
<i>Number of Governments and percentage of total in each category^b</i>				
More developed regions	13 (31)	29 (69)	—	42 (100)
Less developed regions	23 (20)	47 (42)	46 (38)	116 (100)
TOTAL	36 (23)	76 (49)	46 (28)	158 (100)
<i>Population in 1975 (millions) and percentage of total in each category^b</i>				
More developed regions	423 (37)	714 (63)	—	1 137 (100)
Less developed regions	83 (3)	506 (17)	2 306 (80)	2 895 (100)
TOTAL	506 (13)	1 220 (30)	2 306 (57)	4 032 (100)
<i>Percentage of world population in 1975</i>				
More developed regions	10	18	0	28
Less developed regions	2	13	57	72
TOTAL	12	31	57	100

^a See table 1, foot-note a.

^b Percentages shown in parentheses.

As shown in table 5, a significant number of Governments—29 of the more developed countries and 47 of the less developed, which comprised some 30 per cent of the total world population (18 per cent in the more developed and 12 per cent in the less developed regions)—considered it inappropriate to give support to modify rates of natural increase. Consequently, before proceeding to discuss the topic of governmental intervention to modify natural increase, it is important to emphasize that non-intervention is also an option

which Governments may choose and is, in a very real sense, also a policy. The process of decision making is shown schematically in figure I. In the first instance, a Government may adopt a policy either of non-intervention or of intervention, the latter of which may involve action to modify demographic and/or non-demographic factors. Policies designed to modify demographic factors may involve intervention to modify natural increase and/or location of population—the former through intervention with respect to fertility

TABLE 5. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO ACHIEVE CHANGE IN RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, JULY 1978^a

	Full intervention appropriate		Total	Some support appropriate		Total	Neither full intervention nor some support appropriate	Total
	To raise rates	To lower rates		To encourage upward trend	To encourage downward trend			
<i>Number of Governments and percentage of total in each category^b</i>								
More developed regions	8 (19)	—	8 (19)	5 (12)	—	5 (12)	29 (69)	42 (100)
Less developed regions	19 (16)	38 (32)	57 (48)	4 (3)	8 (7)	12 (10)	47 (41)	116 (100)
TOTAL	27 (17)	38 (23)	65 (40)	9 (6)	8 (5)	17 (11)	76 (49)	158 (100)
<i>Population in 1975 (millions) and percentage of total in each category^b</i>								
More developed regions	107 (9)	—	107 (9)	323 (28)	—	323 (28)	707 (62)	1 137 (100)
Less developed regions	78 (3)	2 273 (78)	2 351 (81)	5 (0)	33 (1)	38 (1)	506 (17)	2 895 (100)
TOTAL	185 (5)	2 273 (56)	2 458 (61)	328 (8)	33 (1)	361 (9)	1 213 (31)	4 032 (100)
<i>Percentage of world population in 1975</i>								
More developed regions	3	—	3	8	—	8	18	28
Less developed regions	2	56	58	—	1	1	12	72
TOTAL	5	56	61	8	1	9	30	100

^a See table 1, foot-note a.

^b Percentages shown in parentheses.

TABLE 6. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE IT, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978^a

		Government's perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and the desirability of intervention							Total
		Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
		Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
		Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable			Lower rates desirable			
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	No intervention appropriate (3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
World total	Predominant (A)	—	4	6	19	9	—	—	38
	Significant (B)	15	5	6	3	31	6	22	88
	Minor (C)	12	—	—	—	2	2	16	32
More developed regions	Predominant (A)	—	3	5	10	4	—	—	22
	Significant (B)	2	2	3	2	5	—	—	14
	Minor (C)	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
Less developed regions	Predominant (A)	—	1	1	9	5	—	—	16
	Significant (B)	13	3	3	1	26	6	22	74
	Minor (C)	6	—	—	—	2	2	16	26
TOTAL		27	9	12	22	42	8	38	158

^a See table 1, foot-note a.

and/or mortality and the latter through intervention with respect to spatial distribution and/or international migration.

With regard to the policies of intervention most frequently employed by Governments to modify rates which they consider undesirable, it must be stated that 22 out of the 158 countries at world level—divided almost equally between the more developed and the less developed countries—considered that they had no problems in relation to the level or the trend of natural increase. The remaining countries, which considered the rate of natural increase to be a source of some problems, may be placed in one of two broad categories: those which intervened to modify various demographic variables; and those which emphasized socio-economic restructuring (which, of course, may indirectly influence demographic variables). Table 7

provides an indication of the demographic and non-demographic variables on which action is most frequently taken. It is clear that the most common intervention is that with respect to spatial distribution: 117 countries, 98 of which are less developed countries, reported intervention in the spatial distribution process; 81 countries, of which 62 are less developed, intervened with respect to international migration; 72 countries, of which 58 are less developed, intervened to modify fertility; while only 35 countries reported modification of mortality for explicit demographic ends. On the other hand, the great majority of countries—128 out of 158 countries, 104 of which are in the less developed regions—resorted most frequently to socio-economic restructuring. Of course, it must be emphasized that such action is rarely taken in an isolated manner, but rather is simultaneously directed towards several variables, as indicated in table 8.

TABLE 7. DEMOGRAPHIC AND NON-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES MOST FREQUENTLY CHOSEN FOR ACTION ON RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE^a
(Number of Governments)

	Mortality	Fertility	Spatial distribution	International migration	Socio-economic restructuring	No problems linked to rate of natural increase
More developed regions	9	14	19	19	24	12
Less developed regions	26	58	98	62	104	10
TOTAL	35	72	117	81	128	22

^a For countries in both more developed and less developed regions, see annex table 39.

TABLE 8. COMBINATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES CHOSEN FOR ACTION ON RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE^a
(Number of Governments)

	Natural increase alone	Natural increase and location of population	Location of population	No problems linked to rate of natural increase
More developed regions	2	16	12	12
Less developed regions	—	70	36	10
TOTAL	2	86	48	22

^a See table 7, foot-note a.

Before commencing the discussion of policies and measures adopted by selected countries in the various regions, it is useful to present a brief overview. From the data given in table 9, it is apparent that a breakdown by major areas of the world shows significant differences in Governments' perceptions of the rate of natural increase. The countries that desired a lower rate were distributed as follows. In the area of responsibility of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), which accounts for some 56 per cent of the total world population, the proportion of countries that were dissatisfied with their current rate was the highest: 16 out of 30 countries. Next, in descending order, were the areas of responsibility of the Economic Commission for Latin America

(ECLA), with 13 countries out of 27; the area of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), with 16 countries out of 50; the area of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), with one country out of 39; and the area of the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), in which none of the 12 countries was dissatisfied. The countries that considered their rates to be generally acceptable were headed (proportionately) by ECE, with 25 countries; followed by ECWA, with 7 countries; ECA, with 26 countries; ECLA, with 10 countries; and ESCAP, with 8 countries. It is important to emphasize that the category of countries that reported that they were satisfied with the current rate was heterogeneous in a number of respects: it consisted of countries at different levels of




Figure I. Types of intervention in natural increase

development and at different stages of the demographic transition; also, it included both countries that did not have policies of intervention (but rather were satisfied with the spontaneous trend) and countries whose previous successful policies of intervention had resulted in rates that were currently perceived

TABLE 9. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT (Number of Governments)

	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total
ECA area	8	26	16	50
ECWA area	5	7	0	12
ECLA area	4	10	13	27
ECE area	13	25	1	39
ESCAP area	6	8	16	30
More developed regions	13	29	0	42
Less developed regions	23	47	46	116
TOTAL	36	76	46	158

to be generally acceptable. Lastly, of the countries that desired a higher rate, 13 are located in the ECE area of responsibility, 8 in the ECA, 6 in the ESCAP, 4 in the ECLA and 5 in the ECWA area.

A. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

A majority of countries (26) in the area of responsibility of ECA considered their rate of population growth to be acceptable, while eight Governments desired to attain a higher rate and 16 desired to attain a lower rate. Only four countries in Africa had changed their perception since 1976. Madagascar and Sierra Leone, which previously had desired a lower rate, reported that the current rate was acceptable. In contrast, Guinea, which previously had considered its rate

TABLE 10. PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION, BY CATEGORY OF VIEW, OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total
ECA area	7	60	33	100
ECWA area	24	76	0	100
ECLA area	11	56	33	100
ECE area	40	56	4	100
ESCAP area	1	9	90	100
More developed regions	37	63	0	100
Less developed regions	3	17	80	100
ALL TOGETHER	13	30	57	100

Source: "Provisional estimates and projections of population of the world regions and countries as of 1975 and as assessed in 1978", paper prepared by the Population Division.

of population growth to be acceptable, reported that it desired to increase the rate, while Rwanda, which previously had reported that the rate was acceptable, currently desired to decrease the rate.

Gabon presents an example of a Government that considered its rate of population growth to be deficient and believed full intervention to be appropriate in order to increase the rate. A country with a small total population size, the Government reported in the Fourth Inquiry that the "factor of labour" posed a problem, due to the size of its population. It further reported that it had adopted measures to increase fertility and simultaneously to reduce mortality and emigration; furthermore, immigration was being maintained at its current high level as a short-term solution to the problem of deficient population growth. In addition, the Government had formulated a number of socio-economic policies—to train highly educated cadres, to improve sanitation, to conduct campaigns against malnutrition—which would contribute to achieving a desired population size and a higher rate of population growth.

The Ivory Coast also considered its rate of population growth to be deficient. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that favourable conditions would exist from the current time until the end of the century for high fertility and population growth, as the country was far from being overpopulated. Although it desired to increase fertility, the Government also intended to modify a number of socio-economic factors as a means of stimulating population growth; for example, it had proposed widespread changes in agriculture and rural life and intended to achieve a greater regional equilibrium.

Although Gabon, for example, had formulated a policy designed to increase the rate of population growth, based on the perception of a labour deficit, a larger number of countries in the area desired to achieve lower rates of population growth, based on the perception of a labour surplus. (As previously stated, nearly twice as many Governments in Africa desired to attain lower rates of population growth as desired to attain higher rates—15 countries as opposed to eight.) In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, for example, the Government of Botswana reported that "however buoyant the economy", it would be difficult to create "productive employment for all Botswanans". Therefore, it was considered necessary to reduce population growth. The Government would modify a number of socio-economic factors to attain its goal and would attempt, for example, to increase employment opportunities and to provide special training both in and out of school. However, it placed a major emphasis on the reduction of fertility: by strengthening family planning programmes; educating males with respect to methods of contraception; etc. However, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government acknowledged that a major obstacle to achieving smaller families and lower rates of population growth was the fact that a large proportion of the population was still dependent upon subsistence agriculture.

Egypt and Kenya are two of the other countries which expressed concern about reducing population growth; both identified quantitative targets. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Egypt identified constraints in relation to high population growth and savings generation, capital investment and the provision of adequate basic services; Kenya identified problems with respect to the environment, unemployment and, again, the provision of basic services. Both Governments intended to achieve their goal of reducing population growth by intervening with respect to demographic and non-demographic factors, although both placed a major emphasis on fertility reduction. Egypt reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it intended to further disseminate information about population matters and to improve its family planning services. In addition, it announced a series of non-demographic measures: raising of the socio-economic level of the family; extension of education and participation of women in the labour force; mechanization of agricultural production; extension of social security and so on. The Government further stated that the establishment of new cities, integrated industrial communities and industrialization of rural areas were among the measures designed to reduce population growth. Kenya had adopted a somewhat similar strategy, assigning a certain priority to intervention to modify fertility. Its current policy emphasized reduction of the growth rate through family planning and maternal child health programmes, although the Government acknowledged the importance of agricultural production, education and improvement of its health care services in resolving problems in relation to population growth.

Rwanda, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, also expressed the desire to decrease the rate of population growth. Again, the Government reported that it sought to modify a number of non-demographic factors as well as demographic factors. It desired to increase economic productivity and to promote various labour-intensive activities; with respect to its intervention to modify demographic factors, the Government emphasized that it encouraged the spacing of births, chiefly as a health-related measure, with the acknowledgement that there would be a likely reduction in individual and aggregate levels of fertility. In addition to its proposed intervention to modify fertility, Rwanda was somewhat unusual among countries in the area, in that it considered emigration to be an acceptable solution to excessive population growth (the Government was currently seeking bilateral accords with a number of neighbouring countries for the emigration of its nationals).

A majority of Governments in Africa considered their rates of population growth to be satisfactory, although many perceived constraints of a varying degree. Nigeria is generally representative of the latter group of countries. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that its policy was intended to stimulate the rate of economic growth in order to cope with the rate of population growth. Although it had adopted measures in relation to fertility, the Gov-

ernment emphasized that it had no intention of using family planning to achieve any demographic goals. Rather, it had been adopted "to enhance the pace of socio-economic development".

Sierra Leone also reported that it currently considered its rate to be acceptable, although the Government previously had considered its rate of population growth to be excessive. In its current development plan, the Government has identified a number of problems in relation to its high rate of population growth, and it acknowledged that the rate could be expected to accelerate in the future (largely as a result of declining mortality). Although the Government admitted that it would be difficult to bring about a significant increase in *per capita* income, it would attempt to resolve problems in relation to population growth by means of a programme of socio-economic restructuring. As in the case of Nigeria, the family planning programme in Sierra Leone was considered to be a part of its health care services; the Government emphasized that the goal of family planning was not to reduce population growth but to safeguard the health of mothers and children through the appropriate spacing of births.

Another of the countries in Africa that reported in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry that it had adopted a somewhat similar stance was Madagascar, a country whose major demographic objectives were to reduce mortality (and hence to improve the productive capacity of its population) and to encourage migration to sparsely populated but cultivable zones. With respect to its fertility-related programmes, the Government underlined that its intervention had been motivated by medical and social considerations; its maternal child health and family welfare programmes were not intended to limit births in order to slow population growth, but to educate the population concerning the means whereby a couple could "freely decide upon their family size".

It is important to take note that a number of the countries in Africa which reported natural increase to be generally acceptable and which had not intervened to modify the trend had no adequate data base with which to formulate policies (and, presumably, could change their perception when such data become available). For example, the Niger, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, reported that its first general census had recently been conducted and that it was awaiting its results; the Government stated that in the meantime, no reliable data were available on which to base an opinion about population growth. (Of course, a majority of countries in this position have a rather small population and a change in their perception and policies would not greatly affect world and regional totals with respect to the acceptability of current rates of population growth.)

With regard to quantitative targets, only two of the countries in Africa which replied to the Fourth Inquiry reported that they had identified targets for the reduction of population growth. Egypt reported that it intended to decrease its rate of population growth from

2.06 to 1.06 per cent per annum during the period 1973–1980. So, too, Kenya reported that it desired to decrease the rate from 3.3 to 3.0 per cent per annum during the planning period 1974–1979; it acknowledged, however, in the Fourth Inquiry, that according to a mid-term appraisal conducted in 1977, there as yet had been no impact on the fertility trend in the country. In addition to the targets reported by two of the other countries which replied to the Fourth Inquiry, Ghana identified a long-term target: to reduce the rate of population growth from 3.9 to 1.75 per cent per annum between 1973 and the year 2000.

B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

A majority of countries in the area of responsibility of ESCAP—18 out of 30 countries—considered their rate of population growth to be excessive and desired to attain a lower rate. Eight countries considered the rate to be acceptable; five considered it to be too low. There was little change in perception in the area during the past two years: only Malaysia—which previously had desired a lower rate and currently considered the rate to be acceptable—changed its perception.

It is interesting to take note that none of the Governments in Asia and the Pacific that had desired to attain a higher rate, a majority of which are centrally planned economies, submitted replies to the Fourth Inquiry.²

Of the eight countries in the area that considered their current rate of growth to be acceptable, most fall either in the category of more developed countries—i.e., Australia, New Zealand and Japan—or of countries that had achieved comparatively low fertility as a result of previous successful intervention.

In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government of Australia reported that it had conducted a comprehensive review of long-term population trends; although it considered the current rate of growth to be acceptable, the prospect of declining fertility and declining immigration had led the Government to adopt a policy designed to ensure a desired rate of population growth by increasing immigration. New Zealand, which reported a steady decline in population growth as a result of a continuing downward trend in fertility and a change from net immigration to net emigration, also considered its rate of population growth to be acceptable, although it acknowledged that the New Zealand Planning Council was studying the implications of population and migration changes in the medium term. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Japan similarly reported that its rate of population growth was acceptable and that it had not formulated an explicit policy, although it estimated and expected a "stationary population".

Another of the countries in Asia and the Pacific that

²These countries are Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Kampuchea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, and Nauru.

considered its rate of population growth to be acceptable—largely as a result of its past successful intervention to modify the rate—is Singapore, a small country which had achieved considerable success in lowering fertility and had reached replacement level in 1975. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it desired to maintain replacement-level fertility and that it would continue to implement a series of incentives and disincentives designed to promote the norm of the two-child family. However, in addition to its intervention to modify fertility, the Government would continue to modify a number of socio-economic factors; in the Fourth Inquiry, for example, the Government reported that it was well recognized that an increase in educational and employment levels, particularly among women, and an improvement of the quality of life through “more equitable income distribution, better housing and a clean environment” changed the perception of people concerning family size. Little doubt existed that higher levels of living had contributed to the current low fertility levels in Singapore.

The Government of Malaysia also expressed satisfaction with its rate of population growth and considered that the country did not face a serious population problem. Population policy in the 1970s was conceived of as encompassing wider dimensions than family planning; new land development schemes, rural development, the planning of growth centres and urban renewal programmes were all expected to have an impact on the demographic structure of the country. In the Fourth Inquiry, the Government stated that further actions were being considered to integrate population and family planning programmes within other programmes of social and economic development, utilizing all available resources from both governmental and private sectors.

As previously stated, the great majority of countries in Asia and the Pacific considered their rates of population growth to be excessive and desired to attain lower rates. On the whole, there was somewhat more emphasis in that area than in others on intervention to modify fertility as a means of reducing population growth, and a number of countries had adopted a broad array of incentives and disincentives to promote smaller families. However, a majority of Governments had also formulated policies designed to modify spatial distribution and internal migration and had engaged in socio-economic restructuring. Bangladesh, for example, reported in the Fourth Inquiry that its first national priority was to reduce its rate of population growth, primarily by means of lowering fertility; however, the Government further emphasized that it would achieve its goal by over-all development of the economy, creation of more employment opportunities for women, expansion of primary education and community participation in development programmes.

India reported a somewhat similar policy approach, which placed an emphasis on fertility-related measures but simultaneously adopted a variety of socio-

economic measures. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it was “totally committed” to its family planning programme, although it acknowledged that the policy had been slightly modified in 1977 “to eliminate all forms of compulsion and coercion”; and to make it a “family” welfare programme which included all aspects of family welfare, for example, maternal and child health, nutrition, female education and women’s rights. In addition, the Government emphasized that it would attempt to attain its demographic goals by means of employment creation in rural areas, improvement of the accessibility of health care services, raising of the legal age at marriage etc.

The remaining countries in Asia and the Pacific that replied to the Fourth Inquiry and desired to achieve lower rates of population growth had adopted largely similar strategies. Although the specific measures adopted usually reflected each Government’s own development priorities, most strategies placed an emphasis on the reduction of fertility, as well as on the modification of patterns of spatial distribution and on programmes of economic and social restructuring.

Pakistan reported in the Fourth Inquiry, for example, that, although it assigned priority to family planning programmes as a means of reducing natural increase, new strategies were being developed and operational activities had been merged with health care services. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Sri Lanka similarly reported that family planning was an integral part of its national health care system. However, in its description of the policies designed to modify population growth, the Government emphasized that distribution, as well as growth, had been identified as a “major policy objective”; it further acknowledged the role of free education and health care services, of improved income distribution and of labour-intensive production methods in resolving growth-related problems. Thailand had a somewhat similar policy with respect to population growth, in that it had adopted measures not only to modify fertility but to achieve a more equitable distribution of income, to overcome economic stagnation and to extend education and public health services, especially to rural zones. In addition, however, the Government of Thailand considered that the reduction of immigration—particularly the movement of refugees—was a necessary means of reducing population growth. Conversely, the Republic of Korea, which similarly desired to achieve lower rates of population growth by decreasing fertility (by means of its family planning and “beyond family planning” programmes), considered that an increase of emigration was an important means of reducing population growth. Indonesia also desired a lower rate of population growth, although there was evidence that the growth rate had begun to slow significantly in some of the most densely populated parts of the country (views as to the extent of decline vary; however, some studies indicate that the decline may be on the order of 12 per cent). Indonesia expected to attain its objectives by means of integrated family planning programmes, long-standing efforts to modify patterns of spatial dis-

tribution, programmes of socio-economic restructuring and so forth.

A number of countries in Asia and the Pacific identified targets with respect to population growth. It is interesting to take note that several of those countries which considered their rate of growth to be acceptable reported quantitative targets. Japan, as mentioned above, reported that a stationary population was estimated and expected. In New Zealand, there was clearly an acceptance of low population growth and of fertility which was currently at and eventually would be below replacement level. So, too, Singapore reported that its target was to maintain the replacement-level fertility it had achieved in 1975.

However, a majority of the countries in the ESCAP area that identified quantitative targets desired to attain lower rates of population growth. Bangladesh had targeted a decline in the rate of growth of from 2.8 to 1.5 per cent per annum by 1985. Fiji desired a rate of natural increase of 2.0 per cent per annum and a reduction of fertility to an "acceptable world standard". India reported in the Fourth Inquiry that its family welfare programme was "time-bound and target-oriented"; specifically, it desired to attain a crude birth rate of 30 per 1,000 by 1982/83. Pakistan desired to reduce the crude birth rate from 43.0 to 35.5 per 1,000 during the period 1978-1983; the Philippines, to reach a net reproduction rate of 1.0 by the year 2000; the Republic of Korea, to achieve a rate of population growth of 1.6 per annum during the course of its current five-year plan; Thailand, to reduce its rate of population growth from 2.5 to 2.1 per cent per annum during the period 1977-1981. In addition, Indonesia desired a 50 per cent reduction in the rate of population growth between 1970 and 2000. Malaysia desired to achieve a rate of population growth of 2 per cent per annum by 1985, while Nepal had targeted a decline in the crude birth rate from 42 to 38 per 1,000 during the period 1975-1979.

It is important to take note that China identified a revised quantitative target in early 1978. The Government stated that "planned control of population growth is conducive to planned development of the national economy and to the health of mother and child. . . . We must continue to . . . strive to lower the annual rate of growth of China's population to less than 1 per cent within three years."³ (Although few precise data are available on the demographic situation in China, it is reasonable to speculate that the Government may have attained a previous target announced in its fourth five-year plan—that of achieving a rate of population growth of 1.0 in urban areas and 1.5 in rural areas—in the light of its announcement of a new and more ambitious target.)

C. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Nearly half of the countries in the area of responsi-

³People's Republic of China, Mission to the United Nations, press release, February 1978.

bility of ECLA—13 out of 27 countries—desired lower rates of population growth. Ten Governments considered that the rate was acceptable, and four Governments desired to achieve higher rates. There was some change in Latin America in the period 1976-1978: Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, which previously had desired lower rates of population growth, reported their rates of growth to be satisfactory. In contrast, the Government of Bolivia, which previously had desired a lower rate, currently wanted a higher rate.

Bolivia, one of the countries in Latin America that expressed a desire to increase the rate of population growth, presents something of a special case in that, following the availability (in 1977) of the preliminary results of the 1976 census, the Government had determined that it had 1 million fewer inhabitants than had previously been estimated; that discovery had led the Government to reverse its stance and to express a desire to achieve a larger population size and a higher rate of population growth. (It is interesting that Bolivia is the single country at world level that changed its policy from one of full intervention to achieve lower rates to one of full intervention to achieve higher rates.) In view of its perceived "demographic deficit", the Government currently desired to increase immigration and at least to maintain fertility at its current level; in addition, its development strategy included an ambitious programme of regional planning and socio-economic restructuring.

Another of the countries in Latin America that sought to attain a higher rate of population growth was Argentina, a country which, in contrast to Bolivia, had long had such a policy. In its comprehensive population policy (announced in 1978), the Government cautioned that the current vulnerability of the country which resulted from the size (and distribution) of its population, was a threat to the national security and required urgent resolution. Argentina reported a clearly defined policy with respect to population growth. It desired to reduce mortality and emigration and to increase fertility and immigration for explicit demographic ends; in addition, the Government's recent policy outlined a series of "population-oriented" socio-economic measures.

Among the countries in Latin America that considered the rate of population growth to be acceptable, Cuba, the only centrally planned economy in the major area, has consistently maintained that an integrated process of socio-economic development—characterized by sustained economic growth and accompanied by income redistribution and full employment—obviates the need for a policy directed to reducing population growth. As previously stated, a number of countries in the "generally acceptable" category had changed their perception since 1976. Ecuador, which previously had desired a lower rate, reported in the Fourth Inquiry that the Government had not formulated a policy with respect to the rate of demographic growth. The Government emphasized that it would continue to consider population an important variable, but not apart from the integral process of

socio-economic development; and it further emphasized that no population policy could be a substitute for short-term structural reforms. Colombia, which has been moving through a rapid fertility transition, reported that its rate of growth was satisfactory and that it no longer had an explicit policy with respect to population growth, although it acknowledged that through the provision of integrated health services and socio-economic change, it was possible to reduce fertility—and natural increase—even without an explicit policy. Panama, another country that has had a downturn in fertility, considered its current rate of population growth to be acceptable, a perception related not only to the trend of declining fertility but to the rate of economic growth of the country, which, until recent years, had been the highest in Middle and South America.

As previously stated, nearly half of the countries in Latin America desired lower rates of population growth, although there was variation with respect to the support that Governments considered appropriate to achieve desired rates. The Government of Peru, for example, emphasized that it was opposed to direct intervention to modify fertility; rather, it considered that a process of economic and social restructuring, together with the creation of an environment that would enable families to exercise responsible parenthood, would result in a rate of population growth compatible with the development requirements of the country.

However, a majority of the countries in Latin America that desired lower rates—a number of which are located in the Caribbean and Middle America—considered full intervention to be appropriate. The Dominican Republic, for example, a country which had experienced a significant decline in fertility, considered that its goal of reducing population growth would be achieved largely by means of its national family planning programme, the objectives of which were both demographic and welfare-oriented. El Salvador, a country with a high rate of population growth and high population density, similarly considered that full intervention was appropriate to reduce its population growth; currently, the Government was attempting to achieve its objectives by means of family planning programmes and structural reforms and was exploring the possibility of increasing emigration. Mexico, a country whose policy in relation to population growth is of great significance in the light of its large population size, also was in that group. The Government has emphasized that its new population policy would not be a substitute for socio-economic development; and, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, it reported that national plans for education, urban development, employment, energy etc. could be expected to raise the level of living of the population and contribute to the resolution of problems in relation to population growth. However, the Government had clearly moved to a position of advocating direct intervention to modify growth rates by reducing fertility: by means of family planning and sex education programmes, raising the age at marriage and changing cultural pat-

terns (through programmes of sex education, population and communications etc.). In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it considered its goal of reducing population growth to be feasible, because it had been able to detect the beginnings of a change in the reproductive behaviour of the population.

Fewer countries in Latin America than in Asia and the Pacific identified quantitative targets for the reduction of population growth. Of the countries in Latin America that replied to the Fourth Inquiry, only Mexico reported that it had a quantitative target: to reduce the rate of population growth from 3.2 to 2.5 per cent per annum by 1982. (Previously, Jamaica had identified a quantitative target for the period 1968–1976, and Trinidad and Tobago had set a target for the years 1968–1972.)

D. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA⁴

In the area of responsibility of ECWA, half of the Governments (six) desired to achieve a higher rate of population growth; the other six countries considered their current rate of growth to be acceptable. In contrast to the other geographical regions, none of the Governments in the ECWA area had changed their perception of the acceptability of population growth during 1976–1978, although a number of countries, such as Jordan, had begun to exhibit signs of change.

Of the countries in the area that considered their rate of growth to be acceptable, Bahrain had been faced with a number of problems in the early 1970s (in respect of the provision of basic services, housing etc.) as a result of slower economic expansion and an accelerating rate of population growth. However, those problems were considered to be essentially short term, and the Government currently considered the rate of population growth to be acceptable. Democratic Yemen, which currently had a high level of unemployment and underemployment, considered those problems to be of a structural nature rather than a result of demographic trends and therefore reported that its rate of population growth was generally acceptable; the Government considered that its socio-economic development programme, which involved basic restructuring of the economy, would contribute to the resolution of existing problems in relation to population growth. However, Democratic Yemen had also adopted measures to ensure that an eventual decline in fertility should occur as rapidly as possible. Iraq, another of the countries in the area that considered its current rate of population growth to be acceptable, nevertheless reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it would like to attain a higher rate. The Government acknowledged that it desired to increase fertility and to

⁴Much of the information on the section dealing with the area of responsibility of the Economic Commission for Western Asia was taken from G. M. Stubbs, "Population policy in the Arab countries", in A. R. Omran, ed., *Arab Population* (New York, United Nations Fund for Population Activities, forthcoming).

promote immigration (of other Arab nationals) as a means of expanding its labour force and achieving a larger permanent population.

In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Syrian Arab Republic reported that it had not yet formulated a policy concerning the population growth rate because the Government considered that the current level of growth was acceptable. However, the Government did consider that health and family planning services would contribute to an eventual and desired decline in fertility and a gradual reduction in natural increase. Basically, however, it considered that rapid socio-economic development would resolve problems in relation to population size and growth. Yemen also considered its rate of population growth to be currently acceptable, although it acknowledged the desirability of a long-term decline in population growth. In general, the Government considered that maternal child health and family planning services, as well as emigration and social change, would facilitate the resolution of growth-related problems.

Although Jordan reported that its current rate of population growth was acceptable and emphasized, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, that it had no policy in relation to population growth, it nevertheless considered the rate of natural increase to be somewhat too high in relation to the ability of the economy to provide basic services to its youthful population. The Government had adopted a policy of comprehensive socio-economic development and further considered that its spatial distribution strategy would contribute to the resolution of problems resulting from rapid population growth. In addition, the Government had cautiously changed its position with respect to the desirability of intervention to modify fertility: in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, for example, it reported that although it did not have a policy in regard to population growth, it acknowledged the importance of reducing the level of fertility.

In contrast to the above-mentioned group of countries, a number of countries in Western South Asia explicitly acknowledged that their rates of population growth were too low and that they desired to achieve higher rates. Kuwait, for example, considered its population size to be deficient and desired to maintain fertility at its current high level. Oman, which considered that it had sufficient capital to support a substantially larger population, continued to admit large numbers of immigrants, although it was concerned with the prospect of relying on international migration as a long-term solution to deficient population growth and would prefer an acceleration of its natural increase. Qatar is another country in Western South Asia which desired a higher rate of natural increase but which had relied heavily on immigration; unlike Oman, however, which had expressed concern over the continuance of high levels of immigration, Qatar considered that it would achieve its desired population size by stimulating further natural increase, naturalizing part of the immigrant population and further expanding the immigrant labour force.

Saudi Arabia had a somewhat similar policy, in that it considered that its plans for rapid socio-economic development would require a larger population. The Government hoped to guard against a future decline in fertility and it was likely to accept immigrant labour for some years to come. The United Arab Emirates also had relied on large-scale immigration; currently, however, the Government desired to encourage rapid natural increase and was gradually placing closer controls on immigration.

Although there is substantial economic planning, evaluation of manpower needs, concern among some countries in the ECWA area over the prospects of continuing immigration as a substitute for deficient population growth etc., none of the countries identified quantitative targets with respect to population growth.

E. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

Many of the countries in the area of responsibility of ECE currently have low rates of population growth and a number have reached a point where their populations will soon cease to grow. Although a number of countries expressed concern over the long-term implications of the current trend—the high social costs incurred by aging populations, the potential effects of a loss of demographic dynamism and so on—a majority of the developed countries (28) considered their current rate of population growth to be acceptable, a perception which, for some countries, reflected a belief that there was no need to intervene in the demographic process and, for others, reflected satisfaction with the results of previous government policies. Thirteen countries desired to achieve a higher rate and only one country—Turkey—desired to achieve a lower rate.

There were a number of changes in Europe during the period 1976–1978. Finland, Greece and Ireland, which previously had desired higher rates of population growth, currently considered their rates to be satisfactory. In contrast, such countries as France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, evinced a growing preoccupation with what they considered to be deficient rates.

Turkey, the single developing country in the ECE area of responsibility—and one that is at a different stage of the demographic transition than the other countries in the area—desired a lower rate of population growth. Of the countries that desired a higher rate, a number are very small countries in Western Europe. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Luxembourg, for example, reported that it considered that its current fertility trend corresponded to “national suicide” and it desired to increase its rate of population growth; its demographic objective was to achieve a stable population by 1990, by means of stimulating fertility and limiting immigration. A number of other countries that desired higher rates of population growth were similarly

concerned largely by the trend and, in some instances, by the demographic structures that would result from the current trend. France, for example, reported in the Fourth Inquiry that the proportion of its population over 65 years of age was steadily increasing and stated that if that tendency were to be maintained over a long period, the aging of the population would involve higher social costs and necessitate a major restructuring of government programmes. As a means of stimulating population growth (and avoiding the undesirable consequences of a rapidly aging population), the Government had adopted a series of broad social policies and had recently announced a new series of measures designed to promote larger families.

A number of the countries in Europe that desired to achieve higher rates of population growth are centrally planned economies. The German Democratic Republic, with a declining rate of population growth that had fallen well below replacement, desired to achieve a higher rate to maintain replacement. In its reply for the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that numerous measures had been taken to improve material conditions which would encourage couples to have children. From an "ethical and moral point of view" and because of its importance for the sustained development of the society along "planned lines", the Government encouraged couples to have at least two children; that number would ensure simple population reproduction. Similarly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reported in the Fourth Inquiry that in that country, where the "primary goal of social production" was to "satisfy peoples' growing material and spiritual needs" to the fullest extent possible, questions related to population growth were always considered extremely important. The Government provided material support to mothers and encouraged women to have children.

It is important to reiterate that the 28 countries in the area that considered their current rates of growth to be acceptable fall into two broad groups. A number of countries had adopted that perception because, as a result of previous successful policies, they had achieved desired rates of population growth; another group of countries had adopted it because they maintained an essentially laissez-faire position and did not desire to intervene in the demographic process.

Of the developed countries that replied to the Fourth Population Inquiry and that considered natural increase to be too low, a number indicated that they had identified quantitative targets. That was the case for a majority of the centrally planned countries in Eastern Europe (and also for several countries in other regions of Europe). In Western Europe, France reported that it had had a target since 1975: to attain a level of fertility that would assure replacement and, if possible, a slightly higher level. Finland had gone even further and had identified quantitative targets in 1975-1976 for each of its counties; basically, those targets were intended to prevent a decline in population in any of the

counties. Greece also reported that it had identified a target: to ensure a population growth rate not much lower than 1 per cent per annum, although it stated that as a result of a return flow of migrant labour it had essentially achieved its goal. However, although few of the developed countries had formally identified quantitative targets, many of those countries did have targets in an implicit sense—that is, they had stated quite clearly in various official statements and economic plans that they intended to maintain a level of fertility that would be replacement or slightly above. For example, the Netherlands reported that it had a goal of achieving a stationary population.

In addition to the tendency for a number of the more developed countries to have more or less implicit targets, a further tendency was the adoption by some countries of an attitude of what might be termed "watchful waiting". Faced with uncertainty as to the long-term effects of the current trend, several countries indicated that they might change their policy at some future date. Finland reported, for example, that as a result of a slight upturn in fertility, its problem of low population growth had become less pronounced; the Government currently considered its rate of natural increase to be acceptable, although it stated that in the long term the net reproduction rate would have to be increased. The Netherlands had adopted a similar stance. The Government stated that since fertility in the Netherlands was currently below replacement level, its goal of achieving a stationary population would eventually involve increasing fertility. Although it had adopted a policy of non-intervention for the coming decade, the Government emphasized that it was carefully studying the implications of the trend and was prepared to intervene at a future date. Canada, a country in which international migration, rather than natural increase, had been the most important determinant of population growth, had adopted an even more flexible position and indicated that the objective of its policy was to increase, maintain or decrease the rate, depending upon an annual assessment of the acceptability of the current rate of growth.

CONCLUSION

From the overview presented in the present chapter, it is clear that there are substantial differences in the perception and policies of Governments with respect to population growth—both among and within the various geographical regions. As a final note, it is interesting to observe that, of the 116 less developed countries, the proportions of countries with high rates of population growth that desired lower rates, and those which considered the rate to be acceptable, are nearly identical, while a significant number of Governments (23) with high rates of population growth desired to attain even higher rates. None of the 42 more developed countries desired to attain a lower rate of population growth; rather, one third desired to attain higher rates and two thirds considered their rates to be acceptable,

TABLE 11. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND ACTUAL RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE AND SIZE OF POPULATION

Category of an actual average annual rate of increase 1975-1979	Total number of countries			Countries in more developed regions				Countries in less developed regions				
	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total
A. Countries classified according to actual rates of natural increase 1975-1979												
0.4 or less	4	7	1	12	4	7	—	11	—	—	1	1
0.5-0.9	4	12	—	16	3	12	—	15	1	—	—	1
1.0-1.4	6	9	2	17	5	8	—	13	1	1	2	4
1.5-1.9	2	4	5	11	—	1	—	1	2	3	5	10
2.0-2.4	6	7	11	24	1	—	—	1	5	7	11	23
2.5-2.9	6	20	14	40	—	1	—	1	6	19	14	39
3.0-3.4	7	16	11	34	—	—	—	—	7	16	11	34
3.5 or more	1	1	2	4	—	—	—	—	1	1	2	6
TOTAL	36	76	46	158	13	29	—	42	23	47	46	116
B. Countries classified according to size as of 1975												
0.9 or less	11	12	12	35	4	3	—	7	7	9	12	28
1.0- 4.9	11	22	10	43	1	5	—	6	10	17	10	37
5.0- 9.9	7	15	5	27	2	7	—	9	5	8	5	18
10.0-19.9	2	12	6	20	1	5	—	6	1	7	6	14
20.0-49.9	2	9	8	19	2	5	—	7	—	4	8	12
50.0-99.9	2	3	3	8	2	2	—	4	—	1	3	4
100.0 or more	1	3	2	6	1	2	—	3	—	1	2	3
TOTAL	36	76	46	158	13	29	—	42	23	47	45	116

TABLE 12. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

	Higher rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Total
ECA area				
Eastern Africa	1	8	6	15
Middle Africa	4	5	—	9
Northern Africa	1	2	3	6
Southern Africa	—	—	4	4
Western Africa	2	11	3	16
TOTAL	8	26	16	50
ECWA area				
Western South Asia ^b	5	7	—	12
ECLA area				
Caribbean	—	1	7	8
Middle America	—	2	5	7
Temperate South America	2	1	—	3
Tropical South America	2	6	1	9
TOTAL	4	10	13	27
ECE area				
Eastern Europe ^c	2	4	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	7	—	7
Southern Europe ^c	1	8	—	9
Western Europe ^c	5	4	—	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	2	—	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	2	—	2
USSR ^c	3	—	—	3
TOTAL	13	25	1	39
ESCAP area				
China	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	1	—	1
Other East Asia	2	—	1	3
Eastern South Asia	2	3	4	9
Middle South Asia	1	2	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	2	—	2
Melanesia	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	1	—	3	4
TOTAL	6	8	16	30
More developed regions	13	29	—	42
Less developed regions	23	47	46	116
TOTAL	36	76	46	158

^a For countries in each area, see annex table 38.^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.^c More developed regions.

independent of the observed rate of population growth. Thus, it is apparent that there is no clear correlation between observed rates of population growth and category of perception, suggesting that the decisions of Governments are at least partially based on non-demographic considerations.

