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**EVALUATION REPORT**



**TRANSTEC**  
PROJECT  
MANAGEMENT

**UDF-UKR-09-336 – Your Local Representative, Strengthening Citizen  
Participation in Ukraine**

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All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this report are those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNDEF or of any of the institutions referred to in the report.

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## I. Executive Summary

### **(i) Project Data**

*Your Local Representative: Strengthening Citizen Participation in Ukraine* project sought to enhance the capacities of Ukrainian NGOs and citizens to influence political processes by providing citizens with tools to monitor and evaluate the work of their elected officials and to advocate for needed change. Its intended outcomes were to: 1) increase NGO activism in engaging citizens to undertake citizen monitoring and advocacy activities; 2) increase access to information for citizen about their local representatives and electoral officials through citizens' monitoring; and, 3) increase civil society demand for more accountability from their local representatives and elected officials in eight targeted regions.

This was a two-year USD 275,000 project (1 August 2010 - 30 July 2012). It was implemented by East Europe Foundation (EEF), a Ukrainian Foundation based in Kiev, Ukraine. Its main intended activities were to:

- Build capacity of NGOs in eight target regions on citizen engagement and participation, and on advocacy and use of the media for citizens' engagement;
- Launch a "Your Local Representative" website in eight targeted regions;
- Undertake information and education campaigns for citizens; and,
- Develop recommendations for the transparent composition of party lists and elected official accountability to submit to political parties.

### **(ii) Evaluation Findings**

The project objectives were directly **relevant** to the needs to strengthen civic participation and increase the accountability of locally elected officials in Ukraine. At the time of the proposal, the electoral system was a proportional system based on closed party lists which meant that the voters were not able to hold their representatives directly accountable through the elections. The project targeted local elected officials (city, district and region) which were relevant to the issues that affected the everyday lives of the citizens, but doing this in nine regions using the same branding and templates also increased its relevance at the national level. The activities for outreach to the citizens and their use of the websites however, were under-developed in the design and during implementation. The assumption that these websites alone could result in more responsive party lists or more accountable deputies was unrealistic given the number of other factors that go into these elements.

Project implementation followed the outputs listed in the design but the aspects related to citizen participation and the lobbying of parties were missing. These activities had not been included in the request for proposals (RFPs) issued by EEF. Conceptually, the project seemed to think these elements would emanate from website use but without a critical mass of users, this did not occur. This directly affected the effectiveness and potential impact of the project. However, it did achieve most of its outputs, creating eight websites (plus the original site from Cherkasy) that provided information and some analysis on the regional councils and on at least four councils per regions. Providing a public space that highlighted the work of deputies was **effective** for journalists and some of the minority party deputies. For the journalists, the sites provided a one-stop shop, while the minority deputies found it as a channel to make their work public. They did not feel this was possible through the councils' websites which they thought were controlled by the majority party. The sites averaged about 100 registered users per site, with about 1.6 comments per user over the life of the project.

The project inputs were consistent with the delivery of the outputs but not with its intended outcomes. The outcomes were too ambitious for nine websites without activities or links to other programs in the sector, and for subgrants of under USD 15,000 each. EEF did manage the project itself in an **efficient** and professional manner, undertaking pre-grant award surveys and ensuring the monitoring and reporting aspects of the project were done. This project was based on a pilot done by EEF with its implementing partner, the Cherkasy CVU, and the lessons were incorporated into this project's website template design. EEF did not use its other intended implementing partner, Internews Ukraine, stating that its overhead was too high. Instead, it contracted several of its staff directly as trainers, with Internews concurrence. However, in the design, Internews Ukraine was also responsible for the citizen engagement element of the project, which was what the evaluators felt was missing. At the same time, Internews Ukraine's institutional focus is on information and journalism, so the fact that it was not used might not have affected this aspect.

The impact of this project is difficult to assess as it did not collect outcome information. Even if this information was available, attributing results would be difficult due to the number of other factors that affect governance, the NGO environment and civic participation. The limited use of the site and its lack of links to activities in the sector reduced its potential for **impact** but from the anecdotal information gathered, it seems that on a limited scale, this project resulted in an increased awareness among some deputies that their activities were being watched and that information on their work could get out to the public through NGOs and websites such as these. It also helped to empower some deputies from smaller parties who felt they were able to get information on their parties or work out by having it posted on these sites. This project also developed links among some NGOs across the Ukraine that had similar interests and increased the realization of some of the importance of local governance. It also could have the impact of contributing to incumbency advantages as only elected officials are listed in the sites, and in an election year other candidates would not have their biographies or information on their work featured as well. Although incumbents who were negatively reviewed would also have that information available for the public.

EEF made some efforts to build sustainability into the project by expecting subgrantees to place advertising on the sites to generate income (which was not done), and by developing a formal (signed agreement) as well as informal (Google group) network between the nine NGOs (which was done). This evaluation took place a year after the project was over. Out of the nine sites, seven were still up and had been updated in 2013. The sites were still being visited, with some sites averaging from about 3 - 40 returning visitors a day. The networking continued among some of the NGOs although only at an informal level and on an as needed basis. One of the NGOs (in Volyn) secured National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funding to continue to work on their website through 2013. Most of the NGOs however felt the sites looked dated and lacked integration into the social networks and stated that the original websites were not **sustainable** in the long run without major revamping.

There was **UNDEF value added** for this project as it is unlikely that it would have been funded elsewhere as EEF had been turned down by several donors before turning to UNDEF. It does appear to have generated additional interest in websites of this type as the NED funded several of these types of projects in the Ukraine for other NGOs in 2012.

### ***(iii) Conclusions***

The ***project addressed an important area***. In all of the interviews, the consolidation of power by one individual or party was cited as the main problem facing the communities. Projects of this nature shine a light on governance and the need to pay attention to what elected officials are doing. However, the ***use of a website alone was not enough to***

**generate the change expected by the project**, and more links needed to be made for the use aspect of the information.

EEF had the institutional capacity and expertise required to manage a sensitive subgrant project such as this nationwide, but it **needed an institutional partner to provide the programmatic vision and links** for the more effective use of the information collected. The subgrantees as well had the nonpartisan nature and credibility needed to undertake the information collection and monitoring aspects of the project, but they also needed the connection with activities that could use the information within their sites to improve democratic governance. Nevertheless, the **sites were useful for journalists** that covered political issues **and for some of the minority deputies and civic activists**.

The project was extremely **cautious with its guidelines** for posting which **enabled the websites to continue work without political interference, but also limited ownership** of the sites and the material to the subgrantees themselves. Updating all of the information is labor intensive and the websites **lacked integration with the more dynamic social media networks** that could have helped extend their reach and usefulness. The project might have made more of an impact than was visible to the evaluators, but this is unknown as **only the outputs were tracked**.

#### **(iv) Recommendations**

For similar projects in the future, the evaluators recommend that the grantees **ensure clarity in the project design and project purpose**, and that the desired end state guide the development of the activities. This extends to the **selection of the partners and ensuring that they can provide for all of the elements** provided in the project design. In addition to watchdog type of NGO, **other organizations that work on civic issues and good governance should be included** and **synergies developed with their programs** to ensure effective use of the information collected and the communication channels available on the website.