Examining the relationship between the size of a country and its category or perception, it is interesting to take note that none of the 19 less developed countries with a population of more than 20 million considered its rate of population growth to be unacceptable because it was too low. On the other hand, 12 considered it to be too high, and six considered it to be acceptable. Only 33 countries with a population size of 10

million and above desired to attain higher rates of population growth, while 19 desired a lower rate and 13 considered the rate to be acceptable. Of the some 65 countries within the 5 million population range, 22 desired a lower rate and 17 desired a higher rate. It is clear that, given similar rates of population growth, there is a tendency for Governments of the largest countries in the less developed regions to desire to attain lower rates of population growth (see table 11).

Just as a Government may adopt a perception of the acceptability or non-acceptability of population growth on the basis of demographic as well as non-demographic considerations, there are a variety of objectives of population policies. For a majority of Gov-

TABLE 13. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

<i>Government perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>								
<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>			
<i>Effect of constraints</i>					<i>Effect of constraints</i>			
<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>		
<i>Higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable</i>			<i>Lower rates desirable</i>			
<i>Full intervention appropriate (1)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (2)</i>	<i>No intervention appropriate (3) (4) (5)</i>			<i>Some support appropriate (6)</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate (7)</i>	<i>Total</i>	
ECA area								
Eastern Africa	1	—	—	1	7	1	5	15
Middle Africa	4	—	2	—	3	—	—	9
Northern Africa	1	—	—	1	1	—	3	6
Southern Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	4
Western Africa	2	—	1	2	8	2	1	16
TOTAL	8	—	3	4	19	3	13	50
ECWA area								
Western South Asia ^b	4	1	1	1	5	—	—	12
ECLA area								
Caribbean	—	—	—	1	—	1	6	8
Middle America	—	—	—	—	2	3	2	7
Temperate South America	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	3
Tropical South America	1	1	—	2	4	1	—	9
TOTAL	3	1	—	3	7	5	8	27
ECE area								
Eastern Europe ^c	2	—	—	3	1	—	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	—	3	4	—	—	—	7
Southern Europe ^c	—	1	2	3	3	—	—	9
Western Europe ^c	4	1	2	1	1	—	—	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	2
USSR ^c	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
TOTAL	7	6	7	12	6	—	1	39
ESCAP area								
China	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
Other East Asia	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	3
Eastern South Asia	2	—	—	1	2	—	4	9
Middle South Asia	—	1	—	1	1	—	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	1	—	—	—	—	—	3	4
TOTAL	5	1	1	2	5	—	16	30
More developed regions	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42
Less developed regions	19	4	4	10	33	8	38	116
TOTAL	27	9	12	22	42	8	38	158

^a See table 12, foot-note *a*.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 14. FREQUENCY OF INTERVENTION IN DEMOGRAPHIC AND NON-DEMOGRAPHIC PROCESSES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

	Demographic and non-demographic processes subject to policy intervention						Total
	Mortality	Fertility	Spatial distribution	International migration	Technology and organization	No problems perceived	
ECA area							
Eastern Africa	2	5	13	6	14	1	15
Middle Africa	6	1	9	4	9	—	9
Northern Africa	2	4	5	5	5	1	6
Southern Africa	—	4	4	4	4	—	4
Western Africa	3	3	14	7	14	2	16
TOTAL	13	17	45	26	46	4	50
ECWA area							
Western South Asia ^b	5	7	11	10	11	1	12
ECLA area							
Caribbean	—	6	7	5	7	1	8
Middle America	—	3	5	3	7	—	7
Temperate South America	2	2	2	2	2	1	3
Tropical South America	2	1	7	4	7	2	9
TOTAL	4	12	21	14	23	4	27
ECE area							
Eastern Europe ^c	1	2	2	—	2	3	6
Northern Europe ^c	1	2	2	3	2	4	7
Southern Europe ^c	2	1	4	4	5	2	9
Western Europe ^c	1	4	3	6	7	1	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	3	2	3	3	—	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	1	1	1	2
USSR ^c	2	3	3	1	3	—	3
TOTAL	8	15	16	18	23	11	39
ESCAP area							
China	—	1	1	—	1	—	1
Japan ^c	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Other East Asia	2	3	3	1	3	—	3
Eastern South Asia	2	6	8	2	7	1	9
Middle South Asia	1	6	8	4	8	1	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	2	2	2	—	2
Melanesia	—	1	1	—	1	—	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	4	—	4	3	—	4
TOTAL	5	21	24	13	25	2	30
More developed regions	9	14	19	19	24	12	42
Less developed regions	26	58	98	62	104	10	116
TOTAL	35	72	117	81	128	22	158

^a See table 12, foot-note *a*.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

ernments, demographic action is not directed towards a single objective but towards a complex of objectives. As previously stated, Governments generally identify a complex of related demographic processes as the source of their problems and then try to take action with regard to several of them simultaneously. For example, very few of the 136 Governments that considered that their rate of natural increase presented a problem singled out that process when they decided to intervene in the demographic process: 57 took action simultaneously with regard to mortality, spatial distribution, international migration and non-demographic processes; and 72 took action on fertility as well as the above-mentioned combination of demographic and non-demographic processes. Many countries identified both demographic and non-demographic objectives for their actions.

In addition to the variety of objectives, diverse measures were adopted by Governments: (*a*) those which have a direct effect on demographic process (curative medicine, distribution of contraceptives,

regulation of external migration etc.); (*b*) those which tend to modify the context that determines demographic behaviour (increasing family benefits with the birth of each child, tax incentives for decentralized businesses etc.); (*c*) those which alter a socio-economic situation whose continuance would exacerbate the effects of a population trend already considered a cause for concern (land reform in a region where the rate of natural increase is high); and (*d*) those directed towards reducing national dependence on the industrialized countries through more autonomous development (developing local industrial production technology which requires small investments and makes intensive use of abundant manpower, rather than employing imported technology which requires large investments and little manpower).

The variety of governmental positions with regard to the type of action considered most effective ultimately depends upon the importance that Governments attach to demographic variables in their analyses of development problems. In general, Governments' analyses of

the varying degree of importance of demographic variables were based on several types of assumptions: first, some Governments believed that demographic variables existed almost independently of the national socio-economic context, with their own inertia, and were the main cause of their development problems; many more Governments believed that imbalances between demographic and non-demographic variables

were the main source of development problems and that those problems had both demographic and non-demographic origins; lastly, a third category of Governments attributed a major role to external factors (an assumption which, it should be mentioned, is directly linked to that adopted in the elaboration of the Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order).

Chapter XV

MORTALITY

Mortality is different from other demographic variables in that all countries desire to intervene in the same direction to modify the trend. All Governments desire to achieve a higher level of life expectancy and greater health and well-being for their peoples, regardless of whether those welfare objectives are related to demographic objectives. Currently, a small number of Governments, all of which desired to increase their rate of population growth, considered the lowering of mortality to be a primary means of achieving desired demographic objectives.

Just as all Governments shared a similar perception, every country had some type of health programme, although some could be described as rudimentary at best. However, a significant number of countries perceived their efforts in that area to be inadequate. Ten of the 42 more developed countries currently considered their average level of life expectancy at birth to be unacceptable (in the prevailing economic and social circumstances).¹ Of the 116 less developed countries, only 28 countries considered their level of life expectancy to be acceptable; 88 considered it to be unacceptable, as is shown in table 15.

The fact that 98 countries considered their current level of mortality to be unacceptable may be related to the trend. Even in those countries with high life expectancies, progress has been less than satisfactory in a number of areas (for example, there has been a deterioration in male mortality in a number of countries). In the more developed countries, barring some major break-through with respect to cardio-vascular diseases, neoplasms etc., a minimum of further progress can be expected. In the less developed countries, the norm has increasingly been progressively slower gains in life expectancy. Although there are inadequacies in the data, particularly in an area like sub-Saharan Africa, there is adequate evidence to indicate that mortality gains have slowed sharply and, in some areas, may have ceased altogether. Furthermore, both the pattern and the timing of the mortality decline which has occurred in the less developed countries is diverging from that of the more developed countries. According to the still limited information available, it would appear that the slow-down in mortality decline has occurred sooner than had been anticipated in the less developed countries and has affected infants and young children in particular. Further, the prognosis is not hopeful, since the contribution of imported medical technology—which brought about dramatic im-

¹For views of individual Governments concerning mortality, see annex tables 45-50.

provements during the decade of the 1960s—would appear to have been exhausted in many regions of the world.

Perhaps as an outgrowth of concern over the deceleration of progress in many parts of the less developed regions, and most certainly as a corollary to the gradual change in orientation in world-wide socio-economic development programmes (towards integrated planning, a "basic needs" approach etc.), there has been a shift in government policies designed to reduce morbidity and mortality. Whereas previously, during the 1950s and the early 1960s, many less developed countries tended to borrow models exported from the more developed countries and to establish health care systems which were largely curative and urban-oriented, there has been increasing emphasis on primary health care.² Basically, the concept of primary health care reflects an increasing awareness among Governments that simpler, more direct and more decentralized actions must be taken in order to bring essential health services to those segments of the population who are most in need. Primary health care places particular emphasis on the needs of vulnerable and high-risk groups, assigning high priority to the special needs of women, children, the working population at high risk and various underprivileged groups. Such an approach also involves an emphasis on education concerning prevailing health problems and the means of preventing them, promotion of proper nutrition, provision of potable water and basic sanitation; maternal and child health care, including family planning; immunization against the major infectious diseases, prevention and control of locally endemic diseases, distribution of essential drugs, the training of paramedical personnel and so on.

Of course, many Governments are a long way from implementing effective primary health care programmes. Ideally, such programmes must be fully integrated within broader development strategies. There must be substantial budgetary allocations, sufficient data with which to evaluate progress etc. And it must be mentioned that health care programmes in many developing countries are affected by just such budgetary and data constraints. Nevertheless, the fact that a significant number of countries had at least given

²As an example of the growing importance of the primary health care concept, the representatives of some 140 Governments and non-governmental organizations convened at Alma-Ata, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in September 1978 and adopted a number of recommendations for the implementation of primary health care programmes.

TABLE 15. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT LEVELS OF AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH AND THEIR ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS
(Number of Governments)

	Levels of life expectancy at birth										Total
	70 years and over		62 ^a -69		50-61		Under 50		All ages		
	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	
ECA area	—	—	2	1	—	8	1	38	3	47	50
ECWA area	—	—	3	2	3	—	—	4	6	6	12
ECLA area	—	—	9	6	2	9	—	1	11	16	27
ECE area	25	7	4	2	—	1	—	—	29	10	39
ESCAP area	5	—	2	2	3	6	1	11	11	19	30
More developed regions	26	7	6	3	—	—	—	—	32	10	42
Less developed regions	4	—	14	10	8	24	2	54	28	88	116
TOTAL	30	7	20	13	8	24	2	54	60	98	158

^aA life expectancy at birth of 62 years equals the world average expectation of life by 1985 referred to in the World Population Plan of Action (para. 22). The other categories in this table were chosen by reference to this figure.

recognition to the need for primary health care—despite existing constraints—and had shifted towards a primary health care approach, is in itself significant. Before attempting to assess the potential effect of such programmes on morbidity and mortality trends, it is important to review the situation in each of the major geographical regions.

A. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Somewhat more emphasis is given in the present chapter to countries in the area of responsibility of ECA, not only because the countries in that area have the lowest life expectancies but because the Governments themselves considered poor health and low life expectancy to be their most serious population problem. Currently, Africa is the major area in which Governments were most dissatisfied with their current levels of morbidity and mortality. Indeed, only three countries considered their average level of life expectancy at birth to be acceptable (within prevailing economic and social circumstances), while 47 countries considered it to be unacceptable. Of course, that perception was undoubtedly related to the trend, which—on the basis of United Nations projections—does not give grounds for optimism. (Some 35 countries in the ECA area are expected to have life expectancies under 50 years by 1980–1985, and another 13 countries are expected to have life expectancies in the range of 50–62 years—below the average level of life expectancy of 62 years recommended by the World Population Plan of Action.)

Although a number of countries in Africa will fall short of achieving a mortality reduction of the dimension recommended by the World Population Plan of Action, many Governments reported that they did intend to achieve substantial progress, and a number of countries identified quantitative targets. Of those

countries which replied to the Fourth Inquiry, Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Togo all reported that they had explicit targets. A country such as Egypt—with relatively good demographic data—identified precise targets: to reduce the crude death rate from 14.2 to 13 per 1,000; and the infant mortality rate from 119 to 80 per 1,000 live births by 1982. Kenya expressed its target in terms of increasing life expectancy at birth: from 49 to 60 years by the year 2000. Other countries—Madagascar, for example—identified various intermediate targets, to increase the number of physicians, sanitary aides and hospital beds per inhabitant. It is important to take note, however, that a number of countries reported that they could neither identify quantitative targets nor be at all specific concerning prevailing mortality trends, as a result of gross inadequacies in the data.

Although the problem of deficient data is serious in the ECA area and is obviously a constraint on effective health care planning, a majority of the countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry reported that they had nevertheless reviewed their development strategies to provide maximum support for health care programmes. The diversity of the experience in Africa is interesting and reflects a basic tenet of the primary health care approach: that is, that each country has to determine its own health system in the light of its political, social and economic realities; and, as a result, primary health care will of necessity vary from one country to another. To provide only a few examples, Botswana reported that its major objectives were to reinforce primary health care services in rural and marginal urban areas and to strengthen community participation; Burundi emphasized the training of its citizens with respect to preventive medicine; Egypt planned to concentrate on maternal child health services and the provision of potable water and housing in rural areas; Ethiopia, on the construction of health

care stations, health centres and rural hospitals; Gabon, on improving hygiene, nutrition and rural housing; Kenya, on a rural health programme and a "basic needs" approach; Madagascar, on the training of personnel, the distribution of medicine and sanitary facilities, and a better utilization of traditional medicine; Morocco, on campaigns against infectious diseases and malnutrition and the training of health care personnel; Nigeria, on an immunization programme; Rwanda, on increasing the number of health care centres; Sierra Leone, on the strengthening of maternal and child health services; both Somalia and Togo, on campaigns against infectious diseases.

Whereas individual countries in Africa tended to stress different facets of the primary health care approach, there was a common denominator to their collective policies. All of those countries which replied to the Fourth Inquiry reported measures designed to reach rural and underprivileged groups in their societies. Again, to provide only a few examples, countries reported the following activities:

(a) *Botswana*: services had been provided to rural areas since 1973; currently, 80 per cent of its population were within 1 kilometre of a health care facility;

(b) *Egypt*: emphasis on maternal and child health and nutrition activities, to be delivered by health units in rural (and urban) areas;

(c) *Ethiopia*: the construction of health stations and hospitals in rural areas and the training of village health workers;

(d) *Gabon*: the setting-up of dispensaries in isolated zones;

(e) *Ivory Coast*: the "regionalization" of its health care system and use of mobile health teams;

(f) *Morocco*: the development of basic infrastructure and the training of sanitary personnel;

(g) *Niger*: the organization of village health teams;

(h) *Nigeria*: current establishment of the pilot National Basic Health Scheme;

(i) *Rwanda*: the establishment of health care centres throughout the country;

(j) *Seychelles*: the provision of physicians and nurses to outlying areas;

(k) *Sierra Leone*: the extension of the Endemic Disease Control Unit and the training of increased numbers of middle-level personnel;

(l) *Somalia*: the establishment of mobile units to serve the nomadic population; and

(m) *Togo*: similar use of mobile health teams.

Of course, it is important to state that the examples given above are taken from the replies of various Governments to the Fourth Population Inquiry; and the experience of other Governments that did not reply—such as that of the United Republic of Tanzania, which has made far-reaching efforts in the health care field—may be equally important. However, rather

than continuing to enumerate the policies of individual countries, it is important to identify the trend they reveal: a gradual but observable shift towards a primary health care approach. It must be mentioned that there was by no means a consensus among Governments in Africa as to efficacy of any one approach (indeed, at the conference at Alma-Ata in 1978, there was criticism by some Governments of the increasing reliance on paramedical personnel). Still, what is important is that although few countries in the ECA area had formulated—or, indeed, could wait for—comprehensive health-care policies to reach their entire population, Governments have chosen to intervene at various entry points in line with their own development needs.

B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

As a result of the availability of more reliable statistical data, mortality levels can be determined with greater confidence in the ESCAP area, and it is evident that there has been somewhat greater progress in reducing mortality in the countries of Asia (although, as in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, mortality declines have also slowed in Asia in recent years). Although several small countries, such as Singapore and the Republic of Korea, had relatively low levels of mortality, and four countries in the area fell within the moderately high range, there were still some 12 countries with life expectancies under 50 years. Moreover, a majority of the countries—19 out of 30—in the ESCAP area considered their current level of life expectancy to be unacceptable (in prevailing economic and social circumstances).

As a reflection of the availability of more reliable statistical data and a more advanced degree of socio-economic planning on the whole, there was generally a better integration of health-related policies within over-all development plans in the ESCAP area than in the ECA area. Of the countries of Asia and the Pacific that replied to the Fourth Inquiry, a number emphasized that their national health policies had been fully integrated within their comprehensive development plans. Bangladesh, for example, had a two-year health plan; and health care planning was an important component of the current five-year plan in India, the ten-year plan in the Philippines, the fourth plan in Thailand and so on. Furthermore, a number of the countries (Bangladesh, Fiji, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand) had identified quantitative targets for the reduction of morbidity and mortality, targets that were usually expressed in terms of the reduction of crude death rates and infant mortality rates by a certain number of percentage points per annum; in addition, several countries had identified targets for the reduction of malnutrition and various endemic diseases (tuberculosis, gastro-enteritis, malaria, schistosomiasis etc.).

As in the case of the countries of Africa, there had been growing emphasis in the ESCAP area on a primary health care approach. Bangladesh, to provide a good example, was currently endeavouring to build up a health care infrastructure in all rural *thanas*, to strengthen its training programme for middle-level health workers and field personnel, to set up pharmaceutical units for the production of essential drugs, to encourage the development of traditional medicine etc. And, again, in Asia and the Pacific as a whole, there was increasing emphasis on programmes to reach underprivileged groups, such as women, children and, in particular, the rural population. To cite only a few examples, Bangladesh reported that it was establishing rural health complexes and family welfare centres. In India, the current five-year plan emphasized the provision of health care to vulnerable groups (such as children, pregnant women and lactating mothers) through a minimum needs programme, and it would give preferential treatment to "backward and tribal areas which have so far been neglected." The Philippines was currently reorganizing its total health delivery structure, setting up a *barrio* health system and providing additional midwives in rural areas. Thailand was training a greater number of paramedics, making efforts to provide potable water to every village and setting up a radio communications system. Unlike the countries in Africa—among which there was by no means a consensus as to the acceptability of family planning programmes—the countries in the ESCAP area tended to be more uniformly anti-natalist, and it is important to take note that a number of countries emphasized the role that family planning assumed among their health-related programmes. India and Thailand, for example, emphasized that family planning would be closely integrated within public health activities. Pakistan presented an interesting case in that it intended to expand health care services to the rural population through the conversion of existing family planning clinics into general health-care delivery points.

Before concluding this brief discussion of morbidity and mortality policies in the ESCAP area, it would be useful to single out the case of Sri Lanka, which has achieved dramatic progress in reducing levels of morbidity and mortality. A country with a highly structured health care programme, Sri Lanka reported in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry that it provided free medical care to its entire population. Locational aspects of health care programmes had been given important consideration; and, on average, a person did not have to travel more than 3 miles to reach a free public health facility. In addition, anaemia and malnutrition were being treated through what the Government termed a "package type of family programme". Nutrition supplements were an important part of the Government health care programme and some 50 per cent of the population of Sri Lanka currently received a subsidized food ration which provided half of their daily caloric and protein needs.

C. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

In the area of responsibility of ECLA, countries had achieved—on average—higher levels of life expectancy than those in the ECA and ESCAP areas, although, again, progress had slowed and possibly signified the exhaustion of the potential of health care programmes substantially to reduce mortality. Perhaps as a reflection of this deceleration in mortality gains, a majority of countries—16 out of 27—in the ECLA area considered their current level of mortality to be unacceptable, in spite of the fact that many of those countries had achieved substantial progress in the reduction of morbidity and mortality in recent decades.

As in the ECA and ESCAP areas of responsibility, a number of the countries in Latin America that replied to the Fourth Inquiry reported that they had identified quantitative targets (Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama), while all of the countries in the area that replied to the Inquiry reported that they had reviewed their development strategies to provide maximum support to their health care programmes. Similarly, the Governments all reported that they had adopted measures to reach underprivileged groups in their societies and, in particular, the rural population. The Bahamas, for example, had established a network of health centres, clinics and dispensaries throughout the islands, as well as a "flying doctor-dentist service in more remote areas". Colombia reported that it expected to improve the health of its population through income redistribution, tax reform and an over-all emphasis on social policies. In the short term, however, the Government's Food and Nutrition Plan, its National Health Plan and various programmes for integrated rural development were expected to extend coverage to 36 per cent of the population which was not currently covered by health care services. The Dominican Republic reported that it intended to regionalize health care services, to extend its programme of basic health services and to train greater numbers of paramedical personnel. In Ecuador, the policy had a similar focus which emphasized the extension of coverage to rural areas through the utilization of paramedical personnel and the staffing of rural centres by recent medical school graduates. In Guatemala, the emphasis was on the training of rural health technicians; and in Honduras, on a programme to provide basic infrastructure to remote areas and underprivileged groups. Mexico currently sought to bring health care programmes to the rural population by means of the organized participation of rural groups. Additional measures included the creation of rural medical posts in communities of from 500 to 1,500 inhabitants, which would utilize local personnel trained in a basic needs approach; the extension of social security to the rural areas and so on. Panama reported the building-up of an integrated health system, with auxiliary health personnel. Peru cited the construction of hospitals in rural zones, the training of members of rural communities to attend to basic health necessities and an increase of qualified manpower in rural and

marginal urban zones through the use of recent school-leavers and paramedical personnel.

As in the ESCAP area, one country in Latin America—Cuba—stood out because its level of life expectancy was far higher in relation to other countries in the area than its level of *per capita* income would appear to warrant. Cuba currently appeared to have the highest life expectancy in Latin America, an achievement that is noteworthy since it was brought about largely through the extension of basic health services throughout the country. Again, as in the case of Sri Lanka, Cuba had set up a highly structured health care system, with services delivered throughout the country on rationally ordered levels (determined on the basis of such factors as geographical and demographic characteristics of a given area and over-all health status of its population). As a means of avoiding a duplication of services, the system as a whole had been given a pyramidal structure, with three hierarchical levels (central, provincial, regional) and five levels of services (national, provincial, regional, area, sector). The rural hospital was the basic unit of services in rural communities, while the rural medical post was the smallest unit in the health sector and provided basic health services to between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Community participation was essential to the functioning of the Cuban health care system and massive vaccination programmes had been carried out in record time with the assistance of such mass-based organizations as the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and the sanitary brigades of the Federation of Cuban Women. In addition, a rationing system had been introduced following the revolution, which provided a minimum of 2,650 calories per day to each of the country's inhabitants.

D. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

Although income growth has been rapid in many countries in the area of responsibility of ECWA, those gains have not yet been fully translated into social and health care programmes; and, to date, the pace of mortality decline in the region as a whole has been rather modest. Currently, six of the 12 countries in the ECWA area considered their level of life expectancy to be unacceptable. As in the case of the areas of responsibility of ECA, ESCAP and ECLA, there had been a strong tendency for the various countries in the ECWA area to formulate policies designed to improve the condition of the rural population and underprivileged groups. Bahrain, for example, placed an emphasis on the provision of decentralized polyvalent centres; Democratic Yemen had assigned high priority to maternal child health in rural areas, which would give special attention to the nomadic population and other inaccessible rural groups. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Iraq reported that its current development plan assigned high priority to health care facilities in rural zones. Jordan, which reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it would upgrade basic health care

services beginning in 1978, planned to focus on the expansion of preventive services for the rural and nomadic population and for lower income urban groups. Oman was concerned with the equal provision of basic services in both urban and rural zones. In Saudi Arabia, emphasis was on the extension of health care programmes to the rural and nomadic population and on preventive services, health education, and programmes of maternal child health. The Syrian Arab Republic, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, reported efforts to provide rationally distributed health care institutions; furthermore, as a means of providing improved coverage of the rural population, physicians would be encouraged to work in remote and underprivileged regions. Yemen similarly had assigned priority to the establishment of preventive services in rural zones.³

E. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

A majority of countries in the area of responsibility of ECE (29) considered their level of mortality—as measured by the average expectation of life at birth—to be acceptable, although 10 countries, including seven countries which had an average life expectancy of more than 70 years, considered it to be unacceptable. While several of the countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry reported a recent decline in some areas of mortality—the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, reported a significant decline in infant mortality since around 1974—a number of countries with high life expectancies reported dissatisfaction with the current trend. Finland and France, for example, reported that excess mortality among adult males was an area of continuing concern; and the United Kingdom reported unsatisfactory progress in several areas.

Of the more developed countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry, few reported that they had quantitative targets for the reduction of morbidity and mortality. Greece reported that it had a target for the reduction of infant mortality, Hungary had targets for infant mortality and mortality among middle-aged males and Romania had identified various cause-specific targets. In line with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, a number of the more developed countries had identified a level of mortality which they considered feasible to achieve by 1985. However, some countries with very low mortality declined to identify a level, since, in the absence of any major medical break-throughs, the reduction that they anticipated was rather small. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, reported that it could not identify a future level without further geriatric research.

With respect to morbidity and mortality policies, countries in the ECE area with the highest life expectancies—such as Finland, France and the United

³G. M. Stubbs, *loc. cit.*

Kingdom—shared a number of similar concerns: to reduce the incidence of cardio-vascular diseases and vehicular accidents; to wage campaigns against the effects of excessive alcohol consumption and smoking; etc. Although a majority of the countries in the area had low infant and child mortality, a number of countries placed an emphasis on its further reduction: Denmark had enacted legislation which required the examination of all expectant mothers and children; the Federal Republic of Germany had approved legislation in 1974 which required pre-natal examinations and periodic examinations of children. A major area of growing concern was that of preventive health. The Federal Republic of Germany reported that it issued periodic pamphlets, while the United Kingdom reported that it had focused increasing attention on prevention since 1976 (when it had published a white paper on prevention and health).

One interesting point that emerged from the replies to the Fourth Inquiry is that countries in the ECE area of responsibility would appear to consider differential mortality to be as much of a priority area as do the less developed countries. Although a number of countries had achieved substantial progress in that area, problems remained with respect to occupational hazards. Likewise, a number of countries were concerned with the reduction of sex differentials. France reported that although the level of female mortality was acceptable, that of males was unacceptable; and Finland had initiated a special project directed towards reducing the mortality of males over 45. Although a number of countries—for example, France and Greece—reported that regional mortality differentials had tended to decrease along with the decline in general mortality, many of the more developed countries considered regional differentials to be an area for continuing concern (although, in comparison with the less developed countries, regional differentials in the developed countries were not as a rule demographically significant). A variety of programmes were being implemented, each of which reflected the needs of the individual countries concerned: the Federal Republic of Germany planned to reduce regional differentials through the establishment of regional health service offices; Greece, through the expansion of rural medical centres and the utilization of helicopters; the Netherlands, through hospital construction and subsidies to home-care services in rural areas; Romania, through the creation of medical dispensaries in each community; Spain, through the extension of social security to the countryside; Sweden, through district doctors and nurses who would visit patients in their homes.

This brief examination of recent changes in mortality policies has made it clear that there has been a gradual shift towards a primary health care approach among the less developed countries, an approach that may be effective in arresting the deceleration of mortality decline which has been occurring in much of the developing world. Of course, it is difficult to make any concrete predictions without knowing the actual degree of commitment of individual Governments, the extent of budgetary allocations and so on. From the experience of a few countries—such as Cuba and Sri Lanka—which have been highly successful in reducing morbidity and mortality, it is evident that public health and nutrition programmes (along with such factors as high literacy levels) may have a significant impact. And it is important to take note that such a structured approach may be more successful than over-all socio-economic development in bringing about significant advances in lengthening life. Indeed, a recent paper by one mortality expert concludes that unstructured economic development is, in general, quite inefficient for reducing mortality levels in relation to “structured” development that would channel increments in income (or redistribute pre-existing income) towards educational expenditure or preventive health measures.⁴

With respect to the future impact of current policies in the various regions, in Africa, where mortality is still at high levels, much can still be achieved by means of relatively simple intervention; the primary health care approach may eventually have a significant effect in reducing mortality—a phenomenon that will result in higher rates of population growth for a generation or so. In Asia, and particularly in Latin America, where there has been an exhaustion of the pattern of improvement brought about by existing health care programmes, it will be more difficult to bring about a significant decline. When income gains have been translated into social and health programmes to a greater extent in countries in the ECWA area, a marked acceleration of mortality gain may be expected. In all likelihood, there will be little change in the pattern of improvement in the more developed countries in the near future. And, on the whole, barring some medical break-through that would affect the infant/child complex—diarrhoeal disease syndrome—no rapid change can be anticipated in the less developed regions.

⁴Samuel H. Preston, “Mortality, morbidity and development”, paper submitted to the Seminar on Population and Development in the ECWA Region, 20 September 1978, p. 14.

TABLE 16. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT LEVELS OF AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH AND THEIR ACCEPTABILITY IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Levels of life expectancy at birth										Total
	70 years and over		62 ^b -69		50-61		Under 50		All ages		
	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	Acceptable	Unacceptable	
ECA area											
Eastern Africa	—	—	2	—	—	2	1	10	3	12	15
Middle Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	9	—	9	9
Northern Africa	—	—	—	1	—	4	—	1	—	6	6
Southern Africa	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	3	—	4	4
Western Africa	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	15	—	16	16
TOTAL	—	—	2	1	—	8	1	38	3	47	50
ECWA area											
Western South Asia ^c	—	—	3	2	3	—	—	4	6	6	12
ECLA area											
Caribbean	—	—	4	2	1	1	—	—	5	3	8
Middle America	—	—	2	1	—	4	—	—	2	5	7
Temperate											
South America	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	3
Tropical											
South America	—	—	1	2	1	4	—	1	2	7	9
TOTAL	—	—	9	6	2	9	—	1	11	16	27
ECE area											
Eastern Europe ^d	3	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	6
Northern Europe ^d	5	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	2	7
Southern Europe ^d	5	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	6	3	9
Western Europe ^d	8	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	1	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	1	3
Northern America ^d	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
USSR ^d	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	25	7	4	2	—	1	—	—	29	10	39
ESCAP area											
China	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^d	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Other East Asia	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	1	2	3
Eastern South Asia	—	—	1	—	2	2	—	4	3	6	9
Middle South Asia	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	6	2	7	9
Australia and New Zealand ^d											
Melanesia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2
Micronesia- Polynesia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
TOTAL	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	2	2	4
TOTAL	5	—	2	2	3	6	1	11	11	19	30
More developed regions											
More developed regions	26	7	6	3	—	—	—	—	32	10	42
Less developed regions											
Less developed regions	4	—	14	10	8	24	2	54	28	88	116
TOTAL	30	7	20	13	8	24	2	54	60	98	158

^a For the countries concerned, see annex table 50.

^b See table 15, foot-note a.

^c Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^d More developed regions.

Chapter XVI

FERTILITY

In contrast to mortality, where all Governments desire to intervene in the same direction to modify the trend, or, in fact, to change it, there is considerable diversity of opinion at world level with respect to the acceptability of levels of national fertility and to the feasibility of intervening to change the trend. The varying perceptions of the current acceptability of fertility levels resulted largely from the fact that individual countries were at different stages of the demographic transition (comparatively more countries in Asia, for example, and to a lesser extent, Latin America, were at an intermediate stage of the demographic transition and a number of countries in both regions had experienced a significant fertility decline; a majority of countries in Africa were at an earlier stage and could anticipate higher fertility and higher rates of natural increase as a result of gradual improvements in the area of health; conversely, fertility had fallen to a very low level in a number of the developed countries). Still, a majority of countries at world level (84) considered their current level of fertility to be satisfactory (although their perception might be a result of already successful intervention to modify fertility or simply the expression of a positive assessment of the current level and trend). Of those countries which desired to modify the trend, nearly twice as many countries considered fertility to be too high as considered it to be too low (52 as opposed to 22 countries; see table 17).¹ It must be stated, however, that not all the countries that considered their fertility to be unacceptable had policies to modify the trend (such non-intervention had various causes and might be related to political problems, technical and financial constraints etc.). Lastly, it is important to emphasize that, as in the case of natural increase, there was a discrepancy between the numbers of Governments that desired a particular fertility intervention and the proportion of the world population that resided in those countries.

A distinction must be made between fertility policies that have demographic objectives (a policy of incentives, for example, designed to stimulate fertility and to achieve a higher rate of natural increase, or a policy of incentives and disincentives designed to promote smaller families and result in a lower rate of natural increase) and those fertility policies formulated in relation to family well-being (a policy to permit the regulation and spacing of births, for example, as a means of improving maternal and child health). Thus, also, a

given policy may have both a demographic and a welfare objective (an integrated maternal child health and family planning programme may be designed to modify fertility and to promote the well-being of the family unit). When these policies are added up at world level, one must conclude that virtually all Governments had adopted measures that had some bearing upon fertility.

TABLE 17. GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON CURRENT LEVELS OF FERTILITY
(Number of Governments)

	Rate unsatisfactory: too low	Rate satisfactory	Rate unsatisfactory: too high	Total
ECA area	6	25	19	50
ECWA area	1	9	2	12
ECLA area	3	11	13	27
ECE area	10	28	1	39
ESCAP area	2	11	17	30
More developed regions	10	31	1	42
Less developed regions	12	53	51	116
TOTAL	22	84	52	158

Almost all Governments—whether they desired to increase, maintain or decrease fertility—would acknowledge that broad socio-economic policies (in relation to the employment of women, education, reduction of infant mortality etc.) might be expected to have an impact on individual and aggregate levels of national fertility. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that nearly all Governments (90 per cent) at world level allowed access to modern methods of contraception as a welfare measure and as a human right, in spite of the fact that such programmes might be in no way related to a desire to reduce fertility. Indeed, a majority of countries at world level (83) did not desire to modify fertility and had adopted no explicit measures to modify the trend. Currently, 37 countries had policies to decrease fertility, 21 countries to maintain it and 17 countries to increase the rate (see table 18).

Currently, 98 countries had programmes directly supported by the Government and 20 had programmes that received indirect support, while 26 Governments provided no support. Fourteen Governments—located in all of the geographical regions—limited access to modern methods of contraception. (For the regional breakdown, see table 19.)

With respect to access to modern methods of birth control, a number of changes had been made in that area since 1976, as shown in table 20; a larger number of Governments either allowed access to modern methods of contraception or provided more support.

¹For views of individual Governments concerning fertility, see annex tables 51-67.

TABLE 18. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES DESIGNED TO CHANGE FERTILITY
(Number of Governments)

	Incentives or disincentives				Total
	To increase fertility	To maintain fertility	To reduce fertility	No measure taken	
ECA area	3	2	12	33	50
ECWA area	1	5	—	6	12
ECLA area	3	—	8	16	27
ECE area	8	11	1	19	39
ESCAP area	2	3	16	9	30
More developed regions	9	11	—	22	42
Less developed regions	8	10	37	61	116
TOTAL	17	21	37	83	158

TABLE 19. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING ACCESS TO MODERN METHODS OF BIRTH CONTROL
(Number of Governments)

	Access not limited				Total
	Access limited	Not supported by Government	Indirectly supported by Government	Directly supported by Government	
ECA area	5	12	10	23	50
ECWA area	1	5	2	4	12
ECLA area	1	4	1	21	27
ECE area	4	4	6	25	39
ESCAP area	2	2	1	25	30
More developed regions	5	4	7	26	42
Less developed regions	8	23	13	72	116
TOTAL	13	27	20	98	158

As it was for mortality, it is important to review the situation with respect to fertility in each of the major areas, according to area of responsibility of the regional commissions.

A. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

In the area of responsibility of ECA, proportionally more countries were satisfied with the level of fertility, and a number considered it to be too low. Indeed, of the 12 less developed countries that considered their current level of fertility to be too low, six were located in the ECA area; similarly, of the 52 less developed countries that considered their level of fertility to be satisfactory, 25 were in Africa (on the other hand, of the 52 countries that considered fertility to be too high, 19 were in that area).

With respect to policies, a significant number of countries (33) in the ECA area had taken no measures to intervene to modify fertility. In contrast, three countries had a policy designed to increase fertility,

two to maintain it and 12 to decrease it.² In terms of allowing access to modern contraceptives, slightly under half (23) of the countries in Africa provided direct support to family planning programmes; 10 Governments provided indirect support, 12 provided no support and five restricted access to modern contraceptives. Thus, with respect to perception, policies, support provided to family planning programmes etc., there was relatively more diversity of opinion among the countries of Africa than among countries in other geographical major areas.

The replies of Governments in the ECA area to the Fourth Inquiry provided some idea of the range of perceptions and policies adopted by individual countries. A number of countries, such as Burundi and Ethiopia, reported that, largely as a result of inadequate data with which to formulate policies, they had no policies designed to modify fertility—either in relation to population growth or to family well-being. A somewhat different policy response was that of Togo, which similarly reported no explicit policy with respect to fertility, although the Government acknowledged that it did have “a policy for socio-cultural development” which was expected to have a positive effect on family well-being (through public health and sanitation programmes).

Conversely, there was the view of Gabon, which considered the current level of fertility to be too low and which desired to increase the rate, chiefly by means of maternal child health programmes, a reduction of sterility, improvements in education and fiscal incentives. Although quantitative targets have often been associated with a desire to decrease fertility and population growth, Gabon had identified a quantitative target to increase fertility: to raise the intercensal growth rate to 5 per cent per annum. The Ivory Coast, another country with one of the stronger economies in the area, similarly reported that favourable conditions would exist until the end of the century for high fertility and population growth, since the country was “far from being overpopulated”. However, in contrast to Gabon, which desired to increase the rate, the Ivory Coast desired merely to maintain its current high fertility.

A number of countries—for example, Madagascar, Nigeria and Sierra Leone—had fertility policies in relation to family well-being but not in relation to population growth. Madagascar reported that its intervention with respect to fertility was motivated by such medical and social considerations as child health and family welfare. The Government emphasized that programmes were not intended to limit births in order to slow population growth, but to educate the population as to the manner in which each couple could “freely

²The Central African Empire, Equatorial Guinea and the United Republic of Cameroon desired to increase fertility; Mozambique and the Ivory Coast desired to maintain it; and Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and Uganda in Eastern Africa; Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia in Northern Africa; Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa in Southern Africa; and Ghana in Western Africa all desired to decrease it.

TABLE 20. CHANGES IN POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

Policies in August 1976	Policies in July 1978				Total
	Access limited (1)	Access not limited			
		But no support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)	
(1) Access limited	13	2 ^a	—	—	15
(2) Access not limited but no support provided	—	23	2 ^b	3 ^c	28
(3) Access not limited and indirect support provided	—	—	15	3 ^d	18
(4) Access not limited and direct support provided	—	2 ^e	3 ^f	92	97
TOTAL	13	27	20	98	158
No change as percentage of total in 1978	100	85	75	94	
Number of Governments in 1978 as percentage of total in 1976	93	96	111	101	

^a Argentina and Spain.

^b Italy and Togo.

^c Israel, Senegal and Zambia.

^d Brazil, Mozambique and United Republic of Tanzania.

^e Bolivia and Iraq.

^f Madagascar, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

decide upon their family size". Nigeria reported similarly that it had a fertility policy, but only in relation to family well-being. The Government reported that it did not intend to use family planning to achieve any demographic goal; rather, it had been adopted to improve the pace of socio-economic development. (It is important to note, however, that this limited support of family planning for reasons of family welfare, which represented a subtle shift from the former policy in Nigeria, was significant in light of the country's large population size.) Sierra Leone also reported that it had a policy for family well-being, but not in relation to population growth, because such a policy would meet with "socio-cultural opposition in view of the value of children in an African community". However, as was the case in Nigeria, the Government of Sierra Leone did allow access to modern contraceptives and provided indirect support to private family planning services.

Of course, at the other end of the spectrum are those countries such as Egypt, which considered the level of fertility to be too high, in relation both to family well-being and to population growth, and which desired to decrease the rate. Indeed, Egypt, which is a country with a family planning programme of fairly long standing, remained committed to reducing individual and aggregate fertility. The Government had identified a quantitative target: to lower the rate of natural increase through an annual decrease of the crude birth rate by 1 per cent per 1,000 from 1973 to 1982. Egypt would attempt to attain that goal by means of more efficient family planning services (it reported, for example, in the Fourth Inquiry that it would set up an improved system of incentives for those who worked in the field and would emphasize the role of local administration), maternal child health services, reduction

of sterility, information on population, raising the educational level, fiscal incentives, and monetary and other incentives (such as the provision of low-cost contraceptives). In addition, the Government emphasized the importance of broader socio-economic policies—such as "the full integration of women in the development process and improvement of their situation in the family and society". Morocco was another country in Northern Africa which had a policy designed to decrease fertility in relation both to family well-being and to population growth—by means of a change of age at marriage, the raising of educational levels, and the extension of family planning services through the free distribution of contraceptive products. Of course, a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa similarly desired to decrease fertility from the points of view both of family well-being and of population growth and they had placed a major emphasis on family planning programmes. Botswana reported that it intended to improve the training of community health workers for family planning motivation, to bring about a reduction in the family planning drop-out rate and to improve the education of males with respect to family planning. Kenya also emphasized family planning programmes. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it desired to reduce the rate of population growth from 3.3 to 3.0 per cent per annum (by 1978), mainly through the recruitment of 640,000 new acceptors to its family planning programme. Rwanda also reported that it had a policy in relation to both growth and family well-being; although the major emphasis of the policy was on the spacing and regulation of births, the Government acknowledged that such a policy would be expected to result in the eventual reduction of national fertility rates.

B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The countries in the area of responsibility of ESCAP were more uniform in their perception and policies in relation to fertility behaviour than were countries in the ECA area, and most of the former group have had long experience with a variety of measures designed to modify fertility. Of the 30 countries in the ESCAP area, 17 considered fertility to be too high, 11 considered it to be satisfactory and only two considered it to be too low. Sixteen countries had policies designed to decrease fertility (in contrast, two countries had policies to increase fertility and two to maintain it, while nine countries had not adopted explicit measures to modify fertility). Twenty-five Governments in Asia and the Pacific directly supported family planning programmes; one Government provided indirect support, two provided no support and two restricted access to modern methods of contraception. Because of the wide range of measures adopted in the ESCAP area, it is useful to review the policies of a number of individual countries in somewhat more depth than is done for the other geographical regions.³

Some countries in the region had made strong statements of commitment to reducing fertility. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Bangladesh reported, for example, that the population problem had been declared the major national problem and top priority had been given to the population programme. It stated that population control had been made an integral part of the total development process and all development ministries were involved in population activities. The desired reduction in the growth rate—from 2.8 to 1.5 per cent per annum by 1985—would be brought about by family planning programmes, maternal child health, a change of the age at marriage, information activities and various incentives (such as “annual awards to communities for commendable performance”). On the whole, however, Bangladesh was committed to a voluntary programme of fertility limitation; and although the Government had experimented with a number of incentive schemes, they had been confined primarily to efforts to increase popular acceptance of sterilization.

A number of countries—for example, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines—had identified quantitative targets which they intended to achieve through a variety of measures: maternal child health; family planning; information on population; the raising of educational levels and so on. In addition, quite a number of countries had adopted a fairly elaborate system of incentives and disincentives designed to lower fertility.

³Information on incentives and disincentives adopted by countries in the area of responsibility of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific was obtained from *Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Socio-Economic Measures Affecting Fertility Behaviour with Special Emphasis on Actionable Programmes, Bangkok, 5–10 September 1977*, Asian Population Series, No. 41 (Bangkok, 1978).

The Indonesian family planning programme was strengthening its links with rural areas both by the recruitment of acceptors through a village-based delivery system and by the maintenance of acceptors in the programme through a variety of measures which extended “beyond family planning”. The Government had experimented with individual incentives, but it had generally favoured adoption of a system of community incentives which rewarded collective action. Although Indonesia had recently achieved some success in lowering its rate of population growth, the role of family planning, as opposed to over-all socio-economic development, in that process was by no means clear. Nor were the causal relationships clear in the case of Sri Lanka and Thailand, two other countries in the ESCAP area which had achieved a dramatic decline in fertility. As reported in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Sri Lanka had a family planning programme of long standing (since 1966), but it also had a highly structured health care programme, a programme of dietary supplements, high levels of literacy and so on. Thailand, which also had witnessed a fertility decline in recent years, desired to reduce fertility still further. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that its goal was to recruit more than 3 million new acceptors, although it acknowledged that in addition to family planning, it hoped that modernization would reduce the high fertility rate.

Although Thailand had conducted a number of feasibility studies on the question of incentives and disincentives, those factors had not yet played a significant role, in contrast to the Republic of Korea and Singapore, countries that had drawn up complex systems of incentives and disincentives and that had achieved comparatively low fertility for Asia (again, the causal relationships are by no means clear). The Republic of Korea had intervened in the area of fertility behaviour by promoting a general acceptance of family planning, increasing the age at marriage and allowing induced abortion. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it desired to decrease fertility still further, with a goal of reaching replacement level by 1990. However, future fertility decline, especially to replacement level, would be more difficult to achieve and, in the light of anticipated difficulties, a newly reformulated population policy had been announced by the Government in 1976. The policy seeks to create additional social support for the two-child family; the major strategies for creating support include institutional and legal changes in family institutions, liberalization of abortion and various incentive measures.

Singapore, which had reached replacement level in 1975 and which intended to achieve a stationary population by 2030, had long had an elaborate system of incentives and disincentives which actively discouraged large families. In addition to liberalized abortion and sterilization services on demand, there were graded delivery charges in government hospitals, abolition of paid maternity leave for the delivery of the third and subsequent children, no priority given to large families in the allocation of government housing, lower priority

in the choice of primary school to children of fourth birth order or higher etc. Of course, it is not possible to separate the effects of these measures from widespread changes in the society and the economy. For example, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it encouraged greater participation of women in the labour force (and it stated that in terms of education, career training and career development, women were generally on a par with men).

Although it had not as yet experienced a significant fertility decline, the Philippines had experimented with a wide range of incentives and disincentives. The Government had amended certain sections of the national internal revenue code with respect to the granting of additional tax exemptions (the amendment limited the number of additional exemptions to no more than four). A unique programme at the local level was a financing scheme in some rural banks in which participants paid a lower interest rate, provided they practised family planning and no pregnancy occurred within one year of the loan's duration.

Malaysia desired a continuing reduction of fertility levels, although the Government currently considered the rate of population growth to be satisfactory. Emphasis was on improvement of the quality of life and the family planning programme was focused on the physical, social and economic welfare of families. Although socio-economic changes had taken place in recent years, their relationship to fertility was uncertain. However, such measures as resettlement of the rural population into organized sectors, programmes for youth and land development schemes were considered to have had some bearing on fertility.

Although there is a lack of definite information on China, it would appear that the effort to reduce fertility is unique. Few countries have mounted such an ambitious campaign to alter traditional values relating to marriage and family formation or have gone so far towards making family limitation an object of sustained community interest and pressure. No other country has developed such a comprehensive system for the widespread delivery of family planning services, including contraceptives, sterilization and abortion; and from all indications, it would appear that the Government's commitment to reducing population growth is currently being intensified.

In conclusion, it is evident that the countries in the ESCAP area of responsibility have had a somewhat longer experience with intervention to modify fertility behaviour. A larger proportion of countries in that area than in others desired to attain lower fertility; and a number of countries—including several very large countries—had achieved significant progress in that respect. All but two Governments in the ESCAP area allowed access to modern methods of contraception and many had resorted to complex incentives and disincentives—which ranged from pilot projects to the programme of multiple disincentives adopted by Singapore. For the area as a whole, the most common over-all approach was that of community-based integrated health care-family planning services and of rural

development schemes with family planning built into them as an integral component. Other measures varied from country to country in a range all the way from family planning schemes in rural banks to preferential school admission policies favouring smaller families. A number of countries in the region had followed the example of China and had raised the minimum age at marriage. India, for example, enacted a law in 1978 fixing the minimum age at 21 years for males and 18 for females. Singapore similarly reported in the Fourth Inquiry that an additional policy which had been communicated to the public since 1976 was designed to discourage early marriage and parenthood among young girls, particularly among teen-agers, and to encourage wider spacing between births. Thus, the sharp increase in the number of births expected in the next 10–15 years to rising numbers of women of reproductive ages could be avoided.

Perhaps the most salient change which can be observed throughout the area—and, indeed, the world—is the merging of family planning with over-all family welfare in India, which altered its approach even to the extent of changing the title of its executing agency: from the Ministry of Health and Family Planning to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, India reported that the most recent population policy statement (July 1977) had recorded a departure from previous policy in two important areas. "Compulsion and coercion" of any type had been ruled out in programme implementation; and new emphasis had been placed on the welfare aspect. Health and population education would be given greater attention. All methods for the limitation of family size would be available and the public would be free to select the method they preferred to adopt. The Government further stated that its family planning programme had been integrated with maternal child health and with nutrition programmes for vulnerable groups. It is interesting to take note that although a quantitative target for a reduction in fertility was retained, it had been revised to 25 births per 1,000 by 1985 from 35 per 1,000 by 1983.

C. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Nearly half of the countries in the area of responsibility of ECLA—13 out of 27—considered their current level of fertility to be too high. Almost as many countries (11) considered their level of fertility to be satisfactory, while only three countries considered it too low. In terms of policies, eight Governments had policies designed to decrease fertility and three to increase it; while some 16 Governments—although they had adopted indirect measures which might affect fertility—did not have an explicit policy designed to modify the trend. A majority of Governments—21 out of 27—directly supported family planning programmes; one country provided indirect support and three provided no support. Just one Government re-

stricted access to modern methods of contraception. As was the case in Africa, there was a fairly broad spectrum of opinion in Latin America. And, it is important to state that with regard to the acceptability of current levels of fertility, there had been greater change in perception in the ECLA area in the two-year period than in any other area.

Currently, three countries in the ECLA area desired to increase fertility, as well as their rate of population growth. Two of those countries—Argentina and Uruguay—had pro-natalist policies of long standing; the third—Bolivia—had changed its stance in 1977 when, following the publication of the preliminary results of the 1976 census, the Government had discovered what it termed a “demographic deficit”. As a result, it currently desired to increase fertility and had closed a number of Government-sponsored family planning clinics.

Another group of three countries in the region—Colombia, Ecuador and Panama—which previously had desired to reduce fertility, currently reported that the level was satisfactory and that they had no official policies in relation to population growth. (Ecuador reported that it had a policy with respect to family well-being, while Colombia and Panama reported that they had no fertility policies in relation to either family well-being or population growth). That change might have occurred partially in reaction to the success of previous measures in contributing to a fertility decline, at least in the case of Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Panama. Colombia has had a comprehensive programme designed to reduce fertility since the late 1960s and, although the cause of its sharp fertility decline has been debated, there is evidence that Colombia is moving through a fertility transition that is about as rapid as any on record. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government stated that it no longer had an official family planning policy, although it emphasized that it was possible to reduce fertility, through the provision of integrated health services and through socio-economic change, even though there was no explicit policy.

A significant number of countries in the ECLA area (16) had no explicit measures designed to modify fertility, although they did have maternal child health and family planning programmes and provided information to their citizens on population matters. In general, however, those Governments placed far greater emphasis on the role of socio-economic measures and structural reform. Peru was representative of countries in that group. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government of Peru emphasized that it had not formulated an explicit fertility policy. It considered that fertility would reach an acceptable level as a result of something of a national consensus—i.e., of combined governmental and individual efforts. In its national population policy, issued in 1976, the Government had reported that it was the role of the State to bring about structural change and to create a national environment in which families would be able to exercise free option with respect to family size; the Government would provide educational services and contraceptive means,

but only as a method of facilitating free and responsible parenthood and not with a view towards decreasing individual or aggregate levels of national fertility. Ecuador had a somewhat similar policy. Although the Government of Ecuador stated in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry that the State guaranteed the right of couples to have the desired number of children, it emphasized that no population policy could substitute for short-term structural reforms and reported that it intended to promote plans and programmes that would advance socio-economic development, as well as raise the level of living of the entire population.

Although a majority of countries in Latin America fell within the above-mentioned category and emphasized indirect measures and structural reform, nine countries in the area had explicit policies to reduce fertility. A majority of those countries are located in Middle America and in the Caribbean region. Of the countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry, the Dominican Republic was fairly representative of the latter group. The Government reported that its level of fertility was too high and that it had formulated a policy in relation to both family well-being and population growth, although it had not identified quantitative targets.⁴ The Dominican Republic had assigned high priority to its national family planning programme for a number of years, although, as was the case of a growing number of countries in other regions, family planning was currently closely linked with family welfare measures. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that a national programme of basic health services, including family planning had been initiated in 1976. The goal of the programme, which was directed mainly to rural areas, was to have 4,000 motivators throughout the country by 1980. Mexico, which had changed its pro-natalist position only in 1973, was another country in that group. Currently, Mexico had one of the more comprehensive programmes for fertility reduction among the countries in the ECLA area. In addition to its desire to bring about a reduction in population growth and an improvement in family well-being, the Government emphasized the importance of fertility-related programmes in bringing about an improvement in the status of women and in promoting equality between the sexes. A major focus was on family planning programmes. Early in 1977 the Government had established a co-ordinating body (Coordinación Nacional de Planificación Familiar) to centralize and unify the national population programme. That important body had been given the task of formulating a national family planning programme which would enable the Government to attain its target: to reduce the rate of population growth from 3.2 to 2.5 per cent per annum by 1982. (The goal of the programme was for a threefold increase in the number of contraceptive users in the same five-year period.) However, the Government had also implemented a number of related programmes in the area of sex edu-

⁴It is interesting to take note that few countries in Latin America had identified quantitative targets with respect to fertility or population growth.

cation, population and communications and maternal child health.

The policy shift of Mexico in recent years and its current forceful policy of fertility reduction—which included ambitious quantitative targets—has been given much publicity because it previously had been the only country in the world with more than 60 million inhabitants and a rate of population growth as high as 3.5 per cent. The other large country in the ECLA area—Brazil, which contains one third of the population of Latin America—had somewhat relaxed its pro-natalist position in 1977, to allow access to family planning information and to provide free services to poor women for whom pregnancy was judged to constitute a high health risk. However, the programme was quite small (it was expected to reach some 54,000 women out of a total of about 28 million women of reproductive age); and its implications—whether or not it represented a first step toward a comprehensive national family planning programme—were not yet clear.

D. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

A majority of countries in the area of responsibility of ECWA—nine out of 12 countries—considered their current level of fertility to be satisfactory; only two countries consider it to be too high and one considered it to be too low. An equal number of countries—five in each category—had policies designed to maintain fertility or had adopted no measures to modify the trend. In contrast, only one country had a policy designed to lower fertility and one had a policy to increase fertility. In spite of the pro-natalist or non-interventionist position of a majority of Governments in the ECWA area, only one Government, Saudi Arabia, restricted access to modern contraceptives. Four countries had family planning programmes directly supported by the Government, three had programmes that were indirectly supported and five had programmes that received no support.

In terms of specific policies, the one country in the ECWA area that desired to increase fertility—Iraq—reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it had a policy for family well-being and a policy to increase population growth—mainly by means of family allowances. Of the countries that desired to maintain fertility or that had adopted policies of non-intervention, a number—among them the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen—had placed an emphasis on maternal child health, including maternity-centered family planning programmes. Jordan, which previously had shown a cautious attitude with respect to fertility, exhibited signs of change. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it currently desired to lower fertility and that it had recently commenced a new programme for the development and expansion of maternal and child health centres which would include integrated family planning services.

E. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

Excluding a number of Eastern European countries, fertility had continued to decline in most of the countries in the area of responsibility of ECE; and in a number of countries fertility had fallen below replacement level. However, a majority of the ECE countries (32) reported that their current level of fertility was satisfactory. Only one country, Turkey, considered that it was too high; and nine countries considered that it was too low. Among those countries which desired to achieve a higher rate were several very small countries in Western Europe: Monaco; Liechtenstein; and Luxembourg. The remaining countries were: France; the Federal Republic of Germany; the German Democratic Republic; Greece; Bulgaria; and Israel. Almost all of the countries in the ECE area provided family planning services as a public health measure and as a human right, regardless of whether the Government desired to maintain or to increase fertility. Twenty-seven countries had programmes directly supported by the Government, seven had programmes that received indirect support and four received limited support. Spain had recently relaxed its opposition to family planning programmes; and, currently, only four Governments—Greece, the Holy See, Ireland and Malta—restricted access to modern methods of contraception.

Although a number of countries in the ECE area had similar programmes with respect to fertility (i.e., they provided family planning services, family allowances, maternity benefits and so on), the objectives of those policies might differ. Two of the larger countries in Western Europe that considered their current level of fertility to be too low emphasized that they offered no specific incentives to raise the rate. France was concerned not only with increasing the level of fertility but with avoiding excessive fluctuations in the rate. However, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government emphasized that it would attempt to attain its objectives through broad social policies. The Federal Republic of Germany reported similarly that it had adopted no measures that had the explicit objective of raising fertility, which, it stated, would be achieved by continuous efforts to improve social policies with respect to the family and children. A number of countries did not preclude the possibility of greater intervention at some future date, should fertility fall to some unreasonably low level. Finland reported that because of the recent upturn in the birth rate, it had not formulated a fertility policy; but it indicated that it might do so in the future, if natural increase should fall below an acceptable level. The Netherlands reported that it currently had a policy of non-intervention with respect to fertility, although it was monitoring the trend so that it could formulate a policy if fertility remained too low over too long a period.

On the other hand, a number of countries in the ECE area were actively pro-natalist. That group included a number of countries that considered the current rate to

be satisfactory and were concerned with maintenance of the trend, as well as a country—the German Democratic Republic—that considered the current rate to be deficient. Several of those countries had instituted family allowance schemes, which were designed to stimulate the birth rate through the provision of material incentives. Centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary, had long had programmes of subsidies, family allowances, maternity benefits and so on, which were directed to facilitation of the dual role of women as workers and mothers. One country that had placed increasing emphasis on such incentive was the German Democratic Republic. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it had implemented a number of measures during the period 1972–1975 (extension of paid pregnancy and maternity leave etc.), the effects of which had been measurable since early 1977.

Of course, such family allowance policies, liberal maternity benefits etc., might be designed to improve social justice rather than to attain specific demographic objectives. Finland, for example, did not have an official fertility policy, although it had extended maternity leave in 1975 and again in 1978 and expected to extend it still further.

CONCLUSION

There was a broad range of opinion at world level concerning the acceptability of levels of national fertility and considerable diversity with respect to policies. A majority of Governments (83) considered their level of fertility to be acceptable and had not adopted explicit measures designed to modify the trend, although a significant number of countries (53) desired to decrease fertility and a smaller number (22) desired to increase it. In terms of measures it is interesting to note that the same measures had occasionally been adopted both by countries that desired to increase fertility and by those which desired to decrease it. Nearly all Governments, for example, regardless of the direction in which they desired to modify fertility, allowed access to modern methods of contraception as a public health measure and as a human right. (Indeed, that was one area of human rights where there had been a fairly broad consensus at world level.) An interesting development was the extent to which family planning programmes had been integrated within broader family welfare programmes, something which had occurred in a growing number of countries in all regions of the world. So, too, an increasing number of Governments had adopted additional measures—such as raising of the age at marriage—and had explicitly acknowledged the role of socio-economic factors (raising of educational levels, improvement of the status of women etc.) to bring about changes in fertility behaviour. Although a number of Asian countries had adopted multiple incentives and disincentives, coercion was disavowed; and a majority of Governments in all regions of the world emphasized the right of couples freely to decide upon family size.

As the chapter has demonstrated, considerable variation can be found both among and within regions, due largely to the fact that individual countries are at different stages of the demographic transition. There was somewhat more diversity in Africa, where 19 Governments considered that fertility rates should be decreased, 25 considered that they were satisfactory and six desired to achieve higher rates. In the area of responsibility of ESCAP, where fertility had declined rapidly in a number of countries, a majority of Governments (17) desired lower rates or to maintain their comparatively low rates, and had adopted a broad array of incentives and disincentives to result in smaller families. In the ECLA area, as in the ECA area, there was more diversity of opinion; a few Governments desired to increase fertility (three) and a larger number to decrease it (14), although 10 countries reported that current rates were satisfactory. Although 21 countries in Latin America had Government-sponsored family planning programmes, a significant number of the Governments emphasized the role of structural change and diverse socio-economic measures in bringing about desired rates. In the ECWA area of responsibility, a majority of Governments had policies of non-intervention or desired to maintain their current rates. As to the direction of governmental intervention in the less developed countries, it may be anticipated that a majority of Governments will continue in much the same vein as their current efforts, including the integration of family planning within family welfare programmes, the adoption of a broader range of measures to achieve desired goals and the avoidance of coercive policies. With respect to the trend, although a number of countries of Africa may achieve higher rates for a generation or so as a result of a reduction of mortality, the global trend in fertility may have reached an inflexion point and have begun to decline. Although numerous studies have been conducted, the role of governmental intervention in contributing to this decline is not yet clear, nor can the effect of current policies on future trends be determined with any degree of certainty.

In the more developed regions, fertility had fallen to very low levels in a number of countries, and Governments would have to invest considerable resources in programmes to induce more women to have more children. One fertility expert states that “it is not difficult to visualize a society in which perhaps a third of women would never have any children, which would mean that the remaining two thirds would have to be persuaded to reproduce at an average of three births per woman to maintain replacement”. He concluded that it appears evident that “much more than trivial baby bonuses will be required”.⁵ Indeed, it would appear that with respect to future intervention, more policy changes can be anticipated in the more developed

⁵Charles F. Westoff, “The predictability of fertility in developed countries”, in *Prospects of Population: Methodology and Assumptions*, Papers of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Demographic Projections, United Nations Headquarters, 7–11 November 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.XII.3), p. 213.

than in the less developed countries. France, for example, reported in the Fourth Inquiry in May 1978 that it would attain its objective of achieving higher national fertility by means of broad social policies. Several months later, in December 1978, the Government announced a number of monetary incentives designed to promote larger families (of three or more children): a minimum monthly revenue of 3,500 francs, an additional family allowance of 1,000 francs beginning on 1 July etc.). To date, it has been mainly the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe which have offered direct incentives to encourage larger families, but a number of Western European Governments may be moving in this direction.

It must be mentioned that the situation in France and in other countries of Western Europe differs fundamentally from that of the centrally planned

economies of Eastern Europe. In the Western European countries, until recently, it was possible to resort to increasing immigration as a means of increasing the size of the active population (and the long-term effect of such a policy would be to increase the rate of population growth). In a country such as the German Democratic Republic, however, which is essentially closed to large-scale immigration, the Government will have to rely on increasing fertility in order to bring about a higher rate of natural increase. The Government had already formulated a complex series of incentives which would appear to have had measurable success. However, it may be anticipated that the German Democratic Republic and other Eastern European countries with low fertility will have to make a considerable investment in coming years in order to increase—or even to maintain—fertility at desired levels.

TABLE 21. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CURRENT LEVELS OF FERTILITY, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Rate unsatisfactory: too low	Rate satisfactory	Rate unsatisfactory: too high	Total
ECA area				
Eastern Africa	—	7	8	15
Middle Africa	4	5	—	9
Northern Africa	1	2	3	6
Southern Africa	—	—	4	4
Western Africa	1	11	4	16
TOTAL	6	25	19	50
ECWA area				
Western South Asia ^b	1	9	2	12
ECLA area				
Caribbean	—	1	7	8
Middle America	—	2	5	7
Temperate South America	2	—	1	3
Tropical South America	1	8	—	9
TOTAL	3	11	13	27
ECE area				
Eastern Europe ^c	2	4	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	7	—	7
Southern Europe ^c	1	8	—	9
Western Europe ^c	5	4	—	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	2	—	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	2	—	2
USSR ^c	—	3	—	3
TOTAL	10	28	1	39
ESCAP area				
China	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	1	—	1
Other East Asia	—	2	1	3
Eastern South Asia	2	3	4	9
Middle South Asia	—	2	7	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	2	—	2
Melanesia	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	1	3	4
TOTAL	2	11	17	30
More developed regions	10	31	1	42
Less developed regions	12	53	51	116
TOTAL	22	84	52	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 56.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 22. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO MEASURES OF ENCOURAGEMENT OR DISSUASION WITH A VIEW TO MODIFYING FERTILITY, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Measures of encouragement or dissuasion				Total
	To increase fertility	To maintain fertility	To decrease fertility	No measures of encouragement	
ECA area					
Eastern Africa	—	1	4	10	15
Middle Africa	1	—	—	8	9
Northern Africa	1	—	3	2	6
Southern Africa	—	—	4	—	4
Western Africa	1	1	1	13	16
TOTAL	3	2	12	33	50
ECWA area					
Western South Asia ^b	1	5	0	6	12
ECLA area					
Caribbean	—	—	6	2	8
Middle America	—	—	2	5	7
Temperate South America	2	—	—	1	3
Tropical South America	1	—	—	8	9
TOTAL	3	—	8	16	27
ECE area					
Eastern Europe ^c	2	4	—	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	2	—	5	7
Southern Europe ^c	1	2	—	6	9
Western Europe ^c	4	—	—	5	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	—	1	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	2	2
USSR ^c	—	3	—	—	3
TOTAL	8	11	1	19	39
ESCAP area					
China	—	—	1	—	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	—	2	1	—	3
Eastern South Asia	2	—	4	3	9
Middle South Asia	—	—	6	3	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	—	2	2
Melanesia	—	—	1	—	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	1	3	—	4
TOTAL	2	3	16	9	30
More developed regions	9	11	—	22	42
Less developed regions	8	10	37	61	116
TOTAL	17	21	37	83	158

^a See table 21, foot-note *a*.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 23. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO ACCESS TO MODERN METHODS OF BIRTH CONTROL, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Limited access	Unlimited access			Total
		Not supported by Government	Indirectly supported by Government	Directly supported by Government	
ECA area					
Eastern Africa	1	4	3	7	15
Middle Africa	3	2	2	2	9
Northern Africa	1	—	—	5	6
Southern Africa	—	—	—	4	4
Western Africa	—	6	5	5	16
TOTAL	5	12	10	23	50
ECWA area					
Western South Asia ^b	1	5	2	4	12
ECLA area					
Caribbean	—	—	1	7	8
Middle America	—	—	—	7	7
Temperate South America	1	1	—	1	3
Tropical South America	—	3	—	6	9
TOTAL	1	4	1	21	27
ECE area					
Eastern Europe ^c	—	—	—	6	6
Northern Europe ^c	1	—	—	6	7
Southern Europe ^c	3	2	1	3	9
Western Europe ^c	—	1	5	3	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	—	1	—	2	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	2	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	4	4	6	25	39
ESCAP area					
China	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	—	—	—	3	3
Eastern South Asia	2	1	—	6	9
Middle South Asia	—	1	—	8	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	1	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	—	—	4	4
TOTAL	2	2	1	25	30
More developed regions	5	4	7	26	42
Less developed regions	8	23	13	72	116
TOTAL	13	27	20	98	158

^a See table 21, foot-note *a*.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

Chapter XVII

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION

From the population inquiries conducted by the United Nations Secretariat in 1976 and in 1978, statements made at the World Population Conference and subsequent meetings, national development plans and so on, it became evident that more of a consensus existed at world level with respect to spatial distribution and internal migration than on any other demographic topic. Currently, 68 of the less developed countries considered their distribution of population to be entirely unacceptable and to require substantial modification, and 42 countries considered it to be partially unacceptable (see table 24).¹ In contrast, only six countries in the less developed regions considered their spatial distribution to be entirely acceptable. Among the more developed countries, 13 considered their current pattern of spatial distribution to be acceptable. However, 24 countries considered it to require some modification and five considered it to be largely unacceptable and to require substantial change.

TABLE 24. DEGREE OF SATISFACTION OF GOVERNMENTS WITH SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
(Number of Governments)

	Degree of satisfaction			Total
	Acceptable	Unacceptable to a certain extent	Unacceptable to a large extent	
ECA area	—	15	35	50
ECWA area	3	8	1	12
ECLA area	1	5	21	27
ECE area	13	25	1	39
ESCAP area	2	13	15	30
More developed regions	13	24	5	42
Less developed regions	6	42	68	116
TOTAL	19	66	73	158

Spatial distribution and internal migration policies are a complex topic, since policies are often part of over-all socio-economic development plans and are not conceived as demographic policies *per se*. Still, it is important to take note that locational policies may have a profound impact on other demographic variables through a complex process of interaction which, in some instances, is not yet fully understood (for example, the effects of urbanization on fertility and the

effects of more equalized provision of health care services on mortality). The spatial distribution of a country's population may affect and be affected by international migration (spatial problems may be exacerbated, for example, by trans-frontier urbanization). And, of course, there are important interrelationships between spatial distribution and population growth. It would appear, for example, that the most important influence on city growth rates is the national rate of population growth.² Moreover, a large number of Governments considered that the resolution of problems in relation to spatial distribution was an important means of resolving problems in relation to population growth. Many Governments considered, for example, that the major obstacle was not one of excessive population growth, but of the irrational distribution of population within their national territory.

Not only had a large number of countries identified spatial distribution as a problem area but there was a high degree of awareness at world level of the causes and consequences of spatial trends. From the replies of Governments to the Fourth Inquiry, national development plans and other sources, it became apparent that a majority of countries in all geographical regions had a clear awareness of the historical determinants of spatial distribution patterns in their particular countries. Many Governments had made some attempt to investigate the mechanisms that affected rural-to-urban migration, usually as a means of identifying those processes sensitive to policy intervention. Furthermore, many Governments had identified the nature and extent of such problems as spatial disparities in labour availability and employment opportunities, primate city problems, unbalanced urban networks and related problems of regional integration, regional depopulation and rapid migration to large urban centres.

Not only had a broad range of problems been identified in relation to spatial distribution—problems influenced by each country's historical pattern of socio-economic development, its geographical conditions etc.—but there had been a wide range of policy responses: from the control of migration (a policy adopted by very few countries), to the stoppage of the flow at the source, to the redirection of migrants to frontier areas or to intermediate urban centres, to the

¹For views of individual Governments concerning spatial distribution, see annex tables 68-73.

²See *World Population Trends and Policies, 1977 Monitoring Report*, vol. I, *Population Trends* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.XIII.3), chap. V.

constraint of migration to selected urban centres and regions. Furthermore, some countries had adopted policies designed to accommodate or respond to migration streams rather than to redirect them.

Policies varied from one major area or region to another; Latin America, for example, a highly urbanized major area, had greater problems in relation to high metropolitan primacy etc. The priority assigned to governmental intervention varied between countries where an irrational distribution of population which had resulted from historical patterns of economic dependency severely constrained current economic growth and countries where it was more a question of "fine tuning" of population distribution in relation to environmental questions and the quality of life. Furthermore, it is important to mention that there was by no means a consensus as to the efficacy of any one policy approach. A difference was found, for example, between the centrally planned economies and the market economies, with respect to the desirability of intervention in the rank-size development of settlement networks and the role of market forces in bringing about a balanced urban network. And, of course, each policy might be achieved through a wide range of measures; for example, the retention of population in rural areas might be accomplished through such measures as land reform, credit, public housing, rural electrification and farm-price supports.

A. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

The spatial problems of the countries in the area of responsibility of ECA were closely related to their colonial heritage because colonial Governments, in the establishment of administrative and trading centres, had often ignored or avoided existing nucleation points. In a number of countries not one spatial system but two subsystems had emerged; and although they overlapped to some extent, they were by no means fully integrated, since one served the needs of the colonial system and the other the needs of the vast majority of the population. The current pattern of spatial distribution of most countries of Africa is characterized by the existence of a few locations (cities, plantations, mines etc.) which are immigration areas from within as well as outside of their boundaries, resulting in an over-concentration of population in certain areas and an underpopulation in other areas. In Africa as a whole, the irrational distribution of population—which had resulted from a complex series of historical and economic factors—was regarded second only to high morbidity and mortality as a demographic problem requiring urgent resolution.

A majority of Governments in the ECA area of responsibility expressed strong dissatisfaction with their current pattern of spatial distribution: 35 Governments considered the situation to be highly unacceptable and to require substantial modification; and 15 Gov-

ernments considered it to be partially unacceptable.³ No Government in the area considered its current pattern of spatial distribution to be entirely satisfactory.

From the replies of Governments to the Fourth Inquiry, a general typology emerged with respect to the problems associated with spatial distribution. Even though Africa has a low level of urbanization as compared with other regions, virtually all the countries that replied to the Inquiry reported problems in relation to the rapid growth of the metropolitan region. For example, Botswana reported that its urban population had been increasing by 12 per cent per annum, two thirds of which could be attributed to in-migration from rural areas; and, as a result, urban development was absorbing a disproportionate share of the country's scarce financial and administrative resources. Egypt, one of the more highly urbanized countries in the ECA area, reported that the concentration of population in and around the area of the Nile delta was one of its major development problems. A number of countries with predominantly rural populations—such as Burundi—tended to emphasize the problem of the dispersion of population in rural zones.

In addition to identifying the major problems arising from existing patterns of spatial distribution, it is interesting to observe the extent to which a number of Governments in Africa were concerned with the mechanisms that determined patterns of spatial distribution in their respective countries. Gabon, for example, emphasized the attraction of employment in urban areas. The Ivory Coast explained its high metropolitan primacy in terms of the influence of various modernizing factors; and Somalia acknowledged that the rural population was drawn to the capital by the availability of social services and urban amenities.

With respect to policies, a majority of those formulated by Governments in the ECA area were designed to retain population in rural areas—by means of such measures as employment creation, provision of infrastructure and rural development. Some countries were making efforts to settle frontier zones or sparsely populated areas, and a few countries had complex plans for the construction of new urban centres.

A number of countries that desired to retain potential migrants in rural areas—drawn mainly from the experience of Governments which responded to the Fourth Inquiry—are cited below. Botswana intended to reduce the growth of its metropolitan centre by expanding employment opportunities in rural areas, primarily through the establishment of rural industries. Burundi, a country with a predominantly rural population, was attempting to establish pilot centres for the consolidation of population in sparsely populated rural zones. Gabon and the Ivory Coast, two countries of Africa whose cities were poles of attraction for migrants from both within and outside of their national boundaries also desired to hold their rural populations at the source. Gabon planned to attempt to counteract

³See table 25 at end of chapter.

the attraction of its cities by employment creation in rural areas, again, mainly through the establishment of rural industries. A secondary measure designed to slow the exodus from rural zones was a village re-groupment programme that involved the provision of collective infrastructure. The Ivory Coast, which, along with Gabon, had experienced rapid economic growth, reported that it would attempt to resolve its spatial problems through a complex series of measures: growth of revenue; creation of a network of medium-sized towns to counteract migration to the larger urban centres; etc. Basically, however, it would focus on the improvement of conditions in rural areas as a means of containing the rural to urban flow. The Government intended to stimulate agriculture and agro-industry in rural areas, particularly the savannah, and to create employment in towns in the interior—as a means of retaining potential migrants and promoting return migration. In the long term, the Government considered the solution to the problem of continuing rural-to-urban migration to be the development of “new modes of living” outside of the large cities; it intended to create what it termed a “modern peasantry” by means of changes in the educational system, the focus of the mass media, the country’s system of agricultural production, the status of women and so forth.