**Website users should be allowed to update and post information within a controlled system** which could help broaden the ownership of the site and increase use of the material. This could also contribute to its regular updating and ultimate sustainability. Consideration should also be given to using **a professional web design firm to develop an interactive, multimedia website that is integrated with the social media**. This could attract more youth, which are the primary internet users in the Ukraine, and increase its relevance and use.

**Access to information, accountability and civic participation projects should be prioritized** in similar contexts as these are the critical elements needed to increased citizen demand for improved governance and to sustain democratic transitions. The project's technique of **undertaking similar governance activities at local level in different regions** should be replicated in future projects as this can give national prominence for a project focused on local issues and representatives. Outcome indicators should also be adopted in projects such as these so the information can be used to better target project activities and improve project performance.

## Introduction and development context

### (i) **The project and evaluation objectives**

*Your Local Representative: Strengthening Citizen Participation in Ukraine* project was a two-year USD 275,000 project implemented by the East Europe Foundation (EEF). USD 25,000 of this was retained by UNDEF for monitoring and evaluation purposes. EEF also used USD 50,000 of its core grant support to co-fund some of the costs related to this effort. The project ran from 1 August 2010 to 30 July 2012. Its main objective was to enhance the capacity of Ukrainian NGOs and citizens to influence local political processes and establish dialogue with policy makers. It intended to do this through: 1) increased engagement of CSOs with citizens for monitoring and advocacy activities; 2) increased access to information on local representatives through citizen monitoring; and, 3) more transparent composition of party lists and ways to make the elected candidates accountable to their constituents.

The evaluation of this project is part of the larger evaluation of the Round 2 and 3 UNDEF-funded projects. Its purpose is to “contribute towards a better understanding of what constitutes a successful project which will in turn help UNDEF to develop future project strategies. Evaluations are also to assist stakeholders to determine whether projects have been implemented in accordance with the project document and whether anticipated project outputs have been achieved”.<sup>1</sup>

### (ii) **Evaluation methodology**

The evaluation took place in August 2013 with field work done in Ukraine from 5 - 9 August, 2013. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson and Igor Volzhanin, experts in democratic governance. The UNDEF evaluations are more qualitative in nature and follow a standard set of evaluation questions that focus on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and any value added from UNDEF-funding (Annex 1). This report follows that structure. The evaluators reviewed available documentation on the project and on the issue of citizen participation, and accountability issues for regional and local councils in the Ukraine (Annex 2).

In Ukraine, the team met with the primary grantee, East Europe Foundation in the capital Kiev, before travelling to two towns in the Odessa region to meet with one of the eight NGO subgrantees, and with participants of this effort in that region. The team also visited the region of Cherkasy where one of the implementing partners for this grant was located, and which had piloted the initial concept for this project under other funding. In addition, the team met with journalists, local officials and civil society representatives. Several of the subgrantees in other locations were interviewed by phone to better understand the local implementation strategy and results of their efforts. The list of persons interviewed is provided in Annex 3.

During the preparatory work, the evaluators identified several issues which they followed up on during their interviews. These included:

- **Implementation timeline.** The project agreement was signed in August 2010, but the first major training was not done before December 2010 which seemed to be a long lead in period.

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<sup>1</sup> Operational Manual for the UNDEF-funded project evaluations, p. 6.

- **Selection criteria for NGO subgrantees**, as only 17 NGOs applied for the eight subgrants and lack of NGO interest in the project was not one of the risks identified.
- **Interest of media in project.** The project seemed to benefit from the participation of media outlets resulting in savings, but it was unknown if this helped increase its reach.
- **Conference Hosting.** The final conference was moved from Kiev to Chernihiv which also resulted in significant savings, but the effectiveness of this move was unknown.
- **Risk management.** The political context seemed to be extremely sensitive as EEF was concerned enough about possible legal action against its subgrantees that it entered into an arrangement for legal assistance if needed.

### **(iii) Development context**

Ukraine established a democratic system of governance following its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It had mixed results until the Orange Revolution in 2004 led Ukraine towards more fundamental democratic reforms. However, the revolution's expectations have not yet been achieved with many reforms remaining incomplete. Power is also being consolidated within the executive since the elections in 2010 with a constitutional court decision (2010) reversing the 2004 constitutional amendment that had shifted power from the president to the prime minister and parliament. This, and an increasing emphasis on personal connections in policy making are seen as undermining the checks and balances system and threatening Ukraine's pluralistic political system.<sup>2</sup>

The European Union (EU) and others have expressed their concerns about the situation in the Ukraine. Concerns included issues around the conduct of the October 2012 parliamentary elections and what are seen as the politically motivated convictions of former government officials in trials that did not meet international standards.<sup>3</sup>

Ukraine has a system of local governance with elected regional (oblast), district (rayon) and city-level councils. Key problems include the concentration of power and revenue at the national level, the fragmentation of lower-level administrative units, and poor staffing of local self-government bodies. Local governance reform and decentralization have been stalled at the national level for several years.

In this context, civil society is seen to have a critical role in defending democratic values and practices. This started in earnest during the Orange Revolution but still has yet to lead to a *"great impact on society at large or on the well-being of citizens."* Civil society organizations (CSOs) in general have low outreach to the population. They are now working in an unsupportive environment, and according to CIVICUS need to *"survive in a society with a high level of corruption, disrespect for the rule of law, clientelism, and indifferent attitude of government, distrust and intolerance."* However, CSOs still have a relatively high score for democratic values on the CIVICUS civil society index.<sup>4</sup>

Also noteworthy in the CIVICUS study is that the most influential CSOs were reported to be the think tanks, the CVU, human rights groups, academic institutions and programmes of international NGOs funded by donors.<sup>5</sup>

Civic participation rates in the Ukraine have been falling steadily when measured in terms of voter turnout. In 1994 the turnout was 75.81 percent, while in 2012 it was 57.40 percent for

<sup>2</sup> Freedom House, *Nations in Transit, Ukraine 2013*

<sup>3</sup> Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on Ukraine*

<sup>4</sup> Information and quotes in this paragraph are from Civicus, *Civil Society Index, Ukraine*, p 7

<sup>5</sup> Civicus, Op Cit. p 23




the parliamentary elections, and 71.63 percent for the presidential elections in 1994, falling to 69.70 percent in 2010.<sup>6</sup> Voters also apparently do not know their elected representatives. For example, in Chernihiv, 86 percent could not identify any of their local representatives or elected officials, while in Kiev, 67.4 percent of the citizens did not know who their representative was.<sup>7</sup>

In recent surveys, most Ukrainians are pessimistic in their outlook towards the future, with more responding that the country is on a path towards instability and chaos than towards stability and prosperity in the future (Figure 1).<sup>8</sup> They also have limited confidence in institutions, with the Cabinet of Ministers having a 28 percent confidence rate and the Ministry of Justice at 17 percent. Local government institutions ranked higher, with confidence in the mayor at 49 percent, and the city/village council at 47 percent. Media had the highest level of confidence at 63 percent.<sup>9</sup>