A number of other Governments in the ECA area were also focusing on the development of rural zones. In Rwanda, a predominantly rural country, emphasis was placed on integrated rural development in sparsely inhabited zones and on the creation of rural central places. As a means of reducing the concentration of population in the metropolitan centre, Senegal was installing industry in the interior. A further measure to rationalize the distribution of its population was a series of colonization projects (to so-called “new lands”) designed to reduce demographic pressure in certain agricultural areas. Seychelles, although an island country, was concerned with reducing the concentration of population in the metropolitan centre and would seek to populate its outlying islands and to encourage rural development. Sierra Leone intended to resolve spatial problems through agricultural development and other rural development programmes. Somalia would attempt to alter the distribution of its population by the strategic distribution of development projects among various regions of the country. A further measure would be the provision of social services—maternal/child health centres, hospitals, schools and cultural centres—as well as employment creation, in rural areas, as a means of retaining the potential rural-to-urban flow.

A somewhat different policy had been formulated by Madagascar; it was intended to direct migrants to underpopulated zones. In addition to the provision of assistance to potential migrants and the creation of a number of communal villages to stimulate migration towards unexploited lands, the Government would promote artisanal activities in rural areas as a means of avoiding over-concentration in the country’s urban

zones. Togo had a spatial distribution policy somewhat similar to that of Madagascar. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it would create regional growth poles and agro-industrial units as a means of rationalizing the distribution of the country’s population. In addition, it would utilize agricultural credit mechanisms and irrigation projects to promote the settlement of migrants in arid zones.

A number of countries in the ECA area of responsibility had rather complex spatial distribution strategies, involving rural development, “growth poles”, the creation of a network of intermediate urban centres etc., strategies that usually involved a combination of limited decentralization at the national and regional level and selective concentration at the local level.

Egypt provided an example of that approach. The Government’s major population distribution goal was the deconcentration of activity previously situated in existing urban centres and the deflection of migration to new urban centres in desert areas adjacent to the Nile, to the north-western coastal region and to the Canal zones. In addition, the Government would establish “integrated industrial poles” as a means of stimulating subregional industrialization and would continue its programme of comprehensive rural development (involving electrification, industrialization etc.).

The focus of the Kenyan policy was the concentration of development in urban areas other than Nairobi and Mombasa. Kenya was still a predominantly rural country and the Government reported in the Fourth Inquiry that migration was encouraged in accordance with its policy of achieving a rural/urban balance. However, by encouraging the expansion of nine urban centres in addition to Nairobi and Mombasa, the Government hoped to promote regional growth, to provide more alternatives for the absorption of the migrant population and to reduce problems arising from the excessive concentration of population in one or two urban areas. In addition to the expansion of the nine growth centres, strategy in Kenya consisted of the creation of a network of service centres throughout the country, which would be designed to provide basic services to the rural population on an equitable basis. The selective allocation of investment is another measure; in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that during the planning period 1978–1983, a larger share of investment would be allocated to western Kenya, a region that had had a large share of out-migration to Nairobi and Mombasa.

In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Nigeria mentioned a number of problems arising from the influx of migrants into its major cities, including unemployment in urban areas and a lack of agricultural labour in certain rural zones. As a means of counteracting those problems, the Nigerian policy would focus on the over-all modernization of the country’s rural areas and on the growth of other urban areas, including a new capital to be located in the interior. Construction of the capital was to begin in 1978, with the principal functions of the Government to be transferred there by 1986; it would

be designed to accommodate a population of 1.6 million by the year 2000 and would ultimately be suited for some 3 million inhabitants.

The United Republic of Tanzania had a complex spatial distribution policy, the objectives of which were to promote the equitable distribution and development of resources throughout the country and to discourage expansion of the metropolitan centre, mainly through encouragement of future employment-creating activities in one of nine designated growth poles. A new capital, Dodoma, was being constructed in the interior, to be composed of five self-sustaining towns of some 30,000 inhabitants each. In addition, the policy provided for the expansion of existing service centres and the creation of additional service centres in suitable locations. It is interesting to take note that the country's spatial distribution policy was backed by a programme of ongoing research, the results of which may periodically alter existing strategies. For example, although Ujama (the nation-wide "villagization" programme) continued, current political and economic policies tended to favour the growth of intermediate towns because ongoing research had revealed gaps in the existing settlement patterns—in particular, the marked absence of towns and centres of intermediate size to act as functional links between small settlements and larger towns.

B. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

A majority of countries in the ESCAP area of responsibility, which is more highly urbanized than the ECA area, expressed dissatisfaction with their current pattern of spatial distribution. Indeed, 16 countries in the ESCAP area considered the distribution of population within their national territory to be largely unacceptable and to require substantial modification. Nearly as many countries (12) considered that it was partially unacceptable, while only two countries considered that the distribution of population was entirely acceptable.

Problems in relation to unsatisfactory patterns of spatial distribution are of long standing in the ESCAP area and have been well catalogued by the various Governments. India, for example, one of the first developing countries to formulate explicit measures designed to modify patterns of spatial distribution, identified problems common to many countries in the area, such as the failure of economic infrastructure to keep pace with urbanization and a continuing rural exodus which resulted in over-concentration in the large metropolitan centres. A number of other countries in Asia and the Pacific identified additional adverse consequences of rapid urban growth. Even a Pacific island with a comparatively low level of urbanization—Papua New Guinea—reported problems in relation to urban concentration, such as housing shortages and an increased demand on transport facilities and on basic urban services.

In terms of policies, in comparison with most of the less developed countries of Africa and Latin America, countries in the ESCAP area had instituted fairly vigorous and explicit policies to slow, to stop or even to reverse metropolitan growth and to keep the rural population on the land (see table 26). A few countries had used direct administrative measures, such as "residence passes" and legal restrictions on migration. Almost all had employed indirect socio-economic measures. For the region as a whole, the current implementation of a wide range of explicit population distribution strategies was evident.

It is interesting that few countries in the world have programmes designed to resettle urban residents in rural areas and most of those countries are located in the ESCAP area. China had long had such a programme. Democratic Kampuchea had engaged in one of the widest scale resettlement programmes in history, although little is known of the programme. The most recent example is that of Viet Nam, which had an ambitious programme to resettle some 10 million persons—one fifth of the entire population—in the next two decades. The resettlement programme in Viet Nam had several objectives: to relieve unemployment problems in parts of the south; to overcome chronic food shortages in the north by opening new lands; to make more rational use of the country's manpower. The programme involved not only urban-to-rural but rural-to-rural resettlement, in which several hundred thousand peasants from densely populated areas near Hanoi had been sent to the Central Highlands and to the Mekong Delta in the south and some 700,000 persons had been moved out of Ho Chi Minh City to the New Economic Zones.

Policy makers in other countries of Asia had not made serious attempts at reverse migration. However, there had been comparatively more effort in the ESCAP area than in others—and on a broader scale—to resettle migrants in frontier areas. The most outstanding example of that approach was the transmigration scheme in Indonesia, in which fully sponsored migrants were transported to sites in the country's sparsely populated regions and were allotted land, housing etc. Another programme (which had been somewhat more successful than the Indonesian transmigration programme) was the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) programme in Malaysia. An estimated 8 per cent of all migration in Malaysia in recent years had been a direct consequence of the FELDA resettlement programme and an additional substantial amount had undoubtedly resulted from spin-off economic effects induced by FELDA schemes.⁴

Apart from the two policy options described above—the reversal of migration and resettlement of migrants in frontier zones—a majority of countries in

⁴Alan B. Simmons, "Slowing metropolitan city growth in Asia: a review of policies, programs and results", paper submitted to the Economic Commission for Latin America/Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía Seminar on Population Redistribution, Santiago, Chile, 14–19 August 1978.

the ESCAP area had opted for the retention of migrants in rural areas, mainly by means of rural development programmes; and the redirection of migrants to non-metropolitan centres, by means of the allocation of infrastructure, industrial location and various tax incentives.

An examination of recent development plans and the replies of various Asian countries to the Fourth Inquiry revealed that nearly all countries in the ESCAP area had adopted one or both of the latter policy approaches—that is, to retain population in rural areas and to encourage the growth of intermediate urban centres.

To cite only a few examples, Bangladesh reported that it would attempt to create more employment in rural areas as a means of reducing migration to urban zones. Fiji would focus on rural development as a means of retaining population in rural zones. India reported that it would provide improved infrastructure and other facilities in smaller towns and would restrict the growth of its large urban centres. Indonesia had established industrial estates in several of its less developed zones. Japan, the most industrially advanced country in the ESCAP area, reported that it would promote industrial development in non-metropolitan areas and improve living conditions in agricultural zones. Malaysia had sought to promote the dispersion of industry, mainly through the use of tax incentives. Nepal would attempt to retain population in rural areas through the development of small-scale industry outside existing urban centres.

In Pakistan, the focus was on an integrated rural development programme and "agrovillage" schemes, as well as community development and the promotion of cottage industries in rural areas. Papua New Guinea would encourage the growth of small settlements to deflect migration from its major towns. In the Philippines, the Government had utilized tax incentives; and the selective provision of transport facilities, water and power subsidies and low-cost housing programmes to divert medium- and small-scale industry to various regional centres. The Republic of Korea was taking steps to reduce metropolitan concentration through various tax instruments, rural development programmes (the New Village Movement) and the development of industrial towns in five designated areas. Sri Lanka was attempting to divert population from the metropolitan centre through the establishment of industrial activity outside of the metropolitan region. Thailand had sought to divert industry to the poorer areas of the north-east and to create satellite centres in the vicinity of the metropolitan centre.

C. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA

In the area of responsibility of ECLA, a larger proportion of countries (21 out of 27) than in any other

major area considered that the distribution of population within their national territory was largely unacceptable. Five countries considered that it was partially unacceptable and required some modification, and only one country considered that the distribution of its population was entirely acceptable.

Since Latin America, with nearly two thirds of its population living in an urban place, is the most highly urbanized of the less developed regions, it should not be unexpected that a major concern of Governments was the problem of diseconomies of scale resulting from high metropolitan primacy and over-concentration of population in urban zones. A number of less urbanized countries in the ECLA area, such as those in Middle America, were concerned with the problem of dispersed rural populations, although many highly urbanized countries—such as Mexico—also faced that problem.

In terms of policies, almost all of the Governments in Latin America had adopted measures—usually within broader strategies of regional development—that directly or indirectly affected patterns of spatial distribution. A number of countries had explicit population distribution policies, although most were at early stages of implementation.

Brazil was one of the countries in the ECLA area which had long engaged in regional planning and which had an explicit spatial distribution strategy. In its development plan for 1975–1979, the areas of the north-east, Amazon and central west were identified as zones requiring priority treatment, mainly by means of an investment programme to stimulate the development of agro-industrial growth poles and a programme of agricultural colonization. The Government further desired to minimize problems that resulted from rapid urbanization by means of a number of strategies, such as intraregional dispersion of the dominant south-eastern urban system; ordering of the process of urban development in the southern areas; strengthening of the economic base of the north-eastern urban system; promotion of urbanization in the northern and central-western regions etc. In addition, the Government was promoting the growth of urban nuclei in the Amazon, through concentration of population in the area's major urban poles.⁵

Argentina also had long experience in regional planning. A major objective of the Government's comprehensive population policy (announced in 1978) was to bring about a more rational distribution of population within the national territory—through creation of the appropriate economic and social environment to retain and increase the population of the north, the centre and the Littoral, and to settle migrants in the sparsely populated south. That goal would be achieved by means of a broad spectrum of policies, including the

⁵H. J. Cole, "Country case study: Brazil", report prepared for the Project on National Settlement Analysis and Formulation of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1977.

development of diversified economic activity in the interior and the equitable provision of services and infrastructure. In addition, the Government would stimulate regional development through various tax concessions and credit schemes.

The Government of Chile had adopted a policy to rationalize the growth of the metropolitan centre; primarily by means of discouraging the location of new industrial activity in the metropolitan region. Colombia was another country in Latin America that considered industrial location to be an important component of its spatial distribution strategy. Currently, the Government prohibited the location of new foreign-owned industry at the cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali; and all new industry was to be channelled to the intermediate urban centres. However, although the Government's current policy was focused largely on the development of intermediate urban centres, its strategy did not imply abandonment of the large urban centres; indeed, the Government's plan for urban development provided for the creation of cities within cities as a means of rationalizing the internal development of the major urban centres and reducing problems in connexion with the provision of basic services. The Government had also formulated an explicit migration policy to deal with the regularization of the movement of seasonal workers.⁶

Ecuador was another country in the Andean region which had formulated a spatial distribution policy which involved industrial location and the redirection of migration flows. As a means of reducing internal migration flows, the Government had formulated a strategy designed to concentrate investment in selected urban centres and to promote industrial decentralization. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it desired to reduce the rate of growth of the metropolitan region by means of an equitable distribution of public revenues and incentives to the private sector (to locate investment in accordance with the Government's strategy of industrial deconcentration). The Government also sought to adjust the distribution of the rural population; it supported spontaneous and semi-directed colonization towards unsettled areas of the coast and the Orient, as a means of relieving pressure on densely populated zones.

For a number of years, the Government of Mexico had attempted to redistribute population through indirect measures (industrial location, the creation of industrial estates etc.), although it had recently formulated an explicit population redistribution policy. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it intended to direct migration towards less populated regions in order to obtain a better balance between population, resources and economic infrastruc-

ture. The Government's Plan for Urban Development (1976) emphasized the need for the development of new urban centres and the creation of regional growth poles as a means of promoting balanced urban growth. Venezuela had adopted a somewhat similar strategy and was attempting to modify existing patterns of spatial distribution, mainly by means of decentralization of the economy. The Government intended to locate investment away from the country's most dynamic areas, such as the axis of Caracas, Maracay and Valencia, so as to prevent excessive urban growth.

In the examination of spatial distribution policies in the ECLA area, Peru presented an interesting case. Although the Government had drawn up complex strategies to deal with spatial distribution problems and had outlined a policy of "territorial adjustment" in its two most recent development plans, many of those strategies remained merely indicative as a result of domestic financial constraints. It was perhaps for that reason that the Government reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it had no policy with regard to spatial distribution; it noted that at the current stage of development in Peru, rural-to-urban migration was an inevitable phenomenon, because it resulted from the efforts of the population to adjust to the distribution of wealth and to employment opportunities.

A majority of countries in the ECLA region did, however, have spatial distribution policies; that group included the smaller countries in Middle America and the Caribbean. Panama, for example, a country with a highly dispersed rural population and an over-concentration of population at the terminal cities of Panama and Colón, had formulated a policy to reduce the growth of the metropolitan region, by means of growth poles, decentralization of public administration and integrated development of rural zones. So, too, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Honduras reported that it would include a policy for the support of intermediate urban centres in its forthcoming development plan.

In the Caribbean region, the Dominican Republic reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it had recently drawn up guidelines to modify patterns of spatial distribution. The Government intended to extend agrarian reform in an attempt to reduce internal migration and it foresaw the need for rural "nuclearization", the establishment of intermediate cities and the drafting of a regulatory plan for urban growth. Cuba, the only Latin American country with a centrally planned economy, had placed major emphasis on rural transformation and on the regionalization of services and economic infrastructure, and had largely resolved its spatial distribution problems. A number of direct and indirect measures had had the effect of modifying previous patterns of spatial distribution; the Government's housing policy, for example, had had a redistributive influence, while the requirement of residence permits, ration cards etc.—although not urbanization instruments *per se*—had been highly effective in controlling migration and stabilizing the growth of the metropolitan centre.

⁶Joop Alberts, "Estado actual de las políticas de redistribución espacial de la población en América Latina", paper submitted to the Economic Commission for Latin America/Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía Seminar on Population Redistribution, Santiago, Chile, 14-19 August 1978.

D. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

A majority of countries in the area of responsibility of ECWA—eight out of 12—considered the distribution of population within their national territory to require some modification. Three countries considered their pattern of spatial distribution to be acceptable; only one country considered it to be largely unacceptable. The countries in the ECWA area had experienced rapid urbanization along with rapid economic growth, although a number of Governments faced the additional—and contrasting—problem of dispersed rural populations, including the presence of nomadic and semi-nomadic groups. However, a number of the ECWA countries had had some success in modifying the distribution of their population, by means of selective allocation of infrastructure and industry, development of regional and subregional centres, comprehensive regional development and so on.

To cite only a few examples, Democratic Yemen had focused on agrarian reform and over-all rural development as a means of improving the balance between population and resources. In addition, the Government had sought to sedentarize the nomadic population and to stimulate the growth of regional and subregional centres as a means of stabilizing the growth of the metropolitan centre. Iraq had engaged in a substantial programme of regional development and had promoted the growth of regional and subregional centres; in addition, it had sought to improve infrastructure and basic services in the country's rural zones. Jordan had undertaken a comprehensive socio-economic development programme in rural areas, of which the Jordan Valley Authority is a prime example. The Government had further attempted to reduce the concentration of population in the metropolitan centre by diverting economic and demographic expansion to regional centres.

As a result of its close control over the allocation of large capital investment, Kuwait had been able to achieve what it considered to be an acceptable distribution of population at both the national and regional levels. The Government of Oman had focused on the provision of infrastructure and housing in decentralized centres within the metropolitan region. In addition, the Government had taken steps to modernize the country's rural settlements and to sedentarize the nomadic and semi-nomadic population. Qatar, in order to avoid further concentration in the metropolitan centre, had stimulated industrial growth in the country's intermediate urban centres. Saudi Arabia had channelled investment to the Asir region and to its major oases as a means of retaining population in rural areas. The Government has also sought to control urban expansion by means of a national plan for urban development. The Syrian Arab Republic was providing improved infrastructure, services and industries in the country's smaller urban centres and was focusing on comprehensive rural development as a means of

avoiding further concentration in the metropolitan region.⁷

E. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

In their replies to the Fourth Inquiry, a number of countries in the area of responsibility of ECE reported changes with respect to migration and urbanization trends. France, for example, observed that its western departments had ceased their steady loss of population and that cities in the 100,000–200,000 range were growing at a faster rate than the large metropolitan centres. Finland similarly observed that internal migration had decreased considerably since around 1974 as a result of its economic slow-down and decreasing labour force requirements. Also, there were recent indications that urbanization had slowed down or even reversed itself in several of the more developed countries, such as Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United States.⁸ (See Chapter 5 of the monitoring report.) Consequently, a number of the ECE countries had a somewhat different policy orientation than the developing countries, as a result not only of changing urbanization and migration trends but of their over-all low rates of population growth. One report states, for example, that a downward revision of national population forecasts lessens the need for policies directed to reducing congestion in a country's more densely populated areas (even though the population is still growing as a result of demographic inertia, the prospect of a stationary population or population decline strongly influences the assessment of the need for the resolution of spatial problems).⁹

In any event, a majority of countries (25 out of 39) in the ECE area considered their current distribution of population to be at least partially unacceptable and had adopted policies of intervention. In most countries in the area, the purpose of population distribution policies was to raise the economic level in less populated areas and to reduce over-concentration in highly urbanized areas. That goal was apparent in the case of a majority of the countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry—Canada, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey—all of which reported that they had policies to reduce the rate of growth of the metropolitan region.

However, in a number of the countries in the ECE area, the issue was largely one of "fine tuning" of population distribution as a means of extending an already high level of living to all regions of a country or of meeting environmental goals. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, for example, the Federal Republic of

⁷G. M. Stubbs, *loc. cit.*

⁸World Population Trends and Policies, 1977 Monitoring Report, vol. I, *Population Trends*, chap. V.

⁹Hendrik ter Heide and C. Leo Eichperger, "Dynamic interrelationships between population redistribution policies and demographic developments": paper submitted to the International Geographical Union Symposium on Population Redistribution Policies, Oulu, Finland, 10–17 August 1978.

Germany reported that the major objectives of its regional planning and population distribution policy were to ensure "parity" of living conditions for the population in all parts of the Federal Republic. So, too, in its report on urbanization (1976), the Netherlands emphasized that an important objective of its population distribution strategy was the need to protect "open areas and areas valuable from an ecological or landscape point of view".

Since the countries in the ECE area have complex economies, redistribution policies in these countries were also usually quite complex. In a majority of instances, population redistribution measures were auxiliary instruments of national and regional planning. Measures included incentives and subsidies of one type or another which were intended to overcome the perceived economic disadvantages of certain areas; they might also include subsidized provision of infrastructure, the relocation of government agencies and so on. Among the countries replying to the Fourth Inquiry, Canada reported that it intended to reduce the rate of growth of the metropolitan centre through regional industrial incentives; Finland, to stabilize out-migration from rural areas through the provision of new investment and employment, the decentralization of central government institutions and the relocation of industry; Switzerland, to improve infrastructure in less developed areas and to channel federal investment to mountain regions. In late 1978, France announced a comprehensive spatial distribution policy which would emphasize motivation of the private sector to locate industry in designated zones (such as the north, Lorraine and Pays de la Loire). A national agency for the creation of small enterprises was to be established and public investment allocated to less developed regions of France. In addition, there would be a regionalization of the 1980 budget and efforts to decentralize public administration.

In their replies to the Fourth Inquiry, a number of countries reported policies for the development of new towns. Greece reported that it would focus on the development of a number of regional urban centres in order to deflect migration from greater Athens. Ireland reported that it would promote the expansion of eight major urban centres and other large towns of strategic importance, as a means of stabilizing the growth of the metropolitan region. The Netherlands similarly reported that it would concentrate urban population growth within regions with relatively small cities, through the stimulation of growth centres within those regions.

It is important to mention that a few countries in the ECE area reported a problem that is unique to the more developed countries: rapid out-migration from major urban centres. The United Kingdom reported, for example, that among the objectives of its spatial distribution policies was the achievement of a reduction in the rate of demographic and economic decline in the inner areas of its major cities. The Government stated that it had amended its policies on new towns and had developed remedial measures for dealing with

the inner cities (announced in 1977). The Federal Republic of Germany similarly reported the intensification of its policy for the preservation and renewal of inner city areas.

Intervention in the population redistribution process was of longer standing in the centrally planned economies and was closely related to over-all economic planning. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the USSR reported that plans for the development of the national economy covered population migration based essentially on the planned allocation of productive forces. The German Democratic Republic similarly stated that a stable growth rate of production was supported by a planned, rational location of the productive forces. In that connexion, the regional distribution of the population and labour force assumed great importance. Although some population redistribution measures might be similar to those adopted by the developed market economies, the centrally planned countries had tended to offer a greater range of incentive measures directed towards individuals. For example, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the German Democratic Republic reported that it intended to channel graduates from universities and technical schools to designated areas and to interest young skilled workers in changing their place of work. The Government reported that such regional redistribution of labour was effectively promoted through the provision of additional housing and the improvement of working and living conditions.

Not all of the more developed countries desired to intervene to modify patterns of spatial distribution. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the United States of America reported that it did not have an explicit policy to redistribute population; it stated that "in its complex economy with high levels of income, it would not be feasible to plan population redistribution". It further reported that, largely as a result of market forces, the development of the country had been accompanied by substantial internal migration to areas of relatively better economic opportunity; and, as a result, the various geographical regions had become relatively more equal over time.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this overview of spatial distribution policies which have been adopted by selected countries in the various geographical regions, it is important to take note that, in dealing with spatial distribution and internal migration policies, a two-year period is far too short an interval in which to observe significant change.

However, it is important to mention that certain basic strategies, or combinations of strategies, had been adopted by nearly all Governments for the resolution of spatial distribution problems. A few countries had attempted to control migration by sending urban population to reside in rural areas. On the other hand,

a large number of countries had focused on rural development as a means of holding potential migrants at the source. A somewhat smaller number of countries had attempted to redirect migrants to under-developed or frontier areas, while a significant number of less developed countries, as well as the more developed countries, had established growth poles, intermediate urban centres etc. On the whole, the strategies adopted by the more developed countries, as well as the more advanced developing countries, were quite complex and involved multiple incentives as well as disincentives for industrial relocation, the dispersal of government agencies and so forth.

As stated in the present chapter, there was some variation in the spatial distribution policies adopted by countries in the various geographical regions, which may be explained in part by the fact that a majority of countries in those respective regions were at different stages of the urban transition. In the ECLA area of responsibility, for example, which comprises the most highly urbanized less developed regions, a number of countries had long engaged in regional planning and a majority of national socio-economic development plans included complex spatial distribution strategies, which involved the development of intermediate urban centres, incentives and disincentives for industrial location, decentralization of Government agencies and so forth. In the ESCAP area, comprising the less developed regions which are the next highly urbanized, there had been a strong emphasis on rural development and attempts by a number of countries to resettle migrants in alternative rural zones.¹⁰ Other countries of Asia had established growth poles and had adopted industrial location strategies etc. In the ECWA area of responsibility, a number of countries had adopted rural and regional development strategies designed to improve the distribution of population; and it may be expected that, particularly among the oil-producing countries, the economic expansion resulting from the rapid expansion of revenues would enable Governments to adjust patterns of spatial distribution by means of capital investment in non-metropolitan regions. Lastly, in the ECA area, which contains the less developed regions with the lowest level of urbanization, a majority of countries had adopted rural development policies, which included the establishment of

rural industry, the provision of infrastructure to rural zones etc., as a means of resolving spatial distribution problems. A small number of countries were attempting to redirect migrants to frontier areas, while a few of the more advanced developing countries in Africa had adopted strategies that involved the deflection of migration to new urban centres.

In the area of responsibility of ECE, where all but one of the countries are more developed, a majority of Governments had adopted spatial distribution policies which were usually designed to raise the economic level in less populated areas and to reduce over-concentration in urbanized areas. In a number of those countries, action was generally directed more towards the "fine tuning" of population distribution in response to environmental problems and towards improvement of the quality of life, although, in a number of countries, action might be related to regional employment shifts brought about by changes in industrial requirements. An additional problem faced by several of the more developed countries was that of the deterioration of the inner areas of the older urban centres.

Although there were some differences among regions, which resulted largely from the fact that a majority of countries within each region were at different stages of urbanization, the greatest difference observed at world level was between the centrally planned and the market economies. Of course, in both the market economies and the centrally planned economies, population redistribution policies were embodied in the matrix of national and regional economic planning, which resulted in an emphasis on economic measures as the primary policy instruments. However, although there was a general similarity in approach, there were also very significant differences which derived from the substantial differences in the economic systems involved. The centrally planned economies, with direct control over the greater part of their economies, were able to intervene much more directly in the population redistribution process. In a majority of the market economies, the national strategy for development had priority over the strategy for the implementation of spatial distribution policies and that factor had often led to problems. For example, in some countries, national economic strategies continued to favour the growth of the metropolitan region, in spite of the fact that spatial distribution policies might advocate the development of areas outside of the metropolitan centre.

¹⁰This option is not available to all of the countries in the area of responsibility of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; in a country like Bangladesh, for example, there is virtually no land for settlement.

TABLE 25. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Degree of satisfaction with spatial distribution			Total
	Acceptable	Unacceptable to some degree	Largely unacceptable	
ECA area				
Eastern Africa	—	6	9	15
Middle Africa	—	1	8	9
Northern Africa	—	2	4	6
Southern Africa	—	2	2	4
Western Africa	—	4	12	16
TOTAL	—	15	35	50
ECWA area				
Western South Asia ^b	3	8	1	12
ECLA area				
Caribbean	1	3	4	8
Middle America	—	1	6	7
Temperate South America	—	—	3	3
Tropical South America	—	1	8	9
TOTAL	1	5	21	27
ECE area				
Eastern Europe ^c	3	3	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	2	5	—	7
Southern Europe ^c	3	6	—	9
Western Europe ^c	4	—	—	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	—	2	1	3
Northern America ^c	1	1	—	2
USSR ^c	—	3	—	3
TOTAL	13	35	1	39
ESCAP area				
China	—	1	—	1
Japan ^c	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	—	3	—	3
Eastern South Asia	1	2	6	9
Middle South Asia	—	5	4	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	1	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	1	1	2	4
TOTAL	2	13	15	30
More developed regions	13	24	5	42
Less developed regions	6	42	68	116
TOTAL	19	66	73	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 73.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 26. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION AND INTERNAL MIGRATION OF POPULATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

<i>Policies concerning trends in internal migration from rural areas and small urban centres to major urban areas and metropolitan regions</i>												
<i>Acceleration of migration</i>		<i>Maintenance of migration</i>		<i>Deceleration of migration</i>			<i>Reversal of migration</i>					
<i>Policies concerning structure of urban and rural areas</i>												
	<i>Change in both</i>	<i>No change in either</i>	<i>Change in rural</i>	<i>No change in either</i>	<i>Change in:</i>		<i>No change in either</i>	<i>Change in:</i>		<i>Total</i>		
					<i>Rural-urban</i>	<i>Urban-rural</i>		<i>Rural-urban</i>	<i>Urban-rural</i>			
ECA area												
Eastern Africa	—	1	2	2	4	—	4	—	1	—	1	15
Middle Africa	—	1	—	—	3	—	2	—	2	—	1	9
Northern Africa	—	—	—	1	1	—	4	—	—	—	—	6
Southern Africa	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	4
Western Africa	—	3	3	2	2	1	5	—	—	—	—	16
TOTAL	—	6	5	6	10	1	16	—	3	—	3	50
ECWA area												
Western South Asia ^b	1	4	—	1	1	—	4	—	—	—	1	12
ECLA area												
Caribbean	—	2	—	1	2	1	2	—	—	—	—	8
Middle America	—	1	—	2	1	—	3	—	—	—	—	7
Temperate South America	—	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	3
Tropical South America	1	—	—	—	2	—	6	—	—	—	—	9
TOTAL	1	3	—	3	5	3	12	—	—	—	—	27
ECE area												
Eastern Europe ^c	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	1	—	1	—	3	—	1	—	1	—	7
Southern Europe ^c	—	3	—	1	—	3	2	—	—	—	—	9
Western Europe ^c	—	4	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	3
Northern America ^c	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	3
TOTAL	—	10	—	4	—	13	7	3	—	2	—	39
ESCAP area												
China	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1
Other East Asia	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	3
Eastern South Asia	—	1	1	1	2	—	—	—	1	—	3	9
Middle South Asia	1	—	1	1	2	—	3	—	1	—	—	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	4
TOTAL	1	4	2	4	4	1	6	—	2	1	5	30
More developed regions	—	11	—	4	—	15	6	3	—	3	—	42
Less developed regions	3	16	7	14	20	3	39	—	5	—	9	116
TOTAL	3	27	7	18	20	18	45	3	5	3	9	158

^a See table 25, foot-note a.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

Chapter XVIII

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

In order to deal with the phenomenon of international migration, the present chapter has been organized differently from those preceding it. The discussion examines the major migration flows rather than focusing on the individual regions, since, by the very nature of the phenomenon, international migration cuts across both regional and national boundaries. (For a description of the major flows, see figure II.)

Voluntary migration, as opposed to the movement of refugees, is closely related to the process of economic, social and demographic development in the world as a whole and in individual sending and receiving countries. In broad terms, the movement of migrants is generally from the economically less advanced to the more advanced countries, countries which are characterized by different levels of development and are at different stages of the demographic transition.

Almost all Governments had international migration policies; indeed, only a few Governments—mainly some centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe—reported that international migration was not an area of active policy concern. Of course, it is important to state that some types of international migration are beyond the realm of governmental policies. Undocumented migration may occur without the approval of either the sending or the receiving countries (although it may involve tacit approval on either side), while refugee movements may result from unforeseen natural disasters, political upheavals etc. However, the latter type of movement may be subject to strict control by potential receiving countries. And, it is important to take note that even this type of international migration—involving undocumented migrants or refugees—may affect governmental policy decisions with respect to more traditional immigration. For example, a country that has large numbers of illegal migrants may change its perception of the desirability of future immigration. Similarly, refugees often settle permanently in a receiving country and are in a sense competing for a limited number of places with more traditional migrants.

It is clear that international migration is a complex topic and governmental policies are characterized by a wide diversity. To begin with, policies may be adopted for demographic or non-demographic ends (or both). International migration may be a substitute for an unsatisfactory rate of population growth (a country that desires to increase population growth in the short term may choose to increase immigration because an increase in fertility might take several generations). Conversely, a country with rapid population growth,

high unemployment etc. may opt for increased emigration. On the other hand, an international migration policy may also be adopted for purely economic ends—for example, for temporary adjustment of labour shortages, with the expectation that migrants will return to their countries of origin.

Since an international migration policy may produce more rapid results than a policy designed to decrease mortality or to increase fertility, policies may shift quite rapidly; and, indeed, there have been substantial changes in this area in recent years. Currently, a majority of Governments desired neither immigration nor emigration.¹ With respect to immigration, only 10 countries desired higher immigration (two more developed and eight less developed countries); 16 desired to maintain the rate, subjecting it to strict control; 16 desired to curb immigration in the future but to maintain the current immigrant population. In a vast majority of instances—116 out of 158 countries—Governments considered immigration to be either demographically insignificant or undesirable (see table 27).

With respect to emigration, six countries (two more developed and four less developed) desired to attain a higher rate; 24 desired to maintain the current rate, and 25 desired to curb emigration in the future. Again, in a majority of cases—103 out of 158 countries—Governments considered emigration to be insignificant or undesirable (see table 28).

The discussion in this chapter is organized as follows. The first section examines temporary labour flows, those which proceed largely from the economically less advantaged to the more advantaged countries. The discussion also covers the major poles of attraction in 1978: the oil-producing countries of Western South Asia and Northern Africa; Southern and Western Africa; Latin America; and, lastly, Western Europe, an area in which the flow had largely stabilized and in which policy decisions related largely to the "temporary" migrants who remained.

The second section deals with the current situation in a number of countries that had been traditional poles of attraction for permanent settlement (such countries as Canada, the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand) and with the few countries at world level that still desired to attract permanent immigrants.

The third section focuses on emigration, examining the policies of the major sending countries and discuss-

¹For views of individual Governments concerning international immigration, see annex tables 74-97.




Figure II. International migration, trend during 1976-1978 and future prospects

TABLE 27. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION
(Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of				Total
	Higher rates	Maintenance of current rates but with strict control	Deceleration of future immigration but maintenance of already established immigrant population	Immigration viewed as not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
ECA area	3	3	2	42	50
ECWA area	1	6	—	5	12
ECLA area	4	1	1	21	27
ECE area	1	2	11	25	39
ESCAP area	1	4	2	23	30
More developed regions ...	2	2	11	27	42
Less developed regions	8	14	5	89	116
TOTAL	10	16	16	116	158

TABLE 28. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION
(Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of				Total
	Higher rates	Maintenance of current rates	Deceleration of future emigration	Emigration viewed as not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
ECA area	1	15	4	30	50
ECWA area	—	2	1	9	12
ECLA area	—	3	11	13	27
ECE area	3	1	7	28	39
ESCAP area	2	3	2	23	30
More developed regions ...	2	1	8	31	42
Less developed regions	4	23	17	72	116
TOTAL	6	24	25	103	158

ing the related issue of the "brain drain". The fourth section deals with a topic of growing importance—illegal migration—and the last section examines the issue of refugees.

A. LABOUR MIGRATION

One of the most striking changes that has occurred in the past several years with respect to international migration has been the increasing attraction of the oil-producing Arab States of Western South Asia and Northern Africa for migrant workers. While the total numbers remained uncertain—there might be as many as 2 million "guest workers" in those countries—it is certain that the still largely uncharted phenomenon is having a far greater impact on the Gulf Arab States than did the migration of guest workers to Western European countries during the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, at its peak, a guest worker had held only one out of five positions in Switzerland and one out of seven positions in France. In contrast, in a country such as the United Arab Emirates, three out of four positions were currently held by foreigners, and in the Gulf States as a whole, more than half of the work force was made up of foreign labourers.

The movement of temporary workers to the Gulf States differed from the previous migration of foreign workers to Western Europe not only in terms of relative numbers but in the fact that it was a far more organized movement. In a typical instance, a company that desired to bring in guest workers to one of the

oil-producing States applied to a particular Government for visas, often in groups of up to 500, and then contacted an agent in a sending country to bring in the desired manpower.

Although uncertainty currently existed as to the magnitude of the movement, equally little was known about the economic implications of that vast trade in human labour, although it was evident that exported labour was an important source of hard currency for the sending countries. And, in the light of that fact, migrant labour had been attracted from a growing number of countries and geographical regions. Currently, there were large contingents of temporary workers from Asia (from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea; and smaller numbers from Indonesia and Thailand); from Southern Europe (Turkey); and from Northern Africa (Egypt and Somalia). The flow was likely to increase and to attract labourers from such areas as Ethiopia, Kenya and other Eastern African countries and the Sahelian region in Western Africa.

Briefly reviewing the current policies of the major receiving countries in Western South Asia and Northern Africa, it is clear that there existed substantial demand for manpower, albeit of a temporary nature, in the major oil-producing countries. Of the Arab countries that currently received substantial immigration, all desired to maintain the flow; and one country, Saudi Arabia, desired to attract larger numbers of immigrants. Bahrain desired substantial immigration in order to meet its labour force requirements, although it was mainly interested in attracting temporary migrants

to work on particular construction projects. Kuwait, one of the countries that had attracted massive immigration, was interested in skilled migrants (who were unlikely to remain permanently) and in the temporary immigration of project labour, with guaranteed repatriation upon the completion of specific projects. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya similarly desired the temporary immigration of a project labour force. Oman, like its less populated neighbours along the Gulf, also depended heavily upon expatriate workers, largely from the Indian subcontinent. Qatar, which had recently experienced a construction boom and was engaging in an ambitious industrial programme, had attracted massive immigration, mainly of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from India, Iran, Pakistan and, more recently, Bangladesh. It could be anticipated that it would attract an even larger inflow from a broader geographical area. Saudi Arabia, as a result of its accelerating economic development since the 1960s, had attracted large numbers of immigrants of all skill levels to its major urban centres. Its current development strategy, embodied in the Second Plan, would require an even larger immigrant population to meet the needs of its large-scale industrial programme. Currently, the Government had somewhat relaxed its formerly strict immigration controls in order to ensure sufficient labour to carry out projects outlined in the Second Plan. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia, as well as a number of other countries in the ECWA area, was relying on the recruitment of a temporary project labour force, labour that would be repatriated after the completion of a given project. The United Arab Emirates, which had followed a pattern of rapid economic expansion, continued to attract immigrants of all skill levels; and those immigrants currently constituted an estimated two thirds of the country's total population.

With regard to future prospects, it is clear that in those Arab countries which had adopted economic strategies that emphasized non-labour-intensive sectors, the migration of temporary workers would eventually be halted (possibly during the early or mid-1980s). However, in those countries where a substantial agricultural sector was envisaged, as in Saudi Arabia and Oman, demand for less skilled agricultural labour might continue. In any event, the major oil-exporting countries are likely to continue to need substantial immigration during the next two decades.²

A second major area in which the migration of temporary workers predominated was Africa, where workers from a number of the poorer countries migrated to two major regions of economic attraction: South Africa; and the economically more advanced countries of Gabon and the Ivory Coast.

The first of those movements was of long standing. Migration to South Africa continued from the neighbouring countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, peripheral areas that were politically independent yet economically impoverished, despite their active participation in 100 years of economic growth.

²G. M. Stubbs, *loc. cit.*

Although the numbers of migrants from those countries had fallen off in recent years, the flow could be expected to continue for some time, as those countries were currently incapable of breaking out of their satellite roles. According to estimates prepared by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1978, some 21,000 citizens of Botswana were employed in South Africa, as were nearly 10,000 workers from Swaziland and an additional 33,874 workers from Mozambique. Lesotho, the poorest and most vulnerable of the sending countries due to its scarcity of arable land, had over 97,000 workers—50 per cent of its male and 10 per cent of its female labour force—employed in the mines of South Africa. (Official projections by the Government of Lesotho estimated an anticipated increase in the "absent population" to some 180,000 workers by 1985.) In addition to the movement of temporary workers from the above-mentioned countries, the recruitment of workers from Malawi to South Africa had resumed in mid-1977 (Malawi had put an end to mine labour recruitment following a plane crash in 1974); but the movement of workers from Malawi to South Africa was not expected to reach its former levels.

The second major movement of temporary workers within Africa had occurred in western Middle Africa and in Western Africa, where the major countries of attraction were Gabon and the Ivory Coast.³ Gabon, which had been faced with a chronic scarcity of workers at virtually every level of the economy, continued to import foreign workers, who had constituted approximately one third of the country's labour force in 1976. Some 6,000 workers from Senegal had been active in recent years in public works projects and in teaching. Similar contracts have been negotiated with Burundi, Togo, the United Republic of Cameroon and the Upper Volta, although emigration from the last-named country to Gabon had been halted in late 1977. In addition, non-contract labour was available from a pool of some 60,000 Rio Muniens who had been exiled from Equatorial Guinea.

The Ivory Coast, however, was the principal country of immigration in Western Africa. Currently, an estimated 35 per cent of the total labour force of the Ivory Coast was non-Ivorian; the migrants came mainly from the neighbouring countries of Mali and the Upper Volta. However, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government of the Ivory Coast indicated a recent shift in policy—towards the favouring of more selective immigration—which might eventually affect the employment of skilled manpower from overseas, as well as of unskilled manpower from neighbouring countries of Africa. The Government reported that it intended to adopt a policy of employing young Ivory Coast nationals in sectors of the economy that had been in the hands of foreign nationals. In addition, it planned to seek the "ivorization" of unskilled man-

³The situation of Gabon was somewhat different from that of the Ivory Coast, in that Gabon had received a significant number of refugees. As a result, Gabon had changed its perception of the acceptability of further immigration: it currently desired to maintain the rate, while it previously had desired to increase the rate.

power in the secondary and tertiary sector—through such means as placing higher value on manual labour and aiding the settlement of young agricultural workers in communal villages. If such a programme were carried out on a large scale, the requirements for foreign manpower would be significantly reduced. It may be assumed, however, that the movement of workers from the economically less advanced countries in the region—such as the Upper Volta—to the more advanced countries will continue for some time to come.

There was a large-scale movement of migrant workers among the various countries of Latin America, including the countries of Middle America and the Caribbean. The number of workers involved was large not only by absolute standards but in proportion to the population and labour force of many of the countries involved. The geography of such movements was fairly simple. In the northern part of the South American continent the migrants converged primarily towards Venezuela and came mainly from Colombia. In the centre, there were lesser movements among other countries of the Andean group and between Brazil and its neighbouring countries; and in the south, Argentina was the main immigration country and likewise received an inflow from its neighbours. With respect to the stock, the ILO has distinguished five main categories of migrants in Latin America, primarily on the basis of their time horizon. These migrants are: frontier workers; seasonal workers; short-term temporary workers; medium-term temporary workers; and long-term or permanent workers (who settle with their families but generally keep their original nationalities). Everything suggests that those movements can no longer be considered temporary or a product of current economic conditions but must be seen as a lasting structural phenomenon. During the past few years the traditional migration of frontier and seasonal agricultural workers had been accompanied and gradually replaced by short- or medium-term and, to an increasing extent, permanent migration.⁴

The situation with respect to international migration in Western Europe—formerly a major pole of attraction for migrant labour—had changed considerably since around 1973, when, as a result of the economic slow-down in the developed market economies, many countries that had previously accepted immigrant labour had stopped active recruitment and restricted access to their territory to foreign workers (except for nationals of countries in the European Economic Community (EEC)). Specifically, the Federal Republic of Germany had suspended the recruitment of immigrant workers in November 1973. Switzerland had issued an edict in July 1974 to limit the number of foreigners engaged in remunerative activities. In the Scandinavian countries, the interruption of migration flows from countries outside the Nordic labour market had been universal: since 1974 in Denmark and in Sweden; and since 1975 in Norway (with the ban ex-

tended indefinitely in that country in 1976). Similar restrictive measures had been taken in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Following the imposition of those restrictive measures in the major labour-recruiting countries, there had been a reverse flow, in which perhaps as many as 870,000 migrant workers had returned to their countries of origin. Subsequently, the situation had largely stabilized and there had been a continuing flow of migrants in both directions, although those flows had changed greatly in intensity and in composition. (To cite only one example, in 1970, two thirds of the migrants to France had been workers and one third family members; by 1976, the proportions had been reversed, and the flow of migrants consisted of one third workers and two thirds family members (and, of course, the size of the flow was only a percentage of its former magnitude).

There had been a change not only in the flow but in the stock—i.e., in the character of the foreign population that had resided in the Western European countries in recent years. As a result of the stabilization of the numbers of workers, there had been a predictable aging of the foreign-worker population. Also, as a result of the arrival of family members and of the fact that the migrants' birth rates were often higher than those of the general population, the total number of migrants in the nine Common Market countries had remained roughly the same—about 12.5 million persons. (And, indeed, official projections estimate that even if the number of migrant workers were to remain the same, the total number of foreigners within EEC would rise to some 18 million by 1985.)

In discussing the situation of migrants in Europe, the most salient point is that, although the influx of migrant workers to the industrialized countries of Western Europe had originally been intended to fill only a temporary need and it had been assumed that the guest workers would stay for a period of years and return to their countries of origin, it was currently clear that a majority of migrants—in the seven continental EEC countries as well as in Switzerland—would want to remain in those countries on a permanent basis, which posed problems to the respective receiving countries in terms of political and social tensions, substandard living conditions, cultural difficulties and so on.

Indeed, although a majority of the Western European countries reported that the current level of immigration—which in most instances consisted of a small flow—was acceptable, a number of countries identified problems, in their replies to the Fourth Inquiry, in relation to the integration of the foreign population and mentioned measures that had been adopted to resolve those problems.

The Federal Republic of Germany had faced a number of problems common to other countries in Europe. There had been an initial return flow of migrants—the total number had dropped from a 1973 peak of from 2.5 million to 2.6 million to some 2 million—and it might be anticipated that a slight stream of migrants would continue to return home. Al-

⁴F. Breton, "Working and living conditions of migrant workers in South America", *International Labour Review*, vol. 114, No. 3 (November–December 1976), p. 344.

though the ban on further immigration would probably be extended indefinitely, the Federal Republic of Germany continued to admit families of foreign workers and it was clear that many migrants with family members might remain permanently in the Federal Republic, as it had ruled out direct incentives to induce the workers to return home. As a result, the major focus of the Government's policy was towards integration. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, it reported that its policy consisted of allowing migrant labourers "a life in secure social and legal status". Such a goal would be achieved by further efforts at integrating migrants who currently resided in the Federal Republic of Germany—by such measures as improved residence permit regulations and the granting of unlimited work permits after eight years of residence instead of the previous 10 years. The case of the Federal Republic of Germany presents a certain paradox, in that it was one of the first European countries to have adopted a humane policy of admitting family members; yet, that policy subsequently produced some undesired social consequences. Faced with such problems as high unemployment among foreign youth (an estimated 100,000 foreign adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19 were currently unemployed), the Government was currently considering measures to provide special assistance to migrant children enrolled in school and to provide training programmes for the growing numbers of foreign school-leavers.

Problems in relation to the integration of "temporary workers" and the education of their children were similarly identified by Switzerland, which reported in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry that it desired to accelerate the reverse flow of migrant labour. In 1977, the Federal Consultative Commission on the Problem of Foreigners reported that although from a quantitative standpoint, the problem of foreigners had been rendered less acute by the measures to restrict immigration, many human and social questions remained to be solved. The Committee concluded that "compulsory education in Swiss schools is certainly the best means of integration".⁵

Although virtually all of the Western European countries had adopted measures—usually embodied in bilateral accords—that guaranteed various rights to remaining migrant workers, one country (Sweden) had a particularly comprehensive policy. Currently, the immigration of labour from countries outside the Nordic common market was negligible; however, the immigration of Finns, who constituted the largest group of foreign nationals in Sweden, was still of importance and Sweden had formulated a broad policy to deal with immigration affairs and minority problems (which had been identified not as temporary phenomena but as phenomena that would have lasting consequences on Swedish society). In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government of Sweden reported that an extensive government programme had been designed both to

facilitate the adjustment of immigrants in Sweden and their wishes to preserve contact with their original culture. The aim of the policy was to give immigrants the same level of living as the rest of the population, to provide a real choice between retaining and developing their original cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity.

Whereas a number of Western European countries were largely concerned with questions of integration, others were in the process of negotiating bilateral accords or implementing various measures to facilitate the eventual return of a larger flow of migrants to their countries of origin. France presented a case in point. Except for some Spanish and Portuguese immigrant workers, many of the guest workers in France—particularly the some 870,000 Algerians, 304,000 Moroccans and 164,000 Tunisians—had not been integrated into French society. In the context of high unemployment, public pressure had been in favour of reducing the foreign labour force (there had been a vague target mentioned in some public circles of reducing the contingent by some 250,000 workers). In terms of actual policy decisions, the Government had attempted at first to induce unemployed foreign workers to return home. In June 1977, the Government had begun a programme offering about \$2,000 (F 10,000) to each foreign worker who agreed to return to his country of origin. (That programme did not achieve measurable success; and as of February 1978, fewer than 5,000 workers had accepted the Government's bonus. Subsequently, in November 1978, the programme was declared to be illegal by the Council of State, but in late 1978, it was resubmitted to the National Assembly.) In addition, in September 1977, the Government had imposed a three-year ban on immigration and had announced the termination of the issuance of work permits, the extension of return assistance to all workers who had resided in France for a five-year period and the suspension of family immigration. The last measure had provoked a significant degree of protest and the Government had subsequently decided that foreign workers could continue to bring in family members on the condition that those family members would not seek employment (that measure was to be in effect for a period of three years).

Currently, the Government of France was exploring the possibility of negotiating bilateral accords with a number of former sending countries in order to facilitate the return migration of a larger contingent of migrant workers, particularly those who were unemployed.

The United Kingdom shared a certain similarity with France in that the current immigration problems in both countries partially resulted from their former position as colonial Powers. Although there had been no recent changes in the United Kingdom immigration policy, there had been much debate within the country on the future direction of immigration policy. In accordance with its current policy, embodied in the Immigration Act of 1971, the Government was committed to honour a statutory obligation to an estimated

⁵Switzerland, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, "Information letter on migrant adaptation and integration", November 1977.

30,000–40,000 United Kingdom passport-holders in Eastern Africa, who entered on a quota of 5,000 per annum. In addition, the Government admitted the dependants of those immigrants who had settled in the United Kingdom before 1973.

As an example of the recent debate on the future direction of immigration policy, in March 1978, a bipartisan select committee of the House of Commons called for a virtual end of "major" immigration of Asians and Africans to the United Kingdom and for the introduction of close checks on immigrants already in the country. The report recommended that the Government should make it clear that there would be no major primary immigration in the foreseeable future and that immigration would be allowed only in exceptional individual circumstances. It also recommended the setting of a date to end the right of holders of United Kingdom passports from countries of the Commonwealth to settle in the United Kingdom. Of course, the current Government was not committed to act upon the recommendations of the Select Committee, and it is important to take note that fairly strict controls were already in existence. In any event, regardless of whether a more stringent policy is adopted at a future date, it is evident that the United Kingdom is not likely to accept large numbers of immigrants in the foreseeable future.

In concluding the present discussion of migrant labour in Western Europe, it would be useful to consider possible future prospects. It was clear that the over-all economic situation in the Western European countries would not permit a significant new recruitment of foreign workers. Almost all countries had banned recruitment or had reduced immigration by fixing levels of saturation. Free migration of labour within EEC also had decreased. Currently, a change in that situation was not to be expected. By and large, however, the volume of foreign residents in Western European countries remained stagnant. Only a few countries registered a slight decrease, which had resulted from the return of foreign workers and their families. In countries with a long and continuous tradition of immigration, the permanent presence of foreign residents would presumably be accepted more easily than in countries with more recent experience.⁶ Problems that had resulted from the formation of national minorities and so on would continue to exist and would play an important role in relations between countries.

Only as far as Eastern Europe was concerned did a slight increase of international labour migration appear possible, since economic growth in some of the more industrialized centrally planned economies—such as the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, Hungary—as well as the opening up of new areas in the Soviet Union, had resulted in a labour shortage in some branches of industry and

⁶This acceptance is largely related to the fact that in countries with a long tradition of immigration, the fertility role of the immigrants (i.e., their contribution to natural increase) is often as important as their manpower role.

in the service sector. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) manpower co-operation, which dates from 1971 (although there have been many bilateral and a few multilateral agreements of labour exchange since 1965) was not interpreted as the import and export of labour, but rather as "mutual contractual exchange of manpower"—i.e., the mutual transfer of labour in specified economic fields, for the purpose of turning out production necessary for the common benefit. In contrast to labour migration in the developed market economies, the movement of labour within the CMEA countries is of a temporary nature; it may involve the temporary transfer of specialists and workers from one country to the other—where the former, for example, builds a complete industrial complex in the latter in a designated period of time; in addition, it may involve the transfer of engineers, technicians etc. or daily travel to the labour-deficient border regions of a given country.

Although no official statistics were available concerning the employment of foreign workers within the CMEA, it is clear that employment of foreign workers was of modest extent and could not be compared in any way with the former stream of guest workers in Western Europe. The majority of the foreign workers—mainly from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania—were employed in the German Democratic Republic, which also had recruited some Algerian workers and which had daily commuters along its boundary with Poland. Czechoslovakia also attempted to alleviate its manpower shortages through recruitment of temporary labourers, mainly from Poland. The third host country was the USSR itself, which employed mainly Bulgarians (in the construction of gas pipelines etc.), as well as a small number of Polish and Yugoslav construction workers.

Although the scale of employment of foreign workers is in no way comparable to the labour migration of Western Europe, future movements, especially to Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, were likely to be more sizable. Indeed, there would probably be need of intra-CMEA labour exchange for more than a decade, but there might be some modification of the current trend (Poland, for example, which was currently the largest supplier of workers, was likely to reduce the volume gradually because of greater manpower-absorbing capacity of the national economy and a gradual fall in its demographic growth rate).

B. COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION

In addition to the flow of temporary migrant workers, a few countries—primarily Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America—had a history of accepting migrants for the purpose of long-term resettlement. Those countries had had comparatively little experience with temporary labour migration, although New Zealand had had some guest workers from the Pacific islands and the United States had

had a substantial inflow of undocumented migrants, mainly from Mexico and other countries of Middle America and the Caribbean, a movement which bears a functional resemblance to temporary labour migration.

There had been recent significant changes in the immigration policies of all of the above-mentioned countries, most of which were at an early stage of implementation; in the case of the United States, changes had been proposed by the current administration but had yet to be (and might not be) approved by the country's legislative bodies. It is interesting to note that two of the countries, Australia and the United States, had moved in the direction of accepting a larger flow of migrants, while Canada and New Zealand had moved in the direction of decreasing the migrant flow.

Canada, which historically had had a rather open immigration policy, had recently exhibited signs of change. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry in 1978, Canada reported that its immigration policy had evolved from an emphasis on absorptive capacity to economic development needs and, more recently, to such humanitarian considerations as family reunification and the acceptance of refugees. Those policy changes embodied in its 1978 Immigration Act, the outcome of a three-year period of study by the Government on the desirable future direction of Canadian immigration policy. The act, together with a companion act to create the Commission on Employment and Immigration, represented a new direction with respect to immigration policy and was intended to facilitate a more integrated approach to the planning and administration of employment and immigration programmes.

One innovation of the act was that admission would be facilitated for prospective immigrants who were prepared to make a commitment to live in a designated community (in one of the country's smaller, less developed towns) for a period of up to six months. However, the major innovation was that the Government would determine annual immigration quotas. It stated in the reply to the Fourth Inquiry that the flow might be increased, maintained or decreased each year, depending upon economic conditions. Basically, the procedures set up in the Immigration Act would facilitate the use of immigration as a "central variable in a national population policy"—a recommendation of the Special Joint Committee which had studied the issue for a number of years. Of course, the impact of the act and its effectiveness as a tool for economic and demographic planning remained problematical because the role of the provinces was as yet uncertain. However, although the domestic ramifications of the act—the effect, for example, of the six-month residence requirement—are still unclear, what is certain is that Canada, which had long been an important immigration country, has adopted a far more restrictive policy and will no longer be a major receiving country for immigrants for permanent settlement.

Although the direction of the Canadian immigration policy was towards restricting immigration (increasing, maintaining, or decreasing the flow, depending on

an annual assessment of the country's labour force requirements), that of the United States of America was rather different. The policy of the Government was to maintain the current flow—in line with ceilings established in legislation which had been approved in 1965. However, proposed legislation which dealt both with refugees and undocumented aliens—if approved—would have the effect of increasing immigration (mainly by legalizing the status of migrants who were currently within the country rather than by significantly increasing future flows). Specifically, one set of proposed policy changes would increase immigration in the short term through the admission of larger numbers of refugees (the administration was preparing new legislation which would allow 50,000 refugees to enter the United States each year instead of the current 17,400) and in the medium term through proposed legislation which would legalize the status of undocumented migrants who had resided in the country since before 1 January 1970. The proposal also calls for comprehensive review of immigration laws and recommends increasing the per-country limitation on annual Canadian and Mexican immigration to a combined 50,000 (the current ceiling for any one country is 20,000 per annum).

In addition, the proposed legislation would grant temporary status to large numbers of undocumented migrants—those who had resided in the country continuously since 1 January 1977—and the proposal states that this status would be adjusted outside of the numerical limitation for each country and hemisphere. It is by no means clear whether this group of undocumented migrants, which is estimated to number in the millions, would eventually be granted legal status and allowed to remain in the United States.

To sum up, the changes embodied in the proposed legislation—to admit greater numbers of refugees, to legalize the status of undocumented migrants of longer standing, to increase the combined quota for Canada and Mexico and to grant temporary status to a large group—are all evidence of a willingness to accept a larger number of immigrants. However, although the Government reported in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry that it desired to "increase" immigration, the major thrust of the proposed legislation is to legalize the status of the large numbers of undocumented migrants currently residing in the United States and does not involve significantly increasing the flow.⁷

The same dichotomy that is found in those two countries in the western hemisphere which have traditionally accepted large numbers of migrants for permanent settlement—with one country, Canada, closely monitoring the annual flow; and the other, the United States, moving in the direction of accepting larger numbers of immigrants (by admitting larger

⁷Since the drafting of this monitoring report in 1978, the legislative package proposed by the current administration has not received—and is unlikely to receive—approval. To date, no political consensus on the immigration issue has emerged in the United States and it is not possible to make any definite statements on the Government's policy at this time.

numbers of refugees, legalizing the status of existing undocumented migrants etc.)—is also to be found in Australia and New Zealand. Both countries have recently revised their immigration policies: Australia in the direction of accepting larger numbers of migrants; and New Zealand in the direction of restricting the flow.

In 1978, Australia announced a new immigration policy which was expected to attract some 210,000 immigrants during the subsequent three years. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it had conducted a comprehensive review of long-term population trends and immigration policies and, in response to a situation of below-replacement fertility and declining immigration levels, the Government had adopted a population policy that included a "component of population increase through immigration". In explaining the antecedents of its policy shift, the Government stated that the country's immigration policies had been tightly interpreted since 1974 and some sectors of public opinion had considered it anomalous that Australia, a country built on continuing migration, had so drastically changed its course. The Government stated that it had been against that background that, in 1976, the Australia Population and Immigration Council had prepared a "green paper on immigration policies", which eventually had resulted in the announced policy changes. The Government emphasized that the underlying premise of the policy was that migration to Australia should be for permanent settlement (it stated that the "guest-worker flow" which had until recently been popular in the industrialized countries of Western Europe would not be adopted for Australia). The major changes dealt with the relaxation of previously tight criteria for the entry of family members to Australia, as well as of the narrow occupational controls on the entry of all migrants other than in the immediate family group, refugees and those entering under the arrangement of Australia with New Zealand. With respect to the first group, that of family members, the Government reported that the need had been to devise a policy that could make it easier for family members to qualify for admission, "without bringing about a migrant intake heavily biased towards the unskilled, and so large as to over-strain Australia's absorptive capacity". Those changes, the details of which were being finalized, would involve the application of numerical weightings, or points, to the assessment procedure. With respect to the second group, that of independent applicants, the new approach to migrant selection would also be based on numerical weightings of "factors considered to be indicators of capacity to settle successfully in Australia". The Government stated that applicants would be screened against a group of economic and employment factors and the system was expected to ensure that the migrant intake should remain consistent with the absorptive capacity of the country and that those who were accepted would have the abilities to settle successfully. One group that the Government was particularly desirous of attracting were the entrepreneurs,

"provided that they have the necessary technical and business experience and capital required for the enterprise".

In recognition of the desirability of maintaining a steady rate of immigration and to provide a reliable basis for planning in the private and public sectors, the Government reported that it would implement a "triennial rolling immigration programme", which would commence with the period from 1978-79 to 1980-81. Such a rolling programme approach would allow for flexibility on an annual basis in achieving over-all targets for the three-year period; programmes would be constantly monitored and would have the flexibility needed to vary the composition of the migrant intake to meet particular demands.

It must be noted, however, that although the size and composition of the flow were to be closely monitored, the purpose of that action was not to restrict the intake, as in the case of Canada, but to ensure maximum success in attracting a significant migrant flow. As the Government stated in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, "in simple terms, this programme underlines the Government's faith in immigration as an element in economic growth".

In contrast, New Zealand currently had a policy of maintaining its moderate level of immigration; indeed, that policy, which had been in effect since early 1976, had as its goal an annual net immigration of only about 5,000 persons. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that migration was currently limited to specified occupational groups whose skills were in demand and to "humanitarian cases such as refugees and family reunification". That limitation was a reflection of the current economic situation in New Zealand and the consequent level of unemployment of nationals and permanent residents.

Briefly examining the background of the current policy, as in the case of the three previously mentioned countries, migration had played an historically significant role in population growth in New Zealand. Still, natural increase had continued to account for more than half of the country's total increase; but by the early 1970s, a rapidly declining birth rate, combined with record levels of immigration, had the effect of reversing the traditional dominance of natural increase. That situation had led the Government to introduce unprecedented controls on the immigration of Commonwealth citizens. Subsequently, an increasing acceptance in New Zealand of low, and eventually stationary, population growth had created pressure for a further reduction in immigration levels, an attitude which had led to acceptance of the current restrictive policy.

Aside from Australia and the United States, which remained willing to accept fairly significant numbers of immigrants, few countries in the world currently sought immigration for the purpose of permanent settlement. Indeed, there was only one major area of the world—the ECLA area—in which a number of countries desired an increase in immigration, beyond that of

temporary labour migration.⁸ Of the four countries in Latin America that desired to increase immigration, one country—Ecuador—referred primarily to the entry of migrant workers (in accordance with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (CIME) and Decision 116 of the Cartagena agreement, which facilitated the movement of frontier workers). In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Guyana also reported that it desired to increase immigration—again, of a rather limited group (it sought to attract persons from CARICOM areas and to stimulate the repatriation of Guyanese nationals). Two countries in the ECLA area were among the few remaining Governments that desired to attract significant numbers of immigrants for permanent settlement: Argentina, a large, sparsely populated country which had a long-standing policy seeking to attract large numbers of oversea migrants; and Bolivia, a country with a more recent immigration policy (1977), one which had been prompted by the preliminary results of its 1976 census, which had revealed what the Government termed a “demographic deficit”. However, in both instances, the Governments desired to attract a specific type of immigrant. Although Argentina had not attracted large numbers of immigrants from overseas since around 1975, but rather had received immigration mainly from neighbouring Latin American countries, it desired to attract agriculturists from Western European countries, such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Similarly, Bolivia was interested in attracting migrants with some experience in agricultural settlement and had explored the possibility of attracting migrants of European stock from countries in Southern Africa. It was currently negotiating a bilateral accord with the Government of El Salvador, which involved the settlement of a group of agriculturists and their families in a pilot project. Although Uruguay and Brazil desired to maintain their current level of immigration, rather than to increase it, those countries also accepted immigrants for permanent settlement.

To sum up, as of 1978 there were few avenues remaining open at world level for the absorption of large numbers of permanent immigrants. Those few countries which admitted significant numbers—or which desired to increase the current flow—had fairly specific requirements. Even in the case of a country like Australia, which currently desired to increase the flow and which had modified its formerly strict entry requirements, the process would be closely monitored (applicants would be admitted in accordance with a point system and so on). Apart from emergency situations, such as those involving refugees, it clearly cannot be expected that many countries will open their doors to large numbers of immigrants in the foreseeable future.

⁸Three countries in Africa (Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and South Africa) and one country in Western South Asia (Saudi Arabia) desired to increase immigration; however, in all of those countries, migrant labour was the predominant type.

On the issue of emigration from the countries that formerly had supplied large contingents of guest workers to Western Europe, the situation had changed considerably since around 1974, with the exhaustion of many of the previous opportunities for migrant labour. Many countries that previously had supplied large numbers of migrant labourers were faced with the need to reabsorb migrants. To date, there had not been a massive return of migrant workers to their countries of origin. However, the movement might accelerate as France and other countries negotiated bilateral accords for the return of larger numbers of migrants to their countries of origin.

Any large return movement of migrants to the former sending countries could result in problems since, apart from some reintegration projects on a trial basis (for example, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany had made credits available for development projects employing returning migrant workers; the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey had jointly conducted a training programme for skilled workers; the French Government was implementing programmes to permit Algerian, Moroccan and Portuguese workers who wanted to return to their home country to obtain better vocational training before departure), little had been done in that important area. In the absence of adequate training programmes and other measures, there remained a discrepancy between abilities acquired abroad and those needed in the emigration countries. Furthermore, aids to reintegration—such as priority in housing and loans—had caused resentment in some countries among workers who stayed home. Obviously, in the absence of comprehensive policies for the reintegration of returning migrant workers, various social problems could be anticipated.

Perhaps partially as a result of the problems that resulted from the return of migrant workers, a majority of the former sending countries currently discouraged the emigration of their nationals. Of the countries that formerly had sent large groups of migrant labourers abroad, some, such as Yugoslavia, had begun to question the benefits of emigration as early as the 1960s (Yugoslavia had begun to encourage its workers to return as of 1972). In the case of Italy, the return of migrants had been numerically significant but of lesser socio-economic consequence since, as nationals of a Common Market country, Italian labourers were permitted free circulation within the other member States.

A number of countries that formerly had encouraged, or at least had allowed, significant emigration had reversed their policies. Of the countries that replied to the Fourth Inquiry which traditionally had been emigration countries, several reported that they had formulated explicit policies to reduce the flow of emigrants. Greece, for example, reported that it had a policy to decrease emigration although, as a result of

the reversal of its previous outward migration flow, its goal of reducing emigration had essentially been met. Spain reported that its current employment policy was designed largely to reduce emigration, although it had been conceived as a socio-economic policy rather than one with demographic objectives. Ireland similarly reported that it desired to end involuntary emigration through the provision of increased employment opportunities. A country that expressed particular concern over decreasing the out-migration of its citizens was Finland. It reported that in 1975-1977 the balance of international migration had again been negative and stated that the strong emigration from Finland was of great concern to the authorities; it was a considerable economic loss to Finland and also had long-term demographic repercussions. As a remedial effort, the Government was considering measures to increase the use of labour exchange services in order to decrease emigration caused by unemployment.

Nevertheless, although a majority of the former sending countries in various parts of Europe currently discouraged emigration, it is interesting to note that three countries in the ECE area (out of a total of only six countries at world level⁹) had explicit policies to encourage the emigration of their nationals.

One of those countries, the Netherlands, had a low fertility rate and a resultant low rate of population growth but was, however, densely populated. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that, for demographic as well as socio-economic reasons, it pursued an active emigration policy. It stated that measures were taken to facilitate "the movement of nationals who, on their own accord, have decided to settle in another country". Among those measures were the provision of financial assistance towards transportation costs and follow-up services by Netherlands representatives in the receiving countries. It is important to take note that the Netherlands constituted something of a special case and its current policy must be understood in the context of problems that had arisen from its former status as a colonial Power. In recent years, the country had absorbed more than half a million refugees (some 400,000 from Indonesia, 30,000 from the Mollucans and 130,000 from Suriname). In relation to the country's total population size of some 13 million, that influx had been proportionately greater, for example, than the movement of Commonwealth citizens to the United Kingdom and undoubtedly had contributed to the Government's current perception and policy with respect to emigration.

Portugal, a second country in Europe that desired to increase the emigration of its citizens, had long considered out-migration to be a partial remedy for unemployment. However, in recent years, its perception of the acceptability of emigration and its resultant policy had also been affected by factors that had arisen from its former colonial status. Following the return of some

1 million persons from its former colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Portugal had reached an unemployment level of about 25 per cent. Consequently, it was currently encouraging the emigration both of displaced persons and of those Portuguese nationals who were unemployed and desired to emigrate. Emphasis had been placed on selective emigration to countries of Latin America, and especially to Venezuela, although the numbers involved had so far been small.

The third country in the ECE area that encouraged emigration was Turkey, which had a high level of fertility and a rate of population growth that it considered to be excessive. Turkey had long had a policy of encouraging emigration, although, in its reply to the Fourth Population Inquiry, the Government reported that although it encouraged the emigration of unskilled workers, those who emigrated were often qualified personnel. Currently, Turkey was in somewhat uncertain circumstances. Under the Ankara protocol to EEC, in which Turkey had signed an association agreement, EEC had promised to move towards completely free movement of labour between Turkey and the nine Common Market countries during the period from 1976 to 1986. However, that issue currently remained in doubt. Indeed, it is important to state that the entire issue of free circulation within the Common Market countries is one which may influence future policy decisions. Some Common Market members considered that the admission of such countries as Portugal, in which there was a high level of unemployment, or even of such countries as Spain or Greece, could prompt a new exodus into the Western European countries, a movement that had not recently been desired by a majority of the Common Market countries.

As was the case in the more developed countries, few Governments among the less developed countries desired to increase the emigration of their nationals. However, a number of countries, particularly in Africa, that had significant emigration did desire to maintain the current rate. Of the countries in the ECA area that had significant emigration, only Algeria currently desired to increase emigration, a movement that had long been considered acceptable both as a short-term and a long-term means of resolving unemployment (however, with the rapid diversification of the Algerian economy, there was likely to be a reduction in the need for future emigration).

In addition to the countries in the ECA area that had significant emigration and desired to maintain or increase the rate, one country—Rwanda—currently had insignificant emigration but desired to increase the flow in order to reduce "demographic pressure on the land" and to improve the "well-being of the country's population". In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, the Government reported that it was exploring the possibility of accords with potential receiving countries (which were likely to be the sparsely populated countries of Gabon, Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania). Currently, however, the obstacles to any such mass emigration from Rwanda appeared to be great.

⁹Of the three remaining countries, one is in the area of responsibility of the Economic Commission for Africa and two are in the area of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

In the ESCAP area of responsibility, two countries desired to increase the emigration of their citizens. The first of those countries, Pakistan, had long sent skilled and unskilled migrants to such destinations as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; and, in recent years, had been sending increasing numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled labourers to the Gulf States. The second was the Republic of Korea, a country that—since the world oil crisis had caused a steep rise in its cost of oil imports—had made a concerted effort to export its construction technology and skilled labour, especially to markets in Western South Asia. In addition to that labour migration, which typically consisted of private employment contracts which ran for a fixed period, the Government reported in the Fourth Inquiry that it also desired to encourage permanent emigration and has “frequent contacts with Latin American Government officials”. It further reported that some 50,000 nationals of the Republic of Korea expected to emigrate each year after 1978, as a result of a simplification of emigration procedures and the conclusion of various bilateral accords.

In addition to the above-mentioned countries, there were two countries in the ESCAP area of responsibility—Sri Lanka and Tonga—that had significant emigration and desired to maintain that flow; and one country—the Philippines—where emigration was currently insignificant but that desired to increase the rate. The most salient aspect of emigration from countries in the ESCAP area was that, in recent years, the destination of increasing numbers of migrants from the area had been the Gulf States in Western South Asia. Currently, there were large numbers of migrants from India and Pakistan in Western South Asia, smaller numbers from the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, and additional migrants from Indonesia and Thailand; and the movement could be expected to broaden. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Bangladesh reported, for example, that although emigration was currently insignificant and although it had no formulated policy, it had begun to enter into agreements with Middle East countries for the export of a limited number of skilled and unskilled workers.

The ECLA area differed in its perceptions from the ECA and ESCAP areas, in that, of those countries with significant emigration (14), a majority (10) considered it to be too high. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, for example, Colombia, a country that had long had substantial emigration, particularly towards neighbouring Venezuela and the United States of America, reported that it currently had a policy to decrease the flow. The Government reported that Colombia was currently experiencing strong international migration which, in general, it considered undesirable. The long-term objectives were to reduce emigration and, in the short and medium term, to rationalize the “exodus of population”. The Dominican Republic, another country that had experienced emigration, similarly reported that although some sectors of public opinion considered emigration to be beneficial, the Government considered that the level should be re-

duced. Ecuador and Guyana similarly reported that emigration constrained the achievement of their development objectives.

There were only four countries in the ECLA region that had significant emigration and that considered it to be acceptable. One of those countries, El Salvador, which had high population density and a high rate of population growth was, like Rwanda, exploring the possibility of concluding bilateral accords (with Bolivia and Saudi Arabia) to facilitate the emigration of its citizens.

Of course, the ECWA area of responsibility is comprised of countries which had largely been receiving countries for emigrants from other regions. However, one country in the area (Syrian Arab Republic) had significant emigration and desired to increase the flow and two countries (Democratic Yemen and Yemen) currently had insignificant emigration but desired to increase the flow.

In dealing with the phenomenon of emigration, the “brain drain” must be briefly mentioned. It is interesting that a number of Governments in various regions reported that measures that had been adopted to resolve the brain-drain question often had been ineffective in the light of market forces, wage differentials and other factors. For example, in the ECA area, Somalia, a country that desired to decrease all categories of emigration, reported that it sought to reduce the brain drain; but stated that although corrective measures were taken, people tended to migrate to Western South Asia, where better salaries could be obtained. Egypt is an example of a country that desired to maintain its over-all level of emigration, but that sought to restrict “the emigration of well-educated and experienced persons needed for the purposes of national social and economic development”. Specifically, in its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Egypt reported that an annual quota had been approved for the migration of university graduates and post-graduates.

In the ESCAP area of responsibility, Fiji reported that it had been experiencing a continuous outflow of skilled personnel to such countries as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, with the result that the country’s development plans in certain areas had been adversely affected. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Pakistan reported a number of incentives as well as disincentives: the provision of higher salaries; a requirement of compulsory service for at least two years; a requirement that professionals must obtain permits to travel abroad from the various ministries; etc. Sri Lanka similarly reported that it had instituted a compulsory period of government service, especially in the case of the professions of medicine and law.

In the ECLA area, the Dominican Republic and Mexico expressed concern over the issue of the brain drain in their replies to the Fourth Inquiry, while in the ECWA area, Iraq reported that it had resorted to financial incentives to reduce the flow. It was apparent, however, that the less advanced of the more developed countries in the ECE area also had had to contend with

the problem. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, Greece reported that it had formulated a policy to resolve the brain drain. Turkey reported that although its intention was to allow only non-qualified workers to emigrate, those who emigrated were largely qualified personnel.

Governments in all regions were clearly concerned with and had adopted a variety of measures to deal with the phenomenon of the brain drain—maintenance of contact with students abroad, provision of employment incentives for returnees, compulsory national service etc.—measures that had not always been effective in the light of continuing wage differentials in the sending and receiving countries. However, although many of the less developed countries had formulated domestic policies to reduce the brain drain, those policies might be less effective in resolving the problems than the measures that were gradually being enacted by a number of the more developed countries, such as Canada and the United States of America (the latter country, for example, was gradually placing restrictions on the employment of foreigners in the medical profession). It is important to take note, however, that increasing numbers of professionals were going to the Gulf States in Western South Asia and that movement might accelerate.

D. ILLEGAL MIGRATION

An additional topic that must be examined is that of illegal or undocumented migration, which has been occurring in many regions of the world. In analysing policies and measures designed to deal with illegal or undocumented migration, it is useful to broadly distinguish the various ways in which regulations of the countries of immigration may be contravened. First, entry may be simply undocumented, as when a migrant crosses the frontier and continues in the host country without formal authorization. In other cases, the migrant may actively seek to avoid authorization or any other contact with the receiving country in the expectation that his or her entry would be likely to be denied. Lastly, in addition to undocumented entry, a migrant may illegally enter by providing fraudulent information in order to obtain authorization.

In describing the policies and measures of specific countries, emphasis is placed on the experience of countries in Europe, Northern Africa and Western South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, regions where illegal migration appears to have been rather more widespread and where policies have been more fully developed and implemented.