**Figure 1: Future perceptions**



**Figure 2: Preferences for government types**



There is also a significant level of apathy about democratic governance although this has been decreasing in the last few years. Having democracy as a preferred type of government is also increasing and is currently at more than 45 percent in a recent poll (Figure2).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> International IDEA, *Voter Turnout Data for Ukraine*  
<sup>7</sup> UNDEF,UDF-URK-09-336, *Project proposal*, p 7  
<sup>8</sup> IFES, *Key Findings from IFES Ukraine Survey 2012*  
<sup>9</sup> *ibid*  
<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

## II. Project strategy

### *(i) Project approach and strategy*

With this project, the East Europe Foundation intended to address what it saw as a growing sense of separation between Ukrainian citizens and their elected leaders, and to strengthen the ability of citizens to influence their political processes. Changes in 2006, resulted in a closed list proportional representation system with the parties developing their candidates list in a nontransparent manner.<sup>11</sup> EEF felt this reduced the incentives for elected officials to be representative, transparent or accountable to their constituents.

EEF identified several issues that it thought this project could address to strengthen the ties between voters and elected officials. These were: the lack of information on elected officials and the fulfillment of their campaign promises; the lack of knowledge by citizens on how to obtain this information, monitor their work and demand accountability; and, the lack of CSO capacity to engage citizens in local political life and influence the local and national political processes.

EEF decided to address these issues through the replication of a web-based monitoring system that had been piloted by the Cherkasy branch of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine. That database collected information on the elected officials at the regional and some local council levels, and tracked their activities and fulfillment of campaign promises. It also had places where voters and others could comment on the quality of their work. They expected the local parties then to note the activities of their deputies and comments of the voters, and move the best performing officials to the top of their candidate lists. This would then improve accountability of the elected officials and the quality of the candidates on the list for the next elections.

EEF intended to subcontract the Cherkasy CVU to develop an improved version of its website based on the lessons learned from its pilot. It would then replicate this pilot project in eight other regions, starting with the selection of a non-partisan NGO in each of the targeted regions: Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Odessa, Ternopil, Vinnytsya, Zaporizhzhia and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. EEF intended for these eight NGOs, plus the Cherkasy CVU, to serve as the catalysts for more citizen participation in the Ukraine by starting a policy dialogue through the posting of the data in each of these regions.

EEF expected this project would strengthen 80 NGOs in the targeted regions by enhancing their capacity to act as intermediaries between the government and citizens, and to engage citizens in local political life. This was expected to benefit the 16 million people living in these regions who would have better access to information about their elected officials, and have the tools needed to influence local decision making. This in turn would make the local representatives more aware of citizen scrutiny and the parties more interested in selecting better candidates for its electoral lists.

The project strategy was holistic in that it intended to identify active NGOs in the eight regions that would provide the grounding for the project in each of these regions, and then provide them with the means needed to establish a website, collect the data, and monitor the

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<sup>11</sup> This system was changed in 2011 to a mixed system where now half the representatives are directly elected.

work of the elected officials. It intended to do this through subgrants, mentoring and training. All websites were to use the same template, so that they would be standard across regions.

EEF intended to act as the fund manager for this project working with two implementing partners. The first was the Cherkasy CVU that would develop the website template and provide mentoring to the other NGOs. It would also collect best practices from the eight regions and publish a final publication with this information. The second partner was Internews Ukraine, a branch of the international NGO Internews, that would provide the training and support to the local NGOs on issues of citizen engagement, and train them in organizing advocacy campaigns. Internews also agreed to provide legal assistance for any NGO if needed during this project. EEF itself would develop the request for proposals to identify the main NGO partner for each of the eight regions, issue them with a small subgrant of USD 7,500 each, and ensure their compliance with reporting and implementation requirements.

The project's intended outcomes were:

- Civil society in eight target regions is active at engaging citizens in citizen monitoring and advocacy activities;
- Citizens obtain better access to information about their local representatives and elected officials through citizen monitoring; and,
- Civil society demands more accountability for local representatives and elected officials.

The main project assumptions were that: the CSOs in the regions were mature and motivated enough for them to be able to act as a catalyst for citizen engagement; the experts were competent to provide training to enhance CSO capacities for citizen participation; people in the targeted areas would use information technology; and, non partisan stakeholders were motivated and able to formulate recommendations on the composition of party lists and accountability for submission to local elected officials and political parties.

EEF also identified some major risks for the project. These included that local officials and political parties might attempt to use the project for their own political purposes by either misusing the websites or pressuring the site administrators. To prevent this, the NGO partners were expected to develop boards of local media, businesses and non-partisan activists to ensure transparent decision making. It also felt that officials and parties might see the project itself as partisan, and then discredit it publically. EEF intended to mitigate this possibility by informing the elected officials, parties and coalitions about the project before its launch and emphasize its nonpartisan nature. Another risk was that the citizens themselves would think the effort was a way for parties or officials to gain votes or discredit opponents, and then be unwilling to participate in project activities. To address this, EEF intended to launch an informational campaign that emphasized the non-partisan nature of the effort. This non-partisanship was also to be communicated in all public events, and in all publications and printed materials.

EEF intended for this effort to be sustainable on both the financial and institutional levels. To accomplish this it intended to train the NGO partners and grantees on project implementation, financial management, project evaluation and fund raising. It expected the websites to become sources of funding, as their expected popularity would attract advertisers who would then buy ad space. Revenues from advertising sales would be directed to support the NGOs engagement with citizens and their participation activities. The institutional capacity of NGOs would be strengthened through project training, which was to include how to engage citizens in monitoring and advocacy and participation in local policy making. It expected these NGOs to continue to moderate the websites. Ownership of the project was to

be ensured through the engagement of the non-partisan stakeholders in project activities, including the development of local citizen engagement plans, participation in supervisory boards and formulation of recommendations for elected officials and parties. The NGOs would also develop a network between them to help ensure sustainability of the efforts after the end of the project.