The countries of Western South Asia and Northern Africa, particularly those with substantial oil resources, are among the chief recipients of international migration in the world today. Recently, a good deal of undocumented or illegal migration appears to have arisen in connexion with the rapid economic growth taking place in these countries. Although the amount of illegal migration that accompanies the large flows of authorized migrants is unknown, some fragmentary re-

ports suggest that quite substantial numbers are involved. For example, press reports have made reference to enforcement drives which identified as many as 100,000 illegal migrants in Saudi Arabia (in 1978), mainly from Pakistan. There have been similar reports of substantial movements into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from the Sudan and from Tunisia. The extent to which this undocumented migration is tolerated within the region is in part a reflection of a legal tradition in some countries which provides that nationals of other Arab countries shall enjoy special rights of entry. Two countries, for example, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic extend this right in blanket fashion to all other Arabs. On the other hand, Egypt and Lebanon make little or no distinction between Arabs and other non-nationals. Between these two extremes, other countries in the regions may offer special privileges of entry to nationals of one or two neighbouring countries; in these circumstances, for those immigrants who enjoy some special ease of entry into a country, the likelihood of any form of illegal status is reduced.

Apart from these special cases, however, a majority of countries of the regions, having such high proportions of non-nationals, tend to exercise quite far-reaching controls over immigrants. To cite only a few examples, in Saudi Arabia, fines may be imposed upon anyone who knowingly employs or rents a residence to an illegal alien. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, all foreign workers must be sponsored by a specific local employer.

In most countries, an immigrant needs a visa authorizing entry, a permit of residence, a permit to participate in the labour force and a designated employer. Lacking any of these documents, the immigrant is subject to deportation by administrative action. In many countries, if a person has been deported, strict limitations are placed upon his or her rights to subsequent re-entry. In general, it would appear that countries of the regions have come in recent years to develop an elaborate system of control for dealing with their very large and rapidly increasing numbers of immigrants.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, national frontiers have traditionally been comparatively open. The imposition of national boundaries came relatively late to the region and movement from one country to the next was often subject to minimum control. Large-scale undocumented movements across national frontiers are still common to much of the region. However, the trend is very markedly towards increasing the limitations on international movements.

The situation in the countries of Africa is complicated somewhat by the issue of refugees. It is estimated that there are at least as many undocumented persons who cross international frontiers to move away from intolerable political conditions as there are officially recognized refugees. Of course, this is not the only movement; there continues to be a substantial amount of international labour migration which is not documented and which is often tolerated or even encouraged by the Government of the receiving country. Lastly, there is the case of religious pilgrims from

various Sahelian countries towards the Sudan and to Mecca. As a result of such large flows, there are substantial stocks of aliens in a great many countries of Africa. In recent years, a number of these alien communities have found their status shifting from that of undocumented but tolerated to a status that is undocumented and considered by the host Government to be illegal. In addition to a number of outright expulsions, Governments are making more extensive use of documentation and formal authorization to control international migration. Visas and residence and employment permits for long-term visitors are becoming more widely required of all persons entering a country and not simply for intercontinental migrants. Penalties for violation of such requirements normally are expulsion and in some cases fines or imprisonment. To cite only a few examples, of those countries in the ECA area which replied to the Fourth Inquiry, Botswana, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Togo all reported that they had formulated policies to deal with illegal migrants. Sierra Leone, for example, reported that it had a policy for the repatriation of illegal immigrants, while Somalia reported that illegal immigrants were imprisoned or deported.

Until a few years ago, illegal migration between the countries of Latin America attracted little attention, largely because Governments regarded such movements as a natural phenomenon in a major area that is generally homogeneous. However, there is evidence of a change in recent years. It must be emphasized that the attitude of Governments in Latin America towards migrants' right to reside and work in their national territory varies considerably from one country to another and has tended to change rather frequently as a result of over-all economic circumstances.

In a majority of countries, the police were expected to control immigration and work permits had seldom been required. Gradually, however, both countries of origin and host countries in the region had been taking steps to restrict the entry of illegal migrants. Some Governments had gone even further and had begun to exercise controls over foreigners already living in their respective countries. Various procedures had been adopted: attempts to enumerate and register as many of the workers as possible, especially in frontier zones; issuance of residence permits and, more rarely, work permits to migrants and their families; checks made in places of employment; etc. In the past, illegal immigrants and their families had rarely been expelled from countries in Latin America. However, in Venezuela, where economic growth stimulated by the petroleum industry had attracted large numbers of undocumented migrants (largely from Colombia), there had been large-scale expulsions in recent years.

The adoption of policies to deal with undocumented migration, generally in a rather strict manner, was nearly universal among Western European countries. It is interesting to take note that at least among the countries that formerly had received large numbers of

guest workers, there had been a growing tendency to impose stricter penalties on the employers of illegal migrants, although most continued to impose penalties on the workers themselves. Currently, employers who engaged illegal workers were liable in all States to fines, administrative penalties and/or imprisonment. So, too, middlemen and illegal manpower traffickers frequently faced heavy penalties in all of the European countries. Briefly summarizing some of the measures in force against employers in the Common Market countries: Belgian law provided that employers must pay the travelling expenses of the person who was employed without authorization; a prison sentence and/or fines might be imposed and the court might order the temporary or permanent closure of part or all of the company concerned. Denmark had a somewhat similar law which stipulated that where the employer had consented to illegal migration, he must reimburse the expenses incurred by the authorities that arose from the illegal residence and expulsion of the worker. In the Federal Republic of Germany, employers who temporarily or permanently engaged a foreign worker who did not possess a work permit were liable to a substantial fine.

In France, persons who employed a foreign worker not possessing authorization to work must pay the state a sum amounting to not less than 500 times the standard rate of the guaranteed minimum tax per employee. In addition, such offences as indirectly conspiring in the unlawful residence of a foreigner, false declaration etc. were all subject to varying fines and/or imprisonment. The French law was particularly strict with respect to intermediaries. It provided that individuals or groups participating at any stage in the process of the recruitment and introduction into the country of migrant workers were liable to imprisonment and substantial fines.

The Netherlands was currently considering revised legislation in which penalties against illegal migrant workers would be eliminated and those against their employers would be strengthened. The draft law provided that employers who contravened the regulation of the engagement of foreign workers were subject to imprisonment and a fine 10 times larger than the previous fine.

In spite of the trend towards an increase in penalties levied on employers, virtually all of the Common Market countries continued to apply strict measures to the illegal migrants themselves. Under the most recent legislation in Belgium, workers might be expelled or denied the right of abode. In Denmark, the law provided that any breach of the provisions that governed residence and work permits, failure to register with the authorities and attempts to evade checks, were punishable by a fine and possibly imprisonment. In the Federal Republic of Germany, those who worked without a permit were subject to substantial fines; the law also provided for expulsion from certain regions and for deportation.

In France, the sanctions against illegal workers varied—depending upon whether the procedure involved

was for illegal entry, breach of the residence laws for foreigners etc. Except where the worker's position was regularized, the Minister of the Interior might order the worker to leave the country by applying one of the following measures: expulsion and an order that they be conducted to the frontier; denial of the right of abode for those whose residence permits had expired; expulsion for those who failed to comply with the general regulations concerning residence etc. In addition, fines and possibly imprisonment might be imposed for illegal entry.

A major exception among the European countries was the Netherlands. Under the draft law currently under consideration, the worker could not be prosecuted (although he remained liable for expulsion).

In concluding this brief overview, it is evident that in all of the regions surveyed, there was a clear tendency for Governments to move in the direction of greater controls over undocumented or illegal migration. A form of generalized tightening-up appeared to be taking place through an extension of sanctions to migrants themselves and in some cases to persons with whom they had regular essential contacts, notably employers. For the most part, those actions were being taken unilaterally by receiving countries. There were some attempts by groups of receiving countries to work in concert, but less evidence of effective formal co-operation on that issue between sending and receiving countries.

E. REFUGEES

In dealing with the topic of international migration, a final subject that must be considered, and one that was in the forefront of international news in 1978, is the question of refugees. This movement differs fundamentally from other types of migration in that it is not a voluntary movement (of course, it might be argued that the economic determinants of labour migration, namely, a lack of development, employment opportunities etc. in the sending countries impels migrants to seek opportunities abroad; and, in this sense, the movement is not strictly "voluntary"). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the refugee issue differs significantly from other types of migration in that it may involve the sudden uprooting of large numbers of persons, including children and the aged.

Furthermore, it is important to examine the refugee issue in any discussion of international migration policy, for the sheer magnitude of the problem had induced a number of countries to modify their policies (to reconsider their quotas for the admission of refugees etc.); also, a number of countries that had no previous experience history of immigration were currently receiving substantial numbers of refugees and were faced with the need to make policy decisions in that area. Other countries, which were capable of absorbing migrants but which had been historically reluctant to do so, were being urged by the international community to change their stance in the case of ref-

ugees. For reasons such as those given above, it may be anticipated that the refugee issue will become an area for increasing governmental intervention.

Dealing briefly with the magnitude of the refugee problem, Africa led in total numbers and had the highest ratio of refugees to total population of any continent. With one out of every 300 persons on the continent a refugee, according to 1976 estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the problem is of enormous consequence.¹⁰ According to figures compiled by UNHCR, as well as by a non-governmental organization based in the United Kingdom, the country in Africa with the largest number of refugees is Zaire, with 530,000 refugees who fled from neighbouring Angola. Angola had the second largest number, with 250,000 refugees from Shaba Province in Zaire and some 5,000 Namibians. Examining the situation of a number of other countries of Africa, Botswana had some 4,500 refugees from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa; Burundi had an estimated 49,000 Tutsis who fled Rwanda; the United Republic of Cameroon had about 4,000 refugees from Equatorial Guinea (some exiles put the figure as high as 30,000); Djibouti had more than 5,000 Ethiopians who fled the wars against Eritrean secessionist and Somali liberation forces; Ethiopia had about 11,000, mostly from the Sudan; Gabon had some 60,000 from Equatorial Guinea; Kenya had some 4,250, including 2,500 Ugandans; Lesotho had more than 1,000, mainly those who fled South Africa after the Soweto riots in 1976; Mozambique had 32,000 Southern Rhodesians (United Nations figures), or 57,000 (according to the Zimbabwe African National Union). Rwanda had an estimated 10,000 refugees from Burundi; the Sudan had 130,000 Eritreans, 4,500 Zairese and 2,000 Ugandans; Swaziland was a transit country for South African refugees; Tanzania had some 167,000 Burundians and 44,000 other refugees from such countries as Rwanda and Uganda; Uganda had an estimated 120,000 refugees, from Rwanda, the Sudan and Zaire; Zaire had as many as 470,000 Angolans, while Zambia had 33,600 refugees from Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

Of course, it is important to state that not all of the above-mentioned persons are refugees in the strict sense of the word. Of a total of perhaps 3.7 million refugees in Africa, as many as 1.8 million are displaced persons in need of assistance to return to their native lands. What is perhaps most salient about the entire refugee issue in Africa is that, unlike the situation of refugees in Eastern South Asia, many of whom who had sought and had eventually been granted asylum in the industrialized countries, the refugee movement in Africa is essentially an interregional question and, as such, has received significantly less exposure in the international news media. However, in examining some figures recently issued by UNHCR, which lists those

¹⁰According to more recent figures of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there were an estimated 3.7 million refugees on the African continent at the end of 1977; the number may currently have surpassed 4 million.

countries in all regions of the world which have granted asylum to the largest numbers of refugees, it is interesting that of the nine major receiving countries, four are located in the ECA area. Zaire, which had absorbed more than half a million refugees from Angola, Burundi and Rwanda, was second only to the United States of America in total numbers of refugees. Angola, which had taken in an estimated quarter of a million refugees from Zaire and Namibia, has received the fourth largest number of refugees; the United Republic of Tanzania, which had absorbed some 167,000 refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, had received the fifth largest contingent; and the Sudan, with some 160,000 refugees from Ethiopia and Zaire, had received the sixth (followed by the United Kingdom and France, which are more often identified with refugee problems). To sum up, although the issue has been given comparatively less exposure at the international level, the refugee issue in Africa is a movement of vast scope.

If the total numbers of refugees are uncertain in the ECA area, the situation in Latin America is equally unclear, although the movement is of a smaller magnitude. In 1978, an estimated 16,000 persons fled Nicaragua; and there continue to be tens of thousands of Argentine, Chilean and Uruguayan refugees residing outside their native countries.

However, Asia produced the largest refugee movements in 1978. The largest single group was the 170,000 Rohingyeas, the Muslim Bengali people from the Arakan region, who have continued to migrate into Bangladesh. A second large movement involved the uprooting of ethnic Chinese. Although it is certain that few ethnic groups in Asia have been as great a target for local hostility as the some 20 million oversea Chinese, the exodus of some 110,000 Chinese residents from Viet Nam to China was unique in that it was one of the largest known refugee movements from one centrally planned economy to another. A second such migration which has taken place during the last three years has been the crossing of some 150,000 persons from Democratic Kampuchea, including 20,000 ethnic Chinese, into Viet Nam.

As a result of their geographical proximity to countries that have had an exodus of refugees (Democratic Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and, chiefly, Viet Nam), a number of countries in Eastern South Asia had received large numbers of displaced persons and had had to define clearly their policy stance. One country in the region, Singapore, with one of the world's highest population densities, accepted no refugees for permanent asylum and admitted only those persons who were guaranteed to be accepted by another country within 90 days. A number of other countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, had granted temporary asylum to large numbers of refugees. There currently were as many as 28,000 refugees in Malaysian camps. However, Malaysia, which in recent years had tried to stem the flow of Filipino Muslim refugees to Sabah, was reluctant to accept more refugees. Thailand, however, had re-

ceived the largest numbers of Indochinese refugees—as many as 100,000 of whom were currently in that country's camps. Under a 1977 agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Thailand had reserved the right to distinguish between refugees who had fled for fear of political persecution and other illegal immigrants who had left their country of origin "merely for reasons of personal convenience". According to the terms of that agreement, political refugees were to be placed in camps and processed for movement to third countries, while those in the second category were to be deported. It is clear that Thailand was chafing under its role as receiving country for such large refugee groups. In its reply to the Fourth Inquiry, for example, the Government stated that even with some help from foreign countries, Thailand had been "bearing the greatest burden".

The situation could be somewhat ameliorated by means of a multilateral assistance scheme, such as that proposed by the United States of America. In May 1978, the Government of the United States informed Thailand that it was willing to lead to a group of more developed nations in financing the resettlement of some 100,000 Indochinese. Under an interim proposal approved by the United States in March 1978, that country was currently admitting some 25,000 refugees per annum, with 20,000 of those refugees expected to come from camps in Thailand. France had been accepting some 10,000 refugees per annum and Australia had been accepting some 6,000, although the latter country announced in 1978 that it would accept an additional 2,000 Indochinese refugees this year. Under the terms of the above-mentioned resettlement scheme, such Asian countries as Japan, which had been historically opposed to immigration, would be urged to admit some refugees. In addition, the United States of America was currently considering the possibility of admitting a total of 50,000 refugees each year (the previous quota, before the adoption of the interim quota of 25,000, had been 17,400 refugees per annum).

In concluding this brief discussion of refugee movements, a number of points must be emphasized. First, although the very nature of refugee movements would appear to dictate a rapid solution, the bypassing of usual lengthy admission requirements etc., the admission of Indochinese refugees by the developed countries has remained an essentially selective process. To cite a single example, France had admitted significant numbers of refugees from Democratic Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam, in accordance with admission priorities set up by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. For refugees with no guarantor in France, priority was given to those in particularly difficult circumstances and, secondly, to refugees who had links with France (who had served in the administration or in the French army etc.). In general, more skilled refugees had a far better chance of being resettled.

Secondly, it is important to take note that, particularly in light of the large-scale uprooting of persons in

various regions of the world in recent years, the refugee issue may well become a matter that will require new policy decisions (whether to increase quotas, which entrance criteria to set up etc. or, in the case of a country that had no history of immigration, whether to reverse its stance etc.). Lastly, it is important to mention that the need to resolve the problem of large numbers of refugees may lead many countries to change their perception of the acceptability of legal immigration for, in a very real sense, refugees are competing with immigration from other sources for the relatively small number of opportunities for permanent settlement at world level.

CONCLUSION

In 1978, international migration consisted largely of complex flows: of workers from the less developed to the more developed countries, of temporary and permanent migrants, of intraregional and interregional movements, of movements of undocumented migrants and of increasing numbers of refugees.

Briefly reviewing some of the major issues in connexion with labour migration, it is now apparent that the movement of workers to the industrialized countries of Western Europe has been greatly reduced (and the small flow which continued was mainly for the purpose of family reunification). It is interesting to take note that a movement that at first had occurred mainly as a result of private entrepreneurship had resulted in various social problems for Governments of the receiving countries. Although a few Governments had taken steps to facilitate the repatriation of migrants, it appeared that a majority of "temporary" workers in Western Europe were likely to remain. From the tenor of the replies to the Fourth Inquiry, it is apparent that a number of the former receiving countries were facing major problems in regard to the integration of migrant workers, the formation of national minorities etc.

Although the movement of migrant workers to Western Europe had largely slowed, another long-distance labour migration flow—that of workers from various Asian, Southern European and African countries to Western South Asia—was a relatively new and rapidly accelerating phenomenon. Although a number of the Gulf States in Western South Asia were likely to need continued immigration for the next decade or longer in order to carry out their socio-economic development programmes, several countries in the ECWA area expressed concern at the influx of non-Arab nationals, at the prospect of relying on continuing immigration as a substitute for deficient national manpower and so on. Furthermore, just as the movement of workers to Western Europe had largely been an unplanned phenomenon, and a movement that had resulted in various economic, social and cultural problems for the receiving countries (as well as various problems involving returning migrants for the sending countries), the movement of workers to Western South Asia had occurred largely in response to short-term

manpower needs; and, on the whole, there had been little effort to rationalize and regulate the flow.

A third major movement of temporary migrants was that which was occurring among various Western African and Southern African countries. That movement was of longer standing, particularly in the region of Southern Africa, and it is likely to continue for some time. Although a number of sending countries required their nationals to remit a certain proportion of their earnings, the long-run effects on capital accumulation and on the capacity to generate development in the sending countries is by no means clear. However, it would appear that the circumstances in which most international migration occurred in Africa were usually detrimental to the health and welfare of migrants and to the development of the countries of origin, since the loss of a significant proportion of their population (particularly their young adult male population) had often resulted in a deterioration of their economic and social systems, for which small remittances and the limited experience acquired did not compensate.

Lastly, there was a broad movement of migrant workers among the various countries of Latin America, which would appear to be increasing in scope as well as changing in nature—from short-term migration to a more permanent type—as well as various intra-Arab and smaller intra-Asian flows, movements which are as yet imperfectly understood, since much of the flow was of an illegal nature.

With respect to more traditional immigration, the present chapter has demonstrated that few countries at world level desired to accept large numbers of immigrants for permanent settlement. A few countries—such as the United States of America—continued to accept a significant number of immigrants; but public sentiment in that country, for example, was generally in favour of restricting further immigration. And even in the case of a country such as Australia, which had recently announced a policy to increase immigration, admissions were subject to rolling quotas, a weighted point system etc., and it was an essentially selective process. In general, it must be stated that although most of the current and prospective immigration countries are highly or semi-developed—and therefore have sufficient statistical information to determine future trends in native labour supply etc.—it is also true that their economies are liable to short-term business fluctuations which tend to oppose any stable inflow of migrants.

In regard to emigration, the present chapter has also shown that a decreasing number of countries desired permanent emigration of their nationals. Although a number of Governments in a region such as Southern Europe formerly had promoted or at least had given tacit approval to large-scale emigration, several of those European countries emphasized in the Fourth Inquiry that they intended to resolve problems of unemployment etc. and no longer desired further emigration. A number of less developed countries continued to rely on emigrant remittances. However, from the replies to the Fourth Inquiry it is evident that problems

with respect to the reintegration of returning migrants and, in particular, the issue of the brain drain had tended to outweigh any perceived advantages in the view of the sending countries.

Thus, in conclusion, it can be expected that Governments of receiving countries will continue to keep immigration in conformity with national labour needs, while Governments of sending countries will probably attempt to exert more direct or indirect control over the outflow of qualified workers who are in short supply. At world level, it may be anticipated that international migration will become more transient and more skill-oriented and that an integrated system of many multiway flows within and between continents will soon rapidly tend to replace the more uniform pattern of conventional long-term migration.

It may also be expected that the movement of undocumented migrants will not decrease in the near future, as this type of international migration, because of its low cost for recipient countries and its vital im-

portance for the absorption of labour surpluses in sending countries, meets a real need for mobile manpower at world level.

Lastly, a growing problem is that of refugees. As a result of natural disasters and political upheavals, a number of countries in various regions were having to maintain and sometimes absorb substantial numbers of persons for whom they had not budgeted or planned. As stated in the present chapter, in spite of the world attention focused on the problem of Indochinese refugees, the problem of refugees is particularly acute—and numerically more significant—in the countries of Africa. Although refugee movements in Africa were largely intraregional, most Asian refugees would eventually go to the developed countries, where an essentially selective process of admission had been set up by the prospective receiving countries. Lastly, it must be mentioned that refugees are in a sense competing with more traditional migrants for a limited number of places at world level.

TABLE 29. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF IMMIGRATION AND THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT LEVELS, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Governments perceive immigration to be demographically:					Total
	Significant		Insignificant			
	Unsatisfactory: too low	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory: too high	More immigration desirable	Satisfactory	
ECA area						
Eastern Africa	—	1	—	—	14	15
Middle Africa	2	—	—	—	7	9
Northern Africa	—	1	—	1	4	6
Southern Africa	1	—	—	—	3	4
Western Africa	—	1	2	—	13	16
TOTAL	3	3	2	1	41	50
ECWA area						
Western South Asia ^b	1	6	—	1	4	12
ECLA area						
Caribbean	—	1	—	—	7	8
Middle America	—	—	—	—	7	7
Temperate South America	1	—	—	—	2	3
Tropical South America	—	—	1	3	5	9
TOTAL	1	1	1	3	21	27
ECE area						
Southern Europe ^c	—	—	—	—	6	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	3	—	—	4	7
Southern Europe ^c	—	—	1	—	8	9
Western Europe ^c	—	6	1	—	2	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	—	—	—	2	3
Northern America ^c	—	2	—	—	—	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	1	11	2	—	25	39
ESCAP area						
China	—	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	—	—	—	—	3	3
Eastern South Asia	—	—	1	—	8	9
Middle South Asia	1	1	1	—	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	1	—	—	—	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	1	1	—	2	4
TOTAL	2	2	3	—	23	30
More developed regions	2	11	2	—	27	42
Less developed regions	6	12	6	5	87	116
TOTAL	8	23	8	5	114	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 79.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 30. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a.
(Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of:				Total
	Higher rate	Maintenance of current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing of immigration in future, but maintenance of already established immigrant population	Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
ECA area					
Eastern Africa	—	1	—	14	15
Middle Africa	2	—	—	7	9
Northern Africa	—	1	—	5	6
Southern Africa	1	—	—	3	4
Western Africa	—	1	2	13	16
TOTAL	3	3	2	42	50
ECWA area					
Western South Asia ^b	1	6	—	5	12
ECLA area					
Caribbean	—	1	—	7	8
Middle America	—	—	—	7	7
Temperate South America	1	—	—	2	3
Tropical South America	3	—	1	5	9
TOTAL	4	1	1	21	27
ECE area					
Eastern Europe ^c	—	—	—	6	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	—	3	4	7
Southern Europe ^c	—	—	1	8	9
Western Europe ^c	—	—	7	2	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	—	—	2	3
Northern America ^c	—	2	—	—	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	1	2	11	25	39
ESCAP area					
China	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	—	—	—	3	3
Eastern South Asia	—	—	1	8	9
Middle South Asia	—	2	1	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	1	—	—	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	2	—	2	4
TOTAL	1	4	2	23	30
More developed regions	2	2	11	27	42
Less developed regions	8	14	5	89	116
TOTAL	10	16	16	116	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 85.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 31. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EMIGRATION AND THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT LEVELS, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Governments perceive emigration to be demographically:					Total
	Significant		Insignificant			
	Unsatisfactory too low	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory too high	More emigration desirable	Satisfactory	
ECA area						
Eastern Africa	—	4	2	1	8	15
Middle Africa	—	2	—	—	7	9
Northern Africa	1	3	—	—	2	6
Southern Africa	—	2	1	—	1	4
Western Africa	—	4	2	—	10	16
TOTAL	1	15	5	1	28	50
ECWA area						
Western South Asia ^b	—	2	1	1	8	12
ECLA area						
Caribbean	—	2	4	—	2	8
Middle America	—	1	2	—	4	7
Temperate South America	—	—	1	—	2	3
Tropical South America	—	1	3	—	5	9
TOTAL	—	4	10	—	13	27
ECE area						
Eastern Europe ^c	—	—	—	—	6	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	—	2	—	5	7
Southern Europe ^c	1	1	4	—	3	9
Western Europe ^c	1	—	—	—	8	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	—	3	—	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	—	2	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	3	1	7	—	28	39
ESCAP area						
China	—	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	1	—	—	—	2	3
Eastern South Asia	—	—	—	1	8	9
Middle South Asia	1	2	—	—	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	1	—	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	1	1	—	2	4
TOTAL	2	3	2	1	22	30
More developed regions	2	1	8	—	31	42
Less developed regions	4	24	17	3	68	116
TOTAL	6	25	25	3	99	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 91.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.

TABLE 32. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND REGIONS, JULY 1978^a
(Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of:				Total
	Higher rate	Maintenance of current rate	Curbing of emigration in future	Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
ECA area					
Eastern Africa	—	5	1	9	15
Middle Africa	—	2	—	7	9
Northern Africa	1	3	—	2	6
Southern Africa	—	2	1	1	4
Western Africa	—	3	2	11	16
TOTAL	1	15	4	30	50
ECWA area					
Western South Asia ^b	—	2	1	9	12
ECLA area					
Caribbean	—	2	4	2	8
Middle America	—	1	2	4	7
Temperate South America	—	—	1	2	3
Tropical South America	—	—	4	5	9
TOTAL	—	3	11	13	27
ECE area					
Eastern Europe ^c	—	—	—	6	6
Northern Europe ^c	—	—	2	5	7
Southern Europe ^c	1	1	4	3	9
Western Europe ^c	1	—	—	8	9
Cyprus, Israel and Turkey	1	—	1	1	3
Northern America ^c	—	—	—	2	2
USSR ^c	—	—	—	3	3
TOTAL	3	1	7	28	39
ESCAP area					
China	—	—	—	1	1
Japan ^c	—	—	—	1	1
Other East Asia	1	—	—	2	3
Eastern South Asia	—	—	—	9	9
Middle South Asia	1	2	—	6	9
Australia and New Zealand ^c	—	—	1	1	2
Melanesia	—	—	—	1	1
Micronesia-Polynesia	—	1	1	2	4
TOTAL	2	3	2	23	30
More developed regions	2	1	8	31	42
Less developed regions	4	23	17	72	116
TOTAL	6	24	25	103	158

^a For countries in each category, see annex table 97.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

^c More developed regions.



Annex
STATISTICAL DATA




TABLE 33. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>								
<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development</i>	<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Effect of constraints</i>		<i>Effect of constraints</i>			<i>Effect of constraints</i>		
	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	
	<i>Higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate</i>			<i>Lower rates desirable</i>		
	<i>Full intervention appropriate (1)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (6)</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate (7)</i>	
Predominant (A)	—	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR	Albania Australia Austria Greece Sweden	Czechoslovakia Denmark Hungary Iceland Portugal Romania Spain United Kingdom United States of America Yugoslavia	Chile Italy Poland San Marino	—	—	22
Significant (B)	Bulgaria German Democratic Republic	Germany, Federal Republic of Holy See	Finland Ireland Switzerland	Belgium Norway	Canada Japan Malta Netherlands New Zealand	—	—	14
Minor (C)	Argentina France Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
TOTAL	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42

TABLE 34. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable				
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3) (4)		Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
Predominant (A)	—	Kuwait	—	Bahrain Brazil Cuba Singapore	—	—	—	5
Significant (B)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Mongolia Nauru Qatar United Arab Emirates	Cyprus Paraguay	—	Guyana	Colombia Lebanon Panama Venezuela	Costa Rica	Barbados China Fiji Grenada Mauritius Mexico Republic of Korea Seychelles Tonga Trinidad and Tobago	24
Minor (C)	Israel	—	—	—	Suriname	Bahamas	Jamaica Samoa Sri Lanka	6
TOTAL	7	3	—	5	5	2	13	35

TABLE 35. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable				
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3) (4)		Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
Predominant (A)	—	—	Iraq	Algeria	Burma	—	—	3
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	Cape Verde Ecuador Honduras Jordan Malaysia Syrian Arab Republic	Guatemala Nicaragua Peru	Iran Morocco Philippines South Africa Turkey Uganda	15
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Haiti Kenya Thailand Tunisia	7
TOTAL	—	—	1	1	7	3	13	25

TABLE 36. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>								
<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development</i>	<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Effect of constraints</i>		<i>Effect of constraints</i>			<i>Effect of constraints</i>		
	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	
	<i>Higher rates desirable</i>			<i>Lower rates desirable</i>				
	<i>Full intervention appropriate (1)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (6)</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate (7)</i>	
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Benin Maldives Mali Somalia	Gambia Madagascar Malawi Sao Tome and Principe	—	—	8
Significant (B)	Democratic Kampuchea Guinea Ivory Coast Lao People's Democratic Republic Mozambique Oman Saudi Arabia	Bhutan	Angola Congo Guinea-Bissau	—	Afghanistan Burundi Chad Democratic Yemen Ethiopia Mauritania Niger Nigeria Sierra Leone Sudan Togo United Republic of Tanzania Upper Volta Yemen Zaire Zambia	Liberia Senegal	Botswana Indonesia Papua New Guinea Rwanda Swaziland Viet Nam	35
Minor (C)	Bolivia Central African Empire Equatorial Guinea Gabon United Republic of Cameroon	—	—	—	Djibouti	Comoros	Bangladesh Ghana India Lesotho Nepal Pakistan	13
TOTAL	12	1	3	4	21	3	12	56

TABLE 37. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>								
<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development</i>	<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Effect of constraints</i>		<i>Effect of constraints</i>			<i>Effect of constraints</i>		
	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	
	<i>Higher rates desirable</i>			<i>Lower rates desirable</i>				
	<i>Full intervention appropriate (1)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (4)</i>	<i>(5)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (6)</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate (7)</i>	
More developed regions	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42
Less developed regions	19	4	4	10	33	8	38	116
TOTAL	27	9	12	22	42	8	38	158

TABLE 38. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Lower rates desirable		
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)	
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa								
<i>Eastern Africa</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Somalia	Madagascar	—	—	3
Significant (B)	Mozambique	—	—	—	Malawi	—	Mauritius	10
					Burundi		Rwanda	
					Djibouti		Seychelles	
					Ethiopia		Uganda	
					United Republic of Tanzania			
					Zambia			
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	Comoros	Kenya	2
<i>Middle Africa</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	Sao Tome and Principe	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	—	Angola	—	Chad	—	—	4
			Congo		Zaire			
Minor (C)	Central African Empire	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
	Equatorial Guinea							
	Gabon							
	United Republic of Cameroon							
<i>Northern Africa</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Algeria	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	—	—	Sudan	—	Morocco	3
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Egypt	2
							Tunisia	
<i>Southern Africa</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Botswana	3
							South Africa	
							Swaziland	
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Lesotho	1
<i>Western Africa</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Benin	Gambia	—	—	3
				Mali	—			
Significant (B)	Guinea	—	Guinea-Bissau	—	Cape Verde	Liberia	—	12
	Ivory Coast				Mauritania	Senegal		
					Niger			
					Nigeria			
					Sierra Leone			
					Togo			
					Upper Volta			
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Ghana	1
TOTAL	8	—	3	4	19	3	13	50

TABLE 38. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978
(continued)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Some support appropriate	Full intervention appropriate	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe								
<i>Eastern Europe</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Czechoslovakia Hungary Romania	Poland	—	—	4
Significant (B)	Bulgaria German Democratic Republic	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Northern Europe</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	Sweden	Denmark Iceland United Kingdom	—	—	—	4
Significant (B)	—	—	Finland Ireland	Norway	—	—	—	3
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Southern Europe</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	Albania Greece	Portugal Spain Yugoslavia	Italy San Marino	—	—	7
Significant (B)	—	Holy See	—	—	Malta	—	—	2
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Western Europe</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	Austria	—	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	Germany, Federal Republic of	Switzerland	Belgium	Netherlands	—	—	4
Minor (C)	France Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	Cyprus	—	—	—	—	Turkey	2
Minor (C)	Israel	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
<i>Northern America</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	United States of America	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	Canada	—	—	1
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR	—	—	—	—	—	3
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	7	6	7	12	6	—	1	39

TABLE 38. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978
(continued)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		No constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)		
	Higher rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Some support appropriate	Full intervention appropriate	
Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America								
<i>Caribbean</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Cuba	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Barbados Grenada Trinidad and Tobago	3
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	Bahamas	Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica	4
<i>Middle America</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	Honduras Panama	Costa Rica Guatemala Nicaragua	Mexico	6
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	El Salvador	1
<i>Temperate South America</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	Chile	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Minor (C)	Argentina Uruguay	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
<i>Tropical South America</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Brazil	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	Paraguay	—	Guyana	Colombia Ecuador Venezuela	Peru	—	6
Minor (C)	Bolivia	—	—	—	Suriname	—	—	2
TOTAL	3	1	—	3	7	5	8	27
D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia								
<i>Western South Asia^a</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	Kuwait	Iraq	Bahrain	—	—	—	3
Significant (B)	Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates	—	—	—	Democratic Yemen Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic Yemen	—	—	9
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	4	1	1	1	5	—	—	12
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific								
<i>China</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	China	1
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 38. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE RATES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978
(continued)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a positive contribution to development	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable	Lower rates desirable	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Some support appropriate	Full intervention appropriate	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (continued)</i>								
<i>Japan</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	Japan	—	—	1
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Other East Asia</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	Democratic Republic of Korea	—	—	—	—	—	Republic of Korea	3
Minor (C)	Mongolia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Singapore	Burma	—	—	2
Significant (B)	Democratic Kampuchea	—	—	—	Malaysia	—	Indonesia Philippines Viet Nam	6
Minor (C)	Lao People's Democratic Republic	—	—	—	—	—	Thailand	1
<i>Middle South Asia</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	Maldives	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	Bhutan	—	—	Afghanistan	—	Iran	3
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka	5
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	Australia	—	—	—	—	1
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	New Zealand	—	—	1
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Melanesia</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Papua New Guinea	1
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>								
Predominant (A)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Significant (B)	Nauru	—	—	—	—	—	Fiji Tonga	3
Minor (C)	—	—	—	—	—	—	Samoa	1
TOTAL	5	1	1	2	5	—	16	30

^aExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 39. COMBINATIONS OF POLICY OPTIONS SELECTED BY GOVERNMENTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL INCREASE, BY PERCEPTION OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE IT, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

						Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention									
						Rates too low			Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high			
						Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints			
						Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)			
						Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable						
Policy options ^a						Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3) (4)		Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)				
Mortality	Fertility	Spatial distribution	International migration	Technology and organization				(5)							
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa															
Eastern Africa															
Burundi	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Comoros	•	•	×	×	×					×					
Djibouti	-	•	×	×	×				×						
Ethiopia	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Kenya	•	-	×	•	×						×				
Madagascar	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Malawi	•	•	×	×	×				×						
Mauritius	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Mozambique	-	=	×	×	×	×									
Rwanda	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Seychelles	•	-	•	×	×						×				
Somalia	•	•	•	•	•			×							
Uganda	•	-	×	•	×						×				
United Republic of Tanzania	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Zambia	•	•	×	•	×				×						
Middle Africa															
Angola	-	•	×	×	×			×							
Central African Empire	-	•	×	•	×	×									
Chad	•	•	×	×	×				×						
Congo	•	•	×	•	×			×							
Equatorial Guinea	-	•	×	×	×	×									
Gabon	-	+	×	×	×	×									
Sao Tome and Principe	•	•	×	•	×				×						
United Republic of Cameroon	-	•	×	•	×	×									
Zaire	-	•	×	•	×				×						
Northern Africa															
Algeria	•	•	•	•	•			×							
Egypt	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	-	+	×	×	×	×									
Morocco	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Sudan	-	•	×	×	×				×						
Tunisia	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Southern Africa															
Botswana	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Lesotho	•	-	×	×	×						×				
South Africa	•	-	×	×	×						×				
Swaziland	•	-	×	×	×						×				

Western Africa											
Benin	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Cape Verde	•	•	x	•	x						x
Gambia	•	•	x	•	x						x
Ghana	•	-	x	x	x						x
Guinea	-	+	x	x	x	x					
Guinea-Bissau	-	•	x	•	x				x		
Ivory Coast	-	=	x	x	x	x					
Liberia	•	•	x	x	x						x
Mali	•	•	•	•	•				x		
Mauritania	•	•	x	x	x						x
Niger	•	•	x	•	x						x
Nigeria	•	•	x	•	x						x
Senegal	•	•	x	x	x						x
Sierra Leone	•	•	x	•	x						x
Togo	•	•	x	•	x						x
Upper Volta	•	•	x	x	x						x
TOTAL: 50					8	—	3	4	20	3	12

B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe

Eastern Europe											
Bulgaria	-	+	x	•	x	x				x	
Czechoslovakia	•	•	•	•	•					x	
German Democratic Republic	•	+	x	•	x	x					
Hungary	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Poland	•	•	•	•	•						x
Romania	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Northern Europe											
Denmark	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Finland	-	=	x	x	x				x		
Iceland	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Ireland	•	=	x	x	x				x		
Norway	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Sweden	•	•	•	x	•				x		
United Kingdom	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Southern Europe											
Albania	-	•	x	•	x					x	
Greece	-	+	x	x	x					x	
Holy See	•	•	•	x	x				x		
Italy	•	•	x	x	x						x
Malta	•	•	•	x	x						x
Portugal	•	•	•	•	•					x	
San Marino	•	•	x	•	•						x
Spain	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Yugoslavia	•	•	•	•	•					x	
Western Europe											
Austria	•	•	•	x	•					x	
Belgium	•	•	•	•	•					x	
France	-	+	x	•	x	x					
Germany, Federal Republic of	•	•	•	•	x				x		
Liechtenstein	•	+	•	x	x	x					
Luxembourg	•	+	•	x	x	x					
Monaco	•	+	•	x	x	x					
Netherlands	•	•	x	x	x						x
Switzerland	•	•	x	x	x					x	

TABLE 39. COMBINATIONS OF POLICY OPTIONS SELECTED BY GOVERNMENTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL INCREASE, BY PERCEPTION OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE IT, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

		Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention										
		Rates too low			Rates neither too low nor too high				Rates too high			
		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints				
		Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
		Higher rates desirable					Lower rates desirable					
Policy options ^a					Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3) (4)		Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
Mortality	Fertility	Spatial distribution	International migration	Technology and organization				(5)				
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)												
Western South Asia (part)												
Cyprus	•	=	•	×	×		×					
Israel	-	+	×	×	×	×						
Turkey	•	-	×	×	×					×		
Northern America												
Canada	•	•	•	×	×				×			
United States of America	•	•	•	•	•			×				
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics												
Byelorussian SSR	•	=	×	×	×		×					
Ukrainian SSR	-	=	×	•	×		×					
USSR	-	=	×	•	×		×					
					TOTAL: 39	7	6	7	12	6	—	1
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America												
Caribbean												
Bahamas	•	•	×	•	×					×		
Barbados	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Cuba	•	•	•	•	•			×				
Dominican Republic	•	-	×	•	×						×	
Grenada	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Haiti	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Jamaica	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Trinidad and Tobago	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Middle America												
Costa Rica	•	•	•	×	×					×		
El Salvador	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Guatemala	•	•	×	•	×					×		
Honduras	•	-	×	•	×				×			
Mexico	•	-	×	×	×						×	
Nicaragua	•	•	×	•	×					×		
Panama	•	•	•	•	×				×			
Temperate South America												
Argentina	-	+	×	×	×	×						
Chile	•	•	•	•	•					×		
Uruguay	-	+	×	×	×	×						
Tropical South America												
Bolivia	-	+	×	×	×	×						
Brazil	•	•	•	•	•			×				
Colombia	•	•	×	•	×					×		
Ecuador	•	•	×	•	×							

Guyana	•	•	•	•	•				×		
Paraguay	-	•	×	×	×				×		
Peru	•	•	×	•	×		×				
Suriname	•	•	×	×	×						×
Venezuela	•	•	×	×	×					×	

TOTAL: 27 3 1 — 3 7 5 8

D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia

Western South Asia^b

Bahrain	•	•	•	•	•				×		
Democratic Yemen	•	•	×	×	×					×	
Iraq	-	+	×	×	×			×			
Jordan	•	-	×	•	×					×	
Kuwait	•	=	×	×	×		×				
Lebanon	•	•	×	×	×					×	
Oman	-	=	×	×	×		×				
Qatar	-	=	×	×	×		×				
Saudi Arabia	-	=	×	×	×		×				
Syrian Arab Republic	•	•	×	×	×					×	
United Arab Emirates	-	=	×	×	×		×				
Yemen	•	•	×	×	×					×	

TOTAL: 12 4 1 1 1 5 — —

E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

85	China	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Japan	•	•	×	•	•					×	
	Other East Asia											
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	-	=	×	•	×		×				
	Mongolia	-	=	×	•	×		×				
	Republic of Korea	•	-	×	×	×						×
	Eastern South Asia											
	Burma	•	•	×	•	•					×	
	Democratic Kampuchea	-	+	×	•	×		×				
	Indonesia	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Lao People's Democratic Republic	-	+	×	•	×		×				
	Malaysia	•	•	×	•	×					×	
	Philippines	•	-	×	×	×						×
	Singapore	•	•	•	•	•			×			
	Thailand	•	-	×	×	×						×
	Viet Nam	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Middle South Asia											
	Afghanistan	•	•	×	•	×					×	
	Bangladesh	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Bhutan	-	•	×	×	×		×				
	India	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Iran	•	-	×	•	×						×
	Maldives	•	•	•	•	•			×			
	Pakistan	•	-	×	×	×						×
	Nepal	•	-	×	×	×						×
	Sri Lanka	•	-	×	×	×						×

TABLE 39. COMBINATIONS OF POLICY OPTIONS SELECTED BY GOVERNMENTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL INCREASE, BY PERCEPTION OF THE EFFECT OF NATURAL INCREASE ON DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCEPTABILITY AND THE DESIRABILITY OF INTERVENTION TO CHANGE IT, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Policy options ^a					Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention						
					Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high	
					Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints			
					Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)
					Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable			
					Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)
Mortality	Fertility	Spatial distribution	International migration	Technology and organization	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (continued)											
Australia and New Zealand											
Australia	•	•	×	×	×			×			
New Zealand	•	•	×	×	×					×	
Melanesia											
Papua New Guinea	•	-	×	•	×						×
Micronesia-Polynesia											
Fiji	•	-	•	×	×						×
Nauru	•	•	•	×	•	×					×
Samoa	•	-	•	×	×						×
Tonga	•	-	•	×	×						×
TOTAL: 30					5	1	1	2	5	-	16

^a Key:

Policy options for mortality and fertility

+ Increase (e.g., a "+" in the fertility column indicates that the Government has a policy of increasing fertility)

- Decrease

= Maintain at current levels in the face of probable decrease if no intervention occurred

• No intervention
 × Policy options for spatial distribution, international migration and technology and organization

• Intervention

• No intervention

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 40. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1976-JULY 1978, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention								
Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, July 1976	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		Total
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Lower rates desirable		
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)	
(1)	Argentina Bulgaria France German Democratic Republic Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Uruguay	—	Greece ^a	Czechoslovakia ^a Hungary ^a Romania ^a	—	—	—	12
(2)	—	Byelorussian SSR Germany, Federal Republic of Holy See Ukrainian SSR USSR	Finland Ireland	—	—	—	—	7
(3)	—	—	Albania Australia Austria Sweden Switzerland	—	—	—	—	5
(4)	—	—	—	Belgium Denmark Iceland Norway Portugal Spain United Kingdom United States of America Yugoslavia	—	—	—	9
(5)	—	—	—	—	Canada Chile Italy Japan Malta Netherlands Poland San Marino	—	—	8
(6)	—	—	—	—	New Zealand ^a	—	—	1
(7)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42

^aGovernment's perception of the over-all acceptability of natural increase and the desirability of different rates changed between August 1976 and July 1978.

TABLE 41. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1970-JULY 1978, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, JULY 1970-1974)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, July 1976	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Lower rates desirable		
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)	
(1)	Democratic Republic of Korea Israel Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Mongolia Nauru Qatar United Arab Emirates	—	—	—	—	Bahamas ^a	—	8
(2)	—	Kuwait Paraguay	—	—	—	—	—	2
(3)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
(4)	—	—	—	Brazil Bahrain Cuba Guyana Singapore	—	—	—	5
(5)	—	Cyprus ^a	—	—	Lebanon Panama Suriname Venezuela	—	—	5
(6)	—	—	—	—	—	Costa Rica	—	1
(7)	—	—	—	—	Colombia ^a	—	Barbados China Fiji Grenada Jamaica Mauritius Mexico Republic of Korea Samoa Seychelles Sri Lanka Tonga Trinidad and Tobago	14
TOTAL	7	3	—	5	5	2	13	35

^aGovernment's perception of the over-all acceptability of natural increase and the desirability of different rates changed between August 1976 and July 1978.

TABLE 42. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1976-JULY 1978, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, July 1976	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention							Total		
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high				
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints							
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)			
	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate						Lower rates desirable	
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)			
(1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(2)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(3)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
(4)	—	—	Iraq ^a	Algeria	—	—	—	2		
(5)	—	—	—	—	Burma Cape Verde Honduras Jordan Syrian Arab Republic	Peru ^a	—	6		
(6)	—	—	—	—	Ecuador ^a	Guatemala Nicaragua	—	3		
(7)	—	—	—	—	Malaysia ^a	—	Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Haiti Iran Kenya Morocco Philippines South Africa Thailand Tunisia Turkey Uganda	14		
TOTAL	—	—	1	1	7	3	13	25		

^aGovernment's perception of the over-all acceptability of natural increase and the desirability of different rates changed between August 1976 and July 1978.

TABLE 43. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1976-JULY 1978, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50 YEARS, 1970-1974)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, July 1976	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints		
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable		Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Lower rates desirable		
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)	
(1)	Central African Empire Democratic Kampuchea Equatorial Guinea Gabon Ivory Coast Mozambique Oman Saudi Arabia United Republic of Cameroon	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
(2)	—	Bhutan	—	—	—	—	—	1
(3)	—	—	Angola Congo Guinea-Bissau	—	—	—	—	3
(4)	Guinea ^a	—	—	Benin Maldives Mali Somalia	Djibouti ^a	—	—	6
(5)	Bolivia ^a	—	—	—	Afghanistan Burundi Chad Democratic Yemen Ethiopia Gambia Malawi Mauritania Niger Nigeria Sao Tome and Principe Sudan Togo United Republic of Tanzania Upper Volta Yemen Zaire Zambia	—	Rwanda ^a	20
(6)	—	—	—	—	Madagascar ^a Sierra Leone ^a	Comoros Liberia Senegal	Lesotho ^a	6
(7)	Lao People's Democratic Republic ^a	—	—	—	—	—	Bangladesh Botswana Ghana India Indonesia Nepal Pakistan Papua New Guinea Swaziland Viet Nam	11
TOTAL	12	1	3	4	21	3	12	56

^aGovernment's perception of the over-all acceptability of natural increase and the desirability of different rates changed between August 1976 and July 1978.

TABLE 44. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATURAL INCREASE AND THE DESIRABILITY OF DIFFERENT RATES, JULY 1976-JULY 1978, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT (Number of Governments)

Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, July 1976	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development and desirability of intervention							Total 1976
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints			No constraints	Effect of constraints			
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)		Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable			Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate	Lower rates desirable			
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)*	(3)		(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	
	<i>More developed regions</i>							
(1)	8	—	1	3	—	—	—	12
(2)	—	5	2	—	—	—	—	7
(3)	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	5
(4)	—	—	—	9	—	—	—	9
(5)	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	8
(6)	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
(7)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL, 1978	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42
	<i>Less developed regions</i>							
(1)	16	—	—	—	—	1	—	17
(2)	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	3
(3)	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	3
(4)	1	—	1	10	1	—	—	13
(5)	1	1	—	—	27	1	1	31
(6)	—	—	—	—	3	6	1	10
(7)	1	—	—	—	2	—	36	39
TOTAL, 1978	19	4	4	10	33	8	38	116
	<i>Total</i>							
(1)	24	—	1	3	—	1	—	29
(2)	—	8	2	—	—	—	—	10
(3)	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	8
(4)	1	—	1	19	1	—	—	22
(5)	1	1	—	—	35	1	1	39
(6)	—	—	—	—	4	6	1	11
(7)	1	—	—	—	2	—	36	39
TOTAL, 1978	27	9	12	22	42	8	38	158

TABLE 45. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Under 50 years</i>		<i>50-61 years</i>		<i>62-69 years</i>		<i>70 years and over</i>	
<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>
—	—	—	—	Chile	Albania	Australia	Byelorussian
				Czechoslovakia	Argentina	Austria	SSR
				Hungary	Yugoslavia	Belgium	Finland
				Portugal		Bulgaria	France
				Romania		Canada	Italy
				Uruguay		Denmark	Ukrainian
						German	SSR
						Democratic	United
						Republic	Kingdom
						Germany,	USSR
						Federal	
						Republic of	
						Greece	
						Holy See	
						Iceland	
						Ireland	
						Japan	
						Liechtenstein	
						Luxembourg	
						Malta	
						Monaco	
						Netherlands	
						New Zealand	
						Norway	
						Poland	
						San Marino	
						Spain	
						Sweden	
						Switzerland	
						United States	
						of America	
TOTAL: 42	—	—	—	6	3	26	7

TABLE 46. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974 AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER), JULY 1978

<i>Under 50 years</i>		<i>50-61 years</i>		<i>62-69 years</i>		<i>70 years and over</i>	
<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>
—	—	Republic of Korea	Brazil	Barbados	Bahamas	Cyprus	—
			China	Costa Rica	Bahrain	Fiji	
			Colombia	Cuba	Grenada	Israel	
			Democratic	Guyana	Lebanon	Nauru	
			People's	Jamaica	Libyan Arab		
			Republic of	Kuwait	Jamahiriya		
			Korea	Mauritius	Mexico		
			Mongolia	Panama	Samoa		
			Paraguay	Qatar	Suriname		
				Seychelles	Tonga		
				Singapore	Venezuela		
				Sri Lanka			
				Trinidad and			
				Tobago			
				United Arab			
				Emirates			
TOTAL: 35	—	1	6	14	10	4	—

TABLE 47. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS), JULY 1978

<i>Under 50 years</i>		<i>50-61 years</i>		<i>62-69 years</i>		<i>70 years and over</i>	
<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>
—	—	Dominican Republic	Algeria	—	—	—	—
		Ecuador	Burma				
		Iraq	Cape Verde				
		Jordan	Egypt				
		Malaysia	El Salvador				
		Philippines	Guatemala				
		Singapore	Haiti				
			Honduras				
			Iran				
			Kenya				
			Morocco				
			Nicaragua				
			Peru				
			South Africa				
			Thailand				
			Tunisia				
			Turkey				
			Uganda				
TOTAL: 25	—	7	18	—	—	—	—

TABLE 48. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS), JULY 1978

<i>Under 50 years</i>		<i>50-61 years</i>		<i>62-69 years</i>		<i>70 years and over</i>	
<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>
Pakistan	Afghanistan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Rwanda	Angola						
	Bangladesh						
	Benin						
	Bhutan						
	Bolivia						
	Botswana						
	Burundi						
	Central African Empire						
	Chad						
	Comoros						
	Congo						
	Democratic Kampuchea						
	Democratic Yemen						
	Djibouti						
	Equatorial Guinea						
	Ethiopia						
	Gabon						
	Gambia						
	Ghana						
	Guinea						
	Guinea-Bissau						
	India						
	Indonesia						
	Ivory Coast						
	Lao People's Democratic Republic						
	Lesotho						
	Liberia						
	Madagascar						
	Malawi						

TABLE 48. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1975, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS), JULY 1978
(continued)

	Under 50 years		50-61 years		62-69 years		70 years and over	
	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable
Maldives								
Mali								
Mauritania								
Mozambique								
Nepal								
Niger								
Nigeria								
Oman								
Papua New Guinea								
Sao Tome and Principe								
Saudi Arabia								
Senegal								
Sierra Leone								
Somalia								
Sudan								
Swaziland								
Togo								
United Republic of Cameroon								
United Republic of Tanzania								
Upper Volta								
Viet Nam								
Yemen								
Zaire								
Zambia								
TOTAL: 56	2	54	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 49. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

	Under 50 years		50-61 years		62-69 years		70 years and over	
	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable
More developed regions	—	—	—	—	6	3	26	7
Less developed regions	2	54	8	24	14	10	4	—
TOTAL	2	54	8	24	20	13	30	7

TABLE 50. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

	Under 50 years		50-61 years		62-69 years		70 years and over	
	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa								
<i>Eastern Africa</i>								
Rwanda			—	Kenya	Mauritius	—	—	—
	Burundi			Uganda	Seychelles			
	Comoros							
	Djibouti							
	Ethiopia							
	Madagascar							
	Malawi							
	Mozambique							
	Somalia							
	United Republic of Tanzania							
	Zambia							
<i>Middle Africa</i>								
—	Angola	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Central African Empire							
	Chad							
	Congo							
	Equatorial Guinea							
	Gabon							
	Sao Tome and Principe							
	United Republic of Cameroon							
	Zaire							
<i>Northern Africa</i>								
—	Sudan	—	Algeria	—	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	—	—
			Egypt					
			Morocco					
			Tunisia					
<i>Southern Africa</i>								
—	Botswana	—	South Africa	—	—	—	—	—
	Lesotho							
	Swaziland							
<i>Western Africa</i>								
—	Benin	—	Cape Verde	—	—	—	—	—
	Gambia							
	Ghana							
	Guinea							
	Guinea-Bissau							
	Ivory Coast							
	Liberia							
	Mali							
	Mauritania							
	Niger							
	Nigeria							
	Senegal							
	Sierra Leone							
	Togo							
	Upper Volta							
TOTAL	1	38	—	8	2	1	—	—
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe								
<i>Eastern Europe</i>								
—	—	—	—	Czechoslovakia	—	Bulgaria	—	—
				Hungary		German Democratic Republic		
				Romania		Poland		

TABLE 50. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978
(continued)

	<i>Under 50 years</i>		<i>50-61 years</i>		<i>62-69 years</i>		<i>70 years and over</i>	
	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>	<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Not acceptable</i>
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)								
			<i>Northern Europe</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Denmark Iceland Ireland Norway Sweden	Finland United Kingdom
			<i>Southern Europe</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Greece Holy See Malta San Marino Spain	Italy
			<i>Western Europe</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Austria Belgium Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Netherlands Switzerland	France ^a
			<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Cyprus Israel	—
			<i>Northern America</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Canada United States of America	—
			<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR
TOTAL	—	—	—	1	4	2	25	7
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America								
			<i>Caribbean</i>					
	—	—	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Barbados Cuba Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago	Bahamas Grenada	—	—
			<i>Middle America</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Mexico	—
			El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua	Costa Rica Panama				
			<i>Temperate South America</i>					
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Chile Uruguay	Argentina
			<i>Tropical South America</i>					
	—	Bolivia	Ecuador	Brazil Colombia Paraguay Peru	Guyana	Suriname Venezuela	—	—
TOTAL	—	1	2	9	9	6	—	—

TABLE 50. AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1970-1974, AND GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY IN PREVAILING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978
(continued)

	Under 50 years		50-61 years		62-69 years		70 years and over	
	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable	Acceptable	Not acceptable
<i>D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia</i>								
<i>Western South Asia^b</i>								
	—	Democratic Yemen Oman Saudi Arabia Yemen	Iraq Jordan Syrian Arab Republic	—	Kuwait Qatar United Arab Emirates	Bahrain Lebanon	—	—
TOTAL	—	4	3	—	3	2	—	—
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>								
<i>China</i>								
	—	—	—	China	—	—	—	—
<i>Japan</i>								
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Japan	—
<i>Other East Asia</i>								
	—	—	Republic of Korea	Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia	—	—	—	—
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>								
	—	Democratic Kampuchea Indonesia Lao People's Democratic Republic Viet Nam	Malaysia Philippines	Burma Thailand	Singapore	—	—	—
<i>Middle South Asia</i>								
Pakistan	—	Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal	—	Iran	Sri Lanka	—	—	—
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>								
	—	—	—	—	—	—	Australia New Zealand	—
<i>Melanesia</i>								
	—	Papua New Guinea	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>								
	—	—	—	—	—	Samoa Tonga	Fiji Nauru	—
TOTAL	1	11	3	6	2	2	5	—

^aIn its reply to the Third Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development, the Government of France stated that, whereas it considered that levels of average life expectancy for

females were acceptable in prevailing economic and social circumstances, those for males were not considered acceptable.

^bExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 51. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>					
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>		<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>	
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI
Argentina (2) Bulgaria (4) France (4) German Democratic Republic (4) Greece (1) Liechtenstein (2) Luxembourg (3) Monaco (4) Uruguay (1)	Germany, Federal Republic of (3)	Albania (4) Byelorussian SSR (4) Czechoslovakia (4) Finland (4) Hungary (4) Ireland (1) Poland (4) Romania (4) Ukrainian SSR (4) USSR (4) Yugoslavia (4)	Australia (3) Austria (4) Belgium (3) Canada (4) Denmark (4) Holy See (1) Iceland (4) Italy (3) Japan (4) Malta (1) Netherlands (3) New Zealand (4) Norway (4) Portugal (4) San Marino (2) Spain (2) Sweden (4) Switzerland (3) United Kingdom (4) United States of America (4)	Chile (4)	—
TOTAL: 42	9	1	11	20	1

^aNumbers in parentheses refer to Government policies concerning provision of support for effective individual fertility regulation:

(1) Access limited;

(2) Access not limited, but no support provided;
(3) Access not limited and indirect support provided;
(4) Access not limited and direct support provided.

TABLE 52. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>					
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>		<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>	
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI
Israel (4) Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1)	Cyprus (2)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (4) Kuwait (2) Mongolia (4) Nauru (4) Qatar (2) United Arab Emirates (2)	Brazil (4) Colombia (4) Cuba (4) Guyana (2) Lebanon (3) Panama (3) Paraguay (4) Singapore (4) Suriname (4) Venezuela (4)	Bahamas (3) Bahrain (4) Costa Rica (3)	Barbados (4) China (4) Fiji (4) Grenada (4) Jamaica (4) Mauritius (4) Mexico (4) Republic of Korea (4) Samoa (4) Seychelles (4) Sri Lanka (4) Tonga (4) Trinidad and Tobago (4)
TOTAL: 35	2	1	6	10	3

^aFor key, see table 51, foot-note a.

TABLE 53. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>					
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>		<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>	
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV		<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI
Iraq (2)	—	—	Algeria (4) Burma (4) Cape Verde (4) Ecuador (4) Honduras (4) Malaysia (4) Peru (4) Syrian Arab Republic (4)	Guatemala (4) Jordan (4) Nicaragua (4)	Dominican Republic (4) Egypt (4) El Salvador (4) Haiti (4) Iran (4) Kenya (4) Morocco (4) Philippines (4) South Africa (4) Thailand (4) Tunisia (4) Turkey (4) Uganda (4)
TOTAL: 25	1	—	8	3	13

^aFor key, see table 51, foot-note a.

TABLE 54. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>					
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>		<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>	
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV		<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI
Bolivia (2) Democratic Kampuchea (1) Gabon (1) Guinea (2) Lao People's Democratic Republic (1)	Central African Empire (2) Equatorial Guinea (1) United Republic of Cameroon (3)	Ivory Coast (2) Mozambique (4) Oman (2) Saudi Arabia (1)	Angola (3) Bhutan (4) Benin (2) Burundi (2) Chad (1) Congo (4) Democratic Yemen (4) Ethiopia (3) Gambia (3) Guinea-Bissau (3) Malawi (1) Maldives (2) Mali (4) Mauritania (2) Niger (2) Nigeria (3) Sao Tome and Principe (2) Somalia (2) Sudan (4) Togo (3) United Republic of Tanzania (4) Upper Volta (2) Yemen (4) Zaire (4) Zambia (4)	Afghanistan (4) Comoros (2) Djibouti (3) Liberia (4) Madagascar (3) Rwanda (2) Senegal (4) Sierra Leone (3)	Bangladesh (4) Botswana (4) Ghana (4) India (4) Indonesia (4) Lesotho (4) Nepal (4) Pakistan (4) Papua New Guinea (4) Swaziland (4) Viet Nam (4)
TOTAL: 56	5	3	4	25	8

^aFor key, see table 51, foot-note a.

TABLE 55. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT^a JULY 1978

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>							
	<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>	<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>			
	<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI	<i>Total</i>
More developed regions	9	1	11	20	1	—	42
Less developed regions	8	4	10	43	14	37	116
TOTAL	17	5	21	63	15	37	158

TABLE 56. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>							
	<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>	<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>			
	<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI	<i>Total</i>
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa							
<i>Eastern Africa</i>							
—	—	Mozambique (4)	Burundi (2)	Comoros (2)	Kenya (4)	—	15
			Ethiopia (3)	Djibouti (3)	Mauritius (4)		
			Malawi (1)	Madagascar (3)	Seychelles (4)		
			Somalia (2)	Rwanda (2)	Uganda (4)		
			United Republic of Tanzania (4)				
			Zambia (4)				
<i>Middle Africa</i>							
Gabon (1)	Central African Empire (2)	—	Angola (3)	—	—	—	9
	Equatorial Guinea (1)		Chad (1)				
	United Republic of Cameroon (3)		Congo (4)				
			Sao Tome and Principe (2)				
			Zaire (4)				
<i>Northern Africa</i>							
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1)	—	—	Algeria (4)	—	—	Egypt (4)	6
			Sudan (4)			Morocco (4)	
						Tunisia (4)	
<i>Southern Africa</i>							
—	—	—	—	—	—	Botswana (4)	4
						Lesotho (4)	
						South Africa (4)	
						Swaziland (4)	
<i>Western Africa</i>							
Guinea (2)	—	Ivory Coast (2)	Benin (2)	Liberia (4)	Ghana (4)	—	16
			Cape Verde (4)	Senegal (4)			
			Gambia (3)	Sierra Leone (3)			
			Guinea-Bissau (3)				
			Mali (4)				
			Mauritania (2)				
			Niger (2)				
			Nigeria (3)				
			Togo (3)				
			Upper Volta (2)				
TOTAL	3	3	2	23	7	12	50

TABLE 56. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978^a (continued)

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>						
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>		<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>		
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI	Total
<i>B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe</i>						
<i>Eastern Europe</i>						
Bulgaria (4)	—	Czechoslovakia (4)	—	—	—	6
German Democratic Republic (4)		Hungary (4)				
		Poland (4)				
		Romania (4)				
<i>Northern Europe</i>						
—	—	Finland (4)	Denmark (4)	—	—	7
		Ireland (1)	Iceland (4)			
			Norway (4)			
			Sweden (4)			
			United Kingdom (4)			
<i>Southern Europe</i>						
Greece (1)	—	Albania (4)	Holy See (1)	—	—	9
		Yugoslavia (4)	Italy (3)			
			Malta (1)			
			Portugal (4)			
			San Marino (2)			
			Spain (2)			
<i>Western Europe</i>						
France (4)	Germany, Federal	—	Austria (4)	—	—	9
Liechtenstein (2)	Republic of (3)		Belgium (3)			
Luxembourg (3)			Netherlands (3)			
Monaco (4)			Switzerland (3)			
<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>						
Israel (4)	Cyprus (2)	—	—	—	Turkey (4)	3
<i>Northern America</i>						
—	—	—	Canada (4)	—	—	2
			United States of America (4)			
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>						
—	—	Byelorussian SSR (4)	—	—	—	3
		Ukrainian SSR (4)				
		USSR (4)				
TOTAL	8	2	11	17	1	39
<i>C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America</i>						
<i>Caribbean</i>						
—	—	—	Cuba (4)	Bahamas (3)	Barbados (4)	8
					Dominican Republic (4)	
					Grenada (4)	
					Haiti (4)	
					Jamaica (4)	
					Trinidad and Tobago (4)	
<i>Middle America</i>						
—	—	—	Honduras (4)	Costa Rica (4)	El Salvador (4)	7
			Panama (4)	Guatemala (4)	Mexico (4)	
				Nicaragua (4)		
<i>Temperate South America</i>						
Argentina (2)	—	—	—	Chile (4)	—	3
Uruguay (1)						

TABLE 56. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL FERTILITY AND TO ACCESS TO EFFECTIVE FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978^a (continued)

<i>Governments' perceptions of the acceptability of current fertility and of the desirability of intervention to change it</i>						
<i>Rates not satisfactory; too low: higher rates desirable</i>		<i>Rates satisfactory</i>			<i>Rates not satisfactory; too high: lower rates desirable</i>	
<i>Intervention to raise rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates</i> I	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> II	<i>But incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates</i> III	<i>Intervention not appropriate: no incentives or disincentives implemented</i> IV	V	<i>Intervention to lower rates appropriate and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates</i> VI	Total
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America (continued)						
<i>Tropical South America</i>						
Bolivia (2)	—	—	Brazil (4) Colombia (4) Ecuador (4) Guyana (2) Paraguay (4) Peru (4) Suriname (2) Venezuela (4)	—	—	9
TOTAL	3	—	11	5	8	27
D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia						
<i>Western South Asia^b</i>						
Iraq (2)	—	Kuwait (2) Oman (2) Qatar (2) Saudi Arabia (1) United Arab Emirates (2)	Democratic Yemen (4) Lebanon (3) Syrian Arab Republic (4) Yemen (4)	Bahrain (3) Jordan (4)	—	12
TOTAL	1	5	4	2	—	12
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific						
<i>China</i>						
—	—	—	—	—	China (4)	1
<i>Japan</i>						
—	—	—	Japan (4)	—	—	1
<i>Other East Asia</i>						
—	—	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (4) Mongolia (4)	—	—	Republic of Korea (4)	3
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>						
Democratic Kampuchea (1) Lao People's Democratic Republic (1)	—	—	Burma (2) Malaysia (4) Singapore (4)	—	Indonesia (4) Philippines (4) Thailand (4) Viet Nam (4)	9
<i>Middle South Asia</i>						
—	—	—	Bhutan (4) Maldives (2)	Afghanistan (4)	Bangladesh (4) India (4) Iran (4) Nepal (4) Pakistan (4) Sri Lanka (4)	9
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>						
—	—	—	Australia (3) New Zealand (4)	—	—	2
<i>Melanesia</i>						
—	—	—	—	—	Papua New Guinea (4)	1
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>						
—	—	Nauru (4)	—	—	Fiji (4) Samoa (4) Tonga (4)	4
TOTAL	2	3	8	1	16	30

^a Figures in parentheses refer to Governments' policies concerning provision of support for effective individual fertility regulation:
(1) Access limited;
(2) Access not limited, but no support provided;

(3) Access not limited and indirect support provided;
(4) Access not limited and direct support provided.

^b Excluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 57. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

Access limited (1)	No support provided (2)	Access not limited	
		Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)
Greece Holy See Ireland Malta Uruguay	Argentina (1) ^a Liechtenstein San Marino Spain (1) ^a	Australia Belgium Germany, Federal Republic of Italy (2) ^a Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland	Albania Austria Bulgaria Byelorussian SSR Canada Chile Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland France German Democratic Republic Hungary Iceland Japan Monaco New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Romania Sweden Ukrainian SSR United Kingdom United States of America USSR Yugoslavia
TOTAL: 42	5	4	7

^aCountries whose Governments changed their policy concerning access to modern methods of contraception between 1 July 1976 and 1 July 1978. Figure in parentheses refers to situation as of 1 July 1976.

TABLE 58. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Access limited (1)	No support provided (2)	Access not limited	
		Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Cyprus Guyana Kuwait Qatar Suriname United Arab Emirates	Bahamas Bahrain Lebanon	Barbados Brazil (3) ^a China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fiji Grenada Israel (2) ^a Jamaica Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Nauru Panama Paraguay Republic of Korea Samoa Seychelles Singapore Sri Lanka Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela
TOTAL: 35	1	6	3

^aCountries whose Governments changed their policy concerning access to modern methods of contraception between 1 July 1976 and 1 July 1978. Figure in parentheses refers to situation as of 1 July 1976.

TABLE 59. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

Access limited (1)	Access not limited		
	No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)
—	Burma Iraq (4) ^a	—	Algeria Cape Verde Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Iran Jordan Kenya Malaysia Morocco Nicaragua Peru Philippines South Africa Syrian Arab Republic Thailand Tunisia Turkey Uganda 23
TOTAL: 25	2	—	23

^aCountries whose Governments changed their policy concerning access to modern methods of contraception between 1 July 1976 and 1 July 1978. Figure in parentheses refers to situation as of 1 July 1976.

TABLE 60. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

Access limited (1)	Access not limited		
	No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)
Chad Democratic Kampuchea Equatorial Guinea Gabon Lao People's Democratic Republic Malawi Saudi Arabia	Benin Bolivia (4) ^a Burundi Central African Empire Comoros Guinea Ivory Coast Maldives Mauritania Niger Oman Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Somalia Upper Volta	Angola Djibouti Ethiopia Gambia Guinea-Bissau Madagascar (4) ^a Nigeria (4) ^a Sierra Leone (4) ^a Togo (2) ^a United Republic of Cameroon	Afghanistan Bangladesh Botswana Bhutan Congo Democratic Yemen Ghana India Indonesia Lesotho Liberia Mali Mozambique (3) ^a Nepal Pakistan Papua New Guinea Senegal (2) ^a Sudan Swaziland United Republic of Tanzania (3) ^a Viet Nam Yemen Zaire Zambia (2) ^a 24
TOTAL: 56	7	15	10

^aCountries whose Governments changed their policy concerning access to modern methods of contraception between 1 July 1976 and 1 July 1978. Figure in parentheses refers to situation as of 1 July 1976.

TABLE 61. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION,
BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

Access limited (1)	Access not limited			Total
	No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)	
More developed regions	5	4	7	26
Less developed regions	8	23	13	72
TOTAL	13	27	20	98

TABLE 62. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL
COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

Access limited (1)	Access not limited			Total
	No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)	
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa				
<i>Eastern Africa</i>				
Malawi	Burundi Comoros Rwanda Somalia	Djibouti Ethiopia Madagascar (4) ^a	Kenya Mauritius Mozambique (3) Seychelles Uganda United Republic of Tanzania (3) ^a Zambia (2) ^a	15
<i>Middle Africa</i>				
Chad Equatorial Guinea Gabon	Central African Empire Sao Tome and Principe	Angola United Republic of Cameroon	Congo Zaire	9
<i>Northern Africa</i>				
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	—	Algeria Egypt Morocco Sudan Tunisia	6
<i>Southern Africa</i>				
—	—	—	Botswana Lesotho South Africa Swaziland	4
<i>Western Africa</i>				
—	Benin Guinea Ivory Coast Mauritania Niger Upper Volta	Gambia Guinea-Bissau Nigeria (4) ^a Sierra Leone (4) ^a Togo (2) ^a	Cape Verde Ghana Liberia Mali Senegal (2) ^a	16
TOTAL	5	12	23	50
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe				
<i>Eastern Europe</i>				
—	—	—	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic Hungary Poland Romania	6
<i>Northern Europe</i>				
Ireland	—	—	Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden United Kingdom	7
<i>Southern Europe</i>				
Greece Holy See Malta	San Marino Spain (1) ^a	Italy (2) ^a	Albania Portugal Yugoslavia	9

TABLE 62. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

	Access limited (1)	Access not limited			Total
		No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)	
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)					
<i>Western Europe</i>					
	—	Liechtenstein	Belgium Germany, Federal Republic of Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland	Austria France Monaco	9
	—	Cyprus	<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>	Israel (2) ^a Turkey	3
	—		<i>Northern America</i>	Canada United States of America	2
	—		<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR	3
TOTAL	4	4	6	25	39
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America					
<i>Caribbean</i>					
	—		Bahamas	Barbados Cuba Dominican Republic Grenada Haiti Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago	8
	—		<i>Middle America</i>	Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama	7
Uruguay		Argentina (1) ^a	<i>Temperate South America</i>	Chile	3
	—	Bolivia (4) ^a Guyana Suriname	<i>Tropical South America</i>	Brazil (3) ^a Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela	9
TOTAL	1	4	1	21	27
D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia					
<i>Western South Asia</i>					
Saudi Arabia		Iraq (4) ^a Kuwait Oman Qatar United Arab Emirates	Bahrain Lebanon	Democratic Yemen Jordan Syrian Arab Republic Yemen	12
TOTAL	1	5	2	4	12
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific					
	—		<i>China</i>	China	1
	—		<i>Japan</i>	Japan	1

TABLE 62. POLICIES RELATING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF MODERN METHODS OF FERTILITY REGULATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Access limited (1)	Access not limited			Total
	No support provided (2)	Indirect support provided (3)	Direct support provided (4)	
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (continued)</i>				
			<i>Other East Asia</i>	
			Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia Republic of Korea	3
			<i>Eastern South Asia</i>	
Democratic Kampuchea Lao People's Democratic Republic	Burma		Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam	9
			<i>Middle South Asia</i>	
	Maldives		Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka	9
			<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>	
			Australia	
			New Zealand	2
			<i>Melanesia</i>	
			Papua New Guinea	1
			<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>	
			Fiji Nauru Samoa Tonga	4
TOTAL	2	2	25	30

^aCountries whose Governments changed their policy concerning access to modern methods of contraception between 1 July 1976 and 1 July 1978. Figure in parentheses refers to situation as of 1 July 1976.

^bExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 63. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978^a

Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility ^b	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints							
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable			Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate				
Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
I	Argentina (2) Bulgaria (4) France (4) German Democratic Republic (4) Liechtenstein (2) Luxembourg (3) Monaco (4) Uruguay (1)	—	Greece (1)	—	—	—	—	9
II	—	Germany, Federal Republic of (3)	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Byelorussian SSR (4) Ukrainian SSR (4) USSR (4)	Albania (4) Finland (4) Ireland (1)	Czechoslovakia (4) Hungary (4) Romania (4) Yugoslavia (4)	Poland (4)	—	—	11
IV	—	Holy See (1)	Australia (3) Austria (4) Sweden (4) Switzerland (3)	Belgium (3) Denmark (4) Iceland (4) Norway (4) Portugal (4) Spain (2) United Kingdom (4) United States of America (4)	Canada (4) Italy (3) Japan (4) Malta (1) Netherlands (3) New Zealand (4) San Marino (2)	—	—	20
V	—	—	—	—	Chile (4)	—	—	1
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42

^aFigures in parentheses refer to Government policies concerning provision of support for effective individual fertility regulation:

- (1) Access limited;
- (2) Access not limited, but no support provided;
- (3) Access not limited and indirect support provided;
- (4) Access not limited and direct support provided.

^bDefinitions of categories of Governments' perceptions of national fertility are as follows:

- I. Rates not satisfactory, too low; higher rates desirable. Intervention to raise rates appropriate, and incentives and disincentives implemented to raise rates.
- II. Rates not satisfactory, too low; higher rates desirable. In-

tervention to raise rates not appropriate; no incentives or disincentives implemented.

III. Rates satisfactory. Intervention to change rates not appropriate; but incentives and disincentives implemented to maintain rates.

IV. Rates satisfactory. Intervention to change rates not appropriate; no incentives or disincentives implemented.

V. Rates not satisfactory, too high; lower rates desirable. Intervention to change rates not appropriate; no incentives or disincentives implemented.

VI. Rates not satisfactory, too high; lower rates desirable. Intervention to lower rates appropriate, and incentives and disincentives implemented to lower rates.

TABLE 64. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>								
<i>Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility^b</i>	<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Effect of constraints</i>		<i>Effect of constraints</i>			<i>Effect of constraints</i>		
	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	
	<i>Higher rates desirable</i>			<i>Lower rates desirable</i>				
	<i>Full intervention appropriate</i>	<i>Some support appropriate</i>	<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate</i>			<i>Some support appropriate</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate</i>	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
I	Israel (4) Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
II	—	Cyprus (2)	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (4) Mongolia (4) Nauru (4) Qatar (2) United Arab Emirates (2)	Kuwait (2)	—	—	—	—	—	6
IV	—	Paraguay (4)	—	Brazil (4) Cuba (4) Guyana (2) Singapore (4)	Colombia (4) Lebanon (3) Panama (4) Suriname (2) Venezuela (4)	—	—	10
V	—	—	—	Bahrain (3)	—	Bahamas (3) Costa Rica (4)	—	3
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	Barbados (4) China (4) Fiji (4) Grenada (4) Jamaica (4) Mauritius (4) Mexico (4) Republic of Korea (4) Samoa (4) Seychelles (4) Sri Lanka (4) Tonga (4) Trinidad and Tobago (4)	13
TOTAL	7	3	—	5	5	2	13	35

^aFor key, see table 63, foot-note a.