**(ii) Logical framework**



**ENHANCE CAPACITIES OF LOCAL NGOS TO CONNECT CITIZENS WITH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Select NGOs (RFP)</b></li> <li>• <b>Train NGOs on advocacy and monitoring (3 days)</b></li> <li>• <b>Support NGO work</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 NGOs selected</li> <li>• 30 reps of 8 NGOs trained</li> <li>• 8 roundtables (200 participants)</li> <li>• Ongoing support for 8 NGOs (144 hours total)</li> </ul>	More active NGOs engaging with citizens for advocacy campaigns and monitoring of local deputies and elected officials	Strengthened civic participation and influence on political processes More accountable local representatives
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**PROVIDE TOOLS TO CITIZENS TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE THE WORK OF ELECTED OFFICIALS**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Develop monitoring plans</b></li> <li>• <b>Stakeholder meetings</b></li> <li>• <b>Develop software for website</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 taskforce sessions for 80 participants</li> <li>• 8 monitoring plans</li> <li>• Website template developed</li> </ul>	Increased NGO capacity to collect information and monitor elected officials	Stronger civil society participation in political processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Subgrants to 8 NGOs</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 Your Local Representative websites launched</li> <li>• 8 launch press conferences for 22 persons per region</li> <li>• 8 supervisory boards</li> <li>• 8 grants (USD 7,500 each)</li> </ul>	<p>Increased access to information for citizens on elected officials and their activities</p> <p>Increased citizen demand for accountability</p>	<p>More transparent and representative governance</p> <p>More accountable local representatives</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Information campaign to promote website</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 articles in local press x 8 regions</li> <li>• 2 video/radio spots x 8 regions</li> <li>• 3 articles in national press</li> </ul>	<p>Increased use of websites by citizens and journalists</p> <p>Increased notice of website contents by parties</p>	More transparent , accountable and representative governance

**HELP LOCAL NGOS AND CITIZENS TO DEVELOP AND DELIVER RECOMMENDATIONS TO LOCAL PARTIES**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Train NGOs on media advocacy campaigning (2 days)</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 trainings for 20 NGO representatives each</li> <li>• 16 articles in local print, 16 video/radio spots, 2-3 articles in national press, 2-3 videos/radio spots</li> <li>• 8 roundtables for 15 participants each</li> </ul>	<p>More effective NGO and citizen advocacy</p> <p>More responsive party platforms and candidates</p>	<p>Increased ties between citizens and party platforms and candidate selection</p> <p>Stronger civil society participation in political processes</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Final publication on project's best practices</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1,000 copies of brochure on best practices distributed</li> </ul>	Replication of website in other regions	Increased civil society participation across Ukraine
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Final roundtables and conferences</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 8 roundtables with 30 participants each</li> <li>• 1 final national conference with 80 participants</li> </ul>	Stronger CSO networking efforts for advocacy and monitoring	More transparent, accountable and representative governance

### III. Evaluation findings

#### (i) Relevance

The project design was directly **relevant** to the objectives of the project and in line with the needs to strengthen civic participation and the links between the citizens and their elected officials in the Ukraine. Before 2011, the ties between voters and their representatives had weakened as citizens were no longer able to vote directly for their representatives. This in turn had adversely affected the representational nature of these elected positions and the accountability of those officials towards their voters.

This project intended to address this problem by increasing the amount and type of information available on the deputies at the city and regional council level. Within the broader national context of consolidating power and limiting political space for other voices, having a project that focused on increasing citizen access to information and watching those monitoring those in office, was needed and relevant. The fact the design targeted nine regions located across the Ukraine (Figure 3), and that each of the subgrantee NGOs collected similar information, undertook the same activities, and used the same website format and branding, increased its national relevance, even though it was implemented at selected local levels. This nationwide network and attention to regional and city councils also put it in a position where it could have made a sizeable impact if implemented effectively.



Figure 3: Location of project sites


Addressing issues of accountability and representation at local levels were also extremely relevant as the decisions of city and regional councils affect the everyday lives of the residents, especially in a former socialist state, where even their housing was taken care of by the state and where the local government still is responsible for many of these aspects (such as garbage removal, sanitation and building maintenance). However, in the design, the activities to develop the links between citizens and their deputies were under-developed and limited primarily to advertising the website and two-day training with NGOs. To reach the intended project outcomes of enhanced citizen participation and their being able to hold their representatives accountable, more activities and focus would have been needed on the outreach to the citizens to build their awareness and participation in the effort.

This project was directly relevant to the mandate of the grantee, EEF, which is part of the Eurasia Foundation Network, a group of affiliated, locally registered foundations in Eastern Europe that derived originally from the Eurasia Foundation. As a non-partisan, democratic-focused grant-making organization, it was the ideal umbrella organization to manage and monitor the nationwide sub-grants and contracts required to undertake this work.

It was also directly relevant to contract the Cherkasy CVU to develop the new website

template as it had piloted the original website with EEF in 2009.<sup>12</sup> It was also relevant to use Internews Ukraine (in the design) to provide training on website content. However, in the design Internews Ukraine was also responsible for the consultations with the eight NGOs on citizen engagement and advocacy campaigns. It would have been more relevant in this case to use another NGO that dealt directly with civic participation.

The eight NGO grantees selected did appear to be the right organizations to undertake the monitoring and watchdog activities of the project (Figure 4). From the interviews, it appeared that they were nonpartisan and credible organizations that were able to get the access



needed to collect the information for the websites. But, as with Internews Ukraine, they also did not appear to be the most appropriate organizations to conduct the civic participation aspects of the project as most seemed to have a research or watchdog focus grounded originally in election monitoring.

The design also anticipated that these activities would result in political parties recognizing the more accountable and responsive candidates over others, and changing their slates of candidates based on the information and comments provided in the

websites. Given the number of different variables that factor into party nomination decisions, this was probably an unrealistic assumption, especially without an active advocacy element within the design that would have promoted this effort with the parties and citizens. This was confirmed by the information provided by deputies in the interviews, who said the parties did not consider the information from the websites when compiling their candidate lists.

**(ii) Effectiveness**

Project implementation followed most of the outputs anticipated in the project document. The programmatic elements needed to achieve the anticipated outcomes of “actively engaging citizens in citizen monitoring and advocacy activities”, and “civil society demanding more accountability from local representatives and elected officials” seemed to be completely absent which directly affected the effectiveness of the project. Some of this stemmed from the limited nature of the activities planned as noted in Section IV (i) above, while the remainder resulted from the almost total focus of the sub-grantees on fulfilling the informational aspects of the project, and the expectation that just the development of the websites could deliver the project’s anticipated outcomes.

The subgrantees focused on journalists and NGOs as the primary users for their websites with deputies mentioned as secondary users along with activists. Citizens’ use was rarely mentioned in interviews and the political parties were never mentioned, except for Cherkasy CVU that remarked that some parties had called them during the pilot asking how to use the website.<sup>13</sup> There were also no information campaigns directed at the voters to get them to use the website other than the brochures and links placed by the subgrantees.

The monitoring aspects were done also through the websites, but this was relatively light compared to what is commonly expected from a civil society monitoring effort of councils or

<sup>12</sup> Funded by PACT  
<sup>13</sup> The pilot occurred before the 2010 elections in Ukraine.



deputies, and was tied conceptually to the information provided on the site and reader feedback. Although, in many cases, the websites also included analytical pieces on council decisions or performance.

The disconnect between the project description and implementation was at the grantee level, as these elements were not part of the scope of work used by EEF to generate proposals from the NGOs. The NGOs themselves implemented what was in their subgrant agreements. EEF also did not engage Internews Ukraine as an implementing partner stating that its overhead was too high. Instead it contracted several of its staff individually to undertake some of the trainings with Internews consent.<sup>14</sup>



Figure 5: Project webpage, Luhansk region

Nevertheless, the project was able to achieve most of its intended outputs. The Cherkasy CVU created an updated website template that was used by them and the eight NGO subgrantees in eight regions across the Ukraine (Figures 3 and 4). Each created a website that collected information on the regional council as well as at least four city councils. Each website used the same format and branding which gave uniformity to the site and created the sense of a national project which gave the sites more weight and likely increased its credibility. The journalists and deputies

also noted that this allowed them to check the activities of other deputies and councils in the other regions, to get ideas and information that they could apply to their own work.

The primary benefit of these websites seemed to be that they collected the information from various sites and put it all in one place, so that it was readily available and easily searchable to those interested. Some subgrantees also generated their own content and links with existing journalist efforts and used the website as the distribution platform. The information was also regularly updated during the one-year subgrant period for these NGOs. Information included the names and parties of all of the deputies, their contact information, office hours and relevant news articles (or links) along with space for users to leave comments on the deputies. Each deputy had their own page with their photo and information. Only the NGO was able to upload information, with posts moderated to avoid partisan use of the site or the posting of inappropriate material. The feedback mechanism also provided deputies with a very public reminder that citizens and others could leave comments about their performance, not all of it complimentary. Although most of the comments seemed to be neutral in tone.<sup>15</sup>

The websites were a useful tool for persons already engaged in civic affairs and advocacy activities. Although most city councils and deputies had their own websites, they do not

<sup>14</sup> The overhead for Internews was also not included in the project document budget.  
<sup>15</sup> According to Cherkasy website statistics, it received 2,133 comments to date of which 2,080 were seen as neutral, 37 as positive and only 16 were negative.

generally put the contact information of the individual deputies which makes it difficult to contact them directly or send them feedback. The journalists interviewed all thought this site helped them with their research and saved them time since all of the information and related news was on one site. The deputies interviewed also noted its usefulness, although this appeared to be more so for the deputies from the smaller parties that did not have the networks or level of resources that the other deputies had to either collect information or to track the positions of others. Some of these deputies also noted that the website gave them a channel to get their message out, which may have been blocked by the majority party that controlled the council's website and that they felt only provided the position of the majority party.


The sites did not appear to be promoted enough to reach beyond those already active in the sector. Instead of doing this through other NGOs working on civic issues or participation (which could have also increased their reach and generate synergies with other activities), the subgrantees placed banners or links on other websites or in papers. The website statistics collected for Odessa showed that only 18 percent of the traffic came from referring websites, while 22 percent came directly, and 60 percent came from search engines. The use of the internet in general by the most active group of lobbyists (said to be the pensioners) is limited as noted in Figure 6, where almost 80 percent of those aged 50 and above have never used the internet.

**Figure 6: Ukrainian Internet use (%)**

	18-29	30-49	50+
<b>Daily</b>	19	24	24
<b>Weekly</b>	20	26	28
<b>Never</b>	54	49	47



	18-29	30-49	50+
<b>Daily</b>	52	28	5
<b>Never</b>	15	29	79



At its peak, the Cherkasy site had 6,270 one time users (October 2012) and 10,085 returning visitors (June 2012). However, more than 60 percent of these visits lasted less than five seconds as noted in Figure 7.

During the life of the project, the websites generated 208,955 unique site visitors, with 880 registered users who left 1,472 comments on the activities of local officials.

This averages out to about 100 registered users and about 15 comments per month per website, or about 1.6 comments total per registered user.



The rather limited use of the websites raises the question about the effectiveness of using a website alone as a means to increase the accountability of elected officials, the transparency



of their work, or to strengthen citizen participation. It should be noted that while the number of comments alone is not indicative of the usefulness of the website as an information source, it does indicate shortcomings as a communication platform to bring increased demand for accountability.

Usefulness of the training provided to subgrantees varied depending on the NGO interviewed. Those without much technical savvy felt it was extremely useful, while others felt they learned more from the interaction with other grantees than from the media experts. Most appreciated the social network training.

### ***(iii) Efficiency***

The project's inputs were consistent with delivery of the outputs, but not with its intended outcomes. The project intended to reach NGOs, journalists, political parties, deputies and strengthen citizen participation, and increase the accountability of elected official in nine regions and impact the lives of 16 million citizens. This was too ambitious for nine websites without active links, or activities to these groups, and with subgrants of under USD 15,000 each.

The project itself was managed efficiently by EEF and also apparently by its subgrantees and implementing partner (Cherkasy CVU). EEF as a grant making institution appeared to be extremely professional and efficient in the administrative aspects of the project. It used competitive procurement practices to identify and issue subgrants to the eight NGOs. It undertook a pre-award survey of the subgrantees' administrative and financial systems before awards and monitored their delivery of the project activities as well as their reporting. Its files seemed well documented with reports, receipts and grantee products. However, EEF seemed to leave the programmatic elements of the project to its implementing partner and the subgrantees themselves, and did not appear to have added to the project vision beyond the scope of work it developed for the grants, and by arranging for the trainings and meetings anticipated in the project document.

EEF ensured that it received serious proposals from appropriate NGOs by tailoring its RFP requirements to solicit NGOs that were nonprofit and nonpartisan, experienced in cooperating with local government and implementing projects, already technologically savvy and with their own website, and experienced in monitoring and analysis. It valued this over the locations of the NGOs, and thus out of the eight regions selected, two differed from those indicated in the project document (Donetsk and Lutsk replacing Vinnytsy and Zaporizhzhia). This still ensured a good regional spread but was an efficient way to narrow down the field of potential applicants and focus in on the organizations that could more effectively implement the expected activities.

EEF received 17 proposals. It used an expert to screen the proposals and rate them before convoking a grantee committee of eight persons (four from EEF and 1 each from Internews Ukraine and Cherkasy CVU and two from other NGOs) to select the eight. The committee notes show they did due diligence and discussed the merits of each proposal and NGO before selection. The NGOs selected did seem to be widely perceived as nonpartisan and dedicated to strengthening democratic governance. This element was important given the partisan political context in which they worked and for the credibility of the information on their websites. EEF also made contingency plans for any potential legal problems, such as libel charges, by making arrangements with Internews Ukraine to use their legal counsel if need arose. In the end, there were no legal issues. This is likely due to the care taken in selecting the NGOs and the careful grounds rules provided for website content and management.

EEF used a small amount (USD 50,000) of U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID) funding from its core Eurasia Foundation funding to co-fund the project. This seemed to be from a sense that donors liked co-funded grant proposals more than from actual need as EEF under spent the project budget by USD 24,060.

The use of a concept that had already been piloted by Cherkasy CVU was efficient as they were able to adapt the website based on the lessons learned from the field testing. They were also able to cover a very large area of the Ukraine with very little grant money. The project also saved money by contracting Internews Ukraine staff independently, rather than going through Internews as an institution. However, this eliminated the implementing agency that, at least in the project document, was to be responsible for the civic participation aspects of the project, which the evaluators felt was the missing element to this project.