^bFor key, see table 63, foot-note b.

TABLE 65. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility ^b	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total	
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high			
	Effect of constraints		Effect of constraints			Effect of constraints			
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)	Minor (C)	No constraints	Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)		
	Higher rates desirable			Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate			Lower rates desirable		
	Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
I	—	—	Iraq (2)	—	—	—	—	1	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	Algeria (4)	Burma (2) Cape Verde (4) Ecuador (4) Honduras (4) Malaysia (4) Syrian Arab Republic (4)	Peru (4)	—	8	
V	—	—	—	—	Jordan (4)	Guatemala (4) Nicaragua (4)	—	3	
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	Dominican Republic (4) Egypt (4) El Salvador (4) Haiti (4) Iran (4) Kenya (4) Morocco (4) Philippines (4) South Africa (4) Thailand (4) Tunisia (4) Turkey (4) Uganda (4)	13	
TOTAL	—	—	1	1	7	3	13	25	

^aFor key, see table 63, foot-note a.

^bFor key, see table 63, foot-note b.

TABLE 66. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a

		<i>Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention</i>							
		<i>Rates too low</i>		<i>Rates neither too low nor too high</i>			<i>Rates too high</i>		
		<i>Effect of constraints</i>			<i>Effect of constraints</i>				
		<i>Predominant (A)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>No constraints</i>	<i>Minor (C)</i>	<i>Significant (B)</i>	<i>Predominant (A)</i>	
<i>Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility^b</i>	<i>Higher rates desirable</i>				<i>Lower rates desirable</i>				
	<i>Full intervention appropriate (1)</i>	<i>Some support appropriate (2)</i>	<i>Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate</i>		<i>Some support appropriate (6)</i>	<i>Full intervention appropriate (7)</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
I	Bolivia (2) Democratic Kampuchea (1) Gabon (1) Guinea (2) Lao People's Democratic Republic (1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	
II	Central African Empire (2) Equatorial Guinea (1) United Republic of Cameroon (3)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	
III	Ivory Coast (2) Mozambique (4) Oman (2) Saudi Arabia (1)	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	
IV	—	Bhutan (4)	Angola (3) Congo (4) Guinea-Bissau (3)	Benin (2) Maldives (2) Mali (4) Somalia (2)	Burundi (2) Chad (1) Democratic Yemen (4) Ethiopia (3) Gambia (3) Malawi (1) Mauritania (2) Niger (2) Nigeria (3) Sao Tome and Principe (2) Sudan (4) Togo (3) United Republic of Tanzania (4) Upper Volta (2) Yemen (4) Zaire (4) Zambia (4)	—	—	25	
V	—	—	—	—	Afghanistan (4) Djibouti (3) Madagascar (3) Sierra Leone (3)	Comoros (2) Liberia (4) Senegal (4)	Rwanda (2)	8	

TABLE 66. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978^a
(continued)

Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility ^b	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total	
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high			
	Effect of constraints		Minor (C)	No constraints	Effect of constraints				
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)			Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)		
	Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable					
Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)			
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Bangladesh (4) Botswana (4) Ghana (4) India (4) Indonesia (4) Lesotho (4) Nepal (4) Pakistan (4) Papua New Guinea (4) Swaziland (4) Viet Nam (4)	11
TOTAL	12	1	3	4	21	3	12	56	

^aFor key, see table 63, foot-note a.

^bFor key, see table 63, foot-note b.

TABLE 67. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL FERTILITY AND CURRENT NATURAL INCREASE, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

Category of Governments' perceptions of national fertility ^a	Governments' perceptions of the effect of natural increase as a constraint on development, and the desirability of intervention							Total
	Rates too low		Rates neither too low nor too high			Rates too high		
	Effect of constraints		Minor (C)	No constraints	Effect of constraints			
	Predominant (A)	Significant (B)			Minor (C)	Significant (B)	Predominant (A)	
	Higher rates desirable			Lower rates desirable				
Full intervention appropriate (1)	Some support appropriate (2)	Neither higher nor lower rates desirable: no intervention appropriate (3)	(4)	(5)	Some support appropriate (6)	Full intervention appropriate (7)		
<i>More developed regions</i>								
I	8	—	1	—	—	—	—	9
II	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	3	3	4	1	—	—	11
IV	—	1	4	8	7	—	—	20
V	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	8	5	8	12	9	—	—	42
<i>Less developed regions</i>								
I	7	—	1	—	—	—	—	8
II	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	4
III	9	1	—	—	—	—	—	10
IV	—	2	3	9	28	1	—	43
V	—	—	—	1	5	7	1	14
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	37	37
TOTAL	19	4	4	10	33	8	38	116
<i>Total</i>								
I	15	—	2	—	—	—	—	17
II	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	5
III	9	4	3	4	1	—	—	21
IV	—	3	7	17	35	1	—	63
V	—	—	—	1	6	7	1	15
VI	—	—	—	—	—	—	37	37
TOTAL	27	9	12	22	42	8	38	158

^aFor key, see table 63, foot-note b.

TABLE 68. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	Category of policies concerning spatial distribution of population						Total
	2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow		4. Reversal of flow		
	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	
I. Entirely acceptable: no intervention appropriate	Belgium Denmark Holy See Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malta Monaco San Marino ^a United States of America	—	Czecho-slovakia German Democratic Republic ^a Hungary Sweden	—	—	—	13
II. Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention appropriate	New Zealand ^a	Austria	Bulgaria ^a Ireland ^a Romania Ukrainian SSR ^a	Albania ^a	Iceland	United Kingdom	9
III. Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention appropriate	Canada	Germany, Federal Republic of Italy ^a Norway	Finland ^a Greece ^a Poland Portugal Yugoslavia	Byelorussian SSR ^a Spain USSR ^a	Netherlands ^a Switzerland ^a	France ^a	15
IV. Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention appropriate	—	—	Chile Uruguay ^a	Argentina ^a Japan ^a	—	Australia ^a	5
TOTAL	11	4	15	6	3	3	42

^aCountry whose Government perceives that an adjustment in the spatial distribution of population will contribute to the resolution of problems associated with population growth.

TABLE 69. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population							Total
	1. Acceleration of flow	2. Maintenance of flow	3. Deceleration of flow			4. Reversal of flow		
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	
I. Entirely acceptable: no intervention appropriate	—	Bahrain ^a Barbados Kuwait Nauru ^a Qatar Singapore ^a	—	—	—	—	—	6
II. Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention appropriate ..	—	—	Republic of Korea	—	—	Cuba ^a Mongolia United Arab Emirates	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	5
III. Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention appropriate ..	Brazil ^a	—	Lebanon Tonga ^a	Seychelles ^a Sri Lanka	Bahamas	Cyprus ^a Israel Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	China	10
IV. Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention appropriate	—	Samoa ^a	Grenada	Jamaica Paraguay	—	Colombia Costa Rica ^a Fiji ^a Guyana ^a Mauritius Mexico Panama ^a Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela	—	14
TOTAL	1	7	4	4	1	16	2	35

^a Country whose Government does not perceive that an adjustment in the spatial distribution of population will contribute to the resolution of problems associated with population growth.

TABLE 70. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population								Total	
	2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow				4. Reversal of flow			
	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations		
I. Entirely acceptable: no intervention appropriate	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II. Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention appropriate	—	Malaysia	—	Burma	—	—	—	—	South Africa	3
III. Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention appropriate	Dominican Republic	—	Nicaragua Uganda	Syrian Arab Republic	—	Iraq Tunisia	—	—	—	6
IV. Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention appropriate	Cape Verde Honduras	—	El Salvador Morocco Thailand	Ecuador Guatemala Haiti	—	Algeria ^a Egypt Iran Kenya Peru Turkey	Philippines	Jordan	—	16
TOTAL	3	1	5	5	—	8	1	2	—	25

^aCountry whose Government does not perceive that an adjustment in the spatial distribution of population will contribute to the resolution of problems associated with population growth.

TABLE 71. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population									Total
	1. Acceleration of flow	2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow			4. Reversal of flow			
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	
I. Entirely acceptable: no intervention appropriate	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II. Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention appropriate	Bhutan	—	—	Gambia Maldives ^a	—	—	—	—	—	3

TABLE 71. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978 (continued)

Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population											
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	1. Acceleration of flow		2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow			4. Reverse of flow			Total
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of rural configurations	Adjustment of urban configurations		
III. Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention appropriate . .	Saudi Arabia	Chad Comoros Lesotho Sierra Leone Yemen	Afghanistan Burundi Guinea-Bissau	—	Guinea	—	Democratic Yemen Malawi Oman	Bangladesh Djibouti	—	15	
IV. Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention appropriate	—	Niger	Benin ^a Rwanda Upper Volta	Mali ^a Somalia ^a Swaziland	Congo Ethiopia Indonesia Madagascar Mauritania Nepal Sao Tome and Principe Sudan United Republic of Cameroon Zambia	Nigeria Papua New Guinea	Bolivia Botswana Gabon Ghana India Ivory Coast Liberia Pakistan Senegal Togo United Republic of Tanzania Zaire	Central African Empire Equatorial Guinea	Angola Democratic Kampuchea Lao People's Democratic Republic Mozambique Viet Nam	38	
TOTAL	2	6	6	5	11	2	15	4	5	56	

^aCountry whose Government does not perceive that an adjustment in the spatial distribution of population will contribute to the resolution of problems associated with population growth.

TABLE 72. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978 (Number of Governments)

Category of policies concerning spatial distribution of population											
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution	1. Acceleration of flow		2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow			4. Reversal of flow			
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations
More developed regions	—	11	—	4	—	15	6	3	—	3	—
Less developed regions	3	16	7	14	20	3	39	—	5	—	9
TOTAL	3	27	7	18	20	18	45	3	5	3	9

TABLE 73. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population												
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution ^a	1. Acceleration of flow		2. Maintenance of flow				3. Deceleration of flow		4. Reversal of flow			Total
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa												
<i>Eastern Africa</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	Comoros	Burundi	Uganda	Seychelles ^b	—	Malawi	—	Djibouti	—	—	6
IV	—	—	Rwanda	Somalia ^b	Ethiopia	—	Kenya	—	—	—	Mozambique	9
					Madagascar		Mauritius					
					Zambia		United Republic of Tanzania					
<i>Middle Africa</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	Chad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	—	Congo	—	Gabon	—	Central African Empire	—	Angola	8
					Sao Tome and Principe		Zaire		Equatorial Guinea			
					United Republic of Cameroon							
<i>Northern Africa</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	—	—	—	2
IV	—	—	—	Morocco	Sudan	—	Tunisia	—	—	—	—	4
							Algeria ^b					
							Egypt					
<i>Southern Africa</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	South Africa	1
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	Lesotho	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	Swaziland	—	—	Botswana	—	—	—	—	2
<i>Western Africa</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	Gambia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Sierra Leone	Guinea-Bissau	—	Guinea	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
IV	—	Cape Verde	Benin ^b	Mali ^b	Mauritania	Nigeria	Ghana	—	—	—	—	12
		Niger	Upper Volta	—	—	—	Ivory Coast					
							Liberia					
							Senegal					
							Togo					
TOTAL	—	6	5	6	10	1	16	—	3	—	3	50
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe												
<i>Eastern Europe</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	Czechoslovakia ^b	—	—	—	—	3
							German Democratic Republic					
							Hungary ^b					

TABLE 73. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population												
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution ^a	1. Acceleration of flow		3. Deceleration of flow				4. Reverse of flow					Total
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)												
<i>Eastern Europe (continued)</i>												
II	—	—	—	—	—	Bulgaria	—	—	—	—	—	2
III	—	—	—	—	—	Romania ^b	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	—	—	Poland ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Northern Europe</i>												
I	—	Denmark ^b	—	—	—	Sweden ^b	—	—	—	—	—	2
II	—	—	—	—	—	Ireland	—	Iceland ^b	—	United Kingdom ^b	—	3
III	—	—	—	—	Norway ^b	Finland	—	—	—	—	—	2
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Southern Europe</i>												
I	—	Holy See ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
II	—	Malta ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	San Marino	—	—	—	Italy	Greece	Albania	—	Spain ^b	—	5
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	Portugal ^b	—	—	—	—	—
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	Yugoslavia ^b	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Western Europe</i>												
I	—	Belgium ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
II	—	Liechtenstein ^b	—	—	—	Austria ^b	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Luxembourg ^b	—	—	—	Germany, Federal Republic of ^b	—	—	—	France	—	4
IV	—	Monaco ^b	—	—	—	—	Netherlands	—	—	—	—	—
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Cyprus ^b	—	—	—	2
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Israel	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Turkey	—	—	—	—
<i>Northern America</i>												
I	—	United States of America ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	Canada ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	Ukrainian SSR	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	Byelo-russian SSR	—	—	—	—	2
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	USSR	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	—	10	—	—	4	13	7	3	—	2	—	39

TABLE 73. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population												
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution ^a	1. Acceleration of flow		2. Maintenance of flow		3. Deceleration of flow				4. Reverse of flow			Total
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America												
<i>Caribbean</i>												
I	—	Barbados	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	Cuba ^b	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Dominican Republic	—	—	—	—	Bahamas	—	—	—	—	2
IV	—	—	—	Grenada	Haiti	—	Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	—	—	4
<i>Middle America</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	—	—	Nicaragua	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	Honduras	—	El Salvador	Guatemala	—	Costa Rica ^b	—	—	—	—	6
<i>Temperate South America</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IV	—	—	—	—	—	Chile ^b	Argentina	—	—	—	—	3
<i>Tropical South America</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	Brazil ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
IV	—	—	—	—	Ecuador	—	Bolivia	—	—	—	—	8
<i>Western South America</i>												
Paraguay												
Colombia												
Guyana ^a												
Peru												
Suriname												
Venezuela												
TOTAL	1	3	—	3	5	3	12	—	—	—	—	27
D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia												
<i>Western South Asia^b</i>												
I	—	Bahrain ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
II	—	Kuwait	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Qatar ^b	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
III	—	Saudi Arabia	—	Yemen	—	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	—	United Arab Emirates	—	Democratic Yemen	7
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Iraq	—	Oman	1
TOTAL	1	4	—	1	1	—	4	—	—	—	Jordan	12
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific												
<i>China</i>												
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	China	1
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

TABLE 73. POLICIES CONCERNING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, BY PERCEPTION OF ACCEPTABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION, AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Category of policies with respect to spatial distribution of population													
Perception of over-all acceptability of spatial distribution ^a	1. Acceleration of flow		2. Maintenance of flow				3. Deceleration of flow			4. Reverse of flow			Total
	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration	Adjustment of rural configuration	Adjustment of urban configuration	Adjustment of rural and urban configurations	Adjustment of neither rural nor urban configuration		
E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (continued)													
<i>Japan</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Japan</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Other East Asia</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Middle South Asia</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Melanesia</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>													
I	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
II	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
III	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
IV	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
TOTAL	1	4	2	4	4	1	6	—	2	1	5	30	

^aKey to perceptions:

- I. Entirely acceptable: no intervention appropriate.
- II. Slightly unacceptable: limited intervention appropriate.
- III. Substantially unacceptable: substantial intervention appropriate.
- IV. Extremely unacceptable: radical intervention appropriate.

^bCountry whose Government does not perceive that an adjustment in the spatial distribution of population will contribute to the resolution of problems associated with population growth.

TABLE 74. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Immigration significant</i>			<i>Immigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Immigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Argentina Australia	Austria Canada Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Norway Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States of America	France San Marino	—	Albania Belgium Bulgaria Byelorussian SSR Chile Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland German Democratic Republic Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Malta Netherlands New Zealand Poland Portugal Romania Spain Ukrainian SSR USSR Uruguay Yugoslavia
TOTAL: 42	2	11	2	— 27

TABLE 75. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Immigration significant</i>			<i>Immigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Immigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Israel	Bahamas Bahrain Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Nauru Qatar United Arab Emirates	Samoa Venezuela	Guyana	Barbados Brazil China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Cyprus Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fiji Grenada Jamaica Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Panama Paraguay Republic of Korea Seychelles Singapore Sri Lanka Suriname Tonga Trinidad and Tobago
TOTAL: 35	1	8	2	1 23

TABLE 76. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Immigration significant</i>			<i>Immigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Immigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Iran South Africa	—	Thailand	Ecuador Iraq	Algeria Burma Cape Verde Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Jordan Kenya Malaysia Morocco Nicaragua Peru Philippines Syrian Arab Republic Tunisia Turkey Uganda
TOTAL: 25	2	1	2	20

TABLE 77. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Immigration significant</i>			<i>Immigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Immigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Equatorial Guinea Gabon Saudi Arabia	Bhutan Djibouti Liberia Oman	Ghana Ivory Coast Nepal	Bolivia Sudan	Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Botswana Burundi Central African Empire Chad Comoros Congo Democratic Kampuchea Democratic Yemen Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau India Indonesia Lao People's Democratic Republic Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Maldives

TABLE 77. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978 (continued)

	Immigration significant			Immigration not significant	
	Too low (1)	Satisfactory (2)	Too high (3)	Immigration desired (4)	Situation satisfactory (5)
					Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Pakistan Papua New Guinea Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Swaziland Togo United Republic of Cameroon United Republic of Tanzania Upper Volta Viet Nam Yemen Zaire Zambia
TOTAL: 56	3	4	3	2	44

TABLE 78. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978 (Number of Governments)

	Immigration significant			Immigration not significant		Total
	Too low (1)	Satisfactory (2)	Too high (3)	Immigration desired (4)	Situation satisfactory (5)	
More developed regions	2	11	2	—	27	42
Less developed regions	6	12	6	5	87	116
TOTAL	8	23	8	5	114	158

TABLE 79. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

Immigration significant			Immigration not significant	
Too low (1)	Satisfactory (2)	Too high (3)	Immigration desired (4)	Situation satisfactory (5)
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa				
<i>Eastern Africa</i>				
—	Djibouti	—	—	Burundi Comoros Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Zambia
<i>Middle Africa</i>				
Equatorial Guinea Gabon	—	—	—	Angola Central African Empire Chad Congo Sao Tome and Principe United Republic of Cameroon Zaire
<i>Northern Africa</i>				
—	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	Sudan	Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia
<i>Southern Africa</i>				
South Africa	—	—	—	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland
<i>Western Africa</i>				
—	Liberia	—	—	Benin Cape Verde Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo Upper Volta
TOTAL: 50	3	3	2	1 41
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe				
<i>Eastern Europe</i>				
—	—	—	—	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic Hungary Poland Romania
<i>Northern Europe</i>				
—	Norway Sweden United Kingdom	—	—	Denmark Finland Iceland Ireland

TABLE 79. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

	<i>Immigration significant</i>			<i>Immigration not significant</i>	
	<i>Too low (1)</i>	<i>Satisfactory (2)</i>	<i>Too high (3)</i>	<i>Immigration desired (4)</i>	<i>Situation satisfactory (5)</i>
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)					
<i>Southern Europe</i>					
—	—	San Marino	—	Albania Greece Holy See Italy Malta Portugal Spain Yugoslavia	
<i>Western Europe</i>					
—	Austria Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Switzerland	France	—	Belgium Netherlands	
<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>					
Israel	—	—	—	Cyprus Turkey	
<i>Northern America</i>					
—	Canada United States of America	—	—	—	
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>					
—	—	—	—	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR	
TOTAL: 39	1	11	2	—	25
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America					
<i>Caribbean</i>					
—	Bahamas	—	—	Barbados Cuba Dominican Republic Grenada Haiti Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago	
<i>Middle America</i>					
—	—	—	—	Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama	
<i>Temperate South America</i>					
Argentina	—	—	—	Chile Uruguay	
<i>Tropical South America</i>					
—	—	Venezuela	Bolivia Ecuador Guyana	Brazil Colombia Paraguay Peru Suriname	
TOTAL: 27	1	1	1	3	21

TABLE 79. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

	Immigration significant			Immigration not significant	
	Too low (1)	Satisfactory (2)	Too high (3)	Immigration desired (4)	Situation satisfactory (5)
<i>D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia</i>					
			<i>Western South Asia^a</i>		
Saudi Arabia		Bahrain Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar United Arab Emirates	—	Iraq	Democratic Yemen Jordan Syrian Arab Republic Yemen
TOTAL: 12	1	6	—	1	4
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>					
			<i>China</i>		China
—	—	—	—	—	—
			<i>Japan</i>		Japan
—	—	—	—	—	—
			<i>Other East Asia</i>		Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia Republic of Korea
—	—	—	—	—	—
			<i>Eastern South Asia</i>		Burma Democratic Kampuchea Indonesia Lao People's Demo- cratic Republic Malaysia Philippines Singapore Viet Nam
—	—	—	—	—	—
			<i>Middle South Asia</i>		Afghanistan Bangladesh India Maldives Pakistan Sri Lanka
Iran		Bhutan	Nepal	—	—
			<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>		New Zealand
Australia			—	—	—
—	—	—	<i>Melanesia</i>	—	—
			—	—	—
			<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>		Papua New Guinea
—	—	—	—	—	—
		Nauru	Samoa	—	Fiji Tonga
TOTAL: 30	2	2	3	—	23

^aExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 80. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				
	<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control</i>	<i>Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population</i>	<i>Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
	Argentina Australia	Canada United States of America	Austria France Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Norway San Marino Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom	Albania Belgium Bulgaria Byelorussian SSR Chile Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland German Democratic Republic Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Malta Netherlands New Zealand Poland Portugal Romania Spain Ukrainian SSR USSR Uruguay Yugoslavia
TOTAL: 42	2	2	11	27

TABLE 81. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				
	<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control</i>	<i>Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population</i>	<i>Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
	Guyana Israel	Bahamas Bahrain Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Nauru Qatar Samoa United Arab Emirates	Venezuela	Barbados Brazil China Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Cyprus Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fiji Grenada Jamaica Mauritius Mexico Mongolia Panama Paraguay Republic of Korea Seychelles Singapore Sri Lanka Suriname Tonga Trinidad and Tobago
TOTAL: 35	2	9	1	23

TABLE 82. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>		<i>Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
	<i>Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control</i>	<i>Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population</i>	
Ecuador South Africa	Iran	Thailand	Algeria Burma Cape Verde Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Iraq Jordan Kenya Malaysia Morocco Nicaragua Peru Philippines Syrian Arab Republic Tunisia Turkey Uganda
TOTAL: 25	2	1	21

TABLE 83. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>		<i>Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
	<i>Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control</i>	<i>Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population</i>	
Bolivia Equatorial Guinea Gabon Saudi Arabia	Bhutan Djibouti Liberia Oman	Ghana Ivory Coast Nepal	Afghanistan Angola Bangladesh Benin Botswana Burundi Central African Empire Chad Comoros Congo Democratic Kampuchea Democratic Yemen Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau India Indonesia Lao People's Democratic Republic Lesotho Madagascar Malawi

TABLE 83. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978 (continued)

	Government policies in favour of:			Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population	
				Maldives
				Mali
				Mauritania
				Mozambique
				Niger
				Nigeria
				Pakistan
				Papua New Guinea
				Rwanda
				Sao Tome and Principe
				Senegal
				Sierra Leone
				Somalia
				Sudan
				Swaziland
				Togo
				United Republic of Cameroon
				United Republic of Tanzania
				Upper Volta
				Viet Nam
				Yemen
				Zaire
				Zambia
TOTAL: 56	4	4	3	45

TABLE 84. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978 (Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of:				Total
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population	Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
More developed regions	2	2	11	27	42
Less developed regions	8	14	5	89	116
TOTAL	10	16	16	116	158

TABLE 85. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

	Government policies in favour of:			Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population	
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa				
		<i>Eastern Africa</i>		
	—	Djibouti	—	Burundi Comoros Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Rwanda Seychelles Somalia Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Zambia
		<i>Middle Africa</i>		
Equatorial Guinea Gabon	—		—	Angola Central African Empire Chad Congo Sao Tome and Principe United Republic of Cameroon Zaire
		<i>Northern Africa</i>		
	—	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	—	Algeria Egypt Morocco Sudan Tunisia
		<i>Southern Africa</i>		
South Africa	—		—	Botswana Lesotho Swaziland
		<i>Western Africa</i>		
	—	Liberia	—	Benin Cape Verde Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo Upper Volta
		<i>Ghana Ivory Coast</i>		
TOTAL: 50	3	3	2	42
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe				
		<i>Eastern Europe</i>		
	—		—	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic

TABLE 85. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Higher rate	Government policies in favour of:			Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
	Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population		
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)				
<i>Eastern Europe (continued)</i>				
				Hungary Poland Romania
		<i>Northern Europe</i>		
			Norway Sweden United Kingdom	Denmark Finland Iceland Ireland
		<i>Southern Europe</i>		
			San Marino	Albania Greece Holy See Italy Malta Portugal Spain Yugoslavia
		<i>Western Europe</i>		
			Austria France Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Switzerland	Belgium Netherlands
		<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>		
Israel				Cyprus Turkey
		<i>Northern America</i>		
		Canada United States of America		
		<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>		
				Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR
TOTAL: 39	1	2	11	25
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America				
<i>Caribbean</i>				
		Bahamas		Barbados Cuba Dominican Republic Grenada Haiti Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
		<i>Middle America</i>		
				Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama

TABLE 85. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING IMMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

		Government policies in favour of:			
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate but subject to strict control	Curbing immigration in future but maintaining already established immigrant population	Immigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	
<i>C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America (continued)</i>					
<i>Temperate South America</i>					
Argentina	—	—	—	Chile Uruguay	
<i>Tropical South America</i>					
Bolivia Ecuador Guyana	—	Venezuela	—	Brazil Colombia Paraguay Peru Suriname	
TOTAL: 27	4	1	1		21
<i>D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia</i>					
<i>Western South Asia^a</i>					
Saudi Arabia	—	Bahrain Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar United Arab Emirates	—	Democratic Yemen Iraq Jordan Syrian Arab Republic Yemen	
TOTAL: 12	1	6	—		5
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>					
<i>China</i>					
—	—	—	—	China	
<i>Japan</i>					
—	—	—	—	Japan	
<i>Other East Asia</i>					
—	—	—	—	Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia Republic of Korea	
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>					
—	—	Thailand	—	Burma Democratic Kampuchea Indonesia Lao People's Democratic Republic Malaysia Philippines Singapore Viet Nam	
<i>Middle South Asia</i>					
—	Bhutan Iran	Nepal	—	Afghanistan Bangladesh India Maldives Pakistan Sri Lanka	
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>					
Australia	—	—	—	New Zealand	
<i>Melanesia</i>					
—	—	—	—	Papua New Guinea	
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>					
—	Nauru Samoa	—	—	Fiji Tonga	
TOTAL: 30	1	4	2		23

^aExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 86. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>		
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Emigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)	
Netherlands Portugal	Malta	Finland Greece Ireland Italy New Zealand Spain Uruguay Yugoslavia	—	Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria Byelorussian SSR Canada Chile Czechoslovakia Denmark France German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal Republic of Holy See Hungary Iceland Japan Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Norway Poland Romania San Marino Sweden Switzerland Ukrainian SSR USSR United Kingdom United States of America	
TOTAL: 42	2	1	8	—	31

TABLE 87. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Emigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Republic of Korea	Barbados Grenada Mauritius Sri Lanka Tonga	Colombia Cyprus Fiji Jamaica Mexico Paraguay Seychelles Suriname Trinidad and Tobago	—	Bahamas Bahrain Brazil China Costa Rica Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Guyana Israel Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Mongolia Nauru Panama Qatar Samoa Singapore Venezuela United Arab Emirates
TOTAL: 35	1	5	9	— 20

TABLE 88. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Emigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
Algeria Turkey	Cape Verde Egypt El Salvador Morocco Tunisia	Dominican Republic Haiti Honduras Jordan	Malaysia Syrian Arab Republic	Burma Ecuador Guatemala Iran Iraq Kenya Nicaragua Peru Philippines South Africa Thailand Uganda
TOTAL: 25	2	5	4	2 12

TABLE 89. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

	<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>	
	<i>Too low (1)</i>	<i>Satisfactory (2)</i>	<i>Too high (3)</i>	<i>Emigration desired (4)</i>	<i>Situation satisfactory (5)</i>
Pakistan		Angola Bolivia Chad Comoros Democratic Yemen Lesotho Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Nepal Senegal Swaziland Yemen	Botswana Guinea Somalia Upper Volta	Rwanda	Afghanistan Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burundi Central African Empire Congo Democratic Kam- puchea Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau India Indonesia Ivory Coast Lao People's Demo- cratic Republic Liberia Madagascar Maldives Niger Nigeria Oman Papua New Guinea Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Sudan Togo United Republic of Cameroon United Republic of Tanzania Viet Nam Zaire Zambia
TOTAL: 56	1	14	4	1	36

**TABLE 90. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)**

	<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>		<i>Total</i>
	<i>Too low (1)</i>	<i>Satisfactory (2)</i>	<i>Too high (3)</i>	<i>Emigration desired (4)</i>	<i>Situation satisfactory (5)</i>	
More developed regions	2	1	8	—	31	42
Less developed regions	4	24	17	3	68	116
TOTAL	6	25	25	3	99	158

TABLE 91. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>	
<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Emigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa				
<i>Eastern Africa</i>				
—	Comoros Malawi Mauritius Mozambique	Seychelles Somalia	Rwanda	Burundi Djibouti Ethiopia Kenya Madagascar Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Zambia
<i>Middle Africa</i>				
—	Angola Chad	—	—	Central African Empire Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon Sao Tome and Principe United Republic of Cameroon Zaire
<i>Northern Africa</i>				
Algeria	Egypt Morocco Tunisia	—	—	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Sudan
<i>Southern Africa</i>				
—	Lesotho Swaziland	Botswana	—	South Africa
<i>Western Africa</i>				
—	Cape Verde Mali Mauritania Senegal	Guinea Upper Volta	—	Benin Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau Ivory Coast Liberia Niger Nigeria Sierra Leone Togo
TOTAL: 50	15	5	1	28
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe				
<i>Eastern Europe</i>				
—	—	—	—	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic Hungary Poland Romania
<i>Northern Europe</i>				
—	—	Finland Ireland	—	Denmark Iceland Norway Sweden United Kingdom
<i>Southern Europe</i>				
Portugal	Malta	Greece Italy Spain Yugoslavia	—	Albania Holy See San Marino

TABLE 91. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

	<i>Emigration significant</i>			<i>Emigration not significant</i>	
	<i>Too low</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Too high</i> (3)	<i>Emigration desired</i> (4)	<i>Situation satisfactory</i> (5)
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe (continued)					
			<i>Western Europe</i>		
Netherlands	—	—	—		Austria Belgium France Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Switzerland
			<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>		
Turkey	—	—	—	—	Israel
			<i>Northern America</i>		
—	—	—	—	—	Canada United States of America
			<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>		
—	—	—	—	—	Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR
TOTAL: 39	3	1	7	—	28
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America					
			<i>Caribbean</i>		
—	Barbados Grenada	—	Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago	—	Bahamas Cuba
			<i>Middle America</i>		
—	El Salvador	—	Honduras Mexico	—	Costa Rica Guatemala Nicaragua Panama
			<i>Temperate South America</i>		
—	—	—	Uruguay	—	Argentina Chile
			<i>Tropical South America</i>		
—	Bolivia	—	Colombia Paraguay Suriname	—	Brazil Ecuador Guyana Peru Venezuela
TOTAL: 27	4	—	10	—	13
D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia					
			<i>Western South Asia^a</i>		
—	Democratic Yemen Yemen	—	Jordan	Syrian Arab Republic	Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
TOTAL: 12	2	—	1	1	8

TABLE 91. GOVERNMENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

	Emigration significant			Emigration not significant	
	Too low (1)	Satisfactory (2)	Too high (3)	Emigration desired (4)	Situation satisfactory (5)
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>					
			<i>China</i>		China
			<i>Japan</i>		Japan
Republic of Korea			<i>Other East Asia</i>		Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia
			<i>Eastern South Asia</i>	Malaysia	Burma Democratic Kampuchea Indonesia Lao People's Demo- cratic Republic Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
Pakistan		Nepal Sri Lanka	<i>Middle South Asia</i>		Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran Maldives
			<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>		Australia
			<i>Melanesia</i>		Papua New Guinea
		Tonga	<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>		Nauru Samoa
TOTAL: 30	2	3	2	1	22

^aExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

TABLE 92. GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS, JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				<i>Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate</i>	<i>Curbing emigration in future</i>		
Netherlands Portugal	Malta	Finland Greece Ireland Italy New Zealand Spain Uruguay Yugoslavia	Albania Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria Byelorussian SSR Canada Chile Czechoslovakia Denmark France German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal Republic of Holy See Hungary Iceland Japan Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Norway Poland Romania San Marino Sweden Switzerland Ukrainian SSR USSR United Kingdom United States of America	
TOTAL: 42	2	1	8	31

TABLE 93. GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATELY HIGH AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (60 YEARS AND OVER, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				<i>Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate</i>	<i>Curbing emigration in future</i>		
Republic of Korea	Barbados Grenada Mauritius Seychelles Sri Lanka Tonga	Colombia Cyprus Fiji Jamaica Mexico Paraguay Suriname Trinidad and Tobago	Bahamas Bahrain Brazil China Costa Rica Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Guyana Israel Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Mongolia Nauru Panama Qatar Samoa Singapore Venezuela United Arab Emirates	
TOTAL: 35	1	6	8	20

TABLE 94. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A MODERATE AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (50-59 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				<i>Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate</i>	<i>Curbing emigration in future</i>		
Algeria Turkey	Egypt El Salvador Morocco Tunisia	Dominican Republic Haiti Honduras Jordan		Burma Cape Verde Ecuador Guatemala Iran Iraq Kenya Malaysia Nicaragua Peru Philippines South Africa Syrian Arab Republic Thailand Uganda
TOTAL: 25	2	4	4	15

TABLE 95. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, COUNTRIES IN LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS WITH A LOW AVERAGE LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (UNDER 50 YEARS, 1970-1974), JULY 1978

<i>Government policies in favour of:</i>				<i>Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable</i>
<i>Higher rate</i>	<i>Maintaining current rate</i>	<i>Curbing emigration in future</i>		
Pakistan	Angola Chad Comoros Democratic Yemen Lesotho Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Nepal Senegal Swaziland Yemen	Bolivia Botswana Guinea Somalia Upper Volta		Afghanistan Bangladesh Benin Bhutan Burundi Central African Empire Congo Democratic Kampuchea Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea-Bissau India Indonesia Ivory Coast Lao People's Democratic Republic Liberia Madagascar Maldives Niger Nigeria Oman Papua New Guinea Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Sudan Togo United Republic of Cameroon United Republic of Tanzania Viet Nam Zaire Zambia
TOTAL: 56	1	13	5	37

TABLE 96. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, BY LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT, JULY 1978
(Number of Governments)

	Government policies in favour of:			Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable	Total
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate	Curbing emigration in future		
More developed regions	2	1	8	31	42
Less developed regions	4	23	17	72	116
TOTAL	6	24	25	103	158

TABLE 97. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978

	Government policies in favour of:			Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
	Higher rate	Maintaining current rate	Curbing emigration in future	
A. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Africa				
<i>Eastern Africa</i>				
	Comoros		Somalia	Burundi
	Malawi			Djibouti
	Mauritius			Ethiopia
	Mozambique			Kenya
	Seychelles			Madagascar
				Rwanda
				Uganda
				United Republic of Tanzania
				Zambia
<i>Middle Africa</i>				
	Angola			Central African Empire
	Chad			Congo
				Equatorial Guinea
				Gabon
				Sao Tome and Principe
				United Republic of Cameroon
				Zaire
<i>Northern Africa</i>				
Algeria	Egypt			Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
	Morocco			Sudan
	Tunisia			
<i>Southern Africa</i>				
	Lesotho		Botswana	South Africa
	Swaziland			
<i>Western Africa</i>				
	Mali		Guinea	Benin
	Mauritania		Upper Volta	Cape Verde
	Senegal			Gambia
				Ghana
				Guinea-Bissau
				Ivory Coast
				Liberia
				Niger
				Nigeria
				Sierra Leone
				Togo
TOTAL: 50	1	15	4	30

TABLE 97. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Government policies in favour of:				Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
Higher rate	Maintaining current rate	Curbing emigration in future		
B. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Europe				
<i>Eastern Europe</i>				
				Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic Hungary Poland Romania
<i>Northern Europe</i>				
		Finland Ireland		Denmark Iceland Norway Sweden United Kingdom
<i>Southern Europe</i>				
Portugal	Malta	Greece Italy Spain Yugoslavia		Albania Holy See San Marino
<i>Western Europe</i>				
Netherlands				Austria Belgium France Germany, Federal Republic of Liechtenstein Luxembourg Monaco Switzerland
<i>Western South Asia (part)</i>				
Turkey		Cyprus		
<i>Northern America</i>				
				Canada United States of America
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>				
				Byelorussian SSR Ukrainian SSR USSR
TOTAL: 39	3	1	7	28
C. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Latin America				
<i>Caribbean</i>				
	Barbados Grenada	Dominican Republic Haiti Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago		Bahamas Cuba
<i>Middle America</i>				
	El Salvador	Honduras Mexico		Costa Rica Guatemala Nicaragua Panama
<i>Temperate South America</i>				
		Uruguay		Argentina Chile
<i>Tropical South America</i>				
		Bolivia Colombia Paraguay Suriname		Brazil Ecuador Guyana Peru Venezuela
TOTAL: 27		3	11	13

TABLE 97. GOVERNMENT POLICIES CONCERNING EMIGRATION, BY AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF REGIONAL COMMISSIONS AND GEOGRAPHICAL STATISTICAL REGIONS, JULY 1978 (continued)

Government policies in favour of:				Emigration perceived to be not demographically significant and desirable or not desirable
Higher rate	Maintaining current rate	Curbing emigration in future		
<i>D. Area of responsibility of Economic Commission for Western Asia</i>				
<i>Western South Asia</i>				
	Democratic Yemen Yemen	Jordan		Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic United Arab Emirates
TOTAL: 12	—	2	1	9
<i>E. Area of responsibility of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</i>				
<i>China</i>				
				China
<i>Japan</i>				
				Japan
<i>Other East Asia</i>				
Republic of Korea				Democratic People's Republic of Korea Mongolia
<i>Eastern South Asia</i>				
				Burma Democratic Kampuchea Indonesia Lao People's Democratic Republic Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam
<i>Middle South Asia</i>				
Pakistan	Nepal Sri Lanka			Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran Maldives
<i>Australia and New Zealand</i>				
				Australia
<i>Melanesia</i>				
				Papua New Guinea
<i>Micronesia-Polynesia</i>				
	Tonga			Nauru Samoa
TOTAL: 30	2	3	2	23

^aExcluding Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

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