Most of the subgrantees were able to get information on the city and regional councils, with only a few saying that some cities and/or deputies were reluctant to provide the information. In these cases these city locations were replaced by others or the subgrantees used alternative sources to get the information. Collecting the information and updating it was extremely labor intensive. For example, in Cherkasy, the person responsible said their website had 2,000 pages and it took six months of work to update. Deputies and others were not able to post or update their own information directly but were interested in doing so. Allowing this through some type of controlled access (such as done by sites such as Wikipedia), deputies and others could have helped to keep their own and their council's information up to date requiring a less labor intensive supervisory effort by the subgrantee.

Project reporting to UNDEF was timely, but was done only at the output levels, such as information on number of meetings, websites, etc. There were no detailed statistics or analysis on the use of the websites or any outcome information.

A few of the subgrantees seemed to be able to leverage other donor funding to expand or continue their project-related activities (such as increasing the number of brochures printed). However, at the same time, subgrantees did not take advantage of other similar activities to develop synergies and extend their reach and impact. For example, in Luhansk, this UNDEF-funded project developed the deputy website, but another NGO, the Center for Creative Initiatives East Ukraine, received a NED grant to increase the accountability of local deputies by recording and posting online council sessions, public hearings and other important events through their website (<http://politika.lg.ua>). There were also other opportunities in Chernihiv and in Karkiv.<sup>16</sup> Linking some of these activities could have provided benefits



**Training on website** *Cherkasky CVU Photo*

<sup>16</sup> In Chernihiv, another NGO, the Chernivtsi CVU, also received a NED grant to promote government accountability by monitoring the activities of the regional legislature and city councils and discussing these at roundtables. In Kharkiv, its branch of the CVU also received NED funding to promote government accountability and transparency at the regional and city councils with trainings for the public and deputies on the roles and responsibilities of local officials.

for both programs and grantees.

#### ***(iv) Impact***

The impact of this project is difficult to assess. Outcome data was not collected and the use of the information found on the websites by users is unknown except for a few anecdotal examples provided during interviews and reporting. Neither EEF nor the NGOs collected before/after data on the capacity of NGOs or on the level of citizen influence of political processes with which to compare an end result. Even if this information was available, attributing results to this project would be difficult due to the number of other factors and actors that affect the NGO environment and civic participation in these regions.

The potential impact of the project was limited by its lack of links to the political parties that were supposed to be one of the users of the site information, and with other NGOs working in the sector on civic participation, advocacy and accountability issues. This could have extended its reach and impact. For example, in Cherkasy, one of the NGO persons interviewed headed a coalition of 24 NGOs focusing on youth and gender issues. If the subgrantee had developed linkages with them, that one link could have extended its reach a hundred fold. There were also projects in the targeted region run by international NGOs, such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) that could have also helped to increase the effectiveness and impact of the subgrantee's work. NDI had a civil society strengthening program focused on increasing citizen participation in policy making and supporting grass-roots advocacy campaigns. IRI had a democratic governance program in the Crimea to address the gap between citizens and elected officials and increase civic participation in the decision making process by working with citizens to raise local problems at public hearings. Both of these programs would have been a natural link for a project of this nature.

However, from the anecdotal information gathered, on a limited scale, it is likely that this project resulted in:

- ***Increased awareness among some deputies that their activities were being watched and that information can get out to the public*** through NGOs and could be commented on in a public space by constituents. This is the first step towards developing a more transparent and accountable process, and could be an effective deterrent if usership of the information could gain a critical mass.
- ***More empowered deputies from some smaller parties*** who had limited means on their own and some of whom ***found the information on the site useful in their work*** (such as finding out what other councils had done on certain issues) or ***in getting their own messages out*** (since they did not have the resources or media channels that the major parties did). Assuming a good use of the site, this can contribute in the long term towards increased pluralism and strengthened checks and balances done by elected officials and political parties within elected institutions.
- ***Increased the links between some NGOs across the Ukraine that had similar interests and activities*** by working on a common effort using common tools, and communicating through a common network, such as the Google group it used. This would contribute towards the strengthening of the NGOs, sharing of best practices among them, and perhaps in the future developing nationwide strategies for civil society action to improve governance.
- ***Increased realization by some NGOs on the importance of local politics to***

**citizens** as some of the subgrantees had focused more on national level issues and politics and had not realized the interest that local politics could invoke from the various stakeholders, such as journalists, deputies and other NGOs.

- **Strengthened links between subgrantees and some independent journalists who also act as independent watchdogs.** Journalists interacted with the subgrantee NGOs, which is likely to have strengthened their relationships and monitoring efforts, and which can be expected to be mutually beneficial for similar activities in the future.

A website of this nature also needs to be careful about contributing towards an incumbency advantage as they only provide information on persons already elected to office. This can further contribute to an uneven playing field, as in the next elections, only the incumbent candidates will have their biography or information on their work available on the directory. The amount of negative comments posted about the deputies on the sites seemed to be too minimal to counter balance this.

### **(v) Sustainability**

The nine NGOs participating in the project communicated throughout the project through a Google group that appeared to be active through to the end of 2012. The EEF held a conference at the end of year one to link its NGO subgrantees into a formal network (called the “Monitoring Group”) that it thought would help to continue the sustainability of the project activities. Although an agreement was signed, the network only continues an informal basis.

This evaluation took place a year after the project was completed. Of the nine project websites, seven were still up and operating. Most of these had been updated in 2013, although some more than others. Continued updating is unlikely for the long term without additional funding. This is time-intensive for the NGOs since only the authorized moderator can upload new information. Only the Center for Political Analysis and Electoral Consulting in the Volyn region found funding to continue its website.<sup>17</sup> The Odessa CVU also received NED funding to continue monitoring six local councils and to update its (nonproject) web portal at [www.izbirkom.od.ua](http://www.izbirkom.od.ua).<sup>18</sup>



**Odessa CVU press conference on website**

*Odessa CVU photo*

The evaluators heard many comments during the evaluation about the dated look of the website and its lack of integration with social media which was seen to be more active than website use. Several of the subgrantees, including the Cherkasy CVU, talked about the need to revamp the sites if they were to be continued to be used for the long term.

The sites are still being accessed. The Cherkasy website statistics shows it still generated

<sup>17</sup> NED funding of USD 26,523 for 2012.

<sup>18</sup> NED funding of USD 41,851. This other web portal was also funded by NED for 2011 with USD 44,100.

over 3,000 first time users a month in 2013, with more than 1,000 return users a month. This averages out to about 3 returning visitors per day. Odessa, has had 8,372 repeat visitors for 2013 and 33,937 one time visits as of early August. This averages out to almost 40 repeat visitors a day. However, more than 60 percent of all the visits lasted less than five seconds.

***(vi) UNDEF added value***

It seems apparent that this project would not have been funded without UNDEF's support as EEF had been turned down by three or four other donors before it submitted the proposal to UNDEF. NED has also funded individual NGOs for similar activities related to monitoring local and regional councils. It seems to have provided grants for similar websites in 2012 which makes it likely that one or more of the UNDEF-funded websites generated interest among other NGOs within Ukraine to pursue similar efforts.

## IV. Conclusions

Based on the evaluation findings, the team concludes:

**(i) Projects that focus on increasing information and bringing civic attention to governance issues are important, especially in the context of political consolidation.** Having access to information and diverse comments on the functioning of government is a fundamental element of democratic governance and its checks and balances systems. This project shed a light on the work of the councils and deputies that, even if it was not as widely used as it could have been, helped to keep this space open despite the consolidation of power underway in many areas. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii) and (vi).

**(ii) The project was not implemented as implied in the project design and lacked the programmatic links that could have increased its relevance and effectiveness.** The project focus on implementation was primarily on information gathering and monitoring for journalist/deputy use and not on “*strengthening civic participation*” beyond established CSOs and journalists which was one of the purposes of the project as well as its title. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii) and (vi).

**(iii) EEF had the institutional capacity to effectively manage a sensitive sub-grant project nationwide, but needed an appropriate partner at the country level to provide the programmatic vision required to achieve the intended outcomes.** This was the vision of how to link the website aspects with the civic participation, advocacy and accountability objectives. It is unlikely that Internews Ukraine, even if it had participated institutionally in this project, would have provided this missing link as this is not its mission. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

**(iv) The sub-grantee organizations were the right organizations to undertake the monitoring aspects of the project, but they also needed partners to provide the missing links to civic participation and advocacy.** Most of the NGOs selected as subgrantees had a watchdog focus and were widely perceived as nonpartisan and credible to undertake those activities. But they lacked the networks and experience in civic participation. Connecting them with NGOs experienced in these areas with networks throughout the communities, would have strengthened their work and this project. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

**(v) Web-based directories are useful tools, but need to be linked to the broader efforts in the sector and widely used to be useful and make a difference.** The collection of data on elected officials and councils so that it is easily available and in one place is useful and helped some of the journalists and others, but it needed to be more widely promoted and used by the deputies, parties, other organizations working in the sector and by citizens for it to be more relevant and effective. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

**(vi) Better integration of the websites into social networking could have helped to improve its use and increase its popularity.** The social media is more dynamic and effective at generating civic action for improved governance than a website that was perceived as dated. Integrating these monitoring and information websites into social networks would be the logical next step for websites of this nature. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (vi).

**(vii) The project was overly cautious with its guidelines for the sites. This allowed for it to function without political interference** which was essential for a project of this nature, but this also **limited ownership of the site and its use.** Several deputies expressed their interest in updating their own pages, and had this been allowed within a controlled context, it could have eased the collection/updating burden of the subgrantees and contributed to its use and sustainability. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v).

**(viii) The use of common templates and branding between regions increased the credibility of the project and gave it more national prominence** than it would have had if different formats had been used between regions or if this project had been done only in one or two regions. This is likely a best-practice that could be replicated in other similar project. This conclusion follows from findings (i), (ii) and (iv).

**(ix) The project primarily reached those already active in the sector and is unlikely to have increased citizen participation or the accountability of deputies.** Its reach was too limited due to its design issues and the lack of activities and links with the broader base of stakeholders. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).

**(x) Care needs to be taken when collecting and publishing information on deputies in election years about its effect on the electoral race.** As these sites only have information on incumbents in the database, this can contribute to an incumbency advantage. This is especially important to avoid in an electoral context where there is closing space and an uneven playing field. This conclusion follows findings (i), (ii) and (iv).

**(xi) The project might have made a more substantive impact** than was visible to the evaluators, **but it is not possible to know as it did not have a performance monitoring plan** that tracked its performance and measured its results **beyond the collection of output data.** This conclusion follows findings (ii), (iii) and (iv).



## V. Recommendations

To strengthen similar projects in the future, the team recommends:

**(i) Ensure the selection of partners provides for all of the elements anticipated in the project design.** The addition of civic participation, education and advocacy NGOs to a project of this nature would have extended the use of the information gathered that would have helped to improve its relevance, effectiveness and impact. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii), (iii) and (iv).

**(ii) Ensure clarity in project purpose.** The desired end state should guide the development of activities in the project design. In this case, the activities contributed towards increasing access to information and the ability of NGOs to monitor deputy performance more than increasing civic participation and their links to their representatives. Ensuring a match between the project purpose and activities would strengthen the relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the work. This recommendation follows conclusions (ii) and (iii).

**(iii) Promote links with other organizations to help expand the use of the resource and provide the connections with citizens.** There are many civic and academic institutions that could help increase use of informational websites and generate civic interest and action. These include other NGOs in the democratic governance sector, advocacy NGOs in other sectors (such as health, gender, youth and education), associations (such as pensioners or professional associations), and with high school and university civics, political science and journalism classes. This recommendation follows from conclusions (ii), (iii), (vi), (vii) and (ix).

**(iv) Allow users to update/post information on websites.** Adopting a more open, wiki-style site could shift the burden of updating information from the organization to the users. This could help leverage the interest of deputies, political parties and citizen journalists. The website moderator could still maintain control of content by reviewing information/posts before releasing them to the public site. This could help keep the sites current, sustain the efforts and promote wider ownership of the information and activities within the site. This recommendation follows conclusion (vii).

**(v) Expand databases and website capabilities in election years to include the bios and information on candidates running for office.** This can help to address the incumbency advantage and playing field issues, especially for minority parties and candidates who have fewer means and resources than the incumbents and ruling parties. This also helps provide useful information for voters that can help them to make an informed choice. This recommendation follows conclusion (x).

**(vi) Consider use of a professional public relations/web design company to design a modern interactive webpage integrated with social media.** With all of the advances in ICT, the development of multimedia interactive websites integrated the social media could be easily and professionally done for minimal funding. Having a more



updated and dynamic site could increase its value for those who are featured there as well as for its users. This in turn could increase its use and effectiveness. This would also facilitate the work of the NGOs that could then focus on the content and use of the sites. This recommendation follows from conclusions (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii).

***(vii) Donors should prioritize access to information, accountability and civic participation projects in consolidating democracies*** as these are the critical elements needed to increased citizen demand for improved governance and sustain democratic transitions. This recommendation follows conclusion (i).

***(viii) Replicate the project technique of undertaking similar governance activities at local level in different regions*** to give it national prominence by using the same branding and templates. This can increase its visibility and credibility. This recommendation follows conclusion (viii).

***(ix) Projects should ensure they adopt an appropriate performance monitoring plan that uses indicators that can measure project performance as well as outputs.*** These plans should be able to track performance over time and demonstrate results. For example, if each of these NGOs had placed a user survey on their websites at the start and end of the project, this could have helped identify before/after use for the site and any results stemming from that use. The same could have been done with deputies through the regional or city councils to measure their awareness and opinions of the sites. In addition, some survey data on public opinions could have helped measure changed perceptions of local deputies and their work. This recommendation follows conclusion (xi).

## VI. Overall assessment and closing thoughts

The importance of information and ensuring government/official accountability was underscored in this evaluation by the responses of those interviewed to the evaluators' question on what was the most important issue facing their community. Instead of getting answers related to the employment situation or the condition of roads that was expected when asking questions about local communities, every answer in every location related to the political situation and the attempts by one party or person to take over the power in that area. In this type of climate, a project that focuses on watching the elected officials and the fulfillment of their campaign promises with the citizens takes on increased importance.

The fact that these NGOs continue to be engaged and to follow the situation is an important part of keeping the democratic space open and from closing further. The main issue with this project was not the area that it had selected, but the lack of links between these monitoring NGOs and the potential users for this information. Although their sites were leveraged by journalists, who use this type of information in their daily work, and by some minority deputies who found it useful occasionally, the project did not link into the possible use by councils or more systematic use with the deputies themselves, with other NGOs doing grass roots civic participation work, or even with the civic education efforts within schools and academic institutions. Had the website made these links and reached a critical mass of users that would actively post comments on a daily basis, it is likely that the deputies and others would have increased their interaction with the websites. However as it stands, the website was used mostly as an informational source for the journalist, with little relevance to the very politicians featured on its pages.

## VIII. ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Evaluation questions:

DAC criterion	Evaluation Question	Related sub-questions
Relevance	To what extent was the project, as designed and implemented, suited to context and needs at the beneficiary, local, and national levels?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Were the objectives of the project in line with the needs and priorities for democratic development, given the context?</li> <li>▪ Should another project strategy have been preferred rather than the one implemented to better reflect those needs, priorities, and context? Why?</li> <li>▪ Were risks appropriately identified by the projects? How appropriate are/were the strategies developed to deal with identified risks? Was the project overly risk-averse?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	To what extent was the project, as implemented, able to achieve objectives and goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent have the project's objectives been reached?</li> <li>▪ To what extent was the project implemented as envisaged by the project document? If not, why not?</li> <li>▪ Were the project activities adequate to make progress towards the project objectives?</li> <li>▪ What has the project achieved? Where it failed to meet the outputs identified in the project document, why was this?</li> </ul>
Efficiency	To what extent was there a reasonable relationship between resources expended and project impacts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Was there a reasonable relationship between project inputs and project outputs?</li> <li>▪ Did institutional arrangements promote cost-effectiveness and accountability?</li> <li>▪ Was the budget designed, and then implemented, in a way that enabled the project to meet its objectives?</li> </ul>
Impact	To what extent has the project put in place processes and procedures supporting the role of civil society in contributing to democratization, or to direct promotion of democracy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has/have the realization of the project objective(s) and project outcomes had an impact on the specific problem the project aimed to address?</li> <li>▪ Have the targeted beneficiaries experienced tangible impacts? Which were positive; which were negative?</li> <li>▪ To what extent has the project caused changes and effects, positive and negative, foreseen and unforeseen, on democratization?</li> <li>▪ Is the project likely to have a catalytic effect? How? Why? Examples?</li> </ul>
Sustainability	To what extent has the project, as designed and implemented, created what is likely to be a continuing impetus towards democratic development?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To what extent has the project established processes and systems that are likely to support continued impact?</li> <li>▪ Are the involved parties willing and able to continue the project activities on their own (where applicable)?</li> </ul>
UNDEF value added	To what extent was UNDEF able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What was UNDEF able to accomplish, through the project, that could not as well have been achieved by alternative projects, other donors, or other stakeholders (Government, NGOs, etc).</li> <li>▪ Did project design and implementing modalities exploit UNDEF's comparative advantage in the form of an explicit mandate to focus on democratization issues?</li> </ul>

## Annex 2: Documents Reviewed:

Cherkasy CVU, *Website statistics (StatCounter)*.

Committee of Voters Ukraine website: [http://www.cvu.org.ua/orgs.php?lang=eng&mid=str\\_obl](http://www.cvu.org.ua/orgs.php?lang=eng&mid=str_obl)

Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on Ukraine, 3209<sup>th</sup> Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 10 December 2012*

East Europe Foundation website, <http://eef.org.ua/index.php?lang=en>

Freedom House, *Nations in Transit Report, Ukraine (2013)*

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- Donetsk: [www.miydeputat.dn.ua](http://www.miydeputat.dn.ua)

- Chernihiv: [www.dep.cn.ua](http://www.dep.cn.ua)
- Kharkiv: [www.dep.kh.ua](http://www.dep.kh.ua)
- Odessa: [www.dep.od.ua](http://www.dep.od.ua)
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### Annex 3: Persons Interviewed

4 August 2013	
Arrival international consultant	
5 August 2013	
Yuriy Piskalyuk	Project Manager, East Europe Foundation
	Finance Officer, East Europe Foundation
Vitaliy Moroz	Trainer, Head of New Media Department, Internews Ukraine (telcom)
Olesia Arhipiska	National Center for E-Governance
Oleg Gryshyn	Project Manager, Donetsk Oblast Organization of Committee of Voters of Ukraine (telcom)
Oleksiy Dryomov	Head, Crimea Development Institute (telcom)
Travel to Odessa	
6 August 2013	
Yaroslav Katolyk	Project Manager, Odessa CVU
Igor Brynosh	Head of Legal Department, Odessa CVU
Travel to Belgorod-Dnistrovsk	
Olena Vasina	Bergorod-Dnistrovsk Local Odessa CVU Representative
Olexander Markevich	Journalist
Alexander Makodonskiy	Deputy – Belgorod-Dnistrovsk City Council
Volodimr Menzilentsev	Secretary of the Belgorod-Dnistrovsk City Council
Return to Odessa	
7 August 2013	
Yaroslav Katolyk	Project Manager, Odessa CRU
Olexiy Alby	Deputy, Odessa Oblast Council
Olexandr Ostapenko	Deputy, Odessa City Council
Evgen Kogan	Freelance Journalist Odessa
Return to Kiev	
8 August 2013	
Travel to Cherkasy	
Myhlyk Maksim Mykolaievych	Chairman, Cherkasy CVU
Oksana Kolisnyk	Leading Expert, Cherkasy CVU
Yuriy Sas	Project Manager, Cherkasy CVU
Ivan Kolisnyk	Web Developer, Cherkasy CVU
S. Gonchar	Head, Parity NGO
Victoria Feofilova	Head, Young Dherkanchaynas NGO coalition
V. Latishev	Editor, Ineternet Website “Press-Center”
Olexandr Radychkiy	Deputy City Council
Volodymyr Khanas	Project Manager, Nivroku Art Youth Union, Ternopil (telcom)
Return to Kiev	

9 August 2013

9 August 2013	
Departure international consultant	
Yuriy Piskalyuk	Project Manager, East Europe Foundation
Victor Liakh	President, East Europe Foundation
Kostiantyn Kyurt	Chairman of the Board, Internews Ukraine (telcom)
Mykhaylo Nakhod	Project Manager, Center for Political Analysis and Electoral Consulting (Lutsk) (telcom)

## Annex 4 : Acronyms

CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVU	Committee of Voters of Ukraine
EEF	East Europe Foundation
EU	European Union
IRI	International Republican Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RFP	Request for Proposals
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USD	U.S. Dollar